“A Very Significant Chinese Component”:

Securing the Success of Transformers: Age of

Extinction in China

KIMBERLY OWCZARSKI

JAPAN TO BECOME THE WORLD’S SECOND LAR-

C
HINA SUPPLANTED
gest film market in 2012. That year, box office revenues in
China reached $2.8 billion, then jumped 27% to $3.6 billion
in 2013 as the country added theater screens at a rate of ten per day
to keep up with movie-going demand (Coonan, “China 2013”;
McClintock). Indeed, analysts predict that China will surpass North
America as the world’s largest theatrical market by the end of 2017
(Brzeski).1 Eager to capture a larger part of China’s box office rev-
enues, Hollywood studios have engaged in a number of practices to
gain a foothold in this growing marketplace. These strategies typi-
cally include incorporating Chinese actors, shooting in China, and
partnering with Chinese companies. Despite the potential box office
gold available in Chinese movie theaters, Hollywood studios have
met varying levels of success with these strategies as there are a num-
ber of obstacles to overcome in courting the Chinese film market.
Chief among these challenges is China’s rigid import policy. For
years, the Chinese government allowed only twenty foreign films to
participate in revenue-sharing agreements and exhibit in the coun-
try’s movie theaters, though the number increased to thirty-four in
2012. As a result, international studios jockey for one of these pre-
cious slots, while simultaneously agreeing to receive only a small
share of the box office revenue that they earn in China. In 2012, for
instance, that share had increased to 25% after lumbering below 20%
for years (Nakashima). All films being considered for screens in China

The Journal of Popular Culture, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2017

© 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

490
A Very Significant Chinese Component 491

must also have their content approved by the State Administration of

Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT) through
a nebulous authorization process.2 For example, the Weinstein Com-
pany’s Django Unchained (Quentin Tarantino, 2012) received a release
date from state-owned distributor China Film Group after obtaining
approval, but the film was later pulled by officials after its first day in
theaters for further edits to sequences featuring graphic violence and
nudity (Miller). A month later, when it was released in theaters
again, the film appeared on fewer screens and received little promo-
tion, which contributed to a disappointing box office run.
Given the potential rewards and risks at the Chinese box office,
then, Hollywood studios must continually adapt to this challenging
marketplace in order to be successful. The performance of Para-
mount’s Michael Bay-directed Transformers franchise in China is a case
in point. The release of Transformers in July 2007 broke an opening
weekend box office record in China, earning $12.6 million on approx-
imately 300 screens country-wide (Bresnan).3 The film went on to
earn over $37 million in Chinese theaters, becoming the second-
highest grossing film in the country ever (Frater, “China Nixes”). The
film’s sequel, Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen (2009), ran into trou-
ble when Chinese officials were unhappy with how Shanghai was
depicted in a battle scene, so allusions to the city were edited out of
the film in order to secure its release in Chinese theaters (Jaafar).
After the studio addressed the officials’ concerns, Revenge of the Fallen
earned the largest opening weekend of an English language film in
China with nearly $22 million (“‘Transformers’ Tops”). The sequel
grossed over $65 million total in China during its run in theaters.
Outside of North America, China represented the largest market for
the film.
Weeks before the Transformers sequel hit theaters in July 2009,
Paramount announced the opening of its first office in China, a move
to better facilitate relationships with Chinese theaters, distributors,
and production companies as well as with SAPPRFT (Jaafar). As a
result, Transformers: Dark of the Moon (2011), the third film in the
franchise, capitalized on Paramount’s growing infrastructure in
China. The film grossed over $40 million in its opening weekend in
China, which established a new record for an American film. Buoyed
by the film’s $165 million total haul in China, Dark of the Moon was
the first film in Paramount’s one-hundred year history to gross over
492 Kimberly Owczarski

$1 billion in theaters (“Bots’ 1 Bil”). China’s contribution to the

international box office for Dark of the Moon was double the next lar-
gest market’s revenues, further demonstrating the country’s impor-
tance to the franchise.
With the fourth film in the franchise, Transformers: Age of Extinc-
tion (2014), the studio sought a bolder plan to secure a large box
office gross in China. In April 2013, Paramount announced that por-
tions of the film would be shot in the country and that the studio
was partnering with two Chinese companies in a co-production agree-
ment. These companies would assist the filmmakers with the “selec-
tion of filming sites within China, theatrical promotion and possible
postproduction activities in China as well as casting of Chinese actors
and actresses in the film” (Zakarin). Although the previous films in
the franchise had no involvement with Chinese officials during their
development processes, these were hardly new measures for a Holly-
wood studio to undertake in order to secure box office success there.
What was innovative about the film’s relationship with the Chinese
market, however, was the studio’s push for a stronger, Chinese-
centered marketing platform for the film. From the creation of a
Transformers-centered television reality show with the state-owned
China Movie Channel to brand partnerships and integrations with
state agencies and Chinese companies, Paramount was able to maxi-
mize the box office potential of Age of Extinction in the Chinese mar-
ketplace. Indeed, the film became the highest grossing film ever at
the Chinese box office, earning $320 million—$80 million more than
Age of Extinction grossed in the North American market, typically the
largest market for Hollywood films.
Thus, while incorporating previous Hollywood studio strategies of
Chinese location shoots and the casting of Chinese actors, Age of
Extinction also built upon those strategies to appeal more directly to
the Chinese audience. These strategies ultimately proved successful,
and indicate a significant shift in Hollywood’s relationship with the
Chinese market in particular and global markets in general. Of
course, built-in appeals to local markets are hardly new for Holly-
wood blockbusters, though they usually do not take place in the
development phase of the filmmaking process. As scholars Daniel Bil-
tereyst and Philippe Meers discuss with the Belgian launch of The
Return of the King (Peter Jackson, 2003), the last film in the Lord of
the Rings trilogy, “[G]lobal strategies cannot be deployed without
A Very Significant Chinese Component 493

