Mining Technology

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Wider longwall faces may not be better

B. Hebblewhite & J. Simpson

To cite this article: B. Hebblewhite & J. Simpson (2001) Wider longwall faces may not be better,
Mining Technology, 110:1, 11-17, DOI: 10.1179/mnt.2001.110.1.11

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Wider longwall faces may not be better
B. Hebblewhite and J. Simpson
Synopsis
Newstan colliery, New South Wales, was confronted by
two problems that had a significant effect on both the
immediate and the long-term viability of the business.
The first was periodic weighting and the second was
windblast. For the operation to remain as a longwall
mine ‘management plans’ had to be written and
applied to protect the safety of employees and ensure
its commercial success.
Strata control problems on the longwall face, mani-
fested as periodic weighting, forced a reduction in face
length. The results of this were a great improvement in
face conditions and productivity but also the onset of
windblasts. Methods were developed to predict the
windblast events, monitor their intensity and protect
the workforce from their effects. Subsequent face
lengths were marginally increased in an attempt to
minimize the windblast problem without a return to
the destructive conditions associated with excessive
periodic weighting. The experiences and methodologies
adopted to deal with these conditions are described.
Fig. 1 Schematic illustration of periodic weighting mechanism. After Frith2
Paper first presented at the eleventh International conference on coal
research, ‘Coal for the 21st Century’, held in Calgary, Canada, from
9 to 12 September, 1997; subsequently presented at the Annual con-
ference of the Newcastle Branch of the Institution of Mining and
Metallurgy in Pokolbin, Australia, on 17 October, 1998. Paper pub-
lished with the consent of the International Committee for Coal
Research in Trans. Instn Min. Metall.(Se ct. A: Min. te chno ),l. 110,
January–April 2001. © The Institution of Mining and Metallurgy
2001.
In some underground coal mines where the roof comprises
strong and massive rock in close proximity to the working
seam the caving process is characterized by delayed fracturing
of the roof behind the longwall supports. This results in large
blocks of roof strata forming cantilevered blocks that gradu-
ally rotate as the overhang increases until the front end of the
block detaches itself from the intact roof. The location of this
point of fracture initiation and detachment is dependent on
the strength, thickness and height of the massive strata above
the working seam, but is usually above and ahead of the long-
wall face. Caving of this type, which is of a periodic nature, is
referred to as ‘periodic weighting’ and is illustrated in Fig. 1.
In extreme conditions the consequences of this type of caving
condition can be (i) excessive loading and closure on the
longwall supports; (ii) pre-fracturing of the overlying strata
ahead of the face; (iii) excessive loading on the face coal,
which may lead to spalling; and (iv) development of roof cavi-
ties above the face.
A second characteristic of strong, massive roof strata in
close proximity to the working seam is that with reduced
extraction spans the roof strata do not always cave regularly
as extraction progresses, but ‘hang up’, leading to extensive
areas of unsupported roof in the goaf. These areas can col-
lapse suddenly and often without warning, compressing the
air beneath and forcing it out of the goaf through surrounding
openings, which gives rise to a phenomenon known as ‘wind-
blast’. The force of the wind can cause injury to mine
personnel, disruption to the ventilation system and damage to
plant and equipment. It can also increase the hazard of explo-
sion by expelling methane from the goaf and mixing it with
raised coal dust.
A11
Newstan colliery
Coal has been produced more or less continuously from the
Newstan colliery lease area in New South Wales since 1878.
During this period the mine has worked the Great Northern
seam, the Fassifern seam, the Young Wallsend seam, the
Yard seam (with either the Young Wallsend or Borehole
seams), the Borehole seam and the West Borehole seam
(Young Wallsend, Yard and Borehole seams).
Since 1984 the mine has used the longwall method in the
Great Northern seam, Fassifern seam, Young Wallsend seam
(sometimes including the Yard seam) and West Borehole
seam. The working height has ranged from 2.6 to 4.5 m, the
depth of cover has been from 20 to 310 m and longwall
widths have varied from 95.2 to 226.5 m.
Geology
The West Borehole seam coal is formed within Newstan
colliery holding by the convergence of the Young Wallsend,
Yard and Borehole seams. However, it retains the individual
Fig. 2 Mine plan showing 7-m septum boundary of channel strata
A12
physical characteristics of its constituent coal seams, which
comprise high-volatile bituminous coal with medium to high
ash and low sulphur contents. It contains minor, occasional
shale bands up to 150 mm thick, and some deterioration in
coal quality occurs in those ‘plies’ which comprise the upper-
most elements of the constituent coal seams.
The maximum seam thickness within the Newstan colliery
holding occurs at the line of seam convergence and is approx-
imately 6 m. The extracted seam height during mining of
longwall panels in this region was between 3.3 and 4.3 m.
Over much of the area in question the Nobbys Tuff forms
the immediate roof of the Young Wallsend and West Borehole
seams. In some localities, however, the main roof comprises a
massive conglomerate–sandstone member. This has been
intersected in holes drilled up from gateroads and has been
shown to be up to 50 m thick and to include conglomerate
lenses that vary in thickness up to 30 m. The distance from the
West Borehole seam to the overlying conglomerate member
varies across the panels from approximately 3 to 15 m. The
geological and geotechnical environment has been previously
described by Creech.1 The massive conglomerate–sandstone
strata member has been identified as a sedimentary channel
that meandered across the region, with varying lateral extent
and, as already stated, varying proximity to the seam. Fig. 2
shows the location of the channel, where there is a septum
thickness between seam and channel base of <7 m.

