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Educational Theory and Jewish Studies in Conversation Engaging The Discourses
Educational Theory and Jewish Studies in Conversation Engaging The Discourses
Educational Theory and Jewish Studies in Conversation Engaging The Discourses
Harvey Shapiro
To cite this article: Harvey Shapiro (2013) Educational Theory and Jewish Studies in
Conversation: Engaging the Discourses, Journal of Jewish Education, 79:2, 104-130, DOI:
10.1080/15244113.2013.776867
Article views: 91
HARVEY SHAPIRO
In this article, I argue for the need to expand and deepen what I call
“interdiscursive” relationships between Jewish studies and education. I sug-
gest that these relationships are in need of further philosophical articulation
and conceptual differentiation in order for these fields to realize increas-
ingly meaningful, mutually beneficial engagement. I further maintain that,
notwithstanding significant intermittent efforts to connect these fields, there
are many lost opportunities to do so, resulting in limited interaction and
infrequent reciprocal influence (see Figure 1). Beyond a generic “bringing
Jewish studies and education together,” I wish to broaden and differentiate
the universe of alternatives and rationales for the relationship between these
disciplines and discourses in higher education, professional education, and
scholarship.
In Part 1, I consider the literature on interdisciplinarity and suggest the
potentially more fruitful concept of interdiscursivity. In Part 2, I draw on three
104
Educational Theory and Jewish Studies in Conversation 105
FIGURE 1. As indicated in this diagram, when considered as the sum total of the student’s
formal learning experiences, “bringing Jewish studies and education together” often results
in limited intersecting relationships between the respective disciplines (color figure available
online).
20th-century philosophers for whom the relationship between liberal arts and
professional education is a profound, abiding concern. I suggest how their
conceptions might inform the purposes and practices of relating education
and Jewish studies with one another and how these thinkers might inter-
pret the ways Jewish educational theory has engaged these fields. Through
this philosophical inquiry, I hope to offer some beneficial, new ways to
conceptualize, articulate, refine, and expand these fields and discourses’
relationships.
or are starting points that call for such engagement, these examples sug-
gest the need for sustained conversation and communication among the
fields of Jewish studies, the humanities, social sciences, and education to
resolve particular set of issues, to develop critique, or to articulate new
understandings.
Interdiscursivity, in contrast, involves the reciprocal influence and inter-
action of different discourses. Each discourse has its own set of language
games, vocabularies, norms of reasoning, modes of argument, rules, and
rhetorical styles. But discourses are also living languages, the grammatical,
lexical, syntactic, and semantic dimensions of which speak in texts, conver-
sations, and conduct. Thus, discourse includes language, literature, idioms,
and ideas in use. It exists in sentences, statements, propositions, queries,
and, most importantly, dialogue (Ricoeur, 1976, pp. 5–7). Interdiscursivity,
then, is concerned with questions such as: What does it mean to converse
across discourses, to share meaning, to respond to one another? What kind
of communication is efficacious—and for what purposes?
Let us first consider the notion of interdisciplinarity and how it may
inform the relationship between Jewish studies and education. In his preface
to the second edition of his important book, Interdisciplinarity, Moran (2010)
notes a change in the 8 years since its first publication:
If we trace the literature back even further, we see that, in the last 40 years,
interdisciplinarity has become increasing prominent. Journal articles, books,
commissioned studies, and doctoral dissertations abound with theoretical
approaches to interdisciplinarity, criteria for assessing its efficacy, evaluations
of its influence on institutional and cultural contexts, and historical studies of
its development (Holley, 2009; Addy, 2011; Lattuca, 1996, 2002; Klein, 1990,
1996, 2005).
Articulations of interdisciplinarity’s definitions and purposes continue to
be ubiquitous, recurring, in particular, to the themes of integration, holism,
and pragmatic problem solving (National Academies, 2004, pp. 26–27).
The goals of integration and synthesis extend to both “interdisciplinary
research” and “interdisciplinary learning” (Mansilla, 2005, 2009). Theories
of interdisciplinarity thus tend to incorporate a broader “scope” and seek
to achieve a more “fundamental understanding” with a greater panoptic
vision (National Academies, 2004, p. 26). Also emphasized is the need to
“solve problems” (p. 27). In short, interdisciplinarity is considered a unifier
of knowledge and a way to address the modern world’s problems.
