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Notes On Special Commercial Laws (Philippines)
Notes On Special Commercial Laws (Philippines)
Table of Contents
Topic Page
VII. PDIC 41
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Outline by Garduce, Diane M.
A. Governing Law
- RA 337, as amended by RA 8791 or The General Banking Law
of 2000 (GBL)
- RA 7653 or the New Central Bank Act (NCBA), as amended by
RA 11211
B. Nature of Business
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all been conducted in the head office. A bank and its branches and
offices shall be treated as one unit.
Facts: This case involves two foreign banks (Citibank and Bank of
America) organized and existing under the laws of the US but duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines.
They received dollar deposits from their head office and foreign
branches. These were not reported to the PDIC (as required by the PDIC
law, for insurance purposes), thus, PDIC assessed them for deficiency
premiums.
The foreign banks contend that the dollar placements from their head
office and foreign branches were not deposits covered by the PDIC law.
They postulate that for a “deposit” to exist, there must be at least two
parties – a depositor and a depository – each with a legal personality
distinct from the other. Here, there was no creditor-debtor relationship
created as regards the dollar placements from their foreign offices,
because the foreign counterparts and the respective Philippine branches
are one and the same bank. A bank cannot have a deposit with itself.
PDIC contends that the head offices and their foreign branches are
separate and independent entities. It insists that a bank’s head office and
its branches have a principal-agent relationship only if they operate in the
same jurisdiction. In the case of foreign branches, however, no such
relationship exists because the head office and said foreign branches are
deemed to be two distinct entities. PDIC asserts that under the Philippine
law treats a branch of a foreign bank as a separate and independent
banking unit.
Issue: Whether the funds placed in the Philippine branch by the head
office and foreign branches of foreign banks are insurable deposits under
the PDIC Charter.
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Here, Citibank and Bank of America both fall under the second option.
Their Philippine branches are merely branches, without a separate legal
personality from their parent companies.
Thus, being one and the same entity, the funds placed by the foreign
banks in their respective branches in the Philippines should not be
treated as deposits made by third parties subject to deposit insurance
under the PDIC Charter.
In furtherance thereof, the State shall promote and maintain a stable and
efficient banking and financial system that is:
1. globally competitive;
2. dynamic; and
3. responsive to the demands of a developing economy.
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The SEC shall not register the articles of incorporation of any bank, or
any amendment thereto, unless accompanied by a *certificate of
authority issued by the Monetary Board, under its seal.
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The SEC shall likewise not register the by-laws of any bank, or any
amendment thereto, unless accompanied by a certificate of authority
from the Bangko Sentral.
The Monetary Board may prescribe rules and regulations on the types of
stock a bank may issue, including the terms and rights, in order to
determine compliance with laws and regulations governing capital and
equity structure of banks. But banks shall only issue par value stocks.
The RTC ruled hat while the TCT should be cancelled so that Armando’s
½ share could be properly reflected, the REM’s validity should be
sustained because the bank had the right to rely on the Torrens title. The
CA agreed and held that the bank was a mortgagor in good faith.
Ruling: No. The general rule that a mortgagee in good faith need not
look beyond the face of the title does not apply to banks. Greater degree
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of care and due diligence is required because banks are imbued with
public interest.
Facts: Jao Bio Tong asked for credit accomodation from CBC, to be
secured by a land covered by a TCT.
This land was in the name of Maria Lagon, who was then living in the
US. Jao presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA). CBC granted a
P1 million credit line in his favor. Eventually his loans matured, he failed
to pay, and the bank prepared to foreclose. The Lagons were able to
obtain a TRO but their case against CBC was later dismissed by the
RTC which found the signatures on the SPA authentic.
The CA reversed the RTC, declaring the SPA and the REM void, after
finding that Jao failed to establish the due execution of the SPA because
Lagon did not personally appear during its notarization.
Issue: Were the SPA and REM valid? Was CBC a mortgagee in good
faith?
Ruling: No and no. Jao himself admitted that the SPA was not signed in
the presence of the notary public because Lagion was in the US at the
time. The notarization was therefore irregular, and the REM was
unauthorized.
The bank was not a mortgagee in good faith because it had knowledge
that Lagon was in the US yet it did not question the due execution of the
SPA. Banks are expected to exercise more care and prudence than
private individuals in their dealings, even those that involve registered
lands, because heir business is affected with public interest.
Virginia and her husband took out a loan with PNB, using the land as
security. Later, they failed to pay the loan. PNB foreclosed the mortgage.
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Spouses Jalbay went home for a vacation and learned about the
foreclosure. They filed a case against PNB, contending that the REM and
the foreclosure were invalid for lack of consent of the real registered
owners. The RTC ruled in their favor, but the CA reversed.
Ruling: Yes. The property was inspected and appraised. Careful credit
investigation on the borrowers and mortgagors was conducted. PNB
exerted the necessary diligence.
There are situations where the mortgagor’s title is fraudulent, where the
mortgagor is not the owner. But the mortgage would still be given effect
by reason of public policy. Under the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith
mortgagees dealing with property covered by a Torrens title are not
required to go beyond what appears on the title’s face. For banks, a
higher degree of diligence is required. They cannot solely rely on the
certificate of title. They must conduct ocular inspection and verify the
veracity of this title, in order to determine the real owners.
They informed Citibank and made a formal demand but the bank insisted
that the release was done upon proper verification. They then filed a
complaint against the bank. During trial, a documents examiner from
PNB testified that there was significant difference between the
questioned signature and the samples of Carmelita’s signature.
Meanwhile, Citibank’s officers testified that they followed proper
procedure. The RTC held that Citibank was negligent. The CA affirmed.
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Ruling: Yes. The release and waiver form was not notarized on the
same day. The signatures were irregular. The officer herself detected
discrepancies but she did not exercise additional precautions.
The bank had pictures of their depositors. The officer admitted that the
woman did not resemble the picture on file, but after seeing that they had
similar moles on their faces, the officer believed that the impostor was
Carmelita.
Case — BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI-FB) vs. First Metro
Investment Corporation (FMIC), GR 132390
BPI-FB, four days later (August 29), fraudulently transferred P80 million
to Televesco Arrastre, leaving only P20 million on the deposit. FMIC tried
to draw a check to recover it but the check was dishonored for
insufficient funds.
FMIC filed a complaint for a sum of money. The RTC, CA, and SC all
ruled in favor of FMIC. BPI-FB filed a MR, the issue being the proper
item of the interests imposed by the CA.
The CA ruled that BPI-FB should pay the principal amount, plus 17%
annual interest from August 29, 1989 (date of fraudulent transfer), and
12% legal interest on the 17% from October 4, 1989 (date of filing) until
full payment. The SC affirmed this in its first decision.
BPI-FB contends that the 17% should only be for one year—the term of
the deposit. It had ceased to be a loan or obligation after that one year.
Thus, the interest from August 24, 1990 (end of term) should only be
12% per annum.
It would appear that the first SC decision was on May 21, 2004, and it
has been 15 years since the fraudulent transfer.
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The Civil Code states that deposits of money in banks are governed by
the provisions on loan. A bank deposit is a contract of simple loan where
the bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor.
He claims that the Chua and Tabanag made unauthorized deposits and
encashments amounting to P109,433 in one case. In another civil case,
there were 32 checks amounting to P1.5 million payable to Hope, not
endorsed, but were somehow deposited to Chua’s Metrobank account.
He posits that the checks could not have been accepted without the
participation and connivance of the bank.
The RTC dismissed both cases, after finding that there were valid
reasons for Chua and Tabanag’s actions (for instance, Go had unpaid
debts with Chua). In the second case, however, the RTC held Metrobank
liable for being negligent in allowing the deposit of crossed checks
without proper indorsements.
Ruling: Yes, but only for moral damages arising from the failure of the
bank to exercise extraordinary diligence as a business imbued with
public interest. Specifically, the bank failed to scrutinize the authenticity
of the checks and whether they were properly negotiated.
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It would appear that the check was recalled by the general ledger
accountant of Ford, Mr. Rivera, on account of an error in the tax
computation. With Rivera’s instruction, PCIBank replaced the check with
2 manager’s checks with Pacific Banking Corporation.
Ford filed a case against Citibank and PCIBank. The RTC ruled against
both banks, ordering them to jointly and several pay Ford the face value
of the check with interest. The CA, however, dismissed the case against
Citibank and ordered only PCIBank to pay Ford.
In another case with similar facts, where the checks for tax payments
were stolen in transit from PCIBank, the RTC and CA absolved PCIBank
and made Citibank liable. Thus, the two banks appealed to the SC in this
consolidated case.
Issue: Are the banks (the drawee bank—Citibank, and the collecting
bank for BIR—PCIBank) liable?
In the second case, PCIBank is also liable because any theft affecting
items in transit for clearing shall be for the account of the sending bank,
which in this case was PCIBank.
Case — Firestone Tire & Rubber Company of the Phil vs. CA and
Luzon Development Bank, GR 113236
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Ruling: The slips for withdrawal were not negotiable instruments. Hence,
the rule on immediate notice of dishonor of negotiable instruments don't
apply here.
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The RTC ruled that the “and/or” accounts indicate an active solidarity that
entitled any of the account-holders to demand payment of their proceeds.
Under the NCC, the debtor may pay any one of the solidary creditors but
if any demand was made by one, payment should be made to that
person. Thus, BPI should have made the payment to Tarcila since she
was the first to demand.
Here, BPI connived with Manuel in divesting Tarcila of her share. I acted
with bias and in bad faith when it treated Manuel as the primary despite
the nature of “and/or” accounts.
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B. Distinctions
3. A thrift bank is smaller than commercial and universal banks in the
sense that it caters more to the financing needs of households; business
engaged in agriculture, services, industry, and housing; and small to
medium enterprises.
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Rural Banks Act— “Sec. 2. The State hereby recognizes the need to
promote comprehensive rural development with the end in view of
attaining equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a
sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by
the nation of the benefit of the people; and in expanding productivity as
a key raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
Towards these ends, the State hereby encourages and assists in the
establishment of rural banking system designed to make needed credit
available and readily accessible in the rural areas on reasonable terms.
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All business dealings and activities of the Islamic Bank shall be subject
to the basic principles and rulings of Islamic Shari'a within the purview of
the aforementioned declared policy. Any zakat or "ithe" paid by the
Islamic Bank on behalf of its shareholders and depositors shall be its
obligation to appropriate said zakat fund and to disburse it in legitimate
channels to be ascertained first by the Shari'a Advisory Council.”
All kinds of bank deposits are loans, where the creditor is the depositor
and the bank is the debtor.
The amount is not being held in trust for the depositor nor is it being kept
for safekeeping.
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Issue: Does a bank have the right to apply a deposit to the debt of the
depositor?
Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, a bank has the right to set off deposits in
its hands for the payment of an indebtedness to it on the part of the
depositor. Under the NCC, compensation or set-off may take place when
two persons are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other. In
connection with that, it has been held that the relation existing between a
depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor.
Here, Gullas had a deposit and a debt with PNB, the latter arising from
his liability as general indorser of a dishonored check.
Facts: Lucman was the manager of Land Bank in Marawi City. The
respondents were incumbent barangay chairmen. Land Bank was the
government depositary bank of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of
their barangays. The respondents claim that they were deprived of their
IRAs and that the funds were released by Lucman to third persons. They
filed a petition for mandamus to command Lucman to pay the
respondents. The RTC granted this, and the CA affirmed.
Ruling: Mandamus was not the proper remedy. By virtue of the deposits,
there existed between the barangays and Land Bank, a creditor-debtor
relationship.
Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really
loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether
fixed, savings, or current, are to be treated as loans. Failure of a bank to
honor a deposit is failure to pay its obligation as debtor.
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The IRA funds for which the bank accounts were created belong to the
barangays. They are the only lawful recipients of these funds. Any
transaction or claim involving these funds can be done only through the
proper authorization from the barangays as juridical entities. The
barangays should have been joined as parties to the action.
Facts: Manuel Serrano made a time deposit for one year with 6%
interest, amounting to Php 150,000, with the Overseas Bank of Manila
(OBM). Another time deposit for one year amounting to Php 200,000 with
6.5% interest was conveyed to his name. Demands for encashment were
made against the bank but not a single time deposit certificate was
honored. Thus, Serrano filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition,
with preliminary injunction, seeking the establishment joint and solidary
liabilities amounting to Php 350,000 with interest, against the respondent
banks (Central Bank and OBM), for their alleged failure to return the time
deposits, and for breach of trust.
Banks are irregular deposits. All kinds of bank deposits should be treated
as loans. Serrano, in this case, was in reality a creditor of the OBM and
not a “depositor” (as defined under the law on deposits in Credit
Transactions). The bank was in turn a debtor of Serrano.
Failure of the bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay its obligation
as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from a depositary’s failure to
return the subject matter of the deposit.
Facts: The City fiscal charged Guingona, et al., with estafa and violation
of Central Bank Circular no. 364 and related regulations regarding
foreign exchange transactions.
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receivership by the Central Bank. David filed claims. The Central Bank
reported, however, that only P305,821 was entered into the records of
NSLA as his investments. David now alleges that Guingona, et al.,
misappropriated the unrecorded amounts.
Guingona, et al., contend that their liability is just civil in nature. Thus,
they filed a petition for prohibition to prevent the city fiscal from
proceeding with the preliminary investigation.
When David invested money on nine deposits with NSLA, the contract
perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum, not a contract of
deposit. The relationship created was that of creditor-debtor. The
ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the bank and it
can now make use of such amount. It has the obligation to return the
amount deposited, not the same physical money deposited. Thus, there
can be no “misappropriation”.
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The CA ruled that the bank was remiss in its duty to treat the accounts
with meticulous care, having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship with clients. It ordered the bank to pay LC Diaz P300,000
plus 12%.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature
of banking. This is deemed written into every deposit agreement. This
requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a
good father of a family.
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Two renter’s keys were given: one for CAIDC, and another to Sps.
Pugaos. A guard key remained with the Bank. The safety deposit box
has 2 keyholes, one for the guard key and the other for the renter's key,
and can be opened only with both keys.
Thereafter, a certain Mrs. Ramos offered to buy the 2 lots from CAIDC.
When the CAIDC’s representative and Sps. Pugao went to the bank to
retrieve the TCTs, the box was empty. This caused Mrs. Ramos to
withdraw her offer to purchase. CAIDC filed a complaint for damages
against the bank.
The bank contended that it cannot be made liable for the loss, invoking
Terms 13&14. The RTC agreed with this and ruled in favor of the bank.
The CA affirmed the RTC, holding that the contract was one of lease,
and concluding that the bank was not under any duty to maintain the
contents of the box.
“Art. 1972. The depositary is obliged to keep the thing safely and
to return it, when required, to the depositor, or to his heirs and
successors, or to the person who may have been designated in
the contract…”
Issue: What relation was created between the bank and the parties who
deposited the documents on a safety deposit box? Lessor-lessee
(contract of lease) or bailor-bailee (contract of deposit)?
Ruling: Neither. A safety deposit box with a bank creates a special kind
of deposit.
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and it included special terms, e.g., the depositary cannot open the box
without the renter being present.
As to the contention that Terms 13&14 are void, the SC agreed. They are
inconsistent with the Bank's responsibility as a depositary under the
GBL: “Sec. 72. In addition to the operations ... banking institutions …
may perform the following services:
(a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and valuable objects, and
rent safety deposit boxes for the s afeguarding of such effects.
The banks shall perform the services permitted under subsections (a) …
as depositories or as agents …”
However, it must clearly appear that there actually was such a special
contract, in order to vary the ordinary obligations implied by law. The
liability of the deposit company will not be enlarged or restricted by words
of doubtful meaning.
Thus, the SC affirmed the dismissal of this case, but it did not affirm the
CA’s reasons.
The case must be dismissed (and the bank exonerated from liability for
the loss of the TCTs) not because it was a contract of lease, but
because: (1) there was no competent proof to show that Bank was aware
of the agreement between CAIDC and the Pugaos that the TCTs were
withdrawable only upon both parties' joint signatures; and (2) there was
no evidence to reveal that the loss of the TCTs was due to the fraud or
negligence of the Bank.
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E. Kinds of Deposit
Under the AMLA, in order to prevent money laundering, the law requires
the covered institutions (including banks) to establish and record the true
identity of its clients based on official documents. In banking practice,
they call this “KYC”, or the “know your customer” policy.
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G. Survivorship Agreement
Facts: The petitioner in this case is Romarico Vitug, the widower of the
late Dolores Vitug who died in 1980. In the probate of her will, the
executrix asserted that the funds in a joint savings account in Bank of
America is conjugal property and should be part of Dolores’ estate.
Ruling: No. It is not contrary to law per se. It is valid, unless its operation
or effect would violate a law, such as when:
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In the case of Vitug, none of those instances were present. Thus, the
survivorship agreement is valid. As such, Romarico, as the surviving
spouse, has acquired a vested right over the amounts in the savings
account upon the death of Dolores.
The governing law for this is RA 1405, or the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act (SBDA). It is a law prohibiting disclosure of, or inquiry into, deposits
with any banking institution.
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Aside from the 4 exceptions under the SBDA, there are more exceptions
stated in various laws. It is as if the general rule is the exception, and the
exceptions are the general rule.
Issue: May banks validly refuse to comply with a court order for the
garnishment of a bank deposit of a judgment debtor?
Ruling: No. In this case, the lower court did not order for an examination
of or inquiry into the bank deposit of B&B. It merely required Tan to
inform the court whether or not the B&B had a deposit in Chinabank, only
for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold
it intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
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Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the
deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution
process.
Ruling: Yes. This case does not fall under the 4th exception under the
SBDA.
The subject matter of the action is determined from the indictment that
charges the offense, not from the evidence sought to be admitted by the
prosecution. In this case, the indictment (criminal information)
unqualifiedly and plainly charged Sally with qualified theft by abuse of
confidence and by stealing cash amounting to P1.5 million. It made no
factual allegation that involves the checks in subject. Neither was the
bank account even mentioned in the information.
Without a proper factual allegation (that the bank account contains the
money stolen), it cannot be inferred from the indictment itself that the
bank account is the ostensible subject of the inquiry.
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Estrada filed a motion to quash, claiming that his accounts are covered
by the SBDA.
Issues:
1. Is a trust account covered by the term “deposit” in the SBDA?
2. Does the case fall under any of the exceptions where inquiry is
allowed, considering that the charge was for plunder and not
“bribery or dereliction of duty”?
Ruling:
1. Yes, trust accounts are included in the term “deposit”. The term
“deposits” under the SBDA is to be understood broadly.
2. Yes. In fact the case falls under not just one, but two, exceptions:
(3rd exception) in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty; and (4th
exception) subject matter of litigation.
Facts: The petitioner was the branch manager of Union Bank - Julia
Vargas. The office of the Ombudsman had a pending investigation
against Amado Lagdameo for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). In relation to this, the Ombudsman issued an
order for an “in camera” inspection for his bank account.
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of the pending case. The bank personnel and account holder must be
notified and must be present during the inspection.
Later, it filed a petition for the examination of the account in Allied Bank
(where the 1 million check was drawn against). The RTC dismissed this,
reasoning that the case does not fall under the exceptions to bank
secrecy. The CA affirmed, ruling that the case is not one where the
money is the subject matter of litigation, thus not an exception to bank
secrecy.
Issue: Does the case fall under the exceptions to bank secrecy?
Ruling: No. The petition to examine the bank account must fail because
Union Bank’s prayer did not specifically state that it was seeking
recovery of the amount from the depositor’s account. It merely asked that
Allied Bank should pay the P999,000 discrepancy.
The petitioner was just fishing for information so that it can determine
Allied Bank’s culpability and the amount of damages it can recover. It
appears that it does not seek the recovery of the very money contained
in the deposit.
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The PDIC as a corporate body has the power “to make examination of
and to require information and reports from banks”.
The law provides that all banks must, every January of every odd year
(bakit kaya odd year), forward to the Treasurer of the Philippines, a
sworn statement of all unclaimed balances arranged in alphabetical order
according to the names of creditors and depositors, and showing:
(a) The names and last known place of residence or post office
addresses of the persons;
(b) The amount and the date of the outstanding unclaimed balance
and whether the same is in money or in security;
(c) The date when the person died, if known, or the date when he
made his last deposit or withdrawal; and
(d) The interest due on such unclaimed balance, if any, and the
amount.
Facts: In 1988, a complaint for escheat was filed with the RTC by the
Republic against several banks, praying that the unclaimed balances
reported by these banks be escheated to the Republic.
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summons, notice to the public, the amended petition, and the list of
unclaimed balances. The notice was estimated to occupy 27 pages of
the newspaper at an estimated cost of P50,000.00.
The Republic prayed that the publication of the list of the unclaimed
balances be dispensed with, contending that the summons to the banks
and notice to concerned persons is enough, and that to require it to
publish the names and list of unclaimed balances would only result in
additional and unnecessary expense to the government.
How would other persons who may have an interest in any of the
unclaimed balances know what this case is all about and whether they
have an interest in this case if the amended complaint and list of
unclaimed balances are not published? Such other persons may be heirs
of the bank depositors named in the list of unclaimed balances.
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but still asserts ownership and dominion over the dormant account, then
the bank is no longer obligated to include the account in its sworn
statement. It is not the intent of the law to force depositors into
unnecessary litigation and defense of their rights, as the state is only
interested in escheating balances that have been abandoned and left
without an owner.
