Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588

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Knowledge-Based Systems
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/knosys

Understanding the game behavior with sentiment and unequal status

in cooperation network✩
∗
Mengmeng Liu, Yinghong Ma , Le Song, Changyu Liu
Business School, Shandong Normal University, Jinan, 250014, China

article info a b s t r a c t

Article history: Cooperation network is one of the structural social relationships naturally formed in the evolution of
Received 18 May 2020 human societies. Previous research has focused on well-mixed structures, and yet most individuals in
Received in revised form 29 October 2020 real interactions have sentiments and unequal status in duration and changing in time. This raises
Accepted 30 October 2020
the question of whether cooperation can persist despite different sentiments and unequal status
Available online 9 November 2020
of individuals. In this paper, sentiments are included the positive and the negative, and unequal
Keywords: statues are the small node and the big node based the node degree. We develop a game model to
Cooperation network study cooperative behaviors based unequal statuses and sentiments, and experimentally examine the
Unequal status model by digital and real networks. Surprisingly, we find that small nodes are more prone to choose
Cooperative behavior positive cooperation relative to comparable big nodes on the promise of enough profits of the tacit
Evolutionary game
knowledge and the excess return. Our results reveal that the unequal status is the hidden mechanism
Reputation score
for cooperative behaviors, and provide a new prospective to investigate the evolution of cooperation
in more realistic environments.
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Cooperative behaviors are widely rooted in many scenarios,
such as enterprises, actors, scholars, as well as animals. Scholars
cooperate to meet their respective needs based on social contacts,
trusts and sharing complementary resources [1], forming cooper-
ation networks in science. The contributions of scientist coopera-
tion are not only the breakthrough in unattainable achievements
but also mutual transition and fusion of the knowledge. The
social and professional collaborate relationships of scientists were
proved to be popular cooperative behaviors [2]. The cooperation
game is an effective tool to uncover the cooperative behaviors of
individuals. The conditions that the emergence and sustainability
of cooperative behaviors can be identified by the generalized clas-
sical game models, such as snow-drift game [3,4], public goods
game [5,6] and prisoner’s dilemma game [7–10]. All those clas-
sical games are the favorite mathematical methods to simulate
social dilemma and identify Nash equilibrium.
In many real scenarios, the statuses of players are different
and asymmetric in their power, wealth, influence and so on,
such as social networks [5,11] and biological systems [12,13]. In
academic cooperation, scholars’ status are often unequal, some
✩ This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China
(No.71471106).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: yhma@sdnu.edu.cn (Y. Ma).
scholars are academic leaders who have honorary titles, enough
financial founds and other resources; while other scholars are
invoices without financial support nor human resource. Hence, it
is reasonable to assume that players have the different abilities
or the influences on their neighbors’ evolving traits [14]. High
prestige’s players are easy to spread their strategies and influence
their neighbors’ strategy choices [15], and the popularity of an
individual also affects the cooperation evolution [16]. Players’
connections and their weights can speed up the co-evolving of
strategies and the network structure [3,7,8,17].
Influence factors and structures of cooperations are two im-
portant aspects for evolutionary games. Influence factors impact
on the strategy choice of the player. The effect of variations of
cost-to-benefit ratios on evolution of cooperative behaviors was
investigated through the novel classical games [3], the three-
player game model [18] and three-strategy game model [19].
The continuous supporting policy for cooperators in donation
game [20] and the increasing players who considered the affec-
tion of strategies and the environment together [21] can improve
cooperation level.
The dynamic rewards, such as award factors and penalties
aimed at accounting for the benefit including innovators in a
group and the cost of unsuccessful insights over time, also in-
fluenced the cooperation level in scientific publications [22,23].
One of the most important structural factors of players is the con-
nection with neighborhood, called the node degree reflecting the
number of resources and cooperators. The power of a player mea-
sured by its degree is to qualify the games between players [24].

