SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v.

DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. Laserna v. DDB and PDEA),
regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g); ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as
follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
the company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)

On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations for the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 2004 elections.
Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when
they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For
another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure,
and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.

ISSUE/S:

1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause?

HELD:

1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f) and (g) are
UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause.

RATIO:

1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the
aforementioned facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as
senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC
Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to
be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if
one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early
as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative
power in the following wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however,
as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x
are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department
can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the
shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which
it cannot leap.”

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates
for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c) requiring mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements. A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary
schools is not only acceptable, but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration.

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such
a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while there has been general
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of the
abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities
are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers
to the state’s exercise of police power.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
“reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may
be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is
to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing
that the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s
work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.” It is to be noted the
very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the well-being of the citizens from the deleterious
effects of dangerous drugs.

Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. Unlike the situation covered by
Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for
persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment.
The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never
be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their
being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

MILAGROS E. AMORES v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, GR No. 189600, 2010-

06-29

Facts:

Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009
and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public
respondent), which respectively dismissed... petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the
legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as
representative of the party-list organization Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of
Representatives,... In her Petition for Quo Warranto... petitioner alleged that, among other things,
private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC); he was... disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the
time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond
the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the

Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007
elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15... of RA No. 7941.

As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009,[3] dismissed petitioner's Petition
for Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the COMELEC had
partially proclaimed as entitled to at least... one seat in the House of Representatives through National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was
filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days from private
respondent's... proclamation.

Issues:

(1) whether petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably;
and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

Ruling:

On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
considering petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the 10-day
reglementary period provided in its Rules[8] from the... issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9,
2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May, 2007
elections, along with other party-list organizations,[9] it was by no measure a proclamation of private
respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No.

Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private respondent's
proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits. Alternatively,
since petitioner's challenge goes into private respondent's... qualifications, it may be filed at anytime
during his term.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be... seasonably challenged.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed... to continue in office until the expiration of his term... a
nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination
under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the
elections.

The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or
the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.

The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it
being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.[15] Moreover, he did not change his sectoral
affiliation at least six months before May, 2007,... public respondent itself having found that he shifted
to CIBAC's overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007.[16]

Principles:

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed... to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Juanito Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995 (Digested Case)

Re: Based on verifiable indicators of viability/projected capacity

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the Municipality of
Makati to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. Petitioners contend that the special
law did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction
of Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials; that it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law; that the increase in
legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with the population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and
the LGC.

ISSUES:

(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions.

(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials.

(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed
by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census.

(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill.

(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.

HELD:

(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by
an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. In language that cannot be any
clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality." The court take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the
metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary
dispute.

(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again
in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek
re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may
not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over
which this Court has no jurisdiction.

(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted
to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of
time.

(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
Bai Sandra Sema v Comelec July 16, 2008

Facts:

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in
the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:

Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff
Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were
the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of
Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.

Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law Department
under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Issue:

The petitions raise the following issues:

I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(A) Preliminarily –

(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
 (2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

(B) On the merits –

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and

(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA
Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for
maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]”), despite the
creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).

Held:

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as
it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Ratio:

The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay –
must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria
fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.
However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of
Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.

However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or
any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the
same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative
district.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative
districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in
its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national
law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies
to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative
body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative
body.

In view of certiorari and mandamus

The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue
to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act “which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty.”

In view of mootness

There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner in the 14 May
2007 elections for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” mooted this
petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into
the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another,
determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this
incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised
here. The Court’s ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all
the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

In view of the Felwa case

As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority
of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by operation of the
Constitution, without a reapportionment.”

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional
representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for “creating congressional districts
without the apportionment provided in the Constitution.”

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative
districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation
of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts
provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the
new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was
created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone
from Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create
provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a
legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that
“each province shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan
upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of
Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the
census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.

Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA
7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000
square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following scenarios thus become distinct
possibilities:

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section
20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are
limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government
is established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.”
Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of
Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a
population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then
Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as
projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is
unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000
population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis
and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of
E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l
Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared
official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in
which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification
issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos
population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Perez, J.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated
from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October
2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000)
for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:

Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a

new legislative district in a province.

HELD:

NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative,
there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008

Rogelio Bagabuyo

vs COMELEC

Facts:

RA 9371 was approved dividing Cagayan de Oro into two legislative districts. Later, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution 7837 implementing RA 9371.

