AREEJ

CASE NO. 2
ON THE TERM “RESIDES”
Virginia Garcia Fule v. CA | G.R. No. L-40502 and G.R. No. L-42670, November 29, 1976

CASE NATURE: Petition for letters administration. DENIED.

FACTS: Virginia G. Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna, at Calamba a petition for letters of administration alleging that
Amado G. Garcia, “a property owner of Calamba, Laguna”, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate
and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special
administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of
venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that
as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur.
Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Later, Preciosa B. Garcia also filed a supplemental motion to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix.

ISSUE: Whether or not the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was properly laid in the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.

RULING: NO. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death… The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding…”

The clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in
reality a matter of venue parties.  The CFI has jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased. The Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will,
and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is merely constitutive of venue.

Therefore, what does the term "resides" mean? The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute  or rule in which it is employed. 
In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
— residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.

In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.   No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 

On this issue, the Court ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his death.  As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia shows that his
last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Nevertheless, the long-settled
rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. In asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue, but availed
of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights.