XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki 2006

Session 121

“The Economic Efficiency of Imperial Waqfs in the Ottoman Empire”

Kayhan Orbay, University of Vienna

Introduction

The waqf system had undertaken a significant economic and social function in the

Islamic societies, however, the waqfs were much more widespread and active economic and

social agents in the Ottoman institutional texture.1 The Ottoman imperial waqfs in particular,

together with the large waqfs of the dignitaries2 had a distinctive place in the Ottoman waqf

system, for they were mostly large-sized waqfs overshadowing thousands of small-sized

waqfs made by the public.3 The imperial waqfs 4 held vast agricultural lands and numerous

revenue-yielding commercial properties, and managed extensive budgets. For comparison, the

giant waqf of Süleymâniye in Istanbul and the large waqf of Bâyezîd II in the central

Anatolian town of Amasya have been endowed the revenues from hundreds of villages.5 The

Süleymâniye was drawing around five million akça (silver coin) from its holdings and

Bâyezîd II’s waqf was collecting about a million akça from its agricultural holdings at the end

of the 16th century. These imperial waqfs were in bigger category from every aspect, they

were financially stronger, relatively long-lasting and economically more effective and active

compared to the hundreds of ordinary waqfs, which were endowments of either just a house

worth 2.000 akça or cash of the same amount.

The imperial waqfs held extensive financial resources and managed large budgets,

therefore they would be expected to have been engaged in commercial business and turned

into big investment institutions by operating their savings and profiting from large-scale

ventures. Nevertheless, they neither evolved into large business and investment institutions

nor emerged as commercial ventures. Therefore, for many decades in historiography they

1
have been severely blamed for wasting the economic resources they possessed. Some

scholars, though, emphasized their particular economic and social function.6 It is another fact

that until the very recent centuries, the eastern part of the Old World did not develop joint

commercial ventures and large business partnerships. However, the already existing waqfs as

well as the imperial waqfs were not in principle intended to be a venture, and when a waqf

was born into the legal structure and tradition of its time, it was unable to carry out business

affairs in the same way a commercial venture does.

The lack of more inclusive and common scholarly interest to the waqf system, relative

unavailability of archival documentation in the early period of waqf studies and as a result

emphasis given to their legal aspect might be responsible for failing to include and evaluate

comprehensively their economic and social aspect.7 The fact that during the first decades of

the waqf studies in the last century, scholarly research on the economic aspect of the waqf

institutions were limited in number and the available sources were so restricted that that

obstructed to see their economic role and thus to develop a healthy approach to the waqfs.

However, recently, new archival materials have been introduced and evaluated which allowed

historians to deal with all aspects of these institutions.8 At the same time, studies on the

waqfs, based largely on the new archival sources, increased in number. Recent research and

the contribution of the newly available archival sources reveals that first of all their

endowment deeds or waqfiyyes, which determined and restricted the range of their financial

and commercial activities and stipulated the waqfs as social welfare and poor-relief

institutions, and beyond this, some other factors as well as the features of the waqf system

prevented them from saving funds and from becoming industrial investors or producers. This

paper argues that the purposes of their establishment, the restrictive stipulations for the

financial and managerial decision making in addition to the state’s intervention to their

financial transactions, managerial decisions and to their actual operations as well as the state’s

2
control over these institutions were key factors affecting the economic efficiency of the

imperial waqfs.

The League of Giants; The Imperial Waqfs

Waqfs had been one of the major institutions in the Islamic states and societies from the

beginning of the eighth century until the end of the nineteenth century.9 Among these Islamic

states, particularly in the Ottoman Empire, waqfs were highly developed and played a very

important role in the social and economic order of the Empire. The imperial waqfs were in

particular the largest economic and social institutions in their localities. They were embedded

in the agricultural economy holding thousands of villages and they were the most active

agents in the town economy with hundreds of shops, houses and workshops in their

possession.10 They managed large revenue sources and were able to achieve budget surpluses

and accumulate saving funds. These waqfs of the imperial family were made through the

grants from the state lands or the land was bought by the ruler himself and then endowed.11

The construction of waqf buildings was financed through the state budget. Some of the waqfs

of high dignitaries were also made through the initial grants from the state lands. In the case

of the waqfs of dignitaries, avoiding confiscation or by-passing Islamic inheritance law might

provide an incentive in converting their properties in waqf holdings, however some personal

wishes such as gaining esteem can be assumed to have been a strong motivation of the

founders of imperial waqfs.12 The imperial waqfs were also the symbol of central authority

and tool for legitimization.13

Besides, the imperial waqfs were purposed to perform several functions in economy and

society. They were very efficient re-distributive institutions.14 They were collecting

agricultural revenues from the villages scattered through several regions and channeling them

to the town economy where these large waqfs spent their income through purchases in the

