POLITICAL LAW REVIEW: IV.
Executive Department Case Digests | Wednesday Class @ 4:30-9:30PM
IV. Executive Department
A.2. Presidential Privilege
1. Pormento vs Estrada
G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010
ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, versus JOSEPH ERAP
EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
FACTS:
The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito
Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from any
reelection. Private respondent was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May
11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections
held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed
private respondents candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification.
ISSUE: What is the proper interpretation of the following provision
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: [t]he President shall not
be eligible for any reelection?
HELD:
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he
ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any
reelection will be premised on a persons second (whether
immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal
rights exists.[6] There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or
substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests.[7] No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will
benefit any of the parties herein.[8] As such, one of the essential
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this
case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing
controversies.[9] The Court is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules
of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it.[10] In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes
non-justiciable.[11]
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties.
There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination
thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.[12]
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the
proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May
10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the
results of that elections, private respondent was not elected
President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his
reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve
no useful or practical purpose.
2. Macalintal vs PET
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (PET)
G.R. No. 191618               November 23, 2010
NACHURA, J.
FACTS: Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal filed a petition before the SC,
challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution, which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is
"authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at
the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented
by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential
employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
ISSUE: Is the PET unconstitutional?
RULING: NO. The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome"
task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under
the doctrine of necessary implication.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting
en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the
Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on
the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's
method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the
Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court,
as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which
we have affirmed on numerous occasions.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or
separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court
the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of
the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first
instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first
instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate
courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. It
is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal
court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to
law, over a limited number of cases which were previously within
the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and
distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions
peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was
constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the
constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well
as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal,
respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and
exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply
an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
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ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (PET)
G.R. No. 191618               June 7,2011
NACHURA, J.
FACTS: A Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty.
Romulo B. Macalintal of our Decision[1] in G.R. No. 191618 dated
November 23, 2010, dismissing his petition and declaring the
establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
as constitutional.
Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged
unconstitutional creation of the PET such as a) Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET
and b) The PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
On the other hand, in its Comment to the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that t
he constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the
grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under
paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: IS the PET unconstitutional?
RULING: NO. The discussions of the Constitutional Commission
unmistakably indicate the exercise of the SC’s power to judge
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the
rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive
as petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., who proposed the insertion of the phrase, intended
the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority to promulgate
its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado
forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole power ought
to be without intervention by the legislative department. Evidently,
even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve
presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-
making power connected thereto.
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that
the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was
statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of
the PET in our country cannot be denied
Furthermore, judicial power granted to the Supreme Court
by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the
last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect.  ample restrictions or limitations on the President power to
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power
“shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.” The set up embodied in the
Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral
contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the
Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a
judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they
are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which
involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the
explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article
IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate
and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
C. Rules of Succession
3. Funa vs Ermita
4. Funa vs Agra Arturo
5. De Castro vs. Judicial Bar Council and Pres. Macapagal-
Arroyo
Facts:
The forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno
occurred 7 days after the Presidential election. Under Sec. 4(1),
Art. 8 of the Constitution, provides that vacancy shall be filed
within 90 days from the occurrence thereof from the list of at
least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy.
Cong. Matias Defensor, an ex officio member of JBC, addressed
a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to
the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
JBC passed a resolution agreeing to start the filling of the
position. Application or recommendation and publication opened.
Conformably, JBC automatically considered the position of the 5
most senior associate justices of the court. Others either applied
or were nominated.
Although it has already begun the process of filling of the
position, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees. The actions of the JBC have
sparked vigorous debate on whether the incumbent President
can appoint the next Chief Justice or not.
The OSG submitted its comment stating that the incumbent
President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement because the prohibition under Sec. 15, Art. 7
of the Constitution does not apply to appointments to the SC. It
argues that any vacancy in the SC must be filed within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Sec. 4(1), Art. 8 of the
Constitution; that in their deliberations on the mandatory period
for the appointment of the SC Justices, the framers neither
mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice versa; that
had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to SC
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Art. 7
(executive department) was not written in Art 8 (judicial
department); and that the framers also incorporated in Art. 8
appoint members of the SC to ensure its independence from
political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures,
such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a SC Justice.
The Court admitted the comments.
The main question presented in all the filings herein because it
involves 2 seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution
imperatively demands the attention and resolution of this Court,
the only authority that can resolve the question definitively and
finally. Thus, we resolve.
Issue:
Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement?
Ruling: YES.
Prohibition under Section 15, Art 7 does not apply to
appointments to fill vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
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2 constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
In the consolidated petitions, submit that the incumbent President
can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement on the ground that the prohibition against presidential
appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary.
The Court agrees with the submission.
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously
drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of
the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically
done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention
and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the
allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three
great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive
(Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The
arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation
of powers that underlies the political structure.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the
duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among
others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions
specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon
the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC;
Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the
vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents
or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall
an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced
should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on
the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a
Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so
will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the
President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate
for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be
defeated by mere judicial interpretation.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from
appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article
VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained.
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other
appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the
adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate
midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief
Executive.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section
15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional
Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in
the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend
the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no
longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that
appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of
buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying
partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the
establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial
positions at any level backed by people influential with the
President could not always be assured of being recommended
for the consideration of the President, because they first had to
undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed,
the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the
Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission
on Appointments.
xxx
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14,
Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the
President.
Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to
revoke appointments made by an Acting President, and evidently
refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has
no application to appointments in the Judiciary, because
temporary or acting appointments can only undermine the
independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at
will. The letter and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that
independence. Also, there is no law in the books that authorizes
the revocation of appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their
mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the first and
second level courts and the Justices of the third level courts may
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only be removed for cause, but the Members of the Supreme Court
may be removed only by impeachment.
Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Thereby, the
Constitutional Commission restored the requirement of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments after the
requirement was removed from the 1973 Constitution. Yet,
because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did
not include appointments to the Judiciary.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion
is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all
kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be
clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Wherefore:
Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs
the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to
fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees
for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to
fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the
short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with
this decision.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J:
“I AGREE with the conclusion that the President can appoint the
Chief Justice and Members of the Supreme Court two months
before a presidential election up to the end of the Presidents term,
but DISAGREE with the conclusion that the authority to appoint
extends to the whole Judiciary.”
History tells us that, without exception, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court has always been appointed by the head of the
Executive Department. The only difference in their respective
appointments is the sovereignty under which they were appointed.
The Chief Justices under the American regime were appointed by
the President of the United States; one Chief Justice each was
appointed under the Commonwealth and under the Japanese
Military Administration; and thereafter all the Chief Justices were
appointed by the Philippine President. In every case, the
appointing authority was the Chief Executive.
The use of the generic term Members of the Supreme Court
under Section 9, Article VIII in delineating the appointing
authority under the 1987 Constitution, is not new. This was the
term used in the present line of Philippine Constitutions, from
1935 to 1987, and the inclusion of the Chief Justice with the
general term Member of the Court has never been in doubt. In
fact, Section 4(1) of the present Constitution itself confirms that
the Chief Justice is a Member of the Court when it provides that
the Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of
three, five, or seven Members. The Chief Justice is a Member of
the En Banc and of the First Division in fact, he is the Chair of the
En Banc and of the First Division but even as Chair is counted in
the total membership of the En Banc or the Division for all
purposes, particularly of quorum. Thus, at the same time that
Section 4(1) speaks of a Supreme Court. . . composed of one
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices, it likewise calls all
of them Members in defining how they will sit in the Court.
Thus, both by law and history, the Chief Justice has always been
a Member of the Court although, as a primus inter pares
appointed by the President together with every other Associate
Justice.
The Valenzuela decision gives the full flavor of how the election
ban issue arose because of Chief Justice Narvasas very candid
treatment of the facts and the issue. Valenzuela openly stated
that at the root of the dispute was the then existing vacancy in
the Court and the difference of opinion on the matter between the
Executive and the Court on the application of Section 15, Article
VII, in relation with Section 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII, of the
Constitution.
What appears very clear from the decision, however, is that the
factual situation the Court ruled upon, in the exercise of its
supervision of court personnel, was the appointment by the
President of two RTC judges during the period of the ban. It is
clear from the decision, too, that no immediate appointment was
ever made to the Court for the replacement of retired Justice
Ricardo Francisco as the JBC failed to meet on the required
nominations prior to the onset of the election ban.
From this perspective, it appears clear to me that Valenzuela
should be read and appreciated for what it is a ruling made on
the basis of the Courts supervision over judicial personnel that
upholds the election ban as against the appointment of lower
court judges appointed pursuant to the period provided by
Section 9 of Article VIII. Thus, Valenzuelas application to the
filling up of a vacancy in the Supreme Court is a mere obiter
dictum as the Court is largely governed by Section 4(1) with
respect to the period of appointment. The Section 4(1) period, of
course and as already mentioned above, has an impact uniquely
its own that is different from that created by the period provided
for the lower court under Section 9.
6. Velicaria-Garafil vs Office of the President
VELICARIA – GARAFIL vs. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
FACTS:
 The present consolidated cases involve 4 petitions with
Atty. Velicaria-Garafil, who was appointed State Solicitor II
at the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG); with Atty.
Venturanza, who was appointed Prosecutor IV (City
Prosecutor) of Quezon City; with Villanueva, who was
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appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of
Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority
(CDA), and Francisca B. Rosquita, who was appointed
Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP); and with Atty. Tamondong, who was
appointed member of the Board of Directors of the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)
 All petitions question the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 2 (EO 2) for being inconsistent with Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
 Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then
PGMA issued more than 800 appointments to various
positions in several government offices
 For purposes of the 2010 elections, March 10 2010 was
the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11
March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight
appointments.
 Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight
appointments only "temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety."
 None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall
under this exception.
 On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) took his oath of office as President of
the Republic of the Philippines.
 On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by PGMA
which violated the constitutional ban on midnight
appointments.
ISSUE(s):
W/N the appointments of the petitioners and intervenor
were midnight appointments within the coverage of EO 2?
W/N all midnight appointments, including those of
petitioners and intervenors, were invalid?
RULING:
 All of petitioners' appointments are midnight
appointments and are void for violation of Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.
 Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a
government post is a process that takes several steps to
complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under
the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, must consist of the President signing an
appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the
official transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably
through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the
appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or
her assumption to office.
 The following elements should always concur in the
making of a valid (which should be understood as both
complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to
appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2)
transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment;
and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of
the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The
concurrence of all these elements should always apply,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether
outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These
steps in the appointment process should always concur
and operate as a single process. There is no valid
appointment if the process lacks even one step. And,
unlike the dissent's proposal, there is no need to further
distinguish between an effective and an ineffective
appointment when an appointment is valid.
 Paragraph (b ), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as
midnight appointments those appointments to offices that
will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even though
the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2
remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented
from continuing to rule the country indirectly after the end
of his term.
 Acceptance is indispensable to complete an
appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount
to acceptance of the appointment.60 An oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to
the full investiture of the office.
Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment
process leads us to the very evil which we seek to avoid
(i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of
acceptance will only provide more occasions to honor the
Constitutional provision in the breach. The inclusion of
acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the
entire appointment process prevents the abuse of the
Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively easy to
antedate appointment papers and make it appear that
they were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is
more difficult to simulate the entire appointment process
up until acceptance by the appointee.
 Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four
elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with
certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted
before the appointment ban took effect. On the other
hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office
during the appointment ban.
 Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the
Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional.
Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.
7. Resident Marine Mammal vs Reyes
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon
Strait vs. Reyes GR 180771 and 181527 April 21, 2015
Facts: Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging
the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX).   The service contract
allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait
during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one
exploration well.  The first petition was brought on behalf of
resident marine mammals in the Tañon Strait by two individuals
acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. 
The second petition was filed by a non-governmental
organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with
individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by
the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in
2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait.  Also
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria
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Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in
