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İhsan Dağlı - Human Rights, Democratization and The European Community in Turkish Politics The Özal Years, 1983-87 PDF
İhsan Dağlı - Human Rights, Democratization and The European Community in Turkish Politics The Özal Years, 1983-87 PDF
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I. Dagi
To cite this article: I. Dagi (2001) Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community
in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983-87, Middle Eastern Studies, 37:1, 17-40, DOI:
10.1080/714004367
IHSAN D. DAGI
The first general elections after the military intervention of September 1980
took place in November 1983, bringing the Motherland Party of Turgut
Özal to power. Yet the transition to civilian government did not stop the
debate in Europe about the democratic nature of the new regime and its
respect for human rights.1 The elections were overshadowed by the vetos
and restrictions imposed on the new political parties. The National Security
Council banned former politicians from political activities for five to ten
years under provisional article 4 of the 1982 constitution. In addition the
generals were in a position to veto the founding members of the new
political parties and their parliamentary candidates. Eventually, only three
political parties were allowed to compete in the election, while two other
potentially popular parties were excluded. Furthermore, before handing
power over to the civilian government the military regime extended martial
law for another four months and enacted laws that outlawed the discussion
of any policy of the NSC and the public expression of political ideas by
18 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S
former politicians.2 Hence, by the end of 1983 when the elections were held
the whole of the country was still under martial law, mass trials were
continuing in military courts and the allegations about prison conditions and
torture were widespread.
When the Özal government came to power at the end of 1983, it was
widely believed that the government would look to the Middle East and
Islamic countries for political cooperation and economic expansion; a belief
that was held largely because of Özal’s role in opening up the Turkish
economy to the Middle Eastern markets in the early 1980s and his previous
connection with the National Salvation Party which had strong anti-
European Community orientations.3 He was even portrayed as being in
favour of an alternative Islamic Economic Community, proposed by the
Turkish Islamists as the best line of integration for Turkey.
But these views were proven wrong in a short time. Özal of the 1980s
was not an ideologically minded politician but rather a pragmatist. His
interest in Middle Eastern and Islamic countries was largely prompted by
his economic pragmatism of expanding Turkish trade, disregarding the
ideological or political leanings of the regimes in the region. He had a
balanced view of the West and the Middle East as complementary to each
other.4 As a political realist he was aware of both the economic and political
significance of the European Community and Turkey’s difficulties in
improving its relations with it while Turkey was below the Community’s
standard both economically and politically.
Thus the first Özal government expressed the membership of the
Community as its ‘ultimate aim’ in the government programme.5 Özal
believed that Turkey’s relations and cooperation with the West should not
be exclusively centred around a common defence strategy.6 He wanted to
have closer economic ties which were considered to be essential in order to
integrate Turkey into Europe structurally. Instead of relying solely on any
circumstantial military alliance, the promotion of economic ties would
make Turkey an indispensable part of Europe. The hope was that with the
dissolution of the National Security Council on 13 December 1983 and the
formal transition to civilian rule, Turkey would be readmitted to the
mainstream of Western democratic states. The degree of improvement in
Turkey’s relations with the EC would demonstrate how much the Turkish
hope was realistic. In fact, there were still many contentious issues on the
agenda. Continuing martial law and regulations on the press, trade unions
and associations were seen as an extension of the militaristic regime that
were obstacles to normalization of relations. Still continuing trials of DISK
trade unionists, the Peace Association members and the Intellectuals were
taken up as distractive issues in Community–Turkey relations.
