The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons, 'Ought All Things Considered', and

Normative Pluralism
Author(s): Mathias Slåttholm Sagdahl
Source: The Journal of Ethics , December 2014, Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 2014), pp. 405-
425
Published by: Springer

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43895887

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J Ethics (2014) 18:405-425
DOI 1 0. 1 007/s 1 0892-01 4-9 1 79-9

The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons,

'Ought All Things Considered', and Normative
Pluralism

Mathias Slàttholm Sagdahl

Received: 17 September 2013 /Accepted: 19 June 20 14 /Published online: 12 September 2014

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract The idea that morality and prudence are incommensurable normative
domains - a central idea in normative pluralism - tends to be rejected because of the
argument from nominal-notable comparisons. The argument relies on a premise
that there are situations of moral-prudential conflict where we have a clear intuition
that there are things we ought to do "all things considered". It is usually concluded
that this shows that morality and prudence must be comparable. I argue that nor-
mative pluralists, who defend this type of incommensurability, can account for these
intuitions by (1) arguing that an "ought all things considered" need not presuppose
inter-type comparability among the reasons it covers, and (2) by endorsing more
sophisticated theories of prudence; theories for which there are good, independent
reasons to endorse, in any case. By following these steps, normative pluralism does
not need to have the counterintuitive implications it is often thought to have.

Keywords Comparability of reasons • Morality and prudence • Normative

pluralism • Ought 'all things considered'

Consider the thought that practical normativity is not a unified domain, but that it
rather consists of several incommensurable domains, such as morality and prudence.
With this idea in mind, we can think that there are moral reasons and prudential
reasons, but that there are no plain reasons (no reasons simpliciter). Similarly, we
can think that while there are things one morally ought to do, and things that one
prudentially ought to do, there are no things we just plain ought to do.1 We can call
an idea like this normative pluralism. Although this kind of theory has been

1 I have adopted these terms from McLeod (2001).

M. S. Sagdahl (El)
Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, Centre for the Study of Mind in
Nature (CSMN), University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: m.s.sagdahl@csmn.uio.no

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 406 M. S. Sagdahl

advocated, most pr
literature on norm
due to an argumen
theory. This is "th
The argument fro
domains such as t
incommensurable with each other since there are at least some cases where it is
obvious that moral-prudential conflicts about what to do can be resolved and that there
is something one ought all things considered to do. This "ought all things considered"
is then identified with what one "just plain ought" to do.
The cases that the argument from nominal-notable comparisons appeals to are cases
where an option supported by very strong reasons of one kind is compared with an option
supported by very weak reasons of another kind. For example, we may compare our very
strong moral reasons to save a child from drowning in a pond with the very weak
prudential reason not to do so because we want to avoid getting our shoes wet. In these
cases, we would like to say that the very weak reason of the one kind is outweighed by the
strong reasons of the other kind. There must therefore be an overarching, more general
domain of normativity under which the two types of reasons can be subsumed and
compared in strength. The more comprehensive nature of that domain is what explains
why the resultant 'ought all things considered' should be identified as a plain ought.
If the latter type of 'ought' exists, which subsumes and compares the other
normative domains, then normative pluralism is false. However, it is my claim that
the argument from nominal-notable comparisons fails to show that this kind of
'ought' exists. It is therefore not the decisive argument against normative pluralism
that it has often been considered to be. The most important line of response for the
normative pluralist that I shall be pursuing is to show that the pluralist can account
for the existence of an "ought all things considered" without presupposing any
comparability between the different types of reasons and without understanding this
ought as a result of subsuming the different normative domains. Doing so for the
relevant cases also involves appealing to a more sophisticated theory of prudence
than what generally seems to be presupposed by proponents of the argument from
nominal-notable comparisons. If the pluralist can account for the existence of an
"ought all things considered" in these cases, normative pluralism does not have the
counterintuitive implications it is argued to have.
I will begin, in Sect. 1, by explaining the structure of the argument, and what
conditions need to be satisfied in order for an example to properly target normative
pluralism. In Sect. 2, 1 introduce a way to understand the notion of "ought all things
considered" that is consistent with normative pluralism. My main response to the
argument is in Sect. 3, where I argue that typical examples of nominal-notable
comparisons do not seem to satisfy the conditions laid out in Sect. 1, and that the
central intuition that the argument relies on can be accommodated by the pluralist
understanding of "ought all things considered" laid out in Sect. 2. My proposal is
that plausible theories of prudence do not make room for the existence of genuine
nominal-notable cases. In Sect. 4, 1 assess to what degree the answer I gave in Sect.
3 is a sufficient response on behalf of normative pluralism. I argue that unless one
denies the relevancy of the prudential considerations laid out in Sect. 3, the

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The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons 407

argument from nominal-notable comparisons does not have the

believed to have - even if some nominal-notable cases were to
consider two alternative variants of the argument from nom
isons, and I conclude that neither of them succeeds as decisiv
normative pluralism.

