Arguments

regarding the United Kingdom leaving the European Union rest on sovereignty
and political issues more than economic judgements. An evaluation.

UP775796

University of Portsmouth
School of Social, Historical and Literary
Studies

April 2018

Dissertation submitted on part-fulfilment
for the requirements of
the BA (Hons) International Relations degree.

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 Abstract

My decision to orientate this dissertation on Britain’s membership to the European Union
has stemmed from an interest in British and European Politics. The following research has
been designed to interrogate the relativity of individual state sovereignty within the 21st
century. With the intention of shedding light on the Brexit referendum, one of the key aims
of this dissertation has been to further develop the understanding of why Britain voted for
Brexit. Using both historical and contemporary information, including the use of
quantitative and qualitative data, I investigate the contributing circumstances to the Brexit
referendum in 2016, including the significance of parliamentary sovereignty and the
emergence of right wing scepticism.

I argue that Brexit was the product of a series of political motivations and warned of serious
economic implications following a potential break from the customs union. I have analysed
this dissertation with a pre-selected bibliography which I have referred back to throughout
my research.

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 Acknowledgements

I owe much intellectual debt to my dissertation supervisor Mr Mannin for his guidance
through the political minefield of Brexit, for the present work would not have been possible
without the frequent meetings which significantly helped to lay the foundations for a
dissertation on Brexit. Additionally, I would like to offer a warm thank you to Dr Redgrave
for his guidance in various subjects throughout my undergraduate degree at the University
of Portsmouth. I would also like to warmly acknowledge the support from my mother during
this dissertation. Thanks to my mother as she provided a head start in this dissertation,
helped me through obstacles which were encountered and has always acted as a backbone
and been supportive of my studies.

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 Table of Contents

.
Abstract. 2.

Acknowledgements. 3.

List of tables / figures 6.

Glossary of Key Terms 7.

INTRODUCTION

1. Argument and Hypothesis. 8.
1.1. Rationale for Choosing Topic of Brexit. 8.
1.2. Research Aims of paper. 9.

2. Theoretical framework and methodology 9.
2.1. Selected Annotated Bibliography, some considerations. 10.

3. Dissertation Structure. 12.

4. Outline of Brexit. 15.

5. British sovereignty or shared sovereignty with the European Union? 16.
5.1. British cultural identity 17.
5.2. The emergence of the European Union. 18.
5.3. Understanding ‘sovereignty’ in the 21st century. 19.

6. The Importance of Party Politics. 21.
6.1. Two Party System 22.

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7. The Emergence of the United Kingdom Independence Party. 23.
7.1 The Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 24.
7.2 The rise of Nigel Farage. 26.
7.3 The 2015 election. 27.

8. The Economics of Brexit. 29.
8.1 The European Union and the Four Freedoms. 29.
8.2. Impact on Trade, ‘trade-off’ of Brexit. 31.


CONCLUSION. 35.

APPENDIX. 38.

REFERENCES. 52.

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 List of tables / figures

Source: (Ward, 2017, p. 5) Page number: 33.

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 Glossary of Key Terms

Brexit The British departure from the European Union.
BNP British National Party
CES Centre of European Studies
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FPTP First Past the Post
IR International Relations
MP Member of Parliament
OECD The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONS Office for National Statistics
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party
UK United Kingdom

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 1. Argument and Hypothesis.

Britain joined the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Community (EEC) in
1973 under the Conservative government headed by Edward Heath, ever since Britain’s
membership to the EU has become a highly controversial topic of debate concerning the
question “should the United Kingdom remain a member of the EU?” One of the key claims
in which this dissertation seeks to draw upon is the contention that Brexit derived from a
bed of political circumstance, as opposed to the suggestion that Brexit will provide
economic advantages. That is to say, the hypothesis of this dissertation will underscore the
narrative that Britain was blindly led by sovereignty with regards Brexit and the United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) with regards to Brexit. This paper will further focus on
contemporary issues regarding the ways in which the rise of UKIP influenced Brexit and how
the EU became an immediate problem for the UK and prompted a referendum.

1.1. Rationale.

Since the referendum, the understanding of Britain’s metaphorical divorce from the EU has
shaped much of the world’s current political climate. Britain’s membership with the EU has
become a salient issue which has coincided with the movement from the right. The rise of
UKIP from the far right of the British political spectrum for the first time became a
significant challenger within British party politics, even more so after the “political
earthquake” released after UKIP ‘won’ a relative share of votes in the European Elections of
2014 (Wintour & Watt, 2014). In terms of the rationale, it is necessary to look at the
contemporary global and economic system due to the vast controversy and uncertainty
developing around Brexit. It is important to study and understand this topic because there is
wide speculation on the future of the United Kingdom in the aftermath of a UK departure
from the EU. In particular, attention is driven to the uncertainty of trade deals and customs
agreements after Brexit, whether the UK will be able to continue to trade within Europe
whereby Britain opts for a ‘soft’ Brexit and remains within the customs union, or Britain
pursues a ‘hard’ Brexit and seeks to “negotiate other trade deals” (EURACTIV, 2017).
Moreover, many scholars within the parameters of International Relations (IR) have taken

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particular interest on the subject of Brexit and European integration and how one will affect
the other.

1.2. Research Aims.

1. To examine the factor of sovereignty within the UK as part of the EU and to assess
why Parliamentary sovereignty is so important in comparison to that of Germany.
Also, to challenge the theory of sovereignty and its genuine relevance within the 21st
century.

2. To explain the role of Globalisation and Europeanisation and how the increasingly
interconnected economic and political system has developed a new concept of
‘shared sovereignty.’

3. To examine the importance of party politics within the UK political system including
the rise of the UK Independence Party in influencing the decision of Brexit.

2. Theoretical Framework and Methodology.

The broad theoretical and methodological framework borrowed within this dissertation
borrows from the works of Friedman, (1962) and from other IR scholars who follow the Neo
Liberal school of thought. This paper further incorporates the works of Jean Monnet (2016)
and his study of Neo Functionalism, particularly drawing upon his work on European
integration whereby he hoped that increased integration between nations would
subsequently increase interdependence between states and therefore coincide with the
declining of importance of the nation as an actor within the economy (Monnet, 2016).
Conjunctively, this paper will incorporate the theory of ‘intergovernmentalism’, proposed by
Stanley Hoffmann (1966) as an alternative theory to that of neo-functionalism. Hoffman’s
theory suggests that the government should hold the ability to control the economic and
political reach of the state, however Hoffmann further suggested that it would be highly
likely for a state’s national interests to be infringed upon (Hoffmann, 1966). Alternatively,
from a realist school of thought, this paper will draw upon Using the study of Kenneth Waltz

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and his involvement with the concept of Neorealism. Guided by Waltz (1979) this paper will
present the argument that Brexit can be associated with the Neo realist school of thought,
whereby in the name of Brexit the UK has sought to restore its global authority and state
sovereignty (Waltz, 1979). In addition to the use of theory within this dissertation, the use
of qualitative information will be important when referring to the voting behaviour in the
2016 referendum.

2.1. Selected Annotated Bibliography.

In recent years the notion of a British departure from the European Union and the balancing
of Europeanisation have become a high topic of debate within International relations.
Various approaches have been made by both scholars and economists expanding upon
arguments which can be made both in favour of Brexit and in favour of a collective Europe.
The following selected bibliography has been constructed using various sources ranging
from scholars to the works of accredited economists.

Since the creation of the European Economic Community the United Kingdom in both
economic terms and political terms has undergone a degree of “Europeanisation” involving
the spread of values within Europe. Professor Mike Mannin provides an extensive study, in
his book titled; “British Governance and Politics,” of Europeanisation and Independence
with regards to the British membership to the European Union (Mannin, 2010). Mannin
(2010) notes that there are three uses of the term, ‘Europeanisation’, one referring to the
spread of economic values among member states, another suggests that its impact of
integration in the EU and thirdly, referring to Europeanisation as an impact of the EU
membership on member states. Secondly, this paper will draw upon the works of Neil
Nugent (2017). Within this selected source, Nugent (2017) provides a specific focus on the
benefits and costs of the EU membership to the United Kingdom, whereby he suggests that
the “UK has been by far the greatest beneficiary of differentiation,” (Nugent, 2017, p. 12)
which was arguably most notable from its opt outs from the single currency. This book
further includes the significance of British history in the Brexit vote and the significance of
the EU on the post war transformation within Europe. This paper will further draw upon an
academic journal published by EURACTIV (EURACTIV, 2017). This academic source provides

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specialised information regarding the uncertainty within the EU following the Brexit
referendum. This source introduces the subject of who the UK will seek new future trade
deals with in the post Brexit period, for example suggesting that there could be a temporary
customs union between the UK and the EU in the years following Brexit.

This paper will frequently draw upon the academic accounts of Clarke, Goodwin and
Whiteley (2017). This source introduces the question as to why the small majority of the UK
population voted for Brexit and therefore forwarded the notion of ‘British sovereignty’
(Clarke, Goodwin & Whiteley, 2017). Additionally, this particular source addresses the
political shift within the UK political system and suggests the significance on the rise of UKIP
in the outcome of the 2016 referendum. This paper will draw upon Newman’s approach to
‘Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union’ (Newman, 1996), whereby Newman
(1996) effectively introduces and challenges the concept of sovereignty and its relative use
in the 21st century. Newman’s book is an important source with reference to the hypothesis
of this paper whereby he suggests that sovereignty is illustrated on a regional level. An
additional selected source within this paper refers to the work of (Waltz, 1979). This source
focuses on the realm of authority within the state and presents the argument that states are
given the option to decrease freedom by increasing the control of a country. For example,
the UK hopes to increase the control over its borders by withdrawing from the EU and
therefore preventing the freedom of movement of persons to the UK. Therefore, this
particular source will relate to the second chapter in the structure of this paper regarding
the political issues which have been addressed within Brexit.

