Jurnal Al-Qurba 1(1): 58-81, 2010

Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt In Nusantara:

The Past And Present

Umar Faruk Assegaf1

1
Faculty of Asian Studies Australian National University,
Australia. Email: umar.assegaf@anu.edu.au

Abstract
The existence of Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt in the archipelago could
be traced back to the first time Islam entering Indonesia.
Evidently, a number of religious symbols and practices in the
country seem to have a close association with the basic tenet of
the Shi’i school of thought. Even until today, these practices are
still vivid among Muslim community in Indonesia. As an Islamic
school of thought, this madhhab was not as popularly acceptable
as Sunnism for unknown reason, hence, the developments of this
madhhab in Indonesia came into its lowest ebb until it gained the
moment when Khomeini led-Islamic revolution toppled Shah
Pahlevi of Iran in 1979. However, beside the Iranian revolution,
there were other factors impacting the developments of Shi’ism
in Indonesia, They are including dynamic domestic socio-
economic and political situation in Indonesia. Some dominating
aspects in relation with Islamic movement as general in Indonesia
which gained its moment within the period of 1980s and 1990s
are should be part of the consideration.

Keywords : Ahl Bayt, Nusantara, Iran, revolution, Khomeini.

Introduction
The presence of Shi’ism1, the so-called Madhhab Ahl Al-
Bait, in Indonesia in the past has always been a contentious issue
among historians and scholars of Islam. The main reason is that,

1
In this paper, the term of Shi’ism indicates denomination in contrast with
Sunnism while Shi‘I refers to a follower or devotee in singular form and its plural
one is Shi’is. The term Shi‘i is used both as adjective and noun.
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this subject is pertaining to the ongoing hot debate about the

Islamisation process in the first period in the region. The process
was in fact very complex because it was mainly related to the
different historical perspectives of how, when and by whom Islam
was first introduced into the archipelago.
The Islamisation process might presumably be carried
out by ulamas (Islamic scholars) with different Islamic school of
thoughts, including Sunnism and Shi’ism. Some researchers like
Baroroh Baried, M Yunus Jamil, A Hasyim (Hasymi 1983),
asserted that Shi’ism had played a major role within early period
of the introduction of Islam into Indonesia (Azra 2000). For
instance, they found that Shi’ism had ever emerged as strong
political power in the archipelago and Shi’ism and Sunnism had
engaged in an acute power competition within the corresponding
period (Hasymi 1983) . By contrast, researchers like Hamka and
Azyumadi Azra and Saifuddin Zuhri, rejected those views saying
they were baseless due to the absence of convincing evidences
and any reliable references. He asserted that the influence of
Shi’ism in the process of Islamisation in Indonesia and the
Southeast Asia region was even more controversial.
Nevertheless, Azra maintained that, as religious political
ideology Shi’ism never existed in Indonesia during the first
introduction of Islam in the country but admitted that a “Persian
influence” in cultural and religious matters was undeniable.
The Persian influence in the Nusantara Archipelago could
early been identified in Ayuthia, Thailand during “the Age of
Commerce” from 15 to 17th century (Reid 1988) . Persian Muslim
Shi’is frequented to trade offices in Thailand. The interaction
between the Muslim traders and local people, not only brought
about positive impacts on local financial sector, but also on the
socio-religious discourses into the region. During that period, the
Shi’i Muslims had great influence on the local kingdom, which
was reigned by Prasat Thong. Ibnu Muhammad in his book “The
Ship of Sulaiman” even more said that the Shi’i Muslims helped
out King of Siam Prasat Thong’s son, Narai, organize the annual
Hasan-Hussein feast during the Islamic month of Muharram, the
month which is considered holy in Shi’ism (Mu*hammad Rab*i*
ibn Mu*hammad 1972).
The view of Persian influence was also supported by
Arnold T Walker. Having observed the robust growth of Islam in
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the coastal areas of Java and Sumatra at the end of 14 century,

he strongly believes that the introduction of Islam into Indonesia
was under the influence of Persian and Indian culture with the
banner of Shi’ism (Arnold 1913: 368, 83). Undoubtedly, this view
is easily dismissed and clearly left a big question behind: is the
Persian influence meaning the dissemination of Shi’ism as
religious ideology or not?

The Sufi Theory

With regard to the Shi’ism presence in Indonesia in the

past, there was a popular assumption, if not sufficient to call it a
theory, among historians and researchers is that Shi’ism came to
Indonesia through Sufism. This assumption was closely allied
with a theory proposed by AH Johns. He writes that the spread
of Islam in Indonesia was mainly carried out by Sufi (Johns 1961).
Of course, this is very controversial issue throughout the history
and obviously needs further elaboration to answer a series of
questions which subsequently arise in this respect. What is the
relationship between Shi’ism and Sufism? What the elements of
Shi’ism influence Sufism?. What sort or branch of Sufism which
brought Shi’ism along when entering Indonesia?
In a bid to answer to the above questions, it is important
firstly to elaborate “the Sufi theory”. Johns believes in contrast to
the theory emphasizing on trade activities carried out by local
people and visiting Muslim merchants, the coming of Islam to the
archipelago was successfully carried out by Sufis. His theory was
also supported by other scholars like Fatimi and Azra. He further
said:
It (Sufism) was directly involved in the spread of Islam to
Indonesia, it played a significant part of this social
organization of the Indonesian port towns and it was the
specific nature of Sufism which facilitated the absorption of
non-muslim communities into fold of Islam.(Johns 1961)
Although the Muslim traders had regularly visited Indonesia as of
8th century, the wide spread of Islam in the region only gained its
momentum during 13th century. This was because of the fact that
the Sufism did not appears to be a significant influencing factor in
the Muslim world until the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in
1258. Citing Gibbs, Johns underscores that, after the fall of the

