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The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 7, No.

1, January – June 2017, pages 79 – 94

An investigation of the Theory of Planned Behavior and the role of


Tax Amnesty in tax compliance
Agnes Findia Novianti1, Nurul Hasanah Uswati Dewi2
1, 2 STIE Perbanas Surabaya, Nginden Semolo Street 34-36, Surabaya, 60118, East Java, Indonesia

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT


Article history: The individual taxpayers’ low awareness has become the main problem of developing
Received 3 April 2017 countries in tax aspect. Thus, this study aimed to examine the determinant factors of
Revised 10 May 2017 tax noncompliance using Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior as a theoretical
Accepted 24 May 2017 framework. Specifically, Tax Amnesty is added to the theory’s constructs: attitude,
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. Tax Amnesty is expected to be a
JEL Classification: moderating influence. The population of this study is individual taxpayer in KPP
M48 Pratama Sukomanunggal. Based on convenience sampling method, the number of
sample in this study are 145 samples. The data was analyzed using Structural Equa-
Key words: tion Modeling (SEM) with SmartPLS.3.0 and SPSS 21. The results indicated that
Taxpayers’ Awareness, first, attitude and subjective norms are significantly influence behavioral intention
Tax Noncompliance, except perceived behavioral control. Second, the model including Tax Amnesty pro-
Tax Amnesty, and vides a significant influence of tax noncompliance in two constructs; attitude and
Theory of Planned Behavior. subjective norms. However, the interaction effect of perceived behavioral control does
not appear significantly.
DOI:
10.14414/tiar.v7i1.961 ABSTRAK
Rendahnya kesadaran pembayar pajak individu telah menjadi masalah utama negara
berkembang dalam aspek pajak. Dengan demikian, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk
menguji faktor penentu ketidakpatuhan pajak dengan menggunakan Ajzen's (1991)
Theory of Planned Behavior sebagai kerangka teoritis. Secara khusus, Amnesti Pajak
ditambahkan pada konstruksi teori: sikap, norma subjektif, dan kontrol perilaku yang
dirasakan. Amnesti pajak diharapkan bisa menjadi pengaruh moderat. Populasi dalam
penelitian ini adalah wajib pajak individu di KPP Pratama Sukomanunggal. Berda-
sarkan metode convenience sampling, jumlah sampel dalam penelitian ini adalah 145
sampel. Data dianalisis dengan menggunakan Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)
dengan SmartPLS.3.0 dan SPSS 21. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa pertama, sikap
dan norma subjektif berpengaruh signifikan terhadap niat perilaku kecuali pengenda-
lian perilaku yang dirasakan. Kedua, model termasuk Amnesti Pajak memberikan
pengaruh yang signifikan terhadap ketidakpatuhan pajak dalam dua konstruk; sikap
dan norma subjektif. Namun, efek interaksi kontrol perilaku yang dirasakan tidak
tampak secara signifikan.

1. INTRODUCTION collected by Indonesia government


Indonesia is categorized as a country, which has a (www.kemenkeu.go.id 2016).
low tax ratio level. In 2014, Indonesia tax ratio Tax revenue is the main revenue for covering
compared to its gross domestic product approx- the government expenditures. Thus, the govern-
imately 12.8% and then, 2015 decreased to 12.32%. ment always does some great efforts to increase tax
When compared with other countries, Indonesia revenue by increasing the tax compliance. Various
tax ratio remains below even with Philippines is programs were implemented by the government to
14%, Malaysia is 16% and Singapore is 22%. Hav- raise the awareness in paying taxes. The Directorate
ing low tax ratio level, indicating low tax revenue General of Taxation had issued Sunset Policy pro-

* Corresponding author, email address: 1 agnesfindia1@gmail.com, 2 nurul@perbanas.ac.id.

79
Agnes Findia Novianti: An investigation of the Theory …

gram in 2008, the year of Tax Amnesty in 2014, and encouraged by the low of ratio level of taxpayer
the recently program is Tax Amnesty policy. and the number of people but also other dominant
Sunset Policy is regulated by Act 28 year 2007, factors such as the high number of tax avoidance
conformity with article 37 of statutes, which stand practices, institutional trust, capacity to implement,
for the existence of Sunset Policy. Actually, Sunset tax evasion, administration complexity, tax com-
Policy is not a new program as Sunset Policy con- pliance, and tax morality.
sidered the lowest Tax Amnesty, which was im- It was found by Bobek et al. (2007) that social
plemented in 1984. Sunset Policy is a program of norm mostly influences taxpayers to fulfill their
sanction amnesty for the taxpayers who report debt. It is also supported by Wenzel (2004) that
their income honestly and pay the rest of the tax personal ethics which is based on religion and cul-
before 21st March 2009. If taxpayers used this tural norm may have impact on the free tax com-
program, they would get two benefits. Firstly, pliance behavior of the fiscal exchange between
they got reduction or removal of administrative taxpayers and government. Theoretically, factor
sanction such as interest of annual tax return be- have been identified in tax compliance tax knowing
fore the end of 2007. Secondly, reduction or re- as Theory of Planned Behavior developed by Ajzen
moval of administrative sanction for unpaid tax (1991) which extend the attitude, social norm, and
and lower tax payment either organizational or perceived behavioral control create a person‟s in-
individual. This is also open for the individual tention to perform or not to perform and behavior
taxpayers who register themselves voluntarily to is the most important factors immediately determi-
have taxpayer‟s identity. nant of personal action.
After the expiration of Sunset Policy, the level Some previous study done by Bobek and Hat-
of tax compliance did not seem to increase. Besides, field (2003) examined the noncompliance of tax-
the lower tax revenue collection is from Individual payers by using Theory of Planned Behavior, which
taxpayers. is developed by Ajzen (1991). In their‟ research
Actually, corporation has a better compliance framework, tax compliance was formed by three
than individual taxpayers factors; they are the attitude toward the behavior,
(http://ekonomi.metrotvnews.com). It is proved by subjective norms, and perceived control by adding
revenue from tax sector which never reached the moral obligation as a moderating variable. The re-
target which set by the government since 2009 until sults were attitude toward compliance and subjec-
2015. In conclusion, the potential long-run revenue tive norms affected behavioral intention.
gains from Sunset Policy are relatively small. The Similar result was also reported in Bobek et al.
comparison between target and realization of tax (2007). On occupation the study of Elia (2007)
revenue is illustrated by chart presented in Figure 1. proved that not only attitude, subjective norms,
The next implemented program was the year and perceived behavioral control influenced on tax
of amnesty for taxpayer in 2015, hopefully it would compliance but also financial, facilities, and organi-
increase public awareness to pay taxes and to re- zation environment. However, the inconsistency of
port their annual tax return correctly. The year of findings on the relationship between compliance
amnesty for taxpayer is a chance from government and some of its determinant (Widi and Argo 2010),
before implementing Tax Amnesty in 2016, which they failed to prove all assertion. Koch et al. (2015)
had many advantages; incentives gave to all kind of reported that attitude might make less compliant,
taxes, taxpayers who did not report amount tax otherwise it significantly related to compliance af-
correctly and report tax. Beside, the taxpayers who ter moderating by financial condition. Wenzel
were late to report the tax in 2015 would not be (2004) offered an analysis of norm process in tax
fined or pay the rest of tax. If the taxpayer increas- compliance, which social norm referred to the per-
es, the revenue from tax will increase. Surprisingly, ceived injunctive norms seemed to reduce tax com-
in 2015 tax ratio decreased from 11.32% to around pliance and no longer significant influence.
11% from the previous year. So, the year of amnes- According to Ajzen (2005: 42) there are three
ty for taxpayer program did not success enough broad categories of factors that interact with atti-
(http://www.tribunnews.com 2016). tudes or personality traits. They are situational cir-
Low of public awareness to pay tax reduces tax cumstances surrounding performance of the beha-
compliance and it has become the main problem of vior, characteristic of the individual and secondary
the state from tax aspect. Commonly, small accep- characteristics of the disposition. Situational factor
tance to pay tax voluntary happens in developing is the different condition in some situation but con-
countries, including Indonesia, it seems not only is sistent with each other such as regulation and poli-