This paper will further draw upon the works of Milton Friedman (Friedman, 1962). Friedman
argues the importance of free market capitalism within the international economy rather
than government controlled services. This source effectively suggests the relevance and
importance of increased integration within Europe and will therefore be used to argue the
economic advantages for a EU membership for the UK. Furthermore, Tetlow, (2016)
furthers this argument by suggesting that there is very little evidence which has been
pitched against migrants that would suggest that they push wages down or unemployment
up. Tetlow, (2016) is a source produced by the Financial Times, containing qualitative
information which can be used to present the argument that immigration has been a

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fundamental factor in the development of both the UK and the EU’s economy. However, in
terms of the economic transition in central and eastern Europe, Gros & Steinherr, (2004)
seek to analyse the key issues associated with increased integration within Europe and draw
upon the theory of Europeanisation. In addition to this, Gross & Steinherr, (2004) further
address the potential benefits of EU expansion through cooperation and inclusion of the
European single market. This source may support economic arguments with particular focus
on the fundamental principles of the European Union. The final selected source which has
been prepared for this dissertation further refers to the work of Daniel Gros, in his journal
article titled; “Triangulating Brexit” (Gros, 2016). Gros has worked as an economic adviser to
the European commission and also the European Parliament. In this source, he provides a
detailed account suggesting that free movement of people is equally important to the
availability of free trade within the EU. This source adopts a very similar view to the
contention of this dissertation, whereby it argues that politics within the UK continues to
capture the imagination of the public and suggests that the decision to divide the UK and
Europe was primarily based on political means as opposed to economic understandings.


3. Dissertation Structure.

Chapter 1
The aim of the first chapter will be to introduce the topic of Brexit, including the
contemporary debates which come with it. Furthermore, this section of the paper will
introduce the relevant theories which can be associated with Brexit, for example;
Neoliberalism, Intergovernmentalism and Neo-functionalism.

Chapter 2

The second chapter will effectively introduce the Political Value Judgements regarding
Brexit. In order to do this, this section of the paper will be further broken down into
different sections. Firstly, discussing the constitutional issues regarding Brexit and the so
called ‘constitutional call.’

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Secondly, the concept of sovereignty whereby the validity of the concept will be discussed.
For example, Globalisation has become such a significant concept that one could argue that
individual state sovereignty is becoming irrelevant. Moreover, why Britain’s case for
sovereignty is believed to be of far greater importance to the them in comparison to
Germany for example, who are arguably more willing to coexist in a degree of ‘pooled
sovereignty’ within the EU. Within this chapter I will be drawing upon the works of (Mannin,
2010) to discuss the imperialistic nature of the UK and the relationship it has developed
with the EU.

This chapter will further draw upon and discuss the importance of party politics whereby
British politics has aligned with the Neo-Liberal approach that the European Union operates
within and to further present the argument that the EU does not become a true problem
within the UK until the year of 2006. Within this section, the paper will analyse the influence
of UKIP and political figures such as Nigel Farage and discuss how UKIP became an effective
challenge to both the Conservative party and the Labour party. This section will analyse how
the recent economic downturns both within the UK and the EU played in UKIP’s favour, for
example the austerity measures within the UK, the credit crunch and the failures of the EU
and the role of the media in shaping people’s imaginations leading up to the Brexit
referendum.

Chapter 3

The third chapter of this paper will effectively introduce the debate from an economic
perspective whereby the aim will be to address the economic ‘trade-offs’ as a result of a UK
departure from the EU. This section will discuss the impact on trade, London and the
financial sector, agriculture and the impact on foreign direct investment to the United
Kingdom. The contention of this section of the paper will focus on the hypothesis that the
UK would benefit far greater with membership to the EU as opposed to opting out of the
customs union. In addition, this section of the paper will further present the argument that
the EU is more than merely a Neo-liberal model of economics. Instead, this section will
suggest that the EU maintains the characteristics of a social model and a regulatory model
which UKIP fails to value during the referendum. This section will draw upon the work of

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economist Daniel Gros (2016) whereby he suggests that political leaders have developed a
‘mercantilist’ or a ‘neo-mercantilist’ stance on the EU whereby the UK seeks to maximise its
trade and economic abilities through membership to the EU.

Finally, this chapter will analyse how the EU became an immediate problem for the UK from
an economic viewpoint due to the shared monetary policy and diversity between member
economies. This chapter will further draw upon the works of academic journals such as that
from EURACTIV, (2017), the website ‘EU observer’ and also the Centre for European Studies
(CES) to effectively use statistical information in order to support the hypothesis of this
paper suggesting that the UK would be far better off within an economic union as opposed
to being out.

Chapter 4

This chapter will be the concluding chapter of the paper, reflecting on the different
perspectives and opinions shared by the scholars which have been used throughout the
paper. This section of the paper will closely link with the hypothesis, providing credibility to
the argument that the UK left the EU based on a range of political reasons.

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 4. Outline of Brexit.

The British exit from the European Union, ‘Brexit’ has been subject to one of the most
controversial political, economic and social debates in recent current affairs. The 2016
referendum resulted in a slim ‘victory’ for the ‘leave campaign’, whereby 51.9% of votes
were recorded in favour of a split from the European Union (Hunt & Wheeler, 2018). There
have been many different viewpoints of debate regarding whether the UK should remain
within the EU or seek a future apart from the customs union. Contemporary debates
regarding the Brexit referendum have revolved around the cost of membership to the EU,
the influence of trade, investment and sovereignty within the UK which refers to
immigration and security. Both Gros, (2016) and Tetlow, (2016) have proposed multiple
explanations of the ‘remain’ side of the debate, in comparison to the Eurosceptic approach
which has been adopted by UKIP but also by MP Boris Johnson in particular. The European
Union can be defined as a political, economic and social union between 28 member states
(European Union, 2017). In terms of the aims of the EU, the union aims to promote
harmony through the creation of a single economic market, enabling the free movement of
goods, services and movement of individuals. In addition to this, the European Union
further acts as a social union and a model of cooperative security between member states.
The European Union adopts an approach of increased interdependence among states,
which has been clearly demonstrated through the EU legal order with economic, social,
political, technological and other treaty based agreements” (Mannin, 2010, p. 3).

“Neo Liberals share old liberal ideas about the possibility of progress and change” (Jackson
& Sorensen, 2013, p. 46). The Neoliberalism school of thought can be exemplified within
both the remain and the leave arguments which have formulated the debate of Brexit. One
could suggest that the theory of Neoliberalism applies to the remain argument, based on
the idea that the UK is able to benefit from integration within the European Union in what is
understood as “mutually advantageous cooperation” (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 47).
Alternatively, it is possible to suggest that the neoliberal case in favour of Brexit revolves
around the understanding that the EU is not economically liberal enough and prevents the
UK from pursuing free trade agreements with alternative states within the world economy,
such as the US, China and Saudi Arabia. In addition to this, the theory of Neo Functionalism

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is one in favour of international integration, originally proposed by Ernst Haas, (Haas, 1958)
whereby the notion of Haas’ work builds upon the study of cooperation between states and
governments. Haas (1958) suggests that “integration is a process whereby political actors
are persuaded to shift their loyalties” (Haas, 1958, p. 16). Neo Functionalism refers to a
theory “inspired by intensifying cooperation” between western states (Jackson & Sorensen,
2013, p. 107). However, with close regard to the European Union, one could argue that
integration has to a degree hit a ‘wall’ or slowed down since the initial years of the EEC. The
concept of intergovernmentalism follows on from that of Haas’ work, whereby the theory
contends that state actors control the level of integration to which their economy operates
at. Neil Nugent (2017) illustrates this point further by suggesting that intergovernmentalism
refers to a set of arrangements made by a state, for example; “nation states cooperate with
one another in matters of common interest” (Nugent, 2017).


5. British sovereignty or shared sovereignty with the EU?

For many years the definition of sovereignty has invariably concerned the supreme
authority of the state, including the political and legal independence of a state within the
international system. The concept of sovereignty refers to the arrangement of authority
within the state, however in the modern era sovereignty has become a global system of
authority which extends beyond state boarders, religions and cultures (Jackson, 2013, p. 1).
However, the word ‘sovereignty’ in recent years has evolved to encumber a wider variety of
subjects;

Throughout the course of history, the meaning of sovereignty has undergone
important change and transformation … the relational identities of state and
sovereignty are not fixed in meaning, but are constantly undergoing change and
transformation (Biersteker & Weber, 1996, p. 14).

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 5.1. British Cultural Identity

The arguments for and against the relevance of state sovereignty derive from the factors
which have shaped the identity of states. In terms of British cultural identity, there has long
been an understanding regarding a myth of a “stiff upper lipped authority” which arguably
been encouraged by an “imperial past” associated with Britain. While also more
importantly, British cultural identity has been associated with the constitutional position of
the British parliament including the influence of the House of Commons, along with both
“geographical and linguistic isolation from the rest of Europe” (Anderson & Weymouth,
1999, p. 3). Within this context, one could draw upon contemporary social theory and the
works of Hall (1996), whereby Britain’s view of cultural identification has been devised from
its closeness and differences from the European Union (Bauman, 1996). Cultural identity can
be influenced through a number of domains within a democracy such as that of the UK. For
example, it is possible to draw upon sovereignty of the British currency whereby it is likely
that through complete Europeanisation and commitment to a single currency, the British
pound would be undermined and stripped of basic economic freedoms. This could further
include the possibility that under a single currency, “Britain’s economy will be sustained
under the authority of a central bank directed and located in Germany” (Anderson &
Weymouth, 1999, p. 5).

