SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. HON. ANIANO A.

DESIERTO

FACTS:
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order constituting a Committee for the preparation
of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. The Committee was mandated to take charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration
of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.

Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order reconstituting the Committee and
renamed it as the National Centennial Commission. Appointed as chairman was Vice-President Salvador
H. Laurel. Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp)
was created. Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9)
directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.

Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged
anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special
Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Coseteng’s privilege speech was
referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon
Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.

President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent
citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial
projects, including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair
the Committee. Later, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended the further
investigation by the Ombudsman.

Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer
because EXPOCORP WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC)
WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE, and PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS
NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

ISSUES:
WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the petitioner on the ground that he is not a public officer.

HELD:
The Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the people, who shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the
Constitution upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to investigate any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A
definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on
the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of
duties, and the designation of the position as an office.

The Court held that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as
the power to enforce and administer the laws. The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing
policies and objectives, to carry them into effect and it bears noting the President, upon whom the
executive power is vested, created the NCC by executive order. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign
functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public
office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public
corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner’s position as Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or
omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.

Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for his
services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman.

A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term
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(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal,
from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.

It is clear from Section 2 (b), that the definition of a public officer is expressly limited to the application
of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the Ombudsmans
jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.