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Armor in The Invasion of North Africa (CGSC N2146.43)
Armor in The Invasion of North Africa (CGSC N2146.43)
Armor in The Invasion of North Africa (CGSC N2146.43)
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FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
DOCUMENT NO.N2146. 4 3 COPY NO. I
CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 52-SM
13 Mar 51
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44$
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A RESEARCH REPORT
Prepared at
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort. Knox Kentucky
1949- 1950
( to M (
THE ARMORED
SCHOOL
4HEADQUARTERS
T 0 Comimandant
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
of North Africa, prepared at The Armored School, Which you may retain
for your files.
Inc 1l
a/s Lt Col, Inf
Secretary
w(
f,
COMBINED ARMS RESEARCHLIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS
(2di AIJ
i wt DIVISION)
BY
1949 - 1950
LI1Ui?~ AT
Nf COLONTEL JACK F. * ILI,
CAPTAINT AROLD
P V. AiMIERS ON
1AY 1950
TAI3LE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
2 PRE.EMKT IONKPHASEPASE. .. .9 , . 12
Over-P11 Plrnnirng a f " . " " "a .
a a 12
Training . a. . * a * a .* "* . " . . , a a 19
3 Lo.pD11 G * a a .: *. . . . . a * a " 28
8 COT\LU JPDT-N
jS LOS ^ NYD RECO 71 Da aV a a aN .a 139
Conclusions a a a a a 139.
Lecom'lrdrtioris a a a a . a a a a a a a a a a 143
APPEIYDICES
I. Order of B^ ttl e
Ha Terrr~in _Anrlysis
ITTI.Trrining. "morfndum ,Turmbcr 1 (Gori Post)
TU. 1ovrment Orders, Shinmwnt 3324
V. 1H1ovr-rrnnt
Orders, Ship.nt 3324..)"
FOREWORD
same ship. Due to the scarcity of ships of the right type crews
of combat vehicles were not on the same ship with their vehicles.
The leaders of both the Army and Navy of the expedition had only
was a success. This brings out the lesson which I later felt
as dark as it can be painted and the enemy has his troubles also
di I t {4p
I
** ,,
All
r,
t
1
thy'
;r
PREFACE
indifferent resistance.
Since this report deals with the use of armor, the infantry
infantry which made the initial assaults on the beach and engaged
in the major part of the fighting. The fact that the infantry played
the report. Most of the observer reports and other documents avail-
in small actions,
years after the action occurred. In the early stages of the war
few reports were kept at divisional and lower headquarters. There
this action as there were for later engagements. For the most part
the people who were so helpful to the committee but the reader must
bear in mind that the people who took part in this operation were
that this report could not have been written soon after the action
diaries were kept at this time except by higher commanders and these
BACKGROUND
the armored units were not to be used in the actual assault they
were landed early and played a vital part in the actual success
of the invasion.
the war when troops were better trained, techniques improved, better
and more adequate equipment available, and time: for planning more
adequate.
fell to the Germans in only one day. 3 The British feared that the
Germans and Japanese would join forces somewhere east of the Red Sea.4
Strategic Considerations
of Great Britain had made the decision that our resources would be
and then Japan. 5 The Middle East was the southern supply route to
the U.S.S.R. and the main air ferry route to INDIA. The key to
the Middle East was EGYPT: the best hostile avenue to the Persian
Gulf. Here also was the most convenient base for reenforcing any
threatened part of the Middle Eastern Area. Since Russia was slowly
lest she collapse and the door be opened wide for a complete conquest
United States Army Chief of Staff, and Mr. Harry Hopkins, personal
for a much earlier date. This plan was given the name SLEDGEHAIIER
June 1942, General Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General
turn, The German successes in AFRICA and along the southeastern por-
East, the loss of the Suez Canal and the vital oil supply in the
further meetings with the British Chiefs of Staff. It was felt that
especially in landing craft, and the short period remaining when the
earliest possible moment, despite the fact that it meant the abandon-
called TORCH, The operation was favored by the British but not the
13 August 1942 to proceed with operation TORCH. The target date was
Political Considerations
account by the planners for TORCH,; First was the reactions of the
and there was more than a strong suspicion that urgently needed
material was finding its way Northward across the PYRENNEES. SPAIN
sides of the Straits, the southern shore which was in Spanish hands.
The British and American Ambassadors had assured General Franco
there were indications that the chief anxiety of the Spanish leader was
12
slaught. The Germans considered it a serious mistake to occupy any
tempted to do so.13
whole of FRANCE and that their aim in doing this would be to forestall
marine bases along the French Mediterranean Coast, and above all, to
The Americans had apparently escaped this opprobrium. America was still
except the barest necessities of life, and also stripping the armed
Gallic sense of honor and that resistance to the Axis would materialize
15
in an effort of the French to retain the shadow of their Liberty.
Economic Considerations
craft. In early 1942 there were only enough available for one
division. Since the basic plan called for a landing at three lo-
cations, the British felt the Western landings could not be launched
until at least two or three weeks after the landings in the Mediter-
Russia at all, Resources of England and the United States were search-
program for landing craft was agreed upon. This necessitated a heavy
cut back or delay in the construction then under way of certain major
combat ships for the Pacific Fleet. Also there were added to the
production program in the United States a great many items which would
and depots in the British Isles for the actual landing and for the
that had been made. There was an early plan to send an Armored
Division to AFRICA under Major General George S. Patton Jr. but this
The Plan
As has been stated before, the directive for TORCH was given
changeover from planning ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHA IER to the planning for
TORCH. General Eisenhower had been picked because of the known at-
titude of the French toward the British. The initial plan to employ
The initial target date for TORCH was set for 1 October 1942
by the Americans while the British set a date for September 10. As
will be seen later, both of these dates were overambitious. The
main reason for the haste was the known weather conditions off the
coast of NORTH AFRICA, which were generally bad all year around,
especially in the late fallR Deception was carried out with alter-
nate plans for NORWAY and DAKAR. Troops embarking fro the United
States and Britain were to be toldo that they were enroute to re-
the enemy..21
D Day was moved on to 8 November; and that was the very latest day
in 1942 for a landing on the iron-bound coast of MOROCCO, because of
From this point on this report will deal with the Western i
gether as the staff of the I Armored Corps and other units during
maneuvers and in the Desert Training Center. This helped them some-
this level,
with General Patton emphasizes the manner of giving orders for the
operation.
NW.F. Craven and J.- L.- Cate, The Army Air Forces in W.II
vol II: TORCH .TQP.OIPTBLAM( (Chic.ago; University of' Chicago Press,
1946),'p5.
2 Capt.
Harry C~ Butcher, USNR, My Three Years With Eisenhower
( New York, Simon & Shuster, 1946). p $,
30,x
ci Craven and Cate, p 35.
4 1bid,
p 36.
5 The
War Reports of' Marshall,- Arnold, King (Lippincott, 1947),
p1 3 6
bid, p 15
4,
7 , ..
Terrain and Political Study NkTOUSA-MTOUSA (Command and
General Staf'f' College, 1943), p 31,
8Q2 ityWar Reports of' Mar.9hall, Arnold, King, pp 153-154.
