74 Motion To Modify BOP Conditions

Case 2:11-cr-00070-RAJ Document 74 Filed 09/26/14 Page 1 of 10
1 David H. Smith, WSBA #10721 Magistrate Judge James P. Donahue

Laurence B. Finegold, WSBA #1971
2 Garvey Schubert Barer
Eighteenth Floor
3 1191 Second Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98101-2939
4 (206) 464-3939
5 Attorneys for Defendant
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
9
10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

NO. CR11-0070RAJ
11 Plaintiff,
12 v.
MOTION TO MODIFY DEFENDANT’S
13 ROMAN SELEZNEV, BOP CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
aka TRACK 2, AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY
14 aka ROMAN IVANOV, HEARING
aka RUBEN SAMVELICH,
15 aka nCuX
aka Bulba,
16 aka bandysli64
aka smaus,
17 aka Zagreb,
aka shmak,
18
Defendant.
19
20
21 I. INTRODUCTION
22 Defendant Roman Seleznev (“Seleznev” or “Defendant”), by and through his
23 undersigned counsel, Garvey Schubert Barer, hereby submits the following Motion to Modify
24 Defendant’s BOP Conditions of Confinement. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant
25 respectfully requests that the court conduct an evidentiary hearing at the earliest available
26 opportunity to ascertain the validity of Defendant’s conditions of confinement, which severely
GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER
MOTION TO MODIFY DEFENDANT’S BOP CONDITIONS OF A PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
eighteenth floor
CONFINEMENT AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING - 1 1191 second avenue
seattle, washington 98101-2939
206 464 3939
1 restrict his ability to confer with his counsel and assist in the preparation of his defense.
2 Defendant further requests that the Court order an evidentiary hearing and require a duly
3 authorized representative of the Warden of the Federal Detention Center at SeaTac (“FDC”) to
4 attend the hearing and explanation the reasons for the Defendant’s present conditions.
5 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
6 Upon his arrival at FDC SeaTac on or about August 8, 2014, Mr. Seleznev was placed
7 in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”). On August 15, 2014, a detention hearing was held, at
8 which time Mr. Seleznev objected to his assignment to the SHU. Following the hearing, the
9 Government filed a “Submission Re: Defendant’s BOP Housing.” The submission contained a
10 brief synopsis of the BOP assessment that Mr. Seleznev posed a “security risk,” would remain
11 in the SHU, and should exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review of
12 these conditions of his confinement.
13 Since that filing, Mr. Seleznev has been released from the SHU and transferred to the
14 general population. His attorney-client meetings, however, continue to take place in a no-
15 contact room of the prison’s SHU, meaning that Mr. Seleznev’s ability to communicate with
16 counsel has not improved. As set forth in the attached declaration, communication in the no-
17 contact room has occured via a defective microphone and speaker system that intermittently
18 cuts out, making communication virtually impossible. See Declaration of Anna Goykhman
19 (“Goykhman Decl.”), ¶¶ 7-9; Declaration of David H. Smith (“Smith Decl.”), ¶¶ 3-4. This issue
20 is exacerbated by Mr. Seleznev’s hearing loss, and the need for a Russian speaking interpreter
21 to facilitate communication. Smith Decl., ¶ 4.
22 Counsel is also unable to exchange or review documents with their client in the no-
23 contact room. Goykhman Decl., ¶ 9; Smith Decl., ¶¶ 3, 5. Mr. Seleznev is unable to access a
24 computer, making it also impossible for counsel to utilize his assistance in reviewing the
25 massive volume of electronic discovery forthcoming in this case. Smith Decl., ¶¶ 6-8. These
26
eighteenth floor
206 464 3939
1 conditions make it impossible for Mr. Seleznev’s to aid in the preparation of evidence in
2 support of his defense.
3 In addition, Mr. Seleznev has been unable to receive confidential, privileged mail from
4 counsel while confined at SeaTac. Written attorney-client communication sent by Mr.
5 Seleznev’s former counsel at Fox Rothschild LLP on August 22, 2014 was received by Mr.
6 Seleznev—on September 8, 2014—already opened, and was not opened in his presence.
7 Goykhman Decl., ¶ 10.
8 III. DISCUSSION
9 Whether a court has jurisdiction over a defendant’s challenge to conditions of his
10 confinement is a “threshold question.” United States v. Hashmi, 621 F.Supp. 2d 76, 84
11 (S.D.N.Y 2008). Here, the Court has jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s objections and the
12 Government is incorrect that Defendant must first exhaust administrative remedies. Because
13 Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are at stake, the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
14 (“PLRA”) exhaustion requirement does not govern Defendant’s instant objections to the
15 conditions of his confinement. United States v. Mikhel, 552 F.3d 961, 963 (9th Cir. 2009).
16 Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over Defendant’s challenge to these conditions and
17 must determine whether they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
18 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987).
19 A. Defendant’s Conditions of Confinement Are Not Reasonably Related to