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“(24) Violation of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 9072, otherwise known as the
National Caves and Cave Resources Management Protection Act;
“(25) Violation of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 2002, as amended;
“(26) Violations of Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended, otherwise known as the decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms,
Ammunition or Explosives;
“(27) Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the
Anti-Fencing Law;
“(28) Violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic
Act No. 10022;
“(29) Violation of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines;
“(30) Violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9995, otherwise known as the
Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009;
“(31) Violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9775, otherwise known as the
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009;
“(32) Violations of Sections 5, 7, 8, 9, 10(c), (d) and (e), 11, 12 and 14 of
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination;
“(33) Fraudulent practices and other violations under Republic Act No. 8799,
otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code of 2000; and
“(34) Felonies or offenses of a similar nature that are punishable under the penal
laws of other countries.”
They are also called “predicate crimes” to the money laundering crime.
The most recent amendment (RA 10365, 2012) expanded the definition
of money laundering as an act committed by any person who, knowing
that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates
to the proceeds of any unlawful activity:
a. transacts said monetary instrument or property;
b. converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or
uses said monetary instrument or property;
c. conceals or disguises the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to
said monetary instrument or property;
d. attempts or conspires to commit money laundering offenses
referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c);
e. aids, abets, assists in or counsels the commission of the money
laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c)
above; and
f. performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he
facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in
paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above.
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As a general rule, the AMLC must first secure a court order before they
can inquire into the bank deposits and related accounts related to: (a)
any predicate crime; or (b) any money laundering offense. But as per the
amendment, the AMLC no longer needs a court order to inquire into bank
accounts related to the following predicate crimes:
1. Kidnapping with ransom;
2. Certain violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act;
3. Hijacking;
4. Destructive arson and murder;
5. Felonies of the same nature; and
6. Terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Facts: The AMLC filed an ex parte application (ex parte means without
the participation of the other party) to inquire into the bank deposits and
investments of Pantaleon Alvarez. It was granted.
Alvarez filed a motion to stay the enforcement of the order granting bank
inquiry, arguing that nothing in the AMLA authorized the AMLC to seek
inquiry ex parte. The RTC ruled in favor of Alvarez at first, but it later
reinstated its order in favor of AMLC’s bank inquiry.
Issue: May the AMLC be allowed to inquire into bank accounts without
judicial order?
Ruling: Yes, but only when there is probable cause that the deposits are
related to kidnapping with ransom, certain violations of thee Dangerous
Drugs Act, hijacking and other RA 6235 violations, destructive arson, and
murder.
Those special circumstances do not apply in this case. Thus, the AMLC
must first secure a judicial order.
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financial institution; and (b) gather or cause the gathering of any relevant
information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records from a bank or financial institution.
But before the CA may issue this written authorization, the court must be
satisfied of the existence of a probable cause that: (1) a person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons; and (3) of a member of such judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons.
The bank or financial institution concerned shall not refuse to allow such
examination or to provide the desired information, when so ordered by
and served with the written order of the CA.
The AMLC, either upon its own initiative or at the request of the
Anti-Terrorism Council, is authorized to issue an ex parte order to freeze:
(a) any property or funds that are in any way related to financing of
terrorism or acts of terrorism; (b) property or funds of any person or
persons in relation to whom there is probable cause to believe that such
person or persons are committing or attempting or conspiring to commit,
or participating in or facilitating the financing of terrorism or acts of
terrorism.
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For that purpose, the AMLC is also authorized to inquire into or examine
deposits and investments with any banking institution or non-bank
financial institution and their subsidiaries and affiliates without a court
order.
Case — Carmen lntengan vs. CA, GR. No. 128996; Feb 15, 2000
Ruling: No. The applicable law is not RA 1405, but RA 6426 (FCDA).
Under this, there is only one exception to secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, upon written permission of the depositor.
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Thus, the issue of whether RA 6426 was violated was rendered moot
and academic, and the SC dismissed the petition.
Case — Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Phils., GR. No. 94723
Chinabank invoked Central Bank Circular no. 960 which exempts dollar
deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order.
The laws protecting foreign currency deposits were designed to draw and
encourage foreign investments. A deposit made by a transient is not the
kind of deposit encouraged by the laws. A transient/tourist stays only for
a few days in the country and will maintain his deposit only for a short
time.
Facts: Jose Gotianuy filed a complaint for recovery of money against his
daughter Mary Margaret Dee and her husband George. Jose accused
Mary of stealing, among others, his US dollar deposits with Citibank. She
did this by depositing several Citibank checks, where she ad her father
were co-payees (“payable to Gotianuy: Jose and/or Dee: Mary
Margaret”), to her ChinaBank account.
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China Bank invoked RA 6246 (FCDA). But the CA allowed the inquiry.
Issue: May the foreign currency deposit of an accused who was the
co-depositor of the plaintiff in a civil case be inquired into?
Ruling: Yes. Inquiry into Mary’s account may be allowed, following the
CA’s reasoning.
Upon verified ex parte petition by the AMLC and after determination that
probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any
way related to an unlawful activity (predicate crime), the CA may issue a
freeze order, which shall be effective immediately.
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B. lnsurance Requirement
But subject to the approval of the Board of Directors, any insured bank
which is incorporated under the laws of the Philippines and maintains a
branch outside the Philippines may elect to include for insurance its
deposit obligations payable only at such branch.
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The Deposit Insurance Fund shall be the capital account of PDIC and
shall principally consist of the following:
1. the Permanent Insurance Fund — To carry out the purposes of
the PDIC law, there is “permanent insurance fund” of
P3,000,000,000;
2. assessment collections, subject to the charges;
3. reserves for insurance and financial assistance losses; and
4. retained earnings.
The reserves for insurance and financial assistance losses and retained
earnings shall be maintained at a reasonable level to ensure capital
adequacy. Every 5 years, the PDIC may conduct a study on the need to
adjust the amount of the Permanent Insurance Fund, insurance cover,
assessment rate and assessment base, and thereafter make the
necessary recommendation to Congress.
Insured deposit means the amount due to any bona fide depositor for
legitimate deposits in an insured bank as of the date of closure. The
maximum insurance coverage is P500,000.
In determining the amount due to any depositor, all deposits in the bank
maintained in the same right and capacity for his or her benefit, either in
his or her own name or in the name of others shall be added together.
Rules on Joint-Account
1. A joint account, regardless of whether the conjunction ‘and’, ‘or’,
‘and/or’ is used, shall be insured separately from any
individually-owned deposit account.
1. If the account is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or
by two or more juridical persons (entities), the maximum insured
deposit shall be divided into as many equal shares as there are
persons or entities, unless a different sharing is stipulated in the
document of deposit.
2. If the account is held by a juridical person or entity jointly with
one or more natural persons, the maximum insured deposit shall
be presumed to belong entirely to such juridical person or entity.
3. The aggregate of the interest of each co-owner over several joint
accounts, whether owned by the same or different combinations
of individuals, juridical persons or entities, shall likewise be
subject to the maximum insured deposit of P500,000
Proof of deposit
No owner/holder of any passbook, certificate of deposit, or other
evidence of deposit shall be recognized as a depositor unless the
passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of deposit is
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The PDIC shall not pay deposit insurance for the following accounts or
transactions, whether denominated, documented, recorded or booked as
deposit by the bank:
1. Investment products such as bonds, securities and trust
accounts;
2. Deposit accounts which are unfunded, fictitious or fraudulent;
3. Deposit products constituting or emanating from unsafe and
unsound banking practices; and
4. Deposits that are determined to be proceeds of an unlawful
activity as defined under the AMLA.
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1. There is failure to settle the claim within 6 months from the date
of filing of claim for insured deposit;
2. Such failure was due to grave abuse of discretion, gross
negligence, bad faith, or malice; and
3. The director, officer, or employee is responsible for the delay.
However, the 6-month period shall not apply if the validity of the claim
requires the resolution of issues of facts and or law by another office,
body or agency.
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Facts: In 1980, Security Bank granted Sta. Ines Melale Corp (SMIC) a
credit line of 8M to assist it in meeting additional capitalization
requirements of its logging operations (boo). The line was to expire on
Nov. 30, 1981. One of the conditions is that the bank reserves the right to
amend any of the terms, upon written notice to the borrower.
As additional security for the credit line, Rodolfo Cuenca, then SMIC’s
president, executed a Joint and Solidary Signature/Surety (JSS) binding
himself solidarily with SIMC for the payment of the loans, including
renewals, increases, and other amendments.
In 1985, Cuenca resigned and his shares in the company were sold.
Later, SIMC encountered difficulty in paying the amortizations, thus, it
asked Security Bank for a restructuring. Security Bank approved this in
1989, without notice to Cuenca. SMIC eventually defaulted. Security filed
a case for collection against SIMC and Cuenca. Cuenca appealed.
The CA released Cuenca from liability, reasoning that the Cuenca was
only bound by the first credit line which expired in 1981.
Issue: Should Cuenca (surety in the 1980 credit line) be made liable for
the debtor’s default in the second credit line (1989) in which he was not
given notice?
Ruling: No. Cuenca was only liable for the 1980 credit accomodation
which expired in 1981.
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Hence, the bank cannot hold Cuenca liable for loans obtained in excess
of the amount or beyond the period stipulated in the original agreement,
absent any clear stipulation showing that the latter waived his right to be
notified, or to give consent. This is especially true where, as in this case,
Cuenca was no longer the principal officer or major stockholder of the
corporate-debtor at the time the subsequent obligations were incurred.
He was thus no longer in a position to compel the corporation to pay the
creditor and had no more reason to bind himself anew to the subsequent
obligations.
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E. Bridge Financing
Bridge financing "bridges" the gap between the time when a company's
money is set to run out and when it can expect to receive an infusion of
funds later on. This type of financing is most normally used to fulfill a
company's short-term working capital needs. —investopedia
Meanwhile, QPSDC also failed to pay its obligations to Asiatrust (and the
other banks, collectively “Funders”). The Funders foreclosed the
mortgage on several units, including De Vera’s. De Vera filed a case to
annul the mortgage on the ground of fraud.
The trial court ruled that De Vera’s failure to pay the balance was not his
fault. Thus, it ordered QPSDC, et al., to pay De Vera the sum necessary
to redeem the unit plus damages.
Issue: Was the failure to pay the balance De Vera’s fault? Who has
superior rights over the unit?
Ruling: No, De Vera was not at fault. He has superior right over the unit.
Asiatrust had made several representations to De Vera that his loan had
been approved. The tenor of the letters it sent would lead a reasonable
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man to believe that there was nothing left to do but await the release of
the loan. It cannot hide behind the pithy excuse that the grant of the
bridge financing loan was subject to the release of the Pag-IBIG loan.