9bip 156.
10a ityButcher, entry f'or 14 July 1942,
15 lbid, p 4.
l 6 Tbid, p 5.
17 it Butcher, p 37*
1 $0p cit, War Reports Marshall, Arnold, King, p 157.
Op cit, Craven and ate, p ,13,
20
Litzenberg, Outline History World WKar II quoting Combined
Chiefs of Staff Directive for Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary
Force.
2 1Samuel Elliott Morrison, Operations in North African Waters
(History of US Naval Operations in V II) %l I,. (Atlantic Little
Brow n, 1947) p 16.
2 2 Ibid,
p 18.
23-
Ibid, p 19.
24Personal comments Brigadier General alter J. Muller who
was G-4 for Western Task Force and spent the entire war as a member
of General Pattont s staff. (These comments have been placed on
microfilm and are on file in the documents section, The Armored School)
2 5 Ibid.
PRE-EMBARKATION PHASE
Over-all' Planning
the task organization of the landing teams and the general scheme
on the beaches of PORT LYAUTEY, FEDALA and SAFI with the Task Forces
GOAL POST, BRUSI[OOD and BLACKSTONE being given the abovQ assignments
and the only apparent indication that something was afoot was
evidenced by the accelerated training at FORT BRAGG and the con-
in planning:
following plan: The D Day convoy was combat loaded so that the
available for the assault with all guns blazing. Due to the
limitations of various ships availabei this was not actually at-
complished in that the drivers and vehicles were loaded on one ship;
ly,
arrival date set for five days after D Day. This convoy contained
on the same transports, This type of loading did not permit debarka-
this convoy also included some service troops which were convoy loadedo
Loading along this line included the troops on one ship and supplies
c', The final convoy of this first echelon was called the D
plus 20 convoy with an arrival date 20 days after D Day. This convoy
included the remainder of troops and equipment of the units pre-
a 90 day supply level for all troops in the convoy. The convoy was
commercially loaded. This type loading meant that the equipment and
had been secured. The Port of Embarkation for this convoy was also
the supply plan on the theory that supplies were not available locally
and that the expedition would take sufficient supplies for a sixty-
Combat loaded ships of D convoy could not carry supplies for sixty
days; hence, careful study was necessary to put aboard ships only
troops of D convoy carried rations for 60 days but gasoline for only
sunk, all the gasoline supply would not be sent to the bottom, 6
describes his situation, "Each commander leaned on the heavy side and
siders the fact that from start to finish the complete "Torch" op-
forces. For the attack on MOROCCO our troops had beautiful maps.
road map made by the French tire manufacturer, Michelin. This road
map had been censored by the authorities because it showed the lo-
cation of all the landing fields and airdromes in the area, A copy
ordered very late and for several weeks all government presses
printed nothing else but this chart. It was very hard to maintain
secrecy.
a copy with a set of maps to study on the boat. when crossing the
Atlantic. The study was in such detail that each platoon leader
would know the terrain as if he had been there. The maps had
RIVER between the road to MiANSOURIAH and the main highway, and
preparing to leave HJ2, PTON ROADS. The USS HENRY nilEN was already
out in the stream when a small boat bearing a large crate came along
side. a marine officer came aboard with the proper papers for this
crate and after completing the paper transaction the crate was hauled
on board, No one knew what the box could contain since all equipment
had been loaded at the pier. The "extra cargo" was found to contain
Through the use of this board, briefing was accomplished that after-
Training
although the above training and especially the Maneuvers did provide
amphibious operation.
nearby was far from uniform in that many of the various units of the
sub-task forces involved did not reach the Port in time for such
area for final touch-up, this being the exception rather than the
rule. The landing team of which the 1st Battalion, 67th Armored
VIRGINIA. During the two week stay here most of the training
Battalion until the unit was at sea on their way to NORTH AFRICA.,
follows:
... After the completion of loading, stowage and checking
the USS HARRY LEE and the USS TITANIA left the dock and anchored
in the upper portion of the CHESAPEAKE BAY waiting for the con-
voy to assemble. They remained in this area from the 16th until
the 22d during which time the troops made several practice in-
vasion landings without vehicles, using landing nets and assault
boats. The practice in the quiet bay waters gave the troops some
6
idea of the difficulties to be expected in actual operations...
Training at Sea:
NORTH AFRICA took place the afternoon of Friday, 23 October 1942 when
... from this meeting with the first information that anyone had
had as to where they were going and what they were going to do.
This information was not put out, however, nor were the pounds of
maps that arrived that day opened until the ships were two days out
at sea;...
Life aboard ship passed quickly...since the officers had to be
briefed as soon as the maps were broken down. There were a multi-
tude of jobs and the big picture was to be given to the troops as
well as their own particular job. As the officers were briefed in
the various phases of the operation they held schools for the men.
In addition there was a new weapon that had been loaded on at the
last minute. It was called a Bazooka. It was supposed to knock
out enemy tanks but no one had ever fired it or seen it fired.
Classes were held constantly in its use. The Navy, too, had some
new weapons. Experts in the large caliber weapons, the crew of the
Biddle had never seen a .30 caliber machine gun. Classes were held
by the Army instructors for the Navy on these guns....
These guns were to be the anti-aircraft protection of the
landing craft in which the Battalion vehicles were to be set on
the beach... 1 7
Some of the time on board ship was spent learning about NORTH
AFRICA and the language and customs of its people to better facilitate
. Ibandon
a ship drills and general quarters stations
were a daily routine, .. .19
out the whole convoy. Sub-Task Force GOAL POST issued a regular
.ppendix III) will reveal that the spare time aboard ship was use-
The troops then were ready, the plans and training completed
all in the space of 79 short days of 24 long hours each. By direct deal-
commanders, staff and troops performed the race against time and
in movement and supply that was necessary plus the varied and
the magnanimity of the job performed, the writers are sure he will
Loading. This phase too, was included within those SHORT 79 days.
NCJIT S FOR CHAPTER 2
Ibid.
3
Lieutenant General-Lucien K. Truscott Jr., General Truscott's
personal file on Sub-Task Force GOAiL POST, passim.
Ibid, pzassim.
5
Colonel Ralph J. Butchers, Letter to Research Committee
No" 25, dated 14 N ovember 1949.
6
U. S. Landings in Morocco, a report prepred by the Tactics
Department, The armored Force School, (.kpril 1943), pp5-7.
7
Opcit, Letter from Colonel Ralph J. Butchers,
Ibid.
9
Major Alvin T. Netterblad Jr., personal interview, November,
1949,
10
Op cit, Letter from Major General Hobart R. Gay.
11
History 67th Armored Regiment, a unit history prepared by
members of the 67th Armored Regiment; (Brunswick, Germany: Georg
Westermann, 1945), p 377.
Ibid, p 363.
Ibid, pp 169-1700
Ibid, pp 59-64.
Ibid1, pp 59-64.
16
Op cit, Lieutenant General Lucien K. Truscott Jr.
17
p cit, History 67th Armored Regiment, pp 169-170.
1&
Ibid, pp 59-64.
19
First Lieutenant John H. Cleveland, personal interview,
January 1950.
20
Op cit, History 67th Armored Regiment, pp 59-64.