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The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 7, No. 1, January – June 2017, pages 79 – 94

Target and Realisation of Tax Revenue since 2009 until 2015


in Billions
1600
1400
1200
Revenues

1000
Target
800
Realisation
600
400
200
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Years

Source: Tax council website, processed.


Figure 1
Difference of Target and Realization of Tax Revenue since 2009 until 2015

Source: Ajzen (1991).


Figure 2
Theory of Planned Behavior Construct

cy. Hence, Tax Amnesty as one of recently fiscal 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
policy of government can classified as situational THESIS
factors, which may moderate tax noncompliance, Theory Planned of Behavior
and its determinant factors. Theory of Planned Behavior is formulated in 1991 by
Based on the inconsistency result of previous Icek Ajzen. This theory suggests that a person‟s
study and phenomenon, the researcher is going to behavior is determined by intention to perform the
examine noncompliant behavior toward taxpayers. behavior. Intentions are a function of three basic
In this present study extends this prior tax com- determinants; one reflecting personal nature, one
pliance research in two ways. First, this study use social in nature, and a third dealing with issues of
factor determinants of noncompliance as suggested control (Ajzen 2005: 117). All subject‟s interaction
by Theory of Planned Behavior. Second, it focus on are defined as well as Figure 2.
situational factors, Tax Amnesty, as moderation First, personal factor is the individual‟s atti-
variable will interact with construct toward beha- tude toward the behavior. This attitude is the indi-
vior intention; specific behavior (attitudes), social vidual‟s positive or negative evaluation of the par-
pressures an individual feels to perform (subjective ticular behavior. Attitude is representation of per-
norms), the amount of control an individual per- sonal norms, as actualization of self based stan-
ceived to engage in that behavior (perceived beha- dards or expectation for behavior that flow from
vior control). internalized values (Bobek et al. 2007).

81
Agnes Findia Novianti: An investigation of the Theory …

Attitudes are predispositions to respond favor- kinds of tax compliance; formal compliance and
ably or unfavorably to an object, group, places, do material compliance. Formal compliance is a tax-
something in certain condition. Attitude is a per- payer‟s compliance fulfils their liabilities based on
son‟s feeling or way of thinking that affects a per- tax law formally. Materiel compliance is a taxpay-
son‟s behavior. er‟s condition fulfils all their tax liabilities substan-
Moreover, individual‟s attitudes are represen- tively based on the content of tax law. Materiel
tation of their belief that underlying the outcome. compliance also includes formal compliance, so
That is expectation to achieve some benefits by en- doing formal compliance does not represent mate-
gaging in their behavioral intention. Attitude comes riel compliance.
from their feelings that define the behavior. So, Internal revenue Service defines the formal
attitude in this study represents how the taxpayers compliance in three conditions. They are filling
thinking and expect to after fulfilling their tax lia- compliance, payment compliance, and reporting
bilities. compliance. These Criteria based on regulation
The second determinant of intention is social in 198/PMK.03/2013 refer to KEP-213/PJ/2003.
nature. Social in nature is person‟s perception of Based on regulation 198/PMK.03/2013 taxpayer‟s
social pressure to perform or not perform the beha- compliance is explained as filling accurate and
vior under the consideration. Social in nature deals complete annual tax return before the due date, the
with perceived normative prescription, this factor is rightness of periodic tax report, paying of all tax
termed subjective norms. Subjective norms are a debt (taxpayers never get notice of tax collection),
reference from other peoples that influence some- not having tax arrears except it is permitted by tax
one to do something (Ajzen 1991). Subjective norms officer to pay in installment, never commit a tax
refer to a person‟s belief about individual or groups criminality at least for 5 years.
approve or disapprove that will motivated taxpay-
ers to behave compliant. Tax Amnesty
According to Bobek et al. (2007) subjective Based on UU RI 17 year 2016, Tax Amnesty is an
norm is representation of individual‟s perception of elimination of a tax liability relating to a previous
the injunctive norms held by “referent” others such tax period or periods. It will free charge from inter-
as family, friends, and co-workers. Taxpayers‟ be- est and criminal prosecution including administra-
liefs appear from their compliance reference from tive or punishment if they inform both taxpayer‟s
surrounding such as groups, family members, em- liabilities and assets. Every taxpayers may get the
ployers, friends, and spouse. forgiveness by disclose their asset. The type of am-
Third, the determinant of intention is control nesty is forgiveness for tax liability until the end of
represents the sense of self-efficacy or ability to fiscal year. In exchange for forgiveness, taxpayers
perform or not perform the behavior. This factor is must pay redemption voluntarily.
termed with perceived behavioral control. This control There are some purposes of Tax Amnesty. First,
is more likely to personal deficiencies and external it is for accelerating the economic growth and eco-
obstacles can interfere with performance the beha- nomic restructuring by property transferring. That
vior. will impact on increasing of domestic liquidity,
Finally, all the determinant factors; attitude improved exchange rate, lower interest rate and
toward behavior, subjective norms, perceived be- increased investment. Second, it is for encouraging
havioral control interact each other predict inten- tax reformation; equitable tax system, extended
tion. Then, the intention will translate into action. data basis it make data more valid, comprehensive,
Explanation about how Theory of Planned Behavior and integrated. Finally, the main aim of Tax Amnes-
frames this research discussed in the next discus- ty is for increasing tax revenue.
sion.
Theoretical Framework
Tax Compliance The main purpose of this research is to predict tax
Taxpayers have high contribution to manage their noncompliance using Theory of Planned Behavior
tax responsibilities accurately. Taxpayers should model and examine whether the Tax Amnesty will
count, pay and report their tax by themselves, so interact with the TPB construct or not. According
tax compliance awareness is needed. Tax com- the objective of the research, in this study, there
pliance can be defined as a condition that taxpayers will be three steps.
fulfill all their tax liabilities Siti (2016: 38). First, test the influence of attitude toward non-
According to Siti (2016: 110) there are two compliance, subjective norms, and perceived beha-

