Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659

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Journal of Experimental Child

Psychology
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jecp

Young children’s counterfactual thinking:

Triggered by the negative emotions of others
Keito Nakamichi
Faculty of Education, Chiba University, Inage-ku, Chiba 263-8522, Japan

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Three experiments examined the influence of other people’s nega-
Received 17 November 2018 tive emotions on young children’s counterfactual thinking.
Revised 28 June 2019 Experiment 1 (N = 48) explored whether 4- to 6-year-olds could
30 June 2019
think counterfactually about both physical and emotional events
Available online 2 August 2019
using the discriminating counterfactual tasks that children could
not respond correctly without thinking counterfactually.
Keywords:
Counterfactual reasoning
Experiment 1 showed that 4- to 6-year-olds could think of counter-
Counterfactual thinking factuals associated with emotional events. Experiment 2 (N = 97)
Preschooler and Experiment 3 (N = 48) examined whether a protagonist’s emo-
Early childhood tional state (emotional expression condition) affected 4- to 6-year-
Cognitive development olds’ ability to think counterfactually about physical events. It was
Emotion shown that emotional expression conditions enhanced young chil-
dren’s counterfactual thinking about physical events. These find-
ings suggest that 5- and 6-year-olds can think counterfactually
and that emotional components trigger such thinking.
Ó 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access
article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).

Introduction

Counterfactual thinking is a form of thinking that considers alternative possibilities for an event or
behavior in the past. Counterfactual thinking has an adaptive significance for humans in that it allows
us to learn from past negative experiences and to avoid negative outcomes in the future (Byrne, 2005,
2016; Epstude & Roese, 2008). Moreover, counterfactual thinking has an important role in children’s
cognitive development. Counterfactual thinking during early childhood is closely associated with the
following key abilities: understanding causal relations (German, 1999; Harris, German, & Mills, 1996),

E-mail address: nakamichi@chiba-u.jp

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.012
0022-0965/Ó 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
2 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659

acquiring theory of mind (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Rafetseder & Perner, 2018; Riggs, Peterson,
Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998), understanding regret and relief (e.g., Beck & Crilly, 2009; Guttentag &
Ferrell, 2004), and engaging in pretend play (Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, & Gopnik, 2012).
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the development of counterfactual thinking in the
field of cognitive development (see Beck & Riggs, 2014; Rafetseder & Perner, 2014). One of the main
areas explored in the previous studies is the question of when the capacity for counterfactual thinking
is acquired. Studies of the development of counterfactual thinking have shown mixed results. In their
pioneering work on the development of counterfactual thinking, Harris et al. (1996) presented
children with a scenario that involved a causal chain in the following form: initial state -> causal
event -> effect state (e.g., the floor is clean -> Susie walks across the floor with muddy shoes -> the
floor gets dirty). They then asked each child a counterfactual question (e.g., ‘‘What would have
happened if Susie had taken off her muddy shoes?”; correct answer: the floor would have remained
clean). More than 70% of 3-year-olds were able to get the right answer to this counterfactual question.
Studies based on this approach (Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2010; German, 1999; German & Nichols, 2003;
Nakamichi, 2011; Riggs et al., 1998) have demonstrated that children are capable of counterfactual
thinking by around 5 or 6 years of age.
By contrast, Rafetseder and colleagues (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010; Rafetseder,
Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013; see Rafetseder & Perner, 2014, for a review) have argued that 5- and 6-
year-olds find it difficult to use counterfactual thinking and that the development of counterfactual
thinking is a long-term process. In one experiment, Rafetseder et al. (2013, Experiment 2) asked both
5- to 15-year-old children and adults to perform counterfactual tasks referred to as the discriminating
tasks. Rafetseder et al. presented each participant with a scenario involving a causal chain in the fol-
lowing form: initial state -> first causal event -> interim effect state -> second causal event -> final
effect state (e.g., the floor is clean -> Susie walks across the floor with muddy shoes -> the floor gets
dirty -> Max walks across the floor with muddy shoes -> the floor gets dirty”). They then asked each
participant a counterfactual question (e.g., ‘‘What would happen if Max took off his muddy shoes?”;
correct answer: the floor would still be dirty). This discriminating task looks similar to the simplified
task in Harris et al. (1996). Unlike the latter task, however, the discriminating task has the structure
that does not allow a child to produce the correct answer without taking into account the premises of
the scenario (e.g., even if Max took his shoes off, Susie would still walk across the floor with muddy
shoes). The results showed that 5- and 6-year-olds and 7- to 10-year-olds (percentages of correct
answers = 18% and 53%, respectively) performed less well than 13- to 15-year-olds and adults (per-
centages of correct answers = 88% and 95%, respectively). Moreover, 5- and 6-year-olds performed
lower than chance, and 7- to 10-year-olds performed higher than chance. In contrast to studies
(Beck et al., 2010; German, 1999; German & Nichols, 2003; Nakamichi, 2011; Riggs et al., 1998) based
on the approach used by Harris et al. (1996), the results of Rafetseder et al. (2013) suggest that 5- and
6-year-olds find it difficult to use counterfactual thinking and that children do not acquire an adult-
level mode of counterfactual thinking until around 12 years of age.
Based on these experimental results, Rafetseder and colleagues (Rafetseder et al., 2010, 2013;
Rafetseder and Perner, 2014) have argued that the tasks based on Harris et al. (1996) are a simplified
structure and that such tasks cannot adequately measure a child’s capacity for counterfactual think-
ing. For example, in response to the question ‘‘If Susie was to take off her muddy shoes, . . .?”, children
might answer ‘‘the floor would be clean” based on a generally conceivable premise (e.g., if you take off
your shoes, the floor won’t get dirty) even if children ignore the original scenario. Rafetseder and col-
leagues have called this inference from the general premise basic conditional reasoning and suggested
the need to examine the development of counterfactual thinking using tasks that do not allow chil-
dren to produce a correct answer unless they think of a counterfactual possibility based on the actual
event rather than tasks that allow children to produce a correct answer via basic conditional
reasoning.
By distinguishing between basic conditional reasoning and counterfactual thinking in young chil-
dren, Rafetseder et al. (2010, 2013) have offered important evidence with respect to the development
of counterfactual thinking. However, the fact that 5- and 6-year-olds found it difficult to complete the
discriminating tasks in Rafetseder and colleagues’ studies does not necessarily prove that the children
lacked all capacity for counterfactual thinking. Several studies have shown success on counterfactual
 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659 3