3
local markets and through wage payments. Thus they supported the local production and

commerce. They employed a great number of employees in various capacities and transferred

purchasing power to them.15 Thus, they could be used as a tool for the employment policy.16

They were used to make and to maintain infrastructure investments such as bridges,

aqueducts, fountains, lighthouses et cetera.17 They provided the town with religious services

by building mosques and employing religious officers. They performed health services for

free in their hospitals and undertook educational services by constructing primary schools and

schools of high education (medrese).18 Thus, the imperial waqfs met the basic social and

cultural needs of a city, created employment, and transferred income. In this way they at the

same time led to the emergence of new districts around waqf buildings. They also constructed

covered market places and supported the commercial development of a town. Thus the

imperial waqfs were used as one of the most effective tool for urbanization policy.19

The imperial waqfs usually operated great public kitchens called ‘imâret. These kitchens

distributed free meal and bread to thousands of people including poor and needy. Thus, they

served as poor-relief institutions.20 In addition, the imperial waqfs made monthly stipend

payments to poor and retired persons thus serving as social security institutions. Then, having

been designed by their founders as poor-relief institutions, as a tool for creating employment,

supporting urbanization and local economy, and performing cultural services, they were not

profit-seeking commercial ventures or investment institutions. However, could they not save

funds and make large investments in order better to provide social services or to achieve their

intended functions? Could they not increase their assets, engage in commerce or invest money

in profitable enterprises? Actually there are a few examples showing that they kept budget

surpluses or sent them to the central administration where these savings were kept in safe.

Nevertheless, beyond these sporadic instances the question of why the imperial waqfs were

4
not evolved into commercial institutions or into even bigger social institutions asks for an

explanation.

The First and Foremost Restrictive Factor in Actual Operation; “the endowment deed”

or waqfiyye

An imperial waqf gained its irrevocability through the legal approval of its endowment

deed or the waqfiyye by the judge. The waqfiyye was the first restrictive factor for the actual

operation of the waqf.21 The waqfiyyes of the imperial waqfs minutely determined many

instructions and set rules for almost all kinds of waqf affairs. The waqf administration was not

independent or flexible in actual operation and decision-making and had to follow the

stipulations in the waqfiyye. In the case of the imperial waqfs, the founders’ instructions were

enforced through the central administration and local judges.

A waqfiyye typically listed the revenue sources devoted to the waqf and sometimes

mentioned even the method these sources should be operated by. The range of the services to

be performed by the waqf was stated in the waqfiyye. Sometimes even the quality of the

services was described in detail. For instance, a waqf had to use the same amount of

ingredients in the meals it served as designated in the waqfiyye. The offices of employment as

well as the number of employees in each office together with their salary levels were also

determined in the waqfiyye. Sometimes, some other regular expense items such as the

delivery of cash for the upkeep of Holy Places were included in the waqfiyye. In other words,

both the income and expenditure items were strictly stipulated in the waqfiyye. The income

surplus, if available, was usually supposed to be used for the renewal of the waqf buildings

and to buy new revenue-producing properties. However, the revenue coming from these

properties was bound to be spent on the pre-determined purpose of the waqf. Still, this does

not mean that an imperial waqf could not invest its surplus money into a profitable business,

5
build or buy new properties. Then making more money, it could renew the existing waqf

buildings, improve the service quality or it would even be allowed to maintain another social

service for instance by building a mosque or a caravanserai (fortified inn). Then, the question

arises what other factors prevented them from investing and becoming even larger.

State Control over the Imperial Waqfs and some other Interferences

Being actually like an extension of the state mechanism as well as being very influential

economic and social agents, the imperial waqfs were constantly and closely supervised by the

central administration. The most effective tool of this control mechanism was the annual

account book regularly kept and sent by the waqf administration to the various central offices

responsible for their supervision.22 The account books of the imperial waqfs were audited in

these offices. Special inspectors appointed by the central administration could also be charged

with the inspection of the waqf accounts. In addition, the waqfs were obliged to keep more

detailed registers and when it was deemed necessary they submitted these registers too.23