1 The Structure of the Argument

The first prominent use of the argument, by Ruth Chang, is

normative pluralism, but against the existence of value incom
moral and prudential values. (Chang 1997)2 She mentions that i
as if there is any overarching value (or 'covering value' in Ch
terms of which the moral merit and the prudential merit of op
If this is right, we can say what is best morally and what is bes
what is the best option overall. But Chang argues that it is plausib
actually is such an overarching value, and this, she thinks, can
calls 'nominal-notable comparisons'. Nominal-notable comparis
we compare options that are valuable in different respects (i.e. s
kinds of values), but where one option is valuable in the first resp
marginal degree, but where the other option is valuable in th
notable degree. In these cases, Chang thinks it is plausible to be
value outweighs the 'nominal' value, and hence that there mu
value that takes these two kinds of values as parts and from
overall judgments about overall value. With respect to moral an
asks us to consider the following case:

You can either save yourself a small inconvenience, or you

stranger severe physical and emotional trauma. Suppose t
only nominal prudential [...] value, while the other bears no
[...]. We can say more than that the one act is better morally
better prudentially. We can also say that, with respect to bo
moral value, the latter act is better: given both values, savi
better overall. [. . .] There must therefore be a covering value
comparisons of moral and prudential merits proceed, one th
and prudential values as components. (Chang 1997, p. 32)

The argument is basically an appeal to a certain sort of cases,

we already know or find it highly intuitive that one option is
than the other. Because these judgments presuppose an overar
must be such a value if the judgments are true. The reason w
know or find it highly intuitive that one option is more valuab
the extreme nature of the comparison. Because the com
something which is notably and only nominally valuable (in di
supposed to be especially clear that the values in question can

2 The argument is also used in, for example, Regan (1997), Parfit (2011), a

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 408 M. S. Sagdahl

Although Chang fo
normative pluralism
is no overarching
compared.3 It app
normative standpoin
marginal that they
the other standpoin
reason not to get y
reason you have to
claimed that all thin
seems that there m
prudential reasons a
less obvious cases as well.
The argument from nominal-notable comparisons crucially relies on judgments
about cases. However, the way that these cases are often set up can make us doubt that
they are able to target normative pluralism in an adequate manner, because the
judgments that they appeal to are not necessarily inconsistent with normative
pluralism. Take the example with the drowning child. In this case we are confronted
with an option supported by a substantial moral reason to save the child and another
option supported by a prudential reason not to save the child that is no more than
nominal. But from the fact that you have both these reasons, of different types, it by no
means follows that there is a conflict between the overall verdicts of the moral
standpoint and the overall verdicts of the prudential standpoint, such that they produce
conflicting verdicts about what one ought to do. If one wants to properly target
normative pluralism and claim that it has counterintuitive results, it is not enough to
show that there could be two options where one is supported by a notable moral reason
and the other option supported by only a nominal prudential reason. Reasons are, after
all, only things that count in favour (pro tanto ) of an action. For the argument to be
effective one must also show that this nominal prudential reason is sufficient to make it
the case that one prudentially ought to do what the reason counts in favour of doing.
Unless this is done, one might think that even though there is a nominal prudential
reason to not save the child, there are other prudential reasons that outweigh this
nominal reason. Since the bare fact of a prudential reason counting in favour of not
saving the child is not sufficient to guarantee that one prudentially ought to not save the
child, we can, I shall argue, respond to the argument by pointing out the possibility that
there actually is something one ought to do "all things considered" in these cases that
is consistent with normative pluralism.
A construal of the argument that properly targets normative pluralism must
therefore consist of the genuine possibility of a case with the following elements:

3 The question of normative pluralism is, at least prima facie , distinct from the question of value
pluralism. First, one can think that although there are several types of value, they do not provide several
types of reasons. Second, normative pluralism seems consistent with thinking that there is only one type
of value, as there can be different standards as to how that value is to be distributed. Sidgwick, for
example, reached his famous "dualism of practical reason" on the basis of a hedonistic value theory,
where the "rationality of self-regard" seemed just as undeniable as the rationality of a moral utilitarian
principle (Sidgwick 1981).

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The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons 409

(1) A type 1 requirement to F supported by a notable type 1

(2) A type 2 requirement or permission to not F which is sup
than a nominal type 2 reason.
(3) A clear intuition, considered judgment, or knowledge tha
considered to F in the case at hand.
If (1)- (3) is true, then the explanation of why one ought all things considered to F
must be that type 1 and type 2 reasons are not incommensurable and that there is an
overarching normative standpoint from which one ought to F. Only if one can show
that there is a genuine conflict between the type 1 requirement and the type 2
requirement, will the normative pluralist be unable to account for the intuition that
there is something one ought all things considered to do, in the case at hand.