the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.
In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually
terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities
ceased.  The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the
purpose of review. Due to the alleged grave constitutional
violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention
the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the
Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even
though the particular service contract had been terminated.  including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is
1. Issue: WON the SC-46 entered into and signed by the
Secretary of DOE is considered as the act of PGMA under the
“alter ego principle” NO
Held: Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
requires that the President himself enter into any service contract
for the exploration of petroleum.
SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the
DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to
the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents
have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently
notified of the execution of such contract. Public respondents’
implied argument that based on the “alter ego principle,” their acts
are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo’s, CANNOT
apply in this case.
In Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279 (1998), we explained the
concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified
political agency and its limit in this wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment
of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that
the President had any participation in SC-46. Their argument
that their acts are actually the acts of then President
Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail
as the requirement that the President herself enter into these
kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary
statute, but in the Constitution itself. These service contracts
involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our
natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and
future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure
that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and
likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate
departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has
authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.
2. Issue: WON impleading PGMA as an unwilling co-petitioner is
contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in
suits. YES
Held: Under the Rules of Court when the consent of a party who
should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may
be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling
party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly
implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party's
name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her
knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due
process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for
not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner.
Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-
petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the
functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy
against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands
undivided attention."59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be
impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is
stricken off the title of this case.
8. Almario vs Executive Secretary
National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario, et al. vs. The
Executive Secretary, 701 SCRA 269, G.R. No. 189028 July 16,
2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
History of the Order of National Artists
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the
Law Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts,
was signed into law. It established the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate
over the development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino
national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage.
_____
FACTS: On January 30, 2007, a joint meeting of the NCCA
Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was
held to discuss, among others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order
of National Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award
Secretariat. The nomination period was set for September 2007
to December 31, 2007, which was later extended to February 28,
2008. The pre-screening of nominations was held from January
to March 2008.
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87
nominees were considered during the deliberation and a
preliminary shortlist of 32 names was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly
composed of an entirely new set of Council of Experts met and
shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary shortlist. On
May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted by the 30-
member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP Board of
Trustees and the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the living
National Artists. From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a
final list of four names was agreed upon.
On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the
NCCA, Undersecretary Vilma Labrador, and the President and
Artistic Director of the CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, was sent to the
President: submitting a recommendation of the NCCA Board of
Trustees and CCP Board of Trustees for the Proclamation of the
following as 2009 Order of National Artists:
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1. Mr. MANUEL CONDE+ (Posthumous) – Film
and Broadcast Arts
2. Dr. RAMON SANTOS – Music
3. Mr. LAZARO FRANCISCO+ (Posthumous) –
Literature
4. Mr. FEDERICO AGUILAR-ALCUAZ – Visual
Arts
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred
by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors.
Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received
nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals
strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez,
Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa and Jose Moreno.
The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these
nominations and invited resource persons to validate the
qualifications and credentials of the nominees.
The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the
conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four
recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on
private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno. Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823
declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30,
2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to
1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar
Alcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was
subsequently announced to the public by then Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA
Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select
those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set
the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted
this petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for
restraining order) praying that the Order of National Artists be
conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have been
rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
In a Resolution dated August 25, 2009, the Court issued a status
quo order enjoining "public respondents" "from conferring the rank
and title of the Order of National Artists on private respondents;
from releasing the cash awards that accompany such conferment
and recognition; and from holding the acknowledgment
ceremonies for recognition of the private respondents as National
Artists."
Contention of the Parties
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo
gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the
rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National
Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the
Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the President’s
discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In
particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the
absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA and the
CCP. In adding the names of respondents Caparas, Guidote-
Alvarez, Mañosa and Moreno while dropping Dr. Santos from the
list of conferees, the President’s own choices constituted the
majority of the awardees in utter disregard of the choices of the
NCCA and the CCP and the arts and culture community which
were arrived at after a long and rigorous process of screening and
deliberation. Moreover, the name of Dr. Santos as National Artist
for Music was deleted from the final list submitted by the NCCA
and the CCP Boards without clearly indicating the basis thereof.
For petitioners, the President’s discretion to name National
Artists cannot be exercised to defeat the recommendations made
by the CCP and NCCA Boards after a long and rigorous
screening process and with the benefit of expertise and
experience. The addition of four names to the final list submitted
by the Boards of the CCP and the NCCA and the deletion of one
name from the said list constituted a substitution of judgment by
the President and a unilateral reconsideration without clear
justification of the decision of the First, Second and Final
Deliberation Panels composed of experts.
Petitioners further argue that the choice of respondent Guidote
Alvarez was illegal and unethical because, as the then Executive
Director of the NCCA and presidential adviser on culture and
arts, she was disqualified from even being nominated. Moreover,
such action on the part of the former President constituted grave
abuse of discretion as it gave preferential treatment to
respondent Guidote-Alvarez by naming the latter a National Artist
despite her not having been nominated and, thus, not subjected
to the screening process provided by the rules for selection to the
Order of National Artists. Her inclusion in the list by the President
represented a clear and manifest favor given by the President in
that she was exempted from the process that all other artists
have to undergo. According to petitioners, it may be said that the
President used a different procedure to qualify respondent
Guidote-Alvarez. This was clearly grave abuse of discretion for
being manifest and undue bias violative of the equal protection
clause.
Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of the petitioning
National Artists and insists that there could be no prejudice to the
latter. They remain to be National Artists and continue to receive
the emoluments, benefits and other privileges pertaining to them
by virtue of that honor. On the other hand, all the other
petitioners failed to show any material and personal injury or
harm caused to them by the conferment of the Order of National
Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno. The rule on standing may not be relaxed in favor of the
petitioners as no question of constitutionality has been raised
and no issue of transcendental importance is involved.
On the merits, respondent Caparas contends that no grave
abuse of discretion attended his proclamation as National Artist.
The former President considered the respective
recommendations of the NCCA and the CCP Boards and of the
Committee on Honors in eventually declaring him (Caparas) as
National Artist. The function of the NCCA and the CCP Boards is
simply to advise the President. The award of the Order of
National Artists is the exclusive prerogative of the President who
is not bound in any way by the recommendation of the NCCA
and the CCP Boards. The implementing rules and regulations or
guidelines of the NCCA cannot restrict or limit the exclusive
power of the President to select the recipients of the Order of
National Artists.
On the other hand, the original position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was similar to that of respondent
Caparas. In a subsequent manifestation, however, the OSG
stated that the current Board of Commissioners of the NCCA
agree with the petitioners that the President cannot honor as a
National Artist one who was not recommended by the joint
Boards of the NCCA and the CCP. The implementing rules and
regulations of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, recognized the
binding character of the recommendation of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards and limited the authority of the Committee on
Honors to the determination that (1) there has been no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NCCA and the CCP Boards
in making the nomination, and (2) the nominee is in good
standing. Where a nomination meets the said two criteria, a