To await the release of the Pag-IBIG loan would render any bridge
financing nugatory.
Thus, "the conclusion is inevitable that although the plaintiff was not able
to pay, he was a victim of circumstances and his failure was not due to
his own fault."
Fixed v Floating
A fixed interest means that the interest rate remains fixed, regardless of
changes in interest rates in the market for the entire duration of the loan.
A floating interest rate means the interest rate varies, depending on the
changes that happen with the market.
Escalation clause
This is a stipulation in a contract of loan where it is agreed that the
interest rate may be increased in the event that the applicable maximum
rate of interest is increased by law or by the Monetary Board.
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Case — Security Bank vs. RTC of Makati, 263 SCRA 483 (1996)
The bank appealed, contending that the interest should be 23% because
that was what they agreed on in the promissory notes.
Issue: Should the 23% interest rate stipulated in a contract, which is far
in excess of the ceiling prescribed under the Usury Law, prevail over the
Central Bank’s prescribed annual rate of 12%?
Ruling: Yes. 23% was the interest rate agreed upon by the parties freely.
Significantly, Eusebio did not question that rate.
The Civil Code provides that contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.
Hence, only in the absence of a stipulation can the court impose the 12%
rate of interest.
The bank filed a complaint for sum of money, claiming that CCC failed to
turn over the goods covered by the trust receipt. CCC contends that the
transaction was a simple loan, not a trust receipt.
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In a trust receipt, the ownership over the goods belong to the bank and
they will only be released to the importer in trust after the loan is granted.
In this case, the debtor (CCC) received the goods subject of the “trust
receipt” long before the “trust receipt” was entered into. Ownership over
the goods was already transferred to the debtor. This is inconsistent with
the definition of a trust receipt.
Facts: PNB granted Sps. Almeda several loans totaling 18M payable in 6
years at an interest rate of 21% per annum. Under the loan agreement, it
was stipulated that the bank “reserves the right to increase the interest
rate within the limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever
policy it may adopt in the future”. Later, the bank raised the rate to 28%,
and later 68%.
Issue: Was PNB authorized to raise its interest rates from 21% to 68%?
Ruling: No. The galloping increases in interest rate imposed by the bank
were arbitrary.
C.B. Circular No. 905, Series of 1982 did not authorize the bank, or any
lending institution to progressively increase interest rates on borrowings
to an extent which would have made it virtually impossible for debtors to
comply with their own obligations.
Banks are not granted carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to
levels which would either enslave its borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets. Borrowing represents a transfusion of
capital from lending institutions to industries and businesses in order to
stimulate growth.
Escalation clauses are not basically wrong so long as they are not solely
potestative but based on reasonable and valid grounds. Here, there are
no valid and reasonable standards upon which the increases are
anchored.
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Facts: Sps. Basco obtained a 15,000 loan from PNB. The promissory
note stipulated an interest of 12% per annum “which the Bank may at
any time without notice, raise within the limits allowed by law”. On the
back, it was also agreed that any extension will “give the Bank the right
to charge the interest rates prescribed under its policies from the date the
account was originally granted.”
Ruling: No. The escalation clause cannot be given effect because of the
absence of a de-escalation clause in the event a reduction of interest
was ordered by law. When there is an escalation, there must be a
de-escalation clause to mitigate the one-sidedness of the escalation
clause.
The Monetary Board (MB) shall prescribe the minimum ratio which the
net worth of a bank must bear to its total risk assets which may include
contingent accounts.
The MB may require that such ratio be determined on the basis of the net
worth and risk assets of a bank and its subsidiaries, subject to these
conditions:
1. In the exercise of this authority, the MB shall, to the extent
feasible, conform to internationally accepted standards, including
those of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), relating to
risk-based capital requirements;
2. It may alter or suspend compliance with such ratio whenever
necessary for a maximum period of 1 year;
3. Such ratio shall be applied uniformly to banks of the same
category.
If a bank does not comply with the prescribed minimum ratio, the MB
may:
1. limit or prohibit the distribution of net profits by such bank and
may require that part or all of the net profits be used to increase
the capital accounts of the bank until the minimum requirement
has been met; and
2. restrict or prohibit the acquisition of major assets and the making
of new investments by the bank, with the exception of purchases
of readily marketable evidence of indebtedness of the Republic
of the Philippines and of the Bangko Sentral and any other
obligations which are fully guaranteed by the Republic.
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The MB may temporarily relieve a bank from full compliance with the
required capital ratio only in the following cases:
1. In case of a bank merger or consolidation; or
2. When a bank is under rehabilitation under a program approved
by the Bangko Sentral.
The basis for determining compliance with the single borrower’s limit
(SBL) is the total credit commitment of the bank to or on behalf of the
borrower.
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What can’t they do? T hey can’t, directly or indirectly, for himself or as the
representative or agent of others:
1. borrow from such bank;
2. become a guarantor, indorser or surety for loans from such bank;
3. in any manner be an obligor or incur any contractual liability to
the bank.
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L. Loan Threshold
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Case — Huerta Alba Resort, lnc. (HARI) vs. CA, GR No. 128567;
September 1, 2000
The RTC granted the petition, ordering HARI to pay the debt plus
interest, charges, and fees “within a period of not less than 150 days
from receipt”, otherwise, the properties mortgaged would be sold to
satisfy the judgment.
HARI appealed to the CA, then to the SC, but all appeals and petitions
for certiorari were dismissed. Thus, the RTC’s decision became final on
March 14, 1994. In July, a writ of execution was issued, and a public sale
was scheduled on September 6, 1994.
Before the sale, HARI filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and Set Aside
Writ of Execution, mainly arguing that the 150-day stated in the
resolution has not yet lapsed because of the intervening appeals. The
RTC dismissed the motion, so the case was elevated to the CA.
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This time, HARI invokes a provision in the GBA which states that: “in
case of a foreclosure of a mortgage in favor of a bank, banking or credit
institution, whether judicially or extrajudicially, the mortgagor shall have
the right, within one year after the sale of the real estate as a result of the
foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the property."
Ruling: Yes, but HARI failed to seasonably invoke this right. The GBL
provision may apply to the case because even though the purchaser
(Syndicate) was not a bank or credit institution, its predecessor in interest
(Intercom) was a credit institution. However, HARI was late in invoking
the one-year right of redemption. It should have raised this at the earliest
opportunity, that is, when it submitted its answer to the complaint for
judicial foreclosure.
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and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within
the prescribed period (note: it is now 90-120 days) after the judgment
becomes final, or even after the foreclosure sale if there was no
confirmation of sale yet. After such order of confirmation, no redemption
can be effected any longer.
a. Natural Person
—Sec 6, Act no. 3135 in relation to Sec 47, GBL; See BSP Circular No.
337 Series of 2002
Under Act no. 3135, the debtor or any person with a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage under which the property was foreclosed,
may “redeem within the term of one year from and after the date of the
sale”. This applies to extrajudicial foreclosures.
Under the GBL and BSP Circular 337, the mortgagor or debtor who used
his real property as security for a loan in a bank which later foreclosed,
has the right to redeem the property within one year after its sale. This
applies whether the foreclosure was done judicially or extrajudicially.
The purchaser at the auction sale concerned shall have the right to enter
upon and take possession of the foreclosed property immediately after
the date of the confirmation of the auction sale.
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The bank contended that Goldenway had all the opportune time to
redeem the foreclosed properties from the time it received the letter of
demand and the notice of sale before the registration of the certificate of
sale. And even if we assume that the redemption was timely made, it
was not for the amount as required by law.
Under the new GBL, juridical persons are allowed to exercise the right of
redemption only "until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of
foreclosure sale" and in no case more than 3 months after foreclosure,
whichever comes first. (Section 47)
Goldenway insists that Section 47, GBL should not apply to them
because their mortgage contract expressly stated that any foreclosure
should be in accordance with Act no. 3135. Their contract was executed
in 1985. GBL only became a law in 2000.
(May Section 47, GBL be validly applied in this case when the mortgage
contract was executed in 1985 and the mortgage foreclosed when GBL
was already in effect?— Yes.)
Section 47, GBL did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem but
only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the
one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption
period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon
registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure,
whichever is earlier.
Issue: Does Section 47, GBL infringe the equal protection clause
because it discriminates against mortgagors who are juridical persons?
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Under the old law: A foreign bank may avail itself of only 1 mode of entry,
and a foreign bank or a Philippine corporation may own up to 60% of the
voting stock of only 1 domestic bank or new banking subsidiary. RA
10641 has deleted these limitations.
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In case said bank is the winning bidder, it shall, during the 5-year period,
transfer its rights to a qualified Philippine national, without prejudice to a
borrower’s rights under applicable laws.
If the bank fails to transfer such property within the 5-year period, it shall
be penalized ½ of 1% per annum of the price at which the property was
foreclosed until it is able to transfer the property to a qualified Philippine
national.
C. Offshore Banking
—Sec 1, PD 1034, "Offshore Banking System Decree"
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Board of Directors
- There shall be at least 5, and a maximum of 15 members.
- Two of whom shall be independent directors.
- An "independent director" shall mean a person other than an
officer or employee of the bank, its subsidiaries or affiliates or
related interests.
- Non-Filipino citizens may become members to the extent of the
foreign participation in the equity of said bank.
- The meetings of the board of directors may be conducted
through modern technologies such as, but not limited to,
teleconferencing and video-conferencing.
- Exceptions:
1. If the bank is a rural bank;
2. In cases where such service is incident to financial
assistance provided by the government or a GOCC to
the bank; or
3. When provided under existing laws.
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After due notice to the board of directors of the bank, the MB may
disqualify, suspend, or remove any bank director or officer who commits
or omits an act which renders him unfit for the position.
Case — Busuego vs. CA; G.R. No. 95326 March 11, 1999
Issue: Busuego, et al., claim MB violated their right to due process and
deprived them of their opportunity to be heard before the issuance of the
Resolution.
Ruling: Their right to due process was not violated. They were given
ample opportunity by the MB to air their submission and defenses as to
the findings of irregularity during the regular examination.
The petitioners had the opportunity to present their position to the MB by
their letters-explanation, thus, they were not denied due process.
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Petitioners cite Ang Tibay v. CIR and assert that the following requisites
of procedural due process were not observed by the Monetary Board:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
case and submit evidence in support;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy and not simply accept the view of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision;
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceedings
can know the various issues involved and the reason for the
decision rendered.