Bagabuyo then filed a petition against COMELEC and other officers asking for nulliffication of RA 9371
and Res. 7837 saying that RA 9371 failed to conduct a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division
or conversion of a local governement unit. The court did not grant the TRO or writ of prelim. injunction,
so the May elections proceeded with CDO divided into two legislative districts.

COMELEC, thru OSG argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality
of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House
of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; 3) the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply
when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province,
city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change
in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

ISSUES:

1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant petition be dismissed
on this ground?

2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or
does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?

3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?

Ruling:

Except for issue on the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally without merit.

The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised among them,
whether legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local government
unit are reasons enough for considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to implement the
legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action against a COMELEC en banc
resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court
via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. For these reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts
to be a stumbling block in our consideration of the present case.

Plebiscite

Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district
lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other
hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:

Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the
local government units (historically and generically referred to as municipal corporations) that the
Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. In its strict and proper
sense, a municipality has been defined as a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation
of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof. The creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of
this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly
affected.

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act has
been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of
legislative districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting the standards for their
creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing,
merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than
this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different
although they interface and relate with one another.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement
of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry
out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local

government unit.

Holding of a plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After

it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with the creation, division,
merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with the concept of
legislative apportionment.

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with
the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision
Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat,
Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga,
Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays
Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa,
Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay
1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place
or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided
along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of
another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not
come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
BANAT v COMELEC GR 179271, April 21, 2009

Facts:

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national
papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider
its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans
formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day,
the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Issue:

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined
the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Held:
 WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3
August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence
of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional
seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to
each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of
the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to
determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties
in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law.

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)

 The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the
computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I
vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my
interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major
political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political
parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major
political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear
expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would
figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven
major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the
total number of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties
(including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58%
each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more
than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members
as party-list representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or
only 8 out of the 155 parties garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing
of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution
sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the
interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties
who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political
parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the
marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That
opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-
list system.

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote
required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party list system ─ presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared
constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the
people’s broadest representation in Congress,the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.

Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that
in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula.
But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it
mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system can never exceed 100%.
 Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement.
The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief
Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a
minimum vote requirement is needed --

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low,
from participating in the elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in
the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an
outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not
really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn,
they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system;
and

7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment
as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-
list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the
inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it
prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list
seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of
implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling
completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending
condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the
legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions
remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative
enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It
filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral
grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and
quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public
policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule
65 of the ROC.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It
also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection
is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS:

The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections

December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital
Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing
of the official.

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).

39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to
include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.
ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:

No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts
new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there
will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but
also for non-sectoral parties.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the
armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941

A. F. TRILLANES IV v . HON. O. PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al . 556 SCRA 471 (2008)

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law.

On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded
the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers
surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four
years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term,
Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his
functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case

2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and
serve his mandate as senator

3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention
prisoners who are held without bail

HELD:

No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the
cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable
penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in
the crime charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty.
This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage
of the criminal action.”

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.
Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate,
“they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of
the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of
the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule
of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.

Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on
these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

[CASE DIGEST] Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago (A.C. No. 7399)

August 25, 2009 | A.C. No. 7399

Antero J. Pobre, complainant

Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, respondent

FACTS:

In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered the
following remarks:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,

debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x
x

Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only
sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post.
Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-
Santiago, were automatically disqualified.

Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady
senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt
of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken
against Sen. Defensor-Santiago.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary
action by the Court for her questioned speech.

HELD:

No, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary
immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part
that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the
part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either,
which the Court ultimately regarded as an implied admission.

Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for indulging
in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a
prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light
of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir.

Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its
equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that
"[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not
for their private indulgence, but for the public good."
Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as
Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of
Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC,
in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate
when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is
not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a
GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and
because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals.
Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman
during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is
void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by
the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to
incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a),
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.
95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The
PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the
PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

II. THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the
PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting
the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the
very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private
corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues
defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated
the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,
Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will
be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court
should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground
upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely
affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was
being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August
16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No.
1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of
structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and
the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in
recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective
from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not
been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique
status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and
effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the
former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international
humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations
under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither
“be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian
law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC
or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to
hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does
not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision
of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui generis character of
PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of
a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s
blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to
the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those
who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of
the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared
void must therefore stay.

