Political Underpinnings and Propaganda:

A Critique on Means with no ends: What it’s like in the Duterte Regime

The paper entitled, “Means with no ends: What it’s like in the Duterte Regime,” examines
the Machiavellian practices executed by President Rodrigo Duterte, but rejects the idea of
considering Duterte as a Machiavellian leader. It emphasized that the growing hatred amongst the
Filipino masses will eventually topple the administration and end Duterte’s borderline autocratic
regime, and underscored the greater power of the citizens over a tyrant through the exercise of
their democratic rights such as the elections.
While the paper is able to provide reasonable insights on Duterte’s Machiavellian ideas, it
fell short in enumerating the political tactics and propaganda of the regime to ensure relatively
strong public support and stay in power as of writing, and lacked in justifications of some of its
arguments and propositions. This work will serve as an attempt to dissect the abovementioned
paper, and affirm its strong points while at the same time, try to contribute to arguments that
demand further developments in thought and explication.

Revealing the Machiavelli in Duterte

The paper drew some of its strongest points in pointing out the manifestations of
Machiavellian ideas in the political actions of Duterte. He established his popularity by likening
his presidential conduct to that of an ordinary Filipino citizen. He rejected formalities and decorum
to pose himself as a politician without pretense as compared to his rival elites whom he regarded
as phony. It resembles the Machiavellian principle to gain the favor of the people and the masses,
rather than form alliances with the few elites1.
His Machiavellian brand rests on his successful persuasion of the people that violence and
even extralegal means are needed to resolve the looming criminality in the country. Indeed,
whatever means is justified if it is intended for noble ends. It is also agreeable that Duterte’s
consolidation of power in congress by appointing his political allies and cronies is a manifestation
of embodying Machiavellian practices.

Certain Problematic Ideas

Despite these agreeable points, the paper stated some ideas that can be quite misleading,
and may demand further clarifications and/or revisions.
In the early part of the paper, it was indicated that Duterte's shift in power from mayor to
president is rather drastic and speedy. It led the author to think "...how the sudden shift in power
could corrupt one's will to serve.2" This can come off as problematic as it sounds to be presuming
that Duterte's intentions were good before holding office, and that it is his position in office that
corrupted him. While the idea that “power corrupts a man” holds true, it is still undeniable that
Duterte already had his own political agendas before even confirming his candidacy. Analysts
even claim that the delay in his filing of candidacy is purposeful to lessen the time and
opportunities of journalists to investigate on his background, given the discrepancies of his

1. Alissa Ardito. “Here’s what Machiavelli would have to say about the Republican primaries,” The Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/04/heres-what-machiavelli-would-have-to-say-about-the-republican-primaries/
(accessed October 6, 2020).
2. (n.a.), Means with no ends: What it’s like in the Duterte Regime, 1.
involvement with the Davao Death Squad (DDS)—a notorious group in Davao known for its
vigilante style of killings3.
The paper should pay closer attention on how it phrased its ideas. Another one of its
misleading points is how it distinguished Duterte as "...far from the traditional politicians 4." The
concept of trapo, derived from "traditional politicians" has developed overtime because of its
continuing prevalence in the political scene. It refers to politicians who "...makes false promises,
uses money to buy votes, and perpetuates himself in power5." These very actions are what make
Duterte a trapo himself. Perhaps if the author's intention is to contrast Duterte's unprofessionalism
with other politicians' diplomacies, it would be better to describe the latter as "conventional," not
"traditional" to avoid misinterpretations from connotative meanings of trapo.
Moreover, Duterte’s domination in congress is carried out through the appointment of his
political allies. But such alliance is not formed with the bond of trust, as the paper claims Duterte
appointed officials whom “…he can fully trust.6” It is not trust that flourishes Duterte’s—or
perhaps any other politicians’—alliances; rather common political ambitions and interests. The
loyalty within his alliances is there, seen through the way he grants impunity to his political friends.
But it is too far of a stretch to claim that he fully trusts those who side with him.

Support to the Administration

The paper denied Duterte’s qualification as a Machiavellian leader because of the hatred
he earned from the people. It claimed that his once sturdy stronghold has “…greatly weakened”
due to people’s discontent with the still ongoing war-on-drugs operations, and the incompetent
and delayed response of the government to the pandemic7. This is in contrast to what is actually
reported in the SWS ratings that disclosed a spike in Duterte’s satisfaction ratings amidst the
pandemic8. There is not much evidence to back the decline of the Duterte administration in terms
of public support despite opposing mobilizations and rallies.
The author claimed that before elections and during the early days of Duterte’s presidency,
people were still in support of the government because of the security guaranteed by the president’s
ruthlessness to drugs and crime. While, people’s support eventually turned to disdain and dismay
from the unjustified killings and lack of assistance amidst the pandemic. With this, the paper
seemingly claims that people’s support or opposition to the government is solely linked to the
performance and service they witness from it. However, as is established by the recent satisfaction
ratings, Duterte is still favored by the majority despite his blatant disregard of human rights,
transparent governance, and responsiveness in the middle of a crisis.
This marks the shortcoming of the paper to explore the reasons why Duterte remains
popular and favored by the majority. Instead of establishing a dichotomous perspective on people’s
support or opposition to the government, the paper could have focused on unravelling why public
opinion can be faulty in the face of massive propaganda. Duterte has always been averse to the
traditional media as seen in the recent shutdown of ABS-CBN, and his attacks and restrictions