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The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 7, No. 1, January – June 2017, pages 79 – 94

ANC

SNM TNB
BIT

PBC

Tax
Amnest
y
Source: Ajzen (2005), Fatih (2011), processed.
Figure 3
Theoretical Framework

vioral control on noncompliant intention. Second is noncompliant intention (Bobek and Hatfield 2003;
analyzing the effect of noncompliant intention tax Widi and Argo 2010; Elia 2007). In other hand, Widi
noncompliance. Third is examining the moderation and Bambang (2012) did not support the influence
effect tax between Tax Amnesty and the constructs of subjective norms and noncompliant intention.
of Theory of Planned Behavior. Graphically, the theo- Based on this consideration, the hypothesis is for-
retical framework is shown in Figure 3 (see the va- mulated as follow:
riables identification). H2: Subjective norm significantly influence to non-
The previous theoretical framework shows compliant behavioral intention.
how every variable will have interaction each other.
Based on the previous study and theoretical The Influence of Perceived Behavioral Control to
framework, below are the hypotheses of study. Intention
Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) is outcomes of
The Influence of Attitude toward noncompliance control belief. Control belief lead to the perception
to Intention taxpayers have or do not have capacity to carry out
Attitudes are predispositions to respond favorably the behavior. PBC refer to taxpayer‟s belief about
or unfavorably to behave noncompliance. Attitude the presence or absence of factors which facilitate
is a person‟s feeling or way of thinking that affects or impede noncompliance.
a person‟s behavior. Attitude comes from their in- The higher control toward taxpayers, noncom-
ternalized values. Various studies have demon- pliance may decrease. Empirically, the relation be-
strated the role of personal norms for taxpaying tween perceived behavioral control and noncom-
behavior. That was done by Bobek and Hatfield pliant behavioral is proven. But two previous stu-
(2003) and Elia (2007) that attitude toward non- dies oppose the influence of perceived behavioral
compliance was significantly influent behavioral control and noncompliant behavioral (Bobek and
intention. The other side Widi and Argo (2010) Hatfield 2003; Widi and Argo 2010). Based on this
proved that attitude toward noncompliance did not consideration, the hypothesis is formulated as fol-
affect behavioral intention. Based on this considera- low:
tion, the hypothesis is formulated as follow: H3: Perceived behavioral control significantly influ-
H1: Attitude toward noncompliance significantly ence to noncompliant behavioral intention.
influence to noncompliant behavioral intention.
The Influence of Perceived Behavioral Control to
The Influence of Subjective Norms to Intention Noncompliance
In many condition, taxpayers behavioral is influ- Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) is outcomes of
ence by other peoples. The decision of taxpayer to control belief. Control belief lead to the perception
behave to behave compliance or non compliance is taxpayers have or do not have capacity to carry out
motivated by referent people. The previous study the behavior. PBC refer to taxpayer‟s belief about
showed that subjective norms had high influence to the presence or absence of factors which facilitate

83
Agnes Findia Novianti: An investigation of the Theory …

or impede noncompliance. The higher control to- object that is the main focus of study. Population of
ward taxpayers, noncompliance may decrease. this research is individual taxpayers in KPP Prata-
Empirically, the relation between perceived ma Sukomanunggal. It is located in Bukit Darmo
behavioral control and noncompliant behavioral is Golf No.1 Surabaya. To generate the population,
proven. But two previous studies oppose the influ- sample is needed. Sample is a group of subjects or
ence of perceived behavioral control and noncom- participants from whom data are collected. Sample
pliant behavioral (Bobek and Hatfield 2003; Widi of this research is expectantly more than 100 Indi-
and Argo 2010). Based on this consideration, the vidual taxpayers who come to tax office and volun-
hypothesis is formulated as follow: tarily want to become respondents.
H4: Perceived behavioral control significantly influ- The method for choosing the subject is Conven-
ence to noncompliant behavior. ience Sampling. Convenience sampling is one of non
probability sampling method which subjects are
The Influence of Intention to Noncompliance selected. Besides, Convenience Sampling is availabili-
Intention connects the tax noncompliance and its ty or ease to access. Using Convenience Sampling,
factors determinant. Generally, intention signifi- sample is more objective, valid, and reliable. Con-
cantly influences tax noncompliance. Based on Aj- venience Sampling usually represents the popula-
zen (2005: 101) intention can accurately predict a tion, easy to analyze and interpret the result, give
variety of corresponding action tendencies. generalization possible to similar object Millan
Empirically, Intention is proven related to tax (2008: 118).
noncompliance (Bobek and Hatfield 2003; Widi and
Bambang 2015; Elia 2007). Based on this considera- Data Collection Procedures
tion, the hypothesis is formulated as follow: Related with the research questions on the back-
H5: Tax noncompliant intention significantly influ- ground of the study, the data collection procedure
ence to noncompliance is self-administered survey that primary data are col-
lected by survey to respondents for collecting indi-
The Influence of Tax Amnesty to Theory of vidual taxpayer‟s opinion Jogiyanto (2012: 140).
Planned Behavior constructs Taxpayers will give the opinion based on the ques-
Tax amnesty as compliance driver will increase tionnaire instruction. Then, qquestionnaire is
taxpayer‟s compliance. Previous studies found that handed out to individual taxpayers who come to
tax amnesty had great impact on compliance. Ad- tax administration office in KPP Pratama Sukoma-
vocates of amnesties argue that successful amnes- nunggal. Researcher waits for the taxpayers to fill
ties were accompanied by increased enforcement in the questionnaire and collects the questionnaire
following the amnesties James et al. (1990). directly.
Generally, there are factor of various kinds can
influence intention, but this influence is usually Variables Identification
moderated by more specific condition. An obvious This research model uses latent variables which
potential moderating variable relate to behavioral cannot measure directly but use indicators which
context is situational constraint. Hopefully, Tax influence taxpayer‟s intention to behave non com-
Amnesty as a recent fiscal policy can moderate the pliance; (1) attitude toward non compliant behavior
attitude and personal trait. If an amnesty is accom- (ANC), (2) subjective norms (SNM), (3) perceived
panied by these features, then simple model of behavioral control (PBC), (3) behavioral intention
noncompliance will decrease. (BIT), (4) Tax Amnesty (TAY), (5) tax noncompliant
Based on this consideration, the hypothesis is behavior (TNB).
formulated as follow: Independent variables (X) are attitude toward
H6: Tax amnesty moderates relationship between non compliant behavior, subjective norms, per-
attitude and noncompliance. ceived behavioral control. Dependent Variable (Y)
H7: Tax amnesty moderates relationship between is tax noncompliant behavior. Intervening Variable
subjective norms and noncompliance. is behavioral intention. Moderating Variable is Tax
H8: Tax amnesty moderates relationship between Amnesty
perceived behavioral control and noncompliance.
Operational Definition and Variables Measure-
3. RESEARCH METHOD ment
Population, Sample, and Sampling Technique In this research, behavioral variables use Theory of
Population is a large collection of individuals or Planned Behavior (TPB). All variables classify as la-