One could argue that cultural identity has been shaped around the reluctance to join a
“non-elected EU bureaucracy” which would in turn result in the ability of the UK to exert its
own foreign policy (Anderson & Weymouth, 1999, p. 5). Moreover, scholars such as
Marquand (1999), have drawn upon the significance of parliamentary sovereignty and the
British Monarchy as an established form of cultural identity within Britain as the monarch
has to give final approval to all laws (Marquand, 1995, p. 186). It is possible to suggest that
much of British identity has been formulated from a “Churchillian perception of British
identity” (Marquand, 1995, p. 186). For example, Marquand suggests that the significance of
British sovereignty within parliament and Eurosceptic attitudes to Europeanisation have
stemmed from an imperialistic attitude and “self-perception of British culture and identity”
which had developed in the post war period (Marquand, 1995, p. 186). Additional examples

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of British sovereignty may refer to the significance of ideological groupings and origins
which have been associated with them.

5.2. The emergence of the European Union

The establishment of the EU marked the beginning of both political and economic
interdependence in the post-World War period, including the collective security of all EU
states (Anderson & Weymouth, 1999, p. 5), making a “turning point in the Western
European State System” (Nugent, 2017, p. 29). The introduction of cooperation between
states through political and economic domains coincided with the development of the
notion of ‘pooled sovereignty’ among the 28 European Countries involved within the
European Community, whereby some nations are more accepting of shared sovereignty
within the EU than others. Mannin (2010) draws upon this concept, formally understood as
a process of “Europeanisation” whereby he suggests that states tend to surrender a level (or
all) of their sovereignty and power to the European Union when joining (Mannin, 2010, p.
3).

However, contrary to other states, British politics has a much stronger relationship with the
concept of Sovereignty in comparison to other states, such as Germany. For example,
Mannin further suggests that “perceptions of British politics and government tend to fit
around traditional themes of national sovereignty” (Mannin, 2010, p. 3). In 2005, Germany
passed a new European Union constitution making some changes in leadership, however
failed to gain momentum in the months following. Despite the fact that the constitution
failed to gain momentum immediately following the new constitution, it is possible to
suggest the extent of Germany’s commitment to the EU. One could further illustrate the
political and economic openness of Germany regarding the EU through observing the
constitution of Germany, for example, the law of the land states:

“With a view of establishing a United Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall
participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to
democratic, social and federal principles” (Bundestag, 2014, p. 28).

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While the UK has veered through periods of liberalisation following the Second World War,
protectionism in the 1960s and 1970s before finally becoming more liberal in in the 1980s
(Harvey & Raja, 2018), the constitution of Germany has been shaped around the legislation
of the EU as opposed to exercising its individual sovereignty. One could suggest therefore
that with regards to Brexit, the UK demonstrated a ‘constitutional call,’ with campaigns
rising up from various professions and non-professions calling for increased control on
matters such as immigration and demanding a withdrawal from the European Court. Such
viewpoints were predominantly expressed by the ‘Leave campaign’ and illustrated in brief
by the adopted slogan; “take back control” (VoteLeave, 2016). However, within this section
of the paper, the relativity of sovereignty within the 21st century and its connotative
meaning on contemporary politics will be assessed.

5.3. Sovereignty in the 21st century

‘Sovereignty’ has previously been defined as the state’s authority to manage its own
political and economic system and is closely linked with the functions of states and
democracy. In terms of philosophers, both Thomas Hobbes (1651) and Jean Bodin (1992)
offer theories of absolute monarchical sovereignty. The concept of Sovereignty has been a
fundamental concept in terms of legitimacy and accountability of a state. For example,
previous definitions of sovereignty such as those expressed by English philosopher Thomas
Hobbes suggest that great power of a state or within a community can be associated with
the sovereignty of the person or group of people in question. For example, Hobbes’
Leviathan suggests that Sovereignty was determined through one’s might as opposed to law
(Hobbes, 1651). In addition to this, it is significantly important to draw upon the works of
Jean Bodin within this debate. In his early writings, Bodin (1992) suggests that the concept
of Sovereignty is characterised by absolute and perpetual power and is impossible to be
bound by law (Bodin, 1992). One may associate this definition of sovereignty within the
power and influence of the British parliament, for example; Parliamentary sovereignty is
well grounded within the UK constitution, enabling parliament to be the supreme authority
in the UK, which can create or end any law, including the ability to revoke EU law.
Furthermore, in terms of the Brexit referendum it is possible to suggest that the concept of
sovereignty became a potent and catchy slogan for the Eurosceptic campaigners. For

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example, the slogan of “Take Control” which has previously been addressed within this
paper, however in addition to this it is possible to suggest that the term ‘sovereignty’ had
developed into a slogan, whereby sovereignty had become a key word in engendering a
reaction from the European Union. As a slogan, this quickly became associated with UKIP
and therefore linked with the ‘syndrome’ of anger which was directed towards matters such
as immigration etc.

The UK parliament has always had a problem with the overarching aims of the EU. One
could draw upon Britain’s avoidance of the Eurozone and the Schengen area in an attempt
to avoid complete Europeanisation (Telford, 2017). In addition to this, it is possible to say
that the majority of the British population in general are far less Eurocentric as opposed to
many other European countries, with some proportions of the British population having a
completely negative opinion of the EU, for example; 51.9% of the population who voted in
the Brexit referendum shared a Eurosceptic view (Hunt & Wheeler, 2018). However, EU
integration and interdependence has not been a rejected concept by all European States,
for example, states such as Germany and France have expressed a more cooperative
attitude towards the EU. Such states share the belief that their economic and political
strengths are broadened by the EU. Furthermore, membership to the European Union has
facilitated the grounds for France to remain a superpower within the international system.
Both France and Germany have been able to harness the power and legitimacy of the EU
within the post war period. In addition to this and with particular reference to Germany,
membership to the EU has been fundamental in helping the country regain legitimacy on
the international stage and respectability (Telford, 2017). As a result, one could suggest that
Germany have maintained their positive approach to the EU as a necessary ally to rebuild
their economy and are therefore more accepting on the concept of ‘pooled sovereignty.’

The end of the Second World War consequently resulted in the “collapse of the pre-war
world order and the rise in a new phenomenon” (Mannin, 2010, p. 21). In terms of the UK’s
attitudes towards the EU it is possible to draw upon the significance and the salience of
WWII. Whereby within this context, Britain “romanticises World War 2 because it stood
against Hitler while the rest of Europe fell” (Crines, 2016). Therefore, it is possible to say
that much of Britain’s self-image has been underpinned by its historic imperialist views. The

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notion that Britain has “the strongest parliament in the world” (Marquant, 1995, p. 186) and
“Churchill’s humble address to sovereign” (Anderson & Weymouth, 1999, p. 6) have
consequently developed into a mark of preservation in terms of British sovereignty and
global significance. The reluctance of Britain to acknowledge and admit the benefits which
have been granted by economic and political partnership within the EEC is a further
understanding of the problems Britain had with the overarching aims of the EU. Much of
Britain’s attitude towards the EU was predominantly state centric, declining the opportunity
to join the European Iron and Steel community in 1951 (Wilson, 2014). However, by 1972
Britain had developed a “more confident and positive application” (Mannin, 2010, p. 22)
which later facilitated Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973.

In terms of the true validity of sovereignty within the 21st century, it is possible to say that
economic integration and globalisation has had an effect on a state’s claims to its
sovereignty and as a result of interdependence within the EU, sovereignty has become a
contested phenomenon (Held, 2002). It is possible to present the argument that state
capacity and sovereignty has been undermined by the increasing pressures from
Globalisation and Europeanisation. Such pressures consist of “economic integration;
financial markets; and the competition for employment” (Wall, 2012). Within this context,
the concept of individual state sovereignty within the 21st century has arguably shifted
towards a notion of shared or pooled sovereignty. The growth in representation within
democratic governments including the increase in policy demands from the EU has imposed
many limitations on a state’s individual sovereign power. Within the 21st century states have
been encouraged to share their sovereignty in order to maintain peace and prosperity
through organisations such as NATO, the World Trade Organisation and the EU. As a result
of the encroaching demands of the EU on member states, the EU became a constitutional
issue for the UK.

6. The importance of Party Politics

This section of the paper aims to address the significance of the rise in political actors with
regards to the influence on the Brexit decision. One could suggest that for a period of time
after 1973, British politics was prepared to share political and economic sovereignty with

21
the European Union. For example, the alignment of UK law with the European Convention
on Human Rights through the “Human Rights Act” in 1998, which could suggest a level of
cooperation and approval between the UK and the EU. This section of the paper will
contend that the EU did not become such a large problem for British Politics up until 2005
and 2006, following the emergence of political parties and the development of hard-line
scepticism regarding the EU. Membership to the European Union and the European
Economic Community has long been divided within the United Kingdom. One could present
the argument that following Britain’s entry into the EU, not all of the UK’s domestic
problems were solved. The issues regarding the Brexit decision can be mainly associated
with the UK constitution, and further based around the concepts of political and economic
sovereignty.