2 The Pluralist Construal of 'Ought All-Things Considered'

We certainly say that there are things we just plain ought to do or ought all things
considered to do, and it seems that we can at least sometimes say so truly. For
instance, we would say that you just plain ought not to drink poison, or that all
things considered you ought to treat your friends well. To reject these statements as
false does not seem like a natural way to go, and so the pluralist needs to make sense
of them. However, this sense will inevitably diverge from the way many non-
pluralists understand such statements. Chang, for example, treats "all things
considered" as a placeholder term for the kind of standpoint that would do the job of
commensurating the standpoints that it takes as parts. (Chagn 2004a) With respect
to morality and prudence, she speaks of a commensurating standpoint that she
tentatively names "prumorality".4 (Chang 2004b) On this non-pluralist construal,
'ought all things considered', and the normative standpoint from which it springs,
seems to have two important features.
First, it is comprehensive , meaning that it is able to take every feature into
consideration and assign it a normative weight, where a given consideration could
either have a negative, zero, or positive weight with respect of favouring some
action. But being comprehensive is not enough for a standpoint to represent an
overarching, commensurating standpoint. Arguably, both morality and prudence can
also be understood as comprehensive normative standpoints that takes everything
into account.5 Suppose there is a conflict between morality and prudence such that
you prudentially ought to do F and morally ought to not do F. It seems natural to say
that the prudential standpoint can take into account all the things that the moral

4 Though the ought of 'prumorality' might be seen as a particular kind of ought, it can properly be
understood as a plain ought, because it is the only 'ought' which warrants having the status of 'oughts'. If
prumorality exists and takes morality and prudence as parts, then moral and prudential requirements
together explain what one 'prumorally ought'. In standing in an explanatory relationship to an ought, they
are better understood as reasons explaining an ought, rather than being genuine oughts themselves. See
Broome (2013).
5 We can in any case imagine several competing standpoints concerning what you ought to do, which all
take everything into account but assign a different set of weights to the considerations. Comprehen-
siveness can therefore not be sufficient.

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 410 M. S. Sagdahl

standpoint takes in
vice versa). The n
properly) seem to b
account; the only di
things they take in
somewhat misleadin
oughts, like moral o
all things". It makes
ought to do F and I
just plain ought to
that the ought is a
just a partial judgm
The plain ought is
qualified oughts and
would represent jus
of oughts, rather th
sense take priority
ought to be able to
to have what Davi
being the normativ
The real disagreem
whether there is
somehow more norm
of "prumorality" s
existence, she claim
isons. Normative pl
But how, then, can
many situations, so
Why does it seem t
poison, and to trea
authoritative ought
not the result of so
them up against each
the prudential ough
considered" can be
are in agreement, w
you ought to F bot
morally and pruden

6 John Broome states th

considered' rather refer
2013). However, as the
enough to take us beyon
7 Copp argues that the i
8 Interestingly, Copp is o
required simpliciter , in s
status of the plain ought

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The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons 41 1

can say truly that from all normative standpoints, you ough
commensuration of reasons is involved in reaching this concl
possible to take on a comprehensive perspective without com
the existence of some overarching standpoint takes mora
comparable parts. This interpretation also seems to captur
phrase "all things considered you ought to F". For it is a w
relevant standpoints, and the judgments of these standpoints in
having considered all the reasons and relevant features of
ought all things considered to treat one's friends well, in mos
ought to do so from all relevant normative standpoints: it is
prudential thing to do. By treating them well, one treats th
way, while maintaining the friendship that brings value to on
in most contexts, you ought not to inflict pain on yourself or
you, and so, from all relevant standpoints ought you not to d
However, it is clear that this approach to "ought all th
somewhat limited when it comes to determining a single option
since its application requires the relevant standpoints to be in
option that ought to be taken. But this is how the pluralist wil
morality and prudence differ, there is simply no way to get bey
is seen as irresolvable. One might think that this means that
ever facts about what we ought to do all things conside
quantification sense. There are two things to be said in respon
that the frequency with which the standpoints tend to agree
verdicts will depend on the specific content of these standpo
content to the terms 'morality' and 'prudence' before we can sa
will tend to conflict and to what extent they will harmonize. F
just blank placeholders for whatever moral theory and theory
correct. The second thing to be said is that even with these t
concepts, it seems likely that facts about what one just plain
marginal phenomena. They are, in fact, extremely comm
in situations of conflict.9 If morality requires you to do F and
to do G, there might be no fact as to whether you just plain ou
you just plain ought to do G, but there might be a fact that you
do cp, where doing cp is doing other options than F or G. For i
do F, it follows that you morally ought to not do anything tha
or excludes doing F in the context of that choice situation, a
prudence with respect to any option that is incompatible wit
So this is one type of 'all things considered' -fact that alway
there are things that we ought in a qualified sense. Another fa
if morality and prudence disagrees over whether I should do
that all things considered (in the quantificational sense) I ough

