Retrieving the Tradition

The Third "Testis" A rticle

Maurice Blondel

[Beatitude] consists . . . in an unheard of

relationship of love, in a divinizing adoption
th at in some w ay reverses, w ithout otherw ise
annulling, the m etaphysical order, the
necessary relation of C reator to creature, in
order to introduce this slavish creature into the
intim ate life of the Trinity, as a son.

The theses th at we have placed in opposed pairs are n aturally

grouped into tw o connected system s;1 and each of these systems

[The following is a translation of the third "Testis" installment that was

first published in les Annales de philosophie chrétienne (=APC )in December
1909. BlondeTs writing style poses a special challenge to the translator.
Please consult my essay "Maurice Blondel and the Renewal of the Nature-
Grace Relationship" in the present number of Communio (806-45) to

Maurice Blondel, the noted French philosopher, died in 1949.

Communio 26 (W inter 1999). © 1999 by Communio: International Catholic Review

 The Third "Testis" Article 847

(as it w ould be easy to show) is such that the initial thesis (a or a/)
philosophically governs the ones that follow, w hile the final thesis
theologically governs the ones that precede. Therefore, it will be
especially im portant to appreciate the philosophical value of the
former and the theological value of the latter opposing positions.
And thus we w ill w ork it out spontaneously as a negative proof.
W ithout doubt, if it happens th at the doctrine tow ard w hich our
philosophical preferences incline appears to compromise or im pair,
even slightly, the integrity of the faith, this w ould be for us (and we
are anxious to affirm it expressly beforehand) a decisive claim
against it. But can we not hope that, according to the teaching that
sanctions the accord betw een reason and faith, the harm onies will
be spontaneous and complete? A nd so w ith a very bold confidence
we are going to proceed to this exam ination in two senses: proving
by our effort at rational discussion that we believe in the pow er of
thought, [and] proving by our constant and suprem e concern for
the tradition and orthodoxy that we hold above all to our profes­
sion of Catholicism. If later we have to concern ourselves w ith the
consequences of one or the other of the systems in conflict, of the
fruits that they naturally produce, of the repercussions they entail
in souls or in societies,2 at this m om ent we are only thinking of
determ ining w hat is true or w hat is erring, at all costs and w ith an
absolute im partiality.

understand the background and context of this article.

Blondel offered this brief description of what he intended in the third
"Testis": "Critical examination of opposing theses [thèses]; discernment, from
a theoretical point of view, of their intrinsic value and their truth-
determination of the characteristic traits of the very precise, very complex,
and very serious philosophical and theological error which it is important
to signal."
In this article, Blondel confronts three pairs of alternatives (theses)
against each other. In his discussion of the first pair (a or A), he pits an
abstract, rationalistic epistemology against an epistemology that
acknowledges the role of the knower's will and subjectivity in the concrete
act of knowing. In the second set (b or h ), he shows the consequences that
these two different approaches to knowledge entail in science, the social
order, and the issue of the natural knowledge of God. In the third set (ç or
<T), he works out the implications for an understanding of the nature-grace
relationship: either one posits, rationalistically, an actual state of pure
nature, or one acknowledges, concretely, that nature always exists
"transnaturally," i.e., as fallen but called to redemption.—Trans.]
2This will be the obiect of the following chapter, ex fructibus iudicandum;
848 Maurice Blondel

Conflicts betw een ideas, it is true, too often resem ble the
battles that M ilton describes, the battles of the angels w ho pass
through each other like clouds w ithout colliding or w ho com­
pletely cleave each other only to be im m ediately restored. N ever­
theless, it is the honor and the excellence of Christian philosophy
always to return, in the extrem e liberty of its explications and its
developm ents, to firm bases, to unequivocal tru th s, and to fixed
directions. The great interest of the recent controversies am ong
believers equally hostile to M odernism , b u t diversely orientated,
is th at it gives shape to tendencies th at w ere long laten t and
diffuse. It forces th e secrets of m inds and hearts to reveal them ­
selves, as if by reaction to new or renew ed errors. It show s the
grow ing divergence of curves w hich, setting out from a com mon
origin, end up by crossing each other. It forces the vulnerable
points of ideas, by the very fact th at they tend to oppose one
another, to come to light. By sketching the new clarifications that
m ark the route, it sees w hether the line follow ed goes in the
direction of the tradition. Finally, it brings us once again before
those decisive and unam biguous tru th s w hich m ay be m isu n d er­
stood in the h eat of fragm entary discussions, b u t w hich cannot be
expressly contradicted once they are directly encountered.
U ntil now , p erh ap s, in spite of the effort exerted to
condense the n ebula of sentim ents, the intellectual h abits and
tendencies w hich set at odds the [social Catholics\ and their
\ contradicto r^ into solid cores, we have n ot succeededin show ing
■ ^d n w K aT sn arp angles the conflict occurs, nor especially to stir
am ong all of our readers the ju dgm ent that, w ith an irresistible
spontaneity, it w ould be ap p ro p riate to m ake on this entire
debate. U ndoubtedly some persist in believing th a t it is a
question of dissolving rath er th an opposing nuances, of harm o­
nizing opinions in charity, in dubiis libertas, of pro cu rin g am icable
solutions by m eans of a discrete eclecticism; that, if the churlish
censors, w hose criticism s we have called to m ind, are not rig h t in
their attacks, they are not w rong in their ow n positions. N ow the
m om ent h as arrived w hen w e w ould like to establish that, in so
far as they rise in protest against the m ethods and essential
doctrines of the social Catholics, they form ulate positive errors
w hich are philosophically untenable and theologically indictable.
Several tim es they them selves have conveyed the feeling of
bringing "new insights,"3 and of presenting questions and
solutions very insistently "w hich none of the authors w ho have
 The Third "Testis" Article 849

treated these m atters have done." Well, these novelties are

innovations and deviations; and now our principal task consists
precisely in diagnosing this subtle and complex error w hich,
having been elaborated for too long already, b u t w ith o u t at first
having allow ed itself to be grasped, has finally, by force of logic
and in the h eat of battle, taken on consistency and expressed itself
clearly and characteristically. It is especially in the conflict th at
occurs apropos of the two latter pairs of opposed theses th at w e
catch sight of the aberrations to w hich one m u st do justice. But
first we m ust insist on the philosophical root of the difficulty and
the resolution of the first difference.
a.a'. Every philosophical doctrine reconciles diverse
elem ents in an ever perfectible synthesis. N one develops equally
all the tendencies th a t it seeks to unfold. By the sam e token, to
counter-balance certain assertions that cannot becom e exclusive
w ith im punity, there is none th at does not benefit from tru th s at
least im plicitly and additionally m aintained as a counterw eight
destined to secure the balance of the system. C onsequently, there
is none th a t does not entail m ultiple and som etim es divergent
conclusions. The m ost balanced doctrine cannot escape this law
of instability, these risks of m ovem ent. A nd the com m entators,
the disciples w ho, after the explication of certain tendencies at first
im plicit, jealously em brace this or th at new developm ent,
believing they faithfully serve the M aster's thought, often only
m utilate it and kill its spirit. It is this sort of spectacle th a t we are
about to w itness.
Is there today, if one has ever existed, a philosopher aw are
of his assertions and consistent in his intransigence w ho w ould
m aintain th a t all know ledge stem s only from b are sense percep­
tions,4 those furnished by one of our five exterior senses w hich
are the object of a distinct and designated notation; that, on the
occasion of these d ata w hich b ear their certificate of origin, the
intelligence grasps im m ediately and in a p u rely theoretical w ay
the generic and indivisible character, the v ery essence of the
considered object,5 to the p o in t th at w hen one has seen w h at a