6.1. Two Party System

In terms of British domestic politics, it is possible to say that the model most associated
with parliament can be very much associated with a ‘Two Party System,’ whereby two major
political parties invariably dominate parliament in terms of the shares in seats and the angle
of discussion (Heywood, 2014). However, within contemporary politics one could suggest
that this model of politics has been that of a fundamental flaw within the nature of the
British party system. Within this model, British politics has been driven predominantly by
the constitutional position of political parties to oppose one another at any given cost,
therefore presenting an antagonistic approach to nearly every political issue without the
space for compromise between political parties (Mannin, 2016). As a result, one could
suggest that British party politics has been subjected to a single objective, whereby political
parties strive to attain and/or maintain a level of authority and power within parliament.
Additionally, it is possible to suggest that party politics has been shaped around individual
party interests. Within a two-party system, parties tend to have the propensity to oppose
one another if their agenda is not perfectly suited, rather than include or compromise on an
agenda that is best suited in the nation’s political and economic interests. In addition to this,
Mannin (2016) further suggests that that the debates which are presented by parties within
a ‘two party system’ of politics have been further flawed through their encouragement of
proposing short term perspectives in party politics. For example, one could suggest that the

22
oppositional nature of the British party system has been a major factor in the development
of a Europhobic and Eurosceptic nature. It is possible to say therefore that political parties
failed to address the nature of the relationship to the European Union and were
consequently flawed in their efforts to educate the population on such matters. For
example, both the Tory party and the Labour party have been acquiescent to a membership
with the European Union however feared that the topic might become an electoral issue
within parliament. This leads this paper onto the importance and the significance of the
emergence of UKIP, whereby the debate regarding the EU was forced into the public eye.

7. The emergence of UKIP (2006-2015)

In the early years of the party, UKIP “appeared to be a classical single-issue party…too
narrow and inexperienced to become an enduring force with mass support” (Ford &
Goodwin, 2014, p. 15). However, by 2013 UKIP had propelled itself into the centre of
political debate following an unprecedented amount of political victories, both in the
European Elections and General Elections. UKIP received its first significant form of political
recognition through the European Elections in 2005, which were originally thought to be
‘second order’ elections following low interests and participation in comparison to the
general elections (Ford & Goodwin, 2014, p. 17). Nonetheless, UKIP flourished in this
context of a higher willingness of the public to ‘experiment’ with alternative political parties.
However, it is important for the reader to understand that European Parliament elections
operate under a system of proportional representation, whereby seats within the European
Parliament are allocated to parties in proportion to their share of the vote. In comparison to
the unforgiving nature of the ‘first past the post’ (FPTP) system in general elections, for
example despite UKIP gaining nearly 4 million votes in the 2015 general elections but only
attaining 1 seat in parliament.

However, the UK Independence Party was still associated with the concept of a “single
movement party” and following the 2004 European Elections the party faded from memory,
particularly following the general elections which followed later that year whereby UKIP
only attained 2.2% of the vote and was drastically outperformed by the British Nationalist
Party (Ford & Goodwin, 2014). Between the period from 2005 to 2009 UKIP entered a

23
period of political stagnation whereby their presence was not again felt until the year of
2009 and another set of European Elections. However, it is important to note that the 2009
elections took place amid a huge backdrop of political and economic controversy, following
a recession and a series of scandals which had damaged the popularity of both the Labour
and Conservative party which would provide a “back drop to a UKIP attack on established
parties and elites” (Mannin, 2016) furthermore, such events would present a series of
favourable conditions to aid Nigel Farage’s rise in influence (Ford & Goodwin, 2014).


7.1. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008.

The global financial crisis of 2008 delivered huge exogenous shocks to the European
economic, instigating spikes in unemployment, which in turn developed into visible slumps
in the economic output across the world which increased both public and national debt,
especially within the UK (Allen, 2016). Through the backdrop of “perhaps the worst global
economic crisis” to date, UKIP flourished as a growing political party, through surges in the
party support following groups of people being unhappy and disappointed with the previous
government, and MP Gordon Brown in particular, but also and most importantly a series of
disappointment towards the European Union. The 2009 elections marked the second time
in the history of UKIP that the party had gained large amounts of public support. The crisis
facilitated the influence of far reaching public opinion whereby far right parties such as UKIP
and the British Nationalist Party (BNP) experienced surges in support. However most
importantly with reference to the Brexit referendum, it is possible to say that the crisis and
events which acted in conjunction with it, resurfaced debates regarding Britain’s
membership with the European Union. Within this notion, it is important to note that
Britain was experiencing a political revolt from the far right which coincided with a shift of
support away from the “big three” which were the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and
the Liberal Democrats (Ford & Goodwin, 2014, p. 19). Therefore, it is important for the
reader to understand the significance of a repositioning of public opinion and the influence
in which various exogenous factors played throughout the rise of UKIP.

24
However, in addition to this, one could suggest that much of the success surrounding the
emergence of UKIP had derived from the party capitalising from negative media campaigns
against the political elites at the time. In the wake of the financial crisis, far right parties
took full advantage of the growing anti-elitist and Eurosceptic views, those of which
conveniently for UKIP having further derogatory views of the European Union (Ford &
Goodwin, 2014). This can be illustrated by the growing share of seats that UKIP received in
general elections, for example; in 2005 UKIP successfully saved a deposit of 38 seats in the
general elections. However, by 2010 this figure had significantly grown to 100 seats which
were saved (Hunt, 2014). By this point, it is possible to suggest that the EU had developed
into an electoral issue within parliament, and an issue which could no longer be ignored by
the political elites of the Labour and Conservative parties.

Within this context, one could suggest that much of the population were in search of an
institution, or political figure to be put to blame. The increase in significance of UKIP was
further facilitated through political disappointment with the Labour government in office at
the time, particularly including the growing unpopularity of political head Gordon Brown
following Labour’s decision to commit the UK to a conflict in the Middle East (Ford &
Goodwin, 2014). Furthermore, one could draw upon the significance of the Conservative
party and the role in which it played in setting the foundations for a Brexit decision. The
Conservative and Liberal coalition government were responsible for the initiation of
Austerity measures within the UK economy following their success in the 2010 general
election. During this period, public spending was reduced by “£14.3 billion” compared with
2009-2010 (Merrik, 2017). Although the measures introduced had the incentive of
countering the economic difficulties presented by the financial crisis, it is possible to say
that Britain’s policy of Austerity had affected certain communities more than others, for
example “higher levels of unemployment, housing shortages, NHS waiting lists alongside
mass migration have opened up opportunities for a ‘blame culture’ to develop” (Mannin,
2016). Therefore, it is further possible to suggest that UKIP benefited from the condition of
economic hardship and the change in public mentality.

25
 7.2. Nigel Farage

Nigel Farage’s UKIP found much of its early success post 2006 originating from local
elections in areas outside of London. UKIP’s voters formerly consisted of large euro sceptic
views, rejecting a “Federal Europe” (Ford & Goodwin, 2014). It is important to note that
following the European elections of 2005, UKIP benefited significantly from party
recognition, consequently UKIP was able to present itself as a more conventional political
party, able to perform in local elections following boosts of capital and party donations.
Farage therefore saw it in his best interests to broaden the scope of UKIP in order to attract
a wider audience of voters. For example, one could suggest that following UKIP’s policy to
attract more of the working class and populist Labour and Conservative voters, the typical
voter had developed from a citizen of the lower middle class or working class with a narrow
sceptic view of the European Union to an increasingly educated opinion, thus UKIP’s target
of a broader electoral base “allowed it to position itself between both Labour and
Conservative voters” and shift support (Mannin, 2016). For example, following efforts to
enrich the voting compass of the party, voters shared increasing concerns for policies of
immigration, unemployment, the provision of social services and the ‘sovereignty of
parliament’ (Ford & Goodwin, 2014). As a result of this, it is important to note that Farage’s
leadership, alongside various exogenous and endogenous shocks, was responsible for
doubling the membership of UKIP and successfully raising the political profile of the party
between 2009 and 2013, for example towards the end of 2012, public support for UKIP in
the opinion polls had increased, from barely 2 percent to over 10 percent (NottsPolitics,
2013).

The significance of this period began to bring the debate of British and EU membership into
the limelight, following pressure on the Conservative party and David Cameron in particular
to call a general referendum in 2011. “The European Union Act” passed in 2011 and
scheduled for 2015 could be suggested to be one of the most significant successes for UKIP
and Farage and set in motion various factors which would constitute the beginning of the
Brexit referendum (Mannin, 2016). In addition to this, Farage received an additional
breakthrough for UKIP in the form of the European Parliament Elections in 2014, outpolling
both the Conservative party and the Labour party, whereby UKIP won 27.5% of the vote

26
(Hunt, 2014). In the aftermath of the 2014 European Elections, UKIP had positioned itself as
a respectful challenger in British politics, whereby the growing influence and comprehensive
range of policies brought about by UKIP created further issues following the 2015 national
election (Mannin, 2016). UKIP and Farage could no longer be ignored by the Conservative
and Labour parties and as a result of the growing significance of UKIP within British politics,
it is possible to say that both the Labour party and the Conservative party felt the need to
develop a more accepting view of UKIP’s policies and ‘swing’ towards UKIP’s territory. For
example, David Cameron was bound by an election pledge after he promised to hold an “in-
out” styled referendum following the challenge from UKIP in an attempt to obtain a “re-
established relationship between the UK and the EU” (Mannin, 2016). Farage had essentially
forced the major political parties within parliament to “openly address the issue of EU/UK
relations” (Mannin, 2016) and further encouraged the public to develop an opinion on the
EU.