tasks at age 6 years or younger when the causal structure of the events is clear (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019;
Nyhout, Henke, & Ganea, 2019) and the task demands on memory and attentional resources are
reduced (McCormack, Ho, Gribben, O’Conner, & Hoerl, 2018; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). For example,
Nyhout and Ganea (2019) presented 3- to 5-year-olds with a ‘‘blicket detector” machine that had a
clear and novel structure for children and then asked counterfactual questions (e.g., ‘‘If she did not
put the block on the box, would the light still be on?”). As a result, 4- and 5-year-olds’ performances
were above chance level, although 3-year-olds’ performances were not. These studies suggest that
young children display mature counterfactual thinking under specified conditions. In addition,
Rafetseder and Perner (2018) mentioned the possibility that the performance of Rafetseder et al.
(2013, Experiment 2) task was affected by materials and procedure (e.g., footprints were differently
colored or not, two protagonists entered the scene at the same time or not).
Furthermore, it is possible that the tasks developed by Rafetseder and colleagues did not raise
young children’s needs to consider counterfactual worlds with better outcomes even among those
who did have the ability to think counterfactually. Counterfactual thinking about a specific event is
activated particularly by the event’s negative outcome valence (the general value the result can have),
which has an adaptive significance because it can preempt negative outcomes that could occur in the
future (Byrne, 2005, 2016; Epstude & Roese, 2008). For example, in the course of reviewing previous
studies, Byrne (2016) demonstrated that adults tend to think of counterfactual alternatives more fre-
quently for events that are likely to lead to negative outcomes than for events that are likely to lead to
positive or neutral outcomes.
This characteristic of adult counterfactual thinking is also seen in young children (German, 1999)
and school children (Guajardo, McNally, & Wright, 2016). German (1999) told 5-year-olds about an
event in which the protagonist’s decision could produce either a positive outcome or a negative out-
come (e.g., in a situation where the protagonist could have chosen either a jacket or a cardigan, he or
she wore the cardigan and played outside -> the protagonist is able to play outside all day/the protag-
onist catches a cold and needs to go home early). Participants were then asked to explain the event
outcomes. In this experiment, 5-year-olds produced more counterfactual statements (e.g., the protag-
onist should have chosen the jacket) for events that could lead to negative outcomes than for events
that were likely to lead to positive outcomes. In this way, counterfactual thinking can be invoked by
the negative outcome valence of an event even in young children. All of Rafetseder and colleagues’
counterfactual tasks dealt with physical events that were associated with a relatively ambivalent out-
come valence. For example, the physical state of Max and Susie’s footprints on the floor in the above
scenario does not necessarily have a negative valence for children. This may be the reason why young
children found it difficult to perform Rafetseder and colleagues’ counterfactual task.
In association with these findings, Epstude and Roese (2008) proposed the functional theory of
adult counterfactual thinking. Their theory suggested that the recognition of a problem activates
counterfactual thinking and that the recognition process was influenced by human emotion: ‘‘Nega-
tive affect may also influence the activation of counterfactual thinking” (p. 171). Compared with neu-
tral or positive emotions, negative emotion may signal that there is a potential problem in the
outcome of an event or behavior, thereby encouraging the individual to seek an alternative option that
could produce a better outcome. In short, human negative emotion plays an essential role in triggering
counterfactual thinking by clearly conveying the outcome valence of an event.
In line with theoretical postulates of adult counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008),
Guajardo, Parker, and Turley-Ames (2009) and Nakamichi (2011) have demonstrated that young chil-
dren are better able to use counterfactual thinking when considering events that are related to human
emotion compared to physical events without human emotion (in particular negative emotion). For
example, Nakamichi (2011) presented 3- to 6-year-olds with a scenario about events involving phys-
ical change (e.g., there is a glass cup on the desk -> the cup falls from the desk -> the cup breaks) or
human emotional change (e.g., Taro looks at the flower, which makes him happy -> a dog steps on
the flower -> Taro feels sad) and then asked a counterfactual question about each of these events
(e.g., ‘‘If the cup had not fallen, what would it look like?”, ‘‘If the dog had not stepped on the flower,
how would Taro feel?”). Children’s performance in the emotional task (percentage of correct
answers = 76%) was better than their performance in the physical task (percentage of correct
answers = 55%) and beyond chance for all ages. Furthermore, Guajardo et al. (2009) told 3- to
4 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659

5-year-olds about events involving either physical or emotional change and asked, ‘‘How could the
outcome be changed?”—allowing them to freely produce counterfactual possibilities in response to
each event. Children produced more upward counterfactual statements (i.e., resulting in better out-
comes) for the emotional event than for the physical event. Based on these studies (Guajardo et al.,
2009; Nakamichi, 2011) following the approach of Harris et al. (1996), the young children apparently
were capable of counterfactual thinking when an event was associated with humans’ negative emo-
tion rather than mere physical change, although this effect on young children’s counterfactual think-
ing might not be stable; Beck et al. (2010) contrasted physical and emotional contents in
counterfactual tasks and did not find consistent differences in 3- and 4-year-olds.
These results suggest the possibility that a component of negative human emotion in an event can
clarify the event outcome valence and trigger the ability to think counterfactually in young children.
The events in the counterfactual tasks developed by Rafetseder et al. (2013) involved physical change
only; they had no emotional component such as the protagonist’s emotional state. For this reason,
Rafetseder et al. failed to prove that young children genuinely cannot engage in counterfactual think-
ing. Guajardo et al. (2009) and Nakamichi (2011) based their approaches on Harris et al. (1996); con-
sequently, it is not clear whether children’s better performance in counterfactual tasks associated with
an event involving emotional changes was triggered by human emotional components or by basic
conditional reasoning (Rafetseder et al., 2010, 2013; Rafetseder & Perner, 2014).
The current study explored the impact of negative emotional components on young children’s
counterfactual thinking using tasks that are difficult to answer correctly without taking the actual
events into account (i.e., discriminating counterfactual tasks) rather than tasks that could be easily
answered using basic conditional reasoning. Three experiments were carried out in this study. Exper-
iment 1 compared children’s performance in the physical event task that involved physical change and
no negative emotional component with their performance in the emotional event task that involved
the change of emotional state. Based on Guajardo et al. (2009) and Nakamichi (2011), young children
should perform better on the emotional event task than on the physical event task even using discrim-
inating counterfactual tasks. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 used the physical event task from Exper-
iment 1 to discover whether focusing on a protagonist’s negative response to an event outcome would
encourage young children to think counterfactually. In these three experiments, according to the
results of Rafetseder et al. (2010, 2013), it was predicted that young children would find it difficult
to carry out tasks associated with a physical event. However, if a human’s negative emotion did trigger
counterfactual thinking in young children, better performance could be expected in tasks involving
human emotion across all experiments.