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2020.106588
0950-7051/© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
The degrees of knowledge-sharing or knowledge spillover were
measured by the networked evolutionary game [25], and rep-
resented by knowledge graphs [26]. There are also many other
factors affecting the evolution of strategies or partners, such as
the history behaviors of individuals [27] and the related memory
length [28].
In the process of cooperation, some scholars show positive
attitudes, and they pay much resource, costs and energies for
cooperation research. While, some scholars agree to cooperate
but display negative manners: they do not give enough sup-
ports or even provide nothing if the other side do not provide
direct profits or maximize their interests. Such opportunistic
behaviors of negative players like the free riding in the snow-
drift game [3,4]. Those sentiments were analyzed or detected
by semi-supervised learning model [29], and the degree of in-
tensity for sentiments was predicted using stacked ensemble
method [30] for big social data. The positive or negative senti-
ments of scholars might impact the willingness and the process
of cooperations. This raises the question of whether cooperation
can persist despite different sentiments and unequal status of
individuals. However, sentiments of scholars in their cooperation
have attracted little attention in previous researches. As a result,
cooperation sentiments, individuals status and influence factors
including the involved members, the game rules and the social
economic environment are worthy to be investigated.
In this paper, we develop a game model to study cooperative
behaviors based unequal statuses and sentiments. The equilib-
rium points and stable points are analyzed by this model. The
feasibility and efficiency of the model are shown by numerical
simulations and real data analyses. Contributions of this paper in-
clude four aspects: the individual status represented by the node
degrees is defined as the big node or the small node based the
node degree greater than the average degree of network or not;
and game strategies are partied into positive or negative based
cooperation sentiments; unequal status players with asymmetric
payoffs push the game evolving, and small nodes are more prone
to choose positive cooperation relative to comparable big nodes
on the promise of enough profits of the tacit knowledge and the
excess return; the tacit knowledge encourages small nodes to
cooperate with big ones positively. Our results provide a new
prospective to investigate the evolution of cooperation in more
realistic environments.
The rest of this work is arranged as follows: the evolutionary
game model including parameters, the model and evaluating
indexes is presented in Section 2; in Section 3, a theorem for
equilibrium points and the numerical simulations on game model
are analyzed; the experiments on real data of General Relativity
and Quantum Cosmology (GR-QC) are taken in Section 4. The
effects on the evaluating indexes are simulated with GR-QC data;
and in the final Section 5, discussion and conclusion are given.
2. Modeling a novel evolutionary game
In this work, we suppose that scholars work together for
increasing their profits. The cooperation can only arise from a cer-
tain number of scholars. Because of the limited ability or bounded
rationality, it is impossible for scholars to choose the best strategy
each time to get the maximum benefit, but to optimize their
strategies through continuous trials and errors. The evolutionary
game is based on such assumptions.
A network is supposed as an unweighed and undirected graph,
denoted by G = (V , E), where V is the set of nodes, E is the set
of connections or links of nodes i and j cooperating in projects,
and the sizes of V and E are denoted by |V | = n and |E | = m,
respectively. Usually, G is represented by an adjacency matrix
A = (aij ), where aij = 1 if there is a connection between nodes i
2
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
and j; Otherwise aij = 0. The degree of the node i in G is defined
∑
as the ∑number of neighbors of it, denoted by ki , ki = j aij .
2m = i∈V ki since each link is counted two times by its two
connected nodes. In the following, parameters or influence factors
and the evolutionary game model are presented.
2.1. Influence factors
In this model, we define five influence factors: the excess
return R and its distribution coefficient α , the development cost
c, the reputation value f (ki ) of node vi with degree ki and the tacit
knowledge value S.
• Excess return R and its distribution coefficient α . Two
scholars cooperate in a project that would increase profits which
is defined as an excess return R, and two sides of cooperators
share R with the distribution coefficient α and 1 − α respectively,
where α is a human controllable factor by players 0 < α < 1.
The return R, evaluating the benefit for cooperation with others
in scientific research projects or publications, is similar with the
award factor in real world scenarios [22]. The return for the
focal nodes and their neighbors is one of the most important
factors for the dynamics of cooperative behaviors. The rational
selection implied that the higher return had the higher value and
the higher attractiveness [31]. We set α be the proportion of R
allocated to the big degree node, and 1 − α to the small one. The
specific definitions of the big degree node and the small degree
node are introduced in Section 2.2.
• Development cost c, c ≥ 0. The development cost c is
the sum of the cost of development on the scientific project
and the cost of unsuccessful insights over time, including the
penalty introduced in real world scenario of innovation and de-
velopment [22]. For example, the employer’s salary, the cost of
consumable materials and the penalty etc. Here, we assume that
the positive cooperator cost c and the negative cooperator cost
nothing. A natural assumption is max{α R − c , (1 − α )R − c } ≥ 0.
• Tacit knowledge value S, S ≥ 0. The spillover of tacit
knowledge is the process from the experienced scholars to the
novices [25], and concerned about skills, ideas, and experiences
that people have but may not be easily expressed [32]. Some-
times, the diffusion of tacit knowledge is unconsciously through
practice in a particular context of social networks [33]. To some
extent, the knowledge is ‘‘captured" when the knowledge holder
joins a network or a community of practice [34]. Therefore, tacit
knowledge S described as ‘‘know-how" from neighbors [35] is
also a human controllable factor, and 0 ≤ S ≤ 1.
• The reputation score. The reputation value of a scholar
in network changes with the length of his academic research
career. When cooperating with others, this scholar obtains the
corresponding reputation value from his/her collaborators, so as
to increase his/her own profit. The reputation score is defined
in different ways. For example, Zhang and Zhen found the value
of reputation has a saturation effect [15,36], and defined it as a