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recommendation to the President to confer the award shall be
made.
The OSG further argued that, while the President exercises control
over the NCCA and the CCP, the President has the duty to
faithfully execute the laws, including the NCCA-CCP guidelines for
selection of National Artists and the implementing rules of
Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003. Moreover, the laws recognize
the expertise of the NCCA and the CCP in the arts and tasked
them to screen and select the artists to be conferred the Order of
National Artists. Their mandate is clear and exclusive as no other
agency possesses such expertise.
ISSUE: Whether the proclamation by the President of respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, as a National
Artists is invalid on the ground that they were not recommended by
the joint Boards of the NCCA and the CCP
HELD: YES.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection
process and as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce
the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the matter of
the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to
him/her by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the
President could not have considered conferment of the Order
of National Artists on any person not considered and
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the
proper import of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005,
that the NCCA and the CCP “shall advise the President on the
conferment of the Order of National Artists.” Applying this to the
instant case, the former President could not have properly
considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and
the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection
and meticulous screening process be rendered futile, the
respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees
under relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of
National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its
deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and
undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will also
become meaningless.
In the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the
President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of
the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the
NCCA and the CCP is subject to the President’s discretion.
Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally
unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards
meaningless. Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and
roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying.
In its classic formulation, “discretion is not unconfined and vagrant”
but “canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.” The
President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing
laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful
execution of the laws by the President: Sec. 17. The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Emphasis supplied.) The President’s discretion in the conferment
of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance
with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful
execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on
the President, not a separate grant of power. It simply underscores
the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the
President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute
them. This is precisely why the law provides that “[a]dministrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.”
There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution when the former President gave preferential treatment
to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno;
The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said
respondents was therefore made with grave abuse of discretion
and should be set aside.—There was a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution when the former President
gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The former President’s
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe the
rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the
selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National
Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in
the conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the
rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was
an arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The conferment of the
Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore
made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as
National Artists, such action should not be taken as a
pronouncement on whether they are worthy to be conferred that
honor. Only the President, upon the advise of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards, may determine that. The Court simply declares
that, as the former President committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July
6, 2009, the said proclamations are invalid. However, nothing in
this Decision should be read as a disqualification on the part of
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno to
be considered for the honor of National Artist in the future,
subject to compliance with the laws, rules and regulations
governing said award.
9. Monsanto vs Factoran
Monsanto vs. Factoran
Facts: Salvacion Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog
City) and three other accused were convicted of complex crime
of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Petitioner
Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which
subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was
extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By
reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance
for resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government
Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from
the city governments to the said Ministry. The Finance Ministry
ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon. Seeking reconsideration of the
foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985
stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never
been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension
which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the
entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be
required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of
P4,892.50. The Ministry of Finance, however, referred
petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for further review
and action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy
Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held that acquittal,
not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground
for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to
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payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
Issue: Whether or not the grant of pardon removes the absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office of those convicted
of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Ruling: Yes but regaining the former post is subject to the usual
procedure required for new appointment.
The Court held that pardon may remit all the penal consequences
of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a
pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action, it is a fictitious belief that
pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is
absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. Pardon
cannot mask the acts constituting the crime.
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of
the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held
opinion that pardon does not ipso facto  restore a convicted felon to
public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility
for appointment to that office.
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily
for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common
good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To
insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion
that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa
would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment
to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or
who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities
referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by
her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed.
Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office
which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering
her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and
taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once
again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-
apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
10. Risos-Vidal vs COMELEC
Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however,
former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly
stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
President. None of the disqualification cases against him
prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and
filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective
post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to
run for public office because of his conviction for plunder
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section
40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). 
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding
that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened
and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the
contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as
Mayor of Manila.
Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which
carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold
public office?
Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to
seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered
by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. 
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given
to and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually
specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that
former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same
cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by
legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and
Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with
other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
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xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence
for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of
the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the
only instances in which the President may not extend pardon
remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not
yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations
of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore,
it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the
pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon
that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to
him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of
the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person
who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction
by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia,
to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national
position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to
make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause
of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither
makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion
that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of
the term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence
educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is
an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for
the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly
speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral
part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself
alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its
effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be
the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be
conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same
in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did
not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause
cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to
former President Estrada.
11. Kulayan vs Tan
KULAYAN vs. TAN (G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012)
Facts: Three members from the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial
Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie
jean Lacaba were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation
project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by
three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later
renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was
then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The
Committee convened under the leadership of respondent
Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued the Proclamation No. 1 Series of
2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The
Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the
said declaration, describing it as terrorist act pursuant to the
Human Security act (R.A. 937). It also invoked Section 465 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A 7160), which bestows on
the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian
Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other
necessary actions necessary to ensure public safety.
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et. Al claimed that
Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and
void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to
exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief
executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.
Issue: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out
powers of a President.
Held: It has already been established that there is one repository
of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic.
This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution
speaks of executive power, it granted to the President and no
one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what
became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article
VII thereof.
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While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military, making the civilian president the
nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section
3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President
is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed
forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must
be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-
in-Chief, he has the power to direct military training and talents, but
as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military
operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would
be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces
to military experts, but the ultimate power is his.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power
to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the
assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when
he declared state of emergency and called upon the Armed
Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is
exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if
he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government
Code.
12. Ampatuan vs Puno
G.R. No. 190259               June 7, 2011
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE
SAHALI-GENERALE Petitioners,  powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and
vs.
HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government and alter-ego of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his
stead and on behalf of the President of the Philippines,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their
units operating in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM), and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or
any of their units operating in ARMM, Respondents.
Facts:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of
57 men and women, including some news reporters, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
1946, placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She
directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) "to undertake such measures as
may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence" in the named places.
Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also issued
Administrative Order 273 (AO 273)2"transferring" supervision of
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the
Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). But, due to issues raised over the terminology
used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A
(AO 273-A) amending the former, by "delegating" instead of
"transferring" supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the
ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan,
Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM
officials,4 filed this petition and alleged he proclamation and the
orders empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s
operations and seize the regional government’s powers, in
violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act
9054 (also known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the
Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power
to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control
over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials
and replace them. etitioner ARMM officials claimed that the
President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President
issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its
autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places.8She
issued the proclamation pursuant to her "calling out" power9 as
Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. The determination of the need to
exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.10 She must use
her judgment based on intelligence reports and such best
information as are available to her to call out the armed forces to
suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever
these reared their ugly heads. On the other hand, the President
merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory
powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter
ego any way.
Issues:
1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate
the principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM
Organic Act - No
2. Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City - No
3. Whether the President had factual bases for her actions - Yes
Held:
1. No.
The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the
ARMM. After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor
of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin
Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section
12,14 of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the
then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner
Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.15 In short, the
DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations
of the ARMM.
2. No.
Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised
emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP
and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the
proclamation.16 But such deployment is not by itself an exercise
of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a
state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did
not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized
her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such
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places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise
the same.
The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides.
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for
the President’s exercise of the above power,18 it would generally
defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,19 it is clearly to
the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was
attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord
respect to the President’s judgment.
Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised
emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and
PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.16 But
such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers
as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of
the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state
of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides.
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for
the President’s exercise of the above power,18 it would generally
defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,19 it is clearly to
the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was
attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord
respect to the President’s judgment.
The President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence
network to gather information, some of which may be classified as
highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss
of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless
violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have
any effect at all.
3. Yes.
The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families
engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It is also a
known fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers
who hold elective positions in various parts of the ARMM and the
rest of Mindanao.
he Ampatuan forces are estimated to be approximately two
thousand four hundred (2,400) persons, equipped with about two
thousand (2,000) firearms, about four hundred (400) of which
have been accounted for. x x x
As for the Mangudadatus, they have an estimated one thousand
eight hundred (1,800) personnel, with about two hundred (200)
firearms. x x x
Apart from their own personal forces, both clans have Special
Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel who support them:
about five hundred (500) for the Ampatuans and three hundred
(300) for the Mangudadatus.
What could be worse than the armed clash of two warring clans
and their armed supporters, especially in light of intelligence
reports on the potential involvement of rebel armed groups
(RAGs).
In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the
time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and
hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-
powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two
clans.23 Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the
situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called
out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms
and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the
peace and security in the affected places.
13. Fortun vs Macapagal Arroyo
Fortun vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Facts:
• On Novemeber 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by
the ruling Ampatuan Family, gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. 
• November 24, 2009, issued Presidential Proclamation 1946,
declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat
and Cotabato City
• December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 
• Two days later or on December 6, 2009, President Arroyo
submitted her report to the congress in accordance with Section
18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48
hours from proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a
report in person or in writing of her action. 
• On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of 1987 Constitution to review
the validity of the Presidents action. 
• Two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act,
the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting
Martial Law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao. 
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• Petitioners brought the present actions to challenge the
constitutionality of President Arroyo Proclamation 1959 affecting
Maguindanao. But given the prompt lifting of that proclamation
before congress could review it and before any serious question
affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanao inhabitants could
rise, the court deems any review of its constitutionality the
equivalent of beating a dead horse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the validity of the Presidents’s proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is a political question
Held: Yes.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ if habeas corpus. They
exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly
since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its
own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme
Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers,
which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress
defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such
review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampant. The
constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law
or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable
one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before joint
houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the
same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become
moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law
and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any
justiciable question.
14. Vinuya vs Romulo
VINUYA v ROMULO
GR No. 162230 April 28, 2010
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).
 