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Caliphate, the Sufis played an increasingly role in preserving the

unity of the Islamic world, counteracting the tendency of the
territories of the Caliphate to divide into Arabic, Persian and
Turkish linguistic regions (Johns 1961). In addition, Escaping from
Mongols onslaught, the Sufi missionaries were forced to leave
Baghdad off to the east where they could develop their
orientation (Koentjaraningrat 1984). In addition, Johns describes:
“they were peripatetic preachers ranging over the whole
known world, voluntarily espousing poverty; they were
frequently associated with trade or craft guilds, according
to the order (tariqa) to which they belonged; they taught a
complex syncretic theosophy largely familiar to the
Indonesians, but which was subordinate to, although an
enlargement on the fundamental dogmas of Islam; they
were proficient in magic and possessed powers of healing;
and not least, consciously or unconsciously, they were
prepared to preserve continuity with the past, and to use
the terms and elements of pre-Islamic culture in an Islamic
context (Johns 1961) .
The spectacular spread of Islam in 13th century in the
region was inseparable to particular approaches applied by Sufi
which were typically flexible and in what Johns said: “a
characteristic of the Sufi Apostolate was a readiness to build on the
past and to enroll elements of local belief and custom into the
service of Islam”. (Johns 1961).
As Sufism is assumed to be a driving force of the
Islamisation process in the Malay-archipelago, some scholars
speculate that Shi’ism came into Indonesia through Sufism
mainstream where the influence of both Sunni and Shi’i are
converging (Azra 2000). In this regard, Christoph Marcinkowski
asserted that Shi’i Islam has a long-standing historical footing in
what is now Indonesia. "Philosophical Sufism" and Wujudiyyah
Tarekat2, as well as certain aspects of classical Malay literature,
such as the hikayat genre, according to him, had strong Shi’i
undercurrents as well (Marcinkowski 2008).
For instance, Hamzah Fansuri (1593), a North Sumatran
mystic and poet, gained enlightenment through the Wujudiyyah
2
Wujudiyyah or Wahdatul Wujud (the "Unity of Being") is a Sufi philosophy
stressing that ‘there is no true existence except the Ultimate Truth (God).

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Tarekat in Ayuthia where Shi’i rulers ever reigned ((Drewes and

Brakel 1986). He eventually embraced a particular formulation of
Sufi theosophy, based on Ibn Arabi’s tradition which may be
included Shi’i elements.
Actually, this controversial pantheism was initially
established by Al Hallaj (244/858-309/921), which was later on
adopted by Ibn Arabi, Muhyyidin Abu Abdallah Muhammad
Hatemi At Tha’i (560/165-638/240). Louis Massignon in his 4
volume books about Al Hallaj, writes that Al Hallaj was strongly
influenced by Shi’ism. Under the Caliphate Abbassyiah Al
Muktadirbillah, he was allegedly accused of triggering public
unrest by promoting the doctrine of “Da’wa Rububiya”, meaning
the supreme power of God would only be invested through the
prophets and Imams to establish government states. Such as the
theory, according to Massignon, is no doubt about its Shi’i origin
(Massignon 1982). In conformity, Hamka also attributed the
doctrine of Al Hallaj to Ismailite of Shi’ism, commonly called
Bathiniyah which upholds the belief that the universe was
controlled by “Imamul Ghaib” (the Hidden Imam) (Hamka 1962).
However, Hamka later revised his view by adding that Sufism at
the time it spread in Indonesia was in accordance with Sunnism
(Hamka 1976).
The doctrine of the Hidden Imam, what the so-called as
Imam Mahdi by Sunnism and Imam Zaman by Shi’ism, and his
eventual return to the world constitutes a basic belief in Shi’ism.
The Sufi doctrine of Imam Mahdi was propagated by Ibn Arabi in
chapter 366 of his Al-futuhat Al Makkiyah. (Gibb The
Encyclopaedia of Islam)).
Some years following the Ibn Arabi era, this view was
further developed within the Sufi circle which are mostly of Shi’i
schools of taught. In contrast, Sunni theologians have never been
attracted so much on this belief. They accept the concept of
Imam Mahdi with caution and suspicion (Eliade and Adams The
Encyclopedia of religion). Al Ghazali, for instance, did not write
much about this belief. Distinctively, such a messianic belief is in
fact still common in the Muslim community in Indonesia. More
interestingly, rather similar messianic belief was also well-known
within Hinduism which was prevalent in Indonesia during pre-
Islamic era.

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Therefore, the root of messianic belief in the Indonesian

