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Dworkins Rights Thesis
Dworkins Rights Thesis
Volume 74 Issue 6
1976
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Dworkin's "Rights Thesis", 74 MICH. L. REV. 1167 (1976).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol74/iss6/3
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NOTES
1. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Problems of the Philosophy
of Law, 6 ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY 264 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823
(1972).
3. See Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PmL. 624 (1963) [hereinafter Judicial
Discretion]; The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967) [hereinafter The
Model of Rules], reprinted in EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25-60 (R. Summers ed.
1968); Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE LJ. 855 (1972); [hereinafter Social
Rules and Legal Theory]; Hard Cases, 88 HARv. E. REV. 1057 (1975) [hereinafter
Hard Cases].
4. Supra note 3.
5. For other discussions concerning the nature of judicial adjudication within the
parameters of the Hart-Dworkin debate, see Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial
Decision: Tlze Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 15 COLUM. L. REV.
359 (1975), and Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151
(1971). Additional references are cited throughout these discussions.
6. H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 119-20.
1. Id. at 124.
1167
1168 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1167
8, Id.
9. Id. at 131.
10. Id. at 128.
11. Id. at 132.
12. Dworkin states the tenets of positivism as follows:
(a) The law of a community is a set of special rules • . . • These special
rules can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria, by tests having to
do not with their content but with their pedigree or the manner in which they
were adopted or developed. These tests of pedigree can be used to distinguish
valid legal rules from spurious legal rules . . . and also from other sorts of so-
cial rules (generally lumped together as "moral rules") that the community
follows but does not enforce through public power.
(b) The set of these valid legal rules is exhaustive of "the law," so that if
someone's case is not clearly covered by such a rule • . • then that case cannot
be decided by "applying the law." It must be decided by some official, like a
judge, "exercising his discretion," which means reaching beyond the law for
some other sort of standard to guide him in manufacturing a fresh legal rule or
supplementing an old one.
(c) To say that someone has a "legal obligation" is to say that his case
falls under a valid legal rule that requires him to do or to forbear from doing
something. . . . In the absence of such a valid legal rule there is no legal
obligation; it follows that when the judge decides an issue by exercising his dis-
cretion, he is not enforcing a legal obligation as to that issue.
The Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 17-18.
13. Id. at 35. But see Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 368-99 (questioning whether
it is feasible to draw a hard and fast line between Dworkin's strong discretion in the
sense of "freedom to choose" and his weak discretion in the sense of "judgment").
Contra, Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574 (1975) (arguing
that by "discretion" Hart simply means that a judge must use his best judgmelll by
appealing to public standards in resolving borderline cases).
14. The Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 17.
15. Dworkin has not denied that judges are sometimes granted discretion as, for
example, in fixing criminal sentences. See Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 634
n.6; Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 881.
May 1976] Dworkin's "Rights Thesis" 1169
30. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1060. The rights thesis, as stated, has both a
descriptive and a normative component. This Note, however, restricts its discussion
to the latter. For a view of judicial adjudication consistent with Dworkin's position
that judges should not base their decisions on social policies, see Sartorius, supra note
5, at 158.
31. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078. See text at note 89 infra.
32. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1082. See text at notes 89-90 infra.
33. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1066 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 1060. Dworkin has provided a more complete catalogue of the various
kinds of "hard cases":
(i) In many cases a court is pressed to, and in some cases does, overrule a text-
book rule, and substitute a new one. (ii) Even when, as is more often the case,
a court is determined to follow a particular textbook rule if it applies, that rule
may be so ambiguous that it is not clear whether it applies, and the court cannot
decide simply by studying the language in which the rule has been expressed.
(iii) Sometimes two textbook rules by their terms apply, and the judges must
choose between them. In some such cases the need for choice may be disguised,
in that only one rule is mentioned, but research (or imagination) would disclose
another rule that the court could have adopted as easily. (iv) Sometimes a
court itself will state that no textbook rule applies to the facts. Often the gap
may be cured by what is called "expansion" of an existing rule, but sometimes
a wholly new rule must be invented. (v) A large, and increasing, number of
cases are decided by citing rules so vague that it is often unhelpful even to call
them ambiguous: the critical words in such rules are "reasonable", "ordinary
and necessary", "material", "significant", and the like.
Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 627.
35. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078, 1108.