As a result, despite the return to civilian government, Turkey’s de facto
371mes02.qxd 04/01/2001 16:03 Page 19
frozen relations with the Community did not immediately start moving. The
EC continued to make the reactivation of relations conditional on an
improvement in the Turkish human rights record. The prevailing view was
that despite general elections Turkey still had a long way to go for the full
realization of democracy. Western social democrats and liberals were
especially skeptical about the possibility of establishing a democratic polity
that was based on the 1982 constitution, criticized as it was containing many
illiberal articles. This was one of the reasons for excluding Turkey from the
centre of European politics.7
There was a common view in the West that Turkey’s human rights
performance might improve if ‘Turkey’s West European friends keep up the
pressure’.8 The European Community in this period emerged as a significant
political and economic centre which looked to be able to influence the
human rights policy of Özal’s transitional government. Turkey’s desire to
normalize its relations and re-activate the association agreement enabled the
Community to underline its conviction that ‘respect for human rights is one
of the cornerstones of European cooperation…and an important element in
relations between third countries and the Europe of Twelve’.9 The
Community declared that in its relations with non-member states and in the
administration of aid, the promotion of human rights would be taken into
consideration. The employment of diplomatic and economic means was
regarded as justified to promote respect for human rights. ‘Expression of
concern at violations of such rights cannot be considered interference in the
domestic affairs of a state’.10 In practice Community policy went beyond the
public denunciation of human rights abuses and involved pressures of the
economic and political kind; this especially so towards a country which
places itself in the sphere of Europe and strives for recognition of this self-
placement.
Initially, for the Özal government, the important issues with regard to the
Community were to improve the political relations that had suffered after
1980, in order to release the blocked aid, to reactivate the Association
Agreement, and to increase textile exports. Except for the last item, these
developments were all directly dependent on the level of political
cooperation Turkey would be able to develop in its relations with Europe.
As a first step in this direction the Turkish Foreign Minister Halefoğlu
visited the European Commission in late January 1984 just a month after the
formation of the first Özal government. He conveyed the government’s
desire to normalize its relations with the Community and informed the
Commission about political as well as economic developments. The
message he got from the Commission was that the normalization of
relations depended on the continuation of the process of democratization
and respect for human rights.11
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adoption of two resolutions on the same day. The second one expressed the
concern of the Parliament over ‘continuing violations of human rights’. It
seems that these resolutions were heavily influenced by international non-
governmental human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International,
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International
Commission of Jurists, the International Press Institute and such like, and
signalled that the European Parliament was willing to take up the concern
of these organizations in international forums. The Parliament took the lead
and publicized the cause of international human rights organizations by
expressing the common concern about the violations of human rights in
Turkey and instructing that the resolution be passed to the Council, the
Commission, the United Nations and the US State Department.17
The European Parliament showed its continuous concern about the
human rights situation in Turkey by adopting two further resolutions in
October 1984. One dealt specifically with death sentences and the execution
of two convicts, the first execution since the November elections. The
Parliament called on the Turkish government to suspend implementation of
any more death sentences.18 The other resolution, in October, asked for the
immediate release of a former Turkish ambassador and peace activist,
whose health was deteriorating while kept in detention.19 The European
Parliament also decided not to set up the Joint Parliamentary Committee of
Turkey and the European Parliament, as a move to question the legitimacy
of the Turkish representatives.20
Four highly critical resolutions from the European Parliament in a year
meant that despite a formal return to democracy Turkey needed to prove its
commitment to the observance of human rights in order to improve its
relations with the European Community. The content of criticism also
showed that the concern of the Europeans had shifted from the re-
establishment of democracy to more specific cases of human rights abuses.
On the other front, the Community was far from relaxing economic aid
to Turkey as a response to the transition to a civilian regime. The release of
600 million ECU was as yet out of the question despite British and German
support. Turkey’s quest to reactivate its relations was often objected to by
some member states, especially Denmark, the Netherlands, France and
Greece.
