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10ANKARA150 2010-01-29 07:07 Confidential Embassy Ankara: Reference ID Date Classification Origin
10ANKARA150 2010-01-29 07:07 Confidential Embassy Ankara: Reference ID Date Classification Origin
VZCZCXRO1068
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHAK #0150/01 0290744
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290744Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 6870
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
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RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000150
SIPDIS
¶2. (C) Over the course (boyunca) of the last two-and-a-half years, the
Turkish military has faced a number of allegations of coup
plotting having occurred within its ranks (rütbe), especially in the
2003 to 2004 period. These allegations have increased in
tempo over the last year, with the liberal daily "Taraf"
("Side") -- whose tagline is: "To Think is to Take Sides" --
leading the charge in breaking many of the often-sensational (merak
uyandıran)
stories that draw on leaked information from unnamed military
or judicial sources. (Comment: Taraf owner Basar Arslan has
publicly dismissed claims that Taraf is secretly funded by
the Fetullah Gulen movement. End Comment). Paras 8-14
outline the key allegations that have surfaced in the Turkish
media since 2007.
Common Threads
--------------
¶3. (C) One of the common threads in this review is that the
alleged (iddia edilen) plans are all variations on a theme: they all
involve
efforts to sow (tohum ekmek) chaos or foment (kışkırtmak) public opposition
to the AKP
and to create the conditions for a military intervention.
None of the alleged plots involve a direct military takeover
(Comment: The military's problem in such a scenario is that
it knows its interventions and coup plots are not popular
among the population. The last "successful" coup -- in 1980
-- occurred in response to a massive breakdown of public
order as armed political, ethnic and criminal gangs engaged
in violent attacks. The core(ana) accusation in these current
scenarios is the allegation that the military this time would
foment the violence themselves, blaming radical, Islamic and
other groups, and then step in to "restore order" after the
government fails to do so. End Comment.)
¶4. (C) Another common theme is that all the allegations put
the military in an almost impossible position of having to
prove (kanıtlayan) a negative -- that it did not engage in the planning
actions alleged by the media reports -- to a public, some
parts of whom are increasingly suspicious of the military
with each new claim (iddia). While we may never know the extent to
which each of these allegations are true, it is clear from
statements by former Turkish General Staff Chief Gen. Ozkok
that, at the very least, there was serious consideration
given within the military in 2003 to 2004 to overthrow the
AKP-led government.
¶5. (C) The series of allegations has been eroding (aşındırmak) the
public's confidence (güven) in the military. While the military
still enjoys strong support among the public -- one poll by
Genar Polling in November 2009 indicated that 80.6 percent of
those surveyed viewed the military as the institution that
inspires most confidence, 15 points above the presidency,
which came in second -- this support has slipped. (düşmek) A poll
conducted by A&G Polling in January indicated that while
public support for the military was around 90 percent before
the Ergenekon investigations began, public support has
dropped to 63.4 percent. Ipsos KMG also published a poll in
early January indicating the trust in the military had
declined from 85 to 90 percent before the Ergenekon
allegations, to 73 percent in late 2009. Another poll
conducted in early January by Turkish polling firm MetroPoll,
before the "Sledgehammer" story broke, found that 30 percent
of respondents (cevap veren) in the January poll indicated that their trust
in the military has decreased. 55 percent of respondents
also believed that "there is a group within the military
which is preparing to stage a coup," a rise of 7 percent from
July 2009 figures. Despite the decreasing confidence in the
military indicated by one of three respondents, 62 percent of
respondents did not believe that the military would stage
another coup.
¶6. (C) Secularists who question the motives (saik) of the AKP and
the timing of each new coup plot allegation are convinced (inandırmak)
that most of the claims are a combination of fabrication and
manipulation of actual military documents and that there is a
systematic campaign to erode the trust of the military. TGS
chief Basbug has led this charge (suçlama), calling the series of media
stories an "asymmetric attack" targeting the Turkish Armed
Forces. Even as he denounced (kınamak) the media reports, however,
Basbug has also clearly committed the military to supporting
democracy and the rule of law and has stated that the era of
coups in Turkey is over (ref. b).
¶8. (SBU) Excerpts (alıntı) of diary entries dating back to 2003 and
2004 allegedly belonging to then-Naval Forces Commander
Admiral Ozden Ornek were first published by the weekly
"Nokta" in 2007 (Comment: The magazine was closed shortly
after it published these documents. End Comment). The diary
entries -- popularly known as the "Coup Diaries" -- laid out (tasarlamak)
in detail discussions among senior military officers of steps
the military needed to take to unseat (düşürmek) the Islamist-leaning
Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002.
"Sarikiz" ("Blondie") was the initial coup plan developed by
then-Jandarma Commander General Eruygur, which involved a
coordinated effort among the military and other elements of
Turkey's secular elite, to effect the removal of the AKP from
power. The plot allegedly had the support of all the other
force commanders at the time (Land Forces Commander General
Aytac Yalman, Air Forces Commander General Ibrahim Firtina,
¶10. (SBU) This plot involved senior (deniz kuvvetleri tuğamirali) navy
flag officers and
was uncovered during the April 2009 search of the home of
retired Navy Lieutenant Commander (önyuzbaşı) Levent Bektas, an Ergenekon
suspect, and was revealed by Taraf in November 2009. CDs
found in Bektas's home reportedly revealed a plot drafted (taslak) in
March 2009 headed by then-Sea Area North Commander Vice
Admiral Feyyaz Ogutcu (now retired) and current Sea Area
South Commander Kadir Sardic. The plot included plans to
Assassinate (suikast) prominent (seçkin) non-Muslim figures and blame these
attacks on the AKP in order to increase foreign and domestic
pressure for the AKP to step down (düşürülmek). Media reports indicated
that the plan included setting off a bomb planted at the
submarine (denizaltı) exhibit at the Rahmi Koc Museum in Istanbul and
using women to obtain information from other navy officers
and entrap (tuzağa düşürmek) them into supporting Ergenekon. Bektas has
been
under arrest as part of the Ergenekon probe (soruşturma), as well as
several active duty officers, including Lt. Col. Halil
Ozsarac, and colonels Levent Gulmen and Mucahit Erakyol.
Thus far, neither Ogutcu or Sardic has been questioned about
this plot.
¶11. (SBU) Taraf reporter Mehmet Baransu, who broke the news
about "Kafes," received an award from the Turkish Journalists
Association for his "Kafes" reporting, but was also
investigated for violating the confidentiality (gizlilik) of an ongoing
criminal investigation. While those charges have been
dropped, there is an ongoing case against Baransu and Taraf
manager Adnan Demir for "openly insulting the military
institution of the state," in violation of Section 301 of the
Turkish Penal Code.