Longwall 5

The geological conditions encountered prior to Longwall

(LW) 5, when mining took place only in the Young Wallsend
seam, were varied but controllable. The conditions were aver-
age to good in both the gateroads and the longwall faces, and
the interruptions to production caused by adverse strata
behaviour were about average.
As at most longwall mines, however, Newstan’s manage-
ment was intent on widening and lengthening the longwall
face as far as practical to minimize longwall equipment trans-
fers and to minimize the demand for new gate drivage,
thereby facilitating continuity in longwall production.
LW5 commenced retreating in 1994 in the thicker-section
West Borehole seam coal and good production rates were
achieved until a fall occurred on the face, which severely
impeded production. The face was 226.5 m wide and was
cutting 3.3 m of the 5.6-m West Borehole seam. The bottom
section of the seam was being mined, leaving 1.5–2.5 m of
top coal; the lower section of the seam was mined on account
of the superior quality of the coal. The first fall occurred after
LW5 had retreated some 126 m. Thereafter falls occurred
more or less regularly throughout the time when LW5 was
retreating. There were 14 falls, which extended 20–70 m
along the face, up to 6 m into the longwall block and to more
than 10 m in height. Clearing up and the reinstallation of
supports took from several days to more than a month before
production could recommence.
When the falls occurred lumps in excess of 6 m ´ 1 m fell
on to the armoured face conveyor or formed bridges between
the chocks and the face. Some of the smaller debris rilled in
between the front legs of the chock and the walkway. The
effect on production was severe. It became apparent that the
falls were caused by periodic weighting from the overlying
strata. This has already been discussed in work by Simpson
and Frith3 and Creech.1
The mine could not sustain the effects of periodic weight-
ing for two reasons. (1) Safety—Rock fell from a considerable
height and could rill into the walkway of the chocks with
potentially dangerous outcomes; the cleaning up of close falls
was also potentially dangerous because of the uncontrolled
movement of the rock and the difficulty in cleaning the heavy,
sometimes sharp pieces of rock from the armoured face con-
veyor, etc. (2) Productivity—The loss of production, damage
to equipment and adverse interaction with other mine activi-
ties were too great.
As a result it was decided to reduce the face length to
reduce the impact of periodic weighting. It was thought that a
reduced panel width would enable the overlying massive
strata to span across the longwall excavation, at least in the
vicinity of the face, and thereby force the initiation of the
strata fracturing process to move back into the goaf area,
rather than ahead of the face, as was clearly the case in LW5.
Longwall 6 and beyond
Initial windblast experience
LW6 had already been developed at a width of 226 m, so a
decision was made to split LW6 to give two blocks, each
95.2 m wide. It was expected that these narrower panels
would control the caving process by eliminating periodic
Fig. 3 Mine plan showing panel widths after splitting of original
LW6 panel
weighting and the consequent strata fracturing ahead of the
face line. Fig. 3 shows the mine plan after the original LW6
panel had been split into two narrow panels (LW6 and LW7).
The shortened LW6 was extremely productive for the ini-
tial 300 m of retreat until the first windblast occurred. This
first significant windblast happened in August, 1995, when
two employees were seriously injured. Both men were work-
ing in the maingate. The longwall deputy had just finished
measuring the creep adjacent to the maingate drive and an
electrician was standing at the inbye end of the pantechnicon.
The intensity of this windblast was equal to or greater than
that of any that were measured subsequently. Besides the