Experiment 1

Method

Participants
The participants were 48 children aged 4 to 6 years (24 boys and 24 girls; Mage = 63.56 months,
SD = 7.47, range = 52–75) recruited from three public nursery schools in Shizuoka, Japan. All partici-
pants were Japanese native speakers from middle-income families. The children were divided into
two age groups: a younger group with 24 children (12 boys and 12 girls; Mage = 57.01 months,
SD = 3.38, range = 52–64) and an older group with 24 children (12 boys and 12 girls; Mage = 70.13 -
months, SD = 3.57, range = 65–75), following the Japanese education system of classification.

Materials
Based on earlier studies (Guajardo et al., 2009; Nakamichi, 2011; Rafetseder et al., 2013), six sce-
narios were created: three involving a physical event (cup, footprint, and sandbox scenarios) and three
involving an emotional event (garden, zoo, and birthday scenarios). Original Japanese scripts for the
stories are provided in the Appendix. In each scenario, six pictures (approximately 14.5
14.5 cm)
were used to present the content. Fig. 1 presents the cup and garden scenario pictures used to depict
those emotional and physical events. The physical event scenarios did not refer to the emotional state
 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659 5

Fig. 1. Examples of a physical event scenario (pictures in the first row) and an emotional event scenario (pictures in the second
row) in Experiment 1.

of the protagonist, describing only a physical change. The emotional event scenarios described the
protagonist’s emotional state, changing from a positive emotion to a negative emotion. For each sce-
nario, the first picture displayed an introductory scene. This was followed by a series of pictures in
which the causal structure took the following form: initial state of a physical object/emotion -> first
causal event -> interim state of the physical object/emotion -> second causal event -> final state of
the physical object/emotion. In addition, in each scenario three pictures depicted different answers
to the counterfactual question (Fig. 2).

Procedure
All of the steps in this experiment were reviewed and approved by the affiliated university’s com-
mittee for ethical research involving human participants. The principals in the nursery schools
informed the parents about the experiment and received consent from parents for their children to
participate. Written consent was obtained from a principal of each nursery school, acting as a surro-
gate for the parents. Verbal assent was obtained from the children before they participated in the
experiment.
Each participant was interviewed individually in a quiet room. The interviews lasted for approxi-
mately 20 min. All of the participants were asked to perform tasks involving six scenarios: three phys-
ical event tasks and three emotional event tasks. In each age group, half of the participants were
initially assigned three physical tasks, followed by three emotional tasks; the other half were assigned
the same tasks in reverse order. The order of three tasks (both physical and emotional) was counter-
balanced. After each scenario, participants were asked to answer the Now control question (‘‘What
was the state of object/emotion at the end of the scenario?”), the Before control question (‘‘What
was the state of object/emotion at the beginning of the scenario?”), and the counterfactual Test ques-
tion (‘‘If the second causal event had been different, how would the final state have changed?”).

(A) (B) (C) (A') (B') (C')

(correct answer) (correct answer)

Fig. 2. Examples of response options for the physical scenario (left-hand pictures: A–C) and the emotional scenario (right-hand
pictures: A0 –C0 ) in Experiment 1.
6 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659

In each task, the scenario was described to participants by using picture story cards. For instance,
participants heard the following scenarios:
Physical event task, cup scenario: [introductory picture in Fig. 1] Here are Jiro and Satoko. They are
playing with blocks on the desk. There is a glass cup on the desk. [initial state picture] This is a glass
cup on the desk. The glass cup has two handles. [first causal event picture] As they play with the
toys, Satoko’s block hits the cup. [interim state picture] One of the cup handles breaks. [second cau-
sal event picture] Right after that, Jiro’s hand hits the cup and it falls off the desk. [final state pic-
ture] Both cup handles get broken.

Emotional event task, garden scenario: [introductory picture in Fig. 1] This is Keiko. Keiko is carrying
a piece of candy while looking at a flower in the garden. [initial state picture] Keiko loves candy and
flowers, so she is very happy. [first causal event picture] After a while, a dog comes along, steps on
the flower, and squashes it. [interim state picture] Keiko feels a bit sad. [second causal event pic-
ture] Right after that, Keiko tries to eat her candy but drops it. [final state picture] Keiko feels very
sad.

After the story cards were placed out of children’s sight following the end of the story, participants
were asked to answer two control questions. The Now question involved the final situation in the sce-
nario, and the Before question involved the initial situation in the scenario. For example, in the cup
scenario, the questions were ‘‘At the end of the scenario, did the cup have two handles?” (Now ques-
tion) and ‘‘At the beginning of the scenario, did the cup have two handles?” (Before question). In the
garden scenario, the two questions were ‘‘At the end of the scenario, did Keiko feel happy or very sad?”
(Now question) and ‘‘At the beginning of the scenario, did Keiko feel happy or very sad?” (Before ques-
tion). To avoid response bias, the order of presenting these questions was counterbalanced.
Finally, participants were asked to select one of three possible answers to the counterfactual Test
question: ‘‘If the second causal event had been different, what would the final state have been?” For
instance, in the cup scenario, participants were asked to choose an answer to the question ‘‘If the cup
had not fallen off the desk, what would the cup look like now?” The three choices were a picture of the
cup with no handles (Fig. 2A: final state), a picture of the cup with two handles (Fig. 2B: initial state),
and a picture of the cup with only one handle (Fig. 2C: correct answer). Likewise, in the garden sce-
nario, participants were asked to select one of three possible answers to the question ‘‘If Keiko had
not dropped her candy, how would she feel right now?” The three choices were a face looking very
sad (Fig. 2A’: final state), a face looking happy (Fig. 2B’: initial state), and a face looking slightly sad
(Fig. 2C’: correct answer). For each question, the experimenter presented the final state choice at
the beginning, followed by the remaining two choices at random. Two control questions and a test
question were prepared for each of the other scenarios, in accordance with storylines.

