Brexit in European Integration Theory: Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism and Constructivism

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES
Brexit in European
Integration Theory:
Liberal
Intergovernmentalism,
Neofunctionalism and
Constructivism
Bachelor's Thesis
MARK SZABO
Supervisor: Mgr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Ph.D.
Department of International Relations and European

Studies
International Relations and European Politics
Brno 2019/2020
1
BREXIT IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY: LIBERAL
INTERGOVERNMENTALISM, NEOFUNCTIONALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM
Bibliographic Record
Author: Mark Szabo

Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University
Department of International Relations and
European Studies
Title of Thesis: Brexit in European Integration Theory: Liberal
Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism and
Constructivism
Degree Programme: International Relations and European Politics
Supervisor: Ph.D.Mgr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Ph.D.
Academic Year: 2019/2020
Number of Pages: 47
Keywords: Brexit, European Integration, Europe,
Constructivism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism,
Neofunctionalism, United Kingdom, European
Union, Referendum, Remain, Leave
1
Abstract
Brexit has been widely perceived as one of the most important crises
currently facing the European integration process and one of the key
topics on the European Union’s (EU) agenda since the British voters
voted to leave the bloc in an in/out referendum on 23 June 2016. It is for
the first time ever that a Member State withdraws from the EU. Against
this background, the aim of this thesis is to provide at least a partial
interpretation of this unprecedented phenomenon. As such, the thesis
asks how and to what extent various theories of European integration
can explain Brexit as a contemporary crisis of European integration.
More specifically, it looks at Brexit through the perspective of three
theoretical approaches: liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism
and constructivism.
2
Statutory Declaration
I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Bachelor's Thesis

concerning the topic of Brexit in European Integration Theory:
Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism and
Constructivism independently. All the sources used for the purpose of
finishing this thesisthesis have been adequately referenced and are listed
in the Bibliography.
In Brno 14 May 2020
.......................................
Mark Szabo
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3
Table of Contents
List of Terms and Acronyms 5
1 Introduction 7
1.1 UK as an awkward partner ....................................................................... 7
1.2 European integration theories ............................................................. 10
1.3 Methodology, goals, and research questions .................................. 11
1.4 Literature review ....................................................................................... 13
2 Brexit and the process of European Integration 16

2.1 Brexit as a crisis of European Integration........................................ 16
3 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 19
3.1 About Liberal Intergovernmentalism ................................................ 19
3.2 Brexit and Liberal Intergovernmentalism ....................................... 19
4 Neofunctionalism 23
4.1 About neofunctionalism .......................................................................... 23
4.2 Brexit and neofunctionalism ................................................................. 23
5 Constructivism 28
5.1 About constructivism ............................................................................... 28
5.2 Brexit and constructivism ...................................................................... 29
6 Conclusion 32
7 Bibliography 35
3
LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 5
List of Terms and Acronyms
Brexit – the process of the withdrawal of the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
from the European Union, as dubbed by the media
EU – The European Union
EP – European Parliament
EC – European Commission
UK – The United Kingdom
NI – Northern Ireland
PM – Prime Minister
MP – Member of Parliament (House of Commons of the
Parliament of the UK)
Conservative – The Conservative party of the UK
Labour – The Labour party of the UK
SNP – Scottish National Party
Lib Dem – Liberal Democratic party of the UK
ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community
EEC – European Economic Community
CAD – Common Agricultural Policy
Hard Brexit – The UK would not be subject to the European
Court of Justice or EU Single Market, instead
opting for a free trade deal with the EU.
Soft Brexit – The UK would still be able to access the EU Single
Market, stay in the customs union, still closely
allied with the EU
LI – Liberal Intergovernmentalism
5
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WANT TO APPEAR HERE.
1 Introduction
1.1 UK as an awkward partner
The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) membership in the EU has been a hotly

debated topic since the country’s accession into the European Economic
Community (EEC). Ever since the UK joined the EEC after years of
battling vetoes by the French government and its president, Charles de
Gaulle, who saw the UK as a potential trojan horse of American interests
(CVCE 2016) and a factor that would slow down integration and
decision-making within the Community, the UK has been an awkward
partner and member state, according to some (George 1998) (Geddes
2004, 1-3) academics. On the other hand, there are others, who are
against such a classification (Dunin-Wasowicz, London School of
Economics 2017). There are two sides to this argument and both of them
have some merit to their claims, as the relationship between the UK and
EU can be described as an awkward one, but there are facts that can
convince of the opposite.
From the UK’s perspective, opening up new potential places for trade and
maybe to benefit from the post-war economic boom, would help the
country greatly, which is why it wanted to join the EEC (as the UK was
labeled as the ‘Sick man of Europe’ (Buttonwood 2017)). Despite this,
shortly after joining in 1973, a national referendum was issued in 1975
on the continued membership in the EEC, which was approved by 67.2%
of the people, who voted (Seymour-Ure 1978, 602). The referendum was
held due to the UK’s disagreements with its budgetary contribution and
the Common Agricultural Policy (Monbiot 2018), which saw the UK pay
much more into the budget than it would get back in return, not
mentioning the problems with the Commonwealth, from which the UK
benefited enormously, due to the amount of food it imported from those
nations. (Todd 2016, 39-43) However, the actual main reason was to
unite the Labour party in the question of the EEC and prevent it from
splitting in order to win the general elections in 1974. Even though the
referendum saw the UK remain in Europe, the UK’s political discourse
saw a rise in Euroscepticism, which lead to a large animosity between
7
the Labour and Conservative party. Formerly pro-European (at least

until the late 60s), the Labour party was more anti-EU during and after
the 1975 referendum than before, while the Conservative party became
more pro-European for a while (at least until the late 90s/early 00s)
(Todd 2016, 51-53).
The reason why the relationship between the UK and the EU can be la-
belled as an awkward one, is because throughout the years, the UK has
either been a constructive or a rather unconstructive partner. It began
with the 1975 referendum just a year after joining. The relationship had
its ups and downs, its better or worse, happy, or awkward moments. For
the most part, the UK was at odds with major initiatives within the Euro-
pean Community and was disliked for having a sort of independent point
of view, going as far back as the beginning of the European integration
process in the 50s. (George 1998, Chapter 1) Stephen George outlined
five main points of contention (late accession to the EEC, domestic polit-
ical constraints, parliamentary sovereignty and elitism, a preference for
a ‘special relationship’ with the US, and a fifth theoretical point under-
scoring the UK’s negative attitude towards continental Europe). (George
1998, 275) However, even If awkward at points, the relationship also had
its more positive moments both for the UK and the EU, challenging the
perception of the UK as an awkward partner. Probably the best contribu-
tion to showcase would be the UKs help with the creation of the Single
Market and the advancement of economic reform across the EU (espe-
cially with London being THE economic capital of the EU). Other exam-
ples might be the UKs contribution to the EU’s budget, advocacy for the
2004 Eastern Enlargement, EU animal welfare laws and more, best de-
scribed in the LSE article by Roch Dunin-Wasowicz. (Dunin-Wasowicz,
London School of Economics 2016). In the face of such a lengthy list of
contributions, was the UK such an awkward partner?
Nevertheless, the so-called ‘awkward relationship’ between the UK and

the EU culminated with the referendum on the withdrawal of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union
(or Brexit) in 2016, when the British voters voted to leave by a slightly
bigger margin (51.89%) as opposed to the remain votes (48.11%) (BBC
2016), both the UK’s and the EU’s attention have been focused on one
another, as the whole process was originally supposed to finish by the
8
end of March 2019, but as of writing this thesis (May 2020), there is still
no end in sight, as yes, Britain formally left the EU on the 31.01.2020, but
negotiations regarding future trade relations and more have not
concluded yet, and they will probably take more than a year to fully
finish. Even so, Britain still needs to abide by EU rules at least for the
remainder of 2020, but without any say in the decision-making, as
opposed to when it was a member.
Creating a new precedent, Brexit is viewed differently either

domestically, or abroad (by members and leaders of the European Union,
Scottish National Party, some Labour MPs, Liberal Democrats, 48.1% of
the voters in the 2016 referendum and others) (BBC, BBC News 2020),
with all of them either sharing or differing in their views, while from the
government’s own perspective, it is doing so to ensure future prosperity
and independence (Stewart, Boffey, Syal 2020).
Brexit has been widely perceived as one of the most important crises cur-
rently facing the European integration process, and one of the key topics
on the European Union’s (EU) agenda since the British voters voted to
leave the bloc in an in/out referendum on 23 June 2016. It is for the first
time ever that a Member State withdraws from the EU, in an act disinte-
gration, rather than continuous integration, which is why the thesis will
cover Brexit, rather than another European crisis, as it represents a chal-
lenge to the theories of European integration. Against this background,
the aim of this thesis is to provide at least a partial interpretation of this
unprecedented phenomenon. As such, the thesis asks how and to what
extent various theories of European integration can explain Brexit as a
contemporary crisis of European integration. More specifically, it looks
at Brexit through the perspective of three theoretical approaches: liberal
intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and constructivism. (Liesbet
Hooghe, Gary Marks 2019, 1114-1118) (Troitiño, David & Chochia,
Archil 2012) The theories should provide ample explanation of different
mechanisms, events, and an inquiry into the overall background and
particularities of Brexit.
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1.2 European integration theories
The reason why the theories (liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunc-

tionalism and constructivism) were selected, is because they represent
the most important and integral ideas of European integration, which is
most apt with regards to neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmen-
talism. Neofunctionalism is best summarised by the works of Ernst B.
Haas, specifically his The uniting of Europe: political, social and economic
forces, 1950-1957, where he outlines the importance of this theory dur-
ing the early years of integration, and the way integration will probably
proceed with a functionalistic mindset (Haas 1958, XIV-XVII). Neofunc-
tionalism did influence the integration process, but with Brexit in mind,
it can be a powerful tool to shake the theories’ foundations.
On the other hand, intergovernmentalism is a theory that is sort of con-

trary to the ideas of neofunctionalism, because the theory rejects the spill
over effect argument and the idea that supranational organisations wield
political influence on par with that of national governments. This idea
was developed by Stanley Hoffman and further refined by Andrew Mo-
ravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism theory in The Choice for Europe:
Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, which de-
scribes European integration as “a series of rational choices made by na-
tional leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities
stemming from the economic interests relative power of powerful domestic
constituents, the of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence,
and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate com-
mitments”, (Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State
Power from Messina to Maastricht 1998, 18), which summarizes the
later decades of European integration. Concluding that liberal intergov-
ernmentalism is the one theory that makes sense.
A more modern theory, Constructivism, says that significant aspects of

international relations (in this case European integration) are histori-
cally and socially constructed, created by social practice and interaction.
According to one of the most important constructivists, Alexander
Wendt, shared ideas rather than material forces determine the struc-
tures of human association, coupled with the identities and interests of
10
actors being constructed by these shared ideas, rather than being given
by nature. (Wendt 1999, 1) In simpler terms, ideas, interests and identi-
ties of individuals influence politics, as politics are social in nature, which
means that social interaction between states can shift international pol-
itics. Constructivism represents a new look at politics, and in the case of
European integration, it can explain the shifting attitudes of citizens, and
from that politicians and states themselves, with Brexit being an obvious
example of changing attitudes towards EU and integration.
1.3 Methodology, goals, and research questions
For the analysis and explanation of Brexit in European Integration

Theory, the thesis will use the basic tenets of the three above mentioned
theories. One by one the thesis will try to find an answer to this process,
as Brexit is a matter of European Integration. Sometimes even
concurrently, the thesis will try to compare the theories of European
Integration with each other, bringing into spotlight real life events and
political actualities that might be explained by a certain theory.
An important aspect of the methodology will bet the usage of various

sources, especially secondary sources such as documents, articles,
journals and papers to give proof to the arguments presented in the
thesis, as emoirical evidence is a necessity of a research.
1.3.1 Goal of the thesis

The goal of this thesis is to apply the three european integration
theories on Brexit and try to explain through the lenses of those three
particular theories. As such, the core of this thesis will be made up of an
investigation into how and to what extend do the three theories of
European integration (Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism
and Constructivism) can explain Brexit as a contemporary crisis of
European integration.
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1.3.2 Research questions

To this end, the main question, which the thesis will try to find an
anser to is the following:
How can Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism and