CHAPTER 3
LOADING
Force were widely scattered. Some units were not yet activated when
loading plans were executed by the Asstt Chief of Staff, G-4, Colonel
Ralph J, Butcher, (then Lt Col) together with the Special and General
states,
heavy side, the Division G-4 becoming the "no" man. In the later
assault landings .
(TQM) could not be fully covered in the short period of two weeks;
The desired debarkation priority was also furnished. TOQt s were then
higher echelons. The Army and Navy could not agree on the princi-
same ship with the assault troops who are to use them. Supplies
1942. Of the other sixteen, some were enroute from the Pacific and
others were in the state of being turned over from Merchant Marine
6
Service. None were turned over in satisfactory condition.
War Department Orders were issued .on 2 October 1942, di-
officers, 231 enlisted men and 209 vehicles were directed to report
The 66th and the 67th Armored Regiments were formed into
SAFI. The 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment was assigned to the
tervals during the first few weeks of October. The ist Battalion,
The Combat Team at CA~iP PICKETT returned on the 20th of October for
The elements leaving from NEW YORK were to sail on the sea
train (USS LAKEHURST). On 15 October 1942, this ship was ready for
Merchant Marine Service and the necessary alterations now had ad-
allocation for example, called for some 300 vehicles, The majority
were 2k-ton trucks, but also included, were 54 medium tanks, 6 Car-
riage, Motor, M-7's and 12 Engineer Bridge Trucks (except for the
cargo trucks, the above heavy vehicles were the only equipment of
this kind in the Western Task Force), It was determined later that
this ship could handle but 200 vehicles, but yet after actual plan-
ning had been completed, the maximum number of vehicles the sea
train could carry was 156. This changed the entire setup, but it
10
was too late to stop movement of the vehicles to the port. Fur-
of landing craft.
change in the amount and type of Class V supply also required un-
equipment until after the cargo convoy carrying the mass of that
from the port area unless they could arrange either for its use
maintenance supplies.
for the sea train, loading was executed to take maximum advantage
of all available space, The tank deck or lower deck was loaded
jeeps were loaded on top of each bridge truck and trailers were
sea train had more cargo space in the forward portion of the ship,
adjustment of the water ballast was made to balance the load, Even
after the ship had been loaded. These vehicles were shipped by rail
vision and other units of the Task Force. The loading of an AKA
to LST loading. The APA and AKA ships carried landing barges on
of embarkation for items which were then stacked on the dock by type
cargo lots per vessel, but instead, came in cargo lots per type,
essential that the loss of one ship should not jeopardize the op-
units were divided between two or more ships. This necessary pre-
both NEN YORK and NORFOLK, was the constant pressure of time.
units. Attached units, such as the Air Corps, Signal Corps and
charged with loading the ships had not allowed sufficient space on
NEWS.
the 24th of that month, joined up with the elements from NENPORT
D DAY CONVOY
(Combat Loaded)
into two groups; a small detachment of men from each unit, together
with the rmajority of vehicles from that unit. wore placod .board
Landing Force.
TABLE 2
NO NAIEEOF FORCE
UNIT 01 r TEH TPAISPORT DESIG aTTACHED TO
Hg 2dirnmd Div 1 32 Harris X Unattached
Renainder of Div H Plus H CCA (D / 40 convoy
Hq~ CCB' 1Q0 24 5 Calvert; X. Parent Org
42
Table 2 (Conttd)
NO INAME OF FORCE
UNIT 1 M VEH TRANSPORT DESIG ATTACME D TO
67th_ A77 ______t:
3d 7hAIR.: - _____
41stMeat-
fI 1AE
krmdIIf
r1O OF FORCE
UN4IT 0 Ell VEH TRANSPORT DESIG ATTACHED .TO
82d Rcrn n:
7 0 14 Arcturus Y
1st Plat, Co C 2-y7-~ 0--~ Biddle .Y 1s t En 67 AR
0 11. 12 Calvert
Titaria
X
X. '2d
dE
En 67 AR
7A
2d Plat, Co C 2 3 ' '
NO NAME OF F ORC
UUIIT 10 EVI VEF{ TRANSPORT DEL ATTACHED TO
3 d Plat .Co B
Shr
Pr 1 4 0 Penn Z 1st Bn 66 AR
1s t Plat Co D
UTans, Party) 11 461. 0 Titaria X 2d Bn 67 ARL
2d Plat Co D
(Shore Party) 1~ 46 0 Titaria X 2d Bn 67 AR
3d Plat Co D
(Trans Pat-T 1 46 0 Penn Z 1st Bn 66 AR
Pr~ov En ;r Bridge Co 6--215 .43 Lakehurst X 3d Bn 67 AR
Prov Plat
(Trans Party 1 46 0 Penn Z 1s t Bn 66 AR
Med Det 17th Engr Bn 0Q 10 0 Dix X 3d Bn 47 Inf
(Remainder of 17th Arrid En r Bn on D 40 convoy)--______
142d Arrad Sig Co:______________________
Det 142 Sid Co Il 20 5 1Dix X 3d Bn47 Inf
Detl4SiCo 0 6 1 1Penn Z *lst Bn 66 AR
Det 142d Sig Co 0O 6 1 Titaria x 2d Bn67 AR
Det 142d :Sig Co 0T 6 J. Biddle Y 1st Bn 67 AR
De't12dSig Co 50O 10_ Harris X 1st Bn 47 Inf
_Reainerof_42 Sig Co on D 4 convo _____________
Each UGS convoy carried supplies for the UGF convoy in its
group. After departure of the UGS convoy, equipment left behind re-
verted to the Chiefs of Services after the entire unit to which the
was made that all Table of Basic Allowances (TBA) equipment could be
of all classes for the 35,000 troops in varying amounts, but averaging
about 30 days' supply. Gas and oil ire carried in drums and cans.
TBA equipment shipped, averaged about 40 percent, All wheeled ve-
hicles were included in the cargo.. The required ship tons of cargo
for the 30 dayst supply for 35,000 troops amounted to 49,000 tons
and the TBA for the same number of troops amounted to 245,000 tons.
was fully met.. Requirements for TBA were short by 100,000 tons.
32,000 troops. The cargo capacity of the transports and the cargo
about 30 days' supplies of all classes for the 32,000 troops aboard.
tons for the 30 days' supply items and 244,000 tons for TBA equip-
ment and supplies were crated for debarkation after a port had been
47
secured. It was comprised of one tanker and 25 cargo ships having
TBA equipment for troops that sailed in the D Day and D / 5 con-
allowances. Gasoline and oil drums were shipped along with gaso-
line tanks and pipe lines for storage of 240,000 barrels of gasoline.