9 The truth of this claim depends on the supposition that we can avoid a h
standpoints and the number of normative oughts. The more oughts in play, t
tend to be. Evan Tiffany's version of normative pluralism clearly involves su
2007).

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 412 M. S. Sagdahl

This exclusive disjun

is true that I ought

3 The Possibility a

The quantification
pluralist to explain
But since the nomi
conflict, it seems
judgments that ther
will argue that the
pluralism are, in m
normative pluralist c
the agent ought to
For these particular
structure of (l)-(3),
we are operating wi
could actually be pr
when there is also a
reasons. The doubt
Typical examples
conflict between a
prudential requirem
consider a convers
presented as objecti

Norm: Norm's tele

very painful electr
Norm knows this,
is a misanthrope, a
also enjoys the tele
pleasure watching

Since we can suppo

show and given the
seem plausible:

(l') Norm is morally required not to watch Arrested Development.

(2') Norm is prudentially required to watch Arrested Development .
(3') Watching Arrested Development is, for Norm, all-things-considered
unjustified.

Dorsey then claims that if we accept (l')-(3'), which roughly correspond to (1)-
(3) above, then normative pluralism fails, at least prima facie. The reasons behind
the prudential requirement are clearly outweighed by the reasons behind the moral
requirement, he seems to think.

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The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons 413

Dorsey seems to be right in claiming that if a situation with

like (1X2') could obtain, then normative pluralism has co
quences, because we also tend to have the intuition that (3').
the case could be reconstructed such that "on virtually an
prudential value, Norm could obtain a very minor (thoug
benefit by committing a very grave moral sin". In this, I thi
Just as one can argue that a plausible moral theory would not
only a nominal moral benefit given a notable prudential
conversely, that a plausible prudential theory would not requi
nominal prudential benefit given a notable moral cost. I
plausibly make the case that prudence would require you not
To make this argument, one needs to rely on a more so
prudence than what Dorsey seems to rely on in his rejection
The theory would have to predict that extremely immoral beh
very minor benefit is not in your long-term interest. Conside
tradition in moral philosophy for arguing that morality has
and hence that self-interest requires moral behaviour,10 the pr
need in order to rebut the possibility of nominal-notable
demanding, since we only need the result that prudence
extremely immoral behaviour given that there is not very mu
only need a prudential theory that requires us to be minima
look at some general reasons for why it would be at least so
flout moral requirements. These are prudential reasons that c
other prudential reasons if the benefit is high enough, but that
favour of behaving in accordance with morality and which
defeating reasons that are only nominal.
First, and most obviously, a person often risks external so
violating moral demands. Some of morality's functions seem
mutually benefiting cooperation between individuals in a
everyone a chance to live a good life. Since people therefore
in that other people should behave morally, they tend to imp
who act in morally bad ways. Second, by violating moral
suffer from shame, guilt or similar "internal sanctions" con
emotional states or negative self-assessments which can redu
Third, besides these negative sanctions, many people experie
pleasure in doing the right thing and in contributing to th
seems likely to think that this could both result from a brute s
others as well as from having personal projects that inco
others.
However, it will be objected (as it often has been against th
justify morality in terms of self-interest) that the existenc
feelings, and projects are wholly contingent, and hence
prudential reasons to be moral is also contingent. Altho
generally and in the majority of cases, it is still possible th

10 See, for example, Gauthier (1986).

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 414 M. S. Sagdahl

where there are no

are no more than t
that no prudential
callous that he suff
he enjoys no pleasu
Iwill soon explain,
But let us first not
to be moral, then i
intuitive results in
would exist pruden
conflicting with t
things considered
have some counter-
a knockdown obje
general. It is, for i
of counterintuit
normative pluralis
reason, but merely
needs to be taken i
conserve a greater
especially since t
theoretical framew
not clear that any
But even with the
further considerat
violate notable mo
reason. The explana
and what personal
not the case, accor
psychology and yo
how to attain plea
they are. As a firs
keep in mind tha
account to evaluate
timelessly consid
callousness does no

1 1 Or if one does not,

moral.

12 This might either b

might think that rival
because one might thin
outweighed by the theo
themselves. See Singer
cases.