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock,
non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military
forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in
filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in
the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined
to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of
the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied
by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between
the Philippines and Japan.
Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the
Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They
claim that the comfort women system established by Japan, and the
brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against
humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They allege that the prohibition
against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no
derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of Filipina comfort
women and failing to espouse their complaints against Japan, the
Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford
impunity for crimes against humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the
Philippine governments acceptance of the apologies made by Japan as
well as funds from the Asian Womens Fund (AWF) were contrary to
international law.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals
relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of
1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.  
 
In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by Japan have
been satisfactory, and that Japan had addressed the individual claims
of the women through the atonement money paid by the Asian
Womens Fund.
 
The Asian Women's Fund was established by the Japanese
government in 1995. The AWF represented the government's concrete
attempt to address its moral responsibility by offering monetary
compensation to victims of the comfort women system. The purpose of
the AWF was to show atonement of the Japanese people through
expressions of apology and remorse to the former wartime comfort
women, to restore their honor, and to demonstrate Japans strong
respect for women.
 
On January 15, 1997, the AWF and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support
programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these
were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
  
ISSUE: Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioner’s claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan.
 
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
 
From a
Domestic
Law
Perspectiv
e, the
Executive
Departme
nt has the
exclusive
prerogativ
e to
determine
whether to
espouse
petitioners
claims
against  Ja
pan.
  
In Taada v. Cuenco, we held that political questions refer "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
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Certain types of cases often have been found to present political
questions. One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is
well-established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision." The US Supreme Court has further cautioned
that decisions relating to foreign policy
 
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only
by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of
a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility.
 
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political
questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or
invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but
to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace
of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by
the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
 
In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the US
Supreme Court held that [t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.
 
This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v.
Executive Secretary and Pimentel v. Executive Secretary; its
overreaching principle was, perhaps, best articulated in (now Chief)
Justice Punos dissent in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion:
 
x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of
complexities and consequences, sometimes with life
and death significance to the nation especially in times
of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of
government which can act on the basis of the best
available information and can decide with
decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who
possesses the most comprehensive and the most
confidential information about foreign countries for our
diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on
meaningful events all over the world. He has also
unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence
data.In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is
dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a
wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign
affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are
adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their
judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international
obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of
confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of
other problems with equally undesirable
consequences.
 