About 7,000 tons of coal in bags were shipped in this convoy and
plans were made for further coal shipments in all subsequent UGS
convoys. The required tonnage for this convoy was 188,000 tons for
the 60 days' supply for the 67,000 troops. This tonnage figure was
one sea train and two tankers for Western Task Force. UGF 3 had a
tons on the sea train and 23,000 tons on the transports. The major
and one unit of fire for troops in UGF 3. Also carried was 25 per-
cent of the TBA equipment for the troops in this shipment. Tonnage
sisted of 27 cargo ships and one tanker. The entire convoy for the
fire for all troops in the theater which was approximately 90,000
ized, Gas and oil were shipped in this convoy also and it was de-
90,000 tons required for the 30 days' supply for the 90,000 troops
one sea train for Western Task Force, with a capacity of 25,000
troops and 42,000 ship tons of cargo. Five thousand of the troops
major cargo consisted of 15 days' rations and one unit of fire for troops
in this convoy. TBA equipment for these troops averaged about 40 per-
49
a cumulative unshipped balance of 151,000 tons. The remainder of
classes for all troops in the theater. TBA shipments brought the
the assumption that the Task Force could receive and assemble ve-
The 4th echelon convoy (UGF 5 and UGS 5) was scheduled for
sea train for Western Task Force, The transports had a troop carrying
supply of all classes for troops aboard, TBA equipment for these
Force and was capable of carrying 275,000 tons, The cargo consisted
50
brought the total up to 100 percent. A total of 212,000 tons was
1
Personal Commvnents of Brigadier General Walter J. Muller.
3 Personal
Comments of Colonel Ralph J. Butcher, G-4, 2d
Armored Division.
4
0p cit, Muller, F. Mi.., Lieutenant Colonel, p 3.
1
War Department, Movement Orders, Shipment 3324, WD 370.5
(10-1-42) OB-S-E-M1, dated October 2, 1942.
171b d, p 4*c
17
Ibid, p 4.
19
Ibid, p 5.
20U Landigs in Morrocco, Tactics Department, The Armored
Force School, April 1943, p 11.
2 1 dated
Hadquarters, Task Force A, Memorandum to OPD,
October 22, 1942.
OCEAN MOVEMENT
finally completed on the 24th of October 1942 and it set sail on that
date for the invasion of French Morrocco. The armada moved out of
the NORFOLK, Va, harbor through the swept and buoyed channel in a
There were about forty destroyers that formed the circle around the
formidable formation.
The ships sailed in a column of lines and each ship was about
800 yards froci the one on the right and left and from front to rear..
zag course and the danger of ships colliding with each other was always
1
present.,
what the plans of the task force were until the force was well out to
sea. The plans were then disseminated to all officers and men aboard
Western IAORROeCO, D Day was November 8th and H hour was at 0400
hours.
carried out on each ship. Some ships rigged up rope ladders and some
had rope cargo nets strung up on the ships. The men received daily
Task Force BIECKSTONE and can be reasonably assumed that the same
provisions for exercising all troops daily was made aboard the troop-
ship LYONS. after 10 days at sea, on the 18th and 19th of October,
the LYONS stopped at COVE POINT and held short periods of calesthentics
for the troops. Practically all deck space on the LYONS was taken up
The 2.36 inch rocket launcher, with ammunition, was first seen at this
time. No one knew how to shoot it and furthermore no one knew how to
employ the weapon. Some commanders made every effort to acquaint the
men with the weapon by firing it off the ship at floating debris.
New radios were issued to some units aboard ship,. The radio
operators were not familiar with the operation of the new sets, and
due to the restriction of radio silence, the sets could not be
checked or calibrated.
and PORT LYAUTEY, in the order of their importance. The main port
DIAB and AIN SEBA,) but these are subjected to rough swell and surf,
and are too near the CASABLANCA coastal batteries. The beach at
was not well defended, and there were several beaches in the im-
SEBOU. There is a beach called Mi-IDIA beach north and south of the
were wanted but never obtained. These sea level photos would have
marks at night,
Sub-Task Forces
Harmon.
BROO, LYN and destroyers. They were to silence the French coastal
batteries at CAPE FEDA'LA and SIDI MOHOHLIED BEN CHE RGUI (FORT BLONDIN.)
The detailed plan for the operation was this: two regiments
floating reserve. Each of the two assault regiments had two bat-
57
Sub-Task Force Zed (GOALPCT)
Gencral L. K..: Truscott and consisted of troops from the 9th Infan-
try Division and one armored landing group, from the 2d Armored
1,EIzTA BEACH and the airport at PORT LYAUTEY, to insure its use as
a base for our planes not later than noon of D Day; to capture and
ship TEXAS, cruiser SAVAJ<hAH, and destroyers. They had the mission
of the KASBA FORT as soon as the FORT was taken; then to proceed
7
south along the coastal highway to take the airports at RABAT SALE.
The force had the mission of securing SAFI, and the airdrome
east of town; insure the unloading of the armored elements aboard the
sea train LiKEHURST; secure the crossing over the OUED ER REBIA, in
inforcing CASABLANCA.
Pre-Invasion Training
Force BLACKSTONE, went to the upper part of the CHESAPEAKE BAY for
for the entire trip and these details amounted to approximately the
that they forget the greater part of what was written in the volumi-
nous notes and that they closet themselves in his stateroom and work
odt together the details of the expedition They stayed there for
General Harmon says that his main concern at that time was
small boats, and the moving in an orderly fashion to the shore. The
and as evening came the lighthouse on shore gave them a beacon from
the boat that General Harmon was in. It was supposed to have been
and down the coast and it took until noon of the next day to get them
back to the ships.. This was very discouraging and showed up the in-
experience of the young sailors and coxwains and many other defects
was still highly unsatisfactory. The plan for a third exercise had
to be cancelled and the ships sailed down the harbor on the evening
Air Suooort
Task Force was to approach a coast where the French had an estimated
coast might also be within striking range of the larger Axis bombers.
60
operation was by aircraft carriers' The United States was very
short of carriers in October 1942, The Japanese had sunk the LEX-
INGTON, YORKTCdN, WASP and HORNET, and damaged the SAR.ATOGA and
RANGER, the only large carrier in the Atlantic Fleet, became the
"TORCH" air group. The new SANGAMI-ON class of four escort carriers
converted from tankers, was thrown into the operation with less than
air group also helped to solve the fuel problem, for even after con-
for other ships. Aill together the RzJMER and her four consorts
Naval Operations
Between the 3d and 11th October the Navy sent the covering
TUSCALOOSA and 7JICHITA, and four destroyers, to CASCO BAY and they later
joined the convoy on the 25th October for the voyage. The air group
along with one oiler and nine destroyers was sent to BERMUDA for
training.. The three attack groups;. the covering group, the air
group and the assault group all rendezvoued about 450 miles SSE
of CAPE RACE and continued on their way,. When complete, Task Force
impression that it was just a troop convoy bound for England (Figure 1.)
were encountered on November 7 and one or two had prize crews placed
the main attack plan of the operation, The Navy's mission was stated
along with the Airts mission and then General Patton, who was in com-
mand of the Army troops, got up and called upon the Navy to remem-
ber Farragut, and predicted that all the elaborate landing plans
would break down in the first five minutes, after which the Army
eight knots and the capital ships were refueled with complete success.
