MODULE 1

JURISDICTION
(Three Hours)

Lesson outline:
1) What are the distinctions between: (1) original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction; (2)
general jurisdiction and special or limited jurisdiction; (3) exclusive jurisdiction and
concurrent jurisdiction?
2) What determines jurisdiction of courts?
3) What is meant by doctrine of hierarchy of courts; continuity of jurisdiction (also known
as adherence to jurisdiction); primary jurisdiction?
4) Over what civil actions does the municipal trial court have jurisdiction?
5) Over what civil actions does the regional trial court have jurisdiction?
6) How may the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the parties; over the subject matter;
and, over the res or the property in litigation?
7) What cases are considered small claims cases?

Readings:

a) Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29

FACTS:
Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a
counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the
plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of
execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied,
appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed the appealed
decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI
Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition
for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred
the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE:
WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first
time upon appeal. YES

RATIO:
SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost
fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed
or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after
voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late
for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its
motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary
hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which
ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question
is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and
regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or
summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to
interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case
at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when
the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in
court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a
period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without
filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived
of its day in court.
The orders appealed from are affirmed.

b) Mercado v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719

FACTS:
(1) CIVIL CASE NO. TM-223: Herein petitioners - The MERCADO (siblings) filed an action for
partition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cavite Br. 1 against the SAMONTE siblings. The
defendants filed their answer to the complaint thru their counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine.
(2) CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Since no appeal was made by any of the
defendants, the decision became final and executory, then the trial court issued the
corresponding writ of execution.
(3) Before the writ of execution could be carried out, the defendants filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus seeking to annul the writ of execution. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit.
(4) CIVIL CASE NO. C-2442: Respondent Lucina and Trinidad Samonte filed an action before
the CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the judgment rendered by the trial court on CIVIL CASE
NO. TM-223, alleging that they did not authorize anyone including Atty. Pine to represent them
in said case. Petitioner’s motion to dismiss was denied.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not a CFI or a branch thereof has the authority to annul a final and executory
judgment rendered by another branch of the same court?
(2) Whether or not Atty. Pine is duly authorized to represent petitioner in the case at bar?

HELD: Petition is granted and respondent judge of the CFI or Rizal is ordered to dismiss Civil
Case No. 2442.

RATIO:
(1) BP 129 enacted August 10, 1982, transferred jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgment to the Court of Appeals. Although the prevailing rule before the enactment of BP 129
was that the CFI and their branches have jurisdiction to annul each other’s final judgments.
However fundamental principles still dictate that the better policy, as a matter of comity or
courteous interaction between courts of first instance and branches thereof, the annulment of
cases to be tried by the same court or branch which heard the main action sought to be
annulled, pursuant to judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference should be regarded as
highly important in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.
(2) An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears, and no written power of attorney is required of him to appear in Court for his client.
(SEC 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court)

c) Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one
daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted
to return to her old job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home
together with their daughter and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband
filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but was
dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them and
the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas
corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it
did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE:
W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in
light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD:
Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA
cant be affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in
obtaining custody. The minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas
corpus case will be left without legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases
within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,
injustice, and contradiction. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave injustice
and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.

d) Singson v. Isabela Sawmill, G.R. No. L-27343, Feb. 28, 1979

FACTS:
In 1951, defendants entered into a contract of partnership under the firm name “Isabela
Sawmill”. In 1956 the plaintiff sold to the partnership a motor truck and two tractors. The
partnership was not able to pay their whole balance even after demand was made. One of the
partners withdrew from the partnership but instead of terminating the said partnership it was
continued by the two remaining partners under the same firm name. Plaintiffs also seek the
annulment of the assignment of right with chattel mortgage entered into by the withdrawing
partner and the remaining partners. The appellants contend that the chattel mortgage may no
longer be nullified because it had been judicially approved and said chattel mortgage had been
judicially foreclosed.

ISSUE:
Whether the withdrawal of one of the partners dissolved the partnership.