7.3. The 2015 election.

The re-emergence of the debate regarding UK/EU relations in the 2015 election further
encouraged MPs to develop their own personal opinions. For example, the divisions of
support within the Tory party and the emergence of members who held anti EU views;
individuals such as Bill Cash, John Redwood and Peter Bone along with plenty of Tory party
backbenchers who were described to be “flocking” towards Brexit. The 2015 election
concluded in UKIP receiving just under 4 million (3,881, 099) electoral votes, thus
positioning itself ahead of the Liberal Democrats and as the third most popular political
party in England (Osborn, Clarke, Franklin et. Al, 2015). The elections therefore represented
another breakthrough for UKIP, following Farage’s aims at targeting a far broader electoral
base, however despite this it is important to note that UKIP were only successful in gaining
one seat (Osborn, Clarke, Franklin et. Al, 2015). Moreover, following the 2015 elections it is
possible to suggest that UKIP became a spent force, whereby the party had already
succeeded in what Nigel Farage had set out to do; to build an army of ‘Brexiteers’ and
restore ‘sovereignty’ through the Brexit referendum. For example, in the 2017 general
elections, UKIP had lost its only seat in government and was overtaken by the Liberal
Democrats and the Green Party, making it the fifth most popular party in the UK. For

27
example, in 2015 the party had 3,881,099 votes however in results of the 2017 elections
had demonstrated a major setback in political support as UKIP had generated only 557,390
votes (BBC, 2017).

In terms of significance to the so called “revolt from the right” one could suggest that UKIP
was responsible for resurrecting a British sense of Europhobia (Ford & Goodwin, 2014). In
the aftermath of a series of hard Eurosceptic campaigning UKIP transformed Britain and
planted a number of concerns associated within membership to the European Union. UKIP
had therefore transformed itself and also caused a transformation of society within Britain.
Expressed by Ford & Goodwin (2014), UKIP which was once described as an “insurgent
party” had developed upon a clear agenda and was successful in shifting itself away from
previous association as a “one movement party,” and expressing “clear ideas about
immigration and national identity” (Ford & Goodwin, 2014, p. 30). In addition to this, one
could draw upon the significance of the media amid the factors which had influenced public
opinion within Britain. For example, the significance of UKIP can be expressed through the
party’s growing media attention and public concerns. In 2004 UKIP was mentioned a total of
4,000 times, however by the end of the year in 2013, the amount of times in which UKIP
was mentioned within the media had grown exponentially to 25,000 (Ford & Goodwin,
2014). The rise of UKIP therefore brought to debate a series of long standing concerns and
issues which had developed around the constitution of the UK and the sovereignty of
parliament, which consequently resulted in the Brexit decision. By 2015 it is therefore
possible to say that there was high possibility for a successful exit campaign. One could
suggest that a “perfect storm” had loomed over Britain, incorporating both internal and
external factors such as UK austerity policies, the Eurozone crisis and the failure to prevent
or control the emergent problem of mass migration from unstable countries such as those
in the middle east, consequently, the British public began to question and challenge EU
membership (Mannin, 2016).

28
 8. The economics of Brexit.

This section of the paper will introduce and evaluate the ‘Brexit’ decision from an economic
perspective. It is therefore important for the reader of this paper to be made familiar with
and have an understanding of the benefits which are presented by membership to the
European Union and the economic “trade-offs” which can be associated with a British
departure. Since the UK voted to leave the EU in June 2016, much ink has been spilt on the
causes of the Brexit vote and the further implications for the UK economy. This paper has so
far contended that economic motivations supporting Brexit have been downplayed,
whereby a greater level of emphasis has been placed on arguments in favour of cultural
identity politics and thereby relegating the role of economic policy in addressing voters’
grievances.

8.1. The European Union and the Four Freedoms.

The European Union is underpinned by the Single Market and the “Four Freedoms” which
act as the fundamental principles, consisting of the freedom of movements of goods,
services and capital between EU countries as well as being a powerful customs union
(Foster, 2016). The EU Customs Union acts as a system under which all the Member States
are able to benefit from free barriers of trade with other member states, while agreeing to
impose on tariffs on goods entering the union from outside of the EU. However, the
Customs Union further imposes its influence through other matters such as, health and
safety standards within the work space and ensuring the quality and standards of imports
such as food. Freedom of movement within the member states has been a fundamental
principle of EU law since it was created in the Treaty of Rome (1958).

As one of the four principles of the EU, the freedom of movement within the EU has
become a very important part of European economic integration. In addition to this Munz &
Weiner, (1997, p. 7) argue that the EU has become a model for economic growth as
“Geographical and social mobility are crucial elements of characterising open societies.” In
addition to this, the access to the EU arguably opens doors to various opportunities for
member states, including greater access to new technology and sources of finance. (Peter,

29
2014) It is possible to draw upon the works of Simon Kuper (2014), whereby he presents the
notion that as an economic system, Europe is stronger together. Referred to as the
“European Dream,” Kuper (2014) argues that the four freedoms have influenced huge
advantages through cross border learning. In addition to this, the notion of free movement
within the EU arguably creates a flexible labour force, facilitating the movement of
economically active workers across the EU to fill skills and unemployment gaps. Thus,
increasing European productivity and the global competitiveness of the EU market.
Therefore, one could suggest that a potential economic trade off post Brexit could result in
a less flexible workforce for the UK and potentially creating spare capacity within the UK
economy.

The second of the four principles which are fundamental to the operation of the EU refers
to the free movement of capital across borders. Since the British accession to EU law in
1975, “Britain has benefited from freer trade in Europe” (Abbot, 2013, p. 1). The EU as a
whole is the largest trading partner with the UK. In the year of 2016, 43.1% of all UK exports
were to European countries, the equivalent of £236 billion (Ward, 2017). According to
Deutsche Bank, the most important structural change for the UK economy which has
benefited in terms of increased trade in financial goods and services has been an impact of
the UK’s increase in economic openness (Harvey & Raja, 2018). However, in the short to
medium term following the British divorce from the EU it is likely according to Deutsche
Bank for the UK to experience setbacks following the prevention of net migration. The UK is
further likely to experience reduced import penetration and a higher rate of fiscal spending
which would likely incur a further decline in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) within the UK
(Harvey & Raja, 2018). Therefore, one could present the argument that a withdrawal from
the EU Customs Union may only present larger fiscal costs for the UK economy. For
example, the UK would lose “unrestricted access to the single market” and be subject to
additional costs through barriers of trade and tariffs upon accessing the single market.
(Dhingra, et al, 2016) Additionally, the UK economy would face additional barriers to trade
in goods and services in international markets and would lose its significance as a member
of the EU to attain new trade agreements (OECD, 2016). Moreover, access to the Single
Market has been an essential source of FDI within the UK economy and in the wake of Brexit
it would be likely that such FDI would be terminated, for example Nissan may feel inclined

30
to move its headquarters eastwards whereby the sale and production of its products may
continue to benefit from the clear advantages posed by access to the single market. As a
result, economists would expect business investment to decline in the longer term, in turn
reducing exports and hindering the economic performance of the UK. Therefore, it is
possible to suggest that Brexit has posed several consequences and trade-offs for the UK
economy in the short term. However, from the point in which this paper has been
produced, it is important for the reader to understand that the future of the UK, in a
position where it operates outside of the European Union, is uncertain. Therefore, it is
possible to say that at present, there is a “lack of clarity” regarding the final consequences
and costs for Brexit (Dhingra, et al, 2016, p. 2).

8.2. Impact on trade.

The Bank of England issued a set of warnings concerning the economic implications of
Brexit, further reiterating that the UK’s split from the EU will likely weigh down on domestic
activity (Cox & Chu, 2017). For example, the Bank of England suggests that the “greater
uncertainty around the UK economic outlook” could increase possibility for “material
domestic risks in the near term” (Bank of England, 2017).

Since the UK voted to leave the EU in June 2016 it is highly likely that several companies,
especially financial services firms will consider leaving the UK. In an issue which has been
shrouded by much controversy following Brexit, there have been rumours of a possible
scenario whereby Deutsche Bank would relocate much of its UK workforce back into the EU
after fears that the firm might now be able to conduct business after the UK leaves the EU
(Heathman, 2017). The UK has long been categorised as the “Financial Hub” within Europe
whereby the provision and exports of financial services within the UK account for a large
proportion of the economy’s GDP. The UK economy would be further struck following the
loss of business from multinational investment bank Goldman Sachs. The US investment
giant is expected to depart the UK and establish new hubs in Frankfurt and Paris in
preparation for transferring jobs in order to continue operating within the EU (Keohane,
2017). Therefore, following the relocation of firms such as Goldman Sachs and Deutsche
Bank, one could expect to see a rapid decline in the UK’s economic output, in conjunction

31
higher business uncertainty following a loss of either jobs in the UK or a systematic brain
drain as workers follow suit and relocate in order to remain in work.