Constructivism possibly explain Brexit in the context of European
Integration? Followed by sub questions related to the aforementioned
theories and their relation to Brexit.
Likewise, the thesis will also try to answer these particular sub-
questions:
1.1. How can Liberal Intergovernmentalism explain Brexit?
1.2. How can Neofunctionalism explain Brexit?
1.3. How can Constructivism explain Brexit?
1.3.3 Data
Data will be mostly gathered from primary and secondary sources,
such as news reports, journals, various academic papers, and work. The
reason why these sources will be represented in this thesis is that they
provide ample evidence for the confirmation of certain theories, repre-
senting empirical evidence and as a backbone to the arguments made.
Theories will be source from the books and articles represented in this
sub-section, while information regarding Brexit itself and its surround-
ing impact or the idea behind it will be sourced from news reports,
journals, data analyses.
However, the meat of the thesis will be mostly sourced from these pub-
lications, which provide academic insight into European integration and
theories:
• DINAN, Desmond. Ever closer Union: an introduction to European inte-

gration. 3rd ed. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2005. xiii,665 s.
ISBN 0333961714.
• GEDDES, Andrew. The European union and British politics. 1st pub. Ba-
singstoke: Palgrave, 2004. xv, 252 s. ISBN 0-333-98121-9.
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• Theories of international relations. Edited by Scott Burchill. 5th ed. New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. ix, 388. ISBN 9780230362222
• Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks. „Grand theories of European integration in

the twenty-first century. “Journal of European Public Policy, 2019: 1113-
1133, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1569711
All these sources are, of course, available in the Masaryk University li-
brary and other literary sources for academic work, such as JSTOR or
ResearchGate. All citations and references are provided in the Bibliog-
raphy section.
1.4 Literature review
The literature on European Integration has been mainly focused on

the history and future of integration (Moravcsik, European integration:
looking ahead 2008) (Dinan 2005), mentioning the establishment of the
various forms of cooperation, treaties and EU institutions, while others
on various strands of integration and its contents (Dinan 2005)
(Kühnhardt 2008), such as the contents of the treaties and European pol-
icies. Last but not least, some focus on the long battle between various
ideas and theories (Troitiño, David & Chochia, Archil 2012), for the fu-
ture of the European Union and integration (Moravcsik, European
integration: looking ahead 2008) (Csergo Zsuzsa, James M. Goldgeier
2004), with more contrasting or common ideas, with regards to integra-
tion theory.
Majority of the literature agrees that the most important integration the-
ory is the theory of neofunctionalism, as proposed by Ernst B. Haas, fo-
cusing on the spill over of the integration of one area into further inte-
gration of more areas of policy-making (Helen Wallace, William Wallace,
Mark A Pollack 2005, 15-17), because the functional spill over of ideas
and the impact of the joined sectors of industry or economy made it eas-
ier and more likely for other sectors to integrate (Haas 1958, 282-317),
which made it beneficial for the members, and even enticing for non-
members to join, perpetuating the idea that everything is better together.
Due to the essentiality of this theory with regards to integration, it’s
choice as an explanation for Brexit is without a doubt crucial, as it
13
explains key parts of the Brexit debate, which is also why Gary Marks and
Liesbet Hooghe chose this theory, who are important academic re-
searches, and whose approach towards integration theory is a key in un-
derstanding it. (Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks 2019)
By contrast, the other big influential theory is intergovernmentalism, and

in the case of Brexit, liberal intergovernmentalism (Helen Wallace,
William Wallace, Mark A Pollack 2005, 17-19) (Moravcsik, The Choice for
Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht
1998, 7), which focuses on state preferences and interstate agreements
and policy-making through bargaining. Liberal intergovernmentalism is
a very critical theory for understanding integration, as best described by
Andrew Moravcsik in his Choice for Europe. Moreover, it is a perfect op-
ponent to neofunctionalism, as it can explain a different side of Brexit
altogether, as opposed to just a one-sided view with neofunctionalism.
Several other theories exist though, one of which is Constructivism,

which criticizes mainstream theories and puts an emphasis on ideas,
norms, and identities, which determine policymaking. Key theorists are
Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler and Fierke, who apply constructivism
in the most appropriate way. As a rather new theory, Constructivism was
picked for this thesis due to its more novel population, identity and idea-
oriented approach towards policy-making and in essence, European in-
tegration, saying that decision-making at the top is influenced by think-
ing and ideas from the bottom (Fierke 2013, 188-189) (Adler 2013, 114)
(Wendt 1999, 1-2).
Another strand of literature that is important in this context is the history

of the UK’s relations and its integration history with the European Union
(Geddes 2004, 57-93), which describes the rocky accession and relation-
ship between the aforementioned parties and their often contrasting vi-
sions of Europe, as both the UK and EU have had often a different plan in
mind for the continuing European project (Geddes 2004, 5-8), as evi-
denced by Brexit itself, which is a result of this dissonance (Glencross
2016). Historical perspectives are important, as evidenced by literature
discussing al of the steps taken to achieve their explanation of the Euro-
pean integration theories. Likewise, when it comes to Brexit, authors
14
often arrive at the conclusion that history can be a powerful explanation

of the realities of Brexit (Grin 2019).
Similarly, other literature focusing on the case of Britain and its vision
of Europe identifies the main possible theories behind those visions and
the result of Brexit (Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks 2019) (Mads Dagnis
Jensen, Jesper Dahl Kelstrup 2019), such as liberal intergovernmental-
ism and neofunctionalism (Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks 2019, 1114-
1118), but also other possible models that could explain Brexit, such as
the rational choice, identity, bureaucratic or other models (Mads Dagnis
Jensen, Jesper Dahl Kelstrup 2019, 30-31); which also similarly draw
from theories such as neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism, but
present them in the context of a much larger network of causes. Further
literature discusses the realities and dynamics of Brexit within Euro-
pean integration theory, putting emphasis on theories such as post-
functionalism, which they see as the most influential, due to its focus on
mass politics (Czech Sławomir, Monika Krakowiak-Drzewiecka 2019,
598). Best written by Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, “Post functional-
ism has the greatest leverage in explaining the origins, course, and effects
of the UK referendum on EU membership. It provides a nuanced under-
standing of the rise of national identity, the clash between nationalism
and international governance, and the effects on EU politics”. (Liesbet
Hooghe, Gary Marks 2019, 1124)
However, on the contrary to the other presented literature and the latter
mentioned post-functionalism, this thesis presupposes that constructiv-
ism can be used as a better explanation for Brexit, as in itself it is a fairly
new theory, thus only a fracture of academic work mentions it in relation
to Britain or Brexit itself (Dunin-Wasowicz, London School of Economics
2017) or more contemporary studies of individuals and academics
(Galeeva 2016), who agree that culture and identity play a large role for
states in constructing their policies. Politics are not strictly underlined
by functionalist tendencies, as evidenced by the other mentioned theo-
ries, which is why post-functionalism emphasises the role of mass poli-
tics and identity (Czech Sławomir, Monika Krakowiak-Drzewiecka 2019,
598). On the other hand, constructivism is much more focused on identi-
ties and social interaction influencing politics (Fierke 2013, 190-191),
which is why this thesis uses it as the third explanatory theory.
15
2 Brexit and the process of European