4//All our knowledge takes its rise from sensation" (Summa

Theologica[=STh] I, q. 1, a. 9).
S//The operation of the intellect is two-fold: the first is called the
understanding of indivisibles, through which the intellect apprehends the
essence of anything in itself; the other is the intellectual operation of
850 Maurice Blondel

stone or a fire is, one know s all th at there is to know about

stoneness or fireness*6; th at all further discoveries either have only
to do w ith qualities and accidents w hose indefinite singularity
does n o t interest science or are due to the application of rational
principles to these essential d ata in order to "com pose" them and
link them together logically; th at the w ill, to speak properly,
intervenes only after this task of u n d erstan d in g in order to
pronounce on the intellectual elem ents w hich have been elabo­
rated beforehand and w hich are proposed for its decision? No. If
there rem ain m any thinkers w ho, either to express theoretically
one or the other of these affirm ations in confused conglom erates,
w ith o u t realizing all th at this entails for a th inking th a t takes
genuine care to rem ain self-consistent; or especially to take it in
fact as their basis in order to convey, b y m eans of exclusive
judgm ents and an irritated attitude, their h o rror and d read of
everything w hich, in the act of know ing, refuses to be reduced to
this form alism , none of them has been able to rem ain untouched
by the infiltration of theses th at oppose and correct their own; no
one, confronting the follow ing assertions, w ould dare to contra­
dict them absolutely; and thus there is no one w ho is n ot led by
the very m ovem ent of his thinking and of all thinking to enter the
p a th up o n w hich, as we w ill soon see, the trad itio n has already
tro d —the trad itio n th at they w rongly claim against us; there is no
one w ho could fail to see, against all evidence: th at the real
definition of even sensible objects is not im m ediately abstracted
by intellectual reflection to serve as the basis of deductions which
suffice to com pose the science; th at w e have to take into account
the "insensible perceptions" or subconscience elem ents, like the
infinitesim als (infiniment petits) th at have everyw here, in biology,
or m ath or psychology, revealed their extrem e im portance; that
subjective phenom ena are also the object of science; th a t our
thoughts are in intim ate relation not only w ith the realities they
represent, b u t also w ith the pro fo u n d life of the soul, w ith our
m oral habits, and w ith our entire selves; and that, consequently,
to stu d y and care for m en and peoples, it is n o t sufficient to treat
them as w alking syllogism s, to refute errors dem onstratively, by
dialectical and didactic m eans to establish tru th s w hich im pose

apprehended simples" (Commentaries of St. Thomas on the Peri hermeneias,

Lectio Ï, Prooemium).
6"If the human intellect comprehends the substance of anything, say 'of a
Stone/ nothin? intelli?ible of this fhincr snrr>ac<;oc tho familfir r>f Tinman
 The Third "Testis" Article 851

them selves as fixed structures, like "an unchangeable essence,"

b u t th a t it is still necessary to consider the historical and eco­
nom ic evolution, to envisage the science of h u m an perspectives,
to rely on the slow m aturation of problem s, to aid the fum blings,
to follow the w ork of im plicit th o u g h t and carry it th ro u g h to the
end. A nd, behold, w e have nearly arrived at the m ethod and the
doctrine w hich has been m ade the object of attack.7
Perhaps no one w ill recognize them selves in the doctrine
th at w e just now sketched; and we w ill probably be accused of
having m ade only a chimerical caricature. This is no d o u b t proof
th at no one can really hold and adhere to these theses in their
logical integrity. But it is not proof that the principles from w hich
they draw inspiration are n o t effectively accepted and th at they
are n o t steadily at w ork in m any thinkers w ho, according to the
circum stances, p u t them into practice or b uttress them w ith
others. H ow any thinking person avoids the "infiltration" of new
elem ents th at the developm ent of the positive sciences, of
psychology, and of historical and social studies has b ro u g h t to
philosophical reflection; and how , at the same tim e, the sim plistic
and sheerly notional theories persist and w orsen in spite of these
involuntary adaptations, w here w e have seen one of the profound
causes w ith o u t w hich the attitude of our intransigents rem ains
unintelligible, this is no do u b t w h at w ill appear m ore decisively
by the com parison of a few texts.
As M. Lebreton recently rem arked, if "in our contem po­
rary controversies, no accusation has been m ore often m ade
against scholasticism and p articu larly against Thom ism th an th at
of rationalism , a m ore p rofound m isunderstanding could n ot be
im agined: rationalism is precisely the opposite of Thom istic
inteUectualism."8Yes, b u t then those w ho claim this teaching m ust
not be the first to disto rt it and to "caricature" it. D id I not
recently read, in the m ost authorized of m anuals w hich is used in
the m ost authorized teaching, propositions like the follow ing

7Perhaps it will be objected here that, far from misunderstanding the

possibility and utility of progressions and alliances, the "intransigents" of
which we speak do not fear to cooperate with atheists, with neo-pagans. We
know it; we know it only too well. And further on we will have to judge this
flexibility, to untangle and appreciate the causes and reasons of such
"agreements" that, as will be seen, inspire the errors and even the deviations
that we discuss here.
852 Maurice Blondel

w hich claim to epitom ize the entire spirit of philosophical

teaching (and it is the au th o r's em phasis, n ot mine):

Scholastic philosophy can be called the philosophy of immediate transcendence.

For according to the scholastics theoretical reason immediately knows the
ontological order. For consciousness immediately knows one's own existence9;
the external senses immediately know the existence of other bodies; and,
reliant on this perception of consciousness and the senses, the intellect makes
analytic judgments that are immediately known, and are moreover immedi­
ately known as having objective value in the real order; and, by the aid of the
principle of causality, reason is able to proceed to investigate the real order
further. By no means does the will enter into these cognitions except indirectly,
in so far as it is able to move the intellect to execute that purely theoretical
cognition.10

Thus, consciousness im m ediately attains the absolute of

our being! Sense perception attains the absolute of other bodies!
Reason attains the absolute of ontological truth! A nd the w ill has
only to ratify after the fact w hat p u re theory has defined. In that
case, those w ho are m istaken m ust be in bad faith! But the fact
that this sim plification, w hich in the nam e of St. Thom as A quinas,
gives us bad version of Thomas Reid w ith a taste of false
Cartesianism, false Biranism, and vague Cousinism; that this poor
rationalism, claiming to have an im m ediate grasp of reality, thinks
it can m anipulate it despotically because of its logical linkage of

9That consciousness absolutely and immediately grasps the subject, by

means directly subjective, is an example of what we just termed an
involuntary "infiltration" in the effort even of the most rigid intransigence.
The opposition between Thomism and Augustinianism on this point is well
known. For St. Thomas "our every cognition has its origins in (external)
sense" (STh I, q. 1, a. 9). St. Augustine, in contrast, insists on what we might
call the objective truth of psychological awareness, on the scientific reality
of the subjective: est enim sensus et mentis ("for it is of sense and of the
mind") (Retractiones 1.1.2). And anticipating the analyses of Maine de Biran,
he indicates that the perceptions of the senses suppose a common
consciousness, antecedent to motor effort, a sense of the usage of the body
and of the sensorial organs (Cf. ed. Vivès, 4, p. 258. Letter to Nebridius). But
it never occurred to him to say that the soul theoretically knows its existence
in the abstract and absolute, since he insisted so forcefully on the difficulty
of knowing oneself as one is: knowledge of the self is inseparable from the
knowledge of God: Noverim me, noverim Te, and from the moral reform of
our entire being.
10[This Latin citation was left unidentified in the third "Testis." It is taken
from page 211 of Institutiones Theologiae naturalis (Rome: Pnntifiral
 The Third "Testis" Article 853

concepts, inspires so m any m inds, so m any w orks calling them ­

selves ad mentem Divi Thomae—all of this is only too clear. A nd yet
one of the m ost recent and m ost penetrating historians of St.
Thomas, along w ith M. Lebreton and others, confirms for us that
this is a distortion and a bunch of "foolishness": M. Rousselot tells
us " th a t one m ust always keep in m ind th at if one reads St.
Thom as w hile im plicitly assum ing the identity of hu m an intelli­
gence and intelligence as such, in forgetting this capital restriction
(w hich distinguishes our ratio from intellectus), then the entire
system suddenly becom es childish and contradictory."11 A nd, as
the sam e author again rem arks, St. Thomas him self says: "W hen
A veroës equated the intelligible in itself w ith the hum anly
com prehensible, he said som ething very ridiculous."12
This "childish," "ridiculous" theory of "im m ediately
ontological, theoretical know ing, perm itting the m anipulation of
reality by deduction from concepts" is not only not St. Thomas,
b u t m oreover one finds in him the indication, on the contrary, of
a doctrine th at profo u n d ly show s the role of action in hum an
know ing, so th a t M. Rousselot could write: "W hat is directly
precious and estim able in reason is less its final or exem plary
causality than its efficient causality. . . . It is in aiding action that
reason functions properly, th at it w orks at its ow n pro p er
perfection, nam ely, to attain itself and to attain God. . . . The
question: 'w h a t is the value of the concept [l'idée] V can be reduced
in practical term s to this: Tn w hat m easure does it b ring about
doing the good?'" (L'intellectualisme, 214).
It is necessary to go even further: not only does hum an
reason m easure itself and clarify itself by action, b u t it is m ore­
over inspired by action from the first, and finally becom es
com plete in it. A m ong the 100 texts that it w ould be im p o rtan t to
collect as stepping-stones, let us focus for a m om ent on one of the
very first articles of the Summa Theologica (I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3). There
we see that there are two m odes of judging, tw o w ays to attain
and discern the truth. First, "by w ay of inclination [per modum
inclinationis]: as w hen a person w ho possess the habit of virtue
rightly com m its to w hat should be done in consonance w ith it,
because he is already in sym pathy w ith it; hence A ristotle
rem arks [bk. 10 of the Ethics] th at the virtuous m an him self sets
the m easure and stan d ard for hum an acts." Then, and in another

11Cf. M. Rousselot, L'intellectualisme de S. Thomas, 56.