random real number in the interval [0, 1] or [1, 100] by Zhen and
Wang [36,37]. In this work, we define a reputation value function
corresponding to the degree of nodes, where the function is
ki −20
f (ki ) = (e− 5 + 1)−1 ,
where ki is the degree of node i. And the reputation function of a
node is a non-linear relationship with its degree.
2.2. The novel evolving game model
In this model, we divide players into two parts according to
the node degree and the average degree: one part is the small
degree node (SN) and the other is the big degree one (BN). That
is, we call that two players have unequal statuses. If the degree
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
of a node is less than the average degree, it will be defined as a
SN, and the other is greater than the average, which is called a
BN.
Because BNs have more neighbors than the SNs’, we suppose
that SNs desire to cooperate with BNs based on ‘richer club’
phenomena in cooperation networks. And we also suppose that
players are bounded rationality to choose strategy and pursue
payoff. We define two strategies based on the sentiments of
players: positive cooperation (PC ) and negative cooperation (NC ),
where PC means that the player cooperates with others and is
willing provide human resources, financial supports, technical
instructions and tacit knowledge in the process of cooperation,
while the NC player does not afford enough supports even non
support. A natural assumption is the cost of PC is greater than
the NC and the cost of NC is zero.
If both of SN and BN take the PC strategy, BN gets α proportion
of the excess return R minus the development cost c, and SN gets
the remaining. Each player gets the reputation score from the PC
player. In this case, SN get tacit knowledge value S from BN. If
they both take NC , they get nothing. One player takes PC and the
other takes NC , then NC node gets the reputation score from the
PC node. If BN takes NC and SN takes PC , the SN still gets part
of the tacit knowledge, and suppose S /2. While BN takes PC and
SN takes NC , then the negative SN do not care or learn the tacit
knowledge from BN, tacit knowledge of the SN is 0. Based on the
above analysis, Table 1 can be obtained.
2.3. Rules for the model
Evolution rules greatly influence cooperative behaviors in
games. Fermi evolutionary rule coming from Fermi–Dirac dis-
tribution function in statistical physics [38,39] can be adopted
for implementing the strategy revision phase in which players
randomly chose one of their neighbors to compare their payoffs
and decide to learn neighbors’ strategies or not. The rules for the
player to update his strategies are based on payoffs and strategies
converging to an evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium [40,41].
Suppose that two players with unequal status take the strategy
PC with probability x and y respectively, and we denote the
expected revenues of node i at time t by POi , then
∑ time length t ≤ T ; calculate the degree of each node for the initial
POi∈BN = xy(α (R − c) + f (kj )) + x(1 − y)(α R − c)
j∈SN (1)
+ (1 − x)y(α R + f (kj )),
or
∑
POi∈SN = xy((1 − α )(R − c) + f (kj ) + S)
j∈BN
(2)
+ x(1 − y)((1 − α )R + S /2 − c)
+ (1 − x)y((1 − α )R + f (kj )).
We also denote the probability of player i positively cooper-
ating to one of his neighbor by xi (t) at time t. Hence, at time
t + 1, the strategy of player i is evolved by observing and learning
the strategy of its neighbor j, and then updating its strategy with
probability xi (t + 1),
xi (t + 1) = xi (t)(1 − p(si ← sj )) + xj (t)p(si ← sj ), (3)
where p(si ← sj ) is the transition probability with Fermi rule,
1 Proof. Suppose that the probabilities of the BN i and SN j taking
p(si ← sj ) = , (4)
1 + exp( λ1 (fiti − fitj ))
where si ∈ {PC , NC } is the strategy of node i adopting, and fiti =
β POi + (1 −β ) PO i
. fiti is the combination of the accumulated payoff
k i
and the averaged payoff of node i, presented in Ref. [42]. We call
β is the mixed degree of fiti , 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. When β → 0 means fiti
3
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
determined by the averaged payoff of node i, while β → 1, fiti
depends on the accumulated payoff of node i. In this work, we
set β = 0.01 which means fiti heavily depends on the averaged
payoff of node i. Some other simulation results comparing with
different β are added in Appendix C.
Eqs. (3) and (4) are the evolutionary rule of players, where λ
is the irrationality of a player to adapt strategy based his payoff
and his neighbors’. λ → 0 means that players are rational,
whatever fiti ≥ fitj or not, the node i will choose a strategy that
is conducive to increasing its own payoff. While on the contrary
case is λ → ∞, the player i will update the strategy randomly
regardless of the earnings of player i nor its neighbors, and the
player is irrational. In this work, the scenario is the cooperation
between scholars who had long term education which indicated
they are more rational to make strategy decision. So set λ =
0.1 to describe the players are limited rational [43]. Some other
irrational values are also compared with λ = 0.1 in Appendix D.
2.4. Evaluating metrics
There are three indexes chosen to measure the cooperation
level: the average probability p̄ of all nodes positive cooperation,
the average payoff Ū of the network, and the proportion g of the
player and its neighbors who are all positive cooperators.
∑
xi (t)
p̄ = lim i∈V
, (5)
t →+∞ n
∑
POi (t)
Ū = lim i∈V
, (6)
t →+∞ 2m
1 ∑
g = 1(xi > 0.5, xj > 0.5, aij = 1), (7)
m
1≤i<j≤n
where 1(xi > 0.5, xj > 0.5, aij = 1) is the counts of the number
of aij = 1 when xi > 0.5 and xj > 0.5 holds for nodes i and j.
For a given adjacent matrix A of the scientific network, the
evolutionary game on scientific cooperation networks is evolving
according Eqs. (3) to (7) by the following steps: set the evolving
time t = 0; set xi (0) to each node randomly and then compute p̄,
Ū and g by Eqs. (5)–(7); then update xi (t + 1) by xi (t), t = 0, 1, . . ..
3. Theoretical analysis on the model
In this section, the theory analysis of the model on stable
points, and the numerical simulations of the trends of stable
points under different conditions are discussed.
3.1. Theory and the proof
Theorem (BN vs. SN Game). In the game model of SN vs. BN as
shown in Table 1. There are five equilibrium points: (0, 0), (1, 0), (0,
(1−α )R+S /2−c
1), (1, 1) and (x∗ , y∗ ), where x∗ = (1−α )R−α c −S /2 , y∗ = α R−α R(1−−α
c
)c
.
If S < (1 − α )c, the evolutionary stable point is (0, 1) or (1, 0),
(x∗ , y∗ ) is the saddle point, (0, 0) and (1, 1) are not stable points; If
S ≥ (1 − α )c, the only possible evolutionary stable point is (0, 1) if
L has.
positive cooperation with others are x and y respectively when
SN and BN are playing game. Then the expected payoffs of the
i i
BN i taking strategies PC or NC are Ebp or Ebn , respectively. They
are,
i
Ebp = y(α (R − c) + f (kj )) + (1 − y)(α R − c), and Ebn
i
= y(α R + f (kj )).
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al. Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588