The central administration had to design a more effective monitoring and control system

to overcome the agency problem. Beside the auditing and inspection mechanism, local judges

were also authorized to supervise the waqf affairs and all kinds of transactions.24 In case of

some imperial waqfs, the local judge first audited the waqf accounts, prepared a report about

the financial situation of the waqf, where he even mentioned content or discontent of the waqf

employees with the current waqf administration. Despite the control mechanism seemingly

effective for its age, corruption and the financial losses due to the mismanagement appear to

be a fact in the imperial waqfs just as it was the case in all kinds of waqfs. The waqfs

suffering financial damage due to their managers’ corruption were common as we found

related data in the court records and in the collections of imperial decrees.25 However, beside

the apparent corruption cases such as squeezing money from the waqf, we are not always able

6
to differ a mismanagement period from the period of a successful administrator, because the

central administration did not develop an effective performance evaluation system.

Still there are some clear examples according to which either the waqf administrator or

the other high officials abuse their authority and harmed the waqfs financially. For instance,

in order to provide material benefit to their supporters or for some other political reason or

interest, they issued too many certificates that entitling the holder to receive a meal from the

waqf kitchen or a stipend from the budget.26 The increasing number of beneficiaries drained

the budget surpluses of these waqfs. At the end, the central administration was compelled to

apply stricter control over the meal and stipend distribution taking it directly under its own

authority.27

I cannot say for certain whether the appointment of the waqf employees was under the

authority of the central administration from the very beginning or whether it took over this

authority at a later date due to the corruption in this field. In any case, it seems that in most of

the imperial waqfs the central administration approved the appointees to the vacancies in the

imperial waqfs. The waqf administration seems to have been directly appointed by the central

administration. The procedure for the dismissal of the employees was stipulated in the

waqfiyye. For instance, when an employee made a mistake he was warned and he could be

fired upon repeating the same failure. Such an arrangement of course secured the positions for

the waqf employees. However, all these regulations were keeping the waqf administration

from freely proceed with an employment policy.

The salary levels of the employees were determined in the waqfiyye, however, these

salaries could be increased in time with the approval from the central administration. For a

long time, it was thought that the number of employees and the offices of employment must

be fixed in the waqfs since they were stipulated in the waqfiyye. However, the archival

sources show that not only the salaries were arranged but also new employees were appointed

7
or new offices were established. Actually, the increase in the number of employees was also

allowed in the waqfiyye when needed for better performing the services.

Meal distribution, new stipend allocations and sometimes over employment was also a

policy tool for the central government for many reasons, either to create employment, to

provide poor-relief or social security or simply to enhance political influence and to

strengthen the central authority.28

To sum up the factors stressed so far in the present paper as having played a role in the

waqfs’ economic performance I can say the following. The lack of efficient control

mechanism led to corruption and abuse of authority in the waqfs which surely affected their

economic performance or the quality of their services. The imperial waqfs were under close

state control but at the same time they were open to interference such as additional meal and

stipend distribution or employment. Such interferences of course brought additional burdens

to the waqf budgets, created over employment and eventually drained their budget surpluses.

Having budget surpluses was a vital point for the imperial waqfs, especially for the ones,

which largely depended on agricultural revenues. Because of their nature, the revenues from

the agricultural sources could fluctuate, sometimes extremely so from year to year. But as will

be seen later in this paper, although the imperial waqfs produced income surpluses they were

unable to keep these surpluses and therefore they got frequently into financial crises.

A few more factors should be mentioned here, which affect the economic performance

of the imperial waqfs. They had to ask permission to invest in new revenue sources, even to

build new service facilities. Small and regular repair works, which could be undertaken by the

waqf without putting any trouble to the budget, were not subject to any permission. However,

when an imperial waqf needed to undertake a large repair work, for instance after an

earthquake or fire, it needed approval from the central administration. Actually, if they could

save their budget surpluses and thus held large funds, they would not need such an approval.

8
However, since they could not keep the income surplus they needed to form a repair budget.

Large undertakings affected the waqfs’ regular operations, their services and budgets. Costly

repair and construction undertakings required a large budget. To form such a budget, the

waqfs sometimes ceased to perform some revenue-consuming services. They suspended the

salary payments or at least did not distribute stipend to the beneficiaries and transferred the

income to the repair budget. In addition, they did not deliver any surplus to the central

treasury. Such administrative and financial decisions could not be taken without informing the

central government and having its permission.29 Such state interventions, however, were a

natural extension of the state’s role and its authority as supervisor but also involved the state’s

financial interests because in this case they had to ask the central administration to keep the

annual budget surplus with the waqf instead of forwarding it to the central treasury.