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Qualifications of a conservator:
1. Competent; and
2. Knowledgeable in bank operations and management.
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Under the NCBA, the MB may summarily and without need for prior
hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and
designate the PDIC as receiver and direct it to proceed with the
liquidation of the closed bank, whenever, upon report of the head of the
supervising or examining department, the MB finds that a bank or
quasi-bank:
1. has notified the Bangko Sentral or publicly announced a
unilateral closure;
2. has been dormant for at least 60 days;
3. in any manner has suspended the payment of its deposit/deposit
substitute liabilities;
4. is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary
course of business (but this does not include inability to pay
caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in
the banking community);
5. has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko
Sentral, to meet its liabilities;
6. cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to
its depositors or creditors;
7. has willfully violated a cease and desist order under the NCBA
that has become final, involving acts or transactions which
amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution.
The Monetary Board shall notify in writing, through the receiver, the
board of directors of the closed bank of its decision.
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Appointment:
- The designation of a conservator or the appointment of a
receiver under is vested exclusively with the Monetary Board.
- The designation of a conservator is not a precondition to the
designation of a receiver.
Case — Fidelity Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Cenzon, GR. No.
L-46208; April 5, 1990
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Ruling:
1. No. A banking institution which has been declared insolvent ands
subsequently ordered closed by the Bangko Sentral cannot be
held liable to pay interest on deposits which accrued during the
period when the bank is actually closed and non-operational.
The obligation to pay interest on the deposit ceases from the
moment the operation of the bank is completely suspended by
the Bangko Sentral.
2. There could be no moral or exemplary damages because there
was no bad faith or fraud on the part of the insolvent bank.
Case — Sps Larrobis vs. PVB, GR. No. 135706; October 1, 2004
Facts: Spouses Larrobis had a debt which fell due on February 27,
1981. The bank was placed under receivership between April 1985 and
August 1992. Thus, the extrajudicial foreclosure in relation to such debt
was only effected on October 18, 1995 — 14 years from their default.
In this case, the 10-year period for bringing an action for foreclosure had
already prescribed. A bank is bound by the acts or failure to act of the
receiver.
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Close now, hear later doctrine: Under the law, the sanction of closure
could be imposed upon a bank by the BSP even without notice and
hearing. The lack of procedural due process would not result in the
invalidity of action by the MB.
This “close now, hear later” scheme is grounded on the practical and
legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s
assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors,
creditors, stockholders, and the general public.
The “close now, hear later” doctrine has already been justified as a
measure to protect public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of
the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits.
Objectives:
1. Primary — to maintain price stability conducive to a balanced
and sustainable growth of the economy and employment; and
2. Promote and maintain monetary stability and the convertibility of
the Philippine peso.
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If he/she is any of those, he/she should resign from, and divest himself of
any and all interests in such institution before assuming office as a
member of the Monetary Board.
The members coming from the private sector shall not hold any other
public office or public employment during their tenure.
Before appointment:
No person shall be a member if he has been connected directly with any
multilateral banking or financial institution or has a substantial interest in
any private bank in the Philippines, within 1 year prior to his appointment;
After appointment:
No member of the Monetary Board shall be employed in any multilateral
banking or financial institution within 2 years after the expiration of his
term, except when he serves as an official representative of the
Philippine Government to such institution.
The President may remove any member for any of the following reasons:
1. If the member is subsequently disqualified for not meeting the
qualifications under Section 8;
2. If he/she is physically or mentally incapacitated that he/she
cannot properly discharge his/her duties and responsibilities and
such incapacity has lasted for more than 6 months;
3. If the member is guilty of acts or operations which are of
fraudulent or illegal character or which are manifestly opposed to
the aims and interests of the Bangko Sentral; or
4. If he/she no longer possesses the qualifications.
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Confidentiality:
None of the reports and other papers relative to such examinations shall
be open to inspection by the public, except:
1. Insofar as such publicity is incidental to the proceedings under
the NCBA; or
2. If it is necessary for the prosecution of violations in connection
with the business of the institution.
Supervision Fee:
Supervised institutions shall pay to the Bangko Sentral, no later than May
31 of each year, an annual supervision fee as may be prescribed by the
Monetary Board. In determining the amount of the annual supervision
fee, the Monetary Board shall consider the costs of supervision.
"Supervision" includes:
1. The issuance of rules of conduct or the establishment of
standards of operation for uniform application to all institutions or
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The Bangko Sentral shall establish a mechanism for issues arising from
bank examinations. It shall be independent and report directly to the
Monetary Board, without prejudice to the authority of the Bangko Sentral
and its Monetary Board to take enforcement and supervisory actions
against supervised entities.
Exclusive Issue Power: The Bangko Sentral has the sole power and
authority to issue currency within the territory of the Philippines.
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Legal Tender Power: All notes and coins issued by the Bangko Sentral
are fully guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and shall be legal tender in the Philippines for all debts, both
public and private.
Under the NCBA: Unless otherwise fixed by the Monetary Board*, coins
shall be legal tender in amounts not exceeding P50 for denominations of
25 centavos and above, and in amounts not exceeding P20 for
denominations of 10 centavos or less.
Thus, the amounts were adjusted under *BSP Circular 537 (2006). The
maximum amount of coins to be considered as legal tender are:
1. P1,000.00 for denominations of 1-Piso, 5-Piso and 10-Piso
coins; and
2. P100.00 for denominations of 1-sentimo, 5-sentimo, 10-sentimo,
and 25-sentimo coins.
————————————————————————————————
TRUTH IN LENDING
reditors.
Who is obliged under this law? C
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3. the difference between the amounts set forth under clauses (1)
and (2);
4. the charges, individually itemized, which are paid or to be paid
by such person in connection with the transaction but which are
not incident to the extension of credit;
5. the total amount to be financed;
6. the finance charge expressed in terms of pesos and centavos;
and
7. the percentage that the finance bears to the total amount to be
financed expressed as a simple annual rate on the outstanding
unpaid balance of the obligation.
Facts: Spouses Silos took a loan in PNB. There was a provision in their
credit agreement stating that the fixing of interest rate and its increase
are to be solely determined by PNB.
Spaces for interest rates in the Credit Agreements and promissory notes
were left blank for PNB to unilateral fill, without the need to obtain the
consent of the petitioners as regards such rates.
Spouses Silos filed the case to have said provision nullified for violating
the Civil Code, particularly the rule on mutuality of contracts. PNB
contended that the petitioners are deemed estopped by their failure to
question the imposed rates, and by their continued payments without
opposition.
Ruling: No. In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the
force of law between the parties, there must be mutuality between the
parties based on their essential equality.
Even though they did not question the rates then and still paid them,
estoppel should not apply to the petitioner, because estoppel cannot be
predicated on an illegal act.
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PNB violated RA 3765, which was enacted to protect citizens from a lack
of awareness of the true cost of credit to the user by using a full
disclosure of such cost with a view of preventing the uninformed use of
credit to the detriment of the national economy. The law gives a detailed
enumeration of the specific information required to be disclosed, among
which are the interest and charges.
What’s the effect? Since the escalation clause is annulled, the principal
amount of the loan is subject to the original or stipulated rate of interest,
and upon maturity, the amount due shall be subject to legal interest at
the rate of 12% per annum.
There was a uniform clause in the Promissory Notes that permitted the
bank to increase the rate “within the limits allowed by law at any time
depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future” without giving
prior notice to New Sampaguita. In each drawdown, the Promissory
Notes specified the interest rate to be charged: 19.5% in the first, 21.5%
in the second and third.
The clause in the Promissory Note made the fulfillment of the contracts
dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of PNB and is therefore
void. They have the character of a contract of adhesion, where the
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parties do not bargain on equal footing and the weaker party’s (debtor’s)
participation is reduced to “take it or leave it”.
Case — DBP vs. Felipe Arcilla, GR. No. 161426, June 30, 2005
Arcilla filed a complaint against DBP, alleging that the bank failed to
furnish him with the disclosure statement required under the Truth in
Lending Act (RA 3765).
DBP did not seek to collect any charges other than those disclosed in the
documents. It did not demand something that wasn’t stated in the
documents Arcilla signed.
Under Central Bank Circular no. 158, in addition to the 7 items under Sec
4, RA 3765, the contract shall specify additional charges, if any, which
will be collected in case certain contract stipulations are not met by the
debtor. If the borrower is not duly informed of the data required by law,
the lender will have no right to collect such charge or increases, even if
stipulated in the promissory note. However, such failure shall not affect
the validity or enforceability of any contract.
The SC also noted that Arcilla was a lawyer and a former employee of
the bank. He is therefore presumed to to be knowledgeable with these
matters. He was duly informed of the charges and the implications.
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Facts: George King Tim Pa took out several loans with Consolidated
Bank. In the promissory notes, it was stated that in case of default, the
debtors agree to pay:
(a) 14% interest per annum on the amount due, compounded
monthly, until fully paid;
(b) an additional 10% of the total amount due;
(c) attorney's fees in addition to expenses and costs of suit, which
would bear 1% monthly interest until paid; and
(d) a penalty of 3% per annum on the amount due until fully paid.
After defaulting, the bank filed a case for the recovery of the unpaid
balances on the promissory notes.
Issue: Were the stipulations on (a) interests, (b) handling charges, (c)
penalty charges, and (d) attorney’s fees proper?
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their obligations months before it filed the complaint for recovery of sum
of money.
UCPB contends that while the interest rate was not numerically
quantified in the face of the promissory notes, it was nonetheless
categorically fixed, at the time of execution, because of the phrase "rate
indicative of the DBD retail rate."
Ruling: No. The interest rate provision is illegal not only because of the
provisions of the Civil Code on mutuality of contracts, but also because
they violate the Truth in Lending Act. Not disclosing the true finance
charges in connection with the extensions of credit is a form of
deception.
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ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
l. Governing Laws
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Consistent with its foreign policy, the State shall extend cooperation in
transnational investigations and prosecutions of persons involved in
money laundering activities wherever committed.
