Puyat v. De Guzman G.R. No.

L-51122
[Inhibitions and Disqualifications]

FACTS:

Assemblyman Fernandez moved to intervene for Acero et al. in a case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC, an administrative body) involving an intra-corporate dispute with Puyat et al. regarding
the election of the directors of International Pipe Industries (IPI, a private corporation). Puyat et al. objected,
averring it is in violation of Art VIII, Sec 11 (now art VI, sec 14) of the Constitution which bars assemblymen
from appearing as counsel before any administrative body. On the basis of ownership of 10 shares of stock
of IPI, Fernandez alleged legal interest in the matter in litigation. In view thereof, SEC granted Fernandez
the motion. Hence this petition. Reviewing the circumstances surrounding his purchase of the shares, it
was noted that he had acquired the mere 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares on May 30, 1979—
after he has signified his intention to appear as counsel for Acero but was denied on constitutional ground,
after the quo warranto suit had been filed by Acero et al. on May 25, and one day before the scheduled
hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Fernandez’s intervention is valid.

HELD:

No. Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel but theoretically appearing for the protection of his ownership of shares in respect of the matter in
litigation. However, under the facts and circumstances immediately preceding and following his purchase of
the shares, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect ―appearance as counsel before xxx
an administrative body.‖ That is circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.

RATIO:

An assemblyman cannot indirectly fail to follow the Constitutional prohibition not to appear as counsel
before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying a nominal amount of share of one of the
shareholders after his appearance as counsel therein was contested.
 Aldaza v. Pacana G.R. No. 68159

Facts:

Issues:
1. Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can
exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously; and

2. Whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving
as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.

RATIO:
The point pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election of members of the Batasan
Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that ―governors, mayors, members of the
various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave
of absence from office.‖ Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Big, 337,5 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The reason the position of vice-governor was not included in Section 13[2] of BP Blg. 697 is
explained by the following interchange between Assemblymen San Juan and Davide during the deliberations on said
legislation.

Members of the various sangunian – it includes vice governors and vice mayors.

Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vicegovernor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting
within the law. His succession to the governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in accordance with
Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government
 Osmeña v. Pendatun No. L-17144, 109 Phil 863 [Oct 28, 1960]

Facts:

Petitioner Rep. Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made serious imputations of
bribery against the President. Because of that, a special committee was created by the House to
investigate the truth of the charges against the President. When asked to produce evidence to substantiate
his imputations against the President, he refused. Having made said charges and for failing to produce
evidence in support thereof, Osmeña was, by resolution, suspended from office for a period of 15 months
for serious disorderly behavior. Osmeña now prays for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of
infringement of his parliamentary immunity.

Issues:

(1) Does the House resolution infringe the parliamentary immunity (privilege of speech and debate) of
Osmeña?

(2) Can the House of Representatives punish its members for disorderly behavior?

Held:

(1) No. Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

(2) Yes. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress could be censured, committed to prison, or
even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
 Pelaez v. Auditor General No. L-23825, 15 SCRA 569 [Dec 24, 1965]

Facts:

The President, purporting to act pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), issued EOs
93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating 33 municipalities. Soon after, VP Pelaez, instituted the present
special civil action challenging the constitutionality of said EOs on the ground, among others, that Sec 68 of
the RAC relied upon constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President. The challenged
Sec 68 provides: ―the President x x x may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase
or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces,
separate any political division x x x into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions
or portions with another x x x‖

Issue:

Does Sec 68 of the RAC constitute an undue delegation of legislative power?

Held:

Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Sec 68 of the RAC,
insofar as it grants to the President the power to create municipalities does not meet the well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy xxx, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.58 It is essential, to forestall a violation of
the principle of separation of powers, that the law: (a) be complete in itself x x x and (b) x x x fix a standard
to which the delegate must conform x x x.
 Astorga v. Villegas

Facts:

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the
bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and
Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably
recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City
Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in
case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.

The amendments introduced by Senator Tolentino were approved in toto by the senate during the second
reading. However, the amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the
senate proceedings as having acted upon.

Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator
Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The
printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President.

Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No.
9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines, was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by
the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate
floor.

The Senate president and the President withdrawn their signatures. Adding that it would be untenable and
against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress.

Manila Mayor issued a circular to disregard the RA 4065, the vice mayor filed a petition for ―Mandamus of
injunction and or Prohibition with preliminary Mandatory and prohibitory injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.

RATIO:
Certification of bill by presiding officers of Congress; Effect of.—As far as Congress itself is concerned,
there is nothing sacrosanet in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and
the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage.
In other words, it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is
essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that ―[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes law, be presented to the President.‖

Journals of Congress may be resorted to determine whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress; Case at bar.—This Court is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for that purpose. The journal discloses that substantial
and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare
that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein.
 Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792
[ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, jurisdiction and composition]

FACTS :

Facts. In the 1987 elections, respondent Pineda of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was proclaimed
winner over rival petitioner Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for the position of Representative for the
4th District of Pampanga. Bondoc filed a protest with HRET and was proclaimed winner over Pineda after
revision, reexamination and refor proclamation of Bondoc was Rep. Camasura of the LDP. Declaring
Camasura to have committed a complete betrayal of loyalty to LDP, he was expelled from the party and,
upon the request of LDP, his election to the HRET was rescinded. The promulgation of Bondoc as winner
was then cancelled due to the consequent lack of the required concurrence of 5 members of the Tribunal.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

May the House of Reps, at the request of a political party, change that party’s representation in the HRET?