In the long history of the waqfs and against the forcing conditions, the stipulations in the

waqfiyye would lose their strict nature or be commented liberally by the judges. As said

before, sometimes the method by which the revenue sources were to be operated was also

stated in the waqfiyye. However, when the waqf needed it financially or it was in the interest

of the waqf, some other methods such as the double-renting method called icâreteyn, or the

property exchange called istibdâl was allowed and widely applied.30 Or when the waqf

revenue sources were in disrepair and the waqf could fall into decay for this reason, the waqf

would lease them on a long-term basis.

One more point is very striking, namely that the imperial waqfs never directly engaged

in production in their own workshops, although there were not any regulations in their

waqfiyyes prohibiting this. The imperial waqfs built hundreds of shops and workshops in

covered market places. It is not clear whether they were provided with production tools

themselves in these workshops. However, they themselves never became the operator, the

employer or the producer in these workshops. Instead of engaging in commerce or production

9
they always leased their shops to private entrepreneurs. Differently from the agricultural

revenues, urban-based revenues were relatively stable in the short run. But in the long-term,

the waqfs failed in general to adapt urban-based rent revenues to the price movements.31

Therefore, renting a shop from the waqf provided an advantage to the private tenants. At the

same time, renters enjoyed some other privileges. For instance, when some others opened

shops in the vicinity of the town and sold their stuff cheaper by paying much less rent, the

holders of the waqf shops complained, and appealing to the court they demanded the closing

down of these shops.32 Because such shops would eventually damage the waqf’s finance, the

waqf administration could also take a side in this case. It can be safely said that the imperial

waqfs were used to promote the private investors instead of directly involving them in the

business sector. However, there still remains a question. Although they preferred for some

reason to remain out of the direct engagement in business, they could invest their money to

build much more workshops, baths and mills and thus renting them out they could increase

their rent revenues. This question, however, refers back to the matter of the budget surplus.

Could the imperial waqfs thus keep their budget surpluses for investments?

As mentioned before, it was very important for the imperial waqfs to keep budget

surpluses because they mainly derived their revenues from the agricultural holdings that

showed seasonal and annual fluctuations. Sometimes their properties or buildings fell into

ruin or seriously suffered damage due to natural disasters such as a major earthquake and fire.

Social turmoil, rebel attacks and plagues badly affected their revenue sources and disrupted

the revenue collection as well. To balance the budget and to undertake large repair works they

needed large savings. However, the imperial waqfs were bound to deliver their budget

surpluses to the central treasuries. The money transfers from the waqfs were realized under

two different names. They forwarded to the central treasuries some funds as income surplus

called zevâ’id and some funds as contribution called ‘avâ’id. It is clear that not all the

10
imperial waqfs were forwarding their income surpluses to the central treasuries on a regular

basis, especially when the amount of surplus was not that much and had to be transferred to

the following accounting period as safety funds. In accordance with the imperial decree and

with the request of the local judge, the imperial waqfs sometimes transferred income not to

the central treasury but to the other imperial waqfs for instance in order to support their repair

budget. There were, however, imperial waqfs which delivered their income surpluses quite

regularly to the central treasury as long as they maintain a budget surplus. A very distinctive

sample of money transfer from the waqfs and of the state’s interference with the waqfs is that

the central administration requested extra funding from the hundreds of waqfs for the central

treasury experiencing difficulty due to military spending.33

Concluding Remarks

The imperial waqfs were defined as re-distributive institutions and poor-relief agents.

They were operating like the state-enterprises to fulfill and perform social, economic and

cultural services. They were not commercial ventures designed for profit-maximization. They

had to follow the stipulations in their endowment deeds and also were subject to central

control in terms of their financial and administrative decisions that required approval from the

central administration. Financial activities of the waqfs were closely supervised and their

financial accounts audited by the central offices.

They were not established as industrial producers but to support the industrial

production and emergence of a class of private entrepreneurs. They were not intended to turn

into a capitalist employer rather they conducted an employment policy in accordance with

some social and economic policies in favor of public utility. To maintain social services and

to distribute more meals and stipend to the needy from the annual budget was their primary

object. Therefore, when their economic performance and efficiency are considered, different

11
priorities and purposes in the establishment of the imperial waqfs should be taken into

consideration, and they should be judged on the grounds of whether they functioned

successfully as social welfare institutions. Taking this criterion, one can seek for an answer to

the crucial question of why they did not engage in business as producers and employers nor

invest funds into profitable commercial enterprises. The answer, I think, lies in a series of

factors. The restrictive effect of the waqfiyye and long-established waqf tradition is to be

mentioned first. Then the state’s objective in making waqfs and using them as its policy tool

comes out as another strong factor. Moreover, the state’s control and interference with their

operations sometimes reduced their financial capacity to the extent that they hardly could

maintain themselves at the edge of financial difficulty. Lastly, whenever they achieved an

income surplus, the central administration requested the transfer of surpluses from the waqfs

to the central treasuries, which left the waqfs without safety funds, let alone the investment

funds.