Results

The preliminary analyses did not show differences in task performance by gender and task order.
So, the following analyses combined data for these factors.

Understanding the contents of scenarios

The percentage of correct answers was 95.5% overall for the control questions. In the physical event
tasks, the percentages of correct answers were 94.7% for the Now questions, 93.2% for the Before ques-
tions, and 94.0% overall. In the emotional event tasks, the percentages of correct answers were 98.5%
for the Now questions, 95.5% for the Before questions, and 97.0% overall. Many participants demon-
strated a good understanding of the scenario events. However, some participants gave only one wrong
answer to the control questions, with 9 participants failing in physical event tasks and 6 participants
failing in emotional event tasks. For this reason, they were not excluded from the sample. Instead, to
reflect participants’ different ways of understanding the scenarios, if a participant answered any of the
control questions incorrectly, 0 points were assigned to the corresponding test question regardless of
whether the participant gave the correct answer or not.
 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659 7

Answers to the counterfactual questions

Participants received 1 point if they answered the two control and counterfactual test questions
correctly in each scenario. Afterward, the scores for all three scenarios in both physical and emotional
event tasks were totaled to provide a counterfactual score (Max = 3 each). Table 1 shows the mean
scores and the numbers and percentages of children receiving scores of 0, 1, 2, and 3 by age group
and task.
First, a generalized estimating equation (GEE) analysis was conducted. This GEE model included
age group (younger or older) as a between-participants predictor, task (physical or emotional) as a
within-participants variable, and the counterfactual score (out of 3) as the dependent variable. The
results showed that the older group had only a marginally higher score compared with the younger
group, B = 1.07, SE = 0.59, Wald v2(1) = 3.28, p = .070, odds ratio = 2.90, 95% confidence interval (CI)
[0.92, 9.20]. In addition, the main effect of the task was significant, with the emotional event task gain-
ing a higher counterfactual score than the physical event task, B = 3.51, SE = 0.64, Wald v2(1) = 29.68,
p < .001, odds ratio = 33.57, 95% CI [9.48, 118.82]. The Age Group
Task interaction was not signifi-
cant (p = .785).
Second, a one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test using a counterfactual score was carried out by
age group and task to analyze the difference between participants’ performances and chance level
(chance = 1.00). In the physical event tasks, the younger group’s score was significantly lower than
chance (Z = 2.84, p = .005, r = .58), whereas no significant difference was seen between the older
group’s score and chance (Z = 0.94, p = .346, r = .19). In the emotional event tasks, the scores were
significantly higher than chance for the younger group (Z = 3.84, p < .001, r = .78) and the older group
(Z = 4.04, p < .001, r = .83). Moreover, the analyses using children’s actual response (taking no account
of answer to control questions) showed similar results (physical event tasks: younger group,
Z = 2.52, p = .012; older group, Z = 1.27, p = .206); emotional event tasks: younger group, Z = 4.67,
p < .001; older group, Z = 3.84, p < .001).

Discussion

In Experiment 1, the discriminating counterfactual tasks that are difficult to answer correctly with-
out taking the actual events into account were used to assess the counterfactual thinking of 4- to 6-
year-olds. First, the older group (percentage of correct answers = 51.3%) performed better than the
younger group (percentage of correct answers = 39.7%), meaning that the ability of counterfactual
thinking improved from 3 to 6 years of age. Moreover, participants found it more difficult to perform
physical event tasks (percentage of correct answers = 21.5%) than to perform emotional event tasks
(percentage of correct answers = 69.5%). The performance of the younger group was below chance,
whereas the performance of the older group was similar to chance. Some studies that have used sim-
ple tasks, solvable using basic conditional reasoning (e.g., German & Nichols, 2003; Harris et al., 1996),

Table 1
Numbers and percentages of children receiving scores of 0 to 3 as a function of age group and task in Experiment 1 (between = age
group; within = task).

Mean score Receiving score Total

0 1 2 3
Physical event task
Younger group 0.5 (0.78) 16 (66.7%) 6 (25.0%) 1 (4.2%) 1 (4.2%) 24
Older group 0.8 (0.87) 10 (41.7%) 9 (37.5%) 4 (16.7%) 1 (4.2%) 24
Total 0.7 (0.84) 26 (54.2%) 15 (31.3%) 5 (10.4%) 2 (4.2%) 48
Emotional event task
Younger group 1.9 (0.72) 1 (4.2%) 4 (16.7%) 15 (62.5%) 4 (16.7%) 24
Older group 2.3 (0.74) 0 (0.0%) 4 (16.7%) 10 (41.7%) 10 (41.7%) 24
Total 2.1 (0.74) 1 (2.1%) 8 (16.7%) 25 (52.1%) 14 (29.2%) 48

Note. Standard deviations and percentages are given in parentheses.

8 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659

have previously suggested that 3- and 4-year-olds are capable of counterfactual thinking. However,
the results of Experiment 1 suggest that children under 5 years of age find it extremely difficult to
think counterfactually about physical events that do not involve an emotional component. The diffi-
culty with performing physical event tasks in our study was consistent with the findings of
Rafetseder et al. (2013) that used discriminating counterfactual tasks (percentage of correct answers
in 5- and 6-year-olds = 18%).
Participants in this study performed better in emotional event tasks than they did in physical event
tasks, with all age groups performing above chance. These results confirm the results of studies that
have compared performance in physical events with performance in emotional events (Guajardo et al.,
2009; Nakamichi, 2011). In other words, the current study showed that even when using an approach
based on more stringent standards (i.e., discriminating tasks), children under 5 years of age can think
counterfactually about emotional events but not about physical events without emotional compo-
nents. This result suggests that young children not only use basic conditional reasoning but also think
counterfactually about events with an emotional component.
However, the results of Experiment 1 do not prove that negative emotion triggers counterfactual
thinking in young children. It might simply be less demanding for young children to think about
changes in an emotional state than to think about changes in a physical state. Consequently, a further
experiment was needed to examine the effect of negative emotion on young children’s counterfactual
thinking. If negative emotion triggers counterfactual thinking, young children should be capable of
thinking counterfactually about physical events by presenting them with the protagonist’s negative
emotion. Thus, in Experiment 2, we created the new condition (i.e., emotional expression condition)
that was designed to add negative emotional components to the physical events used in Experiment 1.