Held:

No. The Electoral Tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. To be able to exercise its
exclusive jurisdiction, the tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction xxx is not to be shared by it with the
Legislature nor with the Courts. They must discharge their functions with complete xxx independence—
even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence ―disloyalty to party‖ and ―breach of
party discipline‖ are no valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Rep.
Camasura for having cast a ―conscience vote‖, the House of Reps committed a grave abuse of discretion
violative of the Constitution and thus the expulsion is null and void. To sanction such interference by the
House of Reps in the work of the HRET, would reduce the it to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the
party in power.
 Angara v. Electoral Commission
[SEPARATION OF POWERS]

FACTS:

The Electoral Commission was created pursuant to Art VI sec 4 of the 1935 Constitution (now sec 17)
which conferred to it the power to ―be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.‖ The National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution
confirming the election of petitioner Angara as member of the NA on Dec 3, 1935. On Dec 9, 1935, the
respondent Electoral Commission formally organized for the first time and resolved to fix the same date as
the final day of filing of election protests. Ynsua, a candidate vying for the Angara’s position, filed his
election protest before the Electoral Commission on the same date. Angara sought to prohibit the Electoral
Commission from taking further cognizance of the Ynsua’s motion Angara argues: the Constitution
excludes from the Commission’s jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of such election
contests. Morever, the Commission can regulate the proceedings of election protests only if the NA has not
availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings.

ISSUES:
(1) Does the Electoral Commission have the constitutional power to promulgate rules of procedure (such as
fixing a deadline for filing election protests) relating to election protests notwithstanding the lack of express
conferment of such power in the Constitution?

(2) Does it have the power the promulgate such rules notwithstanding the resolution of the NA?

HELD:
(1) Yes. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests
before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election must be deemed by necessary implication
to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

(2) Yes. The purpose of the of the creation of the Electoral Commission was to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members,
to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging [in the now Art VI, sec 17] of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the NA. If the NA is permitted
to claim the power to regulate proceedings of election contests, then the grant of power to the Commission
would be ineffective for such power would be xxx subject at all times to the regulation of the NA. The
purpose of the framers of our Constitution would be frustrated.
 Tañada v. Cuenco
[SEPARATION OF POWERS]

FACTS:
Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an election protest filed by members of the
Citizens Party (CP) who lost to members of the Nacionalista Party (NP). The Senate was at the time
composed of 23 members of the NP and 1 of the CP — petitioner Sen. Tañada. When the SET was being
organized, Sen. Tañada, in behalf of the CP, nominated himself alone. Sen. Primicias, a member of the
NP, then nominated ―not on behalf of the [NP] but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate‖
Sens. Delgado and respondent Cuenco ―to complete the membership of the Tribunal‖. This he claims is the
mandate of the Constitution which reads: ―xxx Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court xxx and the remaining six shall be Members of the
[House] who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number
of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. xxx.‖51 Over the
objection of Sen. Tañada, Sens. Delgado and Cuenco were chosen to sit in the SET. Sen. Tañada now
contests them in Court. Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no jurisdiction on the matter as
the issue is a political question and not judicial.

ISSUES:

Is the issue a political question beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry?

HELD:
No. The issue at bar is not a political question for the Senate is not clothed with ―full discretionary authority‖
in the choice of members of the SET.52 The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional
limitations. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the
proceedings in connection therewith. We have not only jurisdiction, but also the duty to consider and
determine the principal issue53 raised by the parties herein.
 Lazatin v. HRET
[ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, jurisdiction and composition]

FACTS:
In the 1987 elections, petitioner Lazatin was proclaimed Congressmanelect over Timbol for the 1st
district of Pampanga. Timbol filed an election protest which, summarily, did not meet success leading
him to file with HRET. Lazatin moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that it had been filed late
under BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). However, HRET ruled that the filing was on time in
accordance with HRET rules. Lazatin now comes to this Court averring that HRET does not have
jurisdiction of the protest filed because it has not acquired the same, the protest having been filed out
of time under BP 881

ISSUES:
Does HRET have the jurisdiction over the filed election protest?

HELD:
Yes. The power of HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Reps, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to
matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond
dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution.
Moreover, the use of the word “sole” *in Art VI, Sec 17+ emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred. This grant of power is “full, clear and complete” (J. Malcolm). Thus, in the
absence of a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power as to constitute denial of due
process, the judgment rendered by HRET in the exercise of such sole power is beyond interference of
this Court.

Rule-making power is deemed to have necessarily flowed from the constitutional grant of exclusive
power to the Electoral Tribunals.
 Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works
[POWER OF APPROPRIATION]

FACTS:
Respondent Zulueta, a member of the Senate, was the owner of several parcels of residential land situated
in Pasig, Rizal, known as the Antonio Subdivision. Certain portions of the Antonio Subdivision had been
reserved for the projected feeder roads. For the ―construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement‖ of said feeder roads, Congress passed RA 920, appropriating P85,000 therefor. After over 5
months subsequent to the approval and effectivity of the Act, the projected feeder roads were donated by
Zulueta to the Government. Petitioner Pascual, as Governor of Rizal, filed an action questioning the
constitutionality of the appropriation for the feeder road. The lower court held that the appropriation was
clearly for a private, not a public purpose.

ISSUES:
Is the provision in RA 920 appropriating the said amount unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. Under the express and implied provisions of the Constitution, the legislature is without
power to appropriate public revenue123 for anything but a public purpose… It is the essential
character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity xxx, and not
the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of
the community [may be promoted]. Incidental [benefit] to the public or to the state, [resulting]
from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business,
does not justify their (the private enterprise) aid by the use public money. In the case at bar,
the property sought to be improved with public funds was private in nature at the time the
appropriation was made. Hence, the appropriation sought a private purpose and is thus null
and void. The circumstance that the roads were later donated to the government did not cure
such basic defect.

Public funds may not be appropriated for any purpose other than a public purpose. The circumstance that
the appropriation in furtherance of a private purpose incidentally benefits the general public does not justify
the defect.