taking into account local market structures and cultural differences,

or without displaying a variety of global and local marketing events”
(77). Blockbusters require a complex negotiation between global and
local marketing practices in order to maximize box office potential.
The performance of Age of Extinction in China demonstrates the
increasingly global focus of Hollywood development, production and
distribution practices in contemporary filmmaking.
Using a media economics approach based on trade sources, this
essay explores Paramount’s relationship with Chinese agencies in mar-
keting and releasing Age of Extinction. As Philip M. Napoli has
argued, studies of media economics are crucial for understanding how
the media industries operate in today’s landscape:

As much as media industries are cultural and political entities,

they also are economic entities, and an understanding of the eco-
nomic constraints and incentives under which they operate, and of
the basic economic characteristics of the products in which they
deal, can provide valuable insights into a wide range of dimensions
of media industry behavior.
(161)

Through examining the film’s production and marketing aspects,

the growing importance of China to the box office grosses of tentpole
pictures in a global marketplace can be assessed. These production
and marketing strategies elucidate the escalating lengths necessary for
Hollywood studios to achieve success in China. Indeed, Paramount’s
intricate relationship with the Chinese government, as mitigated
through its production and marketing partners, secured highly favor-
able conditions for the release of the film in China. At the level of
the global film industry, Age of Extinction offers a case study that
exemplifies the close relationship Hollywood studios must have with
Chinese agencies in order to secure success in that country’s growing
film marketplace.

Hollywood and China: A Complicated History

Despite the fact that China recently raised the importation limit to
thirty-four films, the Hollywood studios’ relationship with China’s
market has a long and complex history. American films were
494 Kimberly Owczarski

common in Chinese movie theaters in the first two decades of the

twentieth century, though so were films from Great Britain and
France, as the new medium spread globally. When World War I
embroiled most of Europe, however, American companies flooded
into the Chinese marketplace to become the dominant film suppliers.
According to media scholar Ting Wang, the enormous popularity of
Hollywood imports helped drive audiences to Chinese theaters
through the next few decades:

By the late 1920s, Hollywood achieved de-facto monopoly over

China’s film distribution and exhibition sectors. Rapid expansion
in the number of cinemas in China, from approximately 100 in
1927 up to 250 in 1930, was mostly driven by Hollywood
imports. Chinese cinema operators were eager to embrace Holly-
wood films propelled by commercial motives. Of the 250 cinemas
in 1930, only 50 to 60 screened Chinese films.

Chinese movie theaters thus were more likely to screen Hollywood

movies than domestic ones because of the former’s profitability. Hol-
lywood films continued to dominate Chinese screens, even during the
Japanese occupation of the country during the Sino-Japanese War,
until the US entered into World War II in 1941, cutting China off
as a viable market. Once the war was over, Hollywood films again
inundated the Chinese marketplace and received high ticket sales.
However, the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949
spelled an end to the monopoly Hollywood formerly enjoyed. With
the significant ideological differences between the US and China, and
China’s increasing focus on nationalism within its own cultural
industries, Hollywood studios were shut out of the country’s movie
theaters.
Given China’s large population and the popularity Hollywood films
had previously experienced, American studios wanted to find a way to
return to Chinese theaters. Soon after President Richard Nixon’s visit
to China in 1972, American studio executives engaged in a series of
discussions with Chinese government officials that would begin Hol-
lywood’s long journey back into China’s theaters. In these discussions,
the studios sought trade practices tied to their earlier dominance in
the Chinese marketplace. However, China’s film industry had signifi-
cantly changed in the years since Hollywood had been a major force.
A Very Significant Chinese Component 495