injuries to the employees on the face the windblast caused
significant disruption to the mine ventilation in sections up to
1 km away. The effect in the maingate was catastrophic;
items of equipment weighing around 20 kg were tossed
around, presenting a serious hazard to people.
Caving characteristics
The problem of periodic weighting had already been identi-
fied as being related to the presence of massive strata
(conglomerate–sandstone) in the immediate roof.2 The elimi-
nation of periodic weighting and the delay of any significant
caving were achieved very successfully with the narrow LW6.
However, the behaviour of the same massive channel strata
was now leading to the windblast problem.
It was considered that where the base of the channel was at
sufficient vertical separation from the seam horizon the more
friable septum strata (shales, coal and mudstone) would cave
readily behind the face and bulk up sufficiently to fill the goaf
void and isolate (and cushion) any failure of the overlying
channel strata, thus preventing the generation of a windblast
that would reach the mine workings. Where the septum
narrowed, however, there would be insufficient bulking,
resulting in large, continuous voids in the goaf that could
extend back from the face for possibly hundreds of metres.
Any subsequent failure of the channel, or even large-scale
A13
slabbing from the base of the channel, would then have the
potential to create a windblast on the face. A further compli-
cating factor was that, because of the propensity of the coal at
Newstan to spontaneous combustion, the mine layout did not
include any bleeder headings at the back of the goaf; all
cut-throughs adjacent to the goaf were sealed, so that the only
path for an air movement such as a windblast was back over
the face area.
Early experience of windblasts and correlation with the
observed goaf conditions and geology indicated that a septum
thickness of 7 m or less created the conditions suitable for
windblasts to occur (hence the 7-m septum limiting boundary
for showing the channel location in Fig. 2). A postulated
model of a mechanism for the occurrence of windblasts in
this geological environment is shown in Fig. 4.
The initial accounts of mineworkers who were in the panel
locate, understand and predict windblast events. To gain a
more complete understanding of the process and possibly
develop prevention or control methods, or at least reliable
prediction methods, it was considered essential to pinpoint
the location of each event and attempt to quantify the air
quantities, pressures and velocities involved. It was agreed to
initiate an investigation of which one component would be
windblast pressure–velocity surveys in the gateroads immedi-
ately outbye the face. The other line of the investigation
would be extension of the microseismic monitoring pro-
gramme (originally installed for geotechnical evaluation of
the periodic weighting and caving behaviour) to attempt to
locate three-dimensionally the rockfalls that generated the
windblasts as well as attempt to monitor any precursors to the
main caving event that might provide an early warning system
for the face crews.

Fig. 4 Conceptual model of Newstan windblast mechanism. After Creech1

Table 1 Schedule of windblasts recorded at Newstan colliery

Site Event Day Date Time Maximum wind

number velocity, m/s

LW7 021195#1 Thursday 2 November, 1995 14.33.13 DST 3

061195#1 Monday 6 November, 1995 01.54.54 DST 8
091195#1 Thursday 9 November, 1995 05.17.05 DST 22
091195#2 Thursday 9 November, 1995 05.18.00 DST 4
271195#1 Monday 27 November, 1995 16.37.58 DST 9
291195#1 Wednesday 29 November, 1995 11.41.16 DST 13
291195#2 Wednesday 29 November, 1995 11.41.45 DST 40
291195#5 Wednesday 29 November, 1995 19.22.19 DST 12
021295#1 Saturday 2 December, 1995 10.01.40 DST 9
031295#1 Sunday 3 December, 1995 21.22.05 DST 14
041295#2 Monday 4 December, 1995 06.47.17 DST 12
051295#1 Tuesday 5 December, 1995 04.58.46 DST 11