This was accomplished by having the oiler come along side, make fast
62
N~ew'
AZQR
:i
i
and pump oil through large hoses into the tanks of the ship being
refuelled.
and the weather started to get bad. The wind was rising from the
northwest and the sea started to run very heavily. By 6 November the
heavy seas reported off the Moroccan coast made it doubtful if the
the alternate plans of landing the assault forces inside the Mediter-
from the northeast, and the sea running a moderate ground swell. At
daybreak the SAFI attack group left the convoy and the rest of the
and 1700Z, Companies K and L were transferred from the IYONS to the
parted for their respective landing places. The northern attack group
group made SAFI at 2345, and the center group was at FEDALA at 2353.
exact areas assigned as the transport areas. Two of the three groups
were brought into the transport areas by emergencgy turns which were
follows:
7bd p 9-10.
$Thid , ssm*
9 Muaj . Gen, Harracon, op cit, p 9.
10 Mlorrison, Operations in North African Waters, cit, p 31.
llibid, p4l.
12 Ibidc 1II.
of the American forces who were to seize FEDALA (Figure 3), and
MOROCCO.
in this area, was smooth and even the ground swells were exception-
1
ally small, Signal lights at FEDALA and CASABLANCA intended for a
French convoy moving out of CASABLANCA were a' welcome beacon to the
Navy that had moved the immense convoy across the ATLANTIC. General
to the approach divided the shore into five beaches practical for
1 and Blue 2. One mile west of POINT FEDALA was Yellow Beach, and
three miles east of POINT BLONDIN was Blue 3. H Hour was set at
0400, 8 November, That is, landing craft were to cross the line of
The transport area was six to eight miles off the beaches
(Figure 2). The first line of ships was made up of four destroyers
JEFFERSON, CABROL and DICKIAN, were loaded with the assault waves.
Back of these were the successive waves of reserves and supply ships.
Specialist and four enlisted men. These men had been extensively
USA, and Ensign J. J. Bill, USN. Their mission was to mark the
fifty landing craft. Some of the landing craft were aboard the
No \(1 A ir 1Poricc P hotois
z:
TRANS POR TJ J. 'E S E. IUTLE4I E 0.LL. SCOTT
FLOArI(t'K RE CEAtJ
LA1tCD oq
0 GALL
2 EEtO
®_. L.I
cases landing boats from the second, third or fourth line of ships
were to pick up their troop loads from boats of thc first line, etc,
Landing Teams One and Two, the First and Second Battalions
a sandy open beach extending from the sea jetty east of FEDALA on
the west to a rocky cape on the east, and is about one mile in length:,
Landing Team One was to clear out any small arms fire on the beach,
then turn to the right (west) and clear out the town of FEDALA and
capture POINT FEDALA, on which were located oil tanks, search lights,
a three gun battery of 90 mmn guns and a 2 gun 75 mm. battery (Figure 3).
Landing Team Two was to move inland a mile or so, swing south and
capture everrthing on the east bark of the CUED (river) 1ELILAH. These
FEDALA from the west, and seize the bridge over the OUED ViMLLAH,
which is on the main highway from FEDALAH to C~BkS}LANCA. Company
the Reconnaissance Troop in- the capture of the 90 mm. battery on the
One or Two.
Landing Teams One and Two, the First and Second Battalions
Team Two was to capture the coast defenses at POINT BLONDIN and
the highway and railroad over the OUED NtFIFIKAH, a river running
into the ocean about five miles east of FEDALA (Figure 2), Landing
seize the high ground about five miles inland, Company L of the
30th was to land at H Hour on Blue Beach 3, about two miles east of
the mouth of the OUED NEFIFIKaH and swing to the southwest and assist
Landing Team Two. The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry, less Company L
67th Armored Regiment (light tanks), and the 2nd Battalion of the
the same formation in which the crossing had been made, two right
0
obliques of about 45 were given. The ships were then stopped dead
in the water. The result was that in many instances where boats
from one ship were assigned to take combat loads from another, the
ooxswains were unable to locate the ships from which they were
supposed to get their loads, Where troops were landing on boats that
were part of the equipment of the particular ship they had traveled
on, they were coordinated at the start, but where boats were sent
from one ship to get troops from another ship for the first wave,
there was great confusion. Boat crews' were drifting aimlessly from
,
transport to transport, megaphoning, "Is this the ANCON?" "Is this
the LEONARD WOOD?". Even the navigator on the BIDDLE was unable to
locate the BLISS, which was entirely out of position, Signal lights
flashed, It would have been a field day for enemy air or surface
Due to the above, and the fact that the troops were inex-
who were to mark beaches encountered difficulties and there was con-
guiding troops to proper beaches. He got the first and second waves
started right, but the third wave missed him completely and landed
all the way from POINT FEDALA to CASABLNCA. Many boats landed on
70
Despite difficulties Landing Team One of the 7th Infantry
Many boats were lost on the reefs which separated Red 2 and Red 3.
beaches, but fortunately a patrol boat was able to shoot these out
and POINT FEDALA hit the beaches at dawn causing considerable con-
firing a few rounds. Landing Team One landed all of its elements
MIRAVAR HOTEL at 0630 hours with nine members of the German Armistice
houses for raw materials, and a complete description of all French of-
two 75 mm. guns that was placing effective fire on Red Beaches. The
90 mm. battery had been put out of action by our Destroyers, but
naval fire was not successful in silencing the 75's. The guns were
3 as planned. This team assisted Landing Team Two of the 30th which
was making good progress in the capture of POINT BLONDIN, and then
joined the 3d Battalion which had come ashore and moved into an as-
late morning and participated in the attack on the POINT FEDALA bat-
Teams One and Two of the 30th Regiment landed on their re-
and reefs bordering the beaches. Team Two, because of delay, landed
after daylight at the mouth of the OUED NEFIFIKAH and proceeded to the
being assisted in the end by Red Team Two (7th), Uwhich had landed
on the wrong beach. This battery had been heavily engaged by the
The 15th was ordered ashore about 1100 and at about 1600
General Patton ordered that all Infantry and Engineers be put ashore
09C, but beaches and the road from CUD MFIFIKAH to FEDAIA were d"-
strafed and baebed during the day by planes from the CASABLANCA AIR-
PORT. At least one burst of small bombs was dropped on landing boats
fly few air combat patrols. The few French planes that were up be-
10
came very annoying.
the ARCTURUS, which carried about 2/3 of their vehicles and about
100 men; and the BIDDI, which had 1/3 of the vehicles and the re-
to land on orders, they were able to get a good view of the landing
with him Captain W6ishard, his S-4 and Lieutenant Veenstra, Battalion
the loss of almost half of the available landing craft was being
Walters was moved to the heights overlooking FEALA but did not con-
11
tact the enemy during the night. (Figure 4.)
4o7 of the 19,870 embarked on the twelve transports and cargo vessels
of the landing force, had been landed.. FEDALA, POINT BLODIN, and
the area betwvfeen the CUED lELLAR and the CUED NEFIFIKAH were in Amer-
ican hands. Plans for the movement to CASABLNCA were being made and
however, do not tell the whole story. Although the four ships in
which the assault waves were landed, and the JOSEPH HUVIS had approx-
imately 90/1 of their troops ashore, the remaining ships had landed
very few troops and the total was far behind schedule.
craft. Inexperrience, darkness and the falling tide, were the prin-
cipal causes of boat losses, but even after the tide turned at 0744,
beaches by the incoming tide.. Altogether, between 137 and 160 of 347
landing boats were expondd, the greay' mao.jority on D Day. Of the
boat losses, only two or thrce were the result of direct hits by
enemy batteries,.
fE~644f Cgs4AY'1yc,w
7TSE' aifec'p
yAS6 (0f/ffA/O//r'
x4
30
39 to
~33
C Sep.