f Çf T h n m n c A m i i n a c IV fp fa n h a n h u ç ir c 9 1 1 Cf id C r m tr n
854 Maurice Blondel

sense, judgm ent is p roduced "by w ay of a cognitive process [per

modum cognitionis]: as w hen a person soundly instructed in m oral
science can appreciate the activity of virtues he does n ot him self
possess." N ow, it is the first of these m odes of judgm ent, this
know ing "by connaturality" as St. Thom as calls it, that, in a w ay
und o u b ted ly still im plicit, com prises the real outline of perfect
intellection and of tru e possession, if it is exact to say (and it m ust
be) w ith a recent article in the Revue thomiste, th a t the beatific
vision corresponds to the gift of w isdom , n o t of know ledge
(science).13 "The first w ay of judging divine things belongs to wis­
dom." A nd this w isdom is n o t only the object of study, " quod per
studium habetur."14 It im plies an experience th a t enters into the
core of the w ill and of the entire soul, an affective and effective
sym pathy, an im pression not only passive b u t consenting; because
one can experience a passio only if there is an underlying actio. And
in the same passage, St. Thomas cites Pseudo-Dionysius speaking
of Hierotheus: "being taught by the suffering [patiens] of divine
things, not only by learning about them ." Cajetan comments on
this text: "Patiens comes from passio, in this w ay those are called
passionati to the extent they are strongly affected about something:
in w hich is indicated the greatest inclination of the will, as indeed
a habituated and connatural effect."
H ow then to explain the m isu n d erstan d in g of w hich we
just heard the echo, if not by the exclusive developm ent of one of
the unilateral tendencies of the complex philosophy to w hich one
lays claim? A historian of scholasticism 15recently explained to us
th at St. Thom as in his tim e had appeared to be and actually was
an "innovator," in reaction to the A ug u stin ian tra d itio n and, in
certain respects, to patristic theology. This is an exaggeration, as
has been am ply dem onstrated. But it is no less tru e th a t the Doctor
Eximius [=Francisco Suarez; trans.] inserted new elem ents in his

13Cf. the October 1909 issue, the article of Fr. Raymond Martin concerning
"the formal principle of supernatural contemplation/' Contemplation has its
source in love; it also has as its term the increase of love. Wisdom is affective
knowing. And in the entire series of our acts of knowing up to the highest
term, this concrete sapientia possesses and tastes what scientia only in a
certain sense perceives in outline.
14Cf. STh I, 1, a. 6, ad 3. Concerning knowing by mode of nature, see also
among other important texts: STh II-II, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2.; ibid., q. 45, a. 2; ibid.,
q. 46, a. 2.
15Th. Heitz, Essai historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi, de
Bérenger de Tours à S. Tomas d'Aauin 11909): Cf. M. Laberthonnière. Annales
 The Third "Testis" Article 855

doctrinal synthesis and th a t he b en t the philosophical current in

a direction w herein know ledge—indeed, the know ledge based
exclusively on sense perception—assum es a p rep o n d eran t
im portance, w ithou t how ever, as we have just seen, absolutely
m isunderstanding the rest. N ow, too large a num ber of recent
disciples adhere exclusively to these com plem entary elem ents
w hich they then forge into elem ents th at ru n contrary to an entire
p a rt of the tradition, since this com pletely ideological aspect of
the doctrine m ore easily lends itself to didactic form s and even
instruction m anuals. In this w ay, either by conjunction of
circum stances, or the natu ral b ent of certain m inds, or the desire
of codification, only the second w ay of know ing, quae -per studium
habetur, "w hich is had by study," has been system atically treated.
A nd "philosophers" and "theologians" have m ade m ention of the
first w ay alm ost alw ays in a sim ply adventitious and episodic
m anner, reluctantly and w ith suspicion. But the entirety of
doctrine is not held in scholastic form ulas w here certain people
believe it is preserved in its native purity. A nd, outside of classes
or technical books, a great current has never ceased to circulate in
favor of a m ore living and m ore concrete doctrine. This current is
even found m ore and m ore in St. Thom as him self.16U ndoubtedly,
that w hich w e have just been asked "alw ays to keep in m ind" in
order to in terp ret the authentic m eaning of the great Doctor, the
m ajority have never kept in m ind, the m ajority speak and act as
if the contrary w ere true, the majority, w hen a person recalls this
rule of interpretatio n and bases him self on this teaching, are
su rp rised and scandalized by it.17 It is n ot less exact that, if

16Let one meditate on these texts collected in the Revue thomiste (September-
October 1909: 561): "The order of anteriority and of posteriority in his
synthesis, which is movement, is the activity of the soul. It is the soul that
connects the bundle [la gerbe]. . . . Without the soul there would not be
movement, but only disjoined states.. . . For St. Thomas, with whom mobile
being as such represents nature in its final essence, the objective and the
subjective are not separated as two things. The thing called ''movement7needs
thought in order to exist: it is necessary that man be involved in nature for
nature to subsist. The real is a synthesis." By M. Sertillanges' remarkable
interpretation, one sees that Thomism, in fact, requires a completion opposed
to that which many impose on it. Already M. Charles and M. Mallet in the
Revue de Philosophie had shown in turn how Thomism coincides, in a whole
aspect of its real or possible development, with the philosophy of action.
17It would be strange that, after having so strongly urged the study of St.
TllArMoe onm n rn f n p n 4-/-\ v a o a itta Ut»v\ r*r"U Ua tn i-U ^ 1
— Ï ~
856 Maurice Blondel

contem porary philosophical effort holds a strong interest, it is

precisely because it seeks to integrate the tw o w ays of know ing
instead of opposing them and sacrificing the m ost profound and
m ost living one of them . It is because it studies their solidarity
and strives to set up in classic philosophy this "tw o-in-one"
thought, b o rn of b o th reflection and action. St. Thom as opposed
w hite light to the diverse colors, as if they w ere distinct realities18;
th a t w as th e very im age he used to distinguish the tw o types of
intellect and the tw o types of know ing. R esum ing the sam e
im age, in terp reted by another physics th an his, one m u st say on
the contrary th a t there is only one know ing tru ly w o rth y of the
nam e, a know ing th at uses all the hum an forces and unites all the
pow ers of nature, just as there is only w hite light w hich contains
all colors. O nly those as little inform ed about historical research
and intellectual initiatives as about the m ost positive discoveries
of our era could fail to m iss the traditional m eaning and the tru th
of such an effort—those w ho speak of contem porary p hilosophy
w ith as m uch com petence as of airplanes, "these organism s th at
are in som e sense alive like a bird, since they have rath er pow er­
ful and rap id flapping w ings, and m ay soon be able to lift an
entire battalion into the air."19 No! They do n o t flap their w ings
and they do n ot fly in place, no m ore than the concept (Vidée) can
sustain itself w ith o u t action. They fly only by the m ovem ent th at
displaces them. The concept exists only by the su p p le rig id ity of
its form and by the action th at affords it life and progress.
Perhaps it seems to the reader th at we have strayed rath er
far from the m ethod of the social Catholics. O n the contrary, w e
are quite close; in fact, w e are precisely there: because in w h at
does this m ethod precisely consist b u t in jointly em ploying these
tw o w ays of know ing, in brin g in g them together, in disposing
people on the one side by w ay of experience, inclination, and
good will; on the other, in illum inating m inds concerning the

venom which M. Maurras recommends that one purge from the Gospel?
And indeed do we not see two Thomisms emerging under our eyes: the one,
an instrument of truth, of research, of superior conduct; the other, one that
many people would like to make an administrative process and a sort of
intellectual Prussianism (caporalisme)? Would that they reread the beginning
of opusculum 10 of St. Thomas.
180pusc., II.
19Cf. Le modernisme sociologique, 450. [Blondel is citing from this book by
Tulian In n ta in p Ç T wKn Karl ra-itii-n-T-orl tKo C ' c «
 The Third "Testis" Article 857

truths im plied in these initiatives, w hich m ust clarify the w ay and

show the end to w hich one m u st tend. W hat w e are far from is
this exclusive theory, this bookish and m anualist philosophy th at
they have ru n up against.20 We w ill u n d erstan d this even better
by studying the conflicts th a t rem ain for us to address.
b.b'. If w e have lingered to show th at "the notional
realism ," w hich inspires too m any m inds w ith a h asty zeal, is
only a caricature of philosophy and a d enaturing of the tradition,
it is because w ith o u t this visit to the h id d en roots of the problem ,
we w ould be unable to explain the strange outgrow th, the recent
forms and progressive deviations of w hich w e are now going to
describe. Because (w ithout speaking for the m om ent of the final
causes w hich undoub ted ly contribute to instigating it), the subtle
error w hich is going to open up u n d er our eyes in increasingly
p ro tru d in g and sharp affirm ations, consists in tracing the real
order u p o n the entirely conceptual fram ew ork of abstract th o u g h t
and in falling into a "realist notionalism ." In other w ords, after
having failed to und erstan d th at hum an reason does n ot have an
im m ediate intuition and an adequate grasp of being, one acts as
if it had, and one m isunderstands th at the generic and "m im etic"
know ing th at Thom ism attributes to m an, does not apply de piano
to the individual, to the concrete; one adm its n ot only in theory,
b u t in fact, that the notion we have of diverse orders of reality is
sufficient and exhaustive, to the point of perm itting each order to
be com pletely self-contained. A nd we are going to see this: first of
all and very briefly in w hat affects the relationship of the diverse
dom ains of science and of life; then especially in w hat concerns
the social order in its relationship w ith the m oral and religious
order; and finally and above all in w h at regards the n atu re and
the scope of the n atu ral know ledge we have of God—since, after
all, am ong the points over w hich the social Catholics find
them selves attacked, these are the m ost fundam ental.
(1) W hereas everything in A ristotelianism th at lends itself
to a dynam ic interpretation has been rejected, and one of the