LW8 110496#1 Thursday 11 April, 1996 14.33.13 EST 14

170496#1 Wednesday 17 April, 1996 01.54.54 EST 39
190496#1 Friday 19 April, 1996 05.17.05 EST 8
280496#1 Sunday 28 April, 1996 05.18.00 EST 40
280496#2 Sunday 28 April, 1996 16.37.58 EST 39
300596#1 Thursday 30 May, 1996 11.41.16 EST 32
040696#1 Tuesday 04 June, 1996 11.41.45 EST 16
120696#1 Wednesday 12 June, 1996 19.22.19 EST 23
160696#1 Sunday 16 June, 1996 10.01.40 EST 10

LW9 010297#1 Saturday 1 February, 1997 09.22.09 DST 33

010297#2 Saturday 1 February, 1997 11.42.43 DST 18

at the time of windblasts suggested that the source of particu-
lar events might be some distance back into the goaf (up to
800 m on some occasions). Therefore, simply mapping face
locations at the time of a windblast and correlating those with
the geology could be a misleading indicator in efforts to
A14
Windblast monitoring
As part of the research project, which was undertaken by the
Department of Mining Engineering at the University of New
South Wales, field monitoring equipment was specially devel-
oped to record air pressure and velocity associated with
windblasts. The equipment consisted of an approved under-
ground data-logger, four sensor pods and a hand-held
interface unit.
As it was impracticable to monitor all points where air
might emanate from the goaf, a decision was taken to concen-
trate the windblast monitoring instrumentation in one area
relative to the face. In addition, it was decided to forgo the
opportunities to measure windblast intensity within the area
of the longwall face or in the tailgate as this would have
necessitated running cables through the area of the
face-ends—locations where maintaining cables had proved
difficult during previous monitoring at other sites. The expe-
riences of underground workers indicated that the main focus
for the windblast intensity was between the maingate chock
and the adjacent rib, very little impact being felt on the face
itself. In view of this, monitoring locations were selected in
the maingate and companion roadway (travelling road). For
convenience the Wind Blast Data Logger was positioned in a
cut-through immediately adjacent to the longwall trans-
formers, which also provided its external power source.
A schedule of windblasts recorded at Newstan colliery
between 1995 and 1997—a total of 23 events—is given in
Table 1. The eight windblasts indicated in bold type are con-
sidered significant, i.e. of sufficient intensity to pose a risk of
personal injury or of damage to the mine ventilation system.
The wind velocity–time trace for the event recorded at
15.55 h on 28 April, 1996, is illustrated in Fig. 5. This event,
like several others, showed a maximum velocity in the order
of 40 m/s or 144 km/h—the maximum recording limit of the
instrumentation. Of particular note is the negative velocity
following the initial blast, confirming the ‘suck-back’ phe-
nomenon well known in windblasts. Both the differential
pressure and overpressure curves were of this same general
shape.
Fig. 5 Velocity trace of windblast at 15.55 h, 28 April, 1996
The maximum values of various key parameters recorded
during the eight significant events were peak air velocity,
40 m/s (144 km/h); rate of rise of velocity, 50 m/s/s; peak
differential pressure, 10 hPa; peak overpressure, 100 hPa;
rate of rise of pressure, 50 hPa/s; and impulse, ca 200 hPa.s.
The total volume of air forced down the maingate and
travelling road during one of these significant events was in
excess of 3000 m3. Taking the fall height to have been 2 m
and making the somewhat conservative assumptions that
(1) no air was expelled through the other entries open to the
goaf; and (2) the falling roof acted as a ‘non-leaky piston’ and
was 100% efficient in expelling air from below it into the
maingate and travelling road, the corresponding roof fall area
can be calculated to have been in excess of 1500 m2.
It is of particular concern that during one of the events the
flow of air past the pod mounted on the pantechnicon
exceeded 140 m, i.e. air (and, potentially, methane) from the
goaf penetrated beyond the ‘hazardous zone’ defined by
statute. Fortunately, at Newstan colliery non-flameproof
equipment, such as the panel transformers, was located off
the intakes at a distance from the longwall face that far
exceeded the statutory minimum.
Seismic monitoring
The seismic monitoring was undertaken with an array of geo-
phones installed in boreholes drilled from the surface to
various horizons above the seam. These were connected to a
repeater station, which transmits data via a radio link to a
computer at the pit top, where the data are analysed on line.
Details of the seismic monitoring programme have been
reported by Creech. 1 Significant problems were encountered
initially with the software and analysis of the data and it was
only from LW8 that meaningful data have been obtained.
More work could still be done in relation to both the process-