Table 1
The payoff matrix of SN and BN with two strategies.
SN(j)
PC NC
BN PC α (R − c) + f (kj ), (1 − α )(R − c) + f (ki ) + S α R − c , (1 − α )R + f (ki )
(i) NC α R + f (kj ), (1 − α )R + S /2 − c 0,0

dξ (y) dξ (y)
Hence the mean payoff of the BN i is |
dy y=0
> 0 and dy y=1
| < 0. Then y = 1 is the evolutionary
stable point of SN.
Ebi = i
xEbp + (1 − i
x)Ebn . The evolving traces of the player to his stable points are
By Malthusian replication dynamic equation [44], the growth illustrated by the phrase diagrams, shown in Fig. 1. Set the point
probability of a BN i taking positive cooperation strategy is pro- (x, y) be any point in region [0, 1]×[0, 1]. The four corners of this
portional to x and Ebpi
− Ebi . Therefore, the replication dynamic region and (x∗ , y∗ ) are equilibriums. Fig. 1(a) shows that if y < y∗ ,
equation of BN i interacting with SN j is, x will evolve to 1; if y > y∗ , x will evolve to 0. The evolving trends
of y is shown in Fig. 1(b). The dynamic process of SN vs. BN game
ω(x) = x(Ebp
i
− Ebi ) = x(1 − x)(((1 − α )c − α R)y + α R − c). could be described by Fig. 1(c) and (x∗ , y∗ ) falls in the square area
of [0, 1] × [0, 1]. If the initial is in part I, the system will converge
Similarly, the expected payoffs of SN j taking strategies of PC
to the stable point (0, 1); if the initial state is in part II, the system
or NC respectively are
will first evolve to (x∗ , y∗ ), then turn to (0, 1) or (1, 0); if the initial
j
Esp = x((1 − α )(R − c) + f (ki ) + S) state is in part III, the system will first evolve to (x∗ , y∗ ), then turn
to (0, 1) or (1, 0). If the initial state is in the part IV, the system
+ (1 − x)((1 − α )R − c + S /2), and
will converge to the stable point (1, 0). In the phase perspective,
j
Esn = x((1 − α )R + f (ki )). the evolutionary stable point is (0, 1) or (1, 0), and (x∗ , y∗ ) is not
Then the mean payoff of the SN j is stable point.
Case 2.2. (1 − α )R + S /2 − c < 0 in Table 1. The discuss is
Esj = yEsp
j j
+ (1 − y)Esn . similar as Case 2.1.
Case 2.2.1. (1 − α )R + S /2 − c < (1 − α )R − α c − S /2, then
And therefore, the replication dynamic equation of the SN j
((1 − α )R + S /2 − c − ((1 − α )R − α c − S /2)x) < 0 holds. Hence,
interacting with BN i is dξ (y)
| > 0, dξdy(y) |y=0 < 0. So y = 0 is an evolutionary stable point
dy y=1
ξ (y) = y(Esp
j
− Esj ) of SN.
Case 2.2.2. If (1 − α )R + S /2 − c > (1 − α )R − α c − S /2. If
= y(1 − y)((α c + S /2 − (1 − α )R)x + (1 − α )R + S /2 − c). (1−α )R+S /2−c dξ (y) dξ (y)
x > (1−α )R−α c −S /2 , then dy |y=0 > 0 and dy |y=1 < 0. Then y = 1
By the above analysis, the two-dimensional dynamic system L is an evolutionary stable point of SN;
(1−α )R+S /2−c dξ (y) dξ (y)
formed by j ∈ SN and i ∈ BN is If x < (1−α )R−α c −S /2 , Then dy |y=0 < 0 and dy |y=1 > 0. Then
y = 0 is the evolutionary stable point of SN. In this circumstance,
⎨ω(x) = x(1 − x)(((1 − α )c − α R)y + α R − c),
⎧
there is no evolutionary point, because x > x∗ , y → 1, x < x∗ ,
L : ξ (y) = y(1 − y)((α c + S /2 − (1 − α )R)x (8) y → 0, and y > y∗ , x → 0, y < y∗ , x → 1, the trend of (x, y)
+ (1 − α )R + S /2 − c). rotates around (x∗ , y∗ ).
⎩
The evolving traces of the player to his stable points are
Let (x, y) be the variable of L. Then the local equilibrium points
illustrated by the phrase diagrams, shown in Fig. 2. Set the point
of L are (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1) and (x∗ , y∗ ), where x∗ =
(1−α )R+S /2−c (x, y) be any point in region [0, 1] × [0, 1]. The four corners of
, y∗ = α R−α R(1−−α
c
. We discuss the stable points by the
(1−α )R−α c −S /2 )c this region and (x∗ , y∗ ) are equilibriums. Fig. 2(a) shows that if
two equations of the system L:
dω(x) y < y∗ , x will evolve to 1; if y > y∗ , x will evolve to 0. The
Case 1. By the partial equation of dx = (1 − 2x)(α R − c −
evolving trends of y is shown in Fig. 2(b). The dynamic process
(α R − (1 − α )c)y) in the system L, it is found that:
dω(x) dω(x) of SN vs BN game could be described by Fig. 2(c) and (x∗ , y∗ ) falls
if y > α R−α R(1−−α
c
, dx |x=0 < 0 and dx |x=1 > 0, then x = 0 is an
)c in the square area of [0, 1]×[0, 1]. From Fig. 2(c), we can see that
α R−c dω(x)
evolutionary stable point of BN; and if y < α R−(1−α )c
, dx |x=0 > 0 there is no evolutionary stable point. By the above analysis, the
dω(x)
and | < 0, then x = 1 is an evolutionary stable point of BN.
dx x=1
theorem holds. □
dξ (y)
Case 2. By the partial equation of dy = (1 − 2y)((1 − α )R +
S /2 − c − ((1 − α )R − α c − S /2)x) in the system L and the payoff 3.2. Numerical simulations of influence factors on stale points
matrix, there are two subcases based the signs of (1 −α )R + S /2 − c
and (1 − α )R − α c − S /2: Whatever the evolutionary game models about the dynamic
mechanism of cooperative behaviors in evolving, the numeri-
Case 2.1. (1 − α )R + S /2 − c > 0 in Table 1. Then, we discuss
cal simulation, Monte Carlo simulation and replication dynamic
the sign of (1 − α )R − α c − S /2:
equation were used to analyze the stability and present op-
Case 2.1.1. If (1 −α )R −α c − S /2 < 0, then (1 −α )R + S /2 − c >
timal strategies [23,39,45,46]. Numerical simulation is one of
(1 − α )R − α c − S /2 and ((1 − α )R + S /2 − c − ((1 − α )R − α c −
dξ (y) dξ (y) the computational methods to implement numerical calculating
S /2)x) > 0 hold. Hence dy |y=1 < 0, dy |y=0 > 0. So y = 1 is an
using any structural individuals; Monte Carlo (MC) simulations
evolutionary stable point of SN.
is a numerical simulation method, which can be adopted for
Case 2.1.2. And If (1−α )R−α c −S /2 > 0, and if (1−α )R+S /2−
dξ (y) dξ (y) computing the interesting quantities. The underlying idea of MC
c > (1 − α )R − α c − S /2 holds. Hence dy |y=1 < 0, dy |y=0 > 0.
is to generate configuration subset from the whole phase space
So y = 1 is also an evolutionary stable point of SN. that are representative for the entire ensemble; and we use
Case 2.1.3. If (1 − α )R − α c − S /2 > 0 and (1 − α )R + S /2 − c < replication dynamics to analysis the system by the equivalence
(1 − α )R − α c − S /2. of payoff and fitness, the relation between the individual payoff
(1−α )R+S /2−c dξ (y) dξ (y)
If x > (1−α )R−α c −S /2 , dy |y=0 < 0 and dy |y=1 > 0. Then and its strategy. In this work, we use replication dynamics and
(1−α )R+S /2−c
y = 0 is an evolutionary stable point of SN; if x < (1−α )R−α c −S /2
, numerical simulations to simulate the two-dimensional dynamic
4
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Fig. 1. The phase diagrams of players evolving of the model Table 1 of Case 2.1.
Fig. 2. The phase diagrams of players evolving of the model Table 1 of Case 2.2.
system L of Eq. (8), and for the method of MC, we use it as a
complementary approach and appendix the analysis by Figs. 16
in Appendix B.
To verify the feasibility of the model in Table 1 and the influ-
ences of parameters, we fix three of four parameters to discuss
the dynamic trends of (x, y) to stable points in the system L,
and arrows show the trace of (x, y). Figs. 3–6 show influences
of parameters S and α , and all results are iterated by 50 times
independently.
3.2.1. The dynamic impact of S
We suppose that S is flowing from the big degree node to the
SN. In order to detect the effect of S, let S be a variable. According
to the theorem of BN vs. SN, we discussed two cases: S < (1 −α )c
and S ≥ (1 − α )c. We set α = 0.5, c = 0.4, R = 1 for system L,
and the evolutionary processes of L in the two cases are shown
in Figs. 3 and 4 respectively. Where the horizontal axis x and the
vertical axis y represent the probabilities of the BN and the SN
taking positive cooperation strategy, respectively.
Fig. 3 shows the results when S < (1 −α )c. The S varies from 0
to 0.16. In Fig. 3(a), the initial state is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.1, 0.1). When
S = 0, the values of x and y are slowly increasing, it means that all
nodes prefer to improve their probability of positive cooperation.
The (x, y) will evolve to (0, 1) when S takes other values. In
Fig. 3(b), the initial state is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.1, 0.95). When S varies
from 0 to 0.16, the (x, y) will evolve to (0, 1). In Fig. 3(d), the