-4
e3
M P "t Y
O
7,4
AYg P681
/4A'i,9/4N6 TEAMN
Ti oo Ps
U~j4-Cos
C--* 0 '1-5 LT rKS
{-A L F Tc
@ '$
A qI
A~~ 7&
rn3
PLAT~
*O
M1T
i.cvs (
Q 1
Beginning at about noon or D Day, 1 tndirvs weru concern-
trated on areas within the FEAIA harbor and on Red Beach in order
to better control the small boat traffic and conserve our dwindling
had "Saved the whole Goddamned operation", showed the true value of
12
the beachmaster's decision.
ations was the fact that all troops were seriously overloaded. So
much so that many troops lost their lives in the surf at the beaches
for the sole reason that they were unable to regain their feet after
being knocked over by the waves, Others perished when they fell into
the sea while disembarking to get into their landing boats. Further
the beaches and quays, along the streets of town and across the hill-
D Plus 1
During the night of the 8th, Landing Team One (1st Battalion,
7th Infantry) was relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 20th Engineers and
went into Division reserve. The 15th Infantry moved to the southwest
and went into position on the left of the 7th Infantry, which had
mounted patrols was encouintered during the morning and this con-
tineeod until afternoon when leading units came within the range of
artillery fire was recoived (Figure 5). The enemy at this time was
BLANC A area, At about 1400 hours the forward movement was halted
transport vehicles and the inability of jeeps and 1/12 ton trucks to
8th and continued to harry the 30th until the cessation of hostilities.
The threat, however, was not serious -and no American tanks were moved
to that sector.
TLIRUS into the FED ALA harbor to urload elem: ents of the 67th Tank
Jj
Battalion which vere loaded on the boat. This was a difficult piece
the two landing craft acting as tugs (See Figure 3). Unloading of thne
battalion then oroceded at a more rapid rate from the hRCTURUS and
with the additional landing craft thus made available to the BIDDLE,
the landing of the team was completed in the late afternoon, By 1900
the 9th of Novemboer, the 67th Light Tank Battalion Tean was in the
assembly area betw,een the railroad and the inland road just east of
CUED 17
ELLAH (Figure 5)o At this time orders were received to secure
just east of the QUED YELLAH near the inland road. Its mission was
ground. One platoon of Company A was sent forward to assist the 15th
They soon gained contact -ith enemiy patrols and from that time until
the Armistice, they were in constant contact with the enemy. The
7th Landing Team, advancing on the right received heavy small arms
and machine gun fire, and its right flank received bombardment from
advance was continued and by nightfall the team had occupied the
high ground south and southeast of the city QUL.LD CHUK IL iL0UK
C,4S4'L 7 /CA
FEOWL 4
// T1, /fNr1 c
017 /1
/
CA~t sLAM
o3 f
D' 3 11 A/b
Fo#7u91
and there were a number of road blocks erected on the main high-
ways leading into the city. On the whole, enemy activity on the 10th
artillery fire from CASABLANCA. The artillery fire was from fixed
D Plus 3
During the night of the 10th the 67th received orders to move
11th. H Hour was set at 0730 instead of dawn in order to insure per-
16
fect coordination The attack was to be made by the 7th and 15th
Regimental Combat Teams and the 67th Tank Team, and was to be sup-
the attack was ready to jump off when orders to cease fire and halt
them off in time to prevent their attack on the known artillery po-
surrender only a few minutes, the action would have been started and
following the French surrender, His orders were to move into town
road blocks with tanks in town. The only real excitement occurred
Some of the landing teams that missed the right beach had
strange adventures. Four landing craft carrying 113 officers
and men of a Headquarters Military Police Company took off from
the transport WILLIAM S. BIDDLE after nightfall and missed
Beach Yellow, where they were supposed to land. Two of the boats
entered the roadstead of Casablanca and hailed a French Patrol
vessel, thinking she was one of ours, to ask the way. She opened
up with machine guns, killed the M.P. Company Commander, sank
both boats and took the survivors prisoner,
The most fantastic adventure befell Ensign Harry A. Storts
and a crew of coastguardsmen from the transport JOSEPH T. DICKMAN.
With a support boat borrowed from another transport they were try-
ingly, shortly after 0400 to excort three amphtracs to Beach Blue
2. These were experimental versions of the LVT, improved models
of which in 1943-1945 served in many amphibious operations in the
Pacific. The LVTts were supposed to get themselves and their
crews ashore under their own power. But they frequently broke down
and had drifted so far away from their destination by daylight that
Ens, Storts was ordered to conduct them back along the coast and
to land at the nearest available beach. He joined forces with
two landing craft carrying anti-aircraft half-track batteries.
They picked out a beach some ten or twelve miles east of Sherki
and landed there at 1945, being strafed by an enemy plane during
the process. Behind this beach were French troops, who made their
presence felt at once. Ens. Storts's landing forces, which amounted
to 32 army and 9 Navy and Coast Guard personnel, dug in, set up
their "Buck Rogers" guns, and stood seige. French strafing planes
appeared every half-hour until dark, and killed five men, but the
survivors used their guns to such good purpose that several French
armored cars were driven off o After dark, two men put off in a
rubber boat to intercept a destroyer, while Ens. Storts and four
others set out on foot for Fedalah, hoping to make contact with
the American landing forces. The 29 men left behind shifted their
position from the beach to a near-by concrete pig-pen. "That pen
sure looked good", said one of the coastguardsmen, "we crowded
right in with the pigs and didn't mind the company at all," And
they held out for two days until their ammunition was spent.
The rubber boats never caught their destroyer, but eventually
returned to the Fleet. Ens. Storts and his party what with losing
their way and taking cover from French planes, took Sunday night
and all of Monday to reach an Army command post near Fedalah.
After resting they wore provided by the 30th Infantry with a
half-track, a 75 rm. gun and a rescue squad. Off they rolled
Tuesday morning 10 Nov.., guided by Ens. Storts. On the way they
captured ten French soldiers and took them along, only to find
that those they were seeking to rescue on the beach had themselves
been captured. So back they turned toward Fedalah, everyone on
board the half-track. On the way they were neatly ambushed by
150 native troops led by French officers, who wounded or killed
nearly everyone in the party, including most of the French pris-
oners, The captors conducted the surviving Americans to a French
first-aid station at Bouznika, where their wounds were dressed.