China’s film business was faring exceptionally well; in 1979, its

movie attendance was 29.3 billion, or an average of twenty-eight
times a year per citizen (Wang). According to Wang, cinema was
positioned as “an important form of art for government propaganda
as well as social enlightenment, aimed essentially at national cohesion
and ideological unification.” As a state-funded and state-run industry,
the cinema was no longer a commercial system. Films were subject to
approval over their content before being shown in theaters, and Chi-
nese officials had significant reservations about the cultural values
espoused in Hollywood films. While this was a significant challenge
for the Hollywood studios to overcome, it was the economic aspects
of the Chinese film marketplace that proved to be the bigger obstacle.
The revenue-sharing model where companies received a percentage of
ticket sales from the theaters was no longer an option in the context
of a state-run industry. Instead, Chinese theaters licensed films for a
non-negotiable fee. In the 1980s, that fee was around $30,000, a pal-
try figure for Hollywood blockbusters (Wang).
In the 1990s, however, the Chinese film industry started to experi-
ence a significant slowdown in attendance. There were a number of
factors that contributed to the theaters’ woes. The television industry
in China had undergone major changes as a result of satellite distri-
bution, which cut into theatrical ticket sales, and piracy became ram-
pant, with VHS tapes and later DVDs being considerably cheaper
than movie theater tickets. The state-owned China Film Corporation
sought options to help sustain movie theaters, and it began talks with
Hong Kong and Hollywood studios to bring big-budget films into
China.4 In 1994, Warner Bros. became the first foreign studio to
secure a revenue-sharing agreement for distribution in Chinese the-
aters since the late 1940s. The studio spent $100,000 to promote The
Fugitive (Andrew Davis, 1993) in China, a decision that helped the
film do excellent box office business—over $3 million (Groves). The
terms of the revenue-sharing agreement overwhelmingly favored the
China Film Group, and Warner Bros. pocketed only around
$100,000 despite the film’s strong performance in China (Groves).
Still, the figure was much higher than the flat fee seen during the
1980s and early 1990s. It signaled a major change in the relationship
between the Hollywood studios and the Chinese marketplace.
Other Hollywood studio films followed suit in China, with many
emerging as box office successes. The culmination of this trend was
496 Kimberly Owczarski

Titanic (James Cameron, 1997), the highest grossing film in Chinese

theaters for nearly a decade, with over $40 million at the box office.
Throughout the 1990s, Hollywood films drew audiences to the Chi-
nese movie theaters, as local films continued to struggle:

The ten imported foreign films, essentially Hollywood block-

busters, which the government decided to bring in ultimately to
boost the Chinese national cinema, had taken well over one half of
the market share, squeezing out the domestic films, when they ran
normally. Yet, without the Hollywood films, the Chinese film
market could barely have sustained itself. Differently put, they had
become a seemingly indispensable pillar to buttress the very
survival of the Chinese film industry.
(Wang)

The annual limit of ten imports was gradually increased in 2001

as China sought US support for its entry into the World Trade Orga-
nization, a concession that was as much about demonstrating a move
toward free trade as it was about helping struggling Chinese cinemas.
In 2001, Chinese theaters saw only 220 million moviegoers and total
revenues of less than $200 million (Tschang). Despite being limited
to twenty films annually, Hollywood productions earned over 70% of
theatrical revenues for the next few years.
It is within this environment that Chinese film companies started
to engage in big-budget co-productions with foreign studios in order
to strengthen the local film industry. According to media scholar
Christina Klein, these co-productions provided benefits for all studio
partners, but in particular for the Chinese companies: “Chinese film
policy makers are driven by a form of economic nationalism: they
hope to strengthen the Chinese film industry so that it can withstand
the growing competition from Hollywood that will arise as the Chi-
nese economy continues to open up” (203). Klein argues that films
like Kung Fu Hustle (Stephen Chow, 2004) provided an environment
of “knowledge and technology transfer” for the Chinese film industry
(203). Two Chinese studios helped finance the film, and Kung Fu
Hustle was shot near Shanghai. It also involved the big budget
resources of its Hollywood partner, as well as the production style of
its highly successful Hong Kong director and star, Stephen Chow.
Kung Fu Hustle became the second-highest grossing Chinese film up
to that time, and helped domestic films out-earn Hollywood films for
A Very Significant Chinese Component 497

the first time in a decade (Klein 204). Because Kung Fu Hustle was an
official co-production, Sony received 30–40% of overall box office
grosses in China, as is typical for such co-produced films (Klein 202).
As Klein argues, the film demonstrates “that clear-cut distinctions
between ‘Hollywood films’ and ‘Chinese cinema’ are becoming harder
to make in terms of production, style, market performance and
national-cultural-industrial identity” (205). Indeed, Kung Fu Hustle is
an early example of the growing interconnectedness of the production
and distribution interests of Hollywood and Chinese firms.
In his book Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience: The Globalization
of Chinese Film and TV, Michael Curtin uses co-productions like Kung
Fu Hustle as a launching point to discuss Hollywood’s increasing
interest in the Chinese audience. According to Curtin, these co-
produced films serve as “marquee attractions”

[A]s Hollywood moguls reconsider prior assumptions regarding

the dynamics of transnational media institutions and reassess the
cultural geographies of media consumption. For increasingly they
find themselves playing not only to the Westernized global audi-
ence but also the world’s biggest audience: the Chinese audience.
(1)