Experiment 2

Method

Participants
The participants were 97 children aged 4 to 6 years (46 boys and 51 girls; Mage = 64.34 months,
SD = 6.56, range = 53–76) recruited from three public nursery schools in Shizuoka. All of the partici-
pants spoke Japanese as their first language and were members of middle-income families. These chil-
dren were divided into two groups: a younger group with 47 children (23 boys and 24 girls;
Mage = 58.47 months, SD = 3.23, range = 53–64) and an older group with 50 children (23 boys and
27 girls; Mage = 69.86 months, SD = 3.21, range = 65–76), as with the classification of Experiment 1.
None of the participants from Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2.

Materials
This experiment used the three physical event scenarios from Experiment 1 (the cup, footprint, and
sandbox scenarios). The six pictures representing the content of the event and three pictures of pos-
sible answers to the counterfactual question were used in each scenario. In the emotional expression
conditions, in addition to the six pictures mentioned above, ‘‘a picture of the initial emotional state of
the protagonist” (positive emotion) and ‘‘a picture of the final emotional state of the protagonist” (neg-
ative emotion) were used in each scenario. Fig. 3 shows the pictures used for both the control and
emotional expression conditions.

Procedure
All of the steps in this experiment were reviewed and approved by the affiliated university’s com-
mittee for ethical research involving human participants. As with Experiment 1, written consent was
obtained from a principal of each nursery school, and verbal assent was obtained from the children.
Participants were assigned to either the control condition or the emotional expression condition. In
total, 24 children in the younger group (12 boys and 12 girls; Mage = 59.04 months) and 25 children in
the older group (11 boys and 14 girls; Mage = 70.32 months) were assigned to the control condition,
whereas 23 children in the younger group (11 boys and 12 girls; Mage = 57.87 months) and 25 children
 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659 9

Fig. 3. Examples of a control condition scenario (upper pictures) and an emotional expression condition scenario (lower
pictures) in Experiment 2: (A) initial protagonists’ emotional state; (B) final protagonist’s emotional state.

in the older group (12 boys and 13 girls; Mage = 69.40 months) were assigned to the emotional expres-
sion condition. No significant differences in months of age by condition or gender were seen in these
age groups.
Each participant was interviewed individually in a quiet room. The interview lasted for approxi-
mately 15 min. In both conditions, participants were asked to perform three counterfactual tasks.
The order of presenting three tasks was counterbalanced among participants. In the control condition,
the scenario for each task was described while the picture story cards were presented to participants.
For example, the footprint scenario went as follows:
[introductory picture in Fig. 3] This is Taro, the older brother, and Hanako, his younger sister. The
two are playing outside and have mud on their shoes. [initial state picture] This is the inside of Taro
and Hanako’s house. Today, the floor is very clean. [first causal event picture] A short while later,
Taro walks on the floor with his shoes on. [interim state picture] The floor has Taro’s footprints.
[second causal event picture] Right after that, Hanako walks on the floor with her shoes on. [final
state picture] Now the floor has both their footprints.

After each scenario, participants were asked to answer the three questions (the Now question, the
Before question, and the Test question).
In the emotional expression condition, two scenes referring to the emotional state of the protago-
nist were added to each scenario in the control condition: between the introductory scene and the ini-
tial state scene and after the final state scene. For instance, in the footprint scenario, two scenes were
inserted: a scene where ‘‘both Taro and Hanako have fun playing outside” (Fig. 3A) and a scene where
‘‘Hanako feels sad after seeing footprints on the floor” (Fig. 3B). Apart from these points, the storyline
and task presentation processes were the same as in the control conditions.

Results

Preliminary analyses showed no gender difference. So, the genders were mixed in the following
analyses.

Understanding the contents of scenarios

Overall, the percentage of correct answers to the control questions was 94.6%. In the control
conditions, the percentages of correct answers were 98.0% to the Now questions, 97.3% to the Before
questions, and 97.6% overall. In the emotional expression conditions, the percentages of
correct answers were 97.9% to the Now questions, 97.2% to the Before questions, and 97.6% overall.
Some children gave only one wrong answer (7 participants in the control condition and 7 participants
10 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659

in the emotional expression condition). Therefore, as in Experiment 1, they were not excluded from
the sample.

Answers to the counterfactual questions

The counterfactual scores in each condition were calculated using the same scoring procedure as in
Experiment 1. Table 2 shows the mean scores and the numbers and percentages of children receiving
scores of 0, 1, 2, and 3 by age and condition. Because a preliminary analysis did not demonstrate any
gender difference, the genders were mixed in the following analysis.
First, an ordinal regression analysis was conducted to examine the effect of the two predictor vari-
ables, age group and condition, on the overall score out of 3. This analysis included age group (younger
or older) and condition (control or emotional expression) as categorical predictors and the Age
Group
Condition interaction. This model was significant, v2(3) = 15.87, p = .001. The older group
had a significantly higher score compared with the younger group, B = 1.56, SE = 0.55, Wald v2(1)
= 8.20, p = .004, odds ratio = 4.77, 95% CI [2.63, 0.49]. In addition, the main effect of the condition
was significant; participants in the emotional expression condition had a significantly higher score
than those in the control condition, B = 1.14, SE = 0.52, Wald v2(1) = 4.78, p = .029, odds ratio = 3.14,
95% CI [2.17, 0.12]. The Age Group
Condition interaction was not significant (p = .364).
Second, a one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test using a counterfactual score was performed by
age group and condition (chance = 1.00). In the control condition, the scores of both the younger group
(Z = 1.53, p = .127, r = .31) and the older group (Z = 0.87, p = .383, r = .17) were no different from
chance. In the emotional expression condition, the score of the younger group was no different from
chance (Z = 0.45, p = .655, r = .09), but the score of the older group was higher than chance (Z = 3.20,
p = .001, r = .64). Moreover, the analyses using children’s actual response showed similar results (con-
trol condition: younger group, Z = 1.58, p = .127; older group, Z = 0.87, p = .383; emotional expression
condition: younger group, Z = 0.45, p = .655; older group, Z = 3.29, p = .001).