initial state is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.95, 0.95). When S = 0, the values
of x and y are slowly decreasing, which means that all nodes
prefer to reduce their probability of positive cooperation. When
S takes other values, the (x, y) will also evolve to (0, 1). So when
the initial state is at (0.1, 0.1), (0.1, 0.95), (0.95, 0.95), the (x, y)
5
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
could evolve to stable point (0, 1)(shown in Figs. 3(a), 3(b) and
3(d)). The SN likes to positive cooperation, while the BN likes
to negative cooperation. When S = 0 in Figs. 3(a) and 3(d), the
evolution tends to the saddle point (x∗ , y∗ ). While the initial state
is at (0.95, 0.1), the evolutionary stable point is (1, 0) shown in
Fig. 3(c). If the BN has high probability to positive cooperation
and the SN has low at initial, then the system will evolve to (1,
0). The BN will hold high probability to positive cooperation, and
the SN decreases their probability to 0. We can see that (0, 1) or
(1, 0) is the evolutionary stable point when S < (1 − α )c and
(x∗ , y∗ ) = (1/3, 1/3) is the saddle point, which are completely
consistent with the theorem of BN vs. SN. Fig. 4 shows the results
when S ≥ (1 − α )c. In Fig. 4(a), the initial state is (x0 , y0 ) =
(0.1, 0.1). When S varies, the curves have little difference. These
curves tend to (0, 1), which means the SN is prone to positively
cooperate, and the BN is tend to negatively cooperate. Letting the
initial state be (x0 , y0 ) = (0.1, 0.95) as shown in Fig. 4(b), the
curves are all tend to (0, 1) after 50 times whatever S changes.
In this case, the SN prefers to positively cooperate, and the BN is
averse to cooperation with the SN.
In Fig. 4(c), the initial state is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.95, 0.1) and the
curves evolve to stable point (0, 1). When S = 0.4, S = 0.6,
S = 0.8, and S = 1, y increases rapidly with little various of
x, and converges to 1 before x decreases to 0.8, which means
that the SN tends early to positively cooperate with BN once the
BN shows their positive cooperation willing. There is a special
dω(x)
case, when S = 0.2, α = 0.5, R = 1, c = 0.4, then dx =
(1 − 2x)(α R − c − (α R − (1 − α )c)y) = (1 − 2x)(0.1 − 0.3y),
dξ (y)
dy
= (1 − 2y)((1 − α )R + S /2 − c − ((1 − α )R − α c − S /2)x) =
(1 − 2y)(0.2 − 0.2x). And the initial state is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.95, 0.1),
dω(x)
y0 = 0.1 < 0.1/0.3, based on dx < 0, then x → 1. But
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Fig. 3. Simulations on (x, y) in system L, where S is a varying and S < (1 − α )c. The solid point is the values of an equilibrium point (x∗ , y∗ ) in the region of
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. For example, when S = 0, (x∗ , y∗ ) = (1/3, 1/3).
Fig. 4. Simulations on (x, y) in system L, where S is a variable and S ≥ (1 − α )c. The solid point is the values of an equilibrium point (x∗ , y∗ ) in the region of
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. For example, when S = 0.2, (x∗ , y∗ ) = (1, 1/3); when S = 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, the values of (x∗ , y∗ ) are exceed the region 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ y ≤ 1.
dξ (y)
when x reaches 1, dy = 0, then at this time, it is impossible to
judge whether y should go in the direction of 0 or 1, so it remains
stationary at (1, 0.1). But (1, 0.1) is not an equilibrium point, so
it is not an evolutionary stable point. Letting the initial state be
(x0 , y0 ) = (0.95, 0.95) as shown in Fig. 4(d), the curves are all
tend to (0, 1) after 50 times when S varies from 0.2 to 1. Based
on the above analysis, when S ≥ (1 − α )c, if the system L has
evolutionary stable point the stable point of evolution is (0, 1),
which is completely consistent with the theorem of BN vs. SN.
By Figs. 3 and 4, if S < (1 − α )c, (0, 1) or (1, 0) is the evo-
lutionary stable point and there is a saddle point (x∗ , y∗ ). When
S ≥ (1 − α )c, the SN will take the positive cooperation strategy.
Even if the SN can only obtain a small value of tacit knowledge
spillover, the SN is willing to chose positive cooperation strategy
whatever strategy the BN adopts. And when S ≥ (1 − α )c, the
evolutionary stability strategy of (x, y) is (0, 1) no matter what the
initial probability is. In summary, the simulation results for the
two cases of S are completely consistent with the theorem of BN
vs. SN. More simulations are shown in Figs. 11, 12 in Appendix A.
3.2.2. The dynamic impact of α
We detect the impact of the distribution coefficient α on the
stable evolutionary points. Figs. 5 and 6 show the evolutionary
process of L when α varies.
Then we set S = 0, R = 1, c = 0.4. By Fig. 5, we can see that
(0, 1) or (1, 0) is the evolutionary stable point when S < (1 − α )c.
In Fig. 5(a), the initial state is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.1, 0.1). When α is
small, such as α = 0.01, α = 0.2, α = 0.4, the BN does not
like positive cooperation, while the SN likes positive cooperation,
and (x, y) tends to (0, 1). On the contrary, when α is big, such
as α = 0.6, 0.8, 0.99, (x, y) tends to (1, 0), and the BN takes
positive cooperation, but the SN takes negative cooperation. A
special case is α = 0.6 in Fig. 5(b), and when S = 0, R = 1,
dω(x)
c = 0.4, then dx = (1 − 2x)(α R − c − (α R − (1 − α )c)y) =
dξ (y)
(1 − 2x)(0.2 − 0.44y), dy = (1 − 2y)((1 − α )R + S /2 − c −
((1 − α )R − α c − S /2)x) = (1 − 2y)(−0.16x). The initial state
is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.1, 0.95), y0 = 0.95 > 0.2/0.44, then x → 0
6
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
dω(x) dξ (y)
based on dx < 0. But when x reaches 0, dy = 0, then at
this time, it is impossible to judge whether y should go in the
direction of 0 or 1, so it remains stationary at (0, 0.95). But (0,
0.95) is not an equilibrium point, so it is not an evolutionary
stable point. In Fig. 5(c) there also has a special case α = 0.4, then
dω(x)
dx
= (1 − 2x)(α R − c − (α R − (1 − α )c)y) = (1 − 2x)(−0.16y),
dξ (y)
= (1 − 2y)((1 − α )R + S /2 − c − ((1 − α )R − α c − S /2)x) =
dy
(1 − 2y)(0.2 − 0.44x). And the initial state is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.95, 0.1),
dξ (y)
x0 = 0.95 > 0.2/0.44, based on dy < 0, then y → 0. But
dω(x)
when y reaches 0, dx = 0, then at this time, it is impossible to
judge whether x should go in the direction of 0 or 1, so it remains
stationary at (0.95, 0). In the same way, it is not an evolutionary
stable point. If there is a stable point, Figs. 5(b)–5(d) show that
the evolutionary stable point is (0, 1) when α is small; otherwise,
the evolutionary stable point is (1, 0) if α is big enough. The
simulation results are consistent with the theorem of BN vs. SN.
Then we consider the circumstance of S > (1 − α )c. Let α be
various from 1 − S /c to 1, and S = 0.4, c = 0.4, R = 1. The
setting of these parameters ensures that the tacit knowledge can
spillover from the BN to SN.
In Fig. 6(a), the initial state is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.1, 0.1). When α is
increasing from 0.01, α = 0.2 to α = 0.4, y rapidly increases to
1, while x is less than 0.1. When α = 0.8 and α = 0.99, x rapidly
increases to 1 and then decreases rapidly after y increasing to 0.8.
This means the BN firstly positively cooperates due to the high
proportion of excess return, but tends to negatively cooperate
after many rounds of games. In Fig. 6(b), (x0 , y0 ) = (0.1, 0.95),
five of six curves of different α tending to (0, 1) that is not much
different from the initial state. Only the curve of α = 0.99 has
a similar trace as Fig. 6(a). When SN’s cooperation intention is
high, BN’s intention will decrease, and when SN’s cooperation
intention is low, BN’s intention will increase. When SN’s coop-
eration intention is between [0.2, 0.9], BN will keep unchanged.
This shows that the changes of the cooperation intention of BN
and SN are not only affected by the ratio of profit distribution,
but also by the cooperation intention of opponent. Therefore,
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al. Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588