36. For Hart's opposing view, see text at notes 7-11 supra.
1172 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1167
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1069, 1073; The Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 23 ("The distinction
[between principles and policies] can be collapsed by construing a principle as stating
a goal •.. or by construing a policy as stating a principle •.•").
56. See note 52 supra.
51. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1073, 1077.
May 1976] Dworkin's "Rights Thesis" 1177
at less cost to himself than the plaintiff was likely to suffer if the acci-
dent occurred, discounted by the improbability of the accident. It
may be said that this economic test provides an argument of policy
rather than principle, because it makes the decision tum on whether
the collective welfare would have been advanced more by allowing
the accident to take place or by spending what was necessary to avoid
it. If so, then cases in which some test like Hand's is explicitly used,
however few they might be, would stand as counterexamples to the
rights thesis. 71
Dworkin's rejoinder is that Hand's test is really not an argument of
policy at all, but rather a method of "compromising competing
rights." 72 This can be understood, he says, once the distinction
between "abstract" and "concrete rights" is drawn. "Abstract rights
. . . take no account of competing rights; concrete rights, on the
other hand, reflect the impact of such competition." 73 Hand's test,
he urges, is not a simple cost-benefit formula but rather "a mecha-
nism for compromising competing claims of abstract right." 74
Dworkin applies his distinction between abstract and concrete
rights to a broad range of cases:
Negligence cases are not the only cases in which judges compro-
mise abstract rights in defining concrete ones. If a judge appeals to
public safety or the scarcity of some vital resource, for example, as
a ground for limiting some abstract right, then his appeal might be
understood as an appeal to the competing rights of those whose se-
curity will be sacrificed, or whose just share of that resource will be
threatened if the abstract right is made concrete. His argument is
an argument of principle if it respects the distributional requirements
of such arguments, and if it observes the restriction . . . that the
weight of a competing principle may be less than the weight of the
appropriate parallel policy. 75
Thus, Dworkin's view is much more sophisticated than it first appears
to be. On one hand, he wishes to maintain the position that judges
should not adjudicate on the basis of policy arguments. Yet on the
other hand, he is forced to concede that much of what looks like
adjudication by policy arguments is quite appropriate after all. Dwor-
kin seeks to reconcile these two views by suggesting that ostensible
policy considerations are actually appeals to competing abstract
rights. In the quoted passage, for example, appeals to public
safety-what most people would consider a paradigm instance of a
collective goal-are viewed by Dworkin as appeals to a right. Unfor-
tunately, Dworkin can only manipulate his original definitions of
rights and goals in this manner by conceding much ground to his
11. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1075.
72. Id. at 1076.
73. Id. at 1075.
74. Id. at 1077.
15. Id. (emphasis added). ,
May 1976] Dworkin's "Rights Thesis" 1181
to have, the decision in every case that constitutes the best resolution
of the stipulated principles and policies."89 This "best" or uniquely
correct decision presumably determines the legal rights of the parties
in such a manner that one party is always entitled to judgment in his
favor. 00 The correct decision itself is defined analytically in terms of
what Dworkin has called "the soundest theory of law." 91 That is, the
judge is to decide which party has the right to win the lawsuit by first
determining which relevant theory of law is the soundest, and then by
ascertaining what this theory requires in the particular case.
The soundest theory of law, according to Dworkin, is that "set of
principles that best justifies the precedents" 92 relevant to the case
under consideration. Dworkin's first requirement for such a theory is
that it provide a coherent justification for the rule or provision at
issue.93 When relevant case law exists, this justification must take
into account not only the simple "enactment force" of the prior
decisions, but also their "gravitational force." By the former Dwor-
kin means an opinion's precedential authority as limited by the specific
words used by the courts. The influence of a judicial decision, of
course, is not usually limited to the "canonical form of words" of the
opinion; it includes a "gravitational force" that extends beyond the
specific language of the opinion. The soundest theory, Dworkin
states, must be consistent with both.94
Coherence or consistency, however, is at most a logical prerequi-
site for any plausible theory of law. It cannot in itself always
determine which theory is the "best" or "soundest," since several
theories may be logically consistent with a given statutory provision or
series of decisions. 0 5 If so, how is a judge to determine which of the
available alternative theories is in fact the best? Dworkin answers by
89. Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 633. Dworkin is actually talking here
about his imaginary game "Policies," and not about the law. But it is clear that he
~tends his remarks to apply to the law. Id. at 634 n.7. See text at note 31 supra.