[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive
portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]

CASE DIGEST: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate
Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar
into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the
Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to the
Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the
Ethics Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and
not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved
that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the
Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to
the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also
questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on
the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUES: [1] Is Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, an indispensable party in
this petition?

[2] Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort?

[3] Is the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection?
[4] Is the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI,
Section 16(2) of the Constitution?

[5] Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their effectivity?

HELD: [1] An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that
a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In this
case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be
true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues
in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole
which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.

[2] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not
require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the
contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of
the Court.

[3] While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is
within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the
investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the
investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics
Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate, and not violative of the right to
equal protection.

[4] The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not
violate Senator Villar's right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own
rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."

[5] The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules
of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such
rules need not be published,unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can
take effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide
that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not
required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is
required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement
of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority,
while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a
minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed
the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a
petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged
to Senator Tatad.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or
its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the
laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term “majority,” when
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half
or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does
not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who
could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

BRION, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by
Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the
first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and
reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the
third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every
3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections
of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in
toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to
hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must
pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies
to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve
the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in
the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold
over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in
the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized
elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last
also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision
states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view –
like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover
can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials,
except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections
and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call
without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for
having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is
merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of
RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is
an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than
real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the
elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.
What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials
for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only
for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And
this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous
facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following:

(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in
the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into
two separate districts.

(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of
the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond
that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements.

(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section

Issue:

WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso in
the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to
petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as
set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as
aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless
otherwise provided by law."

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which
pertains to itself. Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO ENBANC

227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:

No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35
did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The
petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment
to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a
conference committee of both chambers.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final
reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in
its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,

was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may
have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain
functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government
and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to
extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in
the discharge of their own public functions.

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (G.R. NO. L-1123)

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the
lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House
Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the
Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill
by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As
a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these
members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed
or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents
argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness
of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an
authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of
the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment
of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended.
The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself
with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled
copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals
and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between
the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified
copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by
the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In
case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ,

EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., ERNESTO F. HERRERA, JOSE
D. LINA, JR., JOHN OSMEÑA, VICENTE T. PATERNO, RENE A. SAGUISAG, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
MAMINTAL ABDUL J. TAMANO, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, ORLANDO S. MERCADO,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, JOSEPH ESTRADA, SOTERO LAUREL, AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., SANTANINA
RASUL, VICTOR ZIGA, petitioners,vs.

HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., HON. VICENTE JAYME, HON. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, HON. FULGENCIO
FACTORAN, HON. FIORELLO ESTUAR, HON. LOURDES QUISUMBING, HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, HON.
ALFREDO BENGSON, HON. JOSE CONCEPCION, HON. LUIS SANTOS, HON. MITA PARDO DE TAVERA,
HON. RAINERIO REYES, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM and HON. EUFEMIO
C. DOMINGO, respondents.

G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990.

FACTS: [Note: Authority of the President to submit a budget to the Congress as basis for the GAB is
found in VII(22)]
GAB of 1989; signed into law as RA No. 6688

— The President vetoing: a) 7 special provisions and b) Sec. 55, a general provision;

— Sec. 55 reads. No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to
Congress… which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use
of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any
purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by
Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act;

— Reason for veto. The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this
Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that
of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.

GAB of 1989; signed into law as RA No. 6831

— The President vetoing Sec. 16, a general provision;

— Sec. 16 reads. Use of Savings. — The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of
Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution and the Ombudsman are hereby
authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their appropriations: PROVIDED, THAT NO ITEM OF APPROPRIATION… [same provision as Sec. 55 of the
GAB of 1989]

— Reason for veto. Same reason for vetoing Sec. 55 of the GAB of 1989 with additional reference to
Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the President to use
savings to augment any item of appropriations in the Executive Branch of the Government.

V. petitioners’ arguments

Petitioners question the validity of the veto as:

— a. The line-veto power of the President in appropriations bill pertain to items, not provisions;

— b. The President cannot veto a provision of an appropriations bill without vetoing the whole bill;

— c. The line-veto power does not authorize the President to strike out restrictions or conditions as it
will be tantamount to legislation in transgression of the doctrine of separation of powers;

— d. The power of augmentation has to be provided by law, thus the Congress may impose restrictions
upon it as it deems necessary.

1. IS THERE AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY?

HELD – YES.
There is an actual controversy between the Senate and the Executive department, the former in
maintaining the charge of unconstitutionality of the President’s veto of said provisions. There is also a
need for definitive ruling. The reiteration of the assailed provisions in the GAB of 1989 and GAB of 1990
underscores the need for judicial determination for the guidance of the departments.