20Their contradictors complain a lot about the invasion of democracy and

mediocracy. Have they reflected on the disadvantages of this
démocratization of thought that, for the benefit of newspapers and popular
reviews, permits men without mandate and without sufficient competence
to call the most delicate of questions before the tribunal of an opinion
incapable of any control, and to impose their solutions which are all the
more readily accepted the more outrageous and less pertinent they appear?
T V lO tr T A m n M n r \ rl A n U l o - m iln -Î £ t i t a T .r /x « « ^ ^ ' —• -i-T-—1 _ * j . i—
858 Maurice Blondel

d om inan t ideas th at genuinely inspired it has been elim i­

n ated —nam ely, the idea of a chain of beings th a t ascend from
below th ro u g h attraction, b u t w ith o u t the conscious cooperation
of a m oving and final cause—one retains, on the contrary,
everything in this great and com plex doctrine th a t fixes beings in
concepts, concepts in w ords, and forces the w orld into a logically
regulated fram ew ork. A ristotle, u n d er the sw ay of a static
conception th at im prisons realities in conceptual and verbal
definitions, declared th at the passage from one genus to another,
from one science to another, to metaballein eis alio genos, is illegiti­
m ate and im possible, and he offered the h y b rid alliance of
arithm etic w ith geom etry or physics as an exam ple of such an
erro r to be avoided, of such a chim era to be condem ned. N ow,
w ho does not know th at the entire progress of the exact sciences
and the sciences of n atu re in m odern tim es is precisely ow ing to
this "interm arriage" (connubium) w hich A ristotle condem ned a
p riori and w hich, in fact, has proved to be indefinitely fruitful in
"the specious algebra" of Descartes w ho directly contradicts the
very exam ple of the Stagyrite, in the infinitesim al calculus of
N ew ton and Leibniz, in the developm ents of m athem atical
physics, in the entire renovation introduced in biology b y the
evolutionist p o in t of view, w hatever its basic value? In all the
dom ains of life and thought, the ancient conception of real
com partm ents (cloisonnements), in harm ony w ith the logical
definitions per essentiam et per genus proximum et per differentiam
specificam, has given w ay to the stu d y of "interdependence" or of
the "interaction" of beings, and to the definitions per generationem
that not only p resent to th o u g h t the distinctive characteristics of
constituted things, b u t also indicate the very law of their real
p ro d u ctio n and the sense of their norm al developm ent. Just as
Leibniz show ed the insufficiency of C artesian m echanics from the
em pirical p o int of view as w ell as from the m etaphysical p o in t of
view, likewise, from bo th the scientific and philosophical p o in t of
view (we w ill have to say soon from the C hristian p o in t of view),
it m ust be said to those w ho have inherited the "apprehension of
indivisibles" (indivisibilium apprehensio), of "stoneness" or
"fireness": "You are w rong w hen, un d er the pretex t of safeguard­
ing the realism of the act of know ing, you take the subjective
sim plifications and artificial contours w hich you im pose on
reality for the very m easure of things, and w hen, th in k in g you
hold the com plete essence of the concrete being in your concept.
 The Third "Testis" Article 859

you claim to govern the real according to the logical distinctions

and deductive processes th a t belong only to abstraction."21
(2) In the logic of this distorted perspective, one talks to us
today of the social order, of rational law , of n atu ral religion as
self-contained realities, such th at they do n o t only have self-
sufficient m eans, b u t a sort of dorm ant stability and an integral
(compact) and closed solidity.
So one boasts—w ith a sincerity th at is too genuine—of
having "insisted, m ore th an any author w ho has treated these
m atters, on the clear and adequate distinction betw een politico-
religious tru th s of the philosophic order, those w hich constitute
the n atu ral religious law of hum anity, and, on the other hand, the
politico-religious tru th s of the su p ern atu ral C hristian order
properly speaking, those w hich constitute the positive and
p articular law of the C hurch."22 Thus there is "a lum inous and
im m utable b o u n d ary [traced] betw een tw o w o rld s,"23 each self-
contained; "all of this is adequately distinct"24; the social order
and n atural law m ust be held as "real and existent realities," th at
is, as constituting a closed system , w hich has need of nothing else
(except, of course, the su p p o rt of the First Cause, w hich is
com m on to everything), and w hich leads to nothing else and
comes to perfection in itself. A nd, still follow ing th is same
exclusive conception, our "extrem ists," certainly n ot of reconcilia­
tion, b u t of condem nation, bend their bow to the breaking point.
It is w o rth the trouble to lend our attention to this enterprise.
In his "D eclaration" of Bordeaux, M. Lorin—in speaking
of the transcendent end of all th o u g h t and action, nam ely,
G od—had said the following w ords, w hich the com plete context
clearly explains and w hich are in tended to keep us from falling
from rationalism into fideism: "Reason u n d o u b ted ly ou g h t to

21Perhaps one will object to us here that neither peripateticism nor

especially scholasticism failed to understand the hierarchy of beings or the
subalteration of the sciences. We will wait to show later how the proposed
solution, far from remedying the disadvantage and suppressing the
difficulty that we just signaled, aggravates and, so to speak, compounds the
difficulty. By studying the attitude resulting from the theory here discussed,
we will have to expound and to judge speculative theses and applications
so tightly connected to each other that it is better not to encroach now on
what we will soon have to say.
22Cf. La Foi catholique (fune 1909): 371 and 375.
23Ibid., 373.
860 Maurice Blondel

suffice to m ake us know w ith certitude th at this reality exists."

Im m ediately, Fr. G audeau retorts: "It m ust n ot be said: ought to
suffice; one m u st say: really suffices, u n d er p ain of being anathem a­
tized by the Vatican C ouncil."25
N ow the constitution De Fide literally declares: "The
C hurch holds and teaches th at God, the beginning and end of all
things, is able to be known with certitude b y the n atu ra l light of
reason and from created things."26Thus, it is a m atter of faith th at
m an is able to know w ith certitude th at God exists. A nd w h en M.
Lorin indicates th at this capability is at the sam e tim e a duty, he
first of all im plies in his assertion everything, precisely every­
thing, w hich the Council has declared; furtherm ore, he indicates
by w h at conditions this potency passes into act; and he in ­
sists—consistent w ith a th o u san d Scriptural, Patristic or Doctoral
texts—on the m oral and obligatory elem ent of belief in God; he
recalls th at there is a "blindness of h eart" (Mk 3:5) and th u s also
a norm al vision of heart; that, according to the expression of St.
Thom as, "divine m atters are m ore effectively shielded from the
unw orthy " (STh I, q. 1, a. 9, ad 3), and consequently th at there is
also a m ethod for m aking oneself less un w o rth y of seeing; that,
for this reason, the faculty th at we have to know and affirm th at
God exists, is n ot a pow er th a t one exercises or n o t ad libitum and
w ith im punity; th at know ledge of the "one God, our Creator, our
Lord, our M aster" is accessible n ot only as a tru th reserved to the
felicitous effort of a free and leisurely study, b u t as a vital
certitu d e im posed on all, as m uch as the fundam ental p rescrip ­
tions of conscience. The anathem atized expression is thus
absolutely correct: reason can and even m u st suffice to know th at
God exists. A nd here w hoever says must says, ipso facto and a
fortiori, can.
But can w e at least say th at the form ula th a t Fr. G audeau
w ants to substitute for w h at he u n d u ly criticizes, in the very
m eaning he gives it, is protected from the anathem a w hich he has
been found to h u rl against the conciliar text itself? By no m eans.
A nd, com pletely to the contrary, he is led by the logic of his error
to absolutely intolerable positions.
(3) Let us pass on to the statem ent that is am biguous an
otherw ise unfaithful to the letter of the Council: "reason really
suffices to know G od." Isolated and benevolently taken in its