Legitimate Penological Interests
20
Constitutional challenges to prison conditions warrant the court’s consideration of
21
whether the restrictions are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482
22
U.S. at 89. In Turner, the Supreme Court pronounced four factors for courts to consider when
23
determining whether prison regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological
24
interests: (i) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the regulation and the
25
legitimate governmental interest used to justify it;” (ii) “whether there are alternative means for
26
eighteenth floor
206 464 3939
1 the prisoner to exercise the right at issue;” (iii) “the impact that the desired accommodation will
2 have on guards, other inmates and prison resources;” and (4) “the absence of ready
3 alternatives.” Id. at 87; see also United States v. El Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 2000);
4 Savage, 2012 WL 5866059 at *5-8 (granting inmate’s challenge to conditions of his
5 confinement after applying Turner factors, reasoning that additional measures by prison were
6 justified by defendant’s need to prepare defense).
7 Here, Mr. Seleznev’s continued inability to confer face-to-face with his counsel, or to
8 review documents either in their presence or otherwise, renders trial preparation virtually
9 impossible. See Smith Decl.; Goykhman Decl. Given these restrictions, the only alternative
10 means for Mr. Seleznev to exercise his right to effective assistance of counsel is to be granted
11 access to his attorneys and to the means necessary to allow him to review the evidence that will
12 be used in his defense. Any impact on prison resources will be minimal, especially given that
13 Mr. Seleznev is already being housed with the general population. Accordingly, Mr. Seleznev
14 simply needs better access to his attorneys (and the documents or other evidence his counsel
15 needs him to review) in order to afford him the opportunity to adequately prepare a defense for
16 his upcoming trial.
17 B. Defendant is Not Required to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
18 The PLRA governs certain prisoner challenges to conditions of confinement, providing
19 that that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 1983 of this title,
20 or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility
21 until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
22 (emphasis added).1 If an action is within the purview of the PLRA, a prisoner must follow a
23 1
The PLRA was passed in the wake of a “sharp rise in prisoner litigation,” and the exhaustion
24 requirement was intended to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.”
See Woodruff v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2382, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006); Porter v.
25 Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). See also 141 Cong. Rec. S
14408-01 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“These suits can involve such
26
grievances as insufficient storage locker space, a defective haircut by a prison barber, the
eighteenth floor
206 464 3939
1 multi-step grievance procedure to exhaust his or her administrative remedies prior to seeking
2 relief at the district court level. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13-524.15. Mr. Seleznev’s challenge to his
3 conditions of confinement, however, is not subject to that restriction.
4 First, the Ninth Circuit has held that administrative review is not a prerequisite when a
5 defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel are at stake. United
6 States v. Mikhel, 552 F.3d 961, 963 (9th Cir. 2009). In Mikhel, the Ninth Circuit instructively
7 reached the merits of a defense motion challenging certain special administrative measures
8 (“SAMs”) without requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. at 963. While a
9 challenge to SAMs generally requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the challenged
10 SAMs in Mikhel precluded the defendant from communicating fully with his counsel. Id. Citing
11 an “unacceptable burden” on the defendant’s due process and Sixth Amendment rights, the
12 Court ordered modifications of the SAMs. Id., see also Savage, supra, 2012 WL 5866059 at *
13 6-7 (affirming that exhaustion requirement is inapplicable if conditions of confinement
14 “directly implicate the court’s ability to fairly and efficiently manage the defendant’s criminal
15 prosecution,” or “directly affect the Court’s ability to ensure that Defendant receives a fair and
16 speedy trial”).
17 Consistently, courts across the country have recognized that a pre-trial detainee’s
18 challenge to the conditions of his confinement, to the extent they interfere with Sixth
19 Amendment rights, is not subject to the PLRA requirement of exhaustion of administrative
20 remedies. See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 2010 WL 4236867 at **6-7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21,
21 2010); United States v. Hashmi, 621 F.Supp. 2d 76, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Instead, a district
22 court has jurisdiction over such a challenge ancillary to its jurisdiction over the criminal case,
23 and pursuant to its inherent authority to regulate practice before it. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b);
24 see also Mikhel, 552 F.3d at 963.
25
failure of prison officials to invite a prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison employee,
26
and yes, being served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy variety.”).
eighteenth floor
206 464 3939
1 Mr. Seleznev is a pre-trial detainee seeking this Court’s consideration of the validity of
2 the ongoing conditions of his confinement, to the extent those conditions infringe upon his
3 Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel. The present conditions of Mr.
4 Seleznev’s confinement prejudice his ability to meet with counsel and prepare a trial defense.
5 To date, he has been unable to meet face-to-face with his counsel, but must instead
6 communicate through a microphone and is unable to review documents either on paper or
7 electronically. These limitations, for which the Government has proffered no justifiable
8 explanation, jeopardize Mr. Seleznev’s ability to adequately prepare for and confer with
9 counsel prior to a complex trial likely requiring extensive documentary evidence.
10 Second, Mr. Seleznev’s objections to his conditions do not constitute an “action.”
11 Whether a defendant must exhaust his BOP remedies turns on whether the defendant’s
12 challenge constitutes an “action” within the meaning of the PLRA. See Hashmi, 621 F. Supp.
13 2d at 84. In light of the objectives of the PLRA, courts have recognized that that “action” is
14 best understood as “a civil or criminal judicial proceeding.” Id. at 85 (citing Black’s Law
15 Dictionary 28 (7th ed. 1999)). Actions, described as a “costly process” or involving a “new
16 lawsuit”, are readily distinguished from applications by a pre-trial detainee for a specific ruling
17 or order brought to a court in the contest of a pre-existing criminal case. Id. Accordingly, a
18 pre-trial detainee’s challenge to aspects of his incarceration that directly and necessarily affect
19 the Court’s ability to give him a fair and speedy trial is not an “action” “within the category of
20 lawsuits to which the PLRA was aimed.” Id.; see also Savage, 2010 WL 4236867 at **6-7
21 (holding that defendant’s complaint about insufficient contact visits with his attorneys was not
22 an “action” subject to PLRA exhaustion requirement).
23 In Savage, the court instructed:
24 There is nothing in either the language of the PLRA or its legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended to strip district courts of the ability to effectively
25
manage their criminal cases. To require Defendant to spend time pursuing
26
eighteenth floor
206 464 3939
1 administrative remedies before we can resolve issues that necessarily bear on

Defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial makes little sense.
2
Savage, 2010 WL 4236867 at *7. Instead, the court sanctioned striking an “appropriate
3
balance” between Congress’ desire to reduce the number of “baseless prisoner lawsuits,” and a
4
court’s “need to manage their criminal dockets without getting bogged down by federal
5
bureaucracy.” Id. Mr. Selznev’s objections are not a new action or lawsuit; rather, they bear
6
directly on this Court’s ability to ensure fair and speedy process in the present action.
7
C. Defendant Has the Right to Receive Confidential Mail
8
While the inspection of mail by prison officials is generally permissible, as it is
9
reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of promoting security and uncovering
10
contraband, legal mail is confidential and subject to stricter First Amendment protection. See
11
Mann v. Adams, 846 F.2d 589, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); O’Keefe v. Van Boening,
12
82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996). “[A] prison’s security needs do not automatically trump a
13
prisoner’s First Amendment right to receive mail, especially correspondence that impacts upon
14
or has import for the prisoner’s legal rights, the attorney-client privilege, or the right of access
15
to the courts.” Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the United
16
States Supreme Court has held that prison officials may open a prisoner’s privileged mail,
17
including that from attorneys, but only if the prisoner is present and the mail is not read. Wolff
18
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 at 577, 94 S.Ct. 2963 at 2985, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 at 963 (1974); see
19
also Hayes v. Radford, 1:09-CV-00555(BLW), 2012 WL 4481213 (D. Idaho Sept. 28, 2012)
20
aff'd, 12-35899, 2014 WL 4100663 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2014). Upon information and belief, Mr.
21
Seleznev has not been afforded these requisite, constitutionally mandated protections.
22
D. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Defendant’s Challenge
23
The court entering a detention order retains jurisdiction to adjudicate a defendant’s
24
challenge to confinement conditions affecting his ability to prepare a defense for trial. The Bail
25
Reform Act instructs that, “The judicial officer may, by subsequent order, permit the temporary
26
eighteenth floor
206 464 3939
1 release of the person, in the custody of a United States marshal or another appropriate person,
2 to the extent that the judicial officer determines such release to be necessary for preparation of
3 the person's defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(4). Pursuant to the Act, a defendant must “be
4 afforded reasonable opportunity for private consultation with counsel.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(3).
5 Because Mr. Seleznev’s present conditions of confinement not afford him a reasonable
6 opportunity to confer with counsel, this Court has jurisdiction to permit his temporary release
7 to the extent this Court determines it necessary for his defense. See, e.g., United States v. Bolze,
8 2010 WL 199978 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 2010) (entertaining defendant’s argument that he should
9 be released to adequately prepare his defense pursuant to Section 3142(i)(4)).
10 IV. CONCLUSION
11 The conditions of Defendant’s confinement have infringed upon his fundamental Sixth
12 Amendment right to counsel. When a prison regulation “offends a fundamental constitutional
13 guarantee,” a district court must discharge its duty to protect an inmate’s constitutional rights.
14 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987); see also
15 United States v. Mikhel, 552 F.3d 961, 963 (9th Cir. 2009). “Prison walls do not form a barrier
16 separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
17 Accordingly, the defendant Roman Seleznev requests that this Court conduct an evidentiary
18 hearing at the earliest available opportunity to ascertain the validity of the conditions of his
19 confinement pending trial and require a duly authorized representative of the Warden of the
20 Federal Detention Center at SeaTac (“FDC”) to attend the hearing and explanation the reasons
21 for the Defendant’s present conditions..
22
23
24
25
26
eighteenth floor
206 464 3939
3 DATED this 26th day of September, 2014.
4 GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