Curtin chronicles the media industries in the 1990s and early

2000s, as Western moguls looked for entry into the opening market-
place in China. Chief among them was Rupert Murdoch, whose News
Corporation purchased a controlling stake in Asian satellite distribu-
tion company Star TV in 1993. Soon after the acquisition, Murdoch
boasted about satellite television’s ability to bypass the censorship
regulations on state-run media, which prompted the Chinese govern-
ment to ban personal satellite dishes, prohibit the advertisement of
foreign satellite services, and promote cable services instead (Curtin
194). These were all direct challenges to the service provided by the
US-based media conglomerate, yet Murdoch found other major obsta-
cles in reaching the Chinese audience through Star TV. Murdoch
envisioned Star TV as an easy pipeline for properties produced by
Twentieth Century Fox television and film studios, key components
of Murdoch’s conglomerate, since the satellite company’s target mar-
ket was English-speaking viewers across Asia. But the market was
small and spread out across many locations and time zones, which
498 Kimberly Owczarski

made programming, scheduling, and marketing a monumental chal-

lenge (Curtin 195). Murdoch’s inability to navigate the intricacies of
the Chinese audience was indicative of Hollywood studios’ attempts
at entry into China. According to Curtin:

What global conglomerates didn’t anticipate was the laborious

effort it would require to establish marketing operations on the
ground and to secure clearances from government authorities. Nor
did they anticipate that local broadcasters would quickly emulate
some of their programming and production strategies. Soon they
found themselves battling hundreds of competitors in dozens of
territories, requiring that they fashion their programs and advertis-
ing to meet the evolving audience expectations in each particular
market. In the end Western conglomerates realized that their
Asian satellite services would need to balance production and dis-
tribution efficiencies against distinctive local circumstances,
accounting for audience tastes, market competition, and stylistic
variations.
(279)

While Curtin argues that media conglomerates entering China’s

television marketplace in the 1990s and early 2000s faced numerous
obstacles in reaching Chinese audiences, particularly in terms of local
competition, significant changes in the Chinese film industry in
recent years suggest that Hollywood film studios now face similar
problems.
In the decade since Kung Fu Hustle’s release and the years since the
publication of Curtin’s book, the local Chinese film industry has
grown stronger. Though the annual top grossing film is often from
Hollywood, overall ticket sales for Chinese films have grown substan-
tially. Between 2004 and 2013, domestic film grosses have outpaced
imported films every year but one, in 2012, ranging from 51.5% to
60% of all Chinese ticket sales (“China Film” 8). In 2013, domestic
films earned 58.6% of all ticket sales in China (“China Film” 7).
Admissions in Chinese theaters topped over 600 million and box
office revenue reached $3.6 billion in 2013, with over $2 billion of
that coming from domestic films (“China Film” 7). More recently,
Chinese blockbusters have outpaced Hollywood studio films at the
box office. The top grossing film in China for 2015 was Monster Hunt
(Raman Hui, 2015), a visual effects-laden adventure film that earned
more than $380 million in Chinese theaters to become the highest
A Very Significant Chinese Component 499

grossing film in that market ever (Brzeski). This record was quickly
supplanted by the comedic The Mermaid (Stephen Chow, 2016) which
grossed over $520 million in Chinese theaters early in 2016. As Hol-
lywood studios continue to look to China for its box office potential,
it is clear that there are significant challenges ahead as revenue for
domestic films now outpaces those for Hollywood films with several
local films beating imports each year. Whereas in previous decades,
Chinese firms looked to Hollywood studios to shore up their industry
and theaters, that dependence has shifted significantly. The Holly-
wood studios’ focus has been on engineering success throughout the
development, production, and exhibition processes of their films in
order to ensure strong box office returns in China. Key to any of these
successes is securing a strong relationship with the state run agencies
that market, distribute, and co-produce films in the Chinese market-
place. Paramount’s Age of Extinction is an excellent case study of this
evolving process, with key Chinese governmental bodies significantly
helping shape the film’s production and distribution.

Age of Extinction as “A New Era of Collaboration”:

Achieving Success in the Chinese Marketplace

The first three Transformers films all performed strongly in China (see
Table 1 below for a breakdown of each film’s box office performance).
In fact, Dark of the Moon emerged as the fourth highest grossing film
of all-time at the Chinese box office, earning $165 million.
Paramount thus wanted to ensure an even larger box office haul in
China for the fourth film in the franchise. Like many contemporary

Table 1
Box office revenue for the Transformers films

Film Domestic International Total Gross in Chinese

gross gross gross China percentage
(in millions) (in millions) (in millions) (in millions) of total gross

Transformers $319 $390 $709 $37 5.2

Revenge of the Fallen $402 $434 $836 $65 7.9
Dark of the Moon $352 $771 $1,123 $165 14.7
Age of Extinction $245 $859 $1,104 $320 29
500 Kimberly Owczarski

