Case 1:

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS (Romero[1], 1994)

FACTS
·         The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a complaint with
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to stop the operation of the City
Government of Caloocan of an 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, due to its
harmful effects on the health of the residents and the pollution of the surrounding water.
·         LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been maintaining the open
dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate from
the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR. They also found the water to have been
directly contaminated by the operation of the dumpsite.
·         LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and other entities to
completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste
matter on the Camarin dumpsite.
·         The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an action for
the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be declared as the sole
authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in
Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.
·         LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law that the review
of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals and not the RTC.
·         RTC denied LLDA’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of the case.
·         The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA has no power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage.
·         The residents seek a review of the decision.
ISSUE
WoN the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was
injunctive.
THEORY OF THE PARTIES
City Government of Caloocan: As a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare
provision of the Local Government Code, they have the mandate to operate a dumpsite and
determine the effects to the ecological balance over its territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA: As an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and
functions by RA No. 4850, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order pursuant to various provisions in EO No. 927.

RULING
YES.
1.        LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment, preserve the quality of human life
and ecological systems and prevent undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution
in the Laguna Lake area and surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan.
·         While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution Adjudication Board under the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it does not preclude mandate from special
laws that provide another forum.
·         In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated to pass upon
or approve or disapprove plans and programs of local government offices and agencies within
the region and their underlying environmental/ecological repercussions.
·         The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over the case when the
DENR acted as intermediary at a meeting among the representatives of the city government,
LLDA and the residents.

2.        LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.
a.        Explicit in the law.
·         §4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
·         While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power “to issue an ex-parte cease and desist
order” in that language, the provision granting authority to “make (…) orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution”, has the same effect.

b.        Necessarily implied powers.

·         Assuming arguendo that the cease and desist order” was not expressly conferred by law,
there is jurisprudence enough to the effect.
·         While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such power as
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has
also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. Otherwise, it
will be reduced to a “toothless” paper agency.
·         In Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the PAB has the
power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order on prima facie evidence of an establishment
exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.
·         LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of the projects
within the Laguna Lake region, and this includes the implementation of relevant anti-pollution
laws in the area.

CASE 2:
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION          GR 139465, 17 October 2000

FACTS:
On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country".

On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the

Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America.

The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of the said
treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a),
Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request
upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident
in the Requesting State).

On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.
S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United
States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by
the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition.

 Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of

(a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts),
(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts),
(c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts),
(d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and
(E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts).
On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a
panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999
requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on
the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied
the request.

On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation,
l for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents,
to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
l certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to
restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court;
l and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any
act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered
the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.

IN SUMMARY:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the
United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609
prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a foreign
country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he be given ample time to
comment on said request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty.

HELD:

NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation where
there is a conflict between a rule of the international law and the constitution. Efforts must first
be made in order to harmonize the provisions so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is
irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
the municipal law in the municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the highest law of
the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the
extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as
"justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law or judicial pronouncements.The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not
be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against
the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on
which our Constitution is premised.

Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment
with supporting evidence. 
Case 3:
AGUSTIN V. EDU       
 G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
FACTS:
Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an
early warning device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the
constitutional guarantee of due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-
delegation of legislative power.
Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the
implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction.
Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft,
which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in
Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"
Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral
because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P
56.00 to P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists
who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to
the specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."
This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and
highways, including expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled,
stalled or parked motor vehicles without appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed
by these disabled vehicles are recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety.
The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine
Government under PD 207.
ISSUE:
WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process.
HELD:
NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no
unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police
power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was
clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: “The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the nation.” 
Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own
act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .
The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever,
at war with the principle of international morality.
Petition dismissed.
Case 4:
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR)
of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that
are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued
by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.  One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of
Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health
claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the
land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with
int’l agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by
promulgating the RIRR.

Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS)
Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e
treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by
2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had
been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk
Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. World Health Assembly

The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are
customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to be
considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states
because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO
resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at
least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the
provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for
exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely
prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they
followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies
as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles
and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of int’l law.

Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f)
->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young
children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from
implementing said provisions.
Case 5
Lawyers League vs. Aquino
In re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180)
October 24, 1986 | G.R. No. 76180

Saturnino Bermudez, petitioner

FACTS:

Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief before the SC, asking the same Court to clarify
exactly who were being referred to in Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution.
Said provision reads in part: "The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for the purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992."

ISSUE:

Does Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution pertain to incumbent President
Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or to elected President Ferdinand Marcos
and Vice-President Arturo Tolentino?

HELD:

Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright for the following reasons:

+ petitions for declaratory relief do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SC;
+petitioner does not have the legal standing to sue;
+although no respondent is impleaded, the instant petition amounts to a suit against
incumbent President Corazon Aquino, who is immune from suits during her incumbency;
+it should be fairly obvious -- mutatis mutandis, there should be no question -- that the
aforecited provision pertains to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador Laurel. The Aquino administration is legitimately recognized by other nations, and all
eleven members of the SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the land under her
government; and
+the people of the Philippines have accepted her government as the one in effective control of
the country, such that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government.
Case 6
HOLY SEE VS. ROSARIO
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy,
and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was
contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation
(PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana
Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and
damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants:
namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper
party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after
finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract
in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes
the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a
lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with
the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in
the courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation
was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of
its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in
the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed
with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely
wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible
for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied
and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been
admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under
both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts
of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic
channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse
its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up
with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a
determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine
government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States,
Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once
the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183
against petitioner is DISMISSED.
FROM ATTY. BAYANI^^
Case 7
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to
prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s
economic life.

 a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the

capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in
the retail trade 

 aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue
their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their
death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval
of the Act or until the expiration of term. 
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of
the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and
other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry. 

 provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business 
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their
liberty and property without due process 
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title 
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations 
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession 
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD:
No. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of police power of
the State. It is clear that the law in question was enacted to remedy a real and actual threat and
danger to the national economy posed by alien dominance and control of retail business and
free citizens and country from the said dominance and control.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail
trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the
Act.
The best evidence to determine the alien dominance in retail business are the statistics on the
retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional
convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade
already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment
of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to
the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade. Statistical figures
reveal that in percentage distribution of assets and gross sales, alien participation has steadily
increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of
retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assets and gross
sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national
as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil.
where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the
State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country,
the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.

Therefore, the petition is denied

Case 8
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Case Digest)
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152154, July 15, 2003
Corrected Version

Topic: Prohibitions/Inhibitions of President of the Philippines

FACTS:
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of
the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first
Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office
after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting
the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." 
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This
Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial
justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of
form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the
government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive
resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal
acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now.
Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with
dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.

Issue:
Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president
during his term of office
                                                                                                                      
Held:
Yes

Ratio:
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in
the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other
stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the
petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and
respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a
position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since
they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which
their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E.
Marcos as President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its
subdivisions and instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E.
Marcos as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.[85] In fact, his management of businesses, like the
administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold
any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any
profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be
financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any
court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any
government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the
provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or
administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be
subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis
for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture
of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs
(c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should
thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income
from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between
petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such
other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents
should have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was
concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents.

Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence
of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material
possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2
must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent
Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net
worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to
allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them
for their violation of the law.