Educational Theory and Jewish Studies in Conversation 107
Sources of Interdisciplinarity
Modern tendencies toward holism, integration, and synthesis constitute
strong foundations for interdisciplinarity. The literature is replete with
references to “the holistic complex of interrelationships” (Stember, 1991,
p. 8), “the promise of . . . overarching synthesis” (Klein, 1990, pp. 65–66),
“conceptual frameworks which claim to transcend the narrow scope of
disciplinary world views” (Miller, 1982, p. 11) in which disciplines are
“subordinate . . . to a particular issue, problem, or holistic scheme” (Klein,
1990, pp. 65–66), “forging new overriding paradigms” (Klein, 2008, p. 400)
in “a comprehensive integrative curriculum design” (Klein, 2010b, p. 24),
“to unify knowledge beyond disciplines” (Palaiologou, 2010, p. 277) in
“comprehensive frameworks” (Klein, 2010a, p. 182).
And, of course, the discourse on interdisciplinarity often has a pragmatic
motivation.1 As noted recently by one theorist, this literature
When academic disciplines are enjoined to work together for the sake of
professional and social utility, particular problems and their resolutions tend
to function as interdisciplinary common denominators (Finkenthal, 2008,
pp. 2–3).
Despite these integrative and pragmatic rationales for interdisciplinarity,
there continue to be significant sources of resistance. For some, the
resistance comes from the term’s ambiguity and self-justification, its “unre-
flexive use” (Moran, 2010, p. viii). A leading literary theorist characterizes
interdisciplinarity as a superficial amalgam—a “Polonius-like religious-
historical-philosophical-cultural overview” (Vendler, 1981, p. 346). And
significant scholarly critiques claim interdisciplinarity’s lack of internal
discursive and ideational rigor: its lack of “intellectual coherence” (Said,
1999), its “distractive eclecticism” (Lenoir, Geoffroy, & Hasni, 2001 as cited
in Palaiologou, 2010, p. 275), that “slights the immanent intelligibility of
disciplines” (Fish, 1995, p. 80). Perhaps the strongest claim against the
assumptions of the above mentioned integrative and pragmatic rationales
for interdisciplinarity is what Bill Readings (1996) calls “suspicion of the
implicit harmonic convergence” of disciplines (p. 201). In Readings’ critique
of “the university in ruins,” he argues “that in thinking about the university
1 I use the word “pragmatic” in the conventional, rather than philosophical sense. To be sure,
the philosophical movement known as “pragmatism” is more complex and diverse than the adjective
“pragmatic.” With this latter term, I wish to emphasize a problem-solving progressivism.
108 Journal of Jewish Education
we should lay aside the automatic privileging of unity and synthesis, without
however simply making disharmony and conflict into a negative goal”
(p. 201). This literature also resonates with calls to rethink the values of
integration and synthesis in Jewish day school education (Ellenson, 2008;
Zeldin, 1998).
Yet interdisciplinary thinking is said to be a response and alternative to
the very intellectual and research norms that the disciplines afford to them-
selves. The dominant academic ethos emplaces a foundational universalism
within demarcated disciplines and departments. In an important sense, then,
the university has not been a comfortable place for transdisciplinary schol-
arship or interdisciplinary teaching (Bledstein, 1978, pp. 89–90). As Weber
(1987) notes: “the very notion of academic ‘seriousness’ came increasingly to
exclude reflection upon the relation of one ‘field’ to another” (p. 32). This
kind of exclusion might also be considered part of a larger effort to main-
tain an insularity not only between departments, but between disciplines
and the broader marketplace of services and commodities (p. 25). Many crit-
ics continue to blame interdisciplinarity for weakening this barrier between
self-contained academic disciplinarity, on the one hand, and broader mar-
ket forces, on the other (Readings, 1996, pp. 38, 113, 121). (It could be
a useful area of inquiry to consider the extent to which Jewish communal
demands parallel or reflect the broader marketplace’s commodification of
higher education.)
are in play (Derrida, 1987, p. 59). Though not immune from the above
noted criticisms of interdisciplinarity, deconstructionists avoid creating newly
bounded, seemingly integrated amalgams that reconstitute or recombine dif-
ferent specializations into a presumed whole. To do so would simply extend
and reconstitute the culture of insulated, autonomous professionalism and
disciplinarity into new supervening structures.