5
6 By /s David H. Smith
David H. Smith, WSBA #10721
7 Laurence B. Finegold, WSBA #1971
1191 2nd Avenue, Suite 1800
8 Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 464-3939
9 Facsimile: (206) 464-0125
dsmith@gsblaw.com
10 lfinegold@gsblaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
eighteenth floor
206 464 3939
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I hereby certify that on September 26, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
3
Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the
4
attorney of record for every party.
5
6 s/Patricia Shillington
Patricia Shillington, Legal Assistant
8 1191 Second Avenue, 18th Floor
Seattle, WA 98101-2939
9 Phone: (206) 464-3939
Fax: (206) 464-0125
10 Email: pshillington@gsblaw.com
11 SEA_DOCS:1162360.1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
MOTION TO MODIFY DEFENDANT’S BOP CONDITIONS OF GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

A PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
CONFINEMENT AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING - eighteenth floor
1191 second avenue
10 seattle, washington 98101-2939
206 464 3939
Case 2:11-cr-00070-RAJ Document 74-1 Filed 09/26/14 Page 1 of 3
1 Magistrate Judge James P. Donahue

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
9 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
10
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CASE NO.: CR11-0070RAJ
11
Plaintiff,
12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
13 vs. MODIFY DEFENDANT’S BOP
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AND
14 ROMAN SELEZNEV, REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY
aka TRACK 2, HEARING
15 aka ROMAN IVANOV,
aka RUBEN SAMVELICH,
16 aka nCuX
aka Bulba
17 aka bandysli64
aka smaus,
18 aka Zagreb,
19 aka shmak.,
20 Defendant.
21
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Motion to Modify Defendant’s BOP
22
Conditions of Confinement, and the Court having considered the materials submitted in support
23
and in opposition, and being otherwise fully informed, now,
24
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named parties are hereby ordered to appear
25
26 before the Court, located at 700 Stewart Street, Suite 2310, Seattle, WA 98101, on the _____ day
27 of _______________, 2014, at the hour of ___________ a.m./p.m., to present evidence
28 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