franchise films, Age of Extinction was partially shot in China and had
production and financial partnerships with Chinese firms, including
the state-owned China Movie Channel and Jiaflix Enterprises, a com-
pany that provides streaming services in China. It was the first Holly-
wood film that the China Movie Channel had invested in, and this
investment was described in April 2013 by Yan Xiaoming, the
Chairman of China Movie Channel, as “[T]he beginning of a new era
of collaboration with the Hollywood studios. We are very confident
that the China Movie Channel/Jiaflix cooperation with Paramount
will result in the famous Transformers brand being an even bigger
success” (qtd. in Tartaglione). Emphasizing the Chinese aspects of the
film, Marc Ganis, President of Jiaflix Enterprises, claimed: “The film
has a great deal to do with China. Effectively, China is a character in
it.” He then added: “There is going to be a single version worldwide
with a very significant Chinese component” (qtd. in “Jiafix”). Ganis’s
comment pointed to Disney’s strategy with Iron Man 3 (Shane Black,
2013), in which the company secured a separate Chinese release of
the film with additional footage featuring Chinese actors. The China-
only release of Iron Man 3 was widely criticized by fans, filmgoers,
and the Chinese press for the poor integration of the Chinese sections
into the film’s overall narrative.
To first demonstrate the film’s “significant Chinese component,”
high-profile Chinese actors were cast. In May 2013, it was announced
that Li Bingbing would join Age of Extinction (Tsui, “China’s Li Bing-
bing”). As one of the best known, critically acclaimed actresses in
China, her casting suggested she would play an important part in the
franchise. She even received a character-based movie poster to help
promote the film to the Chinese audience. Li was featured for about
thirty minutes in the film as Su Yueming, who oversees the Chinese
facility for Kinetic Solutions Incorporated (KSI). In the film, she fier-
cely navigates the streets of Hong Kong on a motorcycle and protects
KSI chief executive officer Joshua Joyce (Stanley Tucci) as rogue CIA
operatives pursue them. In July 2013, it was announced that Han
Geng would also join the film. As a film, television, and pop music
star across Asia—he was once a member of the K-pop boy band Super
Junior—Han’s casting brought a significant wave of publicity. He
had over thirty-five million followers at the time through his social
media presence, ensuring a large level of publicity (Tsui, “Chinese
Star”). Han’s role was more in the line of a cameo—he is briefly
A Very Significant Chinese Component 501

featured with his guitar as his car is drawn up by a large magnet con-
nected to a spaceship. But despite his limited screen time, Han pro-
vided two songs for the film’s soundtrack.
Age of Extinction went a step beyond previous Hollywood studio
efforts of casting Chinese stars by setting up a reality television show
to help choose additional actors for parts in the film. Announced in
April 2013 and titled Transformers 4 Chinese Actors Talent Search Real-
ity Show, the show’s goal was to find two established and two new-
comer acting talents to cast in the film in small roles. As reality
shows are one of the most popular genres on Chinese television, the
program would serve as an outlet for promotion long before the film’s
release. Indeed, for marketing purposes, all of the applicants’ email
addresses were to be entered into a large database to be used by Para-
mount close to the July 2014 release date (Block). From April to July
2013, potential contestants submitted videos to the m1905 Web site,
the online arm of the state-owned China Movie Channel. Potential
contestants had to select one of four character areas to submit their
audition videos. In a promotional video that demonstrated what the
program was looking for, clips of Hollywood films demonstrated each
of these character types, which included a male action role (punctu-
ated with images of Bruce Willis and Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson,
among others), a sexy action female role (Angelina Jolie and Halle
Berry), a male computer geek (Aaron Taylor Johnson and Justin
Long) and a cute, young female (Emma Watson and Chloe Grace
Moretz). The submissions were narrowed down from a pool of
approximately 70,000 contestants to the twelve who appeared on the
program.
Judges for the competition included the film’s producer Lorenzo di
Bonaventura, Jiaflix’s chairman Sid Ganis, and head of Paramount’s
marketing and distribution division, Megan Colligan. Stated di Bon-
aventura about this venture into Chinese reality television: “[We] are
looking forward to becoming more and more part of the Chinese
audience’s experience by bringing the Chinese culture, Chinese tradi-
tions and Chinese talent into the movie” (qtd. in Gilman). Stressed
Ganis about the program: “It’s a good way for the government to
know the American film company is eager to participate with the
Chinese in the making of the movie” (qtd. in Block). Di Bonaventura
and Ganis’s comments suggest that the production partners were not
only looking to showcase the film’s direct ties to China, but also to
502 Kimberly Owczarski

present clear indications of true collaboration to the government.

Since it was the first time that the China Movie Channel worked with
a Hollywood studio to produce a blockbuster, it made sense to use its
airwaves as a promotional mechanism for the film (Block). The
ninety-minute program, which aired in prime-time on August 31,
2013, featured the twelve contestants in individual talent showcases
as well as tasks which demonstrated their acting abilities. The win-
ners included newcomers Byron Li, a martial arts specialist who was
slotted to play a kung-fu fighter, and Candice Zhao, the winner of
the 35th Miss Bikini International Pageant China, who was cast as a
sexy goddess (Coonan, “Paramount Picks”). In the final film, none of
the characters portrayed by the winning contestants had names; for
instance, Zhao was credited simply as “Woman in Elevator” for her
brief turn on screen. Nor did they have more than a few minutes
screen time between them. Yet, the reality show as well as any pro-
motional appearances for each of the selected contestants provided
sustained publicity for the film in the year prior to its release.
While the film did shoot in Hong Kong and China, a good per-
centage of the narrative’s China section was actually shot in Detroit
in July and August 2013, as the reality show was in production.
Paramount spent over $80 million dollars in the state of Michigan.
Much of this footage was for action sequences that were supposed to
take place in Hong Kong. This outlay represents nearly 40% of the
film’s overall production budget, though the film received about $20
million back as part of a 27% filming incentive to draw the shoot to
the state (Goundry). Despite Ganis’s claim that the film would fea-
ture “a significant amount of authentic Chinese involvement,” Detroit
offered strong financial incentives as a location stand-in for the real
Hong Kong (qtd. in Boykoff). It also provided the production with
fewer obstacles than if they had primarily shot in China. For example,
when the production moved to Hong Kong, the film’s crew faced
two different extortion attempts from triads (Goldberg). In an Enter-
tainment Tonight behind-the-scenes video, production members cite
one of the difficulties of shooting in Hong Kong as the sheer amount
of people on the streets, with phones and other recording equipment,
because Chinese laws prevent the production from completely shut-
ting down normal traffic patterns (“From Detroit”; Goldberg).
Despite the fact that Detroit stood in for Hong Kong, little con-
troversy emerged with the Chinese officials over the country’s
A Very Significant Chinese Component 503