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The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 7, No. 1, January – June 2017, pages 79 – 94

tent variables. Latent variables are variables which item between 1 until 7.
not directly observed but inferred from other va-
riables that are observed, Latent variable is meas- Tax Amnesty
ured using indicators called manifest variables Tax Amnesty is an elimination of a tax liability relat-
Byrne (2010: 4). Moreover, this study needs taxpay- ing to a previous tax period or periods. It will free
ers to give their opinion, so the research‟s instru- charge from interest and criminal prosecution in-
ment is questionnaire and the respondent‟s should cluding administrative or punishment by informing
answer the questionnaire as well as interview tran- both taxpayer‟s liabilities and assets. In exchange
script. for forgiveness taxpayers must pay a defined
Type of the questionnaire is interval and nu- amount voluntarily.
merical scale by giving score; 1 until 7 in every There are 7 indicators to measure Tax Amnesty
statement. The respondents must give suitable refer to James (2009). The questions include desire
score for each item between 1 until 7. The informa- to take opportunity, considering its benefits, know-
tion of scale‟s representation is explained below: ing the certain tax liabilities, good reference from
Scale 1: Strongly disagree others, sufficient facilities to take amnesty, and tax
Scale 2: Disagree officer‟s guidance. The respondents must give suit-
Scale 3: Approximately disagree able score for each item between 1 until 7.
Scale 4: Neutral
Scale 5: Approximately agree Attitude toward Noncompliance
Scale 6: Agree The attitude toward noncompliance is determined
Scale 7: Strongly agree by the taxpayer‟s evaluation of outcomes of asso-
ciated with noncompliance behavior and belief
Tax Noncompliant Behavior strength of these associations. According to Ajzen
Noncompliant Behavior of Individual taxpayers are (2005: 124) Estimation of the attitude toward non-
noncompliance of individual taxpayers who do not compliance is based on the person‟s accessible be-
obey the tax liabilities. Noncompliant behavior as liefs about noncompliance by multiplying belief
latent variable is measured by IRS‟s definition of strength and outcome evaluation, and summing the
tax compliance replicated by study of Brown and resulting products. Attitudes are algebraically
Mazur (2003). Every item is elaborated which refer modeled as follows:
to definition of formal compliance which regulated AB= a ∑ biei. (1)
by 198/PMK.03/2013. Where:
The tax compliance can be measured indirectly AB = the attitude toward B;
using indicators which consist of 7 items. They are bi = the subjective probability that performing be-
never get fine for late reporting periodic tax return, havior B will lead to outcome i;
late reporting annual tax return, never get fine for ei = the evaluation of outcome i.
underpayment tax, never commit a tax criminality, The measurement of attitude toward behavior
never correct the fiscal more than 10%, feel guilty is used 7-point scales which replicated Elia (2007).
while doing tax fraudulent, and thinking that doing To measure belief strength and evaluate the out-
noncompliance is not unethical actions. The res- come, respondent should decide rate of expectancy
pondents must give suitable score for each item in every indicator. They are the willingness to pay
between 1 until 7. less tax, allowance for tax investigating fund, feel-
ing a loss upon tax system, the perception of tax
Intention to Tax Noncompliance benefit is not transparent, and the higher bribery
Intention is a planning of someone to perform or cost than economical tax. The respondents must
not perform a specific behavior it is immediately give suitable score for each item between 1 until 7.
determinant of their action. So, Intention represents
taxpayers willing to pay tax, to comply all their tax Subjective Norms
liabilities. Measurement of intention to noncom- Normative beliefs are the beliefs that underlie sub-
pliant behavior as latent variable uses respondent‟s jective norms. Normative beliefs refer to people
opinion replicate Mustikasari (2007). whom motivate, give taxpayers social pressure to
There are two postulates which represent in- comply and the most referents to perform com-
tention variable‟s indicators; (1) preference and (2) pliance or non compliance. Subjective norms can be
decision to comply or do not comply tax regulation. assessed by asking respondent to judge how likely
The respondents must give suitable score for each it is that most people who are important to them