25Ibid., p. 133. [Obviously, the reference is to the First Vatican

Council.—Trans.]
 The Third "Testis" Article 861

broadest and m ost vague sense, it could sim ply m ean th at in fact
m an, considered im personally and universally, attains and
affirm s the First Cause. But, to the extent that Fr. G audeau claims
to proscribe the following proposition as heretical: "C oncerning
the transcendent reality of God, reason (can and) ought to suffice
to m ake us know w ith certitude th at God exists," he inevitably
condem ns him self. A nd he forces us to suscribe helplessly to a
position henceforth unam biguous.27 Because w h at th en does his
form ula m ean, if not th at this real sufficiency is an accom plished
fact; th a t consequently w e all have a reason w hich at the present
tim e suffices to know God; th a t it concerns a positive reality, "the
m ost essential of historical, social, and political realities"28; th at
theism is a doctrine in stable equilibrium , the norm al religion of
norm al hum anity; th at there is, then, historically and validly, a
natural religion w hich is alive and sufficient as such; th at this
n atu ral religion—really and legitim ately "existing in hum anity,
outside of C hristianity,"29 this religion, w hich lies "in n a­
tu re " —ought to be restored from its discredit: because "n atu ral
religion constitutes the n atu ral and prim itive C hristianity of
w hich T ertullian spoke: it is the spiritual place of souls, w here
they can encounter each other, w here in fact all the souls w ho
w ant to live a superior and interior life do m eet, consciously or
not."30
Well, this idea of a positive natural religion, of a viable and
practical p u re theism , of a natural Christianity, w hich is explicit
and lived, is such a defiance of history and trad itio n th a t one
cannot u n d erstan d how a theologian could have been d raw n to
these strange novelties, how so m any m inds could ap p lau d it as
the height of orthodoxy, if it w as n o t under the influence of the
theoretical deviations that we have already signalled and seduced
by the applications that w e w ill soon denounce. Thus in its real
and actual condition, hum anity, even "outside of C hristianity,"
n o t only ought to have, b u t really w ill have a positive religion,
nam ely, theism ; a religion th at ought to be a political reality as a
state religion; a religion that, in its actual reality, unites and gives

27[Blonders observation depends on our seeing the distinction between M.

Lorin's thesis that reason in principle ought to suffice, while, concretely-
speaking, it requires the aid of grace, and M. Gaudeau's thesis that reason
in fact (concretely) suffices on its own.—Trans.]
28La Foi catholique (June 1909), 374.
29La Foi catholiaue ITulv 19091. 37.
862 Maurice Blondel

life to souls! W hat th en is to be m ade of the Scripture text, so

often cited: "since all the gods of the heathens are dem ons"? (Ps
95:5) Or if M. Lorin is criticized for asking C hristianity to m ake us
"know m ore intim ately w h at God is" and for determ ining m ore
precisely the destiny of m an and of society, w ill one d are to allege
of Pius X, either th at he fell into the sam e error by declaring that
"the presen t order of things being subordinate to the conquest of
the absolute good of eternal beatitude, society can neither pro sp er
nor endure for long w hen no place is m ade for religion w hich is
the suprem e rule and the sovereign m aster of m an,"31 or th at w hat
he is proposing w ith these grave w ords is a n atu ral religion, and
th at he is speaking of a beatitu d e other th an the one that belongs
to the properly su p ern atu ral order?
Let us go further—because the logic rem ains an im perious
m aster in the error itself. N ot only does one tell us th at "reason
really suffices to know G od," but, in order for this p roposition to
have the m eaning assigned to it by the very usage m ade of it,32 it
m ust still signify that this know ing is really sufficient in some way.
Because if, in its total extension, it rem ains deficient and tentative,
one w ould no longer be able to speak of this calm and p artially
saturating stability th at is the condition of a theism , p u re and
positive. N o doubt, w hen the occasion presents itself, one does
not fail to recall th at this rational know ledge of God is "insuffi­
cient." It is only th at one is thereby reduced in this form ulation to
m eaning nothing m ore th an th at God is, so to speak, know able in
separate sections; th a t if some of these fragm ents or aspects elude
our n atu ral grasp, at least a piece is accessible b o th in fact and in
principle; th at there is a God of natu re and a God of supernature;
th at the p a rt n atu rally accessible is so to speak juxtaposed to the
other and gives us n o thing further to desire; th at this section is
th u s w ell enough know n th at this know ledge can keep us at rest
and perm its the n atu ral religion th at satisfies itself w ith this
know ledge to becom e established in itself, since it is, as w e are
told in a language th at perh ap s w ould be criticized w hen com ing
from som eone else, "adequately and indispensably distinct" from
the C hristian order?

31Cf. the encyclical Vehementer.

32Again, let us repeat that some (not all) of the formulas that we criticize
could be interpreted in a benign sense. But all the same there is no reason
r\-r-\ r\ c h r\t -tl A /->1'-Nt-v> ^ ^ -»-sl ^ 4 - < - ■ i- ^ ^ ^ 4-V^-v*
 The Third "Testis" Article 863

So w hen St. Thomas told ûs that even for higher tru th s of

the rational order "w e also stood in need of being in stru cted by
divine revelation even in religious m atters th at the hum an reason
is able to investigate; for the rational tru th about God w o u ld have
appeared only to a few, and even so after a long tim e and m ixed
w ith m any m ista k e s/'33 he w as, w ith o u t know ing it, ju st like the
entire tradition, heading tow ard the slope of error—he w as
already on it, he w as falling! So w hen St. A ugustine told us th at
the little know ledge w e have of God is m ore an ignorance than a
science, and th a t we begin to know God to the extent th at w e are
aw are of our inability to avoid m isu n d erstan d in g G od34; and
w hen all the Fathers and all the D octors are agreed in affirm ing
th a t h u m a n thought, w hatever it m ay do, is deficient in divine
m atters, in divinis multum deficiens, w hen they call self-sufficient
virtues and w orship stripped of religious restlessness, vices and
falsehoods, they fall unaw ares into contem pt, w orthy of an ath ­
em a, w ith respect to this positive natu ral religion w hich is, w e are
told, the place of repose of souls, a perfectly solid and stable level,
und o u b ted ly inferior, b u t ultim ately right next to C hristianity!
A nd since one appeals to the evidence of facts and to the certi­
tudes of reason, to history and to philosophy, I ask: W here then
has one seen in the p ast this n atu ral social and religious order
subsisting in stable equilibrium and w ith a real self-sufficiency
that w e are required to affirm u n d er pain of heresy? W hat hu m an
society has ever know n the repose of com plete order th at has
succeeded in suspending the passing of time and the shaking of
the m ost established institutions? W hat know ledge of God can
call itself sufficient w ith o u t im m ediately becom ing an idol?
W ithout transform ing the tru e God, the living and m ysterious
God, into an abstract and anthropom orphic concept? W ithout
draining the sources of religious life? W ithout im peding the élan
of the spirit, the restless heart (irrequietum cor)? W ithout su p p ress­
ing this nostalgia for w ant of w hich a soul is dead to H im w ho is
A bsent, w hom it w ould n o t seek if it had n o t already found him ,
b u t w hom it w ould cease to find as soon as it w ould no longer

33STh I, q. Î, a. 1. Cf. Constitutio de fide catholica, in Denzinger (1786).

34//God is not sense, nor intellect, nor anything that can be thought," St.
Augustine. Ed. Vivès, IV, p. 54. Cf. St. Thomas. "Then only do we truly
know God, when we believe God himself to be above everything that is
possible to be thought about God," (Summa Contra Gentiles, I, V, 1).
"Anything that can be thought or desired is less than God," (Opusc. VII,
864 Maurice Blondel

search? W hat philosophy has the rig h t to quarter itself on its

rational level, to claim to be at hom e there, in com plete integrity,
w hereas, according to the beautiful and p ro fo u n d doctrine of
C ardinal D echam ps, the only philosophically and tru ly C hristian
thesis is th at w hich insists on "the perm an en t and p erd u rin g
insufficiency, intrinsic to even the m ost developed reason, for
resolving the problem of destiny and the religious question such
as it inevitably arises from the hu m an condition."35
A nd if there is a true and precise m eaning to give to the
phrase of Tertullian about "the natu rally C hristian soul" (and not,
as is said, about natural Christianity, w hich is som ething com­
pletely different and, to be honest, a m onstrosity36), it is n o t th at
w hich is being proposed to us, because the confidence of reason
in its real self-sufficiency can only m ake it conceited and close it
in on itself; C hristianity's stepping stone in the soul is, on the
contrary, the feeling of a void hollow ed out in its greatest depths,
the confession of a spirit that, far from doubting the divine object
of its aspiration, h u m bly doubts itself by acknow ledging its
incapacity to attain it such as it is.37
If it is true then th at reason and philosophy have their
ow n force, a solidity am ple enough that it w ould be inexcusable
to fail to grasp their fundam ental verities, there exists no m ore
pernicious error than to attribute to them, even to a sm all degree,
the rig h t to establish a totality th a t is stable enough th a t no
ulterior need m akes itself invincibly felt. There is now here th a t a
hu m an being can feel absolutely at home; he does n o t possess
him self in a n atu re th a t has been han d ed over to his com plete
enjoyment: and here w e touch on the problem th a t dom inates the
entire debate, the relationship of the natu ral order in its totality
w ith the su p ern atu ral order in its purity.
c.c. W hat has preceded already throw s into relief the
response w hich m u stb e given to the th ird alternative posed: "Yes
or no, either ç or d , either the thesis th a t h u m an ity is being
w orked on and as it w ere raised by a grace that, even w hen it is
still anonym ous or pseudonym ous, can guide it in anticipation of