Where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes
the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as
void

2. DO PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI?

HELD – YES.

As taxpayers. The Court enjoys discretion in entertaining suits brought by taxpayers. As Senate
members. They have the requisite personality to raise questions of Constitutionality.

3. IS THE MATTER A POLITICAL QUESTION?

HELD – NO.

The Court will settle controversies otherwise political to delimit constitutional boundaries in accordance
with the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution.

Substantive issues

4. DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE THE POWER TO VETO PROVISIONS (VIS-À-VIS ITEMS) IN AN
APPROPRIATIONS BILL?

HELD – YES.

Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to
the veto of a provision, the extent of the President’s veto power as previously defined by the 1935
Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. (analogous to
the elimination of the service contract provision in La Bugal).

Comparing paragraphs 1 and 2 of Sec. 27 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

— Par. 1 refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of
the entire bill, as a general rule;

— Par. 2 is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of
the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.

The veto under par. 2 pertains to an item, the President cannot veto a portion of an item and approve
the rest. An item in an appropriation bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts . . . of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill.
5. ARE THE ASSAILED PROVISIONS APPROPRIATE?

HELD – NO.

The assailed provisions are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. They are inappropriate
provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.

— they do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation as they generally apply to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Bill;

— the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. One has to resort
the original budget submitted by the President to find them. And some may not even appear on the face
of the Bill as they have been eliminated;

— they are expressions of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation.

Any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation
therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates

6. ARE THE CONDITIONS/RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED BY CONGRESS APPROPRIATE?

HELD – NO.

The criteria set in the questioned GABs are inappropriate conditions. They are actually general law
measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. A general provision of
law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill.

A settled rule is that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while
allowing the appropriation itself to stand. However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in
the real sense of the term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate
legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money
items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures.

7. DOES THE PRESIDENT (AND OTHER OFFICIALS MENTIONED IN SEC. 25(5) OF ART. VI) HAVE THE
POWER TO AUGMENT FROM SAVINGS GRANTED THAT IT MUST BE MADE BY LAW?

HELD – YES.

The statutory authority of the President to augment any appropriation of the executive department in
the General Appropriations Act from savings was specifically provided in existing laws:

— PD No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 (as amended), Sec. 44; and

— GAA of 1989, Sec. 12.

The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.

8. IS THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS ENDANGERED BY SAID AUGMENTATION?

HELD – NO.

The transfer is made within a department (branch), and not from one department (branch) to another.
9. DID THE PRESIDENT PROPERLY VETO THE ASSAILED SECTIONS?

HELD – YES.

These provisions nullify the constitutional authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different
branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI,
Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.

10. DO THE ENACTMENTS OF SEC. 55 (1989) AND SEC. 16 OF QUESTIONED GAAS OPERATE AS AN
IMPLIED REPEAL OF PD NO. 1177?

HELD – NO.

Implied repeals are not favored. If it is indeed a repeal, all the more reason that they should be in a
separate enactment, not in an appropriations bill. PD No. 1177 likewise is not repealed by the 1987
Constitution. The transitory provisions provided for the continuance of laws, decrees, etc., until
repealed, amended or revoked.

11. DID THE CONGRESS UNDERTAKE THE PROPER REMEDY IN THIS CASE?

HELD – NO.

A Presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress.

VII. Dispositive position

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this Petition is hereby
DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose
de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence
to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate
vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest
and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the
concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential

power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President
or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic
as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to
a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all.
But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies (G.R.
No. 167173)
Facts: Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered
foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799) and urging the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent
activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent, which
through its Chairperson Senator Angara, set an initial hearing and invited petitioners herein to attend
the hearing. Petitioners via letter stressed that there were pending cases in court allegedly involving the
same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent committee to proceed with the inquiry.

Legislative investigation commenced but with the invited resource persons not being all present,
Senator Enrile moved for the issuance of subpoena and an HDO or to include such absentees to the
Bureau of Immigrations’ Watch List. During the hearing, it was apparent that petitioners lack proper
authorizations to make disclosures and lack the copies of the accusing documents being mentioned by
Senator Enrile. Thus, when hearing adjourned, petitioners were later served with subpoenas by
respondent.