Discourse
Because transversal thinking takes place in communication and dialogue, it
is in the notion of discourse that I suggest an alternative to the more char-
acteristically modern (i.e., integrative and pragmatic) interdisciplinarity. Let
us then consider what we mean by discourse. Discourse is not just speak-
ing or writing in a language nor is it simply citing or grafting excerpts from
a literature (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 7). Among discourse’s necessary qualities is
that it is eventful—it is what Ricoeur calls the “very event of speaking”
(p. 7). As such, it is communicative. It has speakers and hearers, writers
and readers, as well as senses that it carries. Discourse invokes both lan-
guage and literature (Rosenak, 1987, 1995) but can never be reduced to one
or the other. Every aspect of discourse is laden with a tradition of litera-
ture, gestures, values, concepts, and outlooks. In living discourse, a culture
or community responds and recurs to such a tradition. In doing so, dis-
course is critical as well as creative, interpreting texts, experiences, structures,
and relations while generating new ones. Interpretation, creative expression,
Educational Theory and Jewish Studies in Conversation 111
“more intelligent, more flexible and better adapted to deal effectively with
concrete phenomena of practice” (p. 20).
The concept of “sources” is vital to Dewey’s (1929) notion of educational
theory. For him, there is no discrete, intrinsically demarcated content for
the latter (p. 48). Selected subject matters and experiences serve as sources
for theory to the extent that they enable the educator to have a clearer,
more comprehensive, penetrating vision of her practice (p. 75). And, even
as he articulates the relationship between sources for theory and theory
itself, Dewey emphasizes that a theory of education is included within the
field of education. The latter is not something separated from theory but,
rather, contains it. Since education is an ongoing, dynamic process, theory,
as part of education, is never final nor complete; it “is never made” but “it is
always making,” as it functions in “an endless circle or spiral” (p. 77) within
educational praxis.
Furthermore, Dewey (1929) is ambitious and demanding when it
comes to the study of sources for educational theory, suggesting that their
proper use “would compel attempt at mastery of what they have to offer”
(p. 42, my italics). Considering what Dewey (1922) means by “mastery,”
then, will suggest certain “ends-in-view” for the study of disciplines within
Jewish studies (pp. 223–225). Such mastery would allow the educational
theorist to draw on multiple discourses “so that there shall be steady
and cumulative growth of intelligent, communicable insight and power of
direction” (Dewey, 1929, pp. 9–10). This growth implies that the study of
a source for educational theory requires treating that source as dynamic
and intricate discourse, rather than a static body of knowledge. Such study,
then, should be of the kind that gives the educational theorist “command
of . . . systematized subject matter” (p. 12). Mastery, then, does not only
involve becoming familiar with a specific corpus of information and updated
findings, to be taken off the shelf, as it were, and applied to a particular
curriculum or educational problem or situation; nor does it involve acquiring
an encyclopedic knowledge of a subject. Rather, “command” of a discursive
“system” requires fluid understandings of how one aspect of a system affects
another, how foregrounding one dimension of Jewish history inevitably con-
ceals another dimension, how asserting one mode of Biblical interpretation
influences understandings of prayer and theology, how teaching modern
Hebrew influences understandings of traditional Jewish texts. To function as
a source, Jewish studies requires systemic understanding of its constituent
disciplines. The ability to draw upon Jewish studies systemically and
dynamically involves having a command of the disciplines’ discourses that,
according to Dewey, “liberates individuals” to the extent that it allows them
to “make new integrations” of Jewish studies as a source and “turn it to new
and previously unfamiliar and unforeseen uses” (p. 14).
Contrary to widespread misconceptions of his pragmatism, Dewey
(1929) maintains that such capacities for educational theorists would allow
Educational Theory and Jewish Studies in Conversation 115
sciences and arts, by moral and religious attitudes, and by what takes place
psychologically, socially, technologically” (Buchler, 1951, p. xxxix).
Drawing on Buchler’s (1966) language and distinctions, we can con-
sider Jewish studies and educational theory as “complexes” or “orders” that
bear certain “traits” (pp. xvii, xviii, 1, 2, 5). For Buchler, disciplines are
“complexes” and indeed, so is “whatever is, in whatever way” (p. 1):
isolated traits or complexes, for each trait is a complex; all complexes are
thus comprised of multiple complexes and each is related to others (pp.
xxv, xxvi, 11, 17, 26). There are thus two principles of Buchler’s ordinality:
There are no simple, fully reduced complexes or traits that are not made up of
others; and there is no such thing as an isolated complex that has no relation
to others.