depiction. Instead, Paramount ran into significant problems with

Chinese advertising partners. Age of Extinction featured prominent
product placement of Chinese brands. According to Rob Moore, Vice
Chairman of Paramount Pictures, “Having those products certainly
reinforces the fact that this is Chinese culture and that there is a lot
of story-telling happening there” (qtd. in Wei). Four Chinese compa-
nies each paid $1 million for placement within the movie and to
include products such as drinking water and a duck-meat snack in
the film, and the Wulong district paid over a million dollars to be
featured as well (“Transformers: Hollywood Films”). Another ten to
fifteen Chinese brands received product placement deals, though it is
unclear how much they each paid (Sauer). Domestic films in China
averaged four brand placements in 2013, so Age of Extinction’s use of
the strategy is elevated in comparison (Kuo, “Transformers”). Several
US-based brands, including Coke, Victoria’s Secret, Tom Ford, and
Chevrolet, also appeared in the movie, promoting their products in
both English and Mandarin (Sauer). While about one-third of the
movie takes place in China and Hong Kong, some of the Chinese
brands appear in the film’s other locales, despite their limited avail-
ability outside of China. For example, Cade Yeager (Mark Wahlberg)
uses a China Construction Bank ATM while Shane Dyson (Jack Rey-
nor) drinks a Chinese Red Bull in rural Texas, though neither is
available in the US. Additionally, many of the brands and products
lacked smooth integration into the film. For instance, Joshua Joyce
stops in the middle of an action sequence to drink a Chinese milk
drink, Yili, which is highlighted in two separate, lengthy close-up
shots before the action continues.
Representatives from Filmworks China, an advertising firm repre-
senting several of the featured Chinese agencies, visited shooting loca-
tions in China, Hong Kong, and beyond to observe how their brands
were being integrated into the film. Despite their efforts, several Chi-
nese advertisers were unhappy with the final results. A week before
the film’s release date, the investment firm that owns the Pangu Plaza
Hotel in Beijing filed a lawsuit to stop its release, citing multiple
breaches of the contract by Paramount and its two Chinese co-
production partners. Asserting that the hotel was supposed to be seen
for a minimum of twenty seconds of screen time in the film, receive
props for display in the hotel for eight months, be present in all pro-
motional materials, and host a prerelease party with key personnel
504 Kimberly Owczarski

from the film’s production, representatives of Pangu Plaza claimed

that none of the conditions had been met despite Paramount receiv-
ing $1.6 million in payment. As a result, Paramount officials had to
settle the matter with the Pangu investors quickly or face a delayed
opening in China (Lang, “‘Transformers’”). Within days of the public
complaint and court filing, Paramount executives had moved a giant
replica of the Transformer Bumblebee to the hotel, arranged a press
conference and photo-op with key personnel, and organized a Beijing
premiere for the film at the hotel (Makinen, “Paramount Rushes”).
However, the misunderstandings about advertisements continued.
While Paramount executives were able to placate the investors of the
Pangu Plaza Hotel, they were soon hit with other claims about
breaches of contract with Chinese advertisers. On July 3, 2014, repre-
sentatives from the Chongqing Wulong Karst Tourism Group Com-
pany stated that the film did not feature its national park nearly
enough, nor did it prominently display the name of the park onsc-
reen, which, they claimed, led to a false notion of the park’s location.
Weeks later, the firm filed a lawsuit for over $3 million asking for a
return of its $800,000 product placement fee; nearly $700,000 of lost
revenue during the film’s eight-day shoot in the park, which left the
park closed to tourists; and $2 million in general damages (Makinen
and Silbert). The product placement deal had been brokered by
m1905; representatives from m1905 claimed that the group’s pay-
ments were over five months late. They also stressed that some of the
issues were cultural misunderstandings. For example, the US-based
crew mistakenly believed that a sign was for the park when it was
not. Paramount representatives agreed to place additional footage in
subsequent DVD and TV releases of the film to correctly identify the
park. Also in July 2014, a third advertiser publicly claimed frustra-
tion with their product’s portrayal in the film. Black Duck—which
produces snacks made out of duck meat—was featured onscreen for
about three seconds, but an executive told a Chinese Web site that
they were “much dissatisfied” with the final appearance of the product
in the film (Sauer).
Although the advertising partnerships did not all operate as
smoothly as originally envisioned, they nonetheless presented local
ties directly to the Chinese audience. With the inclusion of Chinese
brands, the foregrounding of Li Bingbing in the narrative and in the
marketing, the tie-in reality show, and the film’s partial setting in
A Very Significant Chinese Component 505