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners
cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could
disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments
by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment
has been constitutionally committed.
 
In any event, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the Philippine
government was without authority to negotiate the Treaty of Peace
with Japan.
 
Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international
settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims, thereby
terminating any recourse under domestic law. 
 
Respondents explain that the Allied Powers concluded the Peace
Treaty with Japan not necessarily for the complete atonement of the
suffering caused by Japanese aggression during the war, not for the
payment of adequate reparations, but for security purposes. The treaty
sought to prevent the spread of communism in Japan, which occupied a
strategic position in the Far East. Thus, the Peace Treaty compromised
individual claims in the collective interest of the free world.
 
We thus hold that, from a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will
not lie. As a general principle and particularly here, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion
and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to
assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against
Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and
those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are
sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
 
The Philip
pines is
not under
any
internation
al
obligation
to
espouse
petitioners
claims.
 
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for
individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been
when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on
the individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are
being asserted, but rather, the states own rights.
The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft Articles on Diplomatic
Protection fully support this traditional view. They (i) state that "the right
of diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State, (ii) affirm its
discretionary nature by clarifying that diplomatic protection is a
"sovereign prerogative" of the State; and (iii) stress that the state "has
the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is
under no duty or obligation to do so."
 
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations
will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of
whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned
to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus
cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that
the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga
omnes  obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law
has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States
towards the community of states as a whole. The concept was
recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona  Traction:
 
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x x x an essential distinction should be drawn
between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising
vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic
protection. By their very nature, the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.
 
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary
international law, from the outlawing of acts of
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the
human person, including protection from slavery and
racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights
of protection have entered into the body of general
international law others are conferred by international
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal
character.
  
The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries
of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international
public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so
clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as
a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice.
The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus
cogens. In international law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law)
refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority.
 
 Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and
we cannot begin to comprehend the unimaginable horror they
underwent at the hands of the Japanese soldiers. We are also
deeply concerned that, in apparent contravention of fundamental
principles of law, the petitioners appear to be without a remedy to
challenge those that have offended them before appropriate
fora. Needless to say, our government should take the lead in
protecting its citizens against violation of their fundamental human
rights. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive
Department to take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power
to urge  and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners
cause.
15. Saguisag vs Ochoa
SAGUISAG vs. OCHOA
[G.R. No. 212444. January 12, 2016.]
Facts:
The petitions question the constitutionality of the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
(U.S.). Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they
entered into EDCA with the U.S., claiming that the instrument
violated multiple constitutional provisions. To support the legality of
their actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties,
and judicial precedents.
Issues:
Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
Ruling:
Yes. The President may enter into an executive agreement on
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
1. The role of the President as
the executor of the law
includes the duty to defend
the State, for which purpose
he may use that power in the
conduct of foreign relations
SECTION 1. Power of Control. —
The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. 
Hence, the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the
land is inherent in executive power and is intimately related
to the other executive functions. These functions include the
faithful execution of the law in autonomous regions; the right
to prosecute crimes;  the implementation of transportation
projects; the duty to ensure compliance with treaties,
executive agreements and executive orders;  the authority to
deport undesirable aliens;  the conferment of national
awards under the President's jurisdiction;  and the overall
administration and control of the executive department. 
The import of this characteristic is that the manner
of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly
granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only
by law, since the President must "take necessary and proper
steps to carry into execution the law
In light of this constitutional duty, it is the
President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and
necessary for Philippine defense interests. It is no
coincidence that the constitutional provision on the faithful
execution clause was followed by that on the President's
commander-in-chief powers, which are specifically granted
during extraordinary events of lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion. And this duty of defending the country is
unceasing, even in times when there is no state of lawless
violence, invasion, or rebellion. At such times, the President
has full powers to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. 
It would therefore be remiss for the President and
repugnant to the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution
to do nothing when the call of the moment requires
increasing the military's defensive capabilities, which could
include forging alliances with states that hold a common
interest with the Philippines or bringing an international suit
against an offending state.
2. The plain meaning of the
Constitution prohibits the entry
of foreign military bases, troops
or facilities, except by way of a
treaty concurred in by the
Senate — a clear limitation on
the President's dual role as
defender of the State and as sole
authority in foreign relations.
The initial limitation is found in Section 21 of the
provisions on the Executive Department: "No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate." The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the
Transitory Provisions, the full text of which reads as follows:
SECTION 25. After the expiration
in 1991 of the Agreement between the
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Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military
Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
It is quite plain that the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution intended to add to the basic requirements of
a treaty under Section 21 of Article VII. This means that both
provisions must be read as additional limitations to the
President's overarching executive function in matters of
defense and foreign relations.  the context of the Constitutional Commission's time of
3. The President, however, may
enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities, if (a)
it is not the instrument that
allows the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or
facilities; or (b) it merely aims
to implement an existing law or
treaty.
SECTION 25. After the expiration
in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military
Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State. (Emphases supplied)
A plain textual reading of Article XIII, Section 25,
inevitably leads to the conclusion that it applies only to a
proposed agreement between our government and a foreign
government, whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of
such foreign government would be "allowed" or would "gain
entry" Philippine territory.
Note that the provision "shall not be allowed" is a
negative injunction. This wording signifies that the President is
not authorized by law to allow foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities to enter the Philippines, except under a treaty
concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the constitutionally
restricted authority pertains to the entry of the bases, troops,
or facilities, and not to the activities to be done after entry.
Under the principles of constitutional construction, of
paramount consideration is the plain meaning of the language
expressed in the Constitution, or the verba legis rule. It is
presumed that the provisions have been carefully crafted in
order to express the objective it seeks to attain.  It is
incumbent upon the Court to refrain from going beyond the
plain meaning of the words used in the Constitution.
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers
solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are
thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of
the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section
25 requirement of validity through a treaty.
Moreover, the Court indicated that the Constitution
continues to govern the conduct of foreign military troops in
the Philippines, readily implying the legality of their initial
entry into the country.
As applied, verba legis aids in construing the
ordinary meaning of terms. In this case, the phrase being
construed is "shall not be allowed in the Philippines" and not
the preceding one referring to "the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities." It is explicit in the
wording of the provision itself that any interpretation goes
beyond the text itself and into the discussion of the framers,
drafting, and the history of the 1947 MBA. Without reference
to these factors, a reader would not understand those terms.
However, for the phrase "shall not be allowed in the
Philippines," there is no need for such reference. The law is
clear. No less than the Senate understood this when it
ratified the VFA.
4. The President may generally
enter into executive
agreements subject to
limitations defined by the
Constitution and may be in
furtherance of a treaty
already concurred in by the
Senate.
As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the
constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign
policy,  the President is vested with the exclusive power to
conduct and manage the country's interface with other states
and governments. Being the principal representative of the
Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the
nation; initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations
with other states and governments; negotiates and enters
into international agreements; promotes trade, investments,
tourism and other economic relations; and settles
international disputes with other states.
The President has the prerogative to
conclude binding executive agreements that do not require
further Senate concurrence. The existence of this
presidential power is so well-entrenched that Section 5 (2)
(a), Article VIII of the Constitution, even provides for a check
on its exercise. As expressed below, executive agreements
are among those official governmental acts that can be the
subject of this Court's power of judicial review:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courtsin:
(a) All cases in which
the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, intern
ational or executive
agreement, law,
presidential decree,
proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
(Emphases supplied)
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One of the distinguishing features of executive
agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not affected
by a lack of Senate concurrence.
Executive agreements may dispense with the
requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal
mandate with which they are concluded.
There are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit
the President's prerogative in concluding international
agreements, such as those that involve the following:
a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within
Philippine territory  executive agreement or a treaty), provided
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts, which must be pursuant
to the authority granted by Congress 
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be
pursuant to a law concurred in by a majority
of all the Members of Congress
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the
Philippines, of foreign loans that must be
previously concurred in by the Monetary
Board  4. The executive agreement must be consistent
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country must be in the form of a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate.  in the form of an executive agreement, respondents carry
f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5,
the concurrence of the Senate is required,
should the form of the government chosen
be a treaty.
1. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution,
contains stringent requirements that must
be fulfilled by the international agreement
allowing the presence of foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities in the
Philippines: (a) the agreement must be in
the form of a treaty, and (b) it must be duly
concurred in by the Senate.
2. If the agreement is not covered by the above
situation, then the President may choose
the form of the agreement (i.e., either an
that the agreement dealing with foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities is not
the principal agreement that first allows
their entry or presence in the Philippines. 
3. The executive agreement must not go beyond
the parameters, limitations, and standards
set by the law and/or treaty that the former
purports to implement; and must not
unduly expand the international obligation
expressly mentioned or necessarily
implied in the law or treaty.
with the Constitution, as well as with
existing laws and treaties.
In light of the President's choice to enter into EDCA
the burden of proving that it is a mere implementation of
existing laws and treaties concurred in by the Senate. EDCA
must thus be carefully dissected to ascertain if it remains
within the legal parameters of a valid executive agreement.

5. The President had the choice

to enter into EDCA by way of
an executive agreement or a
treaty.
No court can tell the President to desist from
choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody an
international agreement, unless the case falls squarely within
Article VIII, Section 25.
Indeed, in the field of external affairs, the President
must be given a larger measure of authority and wider
discretion, subject only to the least amount of checks and
restrictions under the Constitution.
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the
Guidelines in the Negotiation of International Agreements and
its Ratification, thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of
the President when it stated that the DFA "shall determine
whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty."
Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, the Court does not look into whether an international
agreement should be in the form of a treaty or an executive
agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a
statute requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast
constitutional powers and prerogatives granted to the
President in the field of foreign affairs, the task of the Court is
to determine whether the international agreement is consistent
with the applicable limitations.
6. Executive agreements may
cover the matter of foreign
military forces if it merely
involves detail adjustments. 

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