3. David G. Timberman, “Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091 (accessed October 29, 2020).
4. Means with no ends: What it’s like in the Duterte Regime, 1.
5. (n.a.), “How would you define a 'traditional politician'?” PhilStar, https://www.philstar.com/inbox-world/2010/03/01/553485/how-
would-you-define-traditional-politician (accessed October 29, 2020).
6. Means with no ends: What it’s like in the Duterte Regime, 3.
7. Means with no ends: What it’s like in the Duterte Regime, 3.
8. Andreo Calonzo, “Duterte’s Trust Rating Rises to 91% Amid Region’s Worst Outbreak,” Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-05/duterte-s-trust-rating-rises-to-91-amid-region-s-worst-outbreak (accessed October 29,
2020).
imposed on journalists—especially of Rappler—from coverage of national events. Instead, he is
known to weaponize Facebook where his army of minions set out to proliferate false information,
tales of historical revisionism, and self-vested news agendas9. To a common Filipino citizen, who
does not have the time nor intellectual discernment to see through the deception, s/he will be led
to believe that the administration continuously looks out for the welfare of the public. This is how
propaganda can bend people’s agency, political beliefs, and the public opinion at large.
Hence, a person’s political stance is not wholly autonomous for it will always be influenced
by the propaganda and political marketing that operates within the society. The paper should have
acknowledged this because the political participation of the masses is crucial in the context of a
democratic, republican country, predisposing the government to execute deceiving tactics and
strategies to sow public support.

Tying loose ends

Towards the end, the paper reiterated the greater power of the people to appoint leaders
and oust dictators as attested by the nation’s progress from the dark days of Martial Law. While it
is invigorating and empowering in some sense, it lacks in the justification as to how a tyrannical
regime can actually collapse. Duterte has been repressing and oppressing the public by killing
activists and critics, censoring the media, and depriving right to due process. It can be too
presumptuous to simply state that since the Philippines ousted a dictator in the past, it can simply
oust another one given a highly segment population.
The paper could have delved in the unsustainability of the Machiavellian approach to
governance which is to subject people under fear. This can be linked to the eventual collapse of
populist leaderships as exhibited by Duterte. It is said that administrations patterned from a
populist approach is doomed to eventually collapse as “…growth eventually sputters and the costs
associated with populist policies lead to debt-related challenges…” and eventually, the ignition of
a revolution from the masses10.”
Another is the failure to address the institutional weaknesses of free elections, especially
in the Philippines. The electoral system is already riddled with cheats and discrepancies11. Reliance
on the exercise of democratic right to vote is simply not enough to break away from a borderline
autocratic regime. So it is reconciling enough that the paper is able to state the people’s capacity
in ousting a dictator while insinuating revolutionary tendencies.
In general, the paper was able to provide sufficient insights to reveal the Machiavellian
practices of Duterte, yet establish that Duterte does not qualify as a Machiavellian president.
However, it could have pondered deeper upon the reasons to support its claim through statistics,
political theories, empirical predictions, and critical analysis of sociopolitical phenomena such as
propaganda.

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9. John Sy, “Duterte and FB Live: Encoding Spectacles and Propaganda,” Asian Politics & Policy 11 (March 2019): 1-3,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332041422_Duterte_and_FB_Live_Encoding_Spectacles_and_Propaganda (accessed October 29,
2020).
10. Ronald U. Mendoza., and Leonardo M. Jaminola. “Is Duterte a Populist? Rhetoric vs. Reality,” CIRSD,
https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2020-issue-no-15/is-duterte-a-populist-rhetoric-vs-reality (accessed October 29, 2020).
11. Susan Price, “Philippines: Election ‘one of the dirtiest in decades’,” Green Left, https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/philippines-
election-dirtiest-decades (accessed October 29, 2020).
Bibliography

Ardito, Alissa. “Here’s what Machiavelli would have to say about the Republican primaries,”
The Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/04/heres-what-machiavelli-
would-have-to-say-about-the-republican-primaries/ (accessed October 29, 2020).

Calonzo, Andreo. “Duterte’s Trust Rating Rises to 91% Amid Region’s Worst Outbreak,”
Bloomberg.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-05/duterte-s-trust-rating-rises-to-91-amid-
region-s-worst-outbreak (accessed October 29, 2020).

Mendoza, Ronald U., and Jaminola, Leonardo M. “Is Duterte a Populist? Rhetoric vs. Reality.”
CIRSD.
https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2020-issue-no-15/is-duterte-a-populist-
rhetoric-vs-reality (accessed October 29, 2020).

Price, Susan. “Philippines: Election ‘one of the dirtiest in decades’,” Green Left.
https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/philippines-election-dirtiest-decades (accessed October
29, 2020).

Sy, John. “Duterte and FB Live: Encoding Spectacles and Propaganda,” Asian Politics & Policy
11 (March 2019): 1-3.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332041422_Duterte_and_FB_Live_Encoding_Spect
acles_and_Propaganda (accessed October 29, 2020).

Timberman, David. “Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment,” Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-
assessment-pub-78091 (accessed October 29, 2020).

(n.a.). “How would you define a 'traditional politician'?” PhilStar

https://www.philstar.com/inbox-world/2010/03/01/553485/how-would-you-define-traditional-
politician (accessed October 29, 2020).

(n.a.). “Means with no ends: What it’s like in the Duterte Regime,” 1-3.

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