Hong Kong and China, Age of Extinction had many attributes attrac-
tive to Chinese filmgoers. Paramount also secured favorable condi-
tions for the film’s release, in large part due to studio’s marketing
partnership with the China Movie Media Group (CMMG), which
opened its own Los Angeles-based office to help support the film’s
promotion (Cheney). CMMG is a subsidiary of the China Film
Group, which was the only organization that could import and dis-
tribute foreign films at the time. In order to promote the film in
China, CMMG used social networking sites and outdoor advertising
to build awareness about Age of Extinction weeks before its release. For
example, stars from the film recorded messages for Chinese students
about to take college entrance exams in June 2014, wishing them
luck and also asking them to see the film; the videos were then placed
online and widely shared (Coonan, “‘Transformers 4’ Stars”). Subways
cars were wrapped in Age of Extinction promotions, while massive
Transformers statues were erected in both Beijing and Hong Kong
Harbor (Sauer). CMMG also leveraged government assets to enhance
the film’s performance. In particular, the agency’s in-theater advertis-
ing channel featured promotions for the film, reaching just under
three-quarters of filmgoers in over 100 major cities. In addition, ten
of China’s largest cinema chains and an online ticketing site co-
promoted the film with CMMG (Coonan and McClintock). Age of
Extinction was the first Hollywood studio film to have its worldwide
premiere in China, an event also organized by CMMG (Coonan and
McClintock).
The film opened the same day in China as it did in the North
American market, a rarity for foreign films in the Chinese market-
place. By doing so, Paramount was able to eschew the huge drops in
potential revenue that occur when there is a delay between the North
American and Chinese release dates, a financial repercussion often
ascribed to piracy (Burkitt). Age of Extinction also had the good for-
tune to not face any new Hollywood releases its opening weekend in
China, which is also a regular occurrence for studio films in the Chi-
nese marketplace. Often, Hollywood studios do not know the exact
release dates for their films in China until a few weeks before, which
limits the extent of marketing the studios can do. Despite the poten-
tial lawsuit from the Pangu investors group, the Age of Extinction
release date was assigned well ahead of time and did not waver. The
film opened on over 60% of all Chinese screens, leading to a box
506 Kimberly Owczarski

office haul of nearly $100 million dollars in its first three days in the-
aters (“Record-Breaking Transformers Stun China”; Makinen, “‘Trans-
formers’ Breaks”). By the end of its second week, the film became the
highest grossing film ever in China with over $220 million, before
eventually earning $320 million (Frater, “Transformers 4”). This out-
paced the film’s box office revenues in North America by over $80
million, and indicated a significant shift in the importance of China
to the franchise’s fortunes.

Conclusion

While Age of Extinction performed well in China, it received a lot of

criticism in the United States for its China-centered focus. David S.
Cohen, a features editor for Variety, penned an editorial claiming that
the fourth Transformers film was “A splendidly patriotic film, if you
happen to be Chinese.” Cohen’s critique centered on the negative por-
trayal of the CIA and US president while Chinese governmental offi-
cials were presented as benevolent and brave. A year before the film’s
debut, Peter Enav of the Associated Press stressed that as a result of
Hollywood’s growing interest in China, “China’s Communist Party”
is “Coming soon to a theater near you.” While some worry about
Communist propaganda and Chinese nationalism being spread
through Hollywood films attempting to cater to the Chinese market,
other critics fear how governmental censorship and the growing pres-
sure placed upon films to appeal to the Chinese audience specifically
are affecting the quality of studio productions. Being locked out of
the thirty-four films allowed into Chinese theaters that can partici-
pate in revenue-sharing is a major studio concern, particularly for
greenlighting expensive blockbusters. Paramount’s $200 million
World War Z (Marc Forster, 2013) was rejected by Chinese censors,
with speculation that a line attributing the outbreak to China which
was featured in a thirty-second promo shown during the Super Bowl
was the reason for the rejection, despite the line being taken out of
the final film (Shaw and Waxman). Others suggested it was the result
of Brad Pitt, who once starred in Seven Years in Tibet (Jean-Jacques
Annaud, 1997), a film the Chinese government condemned at the
time of its release. Film historian Leonard Maltin stressed that the
potential economic windfalls for the studios were more important
A Very Significant Chinese Component 507