Discussion

Experiment 2 compared 4- to 6-year-olds’ counterfactual thinking in control and emotional expres-

sion conditions. The results showed that children’s performance was worse under the control condi-
tion (percentage of correct answers = 31.3%) than under the emotional expression condition
(percentage of correct answers = 46.0%); the performance in the control condition was similar to
chance even in the older group. In the control condition in Experiment 2, the same physical event sce-
narios were used as in Experiment 1. The results, therefore, confirmed the findings of Experiment 1,
meaning that young children find it difficult to think counterfactually about physical events that do
not involve an emotional component. On the other hand, the task performance was better in the emo-
tional expression condition than in the control condition; in particular, the performance of the older

Table 2
Numbers and percentages of children receiving scores of 0 to 3 as a function of age group and condition in Experiment 2
(between = age group and condition).

Mean score Receiving score Total

0 1 2 3
Younger group
Control 0.71 (0.91) 13 (54.2%) 6 (25.0%) 4 (16.7%) 1 (4.2%) 24
Emotion expression 0.91 (0.95) 10 (43.5%) 6 (26.1%) 6 (26.1%) 1 (4.3%) 23
Total 0.81 (0.92) 23 (48.9%) 12 (25.5%) 10 (21.3%) 2 (4.3%) 47
Older group
Control 1.16 (1.07) 8 (32.0%) 9 (36.0%) 4 (16.0%) 4 (16.0%) 25
Emotion expression 1.80 (0.96) 2 (8.0%) 8 (32.0%) 8 (32.0%) 7 (28.0%) 25
Total 1.48 (1.05) 10 (20.0%) 17 (34.0%) 12 (24.0%) 11 (22.0%) 50

Note. Standard deviations and percentages are given in parentheses.

 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659 11

group (percentage of correct answers = 60.0%) was higher than chance. These results show that 5- and
6-year-olds can think of counterfactual alternatives not only about events associated with emotional
change but also about events associated with physical change as long as negative emotional responses
to the events are presented.
However, in the emotional expression condition of Experiment 2, it is possible that children’s better
performance was a consequence of paying more attention to one of the two characters in the scenario.
In other words, the results of Experiment 2 leave open the possibility that young children’s counter-
factual thinking is encouraged when there is one protagonist in a physical scenario. To eliminate this
possibility, in Experiment 3 we created a new set of physical scenarios with only one character and
examined the influence of emotional expression condition by using these scenarios.

Experiment 3

Method

Participants
The participants were 48 children aged 4 to 6 years (24 boys and 24 girls; Mage = 63.88 months,
SD = 6.47, range = 53–75) recruited from two public nursery schools in Shizuoka. All of the partici-
pants spoke Japanese as their first language and were members of middle-class households. As in
Experiment 2, these children were divided into two groups: a younger group with 24 children (12 boys
and 12 girls; Mage = 58.21 months, SD = 2.99, range = 53–64) and an older group with 24 children (12
boys and 12 girls; Mage = 69.54 months, SD = 3.08, range = 65–75). None of the participants from
Experiments 1 and 2 participated in Experiment 3.

Materials
Based on the three physical task scenarios used in Experiments 1 and 2, new scenarios were created
in which only one protagonist made an appearance. These scenarios had the same causal structure in
Experiment 2. Each scenario used six pictures representing the story content and three pictures as
possible answers to the counterfactual question. For example, the footprint scenario went as follows:
‘‘This is Taro. He is playing outside and has mud on his shoes. This is the inside of Taro’s house.
Today, the floor is very clean. A short while later, Taro walks across the floor with his shoes on
to get a drink of water and leaves footprints on the floor. Later, Taro walks back across the floor
with his shoes on to go outside, leaving two sets of footprints on the floor.”

As in Experiment 2, in the emotional expression condition, ‘‘a picture associated with the initial
emotional state of the protagonist” and ‘‘a picture associated with the final emotional state of the pro-
tagonist” were added to the six original pictures for each scenario.

Procedure
All of the steps in this experiment were reviewed and approved by the affiliated university’s com-
mittee for ethical research involving human participants. As with Experiments 1 and 2, written con-
sent was obtained from a principal of each nursery school, and verbal assent was obtained from the
children.
Participants were allocated to either the control condition or the emotional expression condition. In
total, 12 children in a younger group (6 boys and 6 girls; Mage = 58.83 months) and 12 children in an
older group (6 boys and 6 girls; Mage = 70.17 months) were allocated to the control conditions, whereas
12 children in a younger group (6 boys and 6 girls; Mage = 57.58 months) and 12 children in an older
group (6 boys and 6 girls; Mage = 68.92 months) were allocated to the emotional expression conditions.
No significant differences in months of age by condition or gender were seen in either age group.
Each participant was interviewed individually in a quiet room. The interview lasted approximately
15 min. In both conditions, participants were asked to perform three counterfactual tasks. The order of
presenting the three counterfactual tasks was counterbalanced among participants. In both condi-
tions, task procedures were the same as those in Experiment 2 except for using the new scenarios.
12 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659

Results

Preliminary analyses did not demonstrate any gender difference. So, the genders were mixed in the
following analyses.

Understanding the contents of scenarios

Overall, the percentage of correct answers to the control questions was 96.5%. In the control con-
dition, the percentages of correct answers were 97.2% for the Now question, 95.8% for the Before ques-
tion, and 96.5% overall. In the emotional expression condition, the percentages of correct answers
were 94.4% for the Now question, 98.6% for the Before question, and 96.5% overall. Some children gave
only one wrong answer (5 participants in the control condition and 5 participants in the emotional
expression condition). Therefore, as in Experiments 1 and 2, they were not excluded from the sample.

