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LERMA vs.

CA

G.R. No. 33352, 20 Decemder 1974

FACTS:

Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. They married on May 19, 1951.
On August 22, 1969 petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a
certain Teodoro Ramirez

The respondent filed with the lower court, presided by Judge Leonor Ines Luciano, a
complaint against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody
of their children 2 and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and
their youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent’s
complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her
life.

The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent’s application for support pendente lite,
setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.

Judge Luciano granted the respondent’s application for support pendente lite in an order
dated December 24, 1969, which she amended in an order dated February 15, 1970 to the
following effect: (1) the respondent was declared entitled to support pendente lite from the
date of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly support was reduced
from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.

ISSUE:

Whether adultery is a good defense against the respondent’s claim for support pendente lite.

HELD:

The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property,
presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live
separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing
of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other.

A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act
which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be
considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under
Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease “when the recipient,
be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;” and
under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is “when the spouse has given
cause for legal separation.” The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is
incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.
383. SANTERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-61700

FACTS:Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and


Simona Santero, had three children with Felixberta Pacursa
namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also
had fourchildren with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina, and Miguel (herein privaterespondents). These children
are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married
totheir father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.During the pendency of
the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the
estateof the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Courtquestioning the decision of CFI-
Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in theamount
of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees,
clothing materialsand subsistence out of any available funds in the
hands of the administrator. The petitionersopposed said decision on
the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that
theyhave attained the age of majority, that all of them except for
Miguel are gainfully employed, andthe administrator did not have
sufficient funds to cover the said expenses.Before the Supreme
Court could act on said petition, the private respondents filed
anothermotion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included
Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, allsurnamed Santero, as children of
the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sumof Php
6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance
from the estate of theirfather. This was granted by the CFI-
Cavite.Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing
Anselma Diaz, mother of privaterespondents, to submit a
clarification or explanation as to the additional three children
includedin the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her
previous motions, only the last fourminor children were included for
support and the three children were then of age should havebeen
included since all her children have the right to receive allowance
as advance payment oftheir shares in the inheritance of Pablo
Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing theadministrator
to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on
the oppositionof the petitioners.
ISSUE:a) Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?b) Was
it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance
without hearing?

RULING:Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or


married should not be regarded as thedetermining factor to their
right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil
Code.

Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said
court did was just to follow theprecedent of the court which granted
previous allowance and that the petitioners and privaterespondents
only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of
funds.

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