society might indirectly also give the pathway for the successful
process of Islamisation in Indonesia. In short, we can speculate
that the Sufi propagators at that time might inclusively adopt the
local Hindu-based tradition of messianism or even more possibly
apply the concept of Ibn Al Arabi of Shi’ism. Of course, these
possibilities confined with the basic characteristics of Sufi which
is the flexible and opened-minded as being described by Johns,
Shihab, Azra and Fatimi (Shihab 2001).
Having said that Shi’i cultural and religious traditions was
already famous among local people since 15 century, it is safe to
say that Shi’ism as an Islamic school of thought or a religious
doctrine was not as popularly acceptable as Sunnism in
Indonesia3. This could be seen that the development of Shi’ism in
the country underwent “a stage of quietism” until the Islamic
revolution of Iran in 1979 when the global Islamic revivalism has
been commencing to flourish.
In modern Indonesia, some Shi’I cultural and religious
aspects has so far been underway a process of syncretism with
local culture. This process is easily observable in a number of
religious symbols and practices in Indonesia. Even until
nowadays, these practices are still vivid in Muslim community in
Indonesia. Some are regarded as traditional and cultural events,
commonly performed by Indonesian people such as Acara Tabot
in Bengkulu and Bulan Suro in Java, or the same kind of rituals
are also found in Ternate, Maluku.
Tabot is a communal ceremony (ritual) to honor Imam
Hussein, the second imam in Shi’ism, Hussein was cruelly killed in
Karbala. The word of Tabot is derived from an Arabic word
“tabut” which literally means “woden box” or “case”. The
procession of ritual is taking place about 10 days in Month of
3
Ironically, many propagators of Islam in Indonesia in the past who have Shiite
inspired doctrine, like Hamzah Fansuri and his students, Siti Syekh Jenar, one of
nine Wali Songo, were accused to promote deviant Islamic teachings. Even
more, some of them were prosecuted and bunt alive. In this regard, I am of the
opinion that this pressure and accusation have in turn brought negative impacts
on the developments of Shi’ism in the following era. Therefore, I assumed that
followers of such a teaching would probably feel traumatic and frightened to
publicly exercise their beliefs.

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Muharram (the Islamic lunar calendar). Especially in Bengkulu,

Tabot has completely blended to be a local tradition. This ritual is
also found in Pariaman dan Padang, West Sumatera and also in
Ternate, Maluku (Kuncaraningrat 1990). As no strong written
evidences when Tabot ritual began to be known in Bengkulu and
West Sumatera, it was said that Tabot was introduced by British
soldiers called Sipahi, or Sepoy4. They are Muslim soldiers of
Indian origin, hired by Sir Stanford Raffles to fortify British rule in
the region (Sumbar 1982). The procession of this ceremony was
called Ashura.
Ashura is significant distinctiveness of Shi’ism. This
central beliefs of Shi’i community is Karbala tragedy where,
Hussein, the third Imam of Shi’ism and the grandson of the
Prophet, killed brutally by Yazid of Umayyads. This happened
precisely on October 10, 680 (Muharram 10, 61 AH). At the time,
Yazid was in power, seeking the Bay'ah (allegiance) from
Hussein.
The drama actually began when Hussein and his group,
including companions and family members of no more than 100
men, was intercepted on their way to Kufa, Iraq, by a large army
of about 100.000 strong-men of Yazid. At this stage, Husayn was
forced to give his Bay’ah for Yazid but refused it. Consequently,
in an unbalanced fighting, Hussein and all of his men were killed
and their bodies, including that of Hussein, were mutilated. This
day was commemorated by Shi’i followers as a sad event, which
is commonly called Ashura.
Ashura is of particular significance to Shi’i Muslim all over
the world. A quite few of them would make pilgrimages to the
Mashhad al-Hussein, the shrine in Karbala, Iraq that is Hussein's
tomb. On this day, all Shi’i followers are wearing mourning attire,
mostly black in color. They refrain themselves from music
because it is a time for sorrow, respect of the demise and self
reflection. They express mourning by crying as well as listening to
poems about the tragedy. All of these activities are intended to
connect them with Hussein's suffering and his sacrifices in
keeping Islam alive. Hussein's martyrdom is basically interpreted

4
Sepoy is (from the Persian word ‫ ﺳﭙﺎھﯽ‬Sipahi meaning "soldier’ ) is native of
India. Muslim soldier allied to British power.
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by Shi’ism as a symbol of the struggle against injustice and

oppression.
Indeed, religious ritual and gatherings are among key
practices in Shi’ism. As Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Hussein
Taba’taba’i his book “Shia” that there are certain religious
practices besides the basic rites which are specifically Shi’ism.
Despite stressing the importance of those rites he revealed that
some of those rites might be also familiar to Sunnism
(Taba’taba’i 1981).
In contrast, Vali Nasr maintained that what is setting
apart Shi’i followers from their fellow Sunni friends is “the great
feast of mourning, remembrance and atonement that is Ashoura
(the tenth of Muharram) (Nasr 2006). He believed that those
rites are uniquely Shi’ia. Even more Graham describes that “a
reference of textual and rituals ….religious observances many of
which are peripheral to the doctrines, has been woven into the
fabric of Shi’i collective consciousness, endowing it with a rich
and distinctive iconography ” (Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim
Francke 1999).
Azra and Hamka however insisted that some Shi’ism
inspired-festivals and traditions, like Tabot in Bengkulu, Tabuik in
Padang, or in any other parts of Indonesia, like Ternate and
South Sulawesi, nowadays have lost its religious meanings. Both
scholars suggested that, unlike those of Iran, Tabot festivals in
Indonesia for instance, no longer reflect religious manifestation
and spirituality, they are merely popular celebrations. In response
to that view, I argued that, either Tabot in Indonesia or Ta’ziyeh
in Iran, however, still originally root into the Shi’i religious
tradition and culture and uniquely could be found in Shi’ism. It is
only among Shi’i believers that the Tabot or “ta’zeyah”
ceremonies were performed. If we have an opportunity to take a
close a look and compare Tabot ceremonies which are usually
performed in Indonesia with those in other countries, like
Pakistan, Lebanon and Iran, we might easily come to the very
conclusion that both ceremonies have the same root of culture. It
is true, I have to underscore here that the Tabot festival in
Indonesia has been undergoing a socio-cultural transformation
which might cause it loose its religious meaning but as a cultural
festival, it is still popular performed by local people.