1
For studies dealing with, inter alia, the waqfs’ role in social and cultural life see Fuad Köprülü, “Vak f
Müessesesi ve Vak f Vesikalar n Tarihi Ehemmiyeti”, Vak flar Dergisi, 1, 1938, 1-6; Feridun Akozan, “Türk
Külliyeleri”, Vak flar Dergisi, 8, 1969, 303-309; Bahaeddin Yediy ld z, “Vak f Müessesinin XVIII. As r Türk
Toplumundaki Rolü”, Vak flar Dergisi, 14, 1982, 1-27; Abraham Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of
Modernity, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989; Oded Peri, “Waqf and Ottoman Welfare Policy”,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 35, 1992, 171-185; Amy Singer, Constructing
Ottoman Beneficence, An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem, State University of New York Press, 2002;
Svetlana Ivanova, “Introduction”, in Inventory, eds. E. Radushev et al., Sofia, 2003. On the importance of the
waqfs in the economic life see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Edirne ve Civar ndaki Baz maret Tesislerinin Y ll k
Muhasebe Bilançolar ”, Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, I/2, 1964, 235-377; Bahaeddin Yediy ld z, “XVIII. As r
Türk Vak flar n ktisadi Boyutu”, Vak flar Dergisi, 18, 1984, 5-41.
2
The waqfs of viziers, as, and of the eyhü’l-islâm etc.
3
For the importance of the imperial waqfs in the Ottoman economy, see Barkan, “Baz maret Tesislerinin Y ll k
Muhasebe Bilançolar ”; Halil nalc k, “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire”, Journal of Economic History,
XXIX-1, 1969, pp. 132-135; Haim Gerber, “The Waqf Institution in Early Ottoman Edirne”, Asian and African
Studies, 17, 1983, 29-45; Miriam Hoexter, “Adaptation to Changing Circumstances: Perpetual Leases and
Exchange Transactions in Waqf Properties in Ottoman Algiers”, Islamic Law and Society, 4, 1997, 319-333.
4
The term imperial waqfs refers to the waqfs of the rulers and their family members.
5
For the Süleymâniye waqf complex see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Süleymaniye Cami ve mareti Tesislerine Ait
ll k Bir Muhasebe Bilançosu 993/994 (1585/1586)”, Vak flar Dergisi, 9, 1971, 109-161. For Bâyezîd II’s
imperial waqf see Kayhan Orbay, The Financial Administration of an Imperial Waqf in an Age of Crisis: A Case
Study of Bâyezîd II’s Waqf in Amasya (1594-1657), Unpublished M.A. Thesis, The Department of History,
Bilkent University, Ankara, June 2001.