Dworkin, of course, has veered from his earlier position that judges should decide
cases by an appeal both to principles and policies. See text at note 30 & note 40
supra.
90. See text at note 32 supra.
91. See text at note 25 supra. Dworkin does not use this phrase in Hard Cases.
See note 103 infra. But the political theory of his superhuman judge, Hercules, serves
the same function. See text at notes 111-112 infra.
92. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1093 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1094.
94. Id. at 1088-89. By this distinction Dworkin presumably wishes to make the
point that the influence of an opinion can extend well beyond the particular facts of
that case. When a decision falls into disfavor in the judicial community, it is much
more likely that courts will simply "limit it to its facts," that is, to its enactment
force, rather than overrule it. Id. at 1100.
95. Sartorius, who uses the concept of coherence in a manner similar to Dworkin,
admits the "theoretical possibility" of equal coherence. Sartorius, supra note 5, at
159.
May 1976] Dworkin's "Rights Thesis" 1185
upon which Dworkin bases the rights thesis, that law is a system of
entitlements. The rights thesis assumes, first, that "community mo-
rality," in a sense explored below, permits the development of an
objectively soundest political theory. Second, it supposes that this
political theory, once constructed, will always dictate a uniquely
correct result in hard cases. In other words, Dworkin assumes that a
soundest theory of law is theoretically feasible and that the rights
thesis would be part of that theory. It is important to keep these two
contentions distinct, for Dworkin must prove the truth of both in
order to secure his rights thesis. It is submitted, however, that he
provides no persuasive argument for either contention.
Dworkin's first proposition, that a judge ought to construct the
soundest theory by referring in some manner to "community moral-
ity," raises the question of how a judge is to appeal to moral principles
in hard cases. It is clear that Dworkin rejects the view that a judge is
free to decide simply on the basis of personally held moral princi-
ples.106 For example, a judge ought not to base a decision that
capital punishment offends the eighth amendment on a personal
abhorence of capital punishment. Rather, according to Dworkin's
theory, a judge ought to appeal to principles of "community morality"
in justifying his decisions. Since this phrase may be seriously mis-
leading,107 it is important to clarify what Dworkin has in mind.
Dworkin stresses that it is not "a consensus of belief about a particu-
lar issue, as might be elicited by a Gallup poll,"108 but rather "the
principles that underlie the community's institutions and laws, in the
sense that these principles would figure in a sound theory of law.
• • .»1oo Elsewhere, Dworkin defines it as "the political morality
presupposed by the laws and institutions of the community": 110 that
is, the principles that are necessary to provide an adequate justifica-
tion or rationalization of the laws of the particular jurisdiction. Most
frequently, perhaps, the community morality in this sense will coin-
cide with the beliefs held by a majority of persons in a Gallup-type
survey. Nevertheless, Dworkin is prepared to grant that community
morality, in his sense, may at times diverge from popularly held moral
and political views. On such an occasion, a judge must appeal only
to the community morality as presupposed by the laws, and not to
what is popularly believed or to what he independently may believe is
morally required. 111
106. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078, 1090.
107. One writer has been misled, perhaps justifiably, by Dworkin's loose use of
this kind of language in Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 635, n.9. See Raz, supra
note 2, at 848-51.
108. Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 890.
109. Id.
110. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1105.
111. Id. at 1104-05. Dworkin makes this point somewhat cryptically: "The
1188 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1167
thing, for example, simply to say that someone ought to give to a par-
ticular charity and quite another to say that he has a duty to do so.
. . . It is easy to think of cases in which we should be prepared
to make the first ... [claim], but not the second. 135
Yet it is this very distinction that Dworkin has failed to respect in his
thesis that a litigant always has a right to the uniquely correct
decision. For to contend that judges always have a duty to decide a
lawsuit in one particular manner seems to ignore the way in which
lawyers ordinarily argue and talk about hard cases. Even a~suming,
arguendo, that there is some soundest theory of law, it does not follow
that the soundest theory will always establish "duties" for a judge in
lieu of "oughts." In short, common parlance, though admittedly not
dispositive, belies the assumption that the soundest theory will only
dictate duties to a judge.