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In addition to Tabot, some ritual East Java, like “secret

ritual” (sedekah sirr) and some religious recitation (dzikir) which
are usually performed and read between Isya (evening) prayer up
to midnight, are thought to be parts of the Shi’i aspects. The
recitation (dzikir) Five of the Cloak5 especially, means that they
have five people who can help them out of the hellfire in the day
of Judgement, namely, Al Mustafa (the Prophet), Al Murtada (Ali
ibn Abi Talib), the two siblings (Hasan dan Hussien) and the
daughter (Fatima). The dzikir is read loudly by a group of Muslims
which definitely claim themselves as Sunni (Karim 2007). Indeed,
accurately Marcinkowski describes this situation with the
statement as “Shi’i-inspired festivals are still encountered in the
Archipelago, even if many of their mostly Sunnite participants
might not be aware of their origins or connotations” (Marcinkowski
2008).
The participation of Sunni followers in some Shi’i inspired
activities was also admitted by Azra. In an interview with a
researcher which was conducted Jakarta in 1998, Azra admitted
that some groups of the Tareqat Mu’tabaroh of Sunnism (Sunni
major branch of Sufism) has an intimate relationship with that of
Shi’ism, especially regarding the admiration to Hasan and
Husayn (grandsons of the Prophet) (Basyar 1999).
Considering the above explanation, it is not an
exaggeration to say that cultural aspects of Shi’ism have been
present in parts of Indonesia long before the Islamic Revolution
of Iran in 979. Nevertheless, it is true that it would be difficult to
ascertain the presence of Shi’i religiosity in Indonesia just only
looking at the Shi’i-inspired festive. This implies that there is
hardly evidence to support that Shi’ism has ever been a strong
religious political orientation in Indonesia in the past. However, it
is also improper to deny that Shi’ism has culturally been existing
in the archipelago for as long as 15th century.

5
This dzikir is based on the most widespread tradition of the Prophet (hadist),
accepted by both Sunni as well Shia, in relation to the interpretation of Al
Qur’an (33:33) which is the so-called Hadist Al Kisa’, futher explanation about
this see, Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an, volume four, pp
50.
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Contemporary Indonesia

During 1970s, a series of successes has been taking place

in the Muslim world during 1970s such as the 1973 Egyptian-
Israeli War, the Arab oil embargo as well as the 1979 Islamic
Iranian Revolution. “These successes of the seventies resonated
with an idealized perception of early Islam…” (Esposito 1992). In
addition, a number of social and political events have also been
underway, including the imposition of Islamic law in Pakistan and
Libya, the Islamic opposition movements in Egypt and Turkey as
well as Muslim movement against Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.
Other similar events related to this encouraging development
have been also in progress in Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco
and Malaysia.
Certainly, these events created a great expectation
among Muslims that an Islamic reawakening era was emerging.
These events have boosted the spirit of Islamic revivalism
sweeping all over the Muslim world, including Indonesia.
The late twentieth century revivalist spirit prevalent
simultaneously in most Muslim countries was similar in a number
of ways. In spite of a long and an endless argument on definition
of the Islamic revivalism among social scientists, to my
understanding, it was basically inspired by a single conception
that was “Islam is a complete system of life theologically and
politically”. However, admittedly, in many cases, this spirit
successfully restored credibility to Islam as a code of life superior
to other ideologies, at once weakened the influence of the West
up on young Muslims and helped to limit the influence of
Western ideas and culture. Indeed, as Esposito described, that
this revival spirit led to a higher profile of Islam in Muslim politics
and society.
The indices of Islamic reawakening in personal life are
many: increased attention to religious observances (mosque
attendance, prayer, fasting), proliferation of religious
programming and publication, more emphasis upon Islamic dress
and values and the revitalization of Sufism (Von Der Mehden
1990).
Inescapably, the Islamic movements in Indonesia during
1970s also followed the global trends. The spirit of global Islamic
revivalism not only gave great impetus to the Islamic movements

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in Indonesia but also brought positive impact on social religious

activities as well as personal life of each Muslims in the country.
Meanwhile, in contrary to the global trends, the Islamic activism
in Indonesia during the corresponding period was marked with a
feeling of disappointment. Muslim community in Indonesia was
frustrated with a series of political failures since the defeat of
Masyumi Party 6 up to the general elections 1971 and 1977. The
dismay of Islamic activists reached its peak when the New Order
regime introduced Pancasila as the only one basis for mass-
organizations. As the effect, many Islamic political elite changed
strategically their struggle and social role from political into
cultural interest. They tended to choose education or social
foundation, for instance, instead of political parties in a bid to
articulate their existing aspirations. Majority of the Indonesian
Islamic community no longer regarded political participation as
the only one pathway to contribute for the benefit of the nation
and the religion.
During that period, there was a phenomenon of the
emergence and development of various Islamic movements in
the country such as Hizbut Tahrir, Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Jamaah
Tabligh and Darul Arqam. These movements, not attached to
formal Islamic organizations, were mostly pioneered by young
intellectual Muslims and some of them were even called
underground movements. (Rosyad 1995).
Like other Islamic movements in Indonesia, such as
Muhammadiyah and PERSIS which were deeply influenced by
international developments, Shi’ism has been early growing in
Indonesia. It has gone along with other Islamic strands in
Indonesia as the effects of the dynamic spirit of Islamic revivalism
during the beginning of the 15th century of Islamic calendar
(hijriah), which was expected to be ‘the Century of Islamic
Resurgence’ (Abad Kebangkitan Islam).