In Turkey–Community relations the European Parliament became an
obstacle to the reactivation of the association agreement and an international
arena where the Turkish regime was critically scrutinized. The language of
its resolutions became increasingly harder and harsher. The Parliament took
up the Kurdish issue and accused the government of ‘launching a systematic
campaign of genocide against the Kurdish minority’. In April 1985 the
Parliament described the regime in Turkey as ‘the bloody reign of terror’
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and denounced the death sentences given to ‘Kurdish soldiers’.21 From then
on the European Parliament took a continuing interest in the Kurdish issue
which was forwarded in the context of cultural rights of minorities in
Turkey. The issue was raised and supported mainly by the Communists, the
Socialists, the Greeks and some liberals. When Turkey was moving to lift
martial law gradually, investigate prison conditions and adopt politically a
more pluralistic regime, the strongly critical, uncompromising and non-
cooperative attitude of the European Parliament was partly due to its
internal political structure and partly to the self-righteous conviction of its
members as the genuine pursuers of human rights in the world. Continuing
domestic problems in Turkey and the activities of Turkish exiles in Europe
could also be added to the above mentioned reasons for the Parliament’s
critical approach. Mass trials were still held in military courts,
internationalized trials of DISK trade unionists, Peace Association members
and Intellectuals continued for years without any convictions. Social
Democrat and Socialist members of the European Parliament were
especially interested in these trials. The Parliament adopted another
resolution in mid-1985 entirely devoted to the trial of the members of the
Peace Association.22 The attempt of the Özal government to increase the
power of the police was also faced with opposition from the EC. The EC
representative in Ankara went public on the issue and argued that if the Bill
was enacted it would cause a ‘fatal blow’ to the efforts to reactivate the
relations between the two sides.23
Then, in late 1985, came the controversial Balfe report of the Political
Affairs Committee, which arrived at the conclusion that Turkey’s human
rights practice was still far from ‘complying with the most elementary
standards’ and recommended a further suspension of the setting-up of a
Turkey–Community Joint Parliamentary Committee.24 The report was
accompanied by a highly critical and comprehensive resolution of the
European Parliament which was received with anger and dismay in
Ankara.25 The resolution was adopted with the support of Socialists,
Communists and the Greeks. The European conservatives and the
democratic group were in favour of a dialogue between the two sides
through re-establishment of the Joint Parliamentary Committee.26 The
resolution coincided with the growing desire of the government to improve
its relations with the Community speedily. Therefore, it was a setback to the
efforts of the Turkish government to reactivate the association agreement,
and relations between the two sides became strained again as a result of
Turkey’s reaction to the report and the resolution. Even the Community’s
Turkey representative was publicly accused of misinforming the rapporteur
of the Community.27 The resolution condemned the practice of torture, death
sentences, restrictions on former politicians and trade unions, continuing
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mass trials, repression of minority Kurds etc. and called on the Turkish
government to abolish the death penalty, pardon political prisoners,
prosecute torturers, guarantee fair trials, discontinue mass trials, remove the
restrictions on freedom of political activity and accept the individual right
of appeal to the European Commission on Human Rights.28
But there were some domestic political improvements in 1986 which
were externally recognized and eased Turkey’s relations with the
Community. The main extra-parliamentary opposition parties, the SODEP
and TPP, began to be represented in the Turkish Parliament, helping the
establishment of its legitimacy, the ban on the public speeches of former
politicians was lifted, a partial amnesty was declared leading to the release
of the detainees of the DISK and Peace Association trials, and the
ratification of death sentences by the Parliament was stopped.29 Meanwhile,
Turkey was getting recognition from some international organizations for
its change of policy as the European Commission of Human Rights dropped
the case against Turkey by agreeing on a friendly settlement. Turkey began
to chair the OECD and was offered the postponed presidency of the Council
of Europe in the same year. These were the signs of the improving image of
Turkey in European politics which raised the hope again for a similar turn
in Turkey–Community relations.
In fact, the European Parliament was taking note of the normalization in
Turkey’s relations with other European organizations.30 For this, the Turkish
government wanted to table the EC–Turkey Association Council at
ministerial level. The Turkish call for the Council meeting was received
positively by the Foreign Ministers in early 1986 despite the objection of
Greece.31 The turn actually took place with the visit of Claude Cheysson, the
European Commissioner in charge of Mediterranean policy, which was the
first visit to Turkey by a member of the Commission since the military
intervention in 1980. Cheysson, while stating the Community’s desire to
improve relations, underlined its expectation that Turkey should improve its
human rights record.32 Both sides nevertheless decided to hold the Council
meeting in September. With these mutual expectations the Association
Council met, the first such meeting since the military intervention of 1980,
though without any result. Among the items discussed was the political
situation in Turkey about which the Turkish Foreign Minister gave details.