A. Persons liable
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“(1) Kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
“(2) Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002;
“(5) Robbery and extortion under Articles 294, 295, 296, 299, 300, 301 and 302 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
“(6) Jueteng and Masiao punished as illegal gambling under Presidential Decree No. 1602;
“(7) Piracy on the high seas under the Revised Penal Code, as amended and Presidential
Decree No. 532;
“(8) Qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
“(9) Swindling under Article 315 and Other Forms of Swindling under Article 316 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
“(11) Violations of Republic Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000;
“(12) Hijacking and other violations under Republic Act No. 6235; destructive arson and
murder, as defined under the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
“(13) Terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism as defined and penalized under
Sections 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. 9372;
“(14) Financing of terrorism under Section 4 and offenses punishable under Sections 5, 6, 7
and 8 of Republic Act No. 10168, otherwise known as the Terrorism Financing Prevention
and Suppression Act of 2012:
“(15) Bribery under Articles 210, 211 and 211-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and Corruption of Public Officers under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;
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“(16) Frauds and Illegal Exactions and Transactions under Articles 213, 214, 215 and 216
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
“(17) Malversation of Public Funds and Property under Articles 217 and 222 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended;
“(18) Forgeries and Counterfeiting under Articles 163, 166, 167, 168, 169 and 176 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
“(19) Violations of Sections 4 to 6 of Republic Act No. 9208, otherwise known as the
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003;
“(21) Violations of Sections 86 to 106 of Chapter VI, of Republic Act No. 8550, otherwise
known as the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998;
“(22) Violations of Sections 101 to 107, and 110 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known
as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995;
“(23) Violations of Section 27(c), (e), (f), (g) and (i), of Republic Act No. 9147, otherwise
known as the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act;
“(24) Violation of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 9072, otherwise known as the National
Caves and Cave Resources Management Protection Act;
“(25) Violation of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of
2002, as amended;
“(27) Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law;
“(28) Violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022;
“(29) Violation of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code
of the Philippines;
“(30) Violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9995, otherwise known as the Anti-Photo
and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009;
“(31) Violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9775, otherwise known as the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009;
“(32) Violations of Sections 5, 7, 8, 9, 10(c), (d) and (e), 11, 12 and 14 of Republic Act No.
7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination;
“(33) Fraudulent practices and other violations under Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise
known as the Securities Regulation Code of 2000; and
“(34) Felonies or offenses of a similar nature that are punishable under the penal laws of
other countries.”
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V. Covered Person
—Sec 3(a), as amended by RA 10365
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Composition:
1. Governor of the BSP as Chairman;
2. Commissioner of the Insurance Commission; and
3. Chairman of the SEC.
Functions:
1. to require and receive covered or suspicious transaction reports
from covered institutions;
2. to issue orders addressed to the appropriate Supervising
Authority or the covered institution to determine the true identity
of the owner of any monetary instrument or property subject of a
covered transaction or suspicious transaction report or request
for assistance from a foreign State, or believed by the Council,
on the basis of substantial evidence, to be, in whole or in part,
wherever located, representing, involving, or related to, directly
or indirectly, in any manner or by any means, the proceeds of an
unlawful activity.
3. to institute civil forfeiture proceedings and all other remedial
proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor General;
4. to cause the filing of complaints with the Department of Justice
or the Ombudsman for the prosecution of money laundering
offenses;
5. to investigate suspicious transactions and covered transactions
deemed suspicious after an investigation by AMLC, money
laundering activities, and other violations of the AMLA;
6. to apply before the Court of Appeals, ex parte, for the freezing of
any monetary instrument or property alleged to be laundered,
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Covered persons shall report to the AMLC all covered transactions and
suspicious transactions, within 5 working days from occurrence, unless
the AMLC prescribes a different period not exceeding 15 working days.
Confidentiality of Reports
- Covered persons are prohibited from communicating, directly or
indirectly, in any manner or by any means, to any person, the
fact that a covered or suspicious transaction report was made,
the contents, or any other relative information.
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X. Safe Harbor
—Sec 9, 2nd par., RA 9160;
Rule 22, Sec 5, 2018 IRR
Bank Inquiry With Court Order —Rule 11, Sec 1, 2018 IRR
By authority of the Council, the AMLC Secretariat may file before the CA,
through the OSG, an Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of Bank
Inquiry Order to examine or inquire into any particular deposit or
investment account that is related to an unlawful activity or ML offense.
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The AMLC may issue an ex parte order authorizing the AMLC
Secretariat to inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment
account, including related accounts, with any banking institution or
non-bank financial institution and their subsidiaries and affiliates.
Grounds
This AMLC inquiry without court order may only be done when it has
been established that probable cause exists that the deposits or
investments involved, including related accounts, are in any way related
to any of the following unlawful activities:
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The relevant requirements for Bank Inquiry with Court Corder shall apply
to Bank Inquiry Order by the AMLC, including the procedure for inquiry
into related accounts.
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Facts: In 2005, the AMLC filed an urgent ex-parte application for the
issuance of a freeze order against Lt. Gen. Jacinto Ligot’s monetary
instruments and properties.
The CA granted the freeze order, ruling that probable cause existed that
an unlawful activity or money laundering offense had been committed by
Ligot and his family. The basis of the freeze order were 4 cases (plunder,
perjury, violation of RA 3019, and malicious mischief) being investigated
by the Ombudsman. The freeze order was to be valid or 20 days.
Later, the Republic filed an urgent motion for extension, arguing that if
the bank accounts and properties were not continuously frozen, they
could be placed beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities and the
government’s efforts would be frustrated.
The CA also granted the extension. Thus, the freeze order was to be
effective until after all the appropriate proceedings or investigations are
terminated.
The Ligots filed a motion to lift the freeze order, arguing that there was
no evidence to support the extension, that they were deprived of their
property without due process, and that they were punished before their
guilt could be proven. The CA denied the motion.
Over a month after the denial, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases took
effect on December 15, 2005. Here, a freeze order could be extended for
a maximum of 6 months only. Thus, the Ligots filed a MR, insisting that
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the freeze order should now be lifted because 6 months have lapsed
since its issuance (July 5, 2005). The MR was filed on January 31, 2006.
The Republic argued that the Rule in Civil Forfeiture does not apply
because the CA’s resolution extending the freeze order was issued
before such Rule took effect.
First issue: Does the 6-month extension period in the Rule of Civil
Forfeiture apply in this case involving a freeze order under the AMLA?
Ruling: Yes. While it is true that the order for extension was issued
before the Rule’s effectivity (issuance was on September 20, 2005;
effectivity of the Rule was on December 15, 2005), the Ligots filed an
opposing motion on the extension which was still pending when the Rule
took effect. The motion was only denied on January 4, 2006. Thus, the
provisions of the Civil Procedure limiting an extension of a freeze order to
6 months only, should apply to this case.
Ruling: Yes. There are two requisites for the issuance of a freeze order:
1. Application ex parte by thee AMLC; and
2. Determination of probable cause by the CA.
This probable cause for freeze orders differs from probable cause in
criminal actions. The probable cause in freeze orders means such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent, or
cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity or money laundering
offense is about to be, is being, or has been committed and that the
subject of the order is in any way related to said unlawful activity.
Thus, in determining probable cause in freeze orders, the question is not
whether there was probable commission of an unlawful activity, but
rather whether the assets sought to be frozen are in any way related to
any of the illegal activities under the AMLA.
Going back to first issue: So even if there was probable cause for the
issuance, the freeze order must be lifted.
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reasonable and enough time to build a case. Here it has already been 6
years since the freeze order. Hence, it must be lifted.
The Manila Times published an article stating that the AMLC has asked
the CA to allow examination of the bank accounts of the Binays, their
corporations, and SPCMB Law Offices where the VP’s daughter was a
former partner. The law office wrote to CA Justice Andres Reyes,
requesting for a comment on the presumed petition for bank inquiry.
They wanted a verification from Justice Reyes, as well as copies of
relevant documents.
Justice Reyes denied the request, reasoning that the petition is strictly
confidential. Days later, the Manila Times published another article
reporting that the CA has granted the AMLC’s application to examine the
accounts of the Binays, including the law office.
The law office then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC,
arguing that Section 11 of the AMLA is unconstitutional because:
1. It violates the right to due process;
2. It violates the right to privacy;
3. Even if it is constitutional, the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion because:
a. it refused to provide a copy of the AMLC’s ex-parte
application, violating its right to due process;
b. the carte blanche authority to examine the law office’s
accounts would violate attorney-client privilege;
c. the blanket authority to examine all transactions,
partakes the nature of a general warrant for a mere
fishing expedition;
d. there is nothing in the AMLA that justifies withholding of
records especially if the application for bank inquiry was
already granted;
e. the law office did not commit any predicate crime that
would justify inquiry; and
f. this is a form of political persecution or harassment.
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does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure
of property involved at that stage.
A bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of
physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry
order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or
investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The
monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial
institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on
particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and
transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to
be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or
hidden by the account holder.
Ruling: No. Bank inquiry by the AMLC, upon court order, is one of the
exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality of bank deposits.
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Further, there is nothing in Section 11 nor the IRR which prohibits the
owner of the bank account to ascertain from the CA, post issuance of the
bank inquiry order, if his account is indeed the subject of an examination.
There is nothing in the law which precludes the owner of the account
from challenging the basis for the issuance of the order.
Ruling: No. The Constitution and the Rules of Court prescribe particular
requirements attaching to search warrants that are not imposed by the
AMLA with respect to bank inquiry orders. A constitutional warrant
requires that the judge personally examine under oath or affirmation the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, such examination being
in the form of searching questions and answers. Those are impositions
which the legislative did not specifically prescribe as to the bank inquiry
order under the AMLA and we cannot find sufficient legal basis to apply
them to Section 11 of the AMLA. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a
search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but
not the seizure of persons or property.
C. lnjunction
Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may appeal to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the
subject decision or final order unless the SC directs otherwise.
(a) Civil Forfeiture. - When there is a (a) Civil Forfeiture. – Upon determination
covered transaction report made, and the by the AMLC that probable cause exists
court has, in a petition filed for the purpose that any monetary instrument or property
ordered seizure of any monetary is in any way related to an unlawful activity
instrument or property, in whole or in part, as defined in Section 3(i) or a money
directly or indirectly, related to said report, laundering offense under Section 4 hereof,
the Revised Rules of Court on civil the AMLC shall file with the appropriate
forfeiture shall apply. court through the Office of the Solicitor
General, a verified ex parte petition for
forfeiture, and the Rules of Court on Civil
Forfeiture shall apply.
(b) Claim on Forfeited Assets. - Where (b) Claim on Forfeited Assets. – Where
the court has issued an order of forfeiture the court has issued an order of forfeiture
of the monetary instrument or property in a of the monetary instrument or property in a
criminal prosecution for any money criminal prosecution for any money
laundering offense defined under Section laundering offense defined under Section
4 of this Act, the offender or any other 4 of this Act, the offender or any other
person claiming an interest therein may person claiming an interest therein may
apply, by verified petition, for a declaration apply, by verified petition, for a declaration
that the same legitimately belongs to him that the same legitimately belongs to him
and for segregation or exclusion of the and for segregation or exclusion of the
monetary instrument or property monetary instrument or property
corresponding thereto. The verified corresponding thereto. The verified
petition shall be filed with the court which petition shall be filed with the court which
rendered the judgment of conviction and rendered the judgment of forfeiture, within
order of forfeiture, within fifteen (15) days fifteen (15) days from the date of the
from the date of the order of forfeiture, in finality of the order of forfeiture, in default
default of which the said order shall of which the said order shall become final
become final and executory. This provision and executory. This provision shall apply
shall apply in both civil and criminal in both civil and criminal forfeiture.
forfeiture.
Rule of Procedure
Civil forfeiture proceedings shall be governed by A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC.
the finality of the order of forfeiture, in default of which the said order
shall become executory.