Fig. 5. Simulations on (x, y) in system L, where S = 0, R = 1, c = 0.4 and S < (1 − α )c, α is a variable.

Fig. 6. Simulations on (x, y) in system L, where S = 0.4, R = 1, c = 0.4, α is a variable and S > (1 − α )c. The solid points are the values of the equilibrium point
(x∗ , y∗ ) in the region of 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 with α varying. For example, α = 0.99, (x∗ , y∗ ) = (95/288, 295/493).

Fig. 7. Variations of p̄, Ū and g with S varying, where α = 0.5, R = 1 and c = 0.4. The trends of the three panels coincide. They are all increasing with the increase
of S. p̄ and Ū are always greater than zeros. While the ratio of the player and its neighbors all positive cooperation is going to less than 0.1 rapidly when S = 0,
which means the proportion of players who are willing to positively cooperate with their neighbors (whose positive cooperation probability is greater than 0.5) will
tend to less than 0.1 in the absence of tacit knowledge.

Fig. 8. The evaluations of the average probability of positive cooperation on GR-QC, where S is a variable, and α = 0.5, R = 1, c = 0.4. The horizontal axis in Panels
(a) and (b) are degrees and reputations respectively. The curves of average probabilities in two panels are clearly distinct and steady when the degrees are less than
9 or the reputations are less than 0.08 respectively. While, the curves are decreasing and mixing with the value decreasing of S. And finally, they tend to steady
when the degrees are more than 40. And the reputation of the node is defined in Section 2.1.

based on the changing trend of α = 0.99 in Figs. 6(a) and 6(b),
system L dynamically maintains the cooperation ratio of BN and
SN. In Fig. 6(c), the initial state is (x0 , y0 ) = (0.95, 0.1). In the
three cases of α = 0.4, α = 0.6, α = 0.8, the speed of y
7
increasing to 1 is faster than the two cases of α = 0.01 and
0.2. When BN has higher proportions excess return and higher
positive cooperation probability, then so does the payoff of BN.
Hence the SN would follow the strategy of BN, increasing the
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al. Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588

Fig. 9. The values of p̄, Ū and g are varying with α , where R = 1, S = 0.4 and c = 0.4. The results are the average of 4000 iterations.

Fig. 10. The evolutions of the average probability of positive cooperation on the degree and the reputation score of GR-QC respectively when α is a variable, and
S = 0.4, R = 1, c = 0.4. The curves in two panels are distinct when the degrees are less than 9 or the reputations are less than 0.08 respectively, where the
reputation score of the node is defined in Table 2.

Fig. 11. α = 0.8, R = 1, c = 0.4 and S is a variable. In the case of S < (1 − α )c, the distribution of excess return to big degree nodes is high, and the cost is lower
than excess return. In the case of S < (1 − α )c, (x, y) tends to (1, 0). The small degree nodes do not want to positively cooperate with big degree nodes, and the big
degree nodes take contrary strategy.

Fig. 12. α = 0.8, R = 1, c = 0.4 and S > (1 − α )c. S is a variable. The small degree nodes are more prefer to positively cooperate with big degree nodes.

cooperation probability with times. With time evolving, the BN
found that even its positive cooperation probability is decreasing,
and it also get a higher payoff. Then BN decreases its positive
cooperation probability until to 0. In Fig. 6(d), the initial state is
(x0 , y0 ) = (0.95, 0.95). When α = 0.01, the values of x and y
8
are higher than 0.9 after many generations. But when α = 0.2,
α = 0.4, α = 0.6, α = 0.8, values of x decline to 0 after about
50 generations, which might show that the BN does not like to
positively cooperate with SN.
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al. Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588

Fig. 13. S is a variable, α = 0.5, R = 1, c = 0.1. (a)–(d) are the case of S < (1 − α )c, and (e)–(h) are the case of S > (1 − α )c. SNs are more prefer to positively
cooperate with BNs when S > (1 − α )c in panels (e)–(h), (x, y) tends to (0, 1).

Fig. 14. S is a variable, α = 0.5, R = 0.85, c = 0.4. (a)–(d) are the case of S < (1 − α )c, and (e)–(h) are the case of S > (1 − α )c, respectively. Results in panels
(a)–(d) are similar to Fig. 3, where the solid points are the values of an equilibrium point (x∗ , y∗ ) in the region of 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. For example, when
S = 0, (x∗ , y∗ ) = (1/9, 1/9). Results in panels (e)–(h) are very similar to the results in Fig. 4.

Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) imply that the best strategy is not (0, 1)
when α = 0.8, while the best strategy is (0, 1) in Figs. 6(c) and
6(d). So there is not evolutionary stable point when α = 0.8. Fig. 6
shows that (x, y) rotates around (x∗ , y∗ ) = (95/288, 295/493)
when α = 0.99. Hence, there is no evolutionary stable point.
Therefore, when S ≥ (1 − α )c, (0, 1) is the only evolutionary
stable point if system L has. By the analysis on Fig. 6, it is found
that SN is more willing to positively cooperate than BN. It is also
shown that under certain circumstances the BN is more prone
to positively cooperate when the proportion of excess return α
for BN is high enough. The simulation results are consistent with
the conclusion in the theorem of BN vs. SN. More comparative
9
simulation results about the theorem of BN vs. SN are presented
in Figs. 11–15 in Appendix A.
To sum up, when S < (1 − α )c, (1, 0) or (0, 1) is the
evolutionary stable point, neither (0, 0) nor (1, 1) is stable point;
when S ≥ (1 − α )c, (0, 1) is the unique evolutionary stable point
if system L has. So the simulation results are consistent with the
theorem of BN vs. SN.
4. Experiments on real cooperation networks
In order to study the condition of a node having the highest
probability of positive cooperation, the best profits and the most
neighbors with positive cooperation, we experiment the influence
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Fig. 15. α is a variable. Panels (a)–(h) and (i)–(p) show the results in cases of S < (1 −α )c and S > (1 −α )c respectively. (a)–(d) S = 0, R = 1, c = 0.1, (x, y) evolves to
(0, 1) or (1, 0); (e)–(h) S = 0, R = 0.9, c = 0.4, (x, y) evolves to (0, 1) or (1, 0); (i)–(l) S = 0.4, R = 1, c = 0.1, (x, y) evolves to (0, 1); (m)–(p) S = 0.4, R = 0.9, c = 0.4,
(x, y) displays similar to Fig. 6.
factors by metrics p̄, Ū and g on behalf of the real data GR-QC. In
addition, we also explore the influence of the unequal position
caused by the network structure on the positive cooperation
probability of nodes.
4.1. Data
The data taken from SNAP(Stanford Network Analysis Project)
is a collaboration relationship between scholars of papers pub-
lished in the discipline of General Relativity and Quantum Cos-
mology (GR-QC) [47]. Authors and relations are presented by
nodes and links in GR-QC network respectively. Deleting nodes
with only one neighbor and the link. Finally, |V | = 2434 and
|E | = 10939 of GR-QC.
According to the average degree of nodes of GR-QC 8.9885 in
Table 2, scholars are parted into two parts: the BN is the node
10
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
set whose degrees are greater than 8, and the remaining is the
SN set. There are 1724 small degree nodes, more than 70% of
the total nodes is lower than the average, and not enough to 30%
nodes, 710 big degree nodes whose degrees are bigger than the
average. In Table 2, the small node set is taken into V1 , and V2
to V8 are the big nodes, where V 2 ∪ V 3 is the most portion of
the BN. That is to say, most of the degree of BN is between 9
and 30. The simulation of reputation function is shown in Table 2.
When the node degree is smaller than 9, the reputation score is
very small, and f (ki ) increases with the growth of node’s degree.
Especially, the trend is very significant with the degree increasing
rapidly in the interval from 10 to 30. While the degree is higher
than 40, the increasing trend is to steady. When the degree of
the node reaches 40, it means that the scholar has reached the
academic peak position, and has a high academic influence, so his
reputation score is high. But when the node’s cooperated authors
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Table 2
The degrees with their intervals, and the simulation of reputation function f (ki ).
Fig. 16. Simulations on the system L by MC method. Panels (a) S = 0.02, α =
0.5, c = 0.4, R = 1 and (b) S = 0.6, α = 0.5, c = 0.4, R = 1, (0, 1) or (1, 0)
is the evolutionary stable strategy profile when S < (1 − α )c, and so does (0,
1) when S > (1 − α )c; By panels (c) S = 0, α = 0.2, c = 0.4, R = 1 and (d)
S = 0, α = 0.8, c = 0.4, R = 1, (0, 1) or (1, 0) is the evolutionary stable strategy
set when S < (1 − α )c; In Panel (e) S = 0.4, α = 0.2, c = 0.4, R = 1 and (f)
S = 0.4, α = 0.6, c = 0.4, R = 1, (0, 1) is the evolutionary stable point when
S > (1 − α )c.
reached a threshold, its reputation influence would also reach a
threshold.
4.2. Impacts of S and the node degree on the metric
It is believed that BNs in cooperation network are eminent
scholars who have their own research fields. When authors
11
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
cooperate, there will have tacit knowledge spillover from BN
to SN. So SNs prefer to cooperate with BNs because the tacit
knowledge would enhance their research ability. In this means,
the behavior of nodes will display different phenomena when the
tacit knowledge S is varying in Table 1.
Fig. 7 shows the influence of S, values of p̄, Ū and g are all
increasing with S increasing. When S = 0, the average positive
cooperation probability p̄ closes to 0.35 after 400 times evolving
whatever the degrees of nodes. This phenomenon can also be
proved in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b). It is because the absent of tacit
knowledge value does not appeal small degree node to positively
cooperate, and the BN has no much interest in positive cooper-
ating with the SN. With S increasing from 0 to 0.6, p̄ is growing
higher than 0.7, and g increases to oscillated around 0.7. When
S reaches 1, Ū reaches the highest value followed by the p̄ can
reach 0.75 and g can reach 0.72. The effects of S on p̄ and g have
little difference when S increases from 0.6 to 1.
To further discuss the consistency of effect on the average
probability of positive cooperation, we have listed Figs. 8(a) and
8(b) to show the influence of structures. Fig. 8(a) shows that with
the growth of S, the average positive cooperation probability is
growing too when the degrees of nodes are not greater than 30.
While the curves of average positive cooperation probability are
disorder when the degrees are greater than 30. But for the same
S, the average probability of positive cooperations of SN is overall
higher than BN, and so does the reputations. It means that when
there has more tacit knowledge or possibility of fast growth, SNs
display more willingness to cooperate. While BNs have no obvious
intention of cooperation since the reputations of the BNs are high
and they have many more resources and followers. From the third
column in Table 2, the sum of the node’s degree, it is found that
BNs have more neighbors than SNs. The number of BNs is small
but the number of their neighbors is large. That causes to BNs
not prefer to cooperate with SNs. However, with S increasing,
the probabilities of nodes to positive cooperation show overall
upward trends.
4.3. Impacts of α and the node degree on the metric
The two sides of the BN vs. SN model in Table 1 have many
disparities in resources or reputations, so the proportion of the
return of two sides might unequal during the SN plays game
with BN. How to determine the proportion of payoffs is another
important problem. Hence, it needs to detect which side depends
on the proportion.
The influence of the proportion α on p̄, Ū and g are shown
in Fig. 9. In Fig. 9(a), the average probability p̄ is increasing
with α increasing. In Section 2.2, we made a basic assumption
about this model: positive cooperation is to increase the profits
of collaborators. According to this basic assumption and Fig. 9(b),
the average payoff Ū shows that choosing α = 0.99 can maximize
the network’s payoff. And, according to Fig. 9(c), it is found that
the proportion g of two connected nodes all positive cooperation
at α = 0.99 is large. What is more, when α = 0.8 is selected, the
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Fig. 17. Simulation under β = 0.1 in Fermi rule in Eq. (4). Results on p̄, Ū, g with S or α varying respectively are much similar with Figs. 7 to 10.
average payoff Ū of the system is almost the same as that of α =
0.99, and the largest of g can also be obtained. Comprehensive
consideration, when α = 0.99, almost all of the return is allocated
to BN. When α = 0.8, 20% of the return can be allocated to SN.
So α = 0.8 is a reasonable profile which can not only achieve
a high level of system’s payoff, but also ensure BN and SN both
have considerable return. That is, when the distribution ratio of
BN to excess return reaches 80%, the system partners can achieve
a reasonable income level.
Fig. 10(a) shows the evolution that the average probability
of the nodes with different degrees positively cooperate with
others based on the different proportion of excess return. When
α = 0.01, the average probability of SN is higher than 0.9, but the
12
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
probability of BN tends to 0. Because the excess return R assigning
to BN is too low, then BN does not willing to positively cooper-
ate. And BNs have many small degree neighbors with positively
cooperation willing, so the BNs get high network payoff by free-
riding. The average probabilities of SNs in Figs. 10(a) and 10(b)
show decline trends when α increasing from 0.01 to 0.99, while
the average probabilities of BNs, especially in set V 2∪V 3 shown in
Table 2, display increasing trends totally. By Figs. 10(a) and 10(b),
the average probabilities of nodes with small reputations or the
SNs are higher than 0.5 and overall higher than the BNs′ , which
means that the SNs and the low score reputation nodes are willing
to positively cooperate whatever the proportion distributed to
them.
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Fig. 18. Simulation under β = 0.5 in Fermi rule in Eq. (4). Results on p̄, Ū, g with S or α varying respectively are much similar with Figs. 7 to 10.
5. Discussion and conclusion
The theoretical significance of this work is to investigate the
evolutionary game based on the unequal status players. This
evolutionary game model provides an effective tool to understand
the cooperative behaviors between two unequal status players.
The controllable influence factors on cooperative behaviors are