13 See for example Bricker (1980). Bricker thinks, however, that prudence must b
the agent desires.

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The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons 415

of happiness or a good life, it will be said, requires possession

of empathy, sympathy, and moral virtues.
John Lemos contrasts two different conceptions of prude
and an absolute conception of prudence. (Lemos 2006) Where
prudence looks at what it would be in an agent's interest to
person he is and the character traits he has now, the latter
prudence argues that someone who is fully prudent in t
already have fallen short of the demands of prudence, since
looks at "what it is in an agent's interest to do if he had begu
consistent with the rational pursuit of self-interest".14 He th
which perspective is more important in assessing the extent
conforms to reasons, and for the extent to which the agent
fulfilling life. Lemos thinks that a proper prudential assessm
consists of an assessment according to the absolute criteria,
with athletics. We do not give someone a prize for performin
training. Instead we recognize people for their accomplis
ideals of good athleticism, and not relative to their preparat
One can point to several reasons why prudence would r
moral virtues, or at least avoid the worst moral vices, such as the extreme
callousness shown, for instance, by Norm and which seems to be a necessary trait
for anyone who agrees to violate a notable moral requirement merely for the sake of
a nominal prudential reason. If callousness or a similar trait is necessary for
someone to make this kind of choice, then a prudential theory which requires you to
avoid those traits suffices to avoid all the extreme counterintuitive consequences
that the argument from nominal-notable comparisons is supposed to show. Lemos
argues in a way similar to David Hume: that becoming morally virtuous is simply a
person's best bet for living a good or fulfilling life.15 He claims that if you are
raising a child, then you would want that child to possess the moral virtues. For in
possessing them the child is most likely to lead a happy life because having the
virtues makes us valued members of our communities and reduces our chance of
social ostracism and punishment.16 This means that an agent who has not cultivated
the moral virtues may have been lucky and lived a good and happy life. But given
the poor bet, his way of life has been imprudent. Lemos also points to the
consideration that prudence requires us to develop intellectual virtues and in virtue
of those virtues, we would need to engage in self-deception to mask to oneself the

14 Lemos's wording here is somewhat unfortunate, since the demands of the person who "began his life"
in accordance with an absolute prudence may not seem relevant for the person who has already
committed errors. For the absolute variant of prudence to be interesting, we must suppose that previous
errors in life are no obstacle to starting to conform to the absolute variant of prudence. In terms of virtues,
we must suppose that although an agent has so far not lived a virtuous life, that fact is not a hindrance for
the agent to start living a virtuous life. This assumption seems plausible enough, especially insofar as
virtues are thought to be attained through experience with life.
15 At least this is the interpretation of Hume given by Joel J. Kupperman (2008). Kupperman also appeals
to Paul Ekman's research on "micro-expressions" to argue against the strategy of being only
"apparently" virtuous, like Hume's sensible knave, since people tend to pick up on such insincere
attitudes.

16 This point is also stressed by Hursthouse (1999).

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 416 M. S. Sagdahl

knowledge of one's
breed unhappiness i
Another reason tha
vices stand in the wa
class of goods.18 In
such as callousness or those who lack the moral virtues are unable to form true and
faithful interpersonal relationships, such as true friendship and love. These
relationships, it is argued, require a certain level of empathy and sympathy with
other people, and to see people as valuable in non-instrumental ways. The callous
person lacks these sentiments and so is unable to form true relationships. In addition,
they are unable to show their true selves to the world, but must act in secret and so
cannot live sincerely. Living sincerely without hiding and pretence might be seen as a
good in itself, but it might also be connected with inner states. Plato famously
appealed to the "psychic harmony" enjoyed by the morally virtuous person, and
which is unavailable to the vicious person. A related point is that the virtuous person
enjoys the satisfaction and pleasure that comes from knowing that one is doing well
to others and acting virtuously. Lastly, one can appeal to what seems like the pettiness
and impoverishment of a life without moral motivation. In the words of Stephen
Finlay, "a purely self-interested life is [. . .] a life of small and diminishing rewards in
comparison to the rewards of a life of interest in broader and more enduring matters
(pure self-interest has no 'legacy'). Our objective self-interest itself therefore
counsels us not to live an overly (subjectively) self-interested life". (Finlay 2008,
p. 138(f7)) In preferring to watch a rerun of Arrested Development rather than not
harming a hundred people, Norm's life seems petty and impoverished, and not the
sort of meaningful life that we envision the good life to be.
Some of these claims may seem somewhat strong, especially when we keep in
mind that many of them have been put forth by moral philosophers with the aim of
showing that morality has a self-interested basis. It certainly seems that we can
doubt that they are able to secure a perfect coextension between moral and
prudential requirements. The prudential reasons which are appealed to, and which
count in favour of acting morally, exists because immoral behaviour seems to risk a
certain set of significant goods becoming unavailable to the agent. But the agent
who considers acting immorally could object that despite risking these goods, it is
made up for by the hope of acquiring another set of goods, such as various material
goods, which will considerably enhance the agent's quality of life. The reasons
pointed to above are just ordinary prudential reasons which have the potential of
being outweighed by other prudential reasons. Someone skeptical to the significance
of these prudential reasons to be moral could claim that while it may be the case that
I prudentially ought to be the kind of person who has sympathy with others, that