35Cf. Dechamps, vol. 16, p. 274 and 329. Cf. Bernard de Sailly, Annales de
philosophie chrétienne (October 1906), 58.
360nce again we catch red-handed this habit of transposing that which is
true in the living and concrete order of souls to the abstract order of
concepts where it is less than true and even less than false—as much as to
c n p a lf n f n a t u r a l ciirw arn atiiralicim
 The Third "Testis" Article 865

the gift from on hig h th at R evelation b rin g s and the C hurch

proposes, or the thesis th at nothing su p ern atu ral comes except by-
express presentation by an external authority and into a recepta­
cle devoid of all spontaneity—-which of these theses is true?"
N ow w e w ant to apply all of our energies not only to show
how the diverse errors of perspective, in the philosophical order,
have little by little corrupted the intellectual habits of certain
apologists or of certain polem icists w ho appeal to theology. W hat
w e w ould at present especially like is, inversely, to show how the
theology of the m anuals w hich they depend on to confirm and in
some w ay necessitate their philosophical positions, is itself—if
tackled head on and an answ er is dem anded—deficient, incom ­
plete, and—in so far as it claims to be com plete and exclu­
sive—false, contrary to the trad itio n and to these great Christian
tru th s w hich leave no room for any am biguity.
From the m om ent the diverse orders of reality are
separated like logical concepts or intellectual atom s, and from the
m om ent we juxtapose the rationalism of a th o u g h t th a t really
suffices to know God to the supernaturalism of a faith th a t is p u re
receptivity of a purely extrinsic gift,38it is no longer adm issible or
com prehensible th at there can be a fissure in the n a tu ra l order
that cracks it open, a ferm ent th a t lifts it, nor th a t the su p ern atu ­
ral order can descend into n atu re and act there or cause itself to
be sought, w ith o u t thereby being elim inated. A nd th a t is w hy the
m ere idea of an im m anent presence, of a positive experience, of
an intrinsic m eaning of the su p ern atu ral seems n o t only irrem ed i­
ably incom plete and obscure (which is true), b u t appears as
som ething th at m ust be absolutely and totally excluded (which is
false). T hat is w hy the only com m unication th at one can or w ants
to establish or tolerate betw een the two orders is an argum enta­
tion th a t throw s a sheerly intellectual and sheerly extrinsic bridge
betw een them , to the extent th at any "internal criteria" them ­
selves are involved only in so far as they are reduced to them es
for reflection or m om ents in a deduction. The tru th s of faith, they
say, cannotbe seen, b u t they canbe dem onstratively p roven—and
the grounds for belief is this proof itself.

38No doubt, one imagines that by thus joining an ideology to an

agnosticism one can thereby remedy both. We will soon see, when we study
the attitude that results from such a conception, the secret vices and deadly
consequences of this artifice that only manages to mask the difficulty at the
expense of multiplying the theoretical and practical drawbacks they entail
fr \i- o a A n tiio r W o m u s t n o t b p lip v p th a t s e v e r a l errors combine to make a
866 Maurice Blondel

N ow , this is so false th a t no one w ould dare adhere to this

thesis, w hich nevertheless rem ains w ithin the strict logic of the
perspective adopted: no, the exterior p roposition of the su p ern at­
u ral (how ever dem onstrative it m aybe) never suffices to p roduce
personal assent, as the faith requires, w ith o u t interior help from
God, w ith o u t su p ern atu ral assistance itself. The external signs,
according to the very w o rd s of the V atican Council, enter in only
as "joined w ith internal helps."
But then by w h at bias, by w hat new error does it h ap p en
th a t m any, w ith o u t explicitly denying this fundam ental tru th ,
speak and judge as if it d id n ot exist? It is th at they im agine th at
this interior gift is only concom itant to the exterior and explicit
teaching and th at it rem ains otherw ise absolutely unconscious all
the w hile th at it is operative. Consequently, w ith o u t having, they
think, to treat of it other th an to m ention its m ysterious presence,
they have in view only p u re natu re on the one h and, and, on the
other, the d ata dem onstrated to the m ind and im posed on the
v oluntary adhesion of the believer.
N ow, this is doubly false. First, although they do so
alm ost constantly, it is only by an undeniable error th at one can
reason as if the "n atu ral state" of the unbeliever, of the ig norant
one, of the apostate, w ere the state of "p u re n atu re," a state th at
w ith o u t any d o u b t could have existed, b u t does n o t exist, has
never existed, and of w hich w e cannot even precisely define the
real conditions, since, according to our contradictors' ow n
doctrine (which is tru e in itself), we know nothing concrete except
in function of experim ental data. A nd, in the next place, to
conceal and forget this error w hich it is im possible to affirm
expressly and to m aintain directly, it does n o t help to reso rt to
another error, to the thesis tacitly adm itted by m any and w hich
u n d o u b ted ly no one w ould take responsibility for in its form al
enunciation, nam ely, th at all m en do n ot have a su p ern atu ral
vocation; th at the state—w hich is neither the state of nature, nor
the state of grace and, to abbreviate, we w ill call a "tran sn atu ral"
state, in order to designate the disorder of a destiny th a t has
undergone a fall and is influenced by an inner call—does n ot
enter at all into one's consciousness.
But this is false, so false that in order to escape these errors,
they seek refuge in others, in the m anner of one w ho hurries to
jum p from a tottering rock to another that is prehaps even more
precarious. A nd, not being able expressly to fail to see that the
natural state, w hich precedes supernatural life or th at continues
w ithin it, is not a state of stable equilibrium , not being able to deny
----------------------------- 1 - L- — - c -
 The Third "Testis" Article 867

restlessness, in the strong sense of St. A ugustine or M alebranche,

is the indelible trait of hum anity, one claims at any rate th at grace
is absolutely and inevitably unconscious. Yes, assu red ly grace
rem ains h id d en , veiled, beyond w ords; it does n ot m ake itself
know n and recognized from w ithin, u n d er its ow n nam e, in its
definition, in its ow n being. But it determ ines psychological
realities th a t are know able as such, verifiable and available
realities, realities th at entail responsibility, and of w hich one can
constitute the science, determ ine the interconnection, guide the
em ploym ent.39 For lack of this conscious elem ent, w hich is still
anonym ous, the correspondence of the intelligent and free w ill to
the divine sum m ons w ould lose all reasonable and m oral
character; and the spiritual adhesion, the rationabile obsequium,
w ould lim it itself to a sheerly natu ral ratification of the grounds
of credibility. Then we w ould have in faith only an intellectual
conform ity founded on a scientific dem onstration, and in w hich
God, in an absolutely u nknow n m anner, w ould insert the
su p ern atu ra l elem ent that, as supernatural, w ould allow for no
h u m a n cooperation, w ith m an only furnishing a n atu ra l act of
conscious (savante) reflection. A nd it w ould have to be m aintained
th a t the internal helps are n o t reflected in any psychological
aw areness, are not the origin of any "light of faith" for the
intellect, and are not m orally utilizable by the will.
N ow , this is false, so seriously false th at to avoid this
ruinous terrain, one falls back u p o n another error, an error th at
m akes im proper use of a certain tru th , lending it its appearance
of orthodoxy, b u t w hich profits from this tru th only at the
expense of other salutary and necessary tru th s, as if it w ere
m otivated less by love of the one than by hatred of the others, and
as if, un d er the protection of an irreproachable form ula, it could
canonize itself and becom e the rallying center of all the
precedingly denounced errors. How ever, th o u g h one m ay escape
th ro u g h loopholes, one m ust eventually touch solid ground, and
in the end our p u rsu it corners the adversary at the inevitable, the
brilliant solidity of authentic Christianity.
In recent controversies, it has too often been sup p o sed th at
there are only tw o alternatives available: on the one h an d , the
im m anentism , so justly condem ned, th at affirm s the w hole