85
Agnes Findia Novianti: An investigation of the Theory …

would support their behavior. Symbolically, Sub- prehensively about the respondent‟s profile. This
jective norm is express in equation below: technique is especially used to overview the extent
SN= a ∑ nimi. (2) of tax noncompliance and its determinant‟s. This
Where: descriptive analysis is analyzed by SPSS 20.0.
SN = the subjective norm;
ni = normative beliefs concerning referent i; Structural Equation Modeling
mi = the person‟s motivation to comply with refe- Structural Equation Modeling is applied to answer
rent i. the hypothesis. SEM-PLS specifically uses
The measurement of subjective norm is used 7- SmartPLS 2.0. Besides it, to describe the data and
point scales which replicated Elia (2007) by 4 indi- research subject, SPSS 20.0 is used.
cators to measure this subjective norm. The indica- There are four steps to analysis PLS-SEM;
tors measure the most reference people while fulfill 1. Defining Theoretical Model
taxpayer‟s liabilities such as friends, family mem- Structural equation model is based on causal rela-
bers, tax consultant, and tax officers. The respon- tionship which assumed that every change of vari-
dents must give suitable score for each item be- able will effect to other variable. Causal relation-
tween 1 until 7. ship is strong based on theoretical justification not
because analysis method which used in the re-
Perceived Behavioral Control search. So, the most important of structural equa-
Perceived behavioral control becomes a function tion model must be parsimony with concise theo-
belief. That is beliefs about the presence or absence retical model.
of factors that facilitate or obstruct performance 2. Developing The Overall Measurement Model
compliance or non compliance. Beliefs about re- (Outer Model)
sources and opportunities to comply on don not The second step is measuring path analysis and its
comply may be as underlying perceived behavioral structural equation. Path analysis is a set relation-
control. It can be measured directly by asking tax- ship between exogenous, endogens variables and
payers whether they believe that they are capable manifest. Outer Model defines how each block of
of performing compliance non compliance and indicators relates to its latent variables. Quality of a
whether they believe that doing so is under other‟s measurement model (outer model) can be checked
control. The relation between control belief and by validity and reliability. Validity test is assessed
perceived behavioral control in symbolic form are by examining convergent validity and discriminant
showed below: validity while reliability test is assessed through
PBC = ∑cipi. (3) composite reliability (Chin 2014: 316). The validity
Where: and reliability test had been explained in the validi-
PBC = perceived behavior control ty and reliability test point.
ci = control belief that a given factor i; 3. Assessing Structural Model Identification (In-
pi = the power of factor i to facilitate or inhibit per- ner Model)
formance of the behavior. Evaluation of PLS models should apply nonpara-
Perceived behavioral control is measured with metric prediction-oriented instrument. To that ex-
3 indicator replicated Elia (2007). They are the pos- tent, (1) the R-square is used for dependent latent
sibility of having tax audit by tax authorities, the variables, (2) Stone-Geisser is tested for predictive
possibility of getting tax penalties, and the possibil- relevance, and (3) t-statistic is used to assess the
ity of third-party reporting. The respondents must significance of constructs.
give suitable score for each item from 1 to 7. R-square has criterion; the model is good if R2
score is 0.67, moderate if R2 score is 0.33, and weak
Data Analysis Technique if R2 score is 0.19 (Imam Ghozali 2011: 42). Besides
This research use statistic technique in analyzing looking at R-square as a criterion for predictive
the variables. The data were processed by using value, F-square can also be used to evaluate struc-
SPSS 20.0 and SmartPLS 2.0. The analysis process is tural model in PLS. F-square determines the effect
described as the following. size of latent variables. F-square value indicates
how big the power of latent variable is influenced
Descriptive analysis in structural level. The power of latent variable is
Descriptive statistic includes the mean, variance, “big” if F2 is 0.35, moderate if F2 is 0.15, and weak
maximum, minimum, sum, range, and percentage. if F2 is 0.02.
Cross tabulation is also used to understand com- 4. Interpretation and Model Modification

86
The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 7, No. 1, January – June 2017, pages 79 – 94

Table 1
Respondent’s Profile
Informal Became
Profile Gender Age Formal Education
Education Taxpayers
Highest number Male (77) 36-45 (37.9%) Bachelor degree (53.8%) Seminar (26.2%) 11-20 (40.7%)
Lowest number Female (66) ≤ 26 (1.4%) Doctoral Degree (2.8%) Brevet (5.5%) >30 (5.5%)
Source: SPSS Output, developed by Author.

Table 2
Respondent’s Opinion
Tax Non Subjective Tax
Questions Intention Attitude PBC
compliance Norms Amnesty
Highest Doing Decide to not Feeling a loss Family The possibility of Tax
number noncompliance comply with tax upon tax members getting tax officer‟s
is unethical regulation system penalties guidance
actions
Lowest Never correct Incline to do tax The perception Tax Officers The possibility of Knowing
number the fiscal more noncompliance of tax benefit is having tax audit the certain
than 10% not transparent by tax authorities tax
liabilities
Source: Processed by Excel.

After model is accepted, the researcher may con- highest numbers are 27 to 35 years old, which are
sider modifying the model. The purposed of im- 71 respondent or 49% in which 36 respondents are
provement the model is to repair theories explana- male and 35 respondent are female. In this age,
tion or goodness-of-fit. The measurement is done taxpayers begin to look for the way to do noncom-
by modifying indices score. pliance and think how they can pay smaller tax.
To answer whether the hypothesis is sup- Table 1 demonstrates that the male respon-
ported or not, it should compare t-value and signi- dents are higher than female respondents. It means
ficance of parameter, which is 5%. For the regres- that male is more noncompliant than female. Some
sion result, the hypothesis is supported or signifi- research supports that female is complier than fe-
cant if it has t-statistic more than 1.96, but if t- male. David et al. (1994) defines female has a dif-
statistic is less than 1.96, the hypothesis is not sup- ferent attitude through ethic and ethic code. The
ported or not significant. maturity also decreases noncompliance.
After taxpayers are 27 years old, the percen-
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION tage of noncompliance decreases gradually. Kohl-
The Questionnaire submission is more than one berg model defines moral maturity influence some-
month, which started from 31th October 2016 until one in decision making, whether they do favoura-
2nd December 2016. In this research, there were 150 ble or unfavourable action, indeed noncompliance.
questionnaires delivered to respondents. The entire
questionnaire came back but there are 5 incomplete Research Subject Based on Education
questionnaires. Incomplete questionnaire is out of There are two kinds of educations, they are formal
sample because the respondents did not fill com- and informal. Data respondents based on formal
pletely and give their opinion clearly. Therefore, and. Formal education consists of doctoral degree,
only 145 questionnaires could be analyzed. Hence, master degree, bachelor degree, and senior high
the Respondents are divided into 4 categories. They school. Informal education is divided into 5 catego-
are age, gender, formal and informal education, ries. They are brevet, course, training, seminar, and
and the length of time became taxpayers. Table 1 others.
explained shortly how the demographic of research Looking on the formal education as Table 1,
subject. the most noncompliant are bachelor degree, which
are 53.8% or 78 respondents in which male respon-
Research Subject Based on Age dents are 46 and female respondents are 31. Indi-
Looking on the age of taxpayers, the smallest num- vidual taxpayers who have passed bachelor degree
ber of respondents are at the age of 26, which are and they are between 27 until 35 years old are the
only 2 respondent or 1.4%. This taxpayer does not highest numbers on doing noncompliance, which is
realize that they have done noncompliance. The 28.3%.