6
Masyumi Party (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) (Council of Indonesian
Muslim Associations) was a major Islamic political party during 1950s. It
included the Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah. Masyumi came second in the 1995 election. It won 7,903,886
votes, representing 20.9% of the popular vote, resulting in 57 seats in
parliament. In 1958, some Masyumi members joined a rebellion against the
incumbent President Sukarno. As a result, in 1960 Masyumi was banned.
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Undeniably, as one the striking experiences in the Muslim

world, the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 has further
influenced not only Islamic activists in Indonesia but, indeed, also
throughout the globe (Von Der Mehden 1990). Particularly,
Khomeini, a prominent Islamic scholar of Iran who led the
revolution had been successful in creating a state based on
Islamic ideology. Not surprisingly, this revolution greatly
attracted the attention of Indonesian Muslim scholars.
Having observed the Khomeini’s success in Iran,
Indonesian Muslims intellectuals and politicians were amazed
and motivated to imitate him in search for a new political posture
in the country. Seemingly, Indonesian activists found an
alternative, if not a cure for their political disappointment, in the
Islamic Revolution in Iran.
The impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran on the early
development of Islamic youth resurgence movement are
clear despite the fact that the revolution in Iran was a
revolution of the Shiite (Shi'ah) Muslims. It is a quite
interesting fact that regardless of differences, Indonesian
Sunni Muslims accepted revolutionary ideas from the Shi'
ite Muslims in Iran. (Rosyad 1995)
Of course, as normally and traditionally happening in the
first stage of its development, any Islamic movement spread its
influence through academic discussions in campuses. Academics
and learned-people sphere become nursery and fertile ground for
the early development of Islamic movement (Fox 2004). Some
religious discussions were held in secular campuses. In short,
despite censorship imposed by the New Order regime, secular
campuses, like ITB (Institute of Technology Bandung) and
University of Indonesia (UI), served as good breeding grounds for
almost all of the Islamic movements during the corresponding
period. For instance, ITB’s mosque Salman, was regularly
become the venue for Muslim students to gather and discuss
socio-religious issues.
Thus, the spread of Shi’ism in Indonesia at that time
occurred on university campuses, and one of the most important
factors behind this phenomenon was the spread of Islamic
literature. (Azra et al. 2006). Over the last decades of the
twentieth century, a boom in religious publication enterprises
became visible through the appearance of translations of
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numerous works of Islamic thinkers from outside Indonesia,

including like Muhammad Iqbal, Maududi, and Fazlur Rahman.
Over the 1980s there was also a strong growth in the number of
Indonesian translations of the works of Ali Shari’ati, Sayyid
Tabataba’i and Ayatollah Mutahhari, Khomeini and other Shi’i
thinkers. Through such translations, the influence of Shi’i thought
was to surface in a wide variety of intellectual currents of the
Indonesian Islamic discourse (Van Bruinessen 2002).
“The ideas that made perhaps the strongest intellectual
impact, however, were those of the Iranian thinkers Ali Shari`ati
and, a few years later, Murtaza Mutahhari. These two authors
appealed especially strongly to students and young intellectuals.
Their attraction was in part due, no doubt, to their association
with the Iranian revolution, which fascinated many young
Indonesians,” Martin van Bruinessen said. He asserted that
students and the gradually emerging Muslim middle class
showed a great eagerness for Islamic reading, numerous
discussion circles were formed where books were critically
discussed.
Works by, and studies on, the great Sufis and Muslim
philosophers were translated, and a growing number of
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals published collections of their
lectures, speeches and sermons — oral communication remains
the primary form — as books, which found an avid readership.
One of the most significant manifestations of this era
was the flourishing of Islamic intellectual discourses and the
emergence of young Muslim intellectuals, especially on university
campuses. In his book, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern
Indonesia, Michael Feener has pointed out that despite the
Suharto government’s political pressure concerning the effects of
Iran’s Islamic revolution in Indonesia, the influence of Iranian
Muslim thought was clearly visible among young students in the
years following the 1979 Iranian revolution (Feener 2007). Indeed,
a number of Indonesian students were clearly and increasingly
inclined towards Shi’ism at that time. Most of them graduated
from Western-style educational institutions, and as a result of
coming from such a background they became successful in
introducing Shi’ism to the educated Indonesian middle class. In
addition to seminars and discussions, they also encouraged the

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translation and publication of Shi’i thinkers’ books as a part of

their contributions to the dissemination of Shi’ism.
This group capitalized on deep transformations in
Muslims’ attitudes and understandings of ‘Islamic activism’
occurring in the 1980s–1990s. If previously, political involvement
was seen as the only way to contribute to the benefit of the
nation and of religion, at this point in time, cultural interests,
intellectual debates and philosophy gained a new position, as
important loci of Islamic revival (Djamaluddin Malik 1998). In
addition, a hallmark of this new mode of Islamic revival, was the
emphasis placed upon putting aside religious fanaticism and
myopic views on various religious matters to develop, instead, an
attitude of openness, and the spread of a popular motto of non-
sectarianism (Feener 2007).
An exemplary figure of this phenomenon is Jalaluddin
Rakhmat, a lecturer at Universitas Pajajaran (Pajajaran
University, UNPAD) in Bandung, West Java. In 1988, together
with his colleagues, Haidar Bagir, Ahmad Tafsir, Agus Effendi and
Ahmad Muhajir, he established the Muthahhari Foundation in
Bandung, which was an institution that focused on da’wa and
publishing. Since 1992 the foundation has expanded its scope to
include the establishment of high schools across Java 7. Since the
1980s, Jalaluddin Rakhmat has been widely recognised as the
most active intellectual in spreading Shi’ismon campuses and
more broadly to the educated middle class of Indonesian
Muslims. In the post-Suharto era Rakhmat also took leadership of
the Shi’a community by establishing the Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait
Indonesia (IJABI). Other campus figures incline toward Shi’ism
include Dimitri Mahayana (a lecturer at Institute of Technology
Bandung (ITB) and former chairman of IJABI), Hadi Swastio (a
lecturer at the Communication College and former general
secretary of IJABI) and Yusuf Bakhtiar (formerly, a deputy chief of
Muthahhari Senior High School, and currently, a political activist
in Amien Rais’ National Mandate Party), as well as Sayuti

7
These high schools are well known as senior highs schools plus. The attribute,
‘plus’, is used because its programmes combine a number of subjects from the
national curriculum with Islamic teachings and a focus on fostering moral
conduct. See SMA Plus Muthahhari, available online at: http://www.smuth.net/
(last accessed 26 May 10).
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 Jurnal Al-Qurba 1(1): 58-81, 2010

Asshatri in University of Indonesia (UI), Agus Abu Bakar (UI)8,

Zulvan Lindan (University of Jayabaya) and Haidar Bagir (ITB).