It was conveyed to the Turkish delegation that progress in restoring
democracy and respect for human rights was an essential part of the
normalization between the EC and Turkey.33 The Council meeting ended
without any decision on the reactivation of the association agreement which
Turkey was pressing for.34 It could still be regarded as progress by the Turks
who saw in it the beginning of the long waited ‘normalization’. Then the
British Foreign Secretary and the President of the Council of Ministers
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remarked on the occasion that Turkey was given ‘the green light’ to resume
political relations with EC.35 Although the blocked 600 million ECU was not
released, there were signs of a financially more relaxed Community
approach to Turkey. Some amount of aid was released throughout 1986
from the budget of the Commission, giving the impression that the EC was
moving closer to collaboration with Turkey.36
But these positive changes were immediately overshadowed by the
continuing critical attitude of the European Parliament which adopted a new
resolution ‘on relations between EEC and Turkey’ at the end of 1986. After
expressing its concern and criticism about the shortcomings of the regime
in the political and human rights fields, advising Turkey to pursue ‘a good
neighbour policy towards Greece’ and contribute to the solution of the
Cyprus problem, the Parliament declared that the Community was not yet
‘justified in fully normalizing its relations with Turkey’. It was also
concerned that the meeting of the Association Council gave the false
impression that the EC endorsed the political and human rights situation in
Turkey.37 Persistent in its opposition to the establishment of the Joint
Parliamentary Committee provided by the association agreement, the
European Parliament instead set up a parliamentary delegation in January
1987 as a compromise; a delegation which was institutionally and legally
different from that of a joint Parliamentary Committee.38 In fact, a year after
the adoption of the Balfe report and the resolution that strongly objected to
the re-establishment of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, Balfe himself
came to the conclusion that dialogue between the two Parliaments should be
established.39
The Turkish government had in fact been becoming rather annoyed by the
reluctance of the EC to take decisive and effective steps to improve
relations. There were suggestions in early 1986 that the Özal government
was considering an immediate application for full membership as a move to
break the standstill in relations. Özal was willing to use Turkey’s right,
provided by the Ankara Agreement of 1963, to be a full member, not only
as a threat to secure solutions to some long-standing problems, such as free
circulation of Turkish workers within the EC, but actually applying
officially for full membership, thereby exerting pressure on the Community.
But the European capitals were advising Turkey not to rush for full
membership, which could be vetoed by some member countries anyway
because of bilateral problems, or the concern about the level of democracy
and respect for human rights. Rather Turkey should first go for
normalization.40 There was also an emerging view that the EC was trying to
obstruct Turkey’s application and gain some time by raising the issues
371mes02.qxd 04/01/2001 16:03 Page 25
political in nature, since its economic arguments were rather weak to justify
obstruction.41 A fruitless meeting of the Association Council, a continuing
critical attitude of the European Parliament, and Greece’s blocking of any
attempt to improve relations in the end led the Özal government to the
conclusion that reactivation of the Association Agreement was not possible
in a short term under the prevailing conditions.42 Particularly the opposition
of Greece to the re-activization of Turkey’s relations with the EC, and the
non-existence of pressure by the other member states on Greece to soften its
opposition, became so irritating for the Turkish government that it saw no
other way but official application. In the same year as the government
declared its intention to apply for accession, a Minister of State responsible
for Community affairs was created, who embarked on heavy lobbying in the
Western capitals.43 At the beginning of 1986, while visiting London, Özal
outlined his plan to join the EC.44 In the end Turkey decided to lodge its
application in the course of 1987 and declared its intention despite the
opposition of the member states in the Community.
Although the prospect of full membership was recognized in the Ankara
Agreement of 1963, the member countries in the Community were reluctant
even to see the application for membership put forward. The member states
tried to discourage Turkey from lodging its application, at least until the
1990s. The Community had its own internal problems due to the recent
accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, and to its concern about the
economic and political fitness of Turkey to join the EC.