ing software and interpretation of the results. Nevertheless,
the data currently generated provide invaluable information
in terms of aiding understanding of the mechanics of strata
caving and providing an early warning system for windblasts.
Fig. 6 is a plot of LW8 with the channel boundary (within
7-m proximity) overlain. It also shows the face position for six
windblast events and the location in plan of the ‘source’ goaf
fall for each—all of which are located within the channel
boundary. Unfortunately, difficulties in interpretation of the
vertical coordinate of each detected event remain as a conse-
quence of the contrasting strata types.
Fig. 7 is a plot of the time trace of seismic activity that led
up to the 28 April, 1996, event, illustrated previously in
Fig. 6 Plan of LW8 windblasts showing event source, face and
channel locations
A15
 Fig. 7 Seismic trace, 28 April, 1996, including windblast at 15.55 h
Fig. 5. This clearly shows a progressive increase in both the
frequency of events and their energy intensity prior to the
windblast. Various combinations of parameters have been
developed progressively as alarm triggers in the context of
windblast prediction, including event frequency over a sus-
tained time period, event intensity and the number of
geophones that detect major events. On this occasion the
trigger level leading to evacuation of the face area was given at
15.00 h, 55 min before the windblast occurred.
Since the on-line seismic system has been in operation it
has detected every major event that has occurred. The
requirement now is for further development of the processing
and of understanding of what is being monitored so that false
alarm triggers are avoided, warning times are adequate and
100% effective, but not excessive, and indicators of ‘safe to
return’ conditions are improved.
Remedial systems and application
The ideal was to find a face length that was less than 220 m,
to prevent periodic weighting, and yet wide enough to
encourage regular caving of the intermediate septum strata
that would suffice to choke off the goaf and prevent serious
windblasts. After LW6 face lengths were widened to 130 m.
This was still narrow enough to avoid periodic weighting, but
the windblast problem persisted.
Lost-time injuries have resulted from windblasts, three of
which required hospitalization. After the first windblast in
August, 1995, the longwall was stopped for two days and a
‘management plan’ was formulated and put into practice.
A second incident, in which an employee suffered severe pep-
pering while working in the maingate, resulted in the longwall
being stopped for seven days and a second ‘management
plan’.
Solutions
There are three potential solutions to the windblast problem:
engineering; scientific; and personal protection.
Engineering
There appears to be a ‘window’ between the width of the long-
wall under the sandstone–conglomerate channel at which
periodic weighting occurs and that at which windblasts occur.
At 220 m the periodic weighting occurred without windblasts;
A16
at 130 m windblast occurred without periodic weighting.
It may be possible to hydro-fracture the suspected area
where the channel–septum falls.
The microseismic monitoring currently installed on LW8
and LW9 coupled with surface subsidence monitoring shows
that where the channel is greater than 15 m thick it bridges
the longwall block at 130-m width.
Oceanic Coal and Powercoal are currently studying the
effects of wider longwall panels. West Wallsend No. 2 is cur-
rently working a 150 m wide longwall. The strata above the
longwall are monitored seismically to determine, in three
dimensions, if and where the channel breaks and at what dis-
tance behind the retreating longwall the break occurs. It is the
intention to continue to monitor seismically the behaviour of
the channel in the goaf at progressively wider longwalls.
A safety factor will be employed that is the distance from the
face to the channel break. There may be a width of wall
where the channel–septum falls as the face is mined at which
neither periodic weighting nor windblasts occur.
Scientific
Microseismic monitoring has indicated that there is a build-
up of total energy before a windblast event takes place. The
first 75% of LW9 is in a non-channel geological environment.
A comparison between LW8 seismic events and LW9 seismic
events has been conducted to establish a more sophisticated
trigger for the removal of employees from the face before a
windblast. It now seems possible to determine before a shift
starts that probability of a windblast event is approaching.
The longwall will not be manned until these conditions have
passed. When working in windblast zones full-time monitor-
ing of seismic activity will still be necessary; this should make
for a safer, more productive longwall.
Personal protection
A committee was formed consisting of inspectors from the
Department of Mineral Resources, a district check inspector