Integration
From the perspective of this thesis and this chapter, it would be im-
possible to present a deep insight into the UK-EU relationship, thus only
a more rough/simpler description will be presented, focusing on the
question why Brexit presents such a hardship for the EU.
2.1 Brexit as a crisis of European Integration
Throughout the years the European project faced countless crises that
questioned its position in the world, its decision-making, and its future
prospects (such as the Eurozone crisis, Migrant crisis, Climate change).
(BBC News 2012) (Commission 2020) (BBC News 2016) A large quantity
of these crises had an impact on the idea of European integration, or
more precisely, the manner of integration and lead to discussions and
later reforms and new treaties. (European Parliament 2018)
Now more than ever, the idea of a united Europe is being subjected to a
tough time, as Brexit presents a potential danger to the notion, which
says that the EU cannot dissolve or disintegrate. However, Brexit throws
a wrench into this idea, as it is a possible crack, a form of disintegration
(Sampson 2017, 175-181) (Bickerton 2018, 132-137).
For the continental European Union, the idea of the disintegration of the
EU is a very stressful and scary one, as the years of European integration
decreased the chances of another war erupting in Europe, increased ben-
efits and provided a better ground for European economies to thrive,
while protecting and increasing the rights of European citizens at an un-
precedented scale (HRW 2019). Likewise, having a common currency
(Euro), free movement of goods/services/people/money, the Schengen
Area (borderless Europe) and others prove just how much of an impact
can the EU have on its member states. However, not all of these benefits
were to the liking of the UK, as it had numerous opt-outs (from Schengen,
Euro, rebate and more), which might be signs of British exceptionalism,
but the UK was not the only one with these numerous opt-outs (there is
16
also Denmark, for example). Nonetheless, despite having these opt-outs,

the UK saw the EU heading in a different direction that it wanted it to go,
hence the events leading up to the 2016 referendum.
The Brexit crisis is important, as the UK is the first sovereign state to

withdraw from the EU, creating a new precedent. It is the first and only
EU member state to have invoked Article 50, and the only member that
has left the EU. (BBC, BBC News 2020) The impacts of this can be many,
such as ideological shifts, changes in foreign policy, economic impacts,
institutional reforms or a change in the public perception. Measuring the
impact will take years, as the UK left the EU in January of 2020, so any
research would be best done after this year.
As an example of the impact, the UKs position within the EU needs to be

examined. As a large and populous state, the UK had a rather large pres-
ence and influence within European institutions. Within the European
parliament the UK had over 73 seats (third largest amount after Germany
and France). (European Parliament 2018) Likewise, the UK held promi-
nent positions within the Council, counter-balancing Germany, also hav-
ing held and having been a proponent of right-leaning conservative pol-
icies (due to the inclusion of the Conservative party and UKIP). (Grant
2016)
As for foreign policy, the UK used to be a key leader in the areas of foreign
policy and defence, due to it having one of the largest militaries within
the EU (with significant soft and hard power capabilities). Without the
UK, the EU foreign policy can become less powerful and more inclined to
foreign aggression and influence. (Grant 2016) However, since the UK
was against a common European defence cooperation (it saw it as a com-
petitor to NATO), the EU can set itself to create a European army (as it
sees the UK, the US and other countries shifting their policies to be more
isolationist). (Henley 2017)
Of course, not every state is lamenting the withdrawal of the UK from the
EU, such as Scotland, in which the First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Stur-
geon, is now hopeful of a new independence referendum, as she sees
Scotland better off without the UK inside the EU (If it gets accepted)
(Zalan 2020). Other states such as France and Germany lament the loss
17
of a great partner in the EU, saying that Brexit is an alarm bell for the EU,
saying that the people need more Europe, signalling an interest in a
closer cooperation after Brexit (Daniel Boffey, Jennifer Rankin 2020).
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, Brexit presents a critical juncture

in international politics and European integration, representing another
crisis of large proportions, possibly influencing the future of the Euro-
pean Union going forward.
18
3 Liberal Intergovernmentalism
For the purposes of this thesis, the theory of liberal intergovernmen-

talism was chosen as the best possible explanatory tool, due to it being
specifically related to European integration.
3.1 About Liberal Intergovernmentalism
Intergovernmentalism in the context of European integration theory

is one of the leading explanatory theories of European integration and
governance, specifically liberal intergovernmentalism, which states that
national interests have a privileged role in explaining the conduct of
states. The theory relies on the assumption that sovereignty rests with
the EU’s member states but delegating pieces of their sovereignty into
shared institutions at the European level might be in their best interests,
so that cooperation might work more effectively. (Moravcsik, The Choice
for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht
1998, 7-8)
To put it more simply, liberal intergovernmentalism says that European

integration happens, because national state’s search for mutually advan-
tageous bargains, resulting in integration as the outcome of cooperation
and competition among national governments. This presents a more re-
alistic perspective, as opposed to neofunctionalism (Liesbet Hooghe,
Gary Marks 2019, 1115).
3.2 Brexit and Liberal Intergovernmentalism
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, this thesis uses the now
well-known theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, which has been
commonly used to explain the rationale behind European integration,
and since Brexit is a part of and consequence of integration, LI can offer
some much needed insight.
19
According to the principles of LI, integration is a result of intergovern-