Meanwhile, for the first time in the history of EC–Turkey relations there
was a wide consensus over the membership issue among different economic
and political interest groups in Turkey. It seemed that all segments of
society were in favour of integrating with Europe. For the pro-European
elites it was the ultimate aim of the Westernization process which should be
embarked on as soon as possible. There was also a widely held belief that
Turkey’s membership in the Community would guarantee the durability of
Turkish democracy and reduce the likelihood of another military
intervention, as in the countries of Southern Europe. Premier Özal too, in an
attempt to dismiss criticism that Turkey’s democratic standards were lower
than these of the other members of the Community, argued that Turkey’s
membership would enhance the democratic regime. He would assert that
this was precisely the point; membership of the Community would
irreversibly consolidate the parliamentary democratic regime. Therefore, if
the EC wanted Turkey to have a viable and durable democracy, the best way
of doing this was political integration of Turkey into the Community. In a
speech to EC ambassadors Özal said, ‘What we now need is encouragement
for further consolidation of democracy and strengthening the respect for
human rights’.45 The similarities were hastily drawn with Greece, Spain and
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26 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S
28 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S
30 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S
Premier Özal characterized the West as ‘the expression of a way of life based
on freedom, democratic liberties and respect for human rights’ that went
beyond geographical boundaries.73 It is towards this way of life that the
Turkish state has directed the nation for almost two hundred years with the
initiative of its ruling elites. Under their leadership, no doubt ‘Turkey attaches
great importance to universal values of Western civilization’.74 Since freedom,
democracy and human rights constitute the Western way of life, if one aspires
to be Western one is justifiably expected to comply with these basic
principles. This poses a fundamental dilemma for the Turkish ruling elites in
times of nationwide political crises when the priority shifts from a Western
style government to ‘protection and safeguarding of the state and Kemalist
reforms’, during which the Westernization project can temporarily be
postponed for the future. As the aspirations of the elites to transform the
nation into a modern European one contradict the political realities of Turkey
in times of crisis, then Western institutions and countries begin justifiably to
criticize Turkey as not living up to European standards. The disparity between
the aspiration to be European and domestic political practice thus poses the
main dilemma of Turkish state-political elites and becomes a source of
vulnerability in the face of European criticism and pressure. As recognized by
Dodd, Turkey’s political leaders are ‘sensitive’ to criticism levelled by the
Europeans on the state of human and political rights.75 Turkey’s critics in
Europe are aware of this sensitivity which results in Turkey’s attempt to
‘Westernize’ the political system further as its quest to join Europe continues.
The existence of a European dimension, a place to aspire to, in Turkish
political history was certainly instrumental in constructing and legitimizing
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32 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S
local elections of 1984 of the SODEP and TPP, which were not represented
in the Parliament. The continued persecution of former politicians,
especially Ecevit, was also becoming a source of embarrassment for the
civilian government.
We should not forget, however, the international dimension in
explaining Turkish politics. By 1986 the Özal government was desperately
seeking to normalize its relations with Europe and reactivate the association
agreement with the EC after facing disappointments with its American and
Middle Eastern partners. There were expectations that Turkey would be
offered the presidency of the Council of Europe, and that the long sought
EC–Turkey Association Council would meet in the autumn of 1986. We
should also not forget that these two changes, amnesty and the lifting of the
ban on former politicians, were what the European pressure centres were
pushing for, and were in compliance with Turkey’s recent promises to them,
specifically with the friendly settlement in the ECHR at the end of 1985. As
far as the first move was concerned President Evren bitterly confirms that
the prosecution law was changed ‘under the influence of leftist campaigns
in Turkey and in the West which led to the release of many prisoners’.90
In fact, Turkey increased the level of European pressure by claiming
itself as European, and as a country which aspired to be a member of the
European Community. Özal himself recognized that after application for
full membership in the EC external European criticism began to increase.91
Therefore, when it applied for full membership in early 1987 Turkey was
then liable to criticism based on the European standards. As the political
fitness of Turkey to join the club was raised Turkey became more open and
vulnerable to Europe-centred criticism. With the application what Turkey
did, in fact, was to submit the prospect of its aspirations to the goodwill of
the Europeans. Then Turkey was to be judged by the Europeans using
Western political standards. During the proceedings Turkey was in a
defensive position, trying to prove its good intentions by taking some steps
at home that would convince the Europeans about Turkey’s commitment
and determination to develop a Western style political system. As expressed
by the State Minister in charge of EC affairs, Turkey’s decision to apply for