(a) Any person may be charged with and (a) Any person may be charged with and
convicted of both the offense of money convicted of both the offense of money
laundering and the unlawful activity. laundering and the unlawful activity as
herein defined.
(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful (b) The prosecution of any offense or
activity shall be given precedence over the violation under this Act shall proceed
prosecution of any offense or violation independently of any proceeding relating
under this Act without prejudice to the to the unlawful activity.
freezing and other remedies provided.
Facts: The AMLC filed a complaint in RTC Manila for civil forfeiture with
urgent TRO against Glasgow’s bank deposits in City State Savings Bank,
Inc. A 72-hour TRO was granted, but the RTC ultimately ruled in favor of
Glasgow.
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l. State Policy
—Sec 2, SRC (RA 8799)
Purposes
Under Sec 5.2, SRC (approved in 2000), the SEC’s jurisdiction over the
intra-corporate cases enumerated above is transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate RTC. The SC, in the exercise of its
authority, may designate the RTC branches—special commercial
courts—that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases.
Under Sec 5.1, SRC, the SEC shall act with transparency and shall have
the powers and functions provided by the SEC, PD 902-A, the
Corporation Code, the Investment Houses Law, the Financing Company
Act and other existing laws.
They alleged that these were erroneously made and that Roman, in
evident bad faith, never informed the Board that, at the time he made the
proposals and before the resolutions were issued, ALI had already made
substantial initial cash advance in favor of Capitol but directly payable to
Pacific Asia; that ALI had no legal basis to make such cash advances
because Roman had no authority yet when they were made.
These actions prompted them to ask the SEC to investigate the BOD of
Capital, and to order the constitution of a Management Committee
(ManCom) to temporarily oversee Capitol’s affairs.
Roman and Defensor questioned this SEC Order via a petition for
prohibition with the CA.
The CA held that the SEC had the authority to create the ManCom,
under SEC Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 2003. It stated that
the SEC had the power "to do any and all acts to carry out the effective
implementation of the laws it is mandated to enforce, that is, constitute a
management committee; appoint receivers, issue cease and desist
orders to prevent fraud or injury to the public; and such other measures
to carry out its role as a regulator."
The SEC also asserted that under Section 5.1 of the SRC, it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, to determine
whether the petitioners, who were officers of Capitol, violated the SRC
and its implementing rules and regulation.
Issues: (1) May the SEC validly take cognizance of the letter-complaint?
(2) Was the SEC Order issued in excess of its jurisdiction?
Ruling: (1) Yes, the SEC may take cognizance of the complaint here,
provided that their authority is confined only to the extent of ensuring
compliance with the law and imposing penalties for violations.
(2) No, the SEC did not act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered for
the creation of the ManCom.
The SEC granted this, issuing an Order for the creation of a ManCom, in
order to prevent the paralyzation of its business operations. Accordingly,
with the ManCom’s creation, it was also ordered that all pending actions
for claims against BF be suspenses.
In 1993, a deed of absolute sale over a land in Las Pinas was executed
between BF Homes, represented by Orendain “as absolute and
registered owner”, in favor of the Local Superior of the Franciscan Sisters
of the Immaculate Phils Inc (LSF-SIPI).
Orendain moved to dismiss, stating that: (a) the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the suit and that SEC has, because it was instituted against him as
BF’s former receiver appointed by the SEC; (b) that the cause of action
was barred by the 1994 Order which relieved him of his duties; and (c)
BF and its Committee of Receivers had no personality to institute the
action, in the absence of authorization from the SEC.
not barred by the 1994 Order; and (c) it is within the general powers of a
receiver to institute actions to recover property.
The RTC ruled against Orendain. The CA also dismissed his appeal.
Orendain adds that the resolution of the reconveyance case involves the
issue of whether he acted within his powers as receiver it he questioned
transaction, and that its resolution depends on the ratification of the SEC
of his acts as receiver.
Ruling: It is the RTC who has jurisdiction here, not the SEC. This
controversy involves matters purely civil in character and is beyond the
limited jurisdiction of the SEC.
Ruling: Yes. The case should’ve been filed with the RTC which has
jurisdiction to hear intra-corporate controversies.
Under PD 957, the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving unsound real estate business practices, as well as
breach of contractual obligations in the real estate trade. However, this
does not mean that all cases involving subdivision lots or condominium
units automatically fall under its jurisdiction.
In this case, the complaint alleged causes of action that are not
cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action and the
reliefs sought. Petitioners are actually seeking to nullify and invalidate the
Agreement entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its Board Resolution
which authorized the approval of the conversion of certain units from
saleable to common areas. The acts being assailed are actually those of
PHHC, an indispensable party that wasn’t impleaded in the case.
the jurisdiction over which used to belong to the SEC, but has been
transferred to RTC, pursuant to PD 902-A.
The respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA,
citing lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter. They argued
that Vitaliano’s real goal was to maintain custody of the farm in Quezon,
and because the farm is agricultural land, they contended this was an
agrarian dispute which should’ve been brought to the Department of
Agrarian Reform instead. Moreover, they also asserted that the SEC had
already revoked FQB+7’s registration on September 29, 2003 for failure
to comply with reportorial requirements, thus, the corporation had already
been dissolved and is now just continuing for the limited purpose of
Ruling: No. His Complaint did not seek to enter into contracts, issue new
stocks, acquire properties, execute business transactions, etc. Its aim
was not to continue the corporate business, but to determine and
vindicate an stockholder's right to the return of his stockholdings and to
participate in the election of directors, and a corporation's right to remove
usurpers and strangers from its affairs. The real issue raised in the
complaint was the determination of which group is the bona fide or
rightful board of the dissolved corporation.
Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship
must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
controversy itself is intra-corporate.
In other words:
1. The relationship test deals with the status of the parties, and
requires that the controversy must arise out of a intra-corporate
relations; and
2. The controversy test deals with the nature of the question that is
the subject matter of the controversy, and requires that the
dispute among the parties must be intrinsically connected with
the regulation of the corporation, or the enforcement of rights
and obligations under the Corporation Code and the
corporation’s internal rules.
The RTC denied the motion. The CA also held that the RTC had
jurisdiction, because the complaint involved an intra-corporate dispute.
Alejandro Ty, Alexander’s father, filed two complaints for the recovery of
the properties that were placed in the name of his deceased son, but
were actually acquired using Alejandro’s money, without cause or
consideration from his son.
Ruling: No, there was none. When both parties of a dispute are
stockholders of a corporation, it does not necessarily follow that the
dispute is automatically considered intra-corporate in nature. The better
policy in determining which body has jurisdiction over this case would be
to consider, not merely the status of the parties involved, but likewise the
nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy. When the
nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in
character, it is beyond the ambit of the limited jurisdiction of the SEC
(now the RTC acting as special commercial court).
The SEC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. GSIS contends that
under the SRC and the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate Controversies
(2001), the SEC has jurisdiction to investigate alleged violations of the
rules on proxy solicitations.
The acting corporate secretary, et al. contend that the SEC’s jurisdiction
over election protests, including issues on proxy validations, has been
transferred to the RTC, under the SRC’s express provisions.
GSIS counters that there was no election yet when it filed its petition with
the SEC, thus, there could be no election contest yet over which the RTC
may acquire jurisdiction. What it was pointing out was the violation of the
rules on proxy solicitation (a process that happens before proxy
validation), which remains under the SEC’s jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 20 of the SRC and the AIRR-SRC Rule 4, and by virtue of
Section 53.1, the SEC has the discretion "to make such investigations as
it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated" any
rule issued by it,
Issue: Which tribunal has jurisdiction over the issue of proxy solicitation
in this case?
Ruling: The RTC has jurisdiction, even though the GSIS is questioning
“proxy solicitation” specifically. This still falls within an election
controversy properly cognizable by the RTC.
Thus, Astra filed a complaint in the SEC praying for the invalidation of the
proxies in favor of Tia and for the issuance of a CDO to enjoin the
holding of the meeting until the SEC has resolved the issue on the
proxies.
Astra posits that its case does not fall squarely with GSIS v CA where the
SC held that the matter of proxy solicitation is related to the election, so
as to make it an election controversy cognizable by the RTC. It argues
that: (1) the validation of proxies in this case relates to the determination
of the existence of a quorum; and (2) no actual voting for the members of
the board of directors was conducted, as the directors were merely
elected by motion.
Issue: Does the SEC have jurisdiction over controversies arising from
the validation of proxies for the election of the directors?
Case — Primanila Plans, lnc. vs. SEC, GR No. 193791, Aug 6, 2014
Thus, the SEC declared that it violated Section 16 of the SRC which
states: “No person shall sell or offer for sale to the public any pre-need
plan except in accordance with rules and regulations xxx. Such rules
shall regulate the sale of pre-need plans by xxx requiring the registration
of pre-need plans, licensing persons involved in the sale of pre-need
plans xxx”. Because of this violation, the SEC issued a CDO in April of
the same year, “to prevent further violations and to protect the interest of
the plan holders and the public”.
Issue: Did the issuance of the CDO violate petitioner’s right to due
process?
Under Section 64 of the SRC, the SEC may issue a CDO after proper
investigation or verification, motu proprio or upon verified complaint by
any aggrieved party, without the necessity of a prior hearing, if in its
judgment, the act or practice will operate as a fraud on investors or is
likely to cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing
public. Until the SEC issues a COD, the fact that an investigation has
been initiated or that a complaint has been filed shall be confidential.
There is good reason for this provision, because any delay in the
restraint of acts can only generate further injury to the public who the
SEC is obliged to protect.
In this case, these requisites were duly satisfied by the SEC. Primanila
failed to renew its license as per the records in the Non-Traditional
Securities and Instruments Department. A proper investigation was held
by the Compliance and Enforcement Department of the SEC. They
personally conducted an ocular inspection of Primanila’s declared office,
the company website of Primanila, and Primanila’s Metrobank account.
SEC records also confirmed Primanila’s failure to file a registration
statement for its product, to fully remit premium collections, and to
truthfully declare collections in 2007.
Case — GSIS vs. CA, GR Nos. 183905 & 184275, April 16, 2006
Facts: In the petition the GSIS filed with the SEC, seeking annulment of
certain proxies, the GSIS also prayed for the issuance of CDO to restrain
the use of the proxies during the annual stockholder’s meeting. (See
antecedent facts on page 117)
Issue: Since the SC has ruled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the petition (proxy validation) lies with the RTC, and not the SEC, what
happens to the CDO issued by the SEC in relation to the petition?
Ruling: The lack of jurisdiction of the SEC over the subject matter of
GSIS’s petition necessarily invalidates the CDO. However, the SC still
decided to rule on the validity of the CDO issued in this case, for
jurisprudential value and for the guidance of the SEC.