mental bargaining, saying that states act according to domestic interests
(result of the competition of various interests groups at the domestic
level, who compete in order to influence national preference formation)
(Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from
Messina to Maastricht 1998, 22). As a result of the domestic struggle,
governments go on to represent these national preferences at the level
of intergovernmental bargaining. If the result of bargaining was not in
accordance to the particular states’ preference (or it seeks compliance),
it would transfer some sovereignty to the supranational level to enforce
some sort of compliance. (Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social
Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 1998, 20)
However, what needs to be said is that in the case of Brexit, liberal inter-
governmentalism is unable to fully account for national preferences, as
it cannot rationalize the UK leaving the EU and the government’s prefer-
ence for a ‘hard’ Brexit, since Brexit will affect the economy a lot, since it
will certainly affect businesses, groups and people, whose interests lay
in the commercial sector. (SCHIMMELFENNIG 2018, 1591-1592) These
interest groups are the ones, who should determine state preferences,
but the state preferences contradict them. (SCHIMMELFENNIG 2018,
1589)
The Remain campaign did focus on the economic question, saying that
the UK would be in a worse position, effectively undermining its econ-
omy and international bargaining power (Glencross 2016, 41), but this
argument failed to convince people, as they were more in favour of the
Leave campaign’s rhetoric regarding self-determination, identity issues
(which is an example that the constructivist model can explain best), and
the greatest issue of all, immigration (Glencross 2016, 43- 45).
LI is not able to fully assess the backdrop of Brexit, but it can nearly per-
fectly explain the state of post-Brexit negotiations, especially with re-
gards to the interstate bargaining process between the UK and the EU.
Since LI argues for the importance of national preferences, these prefer-

ences should then be dependent on a state’s economic relations with the
UK. States such as Ireland, France or Germany have various economic
20
interests, and in the case of Ireland, even political and security reasons
(due to the Good Friday agreement) (BBC 2018). Based on the difference
in the level of interests, states should opt for a ‘soft’ Brexit, or in the case
of a ‘hard’ Brexit they should make agreements independently of the
other states’ interest, yet these countries have made a strong case for
unity within the EU, as they continue to support the EU itself in making
deals with the UK, making a case against Brexit being the start of the EU’s
disintegration. (SCHIMMELFENNIG 2018, 1589)
There are many examples of a unified European response, like in the case
of Ireland, as it has the same position as the EU, because it rejects any
hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, effectively un-
dermining the UKs preference for strong border controls, and placing its
idea of being completely sovereign and independent into jeopardy. (Lisa
O'Carroll 2020) Germany, despite its interests in keeping access to the
UK market has made it clear that the common EU position is also its own.
(Wishart 2017) (SCHIMMELFENNIG 2018, 1589)
These examples show the common interests of EU members, who opt to

support the EU and the integrity of the single market, as the MS’s benefits
from the single market outweigh any sort of bonuses they would gain
from independent trade deals with the UK. Also, due to the size of the EU
and its single market, the EU enjoys a superior bargaining position in the
negotiations with the UK, since the UK exports more to the EU than the
EU does to the UK (approx. 44% against approx. 7%). (Office for National
Statistics 2016) Hence the UK will be hurt more economically due to
Brexit than the EU in this regard.
Furthermore, the Article 50 negotiations favour the EU too, as the UK

needs to negotiate with the whole of the EU, which makes the EU unity
and bargaining power even stronger. Likewise, the withdrawal agree-
ment and any sort of change in the negotiations requires the unanimous
consent of the member states, leaving the UK to deal with a huge block of
countries, making its position weak in the process of interstate bargain-
ing. (Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks 2019, 1123) Most of the current deals
reached in the bargaining process (of the withdrawal agreement) reflect
the LI expectations, with the agreements favouring the EU’s stronger po-
sition. (SCHIMMELFENNIG 2018, 1590-1591)
21
In the end, even If liberal intergovernmentalism is unable to explain the

lower level of domestic bargains and national preferences, it can explain
the second level of interstate bargaining, as the post-Brexit negotiations
have all mostly gone according to the theory’s substance.
22
4 Neofunctionalism
4.1 About neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalism, as opposed to the original idea of functionalism,

designates a more levelled approach to functional spill-over, presents
the theory as more of a framework, and overlays it on top of European
integration.
Neofunctionalism presents states as arenas, in which societal actors are

engaged to realize their interests. International politics are not seen as a
game, but rather as an interplay of societal actors. If the societal groups
within the states see that supranational institutions are more promising
than national ones in achieving their interests, then further integration
will happen (Haas 1958, XIV).
Shortly, interest groups lobby national governments and become inter-

national actors, pressuring the government to take part in functional
agencies, which in the long run will spill over beyond the states’ control.
National groups will reinvent themselves on a regional level and policy
makers will try to seek regional, rather than national solutions to their
problems, due to an ever increasing network of rules and organizations
binding member governments, paving to way for more supranational in-
stitutions (Haas 1958, XX-XXIV).
4.2 Brexit and neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalism in the case of Brexit can be apparent in many in-

stances. As described in the previous sub-chapter, neofunctionalism is an
advocate for deeper regional governance, thus it champions integration.
Neofunctionalism places a larger emphasis on economic interdepend-

ence, which in turn drives forward integration. (Liesbet Hooghe, Gary
Marks 2019, 1123) In 2016 nearly 43.4% of UK exports went to the EU,
while 53.3% of imports came from the EU itself. (Office for National
Statistics 2016) Thus, in the case of economic disruption, the UK’s
23
economy would hurt a lot. Furthermore, the cost of exiting the EU for the
UK is enormous, which is why it wanted a transition period of one year,
so it could negotiate specific deals with the EU to soften the blow of the
withdrawal on the economy, as the economies of the UK and the EU were
very intertwined. Likewise, during this transitional period, the UK is still
be under EU jurisdiction for a while. (Edgington 2020)
As opposed to liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism sees in-

terdependence, supranational rules and institutions as tools that
strengthen EU unity in the face of Brexit, and not as tools that drive in-
terstate bargains. Furthermore, the common preference of the EU to pre-
serve the single market provides a further blow to the UK, as states are
more invested into their relations with the EU than the UK.
(SCHIMMELFENNIG 2018, 1591)
According to Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, “The threat of economic