also analyzed, such as the distribution of excess return and tacit
knowledge. The positive or negative sentiments are behind in
cooperative behaviors which should be recognized correctly. In
literatures [48] and [49], cooperation intention recognition was
presented which promoted the emergence of cooperation. On the
basis of previous studies, we set up nodes to identify their neigh-
bors’ cooperative intentions. We use the confidence level [49]
which defines the confidence level of participants to correctly
predict the intention of partners. If it is greater than a given
threshold ρ , he/she will positively cooperate if the intention of
13
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
the partner is identified as positive cooperation in the current
interaction; otherwise, he/she takes negative cooperation. Given
a threshold ρ , values of p̄ or Ū or g show similar trends when S
or α is varying. The average probabilities of positive cooperation
are relatively higher when ρ is bigger. More simulation results on
the cooperation intention recognition for a given threshold ρ are
shown in Figs. 22 of Appendix F.
By the analysis of Malthusian replication dynamic equations
and the two-dimensional dynamic system L, five equilibrium
points and two evolutionary stable points are analyzed, and prob-
abilities of positive cooperation strategy of this game model are
simulated and quantified by the numerical simulations and ex-
periments on real data under three metrics average positive
cooperation probability p̄, the average payoff Ū and the propor-
tion g. The numerical simulation on the novel evolutionary game
model shows that the two strategies: positive cooperation and
negative cooperation are coexist on the game. And it also shows
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Fig. 19. Implemented simulations of the irrational parameter λ. Simulations on p̄, Ū, g with S or α varying respectively. λ = 1 for panels (a)–(f), and λ = 0.01 for
panels (g)–(l). The results are much similar to Figs. 7 to 10.
that the SNs are more prone to choose positive cooperation than
BNs, and the BNs are aroused by more distribution of excess
return. And by computing the real network data of GR-QC, we
found that SNs are more preferred to cooperate with big ones. The
results in the real network have showed that the high proportion
of excess return can promote BNs to select positive cooperation,
but negatively on SNs. The excess return allocation for nodes is
heterogeneous which promotes the cooperative behavior, that is,
the high proportions of excess return to BNs would benefit for
collaboration between unequal nodes. The success of cooperation
relies heavily on the correlation between nodes’ cost and their
payoff allocated from the game [50]. If the core nodes focus on
maintain the income balance between the node and its neighbors,
the optimal distribution coefficient of payoff would be produced
which can minimize the overall probability of opportunistic or
defection behavior [51]. The cooperation level can be improved
14
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
if players obtained the lowest guarantee of payoff as a protec-
tive mechanism [52]. The heterogeneous allocation mechanism
enables nodes to form clusters around several rich cooperating
neighbors initially [53]. Through the disproportion of excess re-
turn, large-scale nodes exert the influence to attract other nodes
to improve the level of cooperation [15]. Simulations on GR-QC
showed that the tacit knowledge has a positive effect on the
average probability of cooperation, especially for the SNs, which
agrees with the previous researches [54,55]. In order to prove the
catholicity about the conclusions drawn from the real networks,
we compared simulation results of GR-QC with two other coop-
eration networks, CondMat and HepTh [47]. CondMat network
has 4002 nodes including 2989 small degree nodes, 12755 edges,
and the average degree is 6.3743, HepTh network has 2834 nodes
and 6006 edges, which the average degree is 4.2385, and there
are 1984 small degree nodes and 850 big degree nodes. We im-
plemented same experiments on CondMat and HepTh networks
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Fig. 20. Simulation results on CondMat network: the variations of p̄, Ū, g with S or α varying respectively, the degree distribution, and the probabilities of positive
cooperations of players.
as GR-QC. The results display similar phenomenon with GR-QC,
shown in Figs. 20 and 21 of Appendix E.
In addition, the rationality of players is a question concerned
with the evolutionary rules. λ is the irrationality of a player in
the evolutionary rule of Eqs. (3) and (4), where λ → 0 means
that players are rational, otherwise, λ → ∞ shows the player
will update his strategy randomly regardless his earnings nor his
neighbors’, which indicates the player is irrational. That is, the
larger of λ value, the more randomly when updating strategy. We
complement cases of λ = 1 and λ = 0.01 in Appendix D, as
shown in Figs. 19. When λ = 1, the evolution process needs a lot
of iterations (about 3000 times) to be stable, shown in Figs. 19(a)–
19(f). In the real world, the two sides of the game cannot play so
many games, so it is not appropriate. While results in Figs. 19(g)–
19(l) display good when λ = 0.01. Therefore, it is reasonable to
take λ = 0.1, which not only ensures the hypothesis of bounded
rationality, but also avoids too many iterations.
The sentiment of cooperation attitude highlights the impor-
tance in the process collaboration, and sentiment recognition or
emotion processing of players is another important aspect for
the closely related task of polarity detection, in which sentiment
analysis leverages human–computer interaction [56] and so on.
We will consider the future work for sentiment analysis on the
networked evolutionary game.
Limitations of this work are inevitable. Evolving strategies for
the model are focused on the distribution of excess return, the
15
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
tacit knowledge and the network structure. However, coopera-
tions in real world are also related to social environments and
the comprehensive situations of players. The real GR-QC data in
this paper is static while the strategies in evolutionary games are
dynamics. Then the data cannot show the evolution of strategy
and the evolution process of decision clearly. On the other hand,
the influence factors, such as the tacit knowledge are assumed
be the value from 0 to 1 which cannot present the real cases. So
researches of evolutionary strategies with time series and data
with real influence factors are some of the future research works.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared
to influence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for the
constructive comments and suggestions, which undoubtedly im-
proved the presentation of this paper. We also show our great
appreciation to all the authors who collected and shared the data
sets of GR-QC, CondMat and HepTh, we also show our thanks
for National natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71471106)
supporting partly for this work.
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Fig. 21. Simulation results on HepTh network.
Appendix A
Numerical simulations on (x, y) in the system L are shown in
Figs. 11–15 in two cases of S < (1 − α )c and S > (1 − α )c
respectively, where R, c are fixed, S or α is a variable, and arrows
show the trends of evolving.
Appendix B
The numerical simulations on the system L by MC method are
shown in Fig. 16.
There are countless initial states of BN and SN and there are
four special initial states to be simulated in this manuscript. We
randomly select 100 combinations strategy states of BN and SN.
The MC method is used to simulate (x, y) in the two-dimensional
dynamic system L by iteration.
Appendix C
Comparisons of simulation results under different values of
β in Fermi rule. We simulate GR-QC with different values of β ,
shown in Figs. 17 and 18.
Appendix D
Implemented simulations of the irrational parameter λ are
shown in Fig. 19.
The parameter of λ referenced in [57,58], the irrationality of a
player to adapt strategy based his payoff and his neighbors’ are
16
Knowledge-Based Systems 212 (2021) 106588
simulated in the evolutionary rule of Eq. (3). λ tends to 0 means
that players are rational, while lambda tends to infinity, the
player will update the strategy randomly regardless of his earning
and his neighbors’, and the player is irrational. We simulate p̄,
Ū and g with the variable S or α when λ = 1 and λ = 0.01
respectively.
Appendix E
Simulation results on CondMat and HepTh networks are
shown in Figs. 20 and 21.
The experiments are complemented on two real networks,
CondMat and HepTh data sets are taken from the SNAP [47]. We
fix the values of influence parameters, α = 0.5, c = 0.4, R = 1,
and to simulate the effects on the two networks by the three
metrics, p̄, Ū and g.
Appendix F
The simulations on the cooperation intention recognition for
a given threshold ρ , shown in Fig. 22.
We set different values of threshold ρ , and other parameters
are set as same as the results of Figs. 7 and 9. The complemented
simulations of the values of p̄, Ū and g are shown in Fig. 22.
ρ = 0.2, α = 0.5, R = 1, c = 0.4 in Figs. 22(a), (e), (i);
ρ = 0.8, α = 0.5, R = 1, c = 0.4 Figs. 22(b), (f), (g); ρ = 0.2, S =
0.4, R = 1, c = 0.4 in Figs. 22(c), (j), (k); ρ = 0.8, S = 0.4, R =
1, c = 0.4 in Figs. 22(d), (h), (l). These figures display results of
p̄, Ū and g with S or α varying when the threshold ρ = 0.2 and
M. Liu, Y. Ma, L. Song et al.
Fig. 22. Parameters in the first two columns are α = 0.5, R = 1, c = 0.4, and the last two columns are S = 0.4, R = 1, c = 0.4. ρ = 0.2 in the first and the third
columns, ρ = 0.8 in the second and the fourth.
ρ = 0.8, respectively. Most values of p̄, Ū and g are increasing
when S is increasing. That is, the high tacit knowledge value S
can enhance the positive cooperation probability, the payoffs and
the connections between nodes. The results are consistent with
Fig. 7. Similar analyses on α also agree with the results in Fig. 9.
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