full membership was based on Turkey’s desire ‘to live in a world of peace
and security respectful of democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms
like member states’.92 If its application was based on enduring democracy
and human rights, then Turkey had to conform to these principles in practice
as a precondition set by the EC. This must have been clear to the Turks from
the beginning.93
On 14 April 1987, Premier Özal gave a press conference to explain
Turkey’s full membership application. In the speech his first concern was to
prove that Turkey was politically fit for full membership; a fitness that
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34 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S
would be measured with the level of democracy and respect for human
rights. In the first half of the speech Özal explained the steps Turkey had
taken on this course since 1983. He was anxious to show Turkey’s
determination to be regarded as a modern democratic country by referring
to both the ‘confirmation’ of the European organizations and domestic
developments. He gladly and specifically talked about Turkey’s
readmittance to the Parliamentary Assembly and the Turkish presidency of
the Council of Europe. The Premier also mentioned the dropped case in the
European Commission of Human Rights, which has been brought by five
European states, as a vindication of Turkey’s improving human rights
record. He then proudly proceeded to underline his government’s
acceptance of individual petition to the European Commission of Human
Rights as a significant move towards catching up the European standards
that his predecessors were so reluctant to do. On the basis of developments
and arguments Özal concluded that Turkey was politically mature enough to
be a full member of the EC.94
As could be read in Özal’s argument, Turkey was defensive vis-à-vis the
EC, which subjected Turkish membership to the precondition of its political
fitness. The way in which Özal presented his case showed Turkey’s
dependency on the Community’s understanding of the Turkish political
system, which he anxiously legitimated by reference to other European
organizations.95 It was also a very welcome coincidence that Turkey was in
the Presidency of the Council of Europe when it lodged its application to the
EC. This attitude also signalled the Özal government’s readiness to
collaborate with the Community to take other political measures to improve
Turkey’s image in and acceptance by the West. A first sign of this, which
seems more than a coincidence, was the permission given to an Amnesty
International team on the same day to study prison conditions in Adana.96
The government was aware of the restraint put on domestic politics by
its application to join the Community. On the one hand the new European
dimension in Turkish politics necessitated a commitment by the government
to protect and promote human rights and function as a complete democracy,
not as a Turkish version of it. On the other, it increased the interest of
Western public opinion in Turkish domestic politics and enabled each
member country to have some sort of say on Turkish politics, making the
illegitimacy of external interference obsolete. It may not be interference in
terms of using force, but Turkey was embarking on a process which
required the condition of a country seeking to join a club to be checked. If
not interference, the membership application provided the EC with political
and legal leverage and a framework of influence which the Community was
able to exert on Turkey. The constraining effect of Turkey’s Community bid
with regard to internal politics was also observed by President Evren who
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36 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S
NOTES
1. For the transition to civilian government see I.D. Dagi, ‘Democratic Transition in Turkey:
The Impact of European Diplomacy’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.32, No.2 (1996),
pp.124–41; F. Ahmad, ‘The Transition to Democracy in Turkey’, Third World Quarterly,
Vol.7 (April 1985).
2. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (hereafter Keesing’s), June 1984, p.32925; and Ahmad,
‘The Transition’, pp.213–14.
3. For example see K. Mackenzie, Turkey in Transition: The West’s Neglected Ally (London:
Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1984), p.15; and Keesing’s, Dec. 1983,
p.32581.
4. See Hukumet Programi 1983 (Government Programme) (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi),
p.56; T. Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey (K. Rustem & Brothers, 1991),
pp.312–15.
5. Hukumet Programi 1983, p.53.
6. Basbakan Turgut Özal’in Basin Toplatilari, 7 Ocak 1984–30 Kasim 1987, 15 Dec. 1984,
p.22.
7. For some arguments raised by the European Parliamentarians, see Official Journal of the
European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament, 10 Dec. 1986, Nos.2–346,
pp.149–59; and Mackenzie, Turkey in Transition, p.7.
8. See E. Mortimer in The Times, 26 July 1985.
9. The statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve on human rights, Bulletin of the
European Communities (hereafter Bulletin EC), 7/8, 1986, point 2.4.4.
371mes02.qxd 04/01/2001 16:03 Page 38
38 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S
10. Ibid.
11. Bulletin EC, Jan. 1984, p.48; and Keesing’s, July 1984, p.32986.
12. See Resolution on election in Turkey, Official Journal of the European Communities:
Information and Notices (hereafter Official Journal EC), NoC 307/79, 14 Nov. 1983.
13. Thirty Second Review of the Council’s Work 1984 (General Secretariat of the Council of the
EC, Brussels, 1985), p.164.
14. Bulletin EC, Dec. 1984, p.97.
15. Resolution, on respect for human rights in Turkey, Official Journal EC, No.C 172/128, 24
April 1984; and Official Journal EC, NoC 172/129.