disruption serves as a mighty disincentive for a hard Brexit. Beyond this,
neofunctionalism highlights the cost of an exit that ruptures decades-long
EU rule making and adjudication,” (Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks 2019,
1123) Neofunctionalism assumes that the costs of exiting sectors and
areas that are interdependent come with high costs (Cavlak 2019, 71-
76), as evidenced by both Theresa May and Boris Johnson’s Brexit
plans, which according to Marks and Hooghe, “…induced the UK govern-
ment to make a desperate plea for a transition period after March 2019,
most recently set at twenty-one months, to allow the country to set up its
own regulatory machinery. However, there are neofunctionalist grounds
to expect that the UK will be extensively subject to EU rules and European
Court of Justice rulings for the foreseeable future.” (Liesbet Hooghe, Gary
Marks 2019, 1123) What this means is that despite the UK wanting to
exit as soon as possible, the country will still be under EU jurisdiction
and legislation, since it takes time to negotiate future relations and an
exit strategy beneficial both to the UK and the EU.
As for what the costs themselves might be, Hakan Cavlak has some inter-
esting perspectives. According to him, the negotiations take so much
time because of the spill over effect, which should take a while to reverse.
(Cavlak 2019, 71) He also writes that “The externalities and spill-over ef-
fect influence the economic sectors, demographic structure, traditional
family structure, bureaucratic/politic structure, economic sectors. This
24
unevenness and complexity cannot be reversed by a single referendum or a

short-term disintegration process. Britain has to embark a costly workload
and a long-term transition period that has many uncertainties.“ (Cavlak
2019, 75)
As evidence of all of these, Cavlak points out the issue of Northern Ireland
and its relations with both the UK and the Republic of Ireland (in the EU).
Neofunctionalism and the effects of spill over show themselves in this
region in a large manner, due to the debate surrounding regulations and
non-tariff barriers. As Cavlak put it, “The soft Brexit and hard Brexit dis-
cussions take place at this point. The United Kingdom desires to end the
free movement of people to prevent illegal immigration. On the other hand,
the free movement of labour is an inseparable part of the Single Market for
Brussels. The goods and services of Britain will face non-tariff barriers at
border of the EU which is a largest market for Britain’s economy.” (Cavlak
2019, 71) For sure, Northern Ireland represents the only external land
border between the EU and the UK, accounting for perhaps the largest
headache of Brexit negotiations1. This headache concerns itself with
many matters, such as the fact that the existence of a hard border would
be detrimental to the economic wellbeing of NI, as it relies on the exist-
ence of the four freedoms of the single market (and no border is also a
stipulation of the Good Friday agreement, which ended the Troubles).
(BBC 2018) The impact on the agricultural sector is also important, as
that is subject to EU laws, and NI lands are also economically and physi-
cally attached to the Irish ones (not mentioning the amount of EU subsi-
dies NI farmers receive from the EU). (Cavlak 2019, 75)
Cavlak also discusses the impact of Brexit on the UK’s institutions, such
as DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), which
according to Cavlak will be the institution most impacted by Brexit and
the costs surrounding it since, “DEFRA’s scope of authority has always
been at the centre of European integration discussion as issues within DE-
FRA’s scope have been difficult to be integrated as well as hard to be
1 For a detailed in-depth explanation, I recommend reading this article by Jen Kirby,
which explains most of the issues surrounding the Irish border.
https://www.vox.com/world/2019/2/18/18204269/brexit-irish-border-ba-
ckstop-explained, accessed 03.05.2020
25
dispersed. DEFRA’s possible breakdown at Brexit process would create sev-

eral risks for critical issues such as public health, food security and national
economy for Britain.“ (Cavlak 2019, 72) DEFRA is indeed a very im-
portant institution, as it in itself has to reach agreements with both EU
and non-EU countries on over 1400 health certificates, and this is just
one institution. (The Parliament of the UK 2018) The rest will need to
negotiate on their own behalf too.
There could also be a discussion about how the restriction of the free
movement of people between Ireland and Northern Ireland might impact
the British economy, or how Brexit revives issues that would be of no
particular concern, such as the case of Scottish independence. In Scot-
land, the EU institutions have been an integral part of the working of the
state (with the EU funding many Scottish initiatives) (Goodier 2018), and
thus the workings of the Scottish institutions and government have been
more in line with the EU’s. This was a result of integration, which im-
pacted Scotland through the spill-over effect. The benefits of the EU
membership led Scotland to vote in favour of remain (both in the Scottish
and Brexit referendums), signalling how integrated Scotland was with
the EU, despite already being part of a larger state (the UK). (Cavlak
2019, 74)Thus, the talks of Scottish independence began again, as the
country would rather remain in the EU, than outside of it with the UK,
showcasing the gradual shift of loyalty towards supranational institu-
tions, which citizens see as better alternatives and more beneficial than
the national ones (Carrell 2020) (Haas 1958, xiv)
However, another key academic of neofunctionalism, Philip Schmitter,

argues that the opposite of spill-over, called spill-back can also perhaps
be predicted by neofunctionalism. According to him, “A spill-back is
when member states no longer wish to deal with a policy at the suprana-
tional level, e.g. the collapse of the Euro or MS’ exits from the Eurozone or
even the EU - be they coerced (e.g. Grexit) or voluntary (e.g. Brexit). Such
“spill-backs” are fervently advocated by parties on the radical left and
right (albeit for different reasons) in both debtor and creditor states.”
(Philippe C. Schmitter 2015) In this case Brexit is an evidence of volun-
tary spill-back, as a sort of negative reaction to European integration
and the externalities surrounding it. Even though spill-back is
26
voluntary, it is still costly to the country employing it, further underlin-

ing the costs of retracting from interdependence and spill over.
27
5 Constructivism
5.1 About constructivism
As a rather novel theory, constructivism stipulates that many aspects

of international relations (in this case European integration) are histori-
cally and socially constructed, created by social practice and interaction
(Wendt 1999, 1-2). In short, ideas, interests and identities of individuals
influence politics, which means that just like social interaction does it be-
tween individuals, so does social interaction between states shift inter-
national politics.
According to some scholars (even constructivists themselves) the pro-

cess of social construction and the modern notions of constructivism in
international relations are not in line with the original theory, because
modern IR constructivists have abandoned many teachings of the origi-
nal theory by connecting this school of thought with other theories of in-
ternational relations, to pursue a more empirical and scientific approach
in order to be taken more seriously by the academic community.
(Checkel 2004)
Constructivism in itself represents a different vision of politics, and in the