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Agnes Findia Novianti: An investigation of the Theory …

Table 3
Model Evaluation
Cropnbach’ R-Square R-Square
Latent Variables AVE CR
Alpha before Moderating after Moderating
Attitude 0.923 0.960 0.917
Subjective Norms 0.983 0.938 0.931
Perceived Behavioral Control 0.562 0.708 0.754
Tax Amnesty 0.877 0.942 0.714
Behavioral Intention 0.522 0.684 0.805 0.362 0.400
Tax Noncompliance 0.613 0.864 0.795 0.014 0.014
Source: PLS Output, developed by Author.

Table 4
Hypothesis Analysis
No. Coefficient t-statistic t-table Noted
1. ANC BIT 0.072 3.708 1.96 Significant
2. SNM BIT -0.204 1.978 1.96 Significant
3. PBC BIT -0.155 1.746 1.96 Not Significant
4. PBC TNB -0.018 0.832 1.96 Not significant
5. BIT TNB 0.118 1.966 1.96 Significant
6. AT_TAY  BIT 0.070 4. 688 1.96 Significant
7. SNM_TAY  BIT -0.204 4.492 1.96 Significant
8. PBC_TAY  BIT -0.065 0.727 1.96 Not significant
Source: PLS Output, developed by Author.

Moreover, on the informal education, training as follow:


is the highest numbers of respondent‟s informal Based on the questions relate to tax non-
education that they had joined. They are 74 res- compliance, individual taxpayers disagree doing
pondents or 51%, which 43 respondents are male noncompliance is unethical actions. They think that
and 31 respondents are female. Brevet is the smal- doing noncompliance is ethical actions because it
lest numbers of respondent‟s informal education does not bring a loss to government directly. Fraud
which are 8 respondents or 5.5% in which male triangle defines doing noncompliance while think-
respondents are male and 7 respondents are female. ing its noncompliance is not unethical action is ca-
The higher level of education should decrease tegorized as rationalization. So, even though the
noncompliance. On the contrary, the phenomena taxpayers did not admit their tax noncompliance,
shows bachelor degree has highest number on they cannot avoid the punishment.
doing noncompliance. Thus proves that having Table 2 indicates individual taxpayers strongly
high education does not guarantee taxpayers will disagree if they did not correct the fiscal more than
more comply. 10%. Taxpayers strongly agree they ever correct the
fiscal more than 10% and it becomes habit. They are
Research Subject Based on Length of Time to be not afraid if they are investigated because tax low
taxpayers in Indonesia provides some choice to be used in
Refers to Table 1, the highest numbers are between calculation tax and
11 to 20 years became taxpayers which are 40.7% or Seeing on taxpayer‟s intention, they very agree
59 respondents in which 37 respondents are male when they do tax noncompliance, firstly they de-
and 22 respondents are male. On the other hand, cide to not comply with its tax regulation. Before
the smallest one is more than 30 years old, which deciding, they will incline to do tax compliance
are only 8 respondents or 5.5%. This can be con- after deciding to not comply with tax regulation.
cluded that the higher age will decrease non- The reason why they don‟t comply is a feeling a
compliance because the taxpayers have known how loss upon tax system, the influence of family mem-
to fulfil their tax liabilities both administrative or bers to avoid tax liabilities, and arguing that tax
payment process. authorities will not audit taxpayers who have small
Next step is counting the mean and analyzing tax expense. Tax authorities prefer to audit corpo-
the opinion of respondents and the result is shown rate taxpayers than individual taxpayers. Besides,

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The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 7, No. 1, January – June 2017, pages 79 – 94

taxpayers strongly agree that Tax Amnesty motivate perceived behavioral control, and Tax Amnesty)
them to comply. behavioral intention is 36.2%. Then, 63.8% of beha-
vioral intention is influenced by others factors. It
PLS Analysis also indicates that the structural model is “more
Model evaluation in PLS-SEM is a two-steps than moderate”.
process. First, evaluating the measurement model is Secondly, the ability of behavioral intention to
called outer model evaluation. Measurement model explain tax noncompliance is only 0.014 or 1.4%.
is evaluated in the term of validity and reliability. Moreover, 98.6% of tax noncompliance is explained
Second, examining the structural model, it is also by others factors which is not included in this mod-
called inner model evaluation. Evaluation of inner el.
model can be assessed by examining the F-square The model seems to improve after adding the
and coefficient determination (R2) Ravand and moderating variable, which is Tax Amnesty. The
Baghaei (2016). improvement is shown by the higher R-Square,
which is 0.400 or 40%.
Outer Model Evaluation To define whether the hypothesis is supported
Outer Model defines how each block of indicators or not based on t-statistic. If t-statistic score is more
relates to its latent variables. Quality of a measure- than 1.96, it means that the hypothesis is supported.
ment model (outer model) can be identified If t-statistic score is less than 1.96, hypothesis is not
through validity and reliability test. supported. In conclusion, the hypothesis 1, hy-
Validity test is assessed by examining conver- pothesis 2, hypothesis 5, hypothesis 6, and hy-
gent validity and discriminant validity while relia- pothesis 7 are supported. Different results, hy-
bility test is assessed through composite reliability pothesis 3, hypothesis 4, and hypothesis 8 do not
(Chin 2014: 316). The outer model evaluation is have significant effect.
explained in Table 3.
Convergent validity should be fulfilled by The Influence of Attitude toward Noncompliance
executing invalid variables must from model until to Behavioral Intention
the entire factor loadings are above the acceptable Attitude toward noncompliance are predispositions
level of 0.50 and check the quality is through aver- to respond favorably or unfavorably to behave tax
age variance extracted (AVE). All of the latent noncompliance. Attitude is also defined as a per-
variables have high average variance extracted son‟s feeling or way of thinking that affects taxpay-
(AVE), which is more than 0.5. AVEs of 50% mean er‟s noncompliance. Attitude is not built but it
that the construct explains at least half of the va- comes from taxpayer‟s internal values. Theoretical-
riance of its observed variables. The highest AVE ly, Ajzen (1991) claimed that attitude is an indica-
is subjective norms, which 0.983. This indicates tion of noncompliance which elaborated in Theory
that construct of subjective norms (indicators) is of Planned Behavior. According to Theory of Planned
able to explain 98.3% of the variance of the its ob- Behavior, an attitude toward noncompliance is one
served variables. of determinant factor influencing behavioral inten-
Reliability test in PLS-SEM can be assessed by tion which indirectly will affect to tax noncom-
composite reliability (CR) and Cronbach‟s alpha. pliance (Ajzen 1991). If the taxpayers have strong
According to the composite reliability of model attitude toward noncompliance, the intention to do
evaluation which it is explained in Table 4, coeffi- noncompliant behavior will be higher.
cients of composite reliable are above 0.70, so all of Based on the empirical result, Table 4, attitude
constructs are reliable. Then, all of the latent va- toward noncompliance is proven significantly in-
riables have Cronbach alpha value more than 0.70, fluence to individual taxpayer‟s behavioral inten-
so all variables are reliable. In conclusion, all of tion. Therefore this result of study is linear with
latent variables have supported reliability and va- Theory of Planned Behavior which demonstrates atti-
lidity. tude toward noncompliance influences behavioral
intention. Then, behavioral intention directly influ-
Inner Model Evaluation ences tax noncompliance.
Table 3 shows that R-Square for behavioral inten- As the characteristic of tax, which is enforced
tion before including moderating effect is 0.362 and contribution and the purpose is for financing gov-
R-Square for tax noncompliance is 0.014. It means ernment operational expenditure, taxpayers will
that firstly, the ability of independent variable‟s look for the way to pay tax less than their liabilities.
indicators to explain (attitude, subjective norms, Beside it refers to individual taxpayer‟s response