16. Official Journal EC, NoC 172/128, 24 April 1984.
17. See ibid.
18. Resolution on death sentences in Turkey, Official Journal EC, No C 300/35, 11 Oct. 1984.
After these executions the Turkish Parliament did not ratify any death sentence.
19. The subject of the resolution was Mahmut Dikerdem who was a former ambassador and
President of Turkish Peace Association; see resolution on the release of Mr Dikerdem,
Official Journal EC, NoC 300/36, 11 Oct. 1984.
20. Survey of the Main Activities of the European Parliament, July 1985–June 1986 (Directorate
General for Research, 1986), p.27.
21. See Resolution ‘on the ruthless violation of human rights and the bloody reign of terror in
Turkey’, Official Journal EC, No C 122/120, 18 April 1985.
22. Resolution on those convicted at the trial of members of the Turkish Peace Committee,
Official Journal EC, No C 175/222, 13 June 1985.
23. The Times, 10 June 1985.
24. European Parliament Working Documents, Document A 2–117/85, 9 Oct. 1985, Report of
Political Affairs Committee On the Human Rights situation in Turkey, Rapporteur R. Balfe,
p.25.
25. Resolution on the human rights situation in Turkey, Official Journal EC, No C 343/60, 23
Oct. 1985; for the Parliamentary debate before the voting see Debates of the European
Parliament No.2–331/47–63.
26. See Debates of the European Parliament, No.2–331/47–63.
27. S. Gunver, Kizgin Dam Uzerinde Diplomasi:Avrupali olabilmenin Bedeli (Istanbul: Milliyet
Yay, 1989), p.303.
28. Official Journal EC, NoC 343/60, 23 Oct. 1985.
29. See Briefing, 29 Dec. 1986, p.21; and Keesing’s July 1986, pp.34500 and 34496. The Turkish
Grand National Assembly voted for a partial amnesty bill on 11 March 1986 and adopted
another bill in April 1986 which lifted the ban on the expression of opinion on domestic and
foreign policy by former politicians.
30. See Debates of the European Parliament, No.2, 346/129–139, 10 Dec. 1986.
31. Keesing’s, July 1986, p.34500; The Times, 18 Feb. 1986.
32. Bulletin EC, June 1986, p.87; Keesing’s, July 1986, p.34500.
33. Debates of the European Parliament, No.2, 346/132, 10 Dec. 1986; also see The Times, 17
Sept. 1986.
34. Bulletin EC, Sept. 1986, pp.69–70.
35. G. Howe’s statement in The Times, 17 Sept. 1986.
36. Turkey received 1in 1986 10 million ECU as special aid which was approved in 1980 and
later delayed. Another 20 million ECU was transfered from the contributions of Denmark,
Ireland and Britain to the Second EC-Turkey Financial Protocol, see Thirty Fourth Review
of the Council’s Work 1986 (General Sec. of EC, Brussels, 1987), p.126; Twentieth General
Report on the Activities of the European Commission 1986 (Brussels, 1987), p.318.
37. Resolution on relations between the EEC and Turkey, Official Journal EC, No C 7/109–111,
Dec. 1986.
38. See Survey of the Main Activities of the European Parliament, July 1987–June 1988
(Directorate General for Research, 1988), p.3
39. See Debates of the European Parliament, No.2–346/155, 10 Dec. 1986.
40. See Briefing, 29 Dec. 1986, p.13; The Times, 8 Dec. 1986. E. Noel, the Secretary General of
the European Community, said that the EC would give a negative answer to Turkey’s
application in the near future. As he expressed, Turkey was expected to establish a full
democratic system as understood by the West before an accession: Foreign Broadcast
Information Service: Western Europe (hereafter FBIS:WE) 21 Jan. 1987, T.4. On the other
hand, Cheysson, a member of the Commission, highlighted Turkey’s economic inadequacies
for membership, see Briefing, 30 Dec. 1985.
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40 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S
78. Resolution 840 (1985), Texts Adopted by the Assembly. Rapporteur of Legal Affairs
Committee Stoffelen also denounced the executions and urged the Turkish government
stop approving other death sentences, See PACE, Official Report, 22–26 April 1985, p.61.