Answers to the counterfactual questions

The counterfactual scores in each condition were calculated using the same scoring procedure as in
Experiment 1. Table 3 shows the mean scores and the numbers and percentages of children receiving
scores of 0, 1, 2, and 3 by age and condition.
First, an ordinal regression analysis was conducted. This analysis included age group (younger or
older) and condition (control or emotional expression) as categorical predictors and the Age
Group
Condition interaction. This model was significant, v2(3) = 9.57, p = .023. The older group
had only a marginally higher score compared with the younger group, B = 1.49, SE = 0.78, Wald
v2(1) = 3.66, p = .056, odds ratio = 4.45, 95% CI [3.02, 0.04]. In addition, the main effect of the condi-
tion was significant; participants in the emotional expression condition had a significantly higher
score than those in the control condition, B = 0.58, SE = 0.78, Wald v2(1) = 4.06, p = .044, odds
ratio = 4.85, 95% CI [3.11, 0.04]. The Age Group
Condition interaction was not significant
(p = .466).
Second, a one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test using a counterfactual score was performed by
age group and condition (chance = 1.00). In the control condition, the scores of both the younger group
(Z = 0.632, p = .527, r = .18) and the older group (Z = 0.80, p = .426, r = .23) were no different from
chance. In the emotional expression condition, the score of the younger group was no different from
chance (Z = 1.00, p = .317, r = .29), but the score of the older group was higher than chance (Z = 2.92,
p = .004, r = .85). Moreover, there were no differences between the above results and the results of
analyses using children’s actual response.
Finally, the task scores in Experiments 2 and 3 were compared by age group and condition. Mann–
Whitney U tests found no significant differences in the scores between Experiments 2 and 3: the con-
trol condition (U = 133, p = .684, r = .07) and emotional expression condition (U = 108.5, p = .283,

Table 3
Numbers and percentages of children receiving scores of 0 to 3 as a function of age group and condition in Experiment 3
(between = age group and condition).

Mean score Receiving score Total

0 1 2 3
Younger group
Control 0.83 (0.94) 6 (50.0%) 2 (16.7%) 4 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 12
Emotion expression 1.25 (0.87) 2 (16.7%) 6 (50.0%) 3 (25.0%) 1 (8.3%) 12
Total 1.04 (0.91) 8 (33.3%) 8 (33.3%) 7 (29.2%) 1 (4.2%) 24
Older group
Control 1.25 (1.29) 5 (41.7%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (16.7%) 3 (25.0%) 12
Emotion expression 2.08 (0.67) 0 (0.0%) 2 (16.7%) 7 (58.3%) 3 (25.0%) 12
Total 1.67 (1.09) 5 (20.8%) 4 (16.7%) 9 (37.5%) 6 (25.0%) 24

Note. Standard deviations and percentages are given in parentheses.

 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659 13

r = .18) in the middle group and the control condition (U = 148, p = .947, r = .01) and emotional expres-
sion condition (U = 125.5, p = .465, r = .14) in the older group.

Discussion

To resolve the remaining issues in Experiment 2, Experiment 3 examined the difference of young
children’s counterfactual thinking between the control and emotional expression conditions using a
scenario with only one protagonist. The results showed that participants performed worse under
the control condition (percentage of correct answers = 34.7%) than under the emotional expression
condition (percentage of correct answers = 55.7%); the level in the control condition was similar to
chance even in the older group. On the other hand, the task performance in the emotional expression
condition was better than in the control condition; in particular, the performance of the older group
(percentage of correct answers = 69.3%) was higher than chance. A comparison of Experiments 2 and 3
showed no differences in young children’s task performance. The Experiment 3 results confirm that
the results of Experiment 2 were not caused by an artifact of the task (e.g., a different number of char-
acters) but rather were caused by a protagonist’s emotional response to the event. In sum, the results
of Experiment 3 strengthened the claim that 5- and 6-year-olds can think of counterfactuals for events
associated with physical change as long as other persons’ negative emotional responses to the event
are presented.

General discussion

One of the main themes in research on the development of counterfactual thinking involves the
question of when the capacity for counterfactual thinking is acquired. To address this question, the
current study examined young children’s counterfactual thinking about physical and emotional events
using discriminating counterfactual tasks that children could not easily answer correctly via basic con-
ditional reasoning. Experiment 1 showed that, although children younger than 5 or 6 years can gen-
erate counterfactual alternatives for emotional events, even 5- and 6-year-olds have difficulty in
thinking counterfactually about physical events. Moreover, Experiment 2 showed that presenting with
the protagonist’s negative feelings about an event outcome (the emotional expression condition)
enables 5- and 6-year-olds to think counterfactually about physical events. Finally, Experiment 3 con-
firmed that the better performance of young children under the emotional expression condition was
not the result of an artifact of the task.
As mentioned in the Introduction, Rafetseder et al. (2010, 2013) have shown that 5- and 6-year-
olds find it difficult to think of counterfactual alternatives using discriminating counterfactual tasks.
The current study demonstrates that the performance of tasks associated with physical events does
not significantly exceed chance even among children aged 5 and 6 years (percentages of correct
answers: physical event task in Experiment 1 = 27.7%, control condition in Experiment 2 = 38.7%, con-
trol condition in Experiment 3 = 41.7%). The results of this study support those of Rafetseder et al.
(2013). However, the current study also shows that 5- and 6-year-olds can think of counterfactual
alternatives as long as there is an explicit reference to the protagonist’s negative feelings about the
event (percentages of correct answers: emotion event task in Experiment 1 = 75.0%, emotional expres-
sion condition in Experiment 2 = 60.0%, emotional expression condition in Experiment 3 = 69.3%).
These results demonstrate that children aged 5 and 6 years are capable of counterfactual thinking
in a certain situation such as presenting the other’s emotions. In other words, the results of the current
study support the claim that the ability to think counterfactually is acquired by 5 or 6 years of age
(Beck et al., 2010; German, 1999; German & Nichols, 2003; Nakamichi, 2011; Riggs et al., 1998) even
when discriminating counterfactual tasks are used.
Why do children display their capacity for counterfactual thinking only when a scenario protago-
nist explicitly shows negative emotion? As mentioned in the Introduction, one possible explanation is
that human negative emotion triggers the counterfactual thinking in young children by clearly con-
veying the outcome valence of an event. Humans’ negative emotion plays the role of clearly conveying
the outcome valence of an event. Counterfactual thinking in both adults (Byrne, 2005, 2016; Epstude &
14 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659