TO MODIFY BOP CONDITIONS AND REQUEST eighteenth floor
1191 second avenue
FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING- 1 seattle, washington 98101-2939
(206) 464-3939
SEA_DOCS:1162423.1
1 regarding the Defendant’s BOP conditions of confinement in order that the Court may ascertain
2 the legality thereof; AND
3
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff United States of America will
4
present testimony at the above ordered hearing by an authorized representative of the Warden of
5
the Federal Detention Center at SeaTac regarding Defendant’s BOP conditions of confinement.
6
7
8 DATED this _____ day of _______________, 2014.
9
10
11 Magistrate Judge James P. Donahue
12
13
Presented By:
14
15
16
By: s/ David H. Smith
17 David H. Smith, WSBA # 10721
18 Laurence B. Finegold, WSBA # 1971
1191 Second Avenue, 18th Floor
19 Seattle, WA 98101-2939
Phone: (206) 464-3939
20 Fax: (206) 464-0125
Email: dsmith@gsblaw.com
21 Email: lfinegold@gsblaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant
22
23
24
25
26
27
1191 second avenue
(206) 464-3939
SEA_DOCS:1162423.1
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2
I hereby certify that on September 26, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
3
Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the
4
5 attorney of record for every party.
6
s/Patricia Shillington
7 Patricia Shillington, Legal Assistant
1191 Second Avenue, 18th Floor
9 Seattle, WA 98101-2939
Phone: (206) 464-3939
10
Fax: (206) 464-0125
11 Email: pshillington@gsblaw.com
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
1191 second avenue
(206) 464-3939
SEA_DOCS:1162423.1

74 Motion To Modify BOP Conditions

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

74 Motion To Modify BOP Conditions

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 2:11-cr-00070-RAJ Document 74 Filed 09/26/14 Page 1 of 10

1 David H. Smith, WSBA #10721 Magistrate Judge James P. Donahue

5 Attorneys for Defendant

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

22 Defendant Roman Seleznev (“Seleznev” or “Defendant”), by and through his

26 opportunity to ascertain the validity of Defendant’s conditions of confinement, which severely

5 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12 these conditions of his confinement.

21 to facilitate communication. Smith Decl., ¶ 4.

2 support of his defense.

4 counsel while confined at SeaTac. Written attorney-client communication sent by Mr.

7 Goykhman Decl., ¶ 10.

9 Whether a court has jurisdiction over a defendant’s challenge to conditions of his

10 confinement is a “threshold question.” United States v. Hashmi, 621 F.Supp. 2d 76, 84

19 A. Defendant’s Conditions of Confinement Are Not Reasonably Related to

4 Savage, 2012 WL 5866059 at *5-8 (granting inmate’s challenge to conditions of his

6 justified by defendant’s need to prepare defense).

16 his upcoming trial.

17 B. Defendant is Not Required to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

18 The PLRA governs certain prisoner challenges to conditions of confinement, providing

3 conditions of confinement, however, is not subject to that restriction.

13 6-7 (affirming that exhaustion requirement is inapplicable if conditions of confinement

19 Amendment rights, is not subject to the PLRA requirement of exhaustion of administrative

24 see also Mikhel, 552 F.3d at 963.

6 communicate through a microphone and is unable to review documents either on paper or

9 counsel prior to a complex trial likely requiring extensive documentary evidence.

10 Second, Mr. Seleznev’s objections to his conditions do not constitute an “action.”

22 an “action” subject to PLRA exhaustion requirement).

23 In Savage, the court instructed:

1 administrative remedies before we can resolve issues that necessarily bear on

9 be released to adequately prepare his defense pursuant to Section 3142(i)(4)).

12 Amendment right to counsel. When a prison regulation “offends a fundamental constitutional

21 for the Defendant’s present conditions..

3 DATED this 26th day of September, 2014.

4 GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

MOTION TO MODIFY DEFENDANT’S BOP CONDITIONS OF GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

1 Magistrate Judge James P. Donahue

27 of _______________, 2014, at the hour of ___________ a.m./p.m., to present evidence

28 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

You might also like

27 of _____, 2014, at the hour of _ a.m./p.m., to present evidence