from the union, rock mechanics experts from Strata
Engineering and the University of New South Wales and
personnel from Oceanic Coal and Newstan colliery. The
committee analysed all available data, including a worldwide
literature search, and developed a ‘windblast management
strategy’. A second committee was formed of representatives
of the original committee and two representatives from each
production unit on the longwall; all shifts were represented. (Sydney: Coalfield Geology Council of NSW 1996), 239–49.
2. Frith R. Development and demonstration of a longwall monitor-
The management strategy was considered by the second ing system for operational decision making. ACARP Project Report
committee and additions were incorporated into the wind- C4017, 1996.
blast strategy. These representatives explained the strategy to 3. Simpson J. and Frith R. Longwall face control under adverse
the longwall crews on each shift. No changes to the strategy roof conditions at Newstan colliery. Paper presented at Prosperity
were enacted without the agreement of the persons from each with safety in a hostile environment: the challenge for underground
coal mines, ACIRL seminar, Brisbane, September, 1995.
shift. The contribution made by the operators was invaluable
in reducing accidents on LW8.
Corresponding author
Conclusions and future directions
B. Hebblewhite graduated from the University of New South Wales,
The problems of periodic weighting and windblasts encoun- Australia, in 1974 and subsequently gained a Ph.D. from the
tered at Newstan colliery are not unique and will University of Newcastle, England, while working on geomechanical
undoubtedly arise in the future at other operations where design issues for Cleveland Potash’s Boulby mine. From 1977 to
massive strata overlie the seam in close proximity. They serve 1995 he was employed by ACIRL, Ltd., in various roles, including
ten years as manager of its mining division. Since 1995 he has been
to illustrate the importance of overall panel design and panel
professor and research director in the School of Mining Engineering
dimensions and the interrelated nature of many of the prob-
of the University of New South Wales, occupying the Kenneth Finlay
lems faced by mine operators—in this case the links between Chair of Rock Mechanics—an industry-funded research appoint-
panel geometry, geology, caving mechanisms, strata control ment.
at the face and windblasts.
Considerable scientific, practical engineering and opera- Address: Mining Research Centre, University of New South Wales,
tional progress has been made in understanding and Sydney, NSW 2952, Australia.
responding to the combined periodic weighting and wind-
blast problems at Newstan. It is clear that no single approach
or investigative tool, in isolation, will be adequate to solve this
very real mining problem.
In recognition of the dearth of international literature on
windblast experience Powercoal has taken the initiative, in
conjunction with the University of New South Wales, to pre-
pare a comprehensive technical report on all aspects of the
windblast research to date at Newstan in the hope that this
will assist other operators to deal with similar problems in an
informed and expedient manner.
Newstan colliery faces the challenge of optimizing the face
length (the longwall tonne/development ratio) further with-
out jeopardizing mineworker safety. There are more blocks of
coal ahead that are influenced by the channel strata, and so it
is imperative that the driving mechanisms of windblasts be
better understood, that prediction of the caving characteris-
tics and the onset of periodic weighting in relation to panel
geometry and geology be developed further and that, as a
result, improved control, prediction and, possibly, prevention
systems be developed to counter these phenomena.
One point that is not disputed is that under periodic
weighting longwall mining was neither safe nor productive.
Although the shorter faces have brought a new range of prob-
lems, with the developing understanding and predictive
methods they are undoubtedly better than those which
induce extreme periodic weighting.

Acknowledgement

The authors are grateful to the National Energy Research,

Development and Demonstration Programme and the Joint
Coal Board Health and Safety Trust for financial support of
the University of New South Wales’ research project; to
Powercoal Pty, Ltd., for financial support of the UNSW
research project and for their overall commitment and sup-
port of these investigations; and to numerous personnel from
Newstan colliery and other supporting organizations for their
invaluable input—in particular, M. Creech, J. Sheehan,
D. Oliver, G. Watson, Dr. B. McKavanagh, Dr. R. Frith and
Dr. J. C. W. Fowler.

References
1. Creech M. Microseismic monitoring, windblasts and longwall
mining under massive strata at Newstan colliery. In Geology in long -
wall mining symposium, University of New South Wales, November, 1996

A17