Following Buchler, certain shared traits between the discourses of
Jewish studies and educational theory can be made explicit even as we
seek to preserve the distinctiveness of the prevailing order—the discursive,
disciplinary integrity—that obtains in each area. Any product of human judg-
ment can acquire new relationships, new ways of being relevant to others.
What Buchler calls a “product of judgment” has a dynamic relationality and
therefore can, in certain senses, transcend its prior delimitations that may
have marked off its initial instantiations.
Let us consider how Buchler suggests we might engage these inter-
secting traits and complexes with each other. For Buchler, such engagement
would involve applying ways of judging, absorbing, and changing complexes
(i.e., orders of prevalence, disciplines). Table 1 reflects the explanation of
Buchler’s terms and the organizing structure of his notion of judgment.
Human beings have two types of relationships to complexes. (In our case, we
are thinking of Jewish studies, educational theory, and their constituent fields
as complexes.) In relation to some complexes, human beings are “products”
(Buchler, 1955, pp. 4, 7); that is to say, one’s sense of self, identity, and basis
for relating to others are functions of being part of a complex; one is, in part,
a product of that complex. Examples of complexes that “produce” human
beings are families, languages, frameworks of meaning, societal contexts,
and professional norms. The second type of relationship is one in which an
individual is a “producer” (Buchler, 1966, pp. 126–28; Buchler, 1955, pp. 6,
80; Buchler, 1951, pp. 54, 58) of a complex, an active shaper and creator of a
TABLE 1. Buchler’s categories of judgment as they relate to Jewish studies and education.
Category 1 Category 2
For Buchler (1974), judgment within and between complexes occurs in two
ways. The first he calls “analysis”:
What he here claims for philosophy can thus extend to programs that join
Jewish studies with educational theory. Those programs need to consider
the nature and scope of the desired conceptual endowment and articula-
tive mastery to be attained in the multiple fields and in their interdiscursive
relations.
can result in “provoking one another to fresh exertions” (p. 489). Finally,
we come to “recognize the voices” of distinct discourses so that we can
“distinguish the proper occasions” to invoke each of them (p. 490). This kind
of conversation does not preclude the possibility or necessity of developing
new skills, strategies, practical directions, and professional guidance. But in
overemphasizing these latter ends, we can lose sight of the vitality of conver-
sation, its capacity to cultivate recognition of distinctions and commonalities,
to develop discernment of proper occasions for different discourses, and a
facility with discursive exchange.
There are clear examples of this notion of conversation in Jewish edu-
cational theory. Interdiscursive conversation appears to be an operative
mode of engagement in the way M. Rosenak and A. Rosenak (2009) engage
Soloveitchik’s philosophy together with his educational concerns. They thus
show that such a conversation is not simply identifying Soloveitchik’s ref-
erences to education. Rather, they maintain “that educational doctrine can
be shown to arise from philosophical writings as such” (p. 114). There is
thus a reciprocally illuminating, critical engagement between Soloveitchik’s
“thought” and “the philosophy of education” (p. 114).
This conversational paradigm is also evident in the way Cohen
(2008–2009) characterizes M. Rosenak’s “lifelong academic pursuit” of cre-
ating a “meeting-ground” between classical Jewish sources and the general
philosophy of education literature (p. 15). And Ackerman (2008–2009)
operates in an Oakeshottian key when he places Hartman’s theology in
conversation with the latter’s work in Jewish education.
It is also significant that Brandeis’s “Bridging Scholarship” initiative pro-
motes “critical dialogue among scholars and teachers” (Mandel Center).
Although it is distinctively Deweyan to engage Jewish studies in order
to improve its being taught (as noted above), this notion of “critical dia-
logue” (Mandel Center for Studies in Jewish Education, 2011) is particularly
Oakeshottian. So Levisohn (2006) promotes this conversational paradigm
when he says that “a better model is to bring people together to engage
in shared discussion, common conversation, joint inquiry” (p. 4).
Perhaps the quintessential interdiscursive conversation is what Joseph
Lukinsky (1987) recalls of his working, as a young rabbi and educator, with
Robert Cover on “a crazy idea that we called ‘The American Talmud”’:
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES