NERY VS.

SAMPANA
Not Cited Recently
EN BANC A.C. No. 10196, September 09, 2014 MELODY R. NERY, COMPLAINANT,
VS. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio A.
Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal
fees and for making Nery believe that the petition was already filed.

The Facts

In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010, [1] Nery alleged that in June 2008, she
engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her
adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and
Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she
had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then
gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption.
Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00 on 10
September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c) P40,000.00 on 17
November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana.

On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already
filed the petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana further informed
Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told
Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When
Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her
presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional.
Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.

On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status
of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the
court.[2] Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the
reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he
would deduct the filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not
be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly
demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands
were left unheeded.
In an Order dated 25 February 2011,[3] the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera
(Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file his answer to the
complaint and to appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were
directed to submit their position papers.

In her position paper,[4] Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.

On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011, [5] Sampana argued that
Nery's allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted
receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and
adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption
because of the old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted
on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the [alien] adopter would be
married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could be
possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents, including the
marriage contracts and the certification of the alien's qualification to adopt from the
Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not
the certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not
file it because he was still waiting for the certification.

Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption.
Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment
case with the petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have
overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the
amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services and actual expenses.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation,[6] Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty
of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and
for failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner
Antiquiera recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of
law.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty Sampana violated the code of professional ethics and whether he misled
his clients into believing the status of the adoption case.

HELD:

In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both
cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file
the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his
client. Sampana's proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the
petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he suggested to
Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended
adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which
Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the
alien's qualification to adopt is waived.[11]

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery
of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed
the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him.
He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code's mandate to deliver the
client's funds upon demand. A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal
profession.[12]

This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana,
[13]
 we already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale of a parcel of
land. We imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one
(1) year and warned him that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

In Rollon v. Naraval,[14] we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal
service after receiving the filing and partial service fee. Considering the serious
consequence of disbarment and the previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to
increase the penalty for Sampana's malpractice and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law

for THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be
dealt with more severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to
complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), with 12% interest per annum from the time of his receipt of the full
amount of money on 17 November 2008 until 30 June 2013, then 6% interest per
annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO, GR No. 188801,
2014-10-15
Facts:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of
notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances
where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the... other spouse
and other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of
summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd)
and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the
estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta
Charissima M. Castro
(Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname,
"Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their
marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963,
but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly
left Jose... after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year
later.
Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had
homosexual tendencies.[5] She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen
(15) years despite their separation(.)"
Jose filed a petition[7] for adoption
In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth
Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth),[8] whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.
The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death... the trial court
approved the adoption
A certificate of finality[20] was issued
Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment
against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.[21] In her complaint, she alleged
that Jose had been remiss in providing support for... their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36
years.[22] She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to
Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R.
Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the... extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and
Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and consent.[23] She also alleged that Jose
made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Larry's wife,... Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry.
Jose died
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision
of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption.
the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the
spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the...
hearing."
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose] in obtaining
an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the interests of
his legitimate heirs"[36] but stated that its hands were bound by the... trial court decision
that had already attained "finality and immutability."
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its application of the law
on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment.[40] They argue that because of the
fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information... shown in the birth
certificates presented as evidence before the trial court,[41] they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from them.
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied the law on
jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable
parties.[43] They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires... the consent, not
only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and
such consent was never secured from Joanne
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not only notice
to them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings.[46] They... argue that
since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic
fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of judgment.[47] They also
argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because... adoption is an action in rem
and, as such, the only indispensable party is the state.
Issues:
whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for annulment for failure of
petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of
extrinsic fraud.
Ruling:
The petition is granted.
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the
Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies of new
trial,... appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner."
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which
annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years
from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by
estoppel or... laches.
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action."[55] As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1,
2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552[56]... which applies over the proceedings. The law on
adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the
consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock
As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his... or her spouse.
n the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained
legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and
Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not
validly... obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her
name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been
given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable
opportunity to contest the... validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained,
Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the
prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have
to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another... person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over
10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was
necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and
Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings.
As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal liabilities.
[78] Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption
decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently.
Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552[79] since
rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left
with no other remedy in law other than the annulment of the... judgment.
he fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is reason to believe
that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the love and care of a father, her
parents having separated a year after her birth. She has never even benefited from any
monetary support... from her father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain
a medical degree from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine[80] and is now
working as a doctor in Canada.[81] These accomplishments, however, are... poor
substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.
 BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 192531               November 12, 2014

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as

beneficiary

FACTS:

                John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was
enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an
accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

                SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the
parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio
who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

                According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

 
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling
that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

                The Court also applied by analogy,  insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned,

the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated.

                The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds
for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and
the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological
parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for
himself at such a tender age.

                From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising
from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child,
the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of
the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from
the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in
the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent
given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already
died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to
herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.