Petitioner now seeks that respondent committee be enjoined from proceeding, citing Bengzon Jr. v.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, claiming that since the issue is already preempted by the courts, the
legislative investigation is an encroachment upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts.

Issue: Whether the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent committee encroaches upon the
judicial power of the courts

Ruling: NO.

The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in
petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile,
was simply “to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign
securities x x x.” This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his
privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.”

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial
body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which
the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or
an administrative investigation.

Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee. The Court
notes that among those invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same
critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered
foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest
for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit.

ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima (G.R. NO. 166715)

Facts:

RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards
and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their respective Commissioners, DOF, DBM, and
NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of
the fund, to set criteria and procedures for removing service officials and employees whose revenue
collection fall short of the target; and further, to issue rules and regulations. Also, the law tasked the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created solely for the purpose of approving
the formulated IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a formulated IRR by the agencies, JCOO became
functus officio and ceased to exist.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing and enforcing said law.

Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that
it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter
this by asserting that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances
rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.

Issue:

Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of
powers under the Constitution

Ruling: YES.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing
the law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional.

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation
of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified
under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-
enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present
the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers.
It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution‘s diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive
or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of
RA 9335 is upheld.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455

235 SCRA 630 (1994)

FACTS: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA
7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a
mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate
days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

ISSUE Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but
the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would
be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this
was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed
with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon
the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975

EUSEBIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. ERNESTO S. MATA, Secretary of National Defense,
and GENERAL MANUEL T. YAN, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
Branch IX, in civil case Q-13466, entitled "Eusebio B. Garcia, petitioner, versus Hon. Ernesto Mata (Juan
Ponce Enrile), et al., respondents," declaring paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the Armed
Forces of the Philippines" of Republic Act No. 16001 unconstitutional and therefore invalid and
inoperative.

We affirm the judgment a quo.

The facts material to this case are embodied in the following stipulation submitted jointly by both
parties to the lower court:

Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his
reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332.
At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain with a monthly emolument of P478.00,
comprising his base and longevity pay, quarters and subsistence allowances;

On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4
months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active
commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial
proceedings;

From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has
neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed
in the Government in any capacity;

As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary petitions with the
offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the President, respectively, but
received reply only from the Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General.

On September 17, 1969 the petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of
Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines2 to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due
to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status. On December 2, 1970 the trial court dismissed
the petition. The court ruled that paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines" in Republic Act 1600 is "invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative."
The petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service
in the AFP when Republic Act 1382 took effect on June 18, 1955. Section I of this law provided:

Reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on
active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted into inactive status except for
cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their own request: Provided, That for purposes of
computing the length of service, six months or more of active service shall be considered one year.
(emphasis supplied)

The petitioner's accumulated active commissioned service was thus short of the minimum service
requirement prescribed in the aforequoted provision of R.A. 1382.

On July 11, 1956,3 while the petitioner was yet in the active service, Republic Act 1600 was enacted into
law. Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (on page
892 of the Act) provided as follows:

11. After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any
period of five consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on active duty for more than two years on the date of the approval of this Act except those
whose military and educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the
needs of the service, shall be reverted to inactive status within one year from the approval of this Act:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned
service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to
inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least five of
active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's authorized base
and longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion for every year of active commissioned
service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a gratuity under the provisions of
this Act shall not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be called to a tour of active duty
within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the Secretary of National
Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers who are qualified military
pilots and doctors; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized in this Act for
the Department of National Defense notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary and any
unexpended balance of certification to accounts payable since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the
appropriation shall be made available for the purpose of this paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That
the Secretary of National Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to the implementation
of the provisions of this paragraph. ( pp. 892-893, RA 1600) (emphasis supplied)

The petitioner consequently argues that his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960 was in
violation of the abovequoted provision which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve
officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned service.
On the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence
whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore
proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 24 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to such appropriation.

A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any
appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first clause of
paragraph 11 itself, which reads,

After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of
five consecutive years:

the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the
operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the
fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status
of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph.

In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general
appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the
Appropriation Act.

The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 15 of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and
rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the
subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject.

In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly
connected therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and every
fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of the validity of the legislative
enactment. But when an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the
act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are inoperative and without effect.

We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. Thus, in
Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is "a sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane
to that general subject." The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in
legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.6

The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation
of the government." Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this
restricted subject or any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision
in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the
policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such
provision is inoperative and of no effect.