39Cf. On the objective, scientific, and universal value of internal

apologetics, see Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 1 (1907):
A A Q -7 7 C ( H/f - J— T‘
868 Maurice Blondel

religious developm ent and the entire C hristian evolution as

arising from below and from the shad o w y d ep ths of conscious-^
ness; on the other hand, a doctrine that, out of a strong aversion
to the preceding, sees only the external gift, the revelation
form ulated from on high, the authority addressing itself to a pu re
receptivity and to a passive obedience. A nd m any even im agine
th a t this latter is the height of orthodoxy, and th a t one can
subtract or add nothing to this m axim alism of intransigence. But
this is false. The thesis th at says th a t everything in C hristianity
comes from w ithout, extrinsecus, is no less incorrect th an the
thesis th at says everything comes from w ithin, by efference. To
have a w o rd for the error, monophorism is the term b o th for this
false doctrine of efference and for the incom plete doctrine of
sim ple afference from w ithout.40 In order to m aintain the integrity
of doctrine, w e m ust oppose and prefer the doctrine of a double
afference to this m onophorism . This doctrine certainly does n o t
attribute to the im m anent m ovem ent of the soul, even if already
supernatu rally p en etrated and stim ulated, the p ow er b y itself to
discern its origin and term ; b u t neither does it attribute to the
pow er of objective tru th , by the m ere fact th at it is authoritatively
proposed to the m ind, the pow er to m ake itself welcom e and
assim ilated; the doctrine that, w ith D echam ps, recognizes th at
there are tw o "an d only tw o facts to verify, the one in us, the
other outside of us; these tw o facts seek each other in order to

40Since technical expressions are always necessary to label complex and

precise doctrines, the theses concerning the question which occupies us
could be thus specified. Radical modernism is
(individual or colleciive^itm a^ersJittle here). Alongside this error which
eliminates the supernatural, we find another which absolutely denatures it
and which one could name an intrinsicist monophorism; because, while
affirming the contribution of an internal supernatural gift, this doctrine,
more specious and also more dangerous than the preceding, considers
objective revelation and exterior authority (when it still admits them) as the
mere social expression of interior afference. In contrast to these, there is an
extrinsicist monophorism, the error we are here diagnosing and whose deadly
effects we will have to describe. In its essence, Catholicism is, at the same
time, life from within and vision (vue) from without, spiritual liberty and
total submission; because the supernatural comes to attract us from within
by grace and from without by revelation which prescribes for us the truth
to believe and the precepts to practice—only because Christ exists; he exists,
and all the interior stimulations of the supernatural vocation ontologically
proceed from his Incarnation, his mediation, and his immolation; he exists,
and from him, his word, his examples, and his institutions proceed both the
 The Third "Testis" Article 869

em brace"41; th at the interior fact is not p u rely n atu ral (because

"fallen n atu re is n ot alone in any one of u s"42; and w e w o u ld not
be able to resist the light w herein the divine solicitations appear
un d er their psychological covering "w ithout resisting conscience
and reason at the same tim e"); consequently, this doctrine
reconciles the intim acy of spiritual life w ith the necessary and
beneficial authority of the infallible m agisterium , and, w ith o u t
sacrificing any aspect of the total ensem ble of the C hristian
m ysteries—life, w ay, and tru th —sets in operation bo th the
invisible gift of w hich the Incarnation and the R edem ption are the
spring w elling up even in persons w ho are the m ost ig norant of
the su p ern atu ral and the illum inating gift of revelation w hich
proposes to our reason, to our intelligent and free assent, to our
m oral use, and to our total adoration, the order th a t is substan­
tially constituted by C hrist, the m ediator and deifier.
True, salutary, and necessary insofar as it condem ns and
elim inates any theory th at w ould claim th at religious life is only
a p ro d u ct of nature or even th at the su p ern atu ral order reveals
itself by the channels of reason and the in dividual and collective
conscience, even from a previously sow n seed, b u t w ith o u t an
explicit revelation and w ith o u t a teaching divinely confided to an
authority, the doctrine th at affirm s the essential and gratuitous
afference of the gift from on high, w ould then becom e—in fact
does becom e—false to the extent that, u n d er the p retext of
affirm ing th a t neither the reality nor the know ledge of C hristian­
ity proceed "from n ature and thro u g h n atu re" (ex natura et per
naturam), it fails to recognize the interior w ork of God in the soul
and the interior w ork of the soul tow ards God, "in n atu re and
according to the m ode of n atu re" (in natura et ad modum naturae);
to such an extent th at Cajetan, following St. Thom as, says that, if
it does n o t belong natu rally to m an as such (non est naturale homini
ut sic), it is n atu ra l to m en such as they are in reality, (est naturae
hominum, est naturale homini ordinato ad patriam)43, indeed, n atu ral
to the "transnaturalized " (transnature) hum an being to be ordered
to 'divine b e a titu d e / because there is no other.44
So w hen M. Lorin is criticized for saying th at only
"C hristianity is adequate to in dividual and social life," it is only

41Cf. Cardinal Dechamps, Oeuvres completes, vol. 1, Épigraphe.

42Ibid., vol. 3, p. 210.
43Cf. Commentaires de Cajetan sur St. Thomas, I-II, q. 3, a. 8; and I, q. 12, a. 1.
44"Human nature is ordered equally with the angels, namely, to beatitude
870 Maurice Blondel

on account of a m entality filled w ith the errors of w hich w e have

just described the tenacious netw ork th at his th o u g h t can be so
badly interpreted, indicted, and condem ned, as it is thus: "If there
is really an equivalence [adéquation] betw een C hristianity and the
in d iv id u al and social life of m an, then it m eans th a t h u m an nature
dem ands and postulates C hristianity; this is the error of im m a­
nence, und ersto o d in the sense rejected by the C hurch."45 A
spurious com plaint; even m ore, a com plaint th at reveals the
prosecuto r's ow n error. It is n o t M. Lorin, b u t M. G audeau w ho
speaks of a state of pu re nature, w ho m istakenly thinks th at this
state of n atu re is "really" actualized in in d iv id u al and social life,
w ho presupposes th at m an rem ains in a state of n atu ral equilib­
riu m until som ething comes to disturb him ; and it is thus he who,
in m aking accusations, accuses and condem ns him self. From this
p o in t of view, it is useless to protest otherw ise, su p ern atu re w ill
alw ays appear as som ething opposed to nature.
There is m ore th an one w ay of transgressing lim its; and
one cannot, m erely for the pu rp o se of stigm atizing an error, get
carried aw ay in the opposed sense w ith o u t risking finally
departin g from the truth. "M onophorism " is no less an aberration
than "im m anentism "; the block th at crushes does n o t kill any less
th an the subtle poison th at insinuates itself. By d in t of seeing in
C hristianity only w hat occurs and im poses itself from w ithout,
one ends up presenting it as a law of fear and constraint, as an
instrum en t of dom ination w ielded against a spoil-sport; because,
since the natural and social order and even n atu ral religion would
be really sufficient w ith o u t it, w hat else can it be other than an
ad d ed and even crushing b u rden, if one refuses to ad m it th at
n atu re is p en etrated by a gift th at secretly provides the strength
to bear the transcendent gift as w ell as the need to accept it? N ow,
if C hristianity is essentially law of love, if the yoke of the Lord is
light and relieving—"the b u rd en of the Lord has w ings" St.
A ugustine says—if the tru th should free and expand the soul, is
there a conception m ore fundam entally anti-C hristian th an the
one w hose sterilizing ingredients w e have ju st analyzed and
w hose com plex and stifling texture we have ju st studied?
In order to restore a bit of life, flexibility, and goodness, one
resorts in vain to a concession and takes refuge in a final hideout,
by speaking at the very least of a "suitability" (convenance) of our
nature w ith respect to the supernatural. This is an illogical pallia­
tive, a recent fabrication, and it is ineffective: because this term
 The Third "Testis" Article 871

says too m uch or too little. Too much: indeed, if it is a m atter of

nature, taken in the pu rely abstract sense th a t one claims to hold,
there is no positive elem ent in it to relate it to the su p ern atu ral;
too little: because, if it is a m atter of the actual state and of the
destiny to which, in fact, we are necessarily called, one m u st not
speak only of fittingness, but, w ith the Vatican Council, St.
Thom as, and the entire tradition, of necessity or strict obligation.
All the recent studies46 th at have gone back to the genuine
sources have show n that, in fact, the entire trad itio n protests
against the error just displayed, against this m anualist theology
w hose invasion, otherw ise very recent, becom es increasingly
m enacing.47It also happens th at the social Catholics as w ell as the
philosophers of action, w ho are accused of oscillating from
naturalism to fideism , have, on the contrary, from their p o in t of
view , show n better than ever before the essential heterogeneity
and real continuity of the tw o orders. It is n o t they w ho say, as
one attributes to St. Thom as,48 th at "the intuitive vision is
postulated in some m anner by the nature of the intellect," because
the su p ern atu ral does not consist uniquely in a vision or an
intuition, no m atter how theoretical and com prehensive of being
one m ay suppose it to be. It consists especially in an u n h eard of
relationship of love, in a divinizing adoption th at in some w ay
reverses, w ith o u t otherw ise annulling, the m etaphysical order,
the necessary relation of the Creator to the creature, in order to
introduce this slavish creature into the intim ate life of the Trinity,
as a son. One could infinitely desire fully to see the infinite
w ith o u t ever desiring, w ith o u t ever suspecting this "excess," this
"folly," w hich is of another order than th at of intellection. A nd
besides we are only able indeed to see and possess God specula­
tively in beatitude if, th ro u g h the m ediation of the incarnate