Finally, it is appropriate to consider one last argument, proffered
by Sartorius, in defense of the thesis that a judge should always
consider himself under a duty to arrive upon the correct decision:
Even if a correct philosophical account of the judicial decision process
implied that a case might arise in which the issues were sq finely bal-
anced that there would be no one uniquely correct decision, it would
not follow that in any particular case a judge would be entitled to
act as if there was no uniquely correct decision . . . . Since there
is a uniquely correct decision in the vast majority of cases, the lack
of a judicial criterion for identifying those in which there is not im-
plies that a judge would never be entitled to treat a case before him
as one in which there was no uniquely correct result, for in all prob-
ability it will not be. 136
This argument implicitly admits the substance of the criticisms above,
but attempts to deny that they have any practical effect. The fallacy
of this argument is not difficult to detect. It is easy to concede that
there are clear legal rights on the part of the litigants in most cases
and correlative duties ·on the part of judges. Hence, Sartorius is
correct in asserting that there will probably be one correct decision in
any randomly selected case. He has not proved or even unequivocally
asserted, however, that there is a uniquely correct decision in the
vast majority of hard cases. And this is precisely what must oe
shown to justify the inference that a judge should always treat a hard
case as if there were, in fact, a uniquely correct decision.
135. Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 857. Another writer has
also referred to a distinction between "ought" and "obligation" and has suggested that
in hard cases it only makes sense to speak of "the correct decision which the judge
ought to reach." Sartorius, supra note 5, at 172-73 (emphasis original).
136. Sartorius, supra note 5, at 158-59. See Sartorius, supra note 19, at 185. At
one point Dworkin remarks, "[t]he law may not be a seamless web; but the plaintiff
is entitled to ask Hercules to treat it as if it were." Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1094
(emphasis added). Might Dworkin have this same kind of argument in mind?
1194 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1167
154. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1064, 1077. See text at notes 46-49 supra.
155. Hard Cases, at 1065.
156. Id. at 1093.
1198 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1167
example, Congress one day may choose to "bail out" Lockheed from
its financial difficulties and the next day refuse to "bail out" New
York City from threatened default even though it believes that the two
situations are relevantly similar. Of course, when a legislator ignores
the requirements of universalizability in this manner, he in effect
makes logically contradictory judgments (assuming, ex hypothesi,
that the two cases are relevantly similar). A judge, on the other
hand, has a relatively powerful institutional duty to respect universal-
izability in adjudicating, a duty that perhaps springs in part from the
fact that the law can serve as an action-guide only if there is an
over-all consistency in the rationales that judges assert in their opin-
ions. The principle of stare decisis is simply a label for this institu-
tional duty. ·
Yet, there is nothing inherent in the requirement of universaliza-
bility that always entitles one party in a civil lawsuit to judgment in
his favor. It is true that judges are bound by an institutional duty to
respect the reasons given for decisions in prior cases, and, to this
extent, cannot assume the role of "deputy legislators." But Dworkin
claims too much in supposing that the requirements of universa.liza-
bility engender a gapless system of entitlements on behalf of litigants.
The thesis of universalizability does not suggest that there is some
soundest theory of law, nor that there is always a uniquely correct
decision. From time to time judges will inevitably differ on what
counts as a relevant similarity or difference between cases. Further-
more, just which reasons and justifications are the actual grounds for
prior decisions will often be a matter of interpretation, about which
there may be disagreement. Therefore, different judges can, on
occasion, be expected to universalize prior cases in different ways. In
such cases it makes little sense to speak of a court as being under an
institutional duty to decide in one particular way, or, correlatively, to
say that a party has a right to a particular decision. Universalizability
simply requires a judge, when he is reasoning his way to a decision in
a hard case, to reconcile his decision with whatever he considers to be
similar cases in precedent, and to determine whether the reasons
given in the prior cases apply to the case he is judging. But unless
the authorities are very clear and persuasive (in which circumstance
he is presented with an easy rather than a hard case), there will not
always be one correct decision that is objectively justified to the
exclusion of all other possible decisions.
Dworkin's fallacy has been to suppose that the law must be
conceived as a seamless web of entitlements if judges are not to be
taken as quasi-legislators. In proposing the thesis of universaliz-
ability of legal judgments, this Note has attempted to describe a mid-
dle ground.