89
Agnes Findia Novianti: An investigation of the Theory …

rate, when taxpayers fulfill their tax abilities they fluence someone to do something (Ajzen 1991).
will consider some factors. The factors that will be Subjective norms refer to person who will give mo-
considered is consist of feeling a loss upon tax sys- tivation to decide noncompliance. In many condi-
tem, the willingness to pay less tax, the higher bri- tion, taxpayers behavioral is truly influenced by
bery cost than economical tax, amount of allowance other peoples.
for tax investigating fund, and taxpayer‟s percep- Refers to Table 4, subjective norms are proven
tion of tax benefit is not transparent. significantly influence behavioral intention. There-
Five factors above as instruments to measure fore, this result of study is linear with Theory of
attitude toward noncompliance. Factor, which has a Planned Behavior which indicates subjective norms
big effect to avoid tax abilities, is feeling a loss upon influence behavioral intention. Then, behavioral
tax system while factor which has a small effect to intention directly influences tax noncompliance.
avoid tax abilities is taxpayer‟s perception. Taxpay- Consistent with the result of Elia (2007), subjective
er precept tax revenue is not used transparently. norms influenced behavioral intention to do non-
However this taxpayer‟s perceptions lead to per- compliance.
form tax evasion or noncompliance. In that research disclosed that tax profession-
There is also evidence showing that attitude do al‟s recommendation had a high impact to corpo-
impact on taxpaying behavioral intention. In expe- rate taxpayers to do noncompliance. Because of all
rimental study by Bobek and Hatfield (2003) to the amount of tax expense is calculated by tax pro-
predict noncompliance behavior in paying tax, fessional. The other study‟s result that supports this
proved the sum of the attitude beliefs was always finding is Bobek and Hatfield (2003). In contrast,
highly significant. Even though, the significance of Bobek and Hatfield (2003) did not successfully
the individual beliefs varied by scenario. prove this expectation.
Furthermore, the finding seems consistent with
Widi and Bambang (2015) and Elia (2007) which tax The Influence of Perceived Behavioral Control to
professional as a representative of corporate tax- Behavioral Intention and Tax Noncompliance
payer supported tax compliance as contribution to Based on the result of Table 4 empirically, proved
government. The respondents agreed that attitude perceived behavioral control does not influence
influenced behavioral intention. Contrast with the behavioral intention. Therefore, it can be concluded
finding of Widi and Argo (2010) proved that atti- that the third hypothesis and fourth hypothesis are
tude did not significantly influence behavioral in- not significantly supported. As Table 4 shows, this
tention. can happens because individual taxpayer is not
afraid of some factors. They are the possibility of
The Influence of Subjective Norm to Behavioral having tax audit by tax authorities, the possibility
Intention of getting tax penalties, and the possibility of third-
This research confirmed that subjective norms in- party reporting. They only consider the advantages
fluence to behavioral intention. Based on individual of noncompliance.
taxpayer‟s responses, they will consider advices of This result of study is contrast with Theory of
family members, tax consultant, their friends, and Planned Behavior, which is claimed that perceived
tax officers. The first reference people who will behavioral intention influences behavioral intention
influence individual taxpayers are family members. and tax noncompliance. Theoretically, perceived
Family member is the most confidential people. behavioral control refers to degree of controlling
Taxpayers have responsibility to fulfill their taxpayer‟s perception they have to involve in a par-
need. Therefore, taxpayer will consider their advice ticular compliant behavior. The higher perceived
and family member‟s need to do noncompliance. behavioral control expectedly can decrease the be-
On the contrary, tax consultant is the last considera- havioral intention to do noncompliance and in-
tion while individual taxpayers do noncompliance. crease tax compliance, although it does not seem
One reason for justification, not all of taxpayers effect the behavioral intention.
may have tax consultant. Theory of Planned Beha- The prior studies also find that perceived be-
vioral proposes subjective norms may have effect to havioral control does not influence behavioral con-
behavioral intention. trol (Widi and Argo 2010). Bobek and Hatfield
Theoretically, subjective norm is one of indica- (2003) prove that perceived behavioral control does
tors of that influence behavioral intention which not effect to behavioral intention but directly influ-
indirectly influence tax noncompliance. Subjective ence tax noncompliance. On the other hand, per-
norms are a reference from other peoples that in- ceived behavioral control is significant influence