12
6
For a work blaming waqfs for wasting resources see Mustafa Akda , Türkiyenin ktisadi ve çtimai Tarihi 1-2
(1453-1559), stanbul, Cem Yay nevi, 1995. For further reading see Amy Singer, “Charity’s Legacies:
Reconsideration of Ottoman Imperial Endowment-Making”, in Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts,
eds. M. Bonner et al., State University of New York Press, 2003, 295-313.
7
For a historical outline of the waqf studies see Daniel Crecelius, “Introduction”, Journal of the Economic and
Social History of the Orient, 38,3, 1995, 247-61; Miriam Hoexter, “Waqf Studies in the Twentieth Century: The
State of the Art”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 41,4, 1998, 474-95. For the earlier
works on the waqfs and further references see W. Heffening, “waqf”, EI, vol. VIII, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1987,
1096-1103; Fuad Köprülü, “Vak f Müessesesinin Hukuki Mahiyeti ve Tarihi Tekamülü”, Vak flar Dergisi, 2,
1942, 1-35.
8
These recent sources are the waqf account books and several types of detailed waqf registers. For some of these
sources see Kayhan Orbay, “On the Mukâta’a Revenues and the Revenue Collection of Bâyezîd II’s waqf in
Amasya”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes (WZKM), vol. 95, 2005, 139-162; Idem, “Detailed
Tax Farm Registers and Arrears Registers as Sources of the Waqfs’ Financial Analyses”, Acta Orientalia:
Academiae Scientiarum Hung., vol. 58, no. 4, 2005, 331-347.
9
For the origin, early development and history of waqf and charitable practices in Islamic history see Köprülü,
“Vak f Müessesesinin Hukuki Mahiyeti”; Idem, slam ve Türk Hukuk Tarihi Ara rmalar ve Vak f Müessesesi,
stanbul, Ötüken Ne riyat, 1983, pp. 311-314; Joseph Schacht, “Early Doctrines on Waqf”, in Fuad Köprülü
Arma an , stanbul, 1953, 443-452; Bahaeddin Yediy ld z, “vak f”, A, vol. 13, stanbul, Milli E itim Bas mevi,
1986, 153-172; John Robert Barnes, An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire, Leiden,
E. J. Brill, 1986; Michael Bonner, “Poverty and Charity in the Rise of Islam”, in Poverty and Charity in Middle
Eastern Contexts, eds. M. Bonner et al., State University of New York Press, 2003, 13-30; Ingrid Mattson,
“Status-Based Definitions of Need in Early Islamic Zakat and Maintenance Laws” in the same volume, 31-51.
10
The waqfs as major agents in the economic activity were interdependent with local rural and urban economy,
see Gerber, “The Waqf Institution in Early Ottoman Edirne”; Idem, Economy and Society in an Ottoman City:
Bursa, 1600-1700, Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, 1988; Yediy ld z, “XVIII. As r Türk Vak flar n ktisadi
Boyutu”; Hoexter, “Adaptation to Changing Circumstances”.
11
Imperial waqfs and in general the waqfs of high dignitaries as well were founded through the endowment of
the acquired state lands which were initially allotted to the founders as private property. For the role and
contribution of the state in waqf making see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “ maret Sitelerinin Kurulu ve leyi Tarz na
Ait Ara rmalar”, stanbul Üniversitesi ktisat Fakültesi Mecmuas , 23/1-2, 1962-63, 239-296; Idem, “Baz
maret Tesislerinin Y ll k Muhasebe Bilançolar ”; Nejat Göyünç, “Vak f Tesisinde Devletin Katk (16. yüzy l
içinde)”, Osmanl Ara rmalar , 11, 1991, 123-128; Klaus Schwarz and H. Kurio, Die Stiftungen des
osmanischen Grosswesirs Ko a Sinân Pascha (gest. 1596) in Uzun aova / Bulgarien, Berlin, Klaus Schwarz
Verlag, 1983.
12
Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “ er’i Miras Hukuku ve Evlatl k Vak flar”, in Türkiye’de Toprak Meselesi; Toplu Eserler
I, Istanbul, Gözlem Yay nlar , 1980, 209-230; Ne et Ça atay, “ slamda Vak f Kurumunun Miras Hukukuna
Etkisi,” Vak flar Dergisi, 11, 1977, 1-6. Waqf-making was a method to protect one’s possessions against
confiscation by converting his property in inalienable waqf holdings or by investing in existing waqf holdings,
Search for political legitimacy and social status or to enforce them in addition to personal glorification and
gaining social prestige and influence could motivate the founders for making waqf, Robert McChesney, “Waqf
and Public Policy: The Waqfs of Shah ‘Abbâs, 1011-1023/1602-1614”, Asian and African Studies, 15, 1981,
165-190; Oded Peri, “The Waqf as an Instrument to Increase and Consolidate Political Power: the Case of
Khasseki Sultan Waqf in late Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Jerusalem”, Asian and African Studies, 18, 1983, 47-
62; Ruth Roded, “The Waqf and the Social Elite of Aleppo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries”,
Turcica, XX, 1988, 71-91; Jane Hathaway, “The Wealth and Influence of an Exiled Ottoman Eunuch in Egypt:
The Waqf Inventory of ‘Abbâs Agha”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 37, 1994, 293-
317; Gabriel Baer, “The Waqf as a Prop for the Social System (Sixteenth-Twentieth Centuries)”, Islamic Law
and Society, 4,3, 1997, 264-297.
13
Suraiya Faroqhi, “Die Legitimation des Osmanensultans: Zur Beziehung von Religion, Kunst und Politik im
16. und 17. Jahrhundert“, Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien, 1989, 2, 49-67.
14
For the re-distributive function of the waqfs see Barkan, “Edirne ve Civar ndaki Baz maret Tesislerinin”;
Gerber, “The Waqf Institution in Early Ottoman Edirne”, pp. 44f; Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of
Modernity, p. 312; Murat Çizakça, “Cash Waqfs of Bursa, 1555-1823”, Journal of the Economic and Social
History of the Orient, 38,3, 1995, p. 351. Through the construction and maintenance of the establishments and
the employment of a large number of people in their operation, the waqfs transferred the wealth of vâk fs
(founders) and later on the revenue of the waqfs to their employees, to poor and to the others who benefited from
the waqf services. Also see Halil Inalc k, “The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600”, in An
Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, eds. nalc k H., Quataert D., New York:

13
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 47, where he stressed the role of the waqfs in the redistribution of the
wealth in society and their significant role economically in Ottoman society. He appreciates this role of the
waqfs in a context where he makes a special reference to the Karl Polanyi’s studies. The conceptual framework
of the so-called “Polanyian Economy” may in fact be convenient and fruitful for the study of economic role of
the waqf system. See Karl Polanyi et al., Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and
Theory, New York, The Free Press, 1965, especially Polanyi’s article, “The Economy as Instituted Process”
between the pages 243-270 in this volume.
15
For their purchasing power see Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Egypt’s Adjustment to Ottoman Rule, Institutions,
Waqf and Architecture in Cairo (16th and 17th Centuries), E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1994, pp. 145f.
16
For the employment capacities of the waqfs see Barkan, “ maret Sitelerinin Kurulu ve leyi Tarz na Ait
Ara rmalar”; Gerber, Economy and Society in an Ottoman City, p. 25.
17
For the public services and constructions undertaken by the waqfs in the cities see Marcus, The Middle East on
the Eve of Modernity, pp. 304-313; Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Egypt’s Adjustment to Ottoman Rule, Leiden, E. J.
Brill, 1994, p. 213.
18
Miri Shefer, “Charity and Hospitality: Hospitals in the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern Period”, in
Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts, eds. M. Bonner et al., State University of New York Press,
2003, pp. 121-143.
19
As a vehicle for settlement policy, the waqf were used to establish new towns, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, “Vak f
Sistemi ve Türk ehircili i”, Vak flar Dergisi, ayr bas m, IX, 1971, 13-37; Leonor Fernandes, “Three Sufi
Foundations in a 15th Century Waqfiyya”, Annales Islamologiques, 17, 1981, pp. 144f; Muhammad Adnan
Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century, Librairie du Liban, 1982, pp. 115-118;
Machiel Kiel, “The Vak fname of Rakkas Sinan Beg in Karnobat (Karîn-âbâd) and the Ottoman Colonization of
Bulgarian Thrace, (14th-15th century)”, in Studies on the Ottoman Architecture of the Balkans, XII, Variorum,
1990; Alexander Lopasic, “Islamization of the Balkans with Special Reference to Bosnia”, JIS, 5, 1994, 163-
186. The waqfs provided essential municipal services see André Raymond, “The Ottoman Conquest and the
Development of the Great Arab Towns”, in Arab Cities in the Ottoman Period, Cairo, Syria and the Maghreb,
Variorum, 2002; Idem, “Architecture and Urban Development: Cairo During the Ottoman Period, 1517-1798”,
in Arab Cities in the Ottoman Period, Cairo, Syria and the Maghreb, Variorum, 2002. For Barkan’s studies
identifying the waqfs’ role in the settlement and colonization policies, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Osmanl
mparatorlu unda Bir skan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Vak flar ve Temlikler I, stila Devirlerinin
Kolonizatör Türk Dervi leri ve Zaviyeler”, Vak flar Dergisi, 2, 1942, 279-304; Idem, “Vak flar n Bir skan ve
Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Kullan lmas nda Di er ekiller”, Vak flar Dergisi, 2, 1942, 354-365.
20
The ‘imârets as social welfare agency, see Peri, “Waqf and Ottoman Welfare Policy”, and the ‘imârets as a
tool for poor-relief policy see Gerber, “The Waqf Institution in Early Ottoman Edirne”, pp. 44f; Singer,
Constructing Ottoman Beneficence; Miriam Hoexter, “Charity, the Poor, and Distribution of Alms in Ottoman
Algiers”, in Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts, ed. M. Bonner et al., State University of New York
Press, 2003.
21
Timur Kuran, “The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic Underdevelopment in the
Middle East”, JEH, vol. 63, no. 2, 2002, 414-446; Idem, “The Logic of Financial Westernization in the Middle
East”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 56, 2005, 593-615.
22
These central offices were the offices of Chief Black Eunuch, Chief White Eunuch, eyhü’l-islâm, the Grand
Vizierate. For the waqf account books see Kayhan Orbay, “Structure and the Content of the Waqf Account
Books as sources of Ottoman Economic and Institutional History”, forthcoming in Turcica, Revue D’Etudes
Turques.
23
The waqf account books and the detailed registers are not the only sources for the actual affairs of the waqfs,
however, they provide apparently the most detailed information on their actual functioning. Although these
sources have been introduced to the researchers about half a century ago, more comprehensive scholarly interest
to the waqf system and to these archival sources as well entered into a new encouraging phase only in the recent
decades. Therefore, our knowledge either about the waqf system or about the imperial waqfs are still stepping
the first track.
24
For the role of the judge in the inspection of the waqfs see Gerber, Economy and Society in an Ottoman City,
pp. 164-66; Ronal Jennings, “Pious Foundation in the Society and Economy of Ottoman Trabzon, 1565-1640”,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, XXXIII, 1990, pp. 272-74.
25
For some decrees in the registers of important affairs (Mühimme Defteri) mentioning the waqf administrators
who embezzled money or gave financial damage to the waqf see MD 12 decree no: 140, MD 193 decree no: 658,
1003, MD 194 decree no: 95, 204.
26
Peri, “The Waqf as an Instrument to Increase and Consolidate Political Power”. Also see Kayhan Orbay,
“Waqf Ta‘âmhorân and Fodûlahorân Registers as Archival Sources for ‘Imârets”, presented at the International
Symposium of Feeding People, Feeding Power; Imarets in the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, Turkey, 8-10 October