On the contrary, one could suggest that the central economic argument for “Britain’s
withdrawal from the EU is that the economic costs of bloc membership far exceed the
benefits” (Abbot, 2013, p. 45). Many economic arguments in support of a British departure
from the European Union have been underlined by the neo liberal school of thought,
however can be further aligned with the theory of intergovernmentalism whereby the vote
to leave the European Union primarily concerned the reestablishment of economic
sovereignty (Harvey & Raja, 2018). For example, MP Boris Johnson initially proposed an
argument whereby he expressed his concern that the majority of British economic growth
and prosperity was being made outside of the parameters of the European Union, saying:

Which brings me to the last crucial reassurances that my side of the argument must
give. We would be mad to go through this process of extrication from the EU, and not
to take advantage of the economic freedoms it will bring. We will stop paying huge
sums to the EU every year and as the PM has said, this will leave us with more to
spend on our domestic priorities, including the NHS (Johnson, 2018).

According to the House of Commons paper written by Mathew Ward, the share of UK
exports to the EU has fallen over time from “54% in 2006 to 43% in 2016” (Ward, 2017, p.
3). As a consequence of this, the UK has experienced a constant financial trade deficit with
the EU, for example the UK has had a trade deficit with the EU in every financial year since
1999. This can be illustrated in the diagram labelled Fig. 1.

32
Fig. 1.

Source: (Ward, 2017, p. 5)

Additionally, at the end of the 2016 financial year, the UK had built up a trade deficit with
the EU amounting to £82 billion whereby a deficit of £96 billion in the trade in goods
drastically outweighed a surplus of £14 billion in the provision of financial services. On the
other hand, the UK has experienced a surplus in its balance of payments with non-EU
countries since 2012 (Ward, 2017, p. 5). However, MP Boris Johnson’s narrative and
proposed economic outlook for the UK whereby Brexit leads Britain to “unilateral free trade
and greater globalisation” is highly unlikely. Instead, Harvey & Raja (2018) and other leading
economists have predicted that in the medium term the UK is likely to experience a rise in
government spending and less economic openness (Harvey & Raja, 2018). In addition to
this, it is possible to suggest that in the short to medium turn and heavily dependent on
whether there is a Hard Brexit or a Soft Brexit, it is highly uncertain whether Britain will
score new trade deals. It is further possible to draw upon the works of Patrick Minford, as a

33
Professor of economics at Cardiff University, Minford has further developed the narrative
that the UK will “gain billions after Brexit” (Minford, 2017). His estimations follow the
assumption that the UK follows a “hard Brexit” whereby the UK cuts all ties and previous
trade agreements with the EU.

However, within the Brexit referendum we see a trade-off between formal sovereignty and
economic benefit. Whereby it is possible to suggest that Farage’s UKIP party rightly
calculated that those who value formal sovereignty and the hard euro sceptic voters who
had been motivated by mainly political, ideological and social arguments were likely to
prefer a “hard” Brexit outcome whereby there was little concern regarding any economic
implications (Neil & Baker, 2018). UKIP had therefore produced a leave campaign which
“focused heavily on the issues of sovereignty and the economic costs of EU membership
(Clarke, Goodwin & Whitely, 2017, p. 440). It is further possible to say that much of the
illusion of Brexit had been orchestrated in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and focused
heavily on mobilising public anxiety over issues such as immigration, “the free movement of
the EU nationals and the enlargement of the EU to encompass Albania, Montenegro, Serbia
and possibly Turkey” (Clarke, Goodwin & Whiteley, 2017, p. 440). However, it is further
possible to suggest that the benefits of globalisation were felt in some areas of the UK more
than others. This brings the paper onto the subject of the economic geography of the UK,
whereby evidence supported by Deutsche Bank suggests that as a result of modern trade
theory “the increase in economic openness in recent decades has been one of the main
drivers of widening regional inequality in the UK” (Harvey & Raja, 2018). However, the
‘wedge’ which has been drawn between London and the rest of the United Kingdom is not a
new theory, however one could suggest that the increasing economic divergence acted in
conjunction to the re-emergence of Eurosceptic attitudes springing out of UKIP, particularly
from individuals who have not benefited directly from globalisation has further contributed
to Farage’s ‘perfect storm.’

34
 Conclusion.

In conclusion, the findings of this research evaluation have illustrated the significance of a
number of factors which have arguably contributed to the British divorce from the EU
scheduled for the 29th March 2019 (McClean, 2017). The primary objective of this paper has
been to contend that Britain has partially ignored economic warnings which have linked
Brexit with problems for the UK economy in the short to medium term. However instead
the decision to leave the European Union was built primarily on the concept of retaining
Sovereignty instead of a liberal or economic standpoint.
The first research aim of this dissertation has drawn upon the controversial debate
regarding the true relevance of sovereignty within the 21st century. One could conclude
from this dissertation that individual state sovereignty has essentially ‘evolved’ into a
concept of pooled sovereignty between EU member states, following social, economic and
political integration. Globalisation and Europeanisation not only has developed an economic
partnership between European states, however it has additionally encouraged the
emergence of a social union following periods of European integration, suggesting that the
EU is much more than an economic partnership. This section of the paper has drawn upon
the history of Britain’s parliamentary sovereignty and cultural identity (Bauman, 1996) and
its stubborn attitude towards the EU, for example, Anderson & Weymouth (1999, p. 3)
argue that the UK parliament has developed a “stiff upper lipped authority” in comparison
to the openness of Germany’s constitution (Mannin, 2016).

The third research aim of this paper has explored the ‘two party’ structure in political affairs
within the UK, whereby the importance of aggressive party politics has arguably contributed
to a system whereby political parties repeatedly joust for power and influence under the
controversial First Past the Post system (FPTP) (Heywood, 2014). Furthermore, as a
consequence of the political structure within parliament, it is possible to suggest that
political parties have failed to perform in the nation’s best interests as parties have
developed a propensity to oppose one another’s manifestos without allowing room for
compromise (Mannin, 2016). With regards to the hypothesis of this dissertation, this paper
has further explored the significance of political figure Nigel Farage and the emergence of
UKIP. It could be concluded from this research that the EU did not become a direct problem

35
within UK politics between 2005-2006, following the emergence of UKIP and hard-line
scepticism towards the EU. As illustrated in this paper, the emergence of UKIP coincided
with one of the worst economic slumps in the history of the global economy. It is possible to
say that the Financial Crisis of 2008 along with the revival of a long outstanding debate in
the tradition of British Parliamentary sovereignty and the constitutional issues regarding EU
membership that people had lost faith in the European Union. However, the most
significant factor in the rise of Farage’s UKIP was arguably the 2015 national elections
whereby the Cameron led Conservative party was voted into parliament on the promise of a
European referendum. UKIP had become a force to be reckoned with, whereby it soon
became impossible to ignore the once “single issue… insurgent party” (Ford & Goodwin,
2014, p. 15).

In order to argue the hypothesis of this dissertation, this research has further drawn upon
the economic arguments in terms of economic trade-offs both for and against the Brexit
referendum. This section of the paper explores the “Four Freedoms” of the European Union
and how they have previously been a beneficial instrument within both the UK and the EU
economy (Foster, 2016). For example, matters such as the freedom of movement in both
people and capital, including examples such as the customs union creating trade free
barriers can be presented as clear examples of the benefits presented by EU membership.
Initially it is possible to suggest that the majority of economic forecasts regarding Brexit
have presented the same conclusion, expressing their concerns that Brexit will damage the
UK economy. For example, the majority of economists have concluded their research using
the theoretical framework of the ‘gravity model’ with economic affairs (Gudgin, 2017). Such
theory assumes that the greater the distance between states, the higher the costs to trade
with one another and has therefore been “widely used in support for EU integration”
(Minford, 2017). Alternatively, individuals such as Minford (2017) have provided a different
account of events following the Brexit referendum, suggesting that despite the “leads and
lags, growth is still well underway” (Minford, 2017). Minford further argues that the overall
benefit which will derive from Brexit is estimated to be “around a 7% boost to GDP.”
Minford’s argument however is built upon a series of assumptions following Brexit, one
arguing the unlikely theory that the UK will develop and benefit from alternative trade deals
with states such as China and the US (Minford, 2017). Despite this, much of the leave

36
argument further touches upon issues concerning Sovereignty, whereby economists such as
Minford have suggested that EU integration and immigration with the EU has presented a
series of problems for the UK economy. Therefore, it is possible to conclude this paper by
stating that much of the support in favour of UKIP and Brexit had developed from a political
perspective, without the regard for economic costs presenting the theory of sleep walking
towards Brexit (Mannin, 2016).

10,606 words.

37
 Appendix.

A transcript of Boris Johnson’s ‘Brexit’ speech, 14th February 2018.

“The other day a woman pitched up in my surgery in a state of indignation. The ostensible
cause was broadband trouble but it was soon clear – as so often in a constituency surgery –
that the real problem was something else.

No one was trying to understand her feelings about Brexit. No one was trying to bring her
along. She felt so downcast, she said, that she was thinking of leaving the country – to
Canada. It wasn’t so much that she wanted to be in the EU; she just didn’t want to be in a
Britain that was not in the EU.

And I recognised that feeling of grief, and alienation, because in the last 18 months I have
heard the same sentiments so often – from friends, from family, from people hailing me
abusively in the street – as is their right.

In many cases I believe the feelings are abating with time, as some of the fears about the
Brexit vote do not materialise. In some cases, alas, I detect a hardening of the mood, a
deepening of the anger. I fear that some people are becoming ever more determined to stop
Brexit, to reverse the referendum vote of June 23 2016, and to frustrate the will of the
people. I believe that would be a disastrous mistake that would lead to permanent and
ineradicable feelings of betrayal. We cannot and will not let it happen.

But if we are to carry this project through to national success – as we must – then we must
also reach out to those who still have anxieties. I want to try today to anatomise at least
some of those fears and to show to the best of my ability that these fears can be allayed,
and that the very opposite is usually true: that Brexit can be grounds for much more hope
than fear.