A French officer then loaded them on a farm truck, with the red
cross painted on the hood, in order to take them to Rabat for
questioning, One mile from Bouznika, the truck was strafed and
disabled by an American plane, which did not see the red cross
in time, and three more of the French were killed. The sur-
vivors walked back to Bouznika, carrying their wounded, and were
then shipped by truck to Boulhaut, 14 m iles inland, Next day -
Armistice Day - a man came in saying the fighting was over, A
priest conducted Ens. Storts and one other survivor of the orig-
inal amphibian party to Fedalah, where they reported on board
ship. Such are the hazards of amphibious warfare,
Of the numerous adventures enjoyed by the army landing teams,
two will suffice. One, whose objective was the railroad bridge
over the Oued Nefifikah, halted an early morning train and pulled
off it 75 very surprised French soldiers going on leave to Casa-
blanca. A unit of the 7th Infantry that landed before daylight
made straight for the Hotel Miramar, headquarters of the German
Armistice Commission. ,According to one story, the Germans were
about to make a getaway in cars, and all but one of the four of-
ficers, as well as six enlisted men, were captured while running
across the golf course to catch a plane,.They were sent on board
the transport ANCON and brought to the U,S.; the first German
prisoners to be taken by U.S. forces on land.
One of the German cars came in handy for a plan that Col,
Wilbur of Gen. Patton' s staff had very much at heart, The French
Gen. Bethouart had been a fellow student of his at the famous
Ecole de Guerre. Assuming that Bethouart had the military com-
mand at Casablanca (°which was incorrect), Wilbur thought that-if
he could only contact his ANCIEN COMARADE and explain matters,
the French would join us instead of resisting. Accordingly, he
went ashore with the assault troops, commandeered a captured
German car, and with a soldier as chauffeur and an impressed
guide dashed through the lines to the French military headquarters
at Casablanca, There he was coldly informed that the Navy was in
command. This gallant escapade seems mildly ridiculous in view
of the fact that Bethouart had been working on our side for weeks -
a good example of the faulty cooperation between American civilian
agencies and the armed forces,
Despite all difficulties, in which inexperience was the
major factor, 7,750 troops and a good deal of equipment were
landed at Fedalah on D day, 8 Nov.; and by nightfall Maj.
Gen. Anderson's 3rd Division had attained all objectives set
down in the attack plan. American troops had control of the
town, the harbor, bridges over the rivers at each end of the
area and the high ridges that commanded the town and beaches.
Yet the story of this debarkation is only part of the picture,
even at Fedalah. Twice on 8 Nov. while the landings were going
on, the French Navy at Casablanca tried to break up the operations,
and they could have easily done so but for the effective work of
the United States Navy.
Cavalry Patrols
greatest force. The batteries at POINT FEDALA and POINT BLONDIN were
on the beaches. Had the French used their mobile artillery and avail-
it could have been. This can be accounted for in part by the sur-
prise landing and partly by the fact that the desire of the French to
fight the Americans was lacking. They fought because they had orders
to, but immediately upon surrender, they were ready to join us,
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5
2
Chapter #4 this report.
3 Reportof Operations in North Africa, a report prepared
for the Chief of Staff, U,S, Army by Brigadier General Arthur R,
Wilson. Officer participated in the landings at Fedala as a member
of General George Pattonts Staff, p 2.
4
Operations in North African Waters, June 1942-1943, a book
prepared by 'Capt. Samuel Elliott Morrison, Naval Reserve Historian,
p 58.
5Wilson,
Op cit, p 3.
6
1bid, p 4.
7 U.S.
Landings-in Morocco, prepared by the Tactics Department,
The Armored School, Ft, Knox, Ky., in 1943, p 19,
id, p 22.
9
'ilson, Op cit, p 6.
10
Tbid, p"7.
12
Morrison, Op cit, p 80.
carrying Task Force BLACKSTONE arrived off the NORTH WEST AFRICAN
port of SAFI. The French garrison in SAFI was apparently not aware
of the impending attack as the lighthouse in. the port was still on
at the time the convoy arrived. This light stayed on until about
had decided to embark the assault waves into their landing craft as
troops?
sions. Its first task was to seize a beachhead at the port of SAFI
and to secure the port for future operations; secondly, the Task
Force was to drive north and secure a crossing over the OUM ER RBIA
RIVER, and, lastly, they were to assist in the reduction of the city
tion into three specific phases, The first phase was the landing
itself. It included the initial landing of the assault troops and
Once the troops had gained the initial toe hold of 5000 yards, they
had been established, This was called the beachhead phase of the
operation. The third phase of the operation was known as the future
consisted of one regiment of infantry, the 47th from the 9th Infantry
and the sea train (the supply ship USS LAKEHURST) which carried
which brought the overall strength of the Task Force up to 327 Officers
and 6,091 Enlisted Men. The Task Force had a total of 779 vehicles
7
of all types.
For the landing phase of the operation four beaches had been
as RED BEACH, just north of the port, BLUE and GREEN BEACHES, which
vere within the port area, and ELLOU BEACH, which was eight miles
south of the port. All of these beaches were very small, the largest
dit ,
Z y~
d / T
UE z r_
I V sue,
C
-' 1- -g
BARRk'
PcS T~/~~?F~$
At: C
TO YCXL, O - 3 NN
the Task Force., As one would expect in an amphibious operation, the
to the command, However, some light tanks were attached to the infan-
For the assault landings the 47th Infantry Regiment was or-
ganized into three battalion landing teams. These teams were designated
as the ist Battalion Landing Team (1st BLT), the 2d Battalion Landing
Team (2d BLT), and the 3d Battalion Landing Team (3d BLT). Further,
two destroyers onto the docks of SAFI within minutes of the time that
the assault troops crossed the beaches. Companies K and L, from the
this company was to proceed south, avoiding the NATIVE CITY, and to
BARRACKS. ° (See Figure 6). Company K was further charged with the
yards south of SAFI, from moving to the north or east. (See Figure 8).
the Ist BLT were to give all assistance possible to this company.
to seize the harbor installations, locate and destroy any enemy within
89
zoce
HORS
S PFCIAL M'.AP
SA Fl
R ED -- Scade /:24;ooo
BE.ACH
BEACH
/4o
/ 86°
S ArF
,C2~.7
To se//rowB ec B
the port area and prevent the burning or destruction of the docks
this company was also given the mission of seizing any and all stocks
10
of gasoline that might be within the port area.
the 70th Light Tank Battalion) was to land on RED and BLUE BEACHES
BEACH. (See Figure 8). They were also to secure the high ground
overlooking the beaches and then to continue their attack inland until
the Task Force reserve. The general plan was to land the 2d Armored
Landing Team in the area that would permit its being unloaded with
4- 75mm"How.
/ - Sydo2 cay.
16-A V~~ (6m fMo O/a1swPl)
#.
2 LtM
W oZ
s-c.)
/ 2.Hvy. P46Gs
/60 rnmMotr
A, n75n w DORT
cH %SA Ft AREA
TSE
From fr //IIy ence A nnex
(NOT TO 5CALE)
To YELL~O
The decision as to where and when they would land was to be made
The sea train was to land on orders from Task Force Head-
necessitated by the fact that all of the medium tanks of the Task
Force were on this ship and the landing craft available at the time
sequently, all troops were enjoined not to open fire until such
18
time as resistance was met. Bases on this hope of no opposition,
plans were made to land all elements of the Task Force, other than
fires from two destroyers and one cruiser. The Gunnery Officers of
the ships concerned were to prepare fire plans to cover all known
1 9
unless the French fired first, l
Navy, The primary mission of the Naval Air Arm was to protect the
not oppose the landings and that all concerned had been ordered to
hold their fire until fired upon4 This order must have caused the
French were reported to have one light tank battalion and one infantry
ing air craft. The bulk of these reserves were located at MARRAKECH,
21
about 97 miles from SAFI. (See Figures 8 and 9).
and that H Hour was set for 0430 hours, 8 November. During this
same period it might be well to see what the French in SAFI were
doing.
hours a second message was received from the "Chief of Staff" which
92
0roccafl
2M~oOccan
1I BLT, 4-17 th
(-)j 4.7 fh
L2d 8-T)Lf7
,SaiEl Tiek [Ej21jroup
O3c Group.