46Cf. E. Thamiry, Les deux aspects de l'immanence; A. Ligeard, La théologie

scolastique et la transcendance du surnaturel; F. Mallet [=Blondel], "Études sur
le cardinal Dechamps" Annales de philosophie chrétienne (October 1905;
February and March 1906; March 1907); M. de Poulpiquet Quelle est la valeur
de l'apologétique interne?; M. Rousselot, L'intellectualisme de S. Thomas, etc.
47Cardinal Dechamps has often insisted upon the modernity of apologetics
and the theology of "ranks," as he called it in contrast to this grand
tradition, the development of which Fr. Martin recently outlined for us. And
Fr. Gardeil indicated to us, with respect to certain theses and methods which
"would be sought in vain in antiquity" although some people give them as
"consecrated," that in reality they arose in the last "150 years." Cf. Revue
Thomiste (July 1909): 388.
872 Maurice Blondel

W ord w ho calls us his brothers (Mt 28:10), we p articip ate in his

hypostatic u nion in the bosom of the Father. So it is no t correct to
have one u n d erstan d th at all thought, all reason intrinsically
tends to a su p ern atu ral end; because there is nothing th at
resem bles an intellectual exigence, nothing b u t g ratu ity in the
excess of charity w hich, by tru ly divine creativity, com m unicates
the Incom m unicable and induces God to m ake him self our
servant, our nourishm ent, our beggar49 in som e fashion; in all of
this, there is nothing naturalizable, no m atter how deeply w e
penetrate into n atu re's inm ost depths. A nd th a t is w hy, w ith o u t
being afraid of falling into a naturalism th at the ideological
doctrine of our adversaries will never avoid, even if they juxta­
pose it w ith an exclusively extrinsicist and au th o ritarian su p er­
naturalism , C hristianity, w hich alw ays consists of goodness and
condescension,50 does n ot extinguish the lam p th at is still
sm oking or just beginning to rekindle; it does n o t drive aw ay the
hesitant prodigal; it does n o t fear to go further, to enter the
darkest place, in ord er to seek the one w ho has strayed. O ur
Savior scarcely ever show ed harshness, except for those people
w ho are n ot needy, w ho refuse the efforts attem p ted by souls to
liberate his T ruth from the shackles and shadow s in w hich he
condescends to enclose it here below, and to rejoin the com plete
expression th a t he has revealed from above: because, u n d er the
pretext of reserving to H im the w ord ("Can the W ord of God
stam m er?") and of striking his enem ies, p erh ap s it is he w hom
one w ould w ound, as he lies in his crib, p erh ap s it is his first cries
th a t one w ould try to silence.
The defenders of the Tem ple and of the Law at the tim e of
the N azarene ironically asked: "C an anything good come from

49,/The Lord rules us as lords, others as servants; to others he gave small gifts,
to us the inheritance" (St. Thomas, Opusc., 7.2). In how many texts does Christ,
by that word that effects what it speaks, not call the faithful soul his spouse, his
friend, his mother; and does not God ask man to engender it in Him?
50Again, far from us to fail to grasp the inalienable sovereignty of the
Master or the crucifying conditions of deification. We will insist on this in
the last part of this study. But these crucifying conditions are not themselves
the expression of a power jealous of its authority, nor the tithe or the duty
demanded of a vassal by a suzerain. They are intrinsically indispensable for
the great work of supernatural transformation: born of love, they no doubt
express, in our state of actual fallenness, the just demands of the purgative
and redemptive goodness; but they also essentially enclose the mysterious
trial that, even before sin, man had to surmount in order tn disnnççpcc
 The Third "Testis" Article 873

N azareth?" Can anything good come from the people, from the
unaw are and corrupted people, this p erp etu ally infantile
m ass?—Disciples of H im w ho scandalized the "just" w ith o u t
being either the du p e or accomplice of the sinners for w hom he
becam e the guest and the doctor, it has seem ed to the social
Catholics th a t one cannot refuse to listen to these stam m erings,
these com plaints, these cries, how ever distant they m ight seem to
be or as they are in reality from the "W ord of G od." A nd are n ot
the tw o aspects of their m ethod the expression of the "tw o facts,"
perhaps im m ensely separate, b u t w hich perh ap s "seek each other
to em brace," the tw o concurrent and coordinate afferences, of
w hich one w ould be m isunderstood only at the risk of sterilizing
the other?
So w hen the social Catholics are accused of minimizing, of
even "betraying" the doctrine th at they defend, far from having
to assum e the attitu d e of those who need to be p ard o n ed —on
account of "their good intentions," of "their doctrinal incom pe­
tence,"51 of "their practical preoccupations," of "their role as boy
scouts [éclaireurs] and lost children"—for the bold initiatives
w hich the intransigent censors incrim inate in the nam e of pu re
orthodoxy, they have the rig h t and no do u b t even the d u ty to
respond: It is you w ho dim inish C hristianity, you w ho constrict
the w ays of God, w ho am pu tate his h eart and im poverish the
m ethods of Providence; it is you w ho, in reducing tru th to a m ere
shrunken notion, tailored to your subjective concepts, and in
substituting for the m oving organism of th o u g h t and action these
anatom ical charts like those h u n g on school walls; in separating
w h at life unites, un d er the pretext of preventing the confusion of
functions by the dissection of organs; in claim ing th at each
m em ber is a w hole; in m aintaining th at reason really suffices to
know God, to the p o int of saying that, legitim ately and histori­
cally, theism , n atu ral religion is a positive religion and even th at
it is "natural C hristianity"; in adm ittin g th a t the actual state of
n atu ral m an is "the state of p u re nature"; in neglecting and
elim inating the stu d y of "inferiority" and of the congenital
restlessness at w ork in h u m an ity ; in failing to u n d erstan d th a t the
internal helps determ ine th e psychological realities th a t evoke a
correspondence on our p a rt and entail a responsibility of con­
science; in thus elim inating the intelligent and m oral character of
the assent, in order to restrict it to an agnostically intellectual

51
One w ill see that we do not d efen d either all the evnreccnnnc nr ovor all
874 Maurice Blondel

conform ity and to require a passive docility absolutely foreign to

the hu m an order of duties and virtues; in thus necessarily
presenting the su p ern atu ral order not as a liberation and an
expansion of our being, w herein a great destiny and a great fall
have opened up a great v oid, b u t as a new subjection, as an
oppression w eighing u p o n a n atu re already full, integral, and
sufficient, and crushing it u n d er the m ystery and u n d er the
divine p ow er—yes, it is you w ho shrink, w ho disfigure the tru th
and the goodness of C hrist. A nd, if it is correct th a t C hristianity
is essentially infinite condescension, revealing and elevating
charity, deifying adoption, do w e not now see, w h at is referred to
as seeing, th at there could not be a m ore radical d en atu rin g of the
"Good N ew s" th an this m ultiform error of w hich w e ju st investi­
gated the subtle threads and analyzed the laden fram ew ork? In
fact, are we n o t carried back, far from all these controversial
questions, to the fundam ental data of the tradition, to these
C hristian evidences, w herein, in the sacred deposit, we w ere
destined to find a principle of ju dgm ent w ith o u t possible
am biguity? A nd, ap art from the Catholic tru th , is n o t the very
m eaning of the m oral destiny and the hum an religious conscience
m isconstrued?
If only it w ere solely a m atter of adventitious m isu n d er­
standings and sheerly speculative errors th a t rem ained confined
to the academic w orld and w hose gravity rem ained theoretical!
But no. Because, ap art from the fact th at there is no theoretical
error th at does n ot have repercussions in practice, such errors
w ould not accum ulate, they w ould n ot form a tight system to the
p o in t of presu ad in g m any people of their solid tru th , w ith o u t the
help of an entire ensemble of intellectual, m oral, and social habits
that translate them into realities and that corroborate them in
m inds and wills. We now have to unveil this pernicious complicity
in as full a light as possible. It w as just observed to w hat degree
th at doctrine has been distorted. There is w orse. A nd one w ill
und o u b ted ly agree w hen one w ill have seen w h at practices—and
w hat failures of the C hristian sp irit—these doctrinal deviations
are at once the cause and the effect.52— Translated by Peter J.
Bernardi, S.J. □

52[In the following "Testis" installments, Blondel especially took to task

the alliance between certain French Catholics and the politico-cultural
movement of Action française whose chief ideologist was the agnostic and