17 It is here reasonable to object that one may not care about whether one's character is good in a moral
way, but it might be replied that this would be an expression of another character trait which is unlikely to
lead to a good life. The theme of self-deception is also pressed by Paul Bloomfield (2008). Bloomfield
connects the self-deception with self-respect and claims that it is impossible for a self-deceiving agent to
have self-respect, since he has a false idea of his self, and couples it with the claim that self-respect is
necessary for a good life.
18 The following list is to a large part taken from Paul Bloomfield (2008).

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The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons 417

sympathy is not enough to establish that I prudentially ought

have all the things I want in life by immorally hurting others.
might suffer somewhat from doing that immoral act, but I o
prudential reasons to get everything I want in life.
Although this argument should worry those who aim to pr
grounding for morality, it should not worry the normative p
not concerned with showing that we always have decisive pr
morally, but only with showing that nominal prudential reas
ground a prudential requirement that conflicts with a moral
by notable moral reasons. Once we are dealing with con
reasons, the situation changes and we are no longer faced w
comparison since what is supposed to ground the nominal re
but a slight reason. This is the very limited aim of the norm
virtue of being weaker than those made by moral philosoph
coextension between the two types of requirements, it is m
We are, after all, only seeking a partial and very minimal ov
In fact, there is a very significant tension between the two
coextension would mean that normative pluralism migh
unclear that we would end up with more than one norm
normative pluralist seeks a certain amount of agreement be
prudential standpoints, to a degree that is sufficient to explain
concerning nominal-notable comparisons, but also to le
prudential conflicts in some situations where significant reas
sides. The prudential reasons I have pointed to which cou
morally seem to be up to that task. They are significant enoug
prudential reasons (being a person who feels sympathy for oth
would not be prudentially worth violating those feelings for
but they do not seem able to prevent all conflicts with morality
only prudential reasons of significance.

4 The Dialectical Situation

Does this reply on behalf of normative pluralism represent an adequate way o

meeting the argument from nominal-notable comparisons? That, of course, depend
on the plausibility of a more sophisticated theory of prudence, one that can appeal t
the reasons pointed to above as significant reasons that are always present t
outweigh prudential reasons that are merely nominal. On the face of it, examples
like Norm seem to rely on a simple hedonistic theory of prudence that take
prudence to consist in maximizing pleasure relative to the agent's actual desires in
the present. Other theories of prudence are concerned with achieving "good lives
in a way which encompass more goods than just pleasure which assess the value of
those goods not just according to the agent's present desires, but "timelessly", an
the theories may not even be maximizing in the same way that the simple hedonisti

19 For reasons to doubt a perfect coextension between morality and self-interest, see Scheffler (2008).

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 418 M. S. Sagdahl

theory seems to b
could exist is theref
exist such-and-such
moral requirement
for whatever theor
be indeterminate.
theories of morality
other with respect
normative standpoi
argument from no
equally well for ev
answer to the possi
debate have to sett
disagreement about
Still, the sophistic
reject the possibilit
and seems a reas
comparisons. In ord
option of denying
considerations that
and then try to sho
after all. Let us bri
First, if the one tr
one is, in effect, ad
we need to settle
discussion which g
should be pointed
intuitively relevant
the considerations
have at least a nomi
as being of little sig
with, and possibly
last option is to den
all possible example
insist that there exist cases that have not been considered and where the reasons I
have pointed to (or similar prudential reasons of notable strength) are not present to
outweigh the nominal prudential reason. Whichever option is taken, insofar as
sophisticated theories of prudence are on the table, it will be up to the non-pluralist
to deny the relevancy of these considerations or to provide a convincing example of
a nominal-notable comparison where these considerations could not be present.
But what if someone were to come up with a plausible nominal-notable example
consistent with the type of sophisticated theories of prudence that give a significant
role to things like sympathy and moral virtues in achieving a good life? I think that a
correct conception of prudence does not allow for nominal-notable conflicts
between prudence and morality, but I have not shown conclusively that they are
impossible. But it seems that if some version of the sophisticated theory of prudence