Roese, 2008) and children (German, 1999; Guajardo et al., 2016) is triggered by the negative outcome
valence of an event. Indeed, young children find it easier to think of a counterfactual alternative for an
event associated with a change in another person’s emotions than for a physical event that does not
have a potentially negative outcome (Guajardo et al., 2009; Nakamichi, 2011). For this reason, when
the protagonist’s negative emotions were explicitly presented, the young children in this study should
demonstrate their capacity for counterfactual thinking.
This explanation may get support from other developmental studies. From their early years of life,
children have sensitivity to others’ face and/or facial expressions. Even infants tend to look at face-like
images longer than at any other pattern such as colored circles and concentric circles (Fantz, 1961)
and react appropriately to distinct facial expressions (Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton,
1978). Moreover, children refer to other people’s emotions, and change their mode of thinking and
course of action, based on other people’s emotions. For example, even 12-month-old infants go over
the visual cliff when their mothers display positive expressions, but not when their mothers display
negative expressions (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Kilinnert, 1985). On the basis of these studies, it seems
reasonable to assume that presenting the protagonist’s emotions gets young children’s attention, con-
sequently improving their performances on counterfactual tasks.
Of course, the results of the current study do not imply that 5- and 6-year-old children have an
adult-like capacity for counterfactual thought. In line with Rafetseder et al. (2013), participants in this
study found it difficult to perform physical event tasks. Rafetseder et al. (2013) argued that counter-
factual thinking emerged later—at around 12 years of age. By contrast, based on the results of this
study, we deem it likely that even preschool children have the ability to think counterfactually. How-
ever, we agree that children have a long way to go to be able to think of counterfactual alternatives
without any prompting (e.g., the other person’s negative emotion expression) such as adult-like coun-
terfactual thinking.
In addition, this study’s participants were native Japanese preschoolers. The current study
advances the previous literature by showing the development of counterfactual thinking in non-
English speakers. On the other hand, this fact implies that the results might be limited to Japanese.
Therefore, they need to be replicated with English speakers’ samples.
Despite these limitations, the results of the current study suggest three directions for future
research. One direction is to integrate the effect of emotional component into the recent studies focus-
ing on the causal structure of events and the task demands (McCormack et al., 2018; Nyhout & Ganea,
2019; Nyhout et al., 2019). For example, Nyhout et al. (2019) manipulated the causal relation between
antecedent events (e.g., two antecedent events were causally connected or disconnected to one
another) in Rafetseder et al. (2013) tasks and investigated children’s counterfactual thinking. The
results showed that, given events with clear causal structures, children aged 6 to 8 years could reason
counterfactually. Based on our finding, children might succeed much earlier on Nyhout and colleagues’
tasks when events include the emotional component.
The second direction involves determining the types of event that drive counterfactual thinking in
young children. The current study has demonstrated that children’s performance on counterfactual
tasks varies, depending on the content of the event (physical or emotional). Previous developmental
studies (e.g., German, 1999; Guajardo et al., 2016) have focused on whether an event involves negative
consequences; therefore, little is known about the influence of event content on young children’s
counterfactual thinking. For instance, Guajardo et al. (2016, Experiment 1) showed that 8- to
11-year-olds’ counterfactual thinking was influenced by not only outcome valence but also outcome
expectancy. Moreover, adults tend to think of counterfactual alternatives more frequently for events
they can control as opposed to events they cannot control (Byrne, 2005, 2016). Young children may
have the same tendency to generate counterfactual alternatives spontaneously. In addition, Beck
and Riggs (2014) also suggested that the amount of knowledge of the target domain is one factor that
contributes to the development of counterfactual thinking. They argued that having much causal
knowledge about a particular domain promotes the thinking about alternative possibilities related
to that domain. Young children may spontaneously think of counterfactual alternatives for event
domains they understand well or with which they are familiar. Such research would expand further
our understanding of the development of counterfactual thinking.
 K. Nakamichi / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 187 (2019) 104659 15

Another direction is to clarify the relationship between counterfactual thinking and executive func-
tion (EF). EF is a cognitive process that exerts goal-oriented control over thought, behavior, and emo-
tion. It encompasses working memory (WM), inhibitory control (IC), and cognitive flexibility as its
components (Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008). Counterfactual thinking requires the individual to retain
and update two pieces of information: ‘‘existing reality (i.e., an actual event)” and an ‘‘imagined alter-
native possibility.” To do this, the individual must inhibit existing real information in order to think of
alternative possibilities (Beck & Riggs, 2014; Byrne, 2005, 2016). Hence, this process of counterfactual
thinking requires EF. However, relationships between counterfactual thinking and EF during child-
hood are not stable. Some studies (Drayton, Turley-Ames, & Guajardo, 2011; Guajardo et al., 2009;
Müller, Miller, Michalczyk, & Karapinka, 2007) have shown relationships between counterfactual
thinking and WM or IC in young children, whereas one study (Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009) found that
counterfactual thinking is unrelated to WM. EF has dual aspects (Zelazo & Carlson, 2012): the process
activated in an emotionally neutral context (i.e., cool EF) and the process activated in an emotional
context (i.e., hot EF). As shown in the current and previous studies (Epstude & Roese, 2008;
Guajardo et al., 2009; Nakamichi, 2011), an emotional element influences counterfactual thinking in
young children and adults. Thus, counterfactual thinking may require not only cool EF but also hot
EF. So, future studies should examine the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hot EF.
In conclusion, our study results reveal that 5- and 6-year-old children demonstrate a capacity for
counterfactual thinking even when using discriminating counterfactual tasks that are difficult to
answer correctly without taking the actual events into account. The current study also confirms that
emotional components trigger their counterfactual thinking. These findings suggest the need to inves-
tigate the influence of emotional components and domain-specific knowledge on counterfactual
thinking during early childhood.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported in part by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI
Grant Nos. JP15K17269 and JP19K03223. I am especially grateful to Jun Nakazawa, Kayoko Inagaki,
and Naoko Nakamichi for their suggestions and constant support. I also thank the children who par-
ticipated in this research and the teachers.

Appendix. Supplementary material

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.

012.

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