Hawza

Another major stream in the development of Shi’ism in

modern Indonesia has flowed through the more traditional
institutions of Islamic education, including that of the Shi’i
hawza. Since the 1960s, there has been an increasingly active
exchange of visits between Iranian-style pesantern, the so-called
hawzas, and various Indonesian pesantren. For example, in 1962 a
leading Shi’i scholar from Iraq, Muhammad Reza Ja’fari, came to
Indonesia to visit the al-Khairiyya school in Bondowoso, and to
meet local Muslim leaders such as Hussein al-Habsyi (1921–
1994). The discussion lasted for four days, and following that
event, some teachers converted to Shi’ism (Zulkifli 2009). This
relationship between hawza and Indonesian pesantren intensified
after the Revolution in 1979. Despite the mounting political
pressure of the Suharto regime, this sort of exchanges continued
during the 1980s in connection with the Iranian ulamas’ mission
of exporting the principles of the Islamic revolution. These
connections contributed greatly to the dissemination of Shi’ism
in Indonesia, as the increasing familiarity of local ulama with their
Shi’i counterparts overseas made it possible to dispatch
Indonesian students to hawzas in Iran. In this regard, two
Hadrami Arabs of the most important figures were Ahmad al-
Habsyi (d. 1994), leader of Pesantren ar-Riyadh in Palembang
(South Sumatra), and Hussein al-Habsyi, who established the
Yayasan Pesantren Islam at Bangil (East Java) in 1976.
Ahmad al-Habsyi, in Palembang, had established early
contacts with hawzas in Iran, and had sent his students Umar
Shahab and Hussein Shahab to study in Qum in 1974 and 1979,

8
Agus Abubakar Arsal Al-Habsyi was born in Makassar, South Sulawesi, on 6
August 1960, to a Hadrami migrant family. He was a Shi’i student well-known in
the early 1980s, and was active at the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque of the UI. He
was a student at the Physics Department. His intensive learning of Shii
teachings took place at the university. He was also familiar with Shi’ism, as it
was known before the Iranian revolution, due to the existence of some Shi’is in a
village in South Sulawesi, who also acted as factors in his conversion. See
Zulkifli, The Struggle of the Shi’is in Indonesia (Leiden: 2009).

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 Assegaf, UF. Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt In Nusantara

respectively (Ali 2002). The activities of Hussein al-Habsyi’s

pesantren in Bangil greatly contributed to the spread of Shi’ism in
Indonesia, and any analysis of Shi’i genealogy in the archipelago
would not be complete without the mention of him9. Born in
Surabaya on April 21 1921, Hussain al-Habsyi started his primary
education at the Madrasah Al Khairiyah -- the oldest Islamic
educational institution in Surabaya, and the same school where
he later came to teach. In 1970, he set up a boarding school in
Bondowoso, and another boarding school for boys in Kenep-Beji,
Bangil. According to his acquaintances, this occurred after the
Iranian revolution, but it is possible that he had already become
interested in this manifestation of Islam before 1979. In fact, it
appears that when teaching at the al-Khairiyya, he, with the
other teachers and students of the school, often encountered
Middle Eastern figures with whom he could discuss Islamic
teachings, including Shi’i doctrines (Zulkifli 2009). In the post-
revolution years, Ahmad al-Habsyi and Hussein al-Habsy fostered
the rapid growth of Shi’ism in Indonesia through their
acquaintances with Iranian scholars. In 1982, a delegation from
Iran, consisting of Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, Ayatollah Masduqi
and Hujjat al-Islam Mahmudi, visited the YAPI. As a result of this
meeting with Hussein al-Habsyi, the hawza ‘ilmiyya in Qum
agreed to accept ten Indonesian students from his school in
Bangil each year. The following year, Muhsin Labib, Ibrahim al
Habsyi, Rusdi Alaydrus, Thoyyib Nafis, Mukhtar al Jufri, Umar
Alatas, Ahmad Baragbah, Hasan Tono, Muhammad and Musam
were sent to Qum (Ali 2002). On their return, after several years
of study, these students became the leading preachers of Shi’ism
in Indonesia. Since then, the number of Indonesian students in
Qum has increased, so that after a decade, Qum graduates in
Indonesia numbered more than a hundred (Ali 2002).
A number of these YAPI alumni returned from their time
in Qom to establish and run their own pesantren, and to take
active roles in several Indonesian Islamic organizations. Among
them, the most prominent were Zahir Yahya (leader of the Al-

9
Ustadz Husein Bin Abu Bakar Alhabsyi Yang Pejuang‘ published on 3 Ocotber
2008 by Republika daily newspaper , last accessed on 29 Ocotber 2009,
available online at:
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/6668/ustadz_husein_bin_abu_bakar_alhabsji
_ustadz_yang_pejuang,(last accessed on October 2009).
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 Jurnal Al-Qurba 1(1): 58-81, 2010