14
2004 and forthcoming in Feeding People, Feeding Power; Imarets in the Ottoman Empire, Eren Yay nc k,
stanbul.
27
Barkan, “Baz maret Tesislerinin Y ll k Muhasebe Bilançolar ”, pp. 287-289; Peri, “Waqf and Ottoman
Welfare Policy”, pp. 171-185; Kayhan Orbay, “Auditing, Preventing Corruption and Early Signs of Performance
Evaluation in the Account Registers of Imperial Foundations in the 16th and 17th-Centuries Ottoman Empire”,
paper presented at the Eleventh World Congress of Accounting Historians, Nantes/France, 19-22 July 2006.
28
For further state interferences see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “ mparatorluk Devrinde Toprak Mülk ve Vak flar n
Hususiyeti”, in Türkiye’de Toprak Meselesi; Toplu Eserler I, Istanbul, Gözlem Yay nlar , 1980, 249-280; Peri,
“The Waqf as an Instrument to Increase and Consolidate Political Power”. Also see Bakhit, The Ottoman
Province of Damascus, pp. 110f, 161f.
29
It seems that the repair budget, the total cost of the repair or construction had to be carefully estimated before
the repair be started. The local qadi together with the experts or a commission of experts and architects charged
by the central government inspected the actual situation, and determined the cost for repair. For some relevant
decrees see MD 27 p. 348 decree no: 837, MD 90 p. 47, p. 348 decree no: 424, MD 193 decree no: 583 and 654.
30
For the application of the “icâreteyn” method in the operation of waqf revenues although its usage was not
designated in the waqfiyye see Klaus Kreiser, “ câreteyn: Zur “Doppelten Miete” im Osmanischen
Stiftungswesen”, Journal of Turkish Studies, vol. 10, 1986, 219-226. For the frequently use of the property
exchange called “istibdâl” see Hoexter, “Adaptation to Changing Circumstances”. Behrens mentioned that
although the exchange of waqf property was prohibited in Egypt, it continued to be used, especially if the
endower permitted it and the judge saw no alternative way of rescuing an estate, Doris Behrens-Abouseif,
Egypt’s Adjustment to Ottoman Rule, Institutions, Waqf and Architecture in Cairo (16th and 17th Centuries), E. J.
Brill, Leiden, 1994, pp. 153-55.
31
Barkan, “Baz maret Tesislerinin Y ll k Muhasebe Bilançolar ”, p. 253; Gerber, Economy and Society in an
Ottoman City; p. 179.
32
MD 90, p. 181.
33
Ahmet Tabako lu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanl Maliyesi, stanbul, Dergah Yay nlar , 1985, p. 271
note 34 and p. 272 note 35.

15