case of European integration, it can explain the various shifting attitudes
of citizens, and from that politicians and states themselves (together
with the media and the rest that interacts with ideas/identities), with
Brexit being an obvious example of changing attitudes towards EU and
integration, due to societal change and an underlying misperception of
the UKs own identity, which has influenced the direction of British policy
for a while. (Brinkley 1990) (Tunzelmann 2019)
28
5.2 Brexit and constructivism
The national interests of Britain or the EU are shaped by who they

think they are and what role they think they should play in the world.
Thus, for constructivists, any understanding of Brexit requires an expla-
nation of the way in which the UK and the EU construct their identities,
and how these play out against each other. Britain’s self-image of itself
as a great power is important, as this represents an identity crisis, which
can be used to explain its decisions and approach to UK-EU relations and
Brexit. (Dunin-Wasowicz, London School of Economics 2017)
Just as much as Britain’s, so is the EU’s self-image important, especially

with regards to the future of European integration, because the EU needs
to show a unified image not just to the UK, but also towards the rest of
the world. The question might be, whether the idea and image of Europe
presented by the UK (independent of a larger supranational system)
(Rajeev Syal 2020) differs and is better than the idea which the Union
presents (a unified interdependent and shared Europe). (European
Union 2020)
5.2.1 The UK’s identity crisis

Nowadays being a smaller island country, located as always off the
shores of the European continent, the UK, and its many smaller territo-
ries around the world, represent just a small chunk of a long imploded
but not forgotten empire.
Thus, the United Kingdom’s identity is contested (Geddes 2004, 26-29),

as it still sees itself as a much larger power than it is today. Even though
the days of the empire are over, the UK seeks the status of a great
power, capable of influencing politics worldwide (sort of like a
hegemon), which it is not capable of. (Geddes 2004, 72-73) Best de-
scribed by Dean Acheson in his speech at a US military academy in
1962: “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role. The
attempt to play a separate power role — that is, a role apart from Eu-
rope, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, a role
based on being head of a ‘commonwealth’ which has no political struc-
ture, or unity, or strength — this role is about played out. Great Britain,
29
attempting to be a broker between the United States and Russia, has

seemed to conduct policy as weak as its military power.” (Brinkley 1990)
The above-mentioned speech is an accurate description of the UK’s

standing during the Cold War. It was willing to act and talk like a big em-
pire, but the reality was quite different. Indeed, the UK was a victor of the
2nd World War, it had the background of an empire, it stood on the fringes
of the European continent…which all influenced and still influence Brit-
ish politics to this day. (Tunzelmann 2019)
The idea of a strong country with rich history played into the behaviour
of the UK, as it was often unwilling to commit itself to causes, which
would lessen its role in the world (unwillingness to join the European
Communities at first or Schengen, opposition to a European defence co-
operation and more) (Geddes 2004, 2-3,156) and it tried to have its own
way in many cases, such as how the European cooperation worked, often
going for opt-outs during the creation of European treaties (since it saw
the new treaties as having a negative impact on its sovereignty, so the UK
would rather go its own way). (Geddes 2004, 18-19)
Certainly not supported by some media’s disapproval of the EU (largely

well-sold British conservative tabloids such as the Sun, Daily Mail, Daily
Mirror and more), who have been criticising the workings of the Union
for some time (special case is the 1975 referendum, which saw the
media’s support for remain), vilifying it and contributing to the fact that
those, who might have next to no knowledge of European affairs
automatically perceive the Union as a negative super-state that meddles
in the UK’s own affairs. (Glencross 2016, 40)
The perception in the UK was that the EU was often restricting its
sovereignty, imposing laws that do not benefit the UK, asking too much
from the country, forcing it to do something that was not in its best
interests (Glencross 2016, 37-41). This attitude, of course, lead to a rise
in populistic rhetoric, fueling the fire of populism more and more
(certainly not helped by the eurozone or migrant crisis), leading to
debates about national sovereignty and more (Glencross 2016, 35-37),
circling back to the problem of the UK’s identity crisis.
30
It can be argued that Brexit is a symptom and a consequence of this iden-

tity crisis, since it demonstrates the UK’s willingness to work on its own
in a world, where small countries do not have the power to protect their
interests on their own, which is why they join larger blocks (like the EU,
for example). The Leave campaign often mentioned sovereignty, taking
back control, overseeing borders, controlling immigration, more trade
deals with the world and so on. (Vote Leave 2016) This rhetoric was, of
course, more interesting to the general public (as opposed to the eco-
nomic focus of the Remain campaign (Glencross 2016, 41-45), as it in-
voked their feelings of nationalism, especially due to its emotional com-
mitment, as opposed to the economic arguments of the Remain cam-
paign. (Glencross 2016, 41-45) The citizens, largely without knowledge
of how the EU works (Hix 2015), and more aware of what the govern-
ment did (and its decades long game of cat and mouse with the EU),
fuelled by the media and their insistence on playing into the UK’s identity
crisis (in various forms) (Jones 2019), together with the Leave cam-
paign’s more nationalistic and emotional rhetoric (Vote Leave 2016),
contributed to the citizens voting in favour of Brexit.
As Fareed Zakaria wrote it in his article, Brexit marks the end of Britain’s
role as a great power (Zakaria 2019), but maybe now will be the time,
when the identity crisis will subside and the UK will finally find its role
in the world, due to being left to its own accords. This could lead to inter-
esting dynamics in the future, but those dynamics are hard to predict,
and this thesis does not concern itself with predictions of the future, but
merely with the recital of past and contemporary dynamics that influ-
ence and surround the current political climate of Brexit.
31
6 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to explain Brexit through three European
integration theories (neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism,
constructivism), by answering several key questions.
The main question of the thesis was, how can Liberal

Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism and Constructivism possibly
explain Brexit in the context of European Integration, with sub-questions
related to the aforementioned theories and their relation to Brexit.
In the case of liberal intergovernentalism, Brexit can be explained as a

result of the traditional position of the UK with regards to foreign affairs
and its own cultural and national heritage. The theory cannot properluy
explain the lower level of domestic bargains, due to the contrasting
preferences of economic actors that would be hurt by Brexit and the
government, which should act in accordance with the interests of
domestic groups, rather than identity or political preferences. This
stands in opposition to constructivism, which can aptly explain the UK’s
identity crisis and the resulting Brexit crisis better. However, liberal
intergovernmentalism is a powerful theory when explaining the current
negotiation process between the UK and the EU, since it clearly shows
just how much leverage the EU as a whole has in contrast with the UK’s
bargaining power, which is unable to negotiate independent deals with
EU countries individually, as that sort of negotiation goes against the
unified and common EU position, attesting to the fact that the more
interdependent countries are, the more they benefit from the bargaining
process.
In the case of neofunctionalism, the fall-out of Brexit will have

implications on the economic and political character of the UK, as its
states such as Scotland and Northern Ireland, who were positively
impacted by the spill over effect of integration, are proving to be major
points of discourse. In the case of Northern Ireland the border with the
Republic of Ireland is a key point of negotiations between the UK and the
EU, as it is not only important because of economic reasons, but also
because of political and social ones. Similarly, many of Scotland’s
32
programmes were funded by the EU, whose results were beneficial to the
economy, which is evidenced by the appreciation of the EU by the
Scottish people (supporting the argument of Ernst B. Haas, of a shifting
of loyalty towards supranational institutions). The impact of Brexit is
and will be felt by major institutions of the UK such as DEFRA, as each
institution needs to make separate agreements with EU and non-EU
countries, which costs not only time, but also money and manpower.
DEFRA is unprepared to deal with Brexit, and so are other institutions
and the British government, which itself called for a transitional period
to deal with the fall-out of the voluntary spill-back decision of Brexit.
As for constructivism, the identity crisis of the UK played a large role in

the decision of the citizens to vote for Brexit. The UK is still unaware of
its role in the world, blinded by its tendency to still see itself as a great
power, thus making decisions (especially foreign policy ones), which are
not accurate to its size, power and current role in the world. The citizens,
unaware of the EUs role, triggered by the Leave campaign and the UK
media’s contribution into said identity crisis, and mainly following the
government and its rhetoric, made a decision befitting a country, which
mispercieves its current position in the world.
Of course, these three theories cannot sufficiently explain all of Brexit,

due to it being a rather complex issue. There are, of course, also other
theories, which could be used as explanatory tools for Brexit, such as
Post-functionalism, which is often used as the main theory by academics
(such as Gary Mark and Liesbet Hooghe) due to its ability to describe the
origins, course and effects of Brexit (see page 15). Post-functionalism
could then probably work as a single explanatory tool, however, due to
the complexity of Brexit, a combination of more than one theory is more
apt. Nevertheless, further exploration of post-functionalism would be
interesting, as it could provide interesting data and viewpoints, which
might be missing from this thesis or from other academic and scholarly
works.
To sum it up, all of the theories explain certain parts of Brexit. Liberal
intergovenmentalism cannot properly explain the national preferences
of the UK, however with inclusion of constructivism, it can be said that
the UK was and is in a deep identity crisis, which saw the government
33
make the decision to follow through with Brexit. Following this,

neofunctionalism explains the amount of interdependence and level of
integration of the UK, its states and the EU, wich make it hard for the UK
to have leverage in the negotiations after Brexit, as the UK would lose
more than it would gain, thus playing into the ideas of liberal
intergovernmentalism, which perfectly explains the power of both the
UK and the EU in the negotiations following Brexit. All of the theories
make an important contribution, even supporting each other by
explaining the parts, where one theory might be lacking.
34
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LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
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Brexit in European Integration Theory: Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism and Constructivism

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FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Supervisor: Mgr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Ph.D.

Department of International Relations and European

Author: Mark Szabo

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Bachelor's Thesis

In Brno 14 May 2020

List of Terms and Acronyms 5

2 Brexit and the process of European Integration 16

List of Terms and Acronyms

Brexit – the process of the withdrawal of the United

1.1 UK as an awkward partner

The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) membership in the EU has been a hotly

the Labour and Conservative party. Formerly pro-European (at least

Nevertheless, the so-called ‘awkward relationship’ between the UK and

Creating a new precedent, Brexit is viewed differently either

1.2 European integration theories

The reason why the theories (liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunc-

On the other hand, intergovernmentalism is a theory that is sort of con-

A more modern theory, Constructivism, says that significant aspects of

1.3 Methodology, goals, and research questions

For the analysis and explanation of Brexit in European Integration

An important aspect of the methodology will bet the usage of various

1.3.1 Goal of the thesis

1.3.2 Research questions

How can Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism and

• DINAN, Desmond. Ever closer Union: an introduction to European inte-

• Theories of international relations. Edited by Scott Burchill. 5th ed. New

• Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks. „Grand theories of European integration in

1.4 Literature review

The literature on European Integration has been mainly focused on

By contrast, the other big influential theory is intergovernmentalism, and

Several other theories exist though, one of which is Constructivism,

Another strand of literature that is important in this context is the history

often arrive at the conclusion that history can be a powerful explanation

2 Brexit and the process of European

2.1 Brexit as a crisis of European Integration

also Denmark, for example). Nonetheless, despite having these opt-outs,

The Brexit crisis is important, as the UK is the first sovereign state to

As an example of the impact, the UKs position within the EU needs to be

Due to the above-mentioned reasons, Brexit presents a critical juncture

For the purposes of this thesis, the theory of liberal intergovernmen-

3.1 About Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism in the context of European integration theory

To put it more simply, liberal intergovernmentalism says that European

3.2 Brexit and Liberal Intergovernmentalism

According to the principles of LI, integration is a result of intergovern-

Since LI argues for the importance of national preferences, these prefer-

These examples show the common interests of EU members, who opt to

Furthermore, the Article 50 negotiations favour the EU too, as the UK

In the end, even If liberal intergovernmentalism is unable to explain the

4.1 About neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism, as opposed to the original idea of functionalism,

Neofunctionalism presents states as arenas, in which societal actors are

Shortly, interest groups lobby national governments and become inter-

4.2 Brexit and neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism in the case of Brexit can be apparent in many in-

Neofunctionalism places a larger emphasis on economic interdepend-

As opposed to liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism sees in-

According to Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, “The threat of economic

unevenness and complexity cannot be reversed by a single referendum or a

dispersed. DEFRA’s possible breakdown at Brexit process would create sev-

However, another key academic of neofunctionalism, Philip Schmitter,