Kautsar Foundation in Malang, East Java, and former head of

YAPI, Miqdad (head of Pesantren Darut Taqrib in Jepara, Central
Java), Fathoni Hadi (founder of the Al-Hujjah Foundation in
Jember, East Java, and, currently member of staff at the Islamic
College for Advanced Studies, the London branch of Islamic
higher education in Jakarta), Muhammad Amin Sufyan (head of
the Samudera Foundation in Surabaya), Abdurrahman Bima
(elected in 2009 as member of Parliament from the Democratic
Party), Husein Alkaff (adviser at the Al-Jawad Foundation in
Bandung), Herman al-Munthahhar (head of the Amirul Mukminin
Foundation in Pontianak, West Kalimantan), Muhammad al-Jufri,
and Abdul Aziz al-Hinduan. The arrival of Qum alumni in the late
1970s and early 1980s helped consolidate the growing Shi’i
movement in Indonesia, as they also directly engaged other
Muslims in informal religious gatherings (pengajian), which were
held in specific locations and attended by a limited circle. On
these occasions, Qum Alumni also performed Shi’i rituals (majlis),
like Kumayl supplication, Ashura commemorations, and so on (Ali
2002).

Post Soeharto Era

The student led reformation in 1998 had delivered a

democratic system in Indonesia and created favorable national
socio-political climate for minority group to survive. Such
dynamic political and social changes happening in Indonesia have
widely opened more windows for Shi’ite followers. Thus, the
situation unleashed the acceleration of Shi’ism in the country.
Consequently, the Shi’ite movement has turned to be more
opened. Its followers have been confidently promoting their
beliefs to others and holding religious ceremonies in the public
phere.
As the result of current democratic system, the Shi’ite
practitioners had no longer to conceal their beliefs; they could
publicly hold their religious congregation at will wherever they
want. They obviously showed their identity. No political pressure,
or despite still social constraints but very minimum, they freely
exercised their beliefs. They seemed to have exercised freedom
in expressing their religious beliefs and therefore they began to
show their real identity.

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 Assegaf, UF. Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt In Nusantara

The development of Shi’i community in Indonesia has

indicated a tremendous progress after the reformation era
following the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. Although it is strongly
believed the Islamic Revolution of Iran (IRI) which delivered the
rise of Khomeini’s regime in Iran, affecting the spread of Shiism
in Indonesia, the favourable domestic socio-economic and
political situation has indeed contributed greatly to the rapid
growth of Shi’ism in the Archipelago.
The phenomena in mushrooming of Shi’i community are
conspicuously visible in middle-to-upper sphere of society in the
archipelago country, including scholars and academics. The
number of Shi’a affiliated-institutions comprising of social
foundations or schools, including higher education, has been
clearly observable nowadays all over the region from Aceh in the
western part of Indonesia to the remote area of Papua in the
most eastern of the country.
However, as minority in the mainstream Sunnism in
Indonesia, Shi’ite community are really aware that the top
priority of their social agenda is to consolidate their own
organizations in a bid to gain a wider social recognition.
More importantly, although they have obtained a tick of
approval from the government, they are still facing challenges
because of a lack of clarification from the Council of Indonesian
Ulama (MUI) about the status of Shi’ism, whether it is regarded
as deviant group or not. The last decree of MUI was issued in
1984, warning Indonesia Muslims to be mindful about Shi’ism. So
far, there has no more decree yet from this council.
Undoubtedly, this unclear status has actually generated
mixed reactions from the majority Sunnite followers in Indonesia
which at least could be classified into three attitudes. Firstly,
those who adopt soft (lenient) attitude believe that there is no
fundamental difference between Shi’ism and Sunnism.
Therefore, the differences could be easily put aside for the shakes
of united community. Obviously, this group include some leading
scholars (ulama) for instance Quraish Shihab who writes
“Sunnah-Syiah bergandengan tangan! Mungkinkah? : Kajian atas
Konsep ajaran dan Pemikiran,”. Abdurrahman Wahid and some
NU leaders seem to belong to this group. In addition to their soft
attitude, they also often appear to come and attend Shi’ite

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congregations and share some of the views with their Shi’ite

counterparts.
The major part in the society in Indonesia showed a
moderate stance towards Shi’ism. This part includes elites of
some major mass-organization, like NU and Muhammadiyah.
Despite of awareness about the differences between Shi’ism and
Sunnism, they try to avoid a horizontal conflict or public debate
with Shi’ism. Basically, they believed that Shi’ism still within the
corridor of Islam. 10
The last social group is those who consider Shi’ism as un-
Islamic. The most active cluster of anti-Shi’ism is Al Bayyinat of
Surabaya which chaired by a Hadhramawt origin, Thohir Alkaf.
Ironically, he is one of alumni from the famous Shi’ite pesantern
of YAPI in Bangil. So, he is a former student of the noted Shi’ite
scholar, Hussein Al-Habsyi. Thohir Alkaf believes that not only
Shi’ite followers are infidels but also their blood is eligible to be
spilt.
Considering the mixed reactions of Muslims in Indonesia,
Shi’ite community in some extent is still facing public resistance
like the ones in Madura, Bondowoso and Bangil, East Java. For
instance, on December 24, 2006, 500 angry villagers in Jambesari
village, Bondowoso Regency, East Java attacked 150 IJABI
members conducting routine prayers, destroying three houses, a
small mosque and a car belonging to the local IJABI’s chairman.
Local Sunni residents objected to the presence of the Shi’ism in
their community and accused them of deviant Islamic beliefs and
heresy.
Another related incidents, on April 8, 2007, in Jember,
East Java, an angry crowd surrounded a house belonging to
Suwarno, the local chairman of IJABI. They demanded IJABI not
spread Shi'ite teachings.
In a rally in front of the local office of public prosecutor in
May 2007, some 500 people in Kecamatan Bangil Pasuruan, East
Java, urged the government to act swiftly against “the deviant
elements” in the society. They carried a big poster “Syiah Go to
Hell”.