To quote the respondents-appellees on this point:

It is obvious that the statutory provision in question refers to security of reserve officers from reversion
to inactive status, whereas the subject or title of the statute from which it derives its existence refers to
appropriations. Verily, it runs contrary to or is repugnant to the above-quoted injunctive provision of the
Constitution. Where a conflict arises between a statute and the Constitution, the latter prevails. It
should be emphasized that a Constitution is superior to a statute and is precisely called the "supreme
law of the land" because it is the fundamental or organic law which states the general principles and
builds the substantial foundation and general framework of law and government, and for that reason a
statute contrary to or in violation of the Constitution is null and void (Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial
Warden, 78 Phil. 599).1äwphï1.ñët If a law, therefore, happens to infringe upon or violate the
fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1).

Upon the foregoing dissertation, we declare Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it
confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it has never been
passed.7

Verily, not having shown a clear legal right to the position to which he desires to be restored, the
petitioner cannot compel the respondents to reinstate and/or call him to active duty, promote or
readjust his rank, much less pay him back emoluments and allowances.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is denied, and the decision of the lower court dismissing the
complaint is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
[CASE DIGEST] Guingona v. Carague (G.R. No. 94571)

April 22, 1991 | 196 SCRA 221

Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., petitioners

Hon. Guillermo Carague in his capacity as DBM secretary, respondent

FACTS:

For the fiscal year of 1990, Congress passed RA 6831, otherwise known as the GAA Act of 1990. The said
budget contained an automatic appropriation of P98.4 billion, of which P86.8 billion was for debt
service. This automatic appropriation was made pursuant to three Marcos-era issuances: PDs 81, 1177,
and 1967.

The said Act set the appropriation for education at P29.7 billion -- significantly lower than the
appropriation for debt service. This was contrary to Section 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that "the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education."

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not greater budget allocation for debt servicing as opposed to education violates Section
5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not PDs 81, 1177, and 1967 are still operative despite having been issued during the
Marcos era.

3. Whether or not automatic appropriation is violative of Section 29(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

1. No, the constitutional provision that the highest appropriation should go to education does not mean
that the hands of Congress are so humstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of
the national interest and the attainment of other state policies/objectives. One of these policies is to
ensure that the President can take advantage of favorable economic conditions, such as situations
where interest rates are low.

2. Yes, said PDs are still operative. These were not automatically revoked upon the ouster of Marcos.
The Court held that these laws remain operative until they are amended, repealed, or revoked, and so
long as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. In addition, the Court dismissed petitioners'
argument that the aforecited PDs fall within the ambit of Section 24, Art. VI pertaining to "all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills," mainly because the PDs in question are considered enacted laws
and not bills.
3. No, the Court held there was no undue delegation of legislative power because the assailed PDs are
complete -- they set out a policy and are complete in their terms, such that the President doesn't have
any choice but to implement them.

Sanchez vs. COA

Facts: In 1991, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7180 (R.A. 7180) otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1992. This law provided an appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set aside
the amount of P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability Building Program. On 11 November 1991, Atty.
Hiram C. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency
Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy, informed then Deputy Executive Secretary Dionisio de la
Serna of the proposal to constitute and implement a "shamrock" type task force to implement local
autonomy institutionalized under the Local Government Code of 1991. The proposal was accepted by
the Deputy Executive Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino, one of the
petitioners herein, who consequently issued a memorandum for the transfer and remittance to the
Office of the President of the sum of P300,000.00 for the operational expenses of the task force. An
additional cash advance of P300,000.00 was requested. Upon post-audit conducted by Department
auditor Iluminada M.V. Fabroa, however, the amounts were disallowed.

Issue: What are two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation may be allowed? Are
those present in this case?

Ruling: Contrary to another submission in this case, the President, Chief Justice, Senate President, and

the heads of constitutional commissions need not first prove and declare the existence of savings before
transferring funds, the Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra, categorically declared that the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall approve the
realignment (of savings). However, "[B]efore giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have
to see to it that: (1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of
expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and (2) The transfer or realignment is for the
purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made.”

The absence of any item to be augmented starkly projects the illegality of the diversion of the funds and
the profligate spending thereof.

With the foregoing considerations, it is clear that no valid transfer of the Fund to the Office of the
President could have occurred in this case as there was neither allegation nor proof that the amount
transferred was savings or that the transfer was for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the
transfer was made.

Further, we find that the use of the transferred funds was not in accordance with the purposes laid
down by the Special Provisions of R.A. 7180.