79. See quotation from Evren’s speech he made while visiting West Germany in 1988, in M.S.
Gemalmaz, The Institutionalization Process of the ‘Turkish Type of Democracy’: A
Politico-Juridical Analysis of Human Rights (Istanbul: Amac, 1989), p.51.
80. ‘Kenan Evren’in Anilari’, serial in daily Milliyet, 9 Nov. 1990, p.25.
81. See, for instance his speech to British MPs, The Times, 20 Feb. 1986.
82. The Times, 10 June 1985.
83. PACE greeted the establisment and work of the Parliamentary Committee.
84. Amnesty International continuously claimed that torture remained systematic and widespread
in Turkey, Turkey: Testimony on Torture (London: Amnesty International, 1985).
85. See Özal’s interview in Der Spiegel, 16 March 1987, p.165, as printed in FBIS: WE, 18
March 1987, T.2–4.
86. The prosecution of torturers was carried on during this period, between May 1985 and May
1986 nearly 30 policemen were convicted for their part in torture cases, Keesing’s, July
1986: p.34500. A Foreign Ministry spokesman gave the number convicted for torturing
from 1980 to mid-1985 as 105, see The Times, 26 July 1985.
87. Keesing’s, July 1986, p.34500. See Özal’s explanation of the change in the law on the
execution of penalties, in Basbakan Özal’in Konusma, Mesaj, Beyanat ve Mulakatlari,
1985–1986 (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi) 7 Feb. 1986, p.232; and ibid. 11 Feb. 1986,
pp.239–40.
88. Evren believed that the Europeans were giving Turkey a hard time because of these trials,
Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anilari, Vol.5. p.59.
89. Keesing’s, July 1986, p.34496.
90. Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anilari, Vol.5, p.383. He was strongly against a general amnesty,
ibid., pp.88, 96.
91. See Özal’s speech published in, Türk Demokrasi Vakfi Bulteni, p.15.
92. FBIS: WE, 25 March 1987, T.2.
93. See editorial of Milliyet for a reminder of this, 28 Oct. 1987, in FBIS: WE, 5 Nov. 1987, p.22.
94. See Basbakan Özal’in Basin Toplantilari, 14 April 1987, pp.3–6. In the second half of the
speech Özal argued for the economic fitness of Turkey to enter the EC.
95. Özal, in September 1987 again directly said that the acceptance of his ruling Motherland
Party as a member of the International Democratic Union showed that there was no human
rights problem in Turkey, see FBIS: WE, 25 Sept. 1987, p.14.
96. FBIS: WE, 15 April 1987, t.6.
97. Evren, kenan Evren’in Anilari., Vol.5, p.62.
98. Steinbach, ‘Turkey Third Republic’, p.248.
99. FBIS: WE, 28 Jan. 1987, p.5.
100. See, for instance, the speech of the President of the Council of Europe, in PACE, Official
Report, 18th Session, 27 Sept. 1989.
101. Özal’in Basin Toplantilari, 12 Sept. 1987, pp.22–3.
102. See Official Journal EC, No C343/62, 23 Oct. 1985.
103. Özal said in an interview with Der Spiegel, on 16 March 1987, ‘it can only be helpful for our
democracy if we were to become a Community member. By the way my government only
recently permitted the Turks to turn to the ECHR’, in FBIS: WE, 18 March 1987, T.2–4.
104. Gemalmaz, The institutionalization Process, p.24.
105. Keesing’s, May 1987, p.35131.
106. President Evren explains that he was considering lifting the ban in mid-1986 but after
consulting his military collegues, he says, he abandoned this idea; see Cemal, Özal
Hikayesi, pp.205–21, for a journalistic story of the debate.
107. The meeting between Bozer and Tindemans took place at the end of September, see FBIS:
WE, 2 Oct. 1987.
108. See The Times, 9 Sept. 1987.
109. A. Finkel and W. Hale, ‘Politics and Procedure in the 1987 Turkish General Election’, in
A. Finkel and N. Sirman (eds.), Turkish State, Turkish Society (London: Routledge, 1990),
p.108.
110. FBIS: WE, 20 April 1987.
111. E. Ozbudun, ‘Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions
and Reequilibrations’, in E. Ozbudun (ed.), Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey (Ankara:
Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), p.45.