10
During the recent interview, Chairman of NU Hasyim Muzadi and Chairman of
Muhammadiyah Din Syamsuddin revealed and shared this view.
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 Assegaf, UF. Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt In Nusantara

Government’s standpoint

On November 2007, Majelis Ulama Indonesia has issued

fatwa regarding nine criteria of deviant groups (aliran sesat) in
Islam. But the fatwa itself raised multi interpretations. Although
MUI has so far not mentioned Shi’ism, the prescribed guidelines
set by the MUI to define "deviant" teachings and sects are
contentious. For instance, the criteria for deviance include
alternative interpretations of Al Qur’an. Under this fatwa, Shi’ism
might be included as a deviant element because some parts of
Shi’ite teachings are derived from the alternative interpretations
of Al Qur’an, which are not in line with the mainstream Sunnism.
For this reason, “Syiar” a Shi’ite affiliated magazine,
made an interview in December 2007 with one of the MUI
chairman Umar Shihab who reinstated that the MUI fatwa did
not mean to include any particular Islamic school of law in its
fatwa. According to Umar, the difference in religious point of
views was mainly due to the different of school of law. MUI will
not involve in judging any madzhab in Islam. “If the Islamic world
has already accepted Shi’ism, why should MUI refuse it?” he said.
This statement is important for Shi’ism in as a shield against
possible violent attacks from opponent groups.
However, the repercussion of Umar’s statement is
actually very weak as it is only the form of interview, not clear
fatwa. For this reason, fearing that the fatwa will be
misinterpreted and misused as a main pretext to attack them as
it happened with Jamaah Ahmadiyah, the Shi’ite denomination
currently continue striving to grab the heart of ummah as the
pathway to gain social legitimacy.
During the recent interview, Chairman of Komisi Fatwa
MUI, Dr. Anwar Ibrahim said that Shi’ism which proliferated in
Indonesia is still within the corridor of Islam. However, he
admitted there was an element of Shi’ism might possibly be
considered as a deviant (ghulat). That is the reason, he added,
that MUI issued fatwa (religious guidance) in 1984 to remind the
Islamic community (umat Islam) be aware of this element. “So
far, there has been no public concern or complaints about Shi’ite
teaching in Indonesia. It is only an extreme group would certainly
create conflict in the society.” he said.

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Anwar’s statement was precisely describing the position

of MUI about the proliferation of Shi’ism in Indonesia. As far as
Shi’ism in Indonesia does not create public concern, MUI would
regard it as no matter.
In line with MUI, the ministry of religious affairs also
regarded Shi’ite community as the same as other religious
groups. The department has developed all means of
communication with all Islamic mass-organizations in Indonesia,
including those of Shi’ite community. “We do not discriminate
one another. They (Shi’i community) will be always welcome if
they want to establish good relationship with us,” said Secretary
of Directorate General of Islam’s Social Guidance Mudzakir.
He stressed that the case of Shi’ism in Indonesia is far
different with that of Ahmadiyah which has been punished by
MUI as a deviant group. The government would always look at
the aspiration of Islamic community in general. “There is no
problem with Sh’ism at all,” he said.
In addition, Head of the Research and Development Body
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Balitbang, Depag), Professor
Atho Mudzar said, as religious group, the proliferation of Shi’ism
in Indonesia has no problem as long as it does not disseminate a
political doctrine against the state ideology, Pancasila. “If they
do not uphold any political belief which is against the state
ideology, we have no problem with them,” he said.
According to Atho, one of his department’s
responsibilities is to secure the harmony of religious life
(kerukunan beragama) in the country. Within this framework, the
government in one side would never limit the right of any
religious groups to live but in other side the government has to
maintain the social stability and security. “If there is violent act
against minority in the country, it is not government’s initiatives
but criminal’s,” he stressed.

Conclusion

Despite the long-standing debate on various theories of

the Islamisation process in Indonesia, the existence of Madhhab
Ahl Al-Bait in the past in the archipelago is undeniable. Its
presence could be traced back to the first time Islam entering
Indonesia. Evidently, a number of religious symbols and practices

78
 Assegaf, UF. Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt In Nusantara

in the country seem to have a close association with the basic

tenet of the Shi’i school of thought. Even until today, these
practices are still vivid among Muslim community in Indonesia.
However, Madhhab Ahl Al-Bait subsequently
marginalized. As an Islamic school of thought, this madhhab was
not as popularly acceptable as Sunnism for unknown reason,
Thence, the developments of this madhhab in Indonesia came
into its lowest ebb until it gained the moment when Khomeini
led-Islamic revolution toppled Shah Pahlevi of Iran in 1979.
In this regard, one should not jump to the conclusion that
the current rapid development of Madhhab Ahl Al-Bait in
Indonesia was a logical bias of the wind of changes blown by the
success of Islamic Revolution in Iran (IRI). In fact, beside the
Iranian revolution, there were other factors impacting the
developments of Shi’ism in Indonesia, They are including
dynamic domestic socio-economic and political situation in
Indonesia. In addition, it would be noteworthy to consider some
dominating aspects in relation with Islamic movement as general
in Indonesia which gained its moment within the period of 1980s
and 1990s. These also directly or indirectly participated in
accelerating the developments of Shi’ism among Muslim
community in Indonesia.

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