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The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 7, No. 1, January – June 2017, pages 79 – 94

both intention or tax noncompliance Widi and Second, characteristic of the individual relates
Bambang (2015) and Elia (2007). with individual difference in various conditions.
Individual difference is considered as moderator is
The Influence of Intention to Tax Noncompliance based on the assumption that consistency may be
Based on Table 4 empirically, proved that beha- expected for some individuals but not for others
vioral intention has significantly influence to tax such as self-monitoring, private self-consciousness,
noncompliance. Therefore, it can be concluded that need for cognition.
the fifth hypothesis is significantly supported. Be- Third, secondary characteristics of the disposi-
havioral intention of individual‟s taxpayer indicates tion may influence the relationship between gener-
the inclination and decision to do tax non com- al attitude and specific behavior for example inter-
pliance influence to tax compliance. Both of the nal structure, reflection, accessibility, vested inter-
factors will lead individual taxpayer to do tax non est, involvement, importance, confidence, direct
compliance. experience. So, theoretically, the most suitable
Based on Table 4 demonstrates more than half moderator between behavior and it determinant
individual taxpayers decide to not comply with tax factor is situational factor. Hopefully, Tax Amnesty
regulation. Then, they rarely agree that they incline as compliance driver will increase taxpayer‟s com-
to do noncompliance. This means that the beha- pliance.
vioral intention is higher to do noncompliance, tax Empirically, In this research Tax Amnesty is
noncompliance will be higher. Hence, to decrease tested whether succeeded or not influence tax non-
tax noncompliance, behavioral intention should be compliance. Tax Amnesty is measured by seven
controlled using such regulation such penalties, points. They are good reference from other people,
low rate, and others. the desire to take opportunity, consideration of its
This result of study also supports Theory of benefits, knowing the certain tax abilities, good
Planned Behavior which defines that person‟s beha- reference from others, and the sufficient informa-
vior is determined by intention to perform the be- tion about Tax Amnesty, sufficient facilities, and tax
havior. Intentions are a function of three basic de- officer‟s guidance for following Tax Amnesty. Based
terminants; one reflecting personal nature, one so- on descriptive statistic as Table 2 the highest factor
cial in nature, and a third dealing with issues of that gives big influence is good reference from oth-
control. ers and sufficient information about Tax Amnesty.
All of the determinant factors is presented in Based on hypothesis testing, Tax Amnesty em-
attitude toward behavior, subjective norms, per- pirically can moderate the relationship between
ceived behavioral control interact each other pre- attitude toward noncompliance and intention and
dict intention. Then, the intention will translate into between subjective norms and behavioral intention.
action (Ajzen 2005: 117). Nurul and Titik (2010) By contrast, Tax Amnesty evidently cannot mod-
intended to do something will increase the desire of erate the relationship between perceived behavioral
behavior. Mostly, there are some studies that also control and intention. Consequently, there are 2
prove there are significant influence between inten- hypothesis is not supported which sixth hypothesis
tion and behavior Widi and Bambang (2015); Widi and seven hypothesis. But, hypothesis 8 is sup-
and Argo (2010); Elia (2007). ported. Thus, the result of study can support and
develop Theory of Planned Behavior.
Discussion of Moderating Effect Previous studies found that Tax Amnesty had
According to Ajzen (2005: 42) there are three broad great impact on compliance. Advocates of amnes-
categories of factors that interact with attitudes or ties argue that successful amnesties were accompa-
personality traits. They are situational circums- nied by increased enforcement following the am-
tances surrounding performance of the behavior, nesties James et al. (1990). Actually, Tax Amnesty
characteristic of the individual and secondary cha- will drive tax compliance higher but the long run
racteristics of the disposition. effect cannot be guaranteed Koch et al. (2015). The
First, situational factor is the different condi- previous study is done by James et al. (2009)
tion in some situation but consistent with each oth- proved that Tax Amnesty had a high effect on reve-
er such as regulation and policy. Hence, Tax Amnes- nue but the effect is about five years after imple-
ty as one of recently fiscal policy of government can menting Tax Amnesty.
classified as situational factors which may mod- By this, it can be concluded that Tax Amnesty is
erate tax noncompliance and its determinant fac- not the most suitable regulation to increase tax
tors. compliance. After implementing Tax Amnesty, gov-

91
Agnes Findia Novianti: An investigation of the Theory …

ernment may have program which can keep the Second, in this study tries to improves the
taxpayer‟s compliance. model. Besides using Theory of Planned Behavior
construct adding Tax Amnesty as moderating va-
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES- riables. Moreover, the model is categorized “weak”
TION, AND LIMITATIONS and needs to be exercised deeply.
This research purposes to examine noncompliant Third, Furthermore, the focus of this study is
behavior toward taxpayers using Theory of on individual taxpayers. So, the result of study
Planned Behavior constructs. Besides that, this also cannot generalize with corporate taxpayers because
analyses the moderation effect of Tax Amnesty to corporate taxpayers may have different opinions,
attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavior- perception, and behavior from the individual tax-
al control. These research objectives are applied to payers.
the individual taxpayers by convenience sampling. Based on the result of and limitation of this
From the discussion in the last chapter. study, there are recommendations for government
Based on the research result, there is a signifi- and future researcher. For government, relates to
cant influence between attitudes toward tax non- Tax Amnesty which recently implemented, as the
compliance and subjective norms to behavioral result of this research, this regulation may change
intention. In contrast, perceived behavioral control the taxpayer‟s behavior. However, the government
does not significantly influence behavioral inten- should provide sufficient facilities, clear informa-
tion. tion and guidance.
This study empirically does not only test the The interesting one, Tax Amnesty not only
influence of perceived behavioral and behavioral moderates the behavioral intention and its deter-
intention but also the influence of perceived beha- minants factor but also decrease tax noncompliance
vioral and tax non compliance. As the discussion directly. For future research is expected to conduct
above, perceived behavioral control does not signif- several improvement by utilizing other or all types
icantly influence tax noncompliance. Therefore, of taxpayers in orders to get more comprehensive
perceived behavioral control does not significantly result. Moreover, not only exercises the causality,
influence both behavioral intention and tax non but also comparing taxpayer‟s behavior between
compliance. others country. Use this study limitation to im-
Empirically, behavioral intention is significant- prove the future research. The next researcher is
ly influence tax noncompliance. Hence, behavioral expected to be able to explain comprehensively the
intention can be the mediation between tax non- research problem.
compliance and its factor determinant.
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