Christina B. Castillo vs.

Philip Salvador
G.R. No. 191240
July 30, 2014

Ponente: J. Peralta

Facts:

On December 2000, herein petitioner (Christina) a businesswoman engaged in real estate,

educational institution, boutique, and trading business, had met respondent (Philip), a famous
Filipino action star, through a common friend. Philip had told the petitioner about the rising
demand of the freight and remittance business in Hong Kong. He also told Christina that his
friends, Jinggoy Estrada and Rudy Fernandez are engaged in the same industry, and that
respondent was the one who promoted their business. Herein petitioner had eventually met with
Philip’s brother, Ramon, and had agreed to engage in the freight and remittance business with
respondent. On March 2001, petitioner along with her husband and herein respondent, had went
to Hong Kong for the promotion of their business. The same group had also gone to Bangkok on
April 2001 for the same purpose. During the two trips, petitioner gave respondent an aggregate
amount of $20,000.00 as his pocket money.

In December 27, 2001, herein petitioner, along with her mother and respondent’s brother,
Ramon, went to Hong Kong to facilitate the registration of the Philip Salvador Freight and
Remittance International Limited. Christina agreed with respondent and his brother that any
profit derived from the business will be equally shared by them. They also agreed Christina
would be the financer, that respondent Philip will be the one responsible for the marketing and
promotion of the business, and that Ramon would be responsible of its local operations. At that
time, the business had not operated yet, as petitioner was still raising funds of up to $100,000.00,
which is the actual amount of capital for the said business.

After raising enough funds on May 2002, petitioner gave the capital money to herein respondent
in her mother’s house in Las Pinas City. She also gave respondent an additional Php 100,000.00
for the payment of the heart-shaped earring that they ordered from Hong Kong. On the same
month, respondent and his brother went to Hong Kong to facilitate the operation of the business.
Howeever, the business was not operated, as respondent had only stayed in Hong Kong for three
days. Upon respondent’s arrival in the Philippines, petitioner asked them about the money and
the business. Respondent confessed that he had used the money to pay for his other obligations.
The $100,000 was not returned at all.

Petitioner filed a case of Estafa under Article 315 of the RPC against respondent Philip Salvador
before the RTC of Las Pinas City in 2006. In its ruling, the RTC found respondent guilty of the
crime charged. Respondent was also ordered to indemnify herein petitioner for the $100,000 that
was used by him.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed his conviction with the CA, which ruled in his favor. In its
ruling, the CA had reversed the ruling of the RTC and had acquitted respondent from the
criminal charge of estafa against him.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

WON the award of damages or the civil aspect be retained.

Ruling:

The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability
ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule
111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the
civil action for damages is “for the same act or omission.

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:

The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, “that a person is
innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the
elements of Estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution’s primary witness herself could not even establish
clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that
she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a
remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in this case indicate the
weakness of her submissions.

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National
Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence”
or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence.

In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the
CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short
period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed
to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered
no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s
claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the
way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the
alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had
been swindled.
Ricardo L. Manotoc Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-62100
May 30, 1986

Ponente: J. Fernan

Facts:

Herein petitioner (Manotoc) is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular

Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc. (MSI for brevity), a stock brokerage house.
He went home from the United States to file a petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the appointment of the management committee. During the pendency of the
petition, the SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear petitioner for
departure, on which a memorandum was issued by the former on February 4, 1980.

When a Torrens title which was suspected to be fake, was submitted to and accepted by his
brokerage house, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner as
president of MSI. Petitioner Manotoc was also charged with estafa by the investigating fiscal
before the then CFI of Rizal. Petitioner has been admitted to bail in the aggregate amount of
Php 105,000.00 for all cases.

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion for permission to leave
the country to the United States, specifically in Louisiana, USA, in order to meet the people and
companies who would be involved in the investments of MCI. The same was denied by the trial
judges after due hearing.

Petitioner wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter’s
memorandum, which was denied by the latter.

Aggrieved, petitioner had elevated the case to the CA. In its ruling, the CA denied petitioner’s
motion for leave to go abroad pendent lite. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail
as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange
Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.

Issue:

Whether or not a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an
unrestricted right to travel.
Ruling:

No. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed
upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave
the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. The
constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel If the accused were
allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of
the courts As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency
of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We
find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to
leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no
reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the
country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.