RULING:
It does not appear that the withdrawal of the partner was not published in the newspapers. The
appellees and the public in general had a right to expect that whatever, credit they extended to
the remaining partners could be enforced against the properties of the partnership. The
withdrawing partner cannot be relieved from her liability to the creditor of the partnership due
to her own fault by not insisting on the liquidation of the partnership. Though she had acted in
good faith, the appellees also acted in good faith in extending credit to the partnership. Where
one of two innocent persons must suffer, that person who gave occasion for the damages to be
caused must bear the consequences. Technically, the partnership was dissolved by the
withdrawal of one of the partners. Through her acts of entering into a memorandum with the
remaining partners misled the creditors that they were doing business with the partnership.
Hence, from the order of the lower court ordering the withdrawing partner to pay the plaintiffs,
she is thus entitled for reimbursement from the remaining partners.

e) Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013

FACTS:
Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-
105602. While on board a jeepney, Elenita's mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a conversation
with one Maura Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of said property. Believing that Maura was a
real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner's copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura.
Maura then subdivided the property into several lots under the name of Elenita and her
husband Felicisimo. Through a falsified deed of sale bearing forged signature of Elenita and
Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers, one of whom was Lorna Ong
(Lorna). Sometime in August 1990, Lorna sold the lot to Editha Padlan for P4,000. After
learning what happened, Elenita demanded Padlan to surrender possession of said land, but the
latter refused. Respondents files a case before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan and summons to
petitioner was thereafter served. On December 13, 1999, respondents moved to declare
petitioner in default and prayed that they be allowed to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner
opposed the same contending that the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over her person.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person of the
petitioner.

HELD:
The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and consequently, over the person of the
petitioner.
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time BP 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, was already amended by RA No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Section 3 of
RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession, of real property, or any interest therein which does
not exceed P20,000 or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed P50, 000. In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an
examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the
value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold in the amount of P4, 000. No tax declaration
was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. Since the amount
alleged is only P4, 000, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.

f) Huguete v. Embudo, G.R. No. 149554, July 1, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for the annulment of deed of sale and partition of the 50-
square meter portion of land against respondent spouses in the RTC. Respondent spouses filed
a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case, arguing that the action is one for annulment of title and the total assessed value of
the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC,
pursuant to Sec 33(3) of BP Blg 129, as amended by RA 7691. Petitioner spouses filed an
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that the subject matter of the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is cognizable by the RTC, as provided by Sec 19(1) of BP
129, as amended.

ISSUE: WON the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

HELD:
No. The argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation considering
that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken. What determines the
nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought (Cañiza vs CA). And in Singsong vs Isabela
Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts
of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-
square meter portion of the property which they purchased from the respondents. Their cause
of action is based on their right as purchaser of the subject land from respondents. They pray
that they be declared owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real
property or any interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was
P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction of MTC.
The annulment of the deed of sale, were prayed for in the complaint because they were
necessary before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof
may be conveyed to petitioners.

g) Quinagoran v. CA, G.R. No. 155179, Aug. 24, 2007

FACTS:
The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a complaint for recovery of a parcel of land with damages
before RTC of Cagayan against Quinagoran. Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under R.A. No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the MTC to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since
the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of
P1,730, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said
amount. The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is accion
publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the value of the
property. The CA affirmed decision of the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court
claiming that under RA 7691, the jurisdiction falls in the MTC. He likewise avers that it is an
indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the property
involved. The complaint does not alleged that the assessed value of the land in question is
more than P20,000.00. There was also no tax declaration attached to the complaint to show the
assessed value of the property. Respondents, therefore, failed to alleged that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of
the value of the property involved?
2. Whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property

HELD:
1. No. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the
RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a
distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below
P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.

Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In Atuel v. Valdez (G.R. No. 139561, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 517), the Court likewise
expressly stated that: Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general
jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction “in all
civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property.” However, if the assessed value of
the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside
of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover
possession of real property.

2. Yes. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the action
and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in
effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of
the claims asserted therein.