than any ideological or aesthetic concerns that catering to China

might provoke: “[T]he explosion of the China market is a boon to
the industry. I’m sure the studios are not excited about making the
China-inspired changes, but they’re in the business to make a buck
and they’re finding it hard to resist” (qtd. in Enav). For Age of Extinc-
tion, producers and director Michael Bay met with representatives
from SAPPRFT in April 2013 to discuss the script, a meeting which
led to “a lot of additional work” to the original screenplay (Tsui,
“Shanghai Festival”). Perhaps this meeting led to lines such as a
policeman shouting “We need to call the central government for help
now!” intended to make the Chinese government look positive in the
midst of the growing chaos onscreen (Kuo, “Why the Abysmal”).
Yet, it is easy to see why Hollywood studios continue to look at
the Chinese marketplace as an additional source of revenue. In 2014,
Chinese box office revenue grew 36% from 2013 to $4.8 billion,
abetted by an average of fifteen screens being added daily in China
(Frater, “China Surges”). At the same time, North American box
office revenue fell 5% in 2014, leaving the global box office as a sav-
ior for an otherwise disparaging year for the studios (Schwartzel).
Indeed, the summer of 2014 experienced a 15% drop from 2013, not
a single summer film cracked $300 million at the domestic box office
for the first time in over a decade, and it was the worst performing
summer in terms of revenue in nearly ten years (Lang, “Box Office”).
Thus, the increasing impact of China’s box office could not be
ignored by the studios.
Chinese productions outpaced Hollywood studio films at the Chi-
nese box office in 2014, garnering 55% of overall revenue, and did so
again in 2015 with 61.6% of revenue, a trend that could potentially
ebb future ticket sales for Hollywood films (Coonan, “China’s
Box Office”; Brzeski). With the performance of Mouse Hunt in 2015
and The Mermaid in 2016, local blockbusters are significantly out-
earning Hollywood films. To compete at the box office in China,
then, Hollywood films will have to continue working with govern-
ment officials to secure favorable release conditions. In fact, Holly-
wood filmmakers have been candid about their understanding of the
importance of China, and are increasingly addressing the Chinese
marketplace in the development process. For example, the China Film
Group was a minority financial backer for Furious 7 (James Wan,
2015), which resulted in long-term promotion for the film and
508 Kimberly Owczarski

record-breaking grosses in China.5 James Cameron claimed that there

will be Chinese characters added to the upcoming Avatar sequels in
order to appeal to the Chinese audience specifically (Carroll).
Hollywood studios continue to look to China as a market that
will increasingly grow for their films even with the challenges faced
in terms of censorship, access to theaters, and the increasing competi-
tion provided by local productions. Despite these obstacles, maximiz-
ing potential box office in China remains a chief goal of the
Hollywood studios, and we will continue to see unique extensions of
Hollywood’s relationship with China as films like the fourth Trans-
formers installment, Age of Extinction, find significant box office suc-
cess in its challenging marketplace. Indeed, Age of Extinction
demonstrated that more money could be earned at the Chinese box
office than the domestic one, a trend that has continued with films
such as Legendary’s Warcraft (Duncan Jones, 2016), Paramount’s Ter-
minator: Genisys (Alan Taylor, 2015), and Lionsgate’s Now You See Me
2 (John Chu, 2016), among others. The key to that success remains
the interactions with Chinese agencies that can best secure favorable
marketing practices and theatrical release conditions, a strategy that
requires the long-term investment by the studios from the develop-
ment stages of their products. Indeed, the “very significant Chinese
component” for Age of Extinction was hardly the Chinese actors and
locations shown on-screen, but the entire process that occurred
behind the scenes as Paramount secured the film’s position in the
Chinese marketplace.

Notes
The author thanks Yizhou Hu for her help accessing and translating content related to Transfor-
mers 4 Chinese Actors Talent Search Reality Show.
1. The North American market includes the US and English-speaking Canada.
2. SAPPRFT was established in 2013 after the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Tele-
vision (SARFT) merged with the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP).
For consistency, I will use SAPPRFT throughout this paper to refer to the state’s regulatory
board.
3. Unless otherwise noted, all domestic, global, and China box office figures were acquired from
the industry tracker Web site Box Office Mojo.
4. It is important to note that the Hong Kong and Chinese film industries developed separately
in the twentieth century, until Hong Kong returned to Chinese rule on July 1, 1997. Since
then, the Hong Kong film industry has remained autonomous but is often intertwined with
A Very Significant Chinese Component 509

the mainland Chinese film industry. Co-productions abound between Hong Kong and Chi-
nese companies, while other Hong Kong films remain independent from the mainland. The
recent Hong Kong film Ten Years (2015), for example, features five segments from different
directors that examine the role of the Chinese government in a dystopian near-future. Con-
demned by Chinese officials, Ten Years received no theatrical release in China but was a
major box office success in Hong Kong. It also won several Hong Kong Film Awards
(HKFA) in a ceremony that was not carried by Chinese television networks due to the film’s
inclusion in the nominations. Derek Yee, chairman of the HKFA, described the film’s situa-
tion as demonstrating “one country [with] two systems at work” (qtd. in Karen Chu). Yee’s
statement mimics Deng Xiaoping’s proposed “One Country, Two Systems” solution for the
different economic and political models operating in Hong Kong and China before the 1997
reunification (Yiu-Wai Chu 4).
5. In 2015, Furious 7 (James Wan, 2015) earned over $390 million to take over the record of
highest grossing film in China from Transformers: Age of Extinction. It was soon surpassed by
Mouse Hunt and The Mermaid, but it remains the highest grossing US film in Chinese
theaters.

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Kimberly Owczarski is an associate professor of Media Industries in the

Department of Film, Television, and Digital Media at Texas Christian
University. She has published in the Journal of Film and Video, Spectator, Jump
Cut and Quarterly Review of Film and Video, as well as several anthologies.