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The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons 419

is correct, then moral-prudential conflicts of the nominal-

maybe even downright exceptional, if they exist at all. It se
be conflicts of this kind, they can only arise for agen
motivational structure who (1) do not have the same inter
ordinary human beings, such as an interest in love, r
relationships; (2) who do not suffer from guilt; (3) who do
cultivating moral virtues; and (4) are under exceptional cir
risk of damaging sanctions is absolutely minimal.
If these are the conditions under which a nominal-not
imaginable, the normative pluralist probably should not wo
especially counterintuitive results that the argument
comparisons are supposed to show that normative pluralism
to a very special class of cases involving special agents. For
with normal motivational structures, the theory does n
counterintuitive results, and it can explain why we o
considered, to do what we are morally required to do.
pluralism attractive for reasons like, e.g., recognizing the
between living a good life and upholding one's moral o
arguably, involve various degrees of self-sacrifice), and fo
Henry Sidgwick, that the "rationality of self-regard"
rationality of self-sacrifice", this restricted set of counterin
be seen as very damaging. (Sidgwick 1981)20 In moral p
widespread moral theories, utilitarianism and deontolo
plagued by counterintuitive consequences. Proponents of th
bullet and accept the counterintuitiveness of the theory's c
to certain cases, but still claim that the theory is the most
The same line of argument can be pursued by the normativ
that alternatives to pluralism would yield less counter
Indeed, we do not even seem to know how to commensura
reasons, and so we do not even seem to have much of an a
evaluate. As far as I can see, no good framework for mora
suration has ever been proposed.
Secondly, we might doubt the degree to which we shoul
regarding this special class of cases. To repeat, the argume
when it deals with an unusual type of agents with a special
could very well be the case that because of the unfamiliar n
we are unable to properly imagine or assess them.21 First
least to some extent, and we have at least a certain empath
guilt. Moral values play a significant role in our own lives,
are committed to could possibly contaminate our judgment

20 See also Wallace (2006), and Copp (2007), for similar themes.
21 In a somewhat similar vein, Elster (201 1) argues against the reliability
"outlandish" features. Although he focuses on moral judgments and cases
outwardly 'freakish', one of the problems he mentions is our ability to pr
psychological makeup. See also Parfit' s criticism against Nozick' s imag
1986).

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 420 M. S. Sagdahl

imagine and influe

presence of prudent
though they are sti
be easy to stipulate
it is much harder t
thought would rem
Since even a small r
our imagination of
nominal reason seem
values and rules m
nominal-notable c
shown by an agen
prudential nominal
outrage. The feeling
being a genuine jud
condemnation. Th
obscure the point o
reasonableness of hi
that normative plura
morally ought to do
his show, has done
true of him), he is
severe form of bla
needed to explain th
purpose.

5 Two Alternative Variants of the Argument from Nominal-Notable

Comparisons

We should now consider two other possible variants of the argument from nominal-
notable comparisons. Each of them would to a certain degree change the dialectical
landscape that we have explored.
As we have seen, the typical way to formulate the argument from nominal-
notable comparisons is to proceed from an example where there is a conflict
between a moral requirement supported by very strong moral reasons and a
prudential requirement supported by a very slight prudential reason. One of the two
ways to alter the argument is to appeal to a different sort of case where the strength
of the two types of reasons supporting two different options is considered not in
absolute terms but in relative terms. Consider an example where one would have the
choice of either losing two hundred thousand dollars or else all Falklanders would
die. A proponent of the argument from nominal-notable comparisons could here
appeal to an intuition that one just plain ought to save the Falklanders. Here it seems
that one is prudentially required not to lose the money, for prudential reasons that
can be understood as notable, but which nonetheless pale with respect to notability
in comparison with the moral reasons for saving the Falklanders. So although the

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The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons 421