There are essentially three types of concern about the momentous choice the nation has
made.

38
1. STRATEGIC

The first is that this is simply a strategic or geo-strategic mistake. On this view Britain is an
offshore island comprising fewer than one per cent of humanity, and we need to be bound
up in the European Union for protection – partly for our protection, and partly so that Britain
can fulfil its historic role of providing protection for the other countries of the European
continent. I come across quite a few people who think that Brexit has cast us adrift – made
our geostrategic position somehow more vulnerable, while weakening the security of the
whole of Europe.

2. SPIRITUAL

The second anxiety is essentially spiritual and aesthetic – that by voting to leave the EU we
have sundered ourselves from the glories of European civilisation. People believe that we
have thrown up a figurative drawbridge, made it less easy to live, study, work abroad; and
decided to sacrifice the Europeanness in our identities. They fear that the Brexit vote was a
vote for nationalism and small-mindedness and xenophobia. They think it was illiberal,
reactionary and the British have somehow shown the worst of their character to the world;
indeed that it was in some sense actually un-British.

3. ECONOMIC

And the third objection is the one that occupies most of the debate – the economic fear that
we have voted to make ourselves less prosperous; that membership of the EU is vital for UK
business and investment, and that the panoply of EU legislation has helped to make life
easier for companies and for citizens. People fear the disruption they associate with change,
and that our friends and partners in the EU may make life difficult for us. Sometimes these
economic anxieties are intensified by the other fears – about identity or security – so that
hitherto recondite concepts like the single market or the customs union acquire unexpected
emotive power.

39
Well I believe that whatever the superficial attractions of these points, they can be turned on
their head. I want to show you today that Brexit need not be nationalist but can be
internationalist; not an economic threat but a considerable opportunity; not un-British but a
manifestation of this country’s historic national genius. And I can see that in making this
case now I run the risk of simply causing further irritation. But I must take that risk because
it is this government’s duty to advocate and explain the mission on which we are now
engaged; and it has become absolutely clear to me that we cannot take the argument for
granted. We cannot expect the case to make itself. That was the mistake of the pro-EU elite
when they won the last referendum in 1975. As the Guardian journalist, the late Hugo Young
points out in his book, This Blessed Plot:

“The most corrupted trait I kept encountering was the sense – so prevalent among the Euro-
elite, that having won the decision they had won the argument. Many exhibited the
unmistakable opinion not only that the battle was over but that the other side, however loud
it shouted, had simply lost and should now shut up.”

And he went on to say:

“The noisier the contest became during the early 1990s, the heavier the silent gloating that
accompanied it, from the class that knew it commanded every operational forum from the
ante-chambers of Whitehall to the boardrooms of big business, from Brussels committee
rooms where a thousand lobbyists thronged, to the outposts of the Commission.”
Well the boot is now on the other foot, at least in theory. For all their power and influence –
every major political party, the CBI, Barack Obama and so on – those voices did not prevail.
But is this the time for the referendum winners to gloat? Should we sit in silent self-
satisfaction? Of course not.

It is not good enough to say to remainers – you lost, get over it; because we must accept
that the vast majority are actuated by entirely noble sentiments, a real sense of solidarity
with our European neighbours and a desire for the UK to succeed. All I am saying is that by

40
going for Brexit we can gratify those sentiments – and more. So let us take the three
anxieties in turn.

1. SECURITY: A STRONG BRITAIN AND A STRONG EU

To all who worry about our strategic position and the supposed loss of Britain to European
security I can offer this same vital reassurance that the PM has made so many times and
that I believe is welcomed by our partners. Our commitment to the defence of Europe is
unconditional and immoveable. It is made real by the 800 British troops from 5th Battalion
The Rifles I saw recently at Tapa in Estonia, who have since been relieved by 1st Battalion
The Royal Welsh.

Already this country is the single biggest spender in the EU both on aid and defence.
Although we represent only 13 per cent of the EU’s population, we contribute 20 per cent of
defence spending – and the RAF’s giant C17 transport aircraft represent 100 per cent of the
heavy lift capacity of the whole of Europe – as well as 25 per cent of the overseas aid budget.

It makes sense for us to continue to be intimately involved in European foreign and security
policy. It would be illogical not to discuss such matters as sanctions together, bearing in
mind that UK expertise provides more than half of all EU sanctions listings.

We will continue to be Europeans both practically and psychologically, because our status as
one of the great contributors to European culture and civilisation – and our status as one of
the great guarantors of the security of Europe – is simply not dependent on the Treaty of
Rome as amended at Maastricht or Amsterdam or Lisbon.

2. SPIRITUALLY BRITISH, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL

So let us next tackle the suggestion that we are somehow going to become more insular. It
flies in the face of the evidence. It was my Labour predecessor Ernie Bevin who said, “my
foreign policy is to go down to Victoria station and go anywhere I damn well please.”

41
That is pretty much what the British people already do. We have a bigger diaspora than any
other rich nation – 6m points of light scattered across an intermittently darkening globe.
There are more British people living in Australia than in the whole of the EU, and more in the
US and Canada. As I have just discovered we have more than a million who go to Thailand
every year, where according to our superb consular services they get up to the most eye-
popping things.

The statistical trajectory suggests that this wanderlust is most unlikely to abate. In 2016 the
British people paid 71m visits to other countries – and that is a 70 per cent increase since the
mid-1990s, and now more than one foreign trip per person per year.

If we get the right deal on aviation and on visa-free travel – both of which are in our mutual
interest – this expansion of UK tourism will continue, not just beyond the EU, but within the
EU itself; and we will continue ever more intensively to go on cheapo flights to stag parties in
ancient cities, meet interesting people, fall in love, struggle amiably to learn the European
languages whose decline has been a paradoxical feature of EU membership.

There is no sensible reason why we should not be able to retire to Spain (as indeed we did
long before Spain joined the EU), or anywhere else. We can continue the whirl of academic
exchanges that have been a feature of European cultural life since the middle ages, and
whose speed of cross-pollination has been accelerated by the web as well as by schemes like
Horizon or Erasmus – all of which we can continue to support, and whose participating
scholars are certainly not confined to the EU.

For those who really want to make Britain less insular, the answer is not to submit forever to
the EU legal order, but to think about how we can undo the physical separation that took
place at the end of the Ice Age.

Fly over the Channel at Dover and you see how narrow it is, the ferries plying back and forth
like buses in Oxford street, and as you measure the blue straits with your fingers you can see
that this moat is really an overgrown prehistoric river that once flowed down from Norway
and was fed by its tributaries, the Thames and the Seine and the Rhine.

42
In 1986 Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand had the vision to heal the rupture with a
first dry crossing; and it is notable that Eurotunnel is now calling for both sides of the
Channel to prepare for a second fixed link. It does indeed seem incredible that the fifth and
sixth most powerful economies in the world, separated by barely 21 miles of water, should
be connected by only one railway line.

I accept that the solution is still a few years off – though the need will be upon us fast – but I
say this to signal something about the attitudes that should inform Brexit. It’s not about
shutting ourselves off; it’s about going global.

It’s not about returning to some autarkic 1950s menu of spam and cabbage and liver. It’s
about continuing the astonishing revolution in tastes and styles – in the arts, music,
restaurants, sports – that has taken place in this country not so much because of our EU
membership (that is to commit the fallacy known in the FCO as post hoc ergo propter hoc)
but as a result of our history and global links, our openness to people and ideas that has
brought 300 languages on to the streets of London, probably the most diverse capital on
earth.

In that sense Brexit is about re-engaging this country with its global identity, and all the
energy that can flow from that. And I absolutely refuse to accept the suggestion that it is
some unBritish spasm of bad manners. It’s not some great V-sign from the cliffs of Dover.

It is the expression of a legitimate and natural desire for self-government of the people, by
the people, for the people. And that is surely not some reactionary Faragiste concept.

It is to fulfil the liberal idealism of John Stuart Mill himself, who recognised that it is only the
nation – as he put it, “united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist
between themselves and others” that could legitimate the state.

It was only if people had this common sympathy that they would consent to be governed as
a unit, because this feeling of national solidarity would “make them cooperate more willingly

43
than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire it should be
government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively.”

And there is good reason for insisting on this national solidarity, or common sympathy,
because government involves tremendous impositions, by which we collectively agree to
taxation that pre-empts half our income, and obedience to laws not all of which we think are
necessarily sensible.

If we are going to accept laws, then we need to know who is making them, and with what
motives, and we need to be able to interrogate them in our own language, and we must
know how they came to be in authority over us and how we can remove them.

And the trouble with the EU is that for all its idealism, and for all the good intentions of
those who run the EU institutions, there is no demos – or at least we have never felt part of
such as demos – however others in the EU may feel.

The British people have plenty of common sympathies with the people of France, but it is
hard to deny that they also share common sympathies with plenty of non-EU people – the
Americans, the Swiss, the Canadians, the Pakistanis; and that is one of the reasons why we
in the UK have had such difficulty in adapting to the whole concept of EU integration.

To understand why EU regulation is not always suited to the economic needs of the UK, it is
vital to understand that EU law is a special type of law, unlike anything else on earth.

It is not just about business convenience. It is expressly teleological. It is there to achieve a

political goal.

The aim is therefore to create an overarching European state as the basis for a new sense of
European political identity.

British politicians, Labour and Tory, have always found that ambition very difficult. It is hard
to make it cohere with our particular traditions of independent parliamentary and legal
systems that go back centuries.