It would appear that the SEC committed two fatal errors: (1) it neglected
to expressly state the specific legal basis for the issuance of the CDO;
and (2) only one Commissioner signed it.
First fatal error: Under the SRC, there are 3 distinct legal bases for the
issuance of a CDO.
In the case of Section 53.3, the SEC must make two findings:
1. that such person has engaged in any such act or practice;
2. that there is a reasonable likelihood of continuing (or engaging
in) further or future violations by such person.
In the case of Section 64, the SEC must adjudge that the act, unless
restrained, will operate as a fraud on investors or is otherwise likely to
cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing public.
As to the term of the CDO, Section 53.3 states that the CDO shall have a
life of 10 days. Section 64.1 does not provide for a specific period, but
64.2 allows the accused company to file a request to lift within 5 days
from its issuance, and this should be heard within 15 days by the SEC.
The CDO in this case was not precisely clear whether it was issued on
the basis of Section 5.1, Section 53.3 or Section 64 of the SRC. The
CDO actually cites all three provisions.
The error of the SEC in granting the CDO without stating which kind of
CDO it was issuing is unpardonable, because it contravenes due process
of law.
Second fatal error: To make matters worse for the SEC, the CDO was
signed by only one commissioner.
In this case, Commissioner Martinez (the one who signed) is not the
entire SEC. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the SEC. The
SEC acts through a five-person body, and the five members of the
commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a
case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.
lV. Securities
—Sec 3.1, SRC
A. Definition of Terms
—Sec 3.2 - 3.4, 3.8 - 3.10, SRC
3.4) Dealer means any person who buys and sells securities for his/her
own account in the ordinary course of business.
3.9) Pre-need plans are contracts which provide for the performance of
future services of or the payment of future monetary considerations at
the time actual need, for which plan holders pay in cash or installment at
stated prices, with or without interest or insurance coverage and includes
life, pension, education, interment, and other plans which the SEC may
from time to time approve.
B. Registration of Securities
—Sec 8.1- 8.3, SRC
8.3) Written Offer for Sale — The SEC may specify the terms and
conditions under which any written communication, including any
summary prospectus, shall be deemed not to constitute an offer for sale.
C. Exempt Securities
—Sec 9.1, SRC
D. Exempt Transactions
—Sec 10.1 & 10.2, SRC
10.1) The requirement of registration does not apply to the sale of any
security in any of the following transactions:
1. At any judicial sale, or sale by an executor, administrator,
guardian or receiver or trustee in insolvency or bankruptcy.
2. By or for the account of a pledge holder, or mortgagee or any of
a pledge lien holder selling of offering for sale or delivery in the
ordinary course of business and not for the purpose of avoiding
the provision of the SRC, to liquidate a bonafide debt, a security
pledged in good faith as security for such debt.
3. An isolated transaction in which any security is sold, offered for
sale, subscription or delivery by the owner therefore, or by his
representative for the owner’s account, such sale or offer for sale
or offer for sale, subscription or delivery not being made in the
course of repeated and successive transaction of a like character
by such owner, or on his account by such representative and
such owner or representative not being the underwriter of such
security.
4. The distribution by a corporation actively engaged in the
business authorized by its articles of incorporation, of securities
10.2) The Commission may exempt other transactions, if it finds that the
requirements of registration under the SRC is not necessary in the public
interest or for the protection of the investors such as by the reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering.
V. Investment Contract
The CA, however, set aside the CDO and ruled that following the “Howey
test” the scheme does not constitute an investment contract.
Ruling: No. The elements under the Howey test were not satisfied.
Ruling: Yes. An investment contract is defined in the IRR of the SRC as
a "contract, transaction or scheme (collectively ‘contract’) whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits primarily from the efforts of others."
24.1) It shall be unlawful for any person acting for himself or through a
dealer or broker, directly or indirectly:
1. To create a false or misleading appearance of active trading in
any listed security traded in an Exchange of any other trading
market:
a. By effecting any transaction in such security which
involves no change in the beneficial ownership;
b. By entering an order or orders for the purchase or sale
of such security with the knowledge that a simultaneous
order or orders of substantially the same size, time, and
price, for the sale or purchase of any such security, has
or will be entered by or for the same or different parties;
or
c. By performing a similar act where there is no change in
beneficial ownership.
2. To affect, alone or with others, a securities or transactions in
securities that:
Neither shall any short sale be effected nor any stop-loss order be
executed in connection with the purchase or sale of any security except
in accordance with such rules and regulations as the SEC may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest for the protection of
investors.
24.3) The SEC, having due regard to the public interest and the
protection of investors, may, by rules and regulations, allow certain acts
or transactions that may otherwise be prohibited under this Section.
Insider means:
1. the issuer;
2. a director or officer (or any person performing similar functions)
of, or a person controlling, the issuer who gives or gave him
access to material information about the issuer or the security
that is not generally available to the public;
3. a government employee, director, or officer of an exchange,
clearing agency, or self-regulatory organization who has access
to material information about an issuer or a security that is not
generally available to the public; or
4. a person who learns such information by a communication from
any forgoing insiders.
Exceptions:
a. The insider proves that the information was not gained from such
relationship;
b. If the other party selling to or buying from the insider (or his
agent) is identified, the insider proves: (i) that he disclosed the
information to the other party, or (ii) that he had reason to believe
that the other party otherwise is also in possession of the
information.
The SEC averred that it received reports that Interport failed to make
timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its
directors heavily traded Interport shares utilizing this material insider
information.
Interport and its Officers contend in their omnibus motions that SEC had
no authority to investigate the subject matter, since under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, jurisdiction was conferred
upon the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC.
SEC filed a Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders so that the
case may be investigated by the PED in accordance with the SEC Rules
and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, and not by the special body whose
creation the SEC had earlier ordered.
Insiders have the duty to disclose material facts which are known to them
by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom
they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment. In
some cases, however, there may be valid corporate reasons for the
nondisclosure of material information. Where such reasons exist, an
issuer's decision not to make any public disclosures is not ordinarily
considered as a violation of insider trading. At the same time, the
undisclosed information should not be improperly used for non-corporate
purposes, particularly to disadvantage other persons with whom an
insider might transact, and therefore the insider must abstain from
entering into transactions involving such securities.
(c) Materiality Concept - Materiality "will depend at any given time upon
a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and
the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
company activity." Ideally, it would be desirable to have absolute
certainty in the application of the materiality concept, but such a goal is
illusory and unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmental in nature
Even assuming that the term "beneficial ownership" was vague, it would
not affect respondents' case, where the respondents are directors and/or
officers of the corporation, who are specifically required to comply with
the reportorial requirements under Section 36(a) of the Revised
Securities Act. The validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
Second issue: While the case was pending, the SRC took effect on
August 8, 2000. It repealed Section 8 of PD 902-A which created the
PED. Thus, under the new law, the PED is abolished. Does this affect
the case?
Here, a criminal case may still be filed against the respondents despite
the repeal, since Sections 8, 12, 26, 27 and 23 of the Securities
Regulations Code impose duties that are substantially similar to Sections
8, 30, and 36 of the repealed Revised Securities Act.
The same acts are penalized and some provisions are even lifted from
the old law.
In a disclosure letter, BCI informed the PSE that it is selling all of BCI’s
and ACC’s stocks in UCHC to Cemco.
Issue: Does the rule on mandatory tender offer apply to the indirect
acquisition of shares in a listed company, in this case, the indirect
acquisition by Cemco of 36% of UCC, a publicly-listed company, through
its purchase of the shares in UCHC, a non-listed company?
The coverage of the mandatory tender offer rule covers not only direct
acquisition but also indirect acquisition or "any type of acquisition."
It gives the minority shareholders the chance to exit the company under
reasonable terms, giving them the opportunity to sell their shares at the
same price as those of the majority shareholders.
Case — Osmena lll vs. SSS, GR No. 165272, September 13, 2007
BDO-EPCI, stands now as the issuer of what were once the subject
Shares. Consequently, should SSS opt to exit from BDO and BDO
Capital, or BDO Capital, in turn, opt to pursue SSS’s shareholdings in
EPCIB, as thus converted into BDO shares, the sale-purchase ought to
be via an Issuer Tender Offer -- a phrase which means a publicly
announced intention by an issuer to acquire any of its own class of equity
19.1) Definitions
The exemption shall not become effective until publicly disclosed by the
purchaser in a newspaper of general circulation. Such disclosure shall
describe the proposed transaction and indicate the provision (under Rule
19 paragraph 3) under which exemption was claimed.
Any person seeking an exemption under this paragraph may not rely
upon the grant of a previous exemption and shall separately apply for
such relief.
X. Proxy Solicitation
—Sec 20, SRC
20.3) Unless otherwise provided in the proxy, it shall be valid only for the
meeting for which it is intended. No proxy shall be valid and effective for
a period longer than 5 years at one time.
20.5) A broker or dealer who holds or acquire the proxy for at least 10%,
or such percentage as the SEC may prescribe, of the outstanding share
of such issuer, shall submit a report identifying the beneficial owner of 10
days after such acquisition, for its own account or customer, to the issuer
of security, to the exchange where the security is traded, and to the SEC.
(a) The issuer and every person who signed the registration statement:
(b) Every person who was a director of, or any other person performing
similar functions, or a partner in, the issuer at the time of the filing of the
registration statement or any part, supplement or amendment thereof
with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(d) Every auditor or auditing firm named as having certified any financial
statements used in connection with the registration statement or
prospectus.
(e) Every person who, with his written consent, which shall be filed with
the registration statement, has been named as having prepared or
certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or
certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the
registration statement, with respect to the statement, report, or valuation,
which purports to have been prepared or certified by him.
56.2) If the person who acquired the security did so after the issuer has
made generally available to its security holders an income statement
covering a period of at least 12 months beginning from the effective date
of the registration statement, then the right of recovery under this
subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person acquired the
security relying upon such untrue statement in the registration statement
or relying upon the registration statement and not knowing of such
income statement, but such reliance may be established without proof of
the reading of the registration statement by such person.
ny person who:
Who is liable? A
(b) Offers to sell or sells a security, whether or not exempted by the SRC,
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication, by means of a prospectus or other written or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
(the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall
fail in the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission.
Who is liable? Any person who shall make or cause to be made any
statement in any report or document filed pursuant to SRC or any SEC
rule or regulation, that is false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, at the time and in light of the circumstances under which it was
made.
Defense: The person will not be liable if he proves that he acted in good
faith and had no knowledge that the statement he made was false or
misleading.
What is the liability? He is jointly and severally liable with, and to the
same extent as, the insider, or person in the case of a tender offer, to
whom the communication was directed and who is liable under
Subsection 61.1 by reason of his purchase or sale of a security.
——Nothing follows——