prudential reasons are in some sense considerable, they become

outweighed when compared to the moral reasons. Or so th
would go.
This way of advancing the argument has the advantag
prudential reasons are, at least from a prudential perspect
clearer that the prudential reasons actually support the t
requirement not to do the morally required option. It does no
agent with an alien motivational structure or that we need an
prudence in order for there to actually be a prudential re
morally. So the argument can much more clearly target the p
kinds of examples. On the other hand, however, the advantage
also a disadvantage. What makes the existence of a pruden
more plausible is the presence of prudential reasons that are, f
of the agent, notable. This also makes it much more plau
prudential option is actually an option that his reasons make e
above, that the prudential option would be notable becomes m
reflect on the consequences of not acting prudentially. Losing
dollars may lead the agent into debt or economic uncertainty
seriously reduce his life prospects and life quality (if we stipu
then the argument would no longer have the form which we
The agent is sacrificing himself and the quality of his own l
extent for the lives of others, and it is a sacrifice that is not
agent, by the moral gains. That it can be reasonable and prai
oneself in this manner is not disputed by the pluralist, but it
that this is the only reasonable thing to do - as the argument
of the significant costs to the agent and the quality of his o
conforming to morality, we may also find it reasonable for
prudential option. If one still resists this thought, and insists
the only reasonable thing to do for the agent, then we can a
account for this intuition by explaining it through a quantific
considered. That one would suffer a considerable prudential lo
options does not imply that one is, on the whole, prudentially
loss. I doubt that I could live with the knowledge of being res
of all Falklanders, as that knowledge would seriously affect
and probably more so than being in debt. Even if this would n
case - or be the case for every other agent - facts like these
judgment about what the agent in question ought to do
considering the examples only in the abstract, have a difficult
ourselves in the agent's place and understanding the conse
well-being. So there is room to doubt the usefulness of our in
as well.
The second way of varying the argument is to switch which normative standpoint
is supported by nominal reasons and which is supported by notable reasons. As we
have seen, the typical way to formulate the argument from nominal-notable
comparisons is by appealing to an example where there is a moral requirement
supported by notable prudential reasons, and a prudential requirement supported

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 422 M. S. Sagdahl

only by nominal pr
imagine a case that
requirement with n
nominal moral reaso
there probably is
However, I will then
may likely be foun
Cases where there
and where there is
seem plausible as a
moves around a lot
morning. However,
legally earn an easy
can assume that y
Although it can ini
prudential requirem
moral requiremen
consequences to you
easily come to doub
promise, given the
very strict moral t
view of morality. F
morality as includi
that morality allow
what would be all
calculus).22 The tho
compromise with r
best morality, but r
would not be a pl
fundamental aims
(Scheffler 2008) Sc
moderate system o
coherent and attrac
impersonal point of
of others and our n
1992) When we appl
conflicts between a
ment, the putative
great personal cos
unreasonable not j
standpoint. This vi
moral rules that ide
appeal to moderac

22 The most prominent

Finlay (2008).

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The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons 423

utilitarian theory of morality, and a utilitarian can therefore n

for these kinds of nominal-notable conflicts in the sam
utilitarians, these kinds of conflict seem to be impossible for
my own costs are to be included in the moral calculus, any n
would simply outweigh any benefits to others that are merely
These considerations suggest that unless one defends a ce
demanding morality (in terms of personal costs), nominal-nota
prudential requirements based on notable prudential reasons an
based only on nominal moral reasons are an impossibility. And
on the possibility by defending a very demanding moralit
centred prerogative and where one's own costs do not outweigh
from the moral standpoint, then normative pluralism does n
plausibility by the possibility of these kinds of conflicts. Qu
morality really demands so much of me, then am I really un
morality aside and acting prudentially?23
I believe these considerations explain why opponents of norm
to ignore these kinds of putative nominal-notable conflicts an
the converse type of putative conflict. But as we have see
doubt the possibility of such nominal-notable conflicts as
retain the focus on notable prudential reasons and nominal m
be able to argue for a different sort of nominal-notable confli
not between two requirements, but between a prudential requ
permission. Take again the example with helping your friend
seem prudentially required to earn those million dollars, and m
so, you could also, arguably, be morally permitted to decline t
meet your friend at the time you had promised. That it would
some moral theories, such as typical Kantian theories as well
have moral reasons to look after your own interests which m
moral reasons and not only permit you, but require you t
yourself. If that is right, then these types of nominal-notab
obtain either. But if this is not right, and "agent-centred pr
permissions not to sacrifice your own interests for a slight mor
of nominal-notable conflict does seem possible. Although I ha
the matter, I take it that the latter view of agent-centred prer
implausible. This means that the normative pluralist may after
deal with a particular type of nominal-notable conflict.
How serious is this for the pluralist? My claim is that it is a p
concern the pluralist too much, even if the pluralist would hav
deny the commonly accepted intuition that one just plain ough
dollars rather than keep one's promise. The main reason is
represent a very different type of conflict, where both norm
be satisfied by the same action, and where the nominal mora

23 Witness for instance Finlay (2008), who starts by defending a very demand
the possibility of these kinds of conflicts with self-interest, and then ends up
relationship between morality and self-interest which seems to be a version o

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 424 M. S. Sagdahl

keeping the promis

when deliberating
not give the same v
this, there would b
to do. But, on the o
option, you can d
(quantificationally)
a whole does not dis
agent with a norma
morality's demands
taking the prudent
is all things consid
existence of these k
intuitive results of

Acknowledgments I am g
of Ethics. I would also li
Oslo for making this wo
discuss these issues wit
and Kasper Lippert-Ras

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