44
And in spite of sheeplike coughs of protest from the UK, the process of integration deepened,
and the corpus of EU law grew ever vaster and more intricate, and ever more powers and
competences were handed to EU institutions, culminating in the Treaty of Lisbon.

We now have arrangements of such complexity and obscurity that I ask even my most
diehard of remainer friends if they can explain their Spitzenkandidaten process – which has
genuinely delighted the MEPs as much as it has mystified the UK; or the exact relationship
between the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, justiciable in Luxembourg, and the
European Convention on Human Rights whose court sits in Strasbourg.

How many in this room knows the answer to those questions, let alone the name of their
Euro-MP? And that is the point I sometimes make to those who hail me in the street with
cheery four letter epithets. At least they know roughly who I am and roughly what I do.

If we wanted to find the person responsible for drafting the next phase of EU integration – in
which Tony Blair would presumably like us to take part – we wouldn’t know where to find
them, let alone how to remove them from office. That is why people voted Leave – not
because they were hostile to European culture and civilisation, but because they wanted to
take back control. That is why it is so vital not to treat Brexit as a plague of boils or a
murrain on our cattle, but as an opportunity, and above all as an economic opportunity.

3. THE BREXIT ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Which brings me to the last crucial reassurances that my side of the argument must give. We
would be mad to go through this process of extrication from the EU, and not to take
advantage of the economic freedoms it will bring. We will stop paying huge sums to the EU
every year and as the PM has said, this will leave us with more to spend on our domestic
priorities, including the NHS.

We will be able to take back control of our borders – not because I am hostile to immigrants
or immigration. Far from it. We need talented people to come and make their lives in this

45
country – doctors, scientists, the coders and programmers who are so crucial to Britain’s
booming tech economy.

It was my proudest boast as Mayor of London that we had 400,000 French men and women
in the British capital – high-earning and high-spending types – while only about 20,000 UK
nationals were living in Paris. We must remain a magnet for ambition and drive.

But we also need to ask ourselves some hard questions about the impact of 20 years of
uncontrolled immigration by low-skilled, low-wage workers – and what many see as the
consequent suppression of wages and failure to invest properly in the skills of indigenous
young people.

We do not want to haul up the drawbridge; and we certainly don’t want to deter the
international students who make such a huge contribution to our HE economy, with 155,000
Chinese students alone.

But we want to exercise control; and if we are going to move from a low-wage, low-
productivity economy to a high-wage, high productivity economy – as we must – then Brexit
gives us back at least one of the levers we need.

It is very striking that since the Brexit vote the fortunes of UKIP – the one stridently anti-
immigration party in this country – have gone into a long deserved eclipse; and that is
because people feel they are being heard in their desire at least for control. And the contrast
is very striking with some Schengen countries, where no such control is possible, and where
the far right is on the rise.

And as the PM has said repeatedly, we must take back control of our laws. It would
obviously be absurd, as Theresa May said in her Lancaster House and Florence speeches –
which now have the lapidary status of the codes of Hammurabi or Moses – if we were
obliged to obey laws over which we have no say and no vote.

As the PM said at Lancaster House remaining within the single market “would to all intents
and purposes mean not leaving the EU at all.”

46
The British people should not have new laws affecting their everyday lives imposed from
abroad, when they have no power to elect or remove those who make those laws. And there
is no need for us to find ourselves in any such position.

To those who worry about coming out of the customs union or the single market – please
bear in mind that the economic benefits of membership are nothing like as conspicuous or
irrefutable as is sometimes claimed.

In the last few years there have been plenty of non-EU countries who have seen far more
rapid growth in their exports to the EU than we have – even though we pay a handsome
membership fee.

In spite of being outside the stockade, the US has been able to increase its exports twice as
fast.

And for those of us within the stockade, the cost of EU regulation was estimated at 4 per
cent of GDP by Peter Mandelson and 7 per cent by Gordon Brown.

It is only by taking back control of our laws that UK firms and entrepreneurs will have the
freedom to innovate, without the risk of having to comply with some directive devised by
Brussels, at the urgings of some lobby group, with the aim of holding back a UK competitor.
That would be intolerable, undemocratic, and would make it all but impossible for us to do
serious free trade deals.

It is only by taking back control of our regulatory framework and our tariff schedules that we
can do these deals, and exploit the changes in the world economy. It is a striking fact that
our exports to the EU have grown by only 10 per cent since 2010, while our sales to the US
are up 41 per cent, to China 60 per cent, to Saudi Arabia 41, New Zealand 40, Japan 60,
South Korea 100 per cent.

Those figures reflect the broader story that the lion’s share of the growth is taking place
outside the EU, and especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

47
In a world that demands flexibility and agility, we should be thinking not of EU standards but
of global standards, and a regulatory framework to suit the particular needs of the UK, a
country that already exports a higher share of its GDP outside the EU than any other EU
country.

We already boast an amazing economy, very diverse and different from rest of EU.

We are the nation that has moved the furthest up the value chain of the 21st century
economy.

We are a nation of inventors, designers, scientists, architects, lawyers, insurers, water slide
testers, toblerone cabinet makers. There are some sectors, such as AI or robotics, or bulk
data, or bioscience where we excel and where we may want to do things differently.

Of course we will need to comply with EU regulation in so far as we are exporting to the EU.
(though we should realise that the single market is not quite the Eden of uniformity that it is
cracked up to be: you try becoming a ski instructor in France; and I discovered the other day
that we have totally different standards for flame retardant sofas, to say nothing of plugs)

But in a global marketplace, where we are trading in products that hadn’t been conceived
even five years ago, serving markets that were poverty stricken only 20 years ago, it seems
extraordinary that the UK should remain lashed to the minute prescriptions of a regional
trade bloc comprising only 6 per cent of humanity – and when it is not possible for us or any
EU nation to change those rules on our own.

In so far as we turn increasingly to the rest of the world – as we are – then we will be able to
do our own thing.

We will be able, if we so choose, to fish our own fish, to ban the traffic in live animals, end
payments to some of the richest landowners in Britain while supporting the rural economy;
and we will be able to cut VAT on domestic fuel and other products.

48
We can simplify planning, and speed up public procurement, and perhaps we would then be
faster in building the homes young people need; and we might decide that it was indeed
absolutely necessary for every environmental impact assessment to monitor two life cycles
of the snail and build special swimming pools for newts – not all of which they use – but it
would at least be our decision.

Freed from EU regimes, we will not only be able to spend some of our Brexit bonus on the
NHS; but as we develop new stem cell technology – in which this country has long been in
the lead – it may be that we will need a regulatory framework, scrupulous and moral, but
not afraid of the new. The same point can be made of innovative financial services
instruments, where the FCA already leads the way.

We will decide on laws not according to whether they help to build a united states of Europe
but because we want to create the best platform for the economy to grow and help people
to live their lives. And when we are running ourselves – when all these freedoms open before
us – we will no longer be able to blame Brussels for our woes, because our problems will be
our responsibility and no-one else’s.

And indeed no one should think that Brexit is some economic panacea, any more than it is
right to treat it as an economic pandemic.

On the contrary, the success of Brexit will depend on what we make of it. And a success is
what we will make of it – together. And that very success will be the best thing for the whole
of continental Europe – a powerful adjacent economy buying more Italian cars and German
wine than ever before.

And so I say to my remaining remainer friends – actually quite numerous – more people
voted Brexit than have ever voted for anything in the history of this country.

And I say in all candour that if there were to be a second vote I believe that we would simply
have another year of wrangling and turmoil and feuding in which the whole country would
lose.

49
So let’s not go there.

So let’s instead unite about what we all believe in – an outward-looking liberal global future
for a confident United Kingdom.

So much of this is about confidence and national self-belief.

We love to run ourselves down – in fact we are Olympic gold medal winners in the sport of
national self-deprecation

And in the current bout of Brexchosis we are missing the truth: that it is our collective
national job now to ensure that when the history books come to be written Brexit will be
seen as just the latest way in which the British bucked the trend, and took the initiative – and
did something that responds to the real needs and opportunities that we face in world today
and had the courage to break free from an idea – however noble its origins – that had
become outdated, at least for us.

Konrad Adenauer said that every nation had its genius, and that the genius of the British
people was for democratic politics. He was right, but he didn’t go far enough.

Yes, it was the British people who saw that it was not good enough for Kings and princes to
have absolute power and who began the tradition of parliamentary democracy in a model
that is followed on every continent.

It was also Britain that led the industrial revolution and destroyed slavery and the British
people who had the wit to see through the bogus attractions of protectionism and who
campaigned for free trade that has been the single biggest engine of prosperity and
progress.

And to my constituent I say – don’t go to Canada, or anywhere else, lovely though Canada is.

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This is the country that is once again taking the lead in the shaping of the modern world and
it is our stubborn attachment to running ourselves that will end up making our society fairer
and more prosperous.

In its insistence upon democracy, its openness, its belief in the rights of the individual, in its
protection of our legal system its scepticism about excessive regulation its potential for
devolving power downwards and in its fundamental refusal to discriminate between all the
other peoples of the earth and in its central distinction between the EU institutions and our
eternal love for European culture, values, civilisation

Brexit is not just the great liberal project of the age, but a project that over time can unite
this country. So, let’s do it with confidence”.

(Johnson, 2018)

51
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Statement of originality

I confirm that to the best of my understanding this work has been prepared in

accordance with the university’s regulations and guidelines on referencing and is

substantially my own work.

Signed Thomas Knights

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