/e/ow
Mad~6 Se"
N ~~~Ma~rakech fjr.L)
1 JMorK
SkETCH (;o
SAFIAIAZAGANV AREA 2 (L; 1
4
alert message was received, this one coining from the Naval Head-
Commander Deuve, the garrison commander, alerted his command for the
defense of SAFI. Using the time of the first alert we find that
the garrison in SAFI had one hour and ten minutes to prepare for
action.
bor the French opened fire. At 0430 hours the BERN1ADOU ran aground
just off the PETITE JETTEE. (See Figure 1). In spite of the fact
that she was aground, the BERT.NADOU, supported by the destroyer USS
J RVIBE, returned the French fire and within six. minutes the French
fires in the area were silenced or at least ceased. 23 For the men
opposed.
hour to complete the disembarkation, In the mean time the USS COLE,
0500 hours and berthed at the PHOSPHAVE DOCK. The infantry dis-
embarked immediately and took over their 'duties of guarding the port
24
area,
IVEW YORK. The French opened fire to seaward at 0440 hours and were
immediately taken under fire by the NE YORK. The first salvo fired
battery continued in action, though its fire was now very inaccurate,.
until it had fired about one hundred rounds. At this time, due to the
improved accuracy of the guns of the NEW YORK, the French gunners had
BLT and the platoon of light tanks which were attached to the 1st
BLT, hit BLUE and GREEN BEACHES at 0530 hours. The tanks were
started out on its mission at about 0530 hours. As the tail of the
Company cleared the PETITE JETTEE, which was at the head of GREEN
of this information two light tanks were ordered to attack the house..
-26
This they did and the French defenders beat a hasty retreat.
gun and rifle fire and the attack started to bog down, This was
94
largely due to the fact that this Wai the first action for the
Commander,
taken under fire by the two French 75mm guns located in the vicinity
of the OLD PORTUGUESE FORT. (See Figure 8). These guns were not
taken under fire by the Navy presumably because Company K was sup-
posed to capture or destroy them, For some reason this company had
28
not reached the FORT as yet.
Team, along with the sea train, had been held in Task Force reserve.
95
rather than at YELLOW BEACH. Consequently, they were ordered ashore
and the first wave went across GREEN BEACH at about 0900 hours,; D
Day.
him at 0900 hours were nearly out of ammunition.. However, they were
MARRAKECH 29
Down near the OLD PORTUGUESE FORT the 75mm guns that had
fired on our assault boats at 0740 hours resumed their fire at 0910
hours. Again they directed their fire on the landing craft. This
time, however, the fire was returned by the Naval boat crews. A
short time later these two guns were picked up by a naval air observer
who directed such accurate naval gunfire on them that the French
At both places the tankers found that naval gunfire had done its
30
work--the positions were abandoned.
the first wave of the 2d BLT didn t t arrive on the beach until 0943
hours. (H Hour was at 0430 hours), The landing of the 2d BLT was
unopposed, however, and the entire landing team was ashore by 1015
31
hours.31
cording to plan they continued their drive on toward their final ob-
in the south portion of the town. (See Figures 6 and 8). The bat-
talion landed at 1009 hours and, after assembling, moved out to ac-
the BARRACKS from the north. Company K was already besieging the
BARRACKS from the south, their attack having been stopped by French
fire. As ordered., Company I launched its attack but was pinned down
almost at once. Apparently the attack of this company was not too
was stopped by, 'overs from K Company firing from house tops directly
captured a French light tank which was promptly turned into a pillbox
and used against the French. (It is interesting to note just how
this French tank fell into our hands. The driver of the vehicle,.
for reasons unknown, ran into a wall and was knocked unconscious.
to this captured French tank one American light tank also took part
in this battle,
fire turned out to be the straw that broke the camel's back, as the
While the battle at the BARRACKS was taking place the sea
' train, with the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment on board, sailed
into the harbor and berthed at the PHOSPHATE DOCK at 1400 hours-
At about the same time the USS TITANIA, with the remainder of the
The unloading of these two ships was not without its problems.
approximately fiv4 hours to repair this winch the unloading was slowed
98
All through the landing operations communications between
the units ashore and the Task Force Headquarters on the USS HARRIS
post in the dock area. Upon landing the General noticed that the
tive in that they were doing nothing about the many snipers still
twin-engine bomber flew over the port area. This plane did not
The plane was forced down by anti-aircraft fire from the USS BERNADOU
and the USS COLE. This was the only French plane seen in the air
on D Day.
By 1600 hours the 1st BLT had secured its final objective,
the 10,000 yard beachhead. At 1800 hours the 2d BLT, which had
landed at SYLLOW BEACH, joined the 1st BLT and took over the southern
movement on SAFI at 1153 hours. During their march from the beach
a security screen to protect the beachhead from any French threat that
sage to Admiral Davidson who was in command of the Naval convoy that
During the night of 8-9 November all was quiet along the
with the Task Force reported that the unloading accomplished after
dark was rather "sporadic," Thc same observer went on to state that
French bomber flew out of the clouds at 0650 hours and attacked the
port area. Two bombs and a few incendiaries were dropped before
the plane was shot down. The damage done by this attack was rela-
tively light.
within the area was the unloading of the various ships in the port,
fifty French trucks had been spotted moving toward SAFI on the main
The Naval air arm was also ordered to attack this column.
At 1400 hours this column was bombed and strafed from the
101
Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment were placed in the lead while the
Contact with the French was made at 1700 hours just west
Fortunately they did not destroy the bridge. The 2d Battalion con-
EL TLETA was quic]ly cleared of all enemy just prior to dark. The
tacked by Naval air. Shortly after the air attack the 2d Battalion,
67th Armored Regiment, attempted to move east into the hills outside
the 14th and 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalions fired some 306
it did not knock them out nor did it cause them to withdraw from
43
their positions. It is presumed that this failure to drive off
102
or destroy the French artillery accounts for the fact that no new
Division were finally unloaded from the sea train by 1700 hours.4
ashore.
At this time General Harmon, mwho had had no word from General
Patton since the beginning of the operation, decided to move the armor
north against MAZAGAN and then CASABLI NCA. (The 47th Infantry Regi-
b-"' sible. At 1900 hours, with the 2d Battalion leading, the Combat
due to the fact that there was an acute shortage of trucks and that
distance from IMAZAGAN to CASABLANCA was only about forty miles and
what few trucks there were could be used to haul more supplies over
that relatively short distance than they could if they had to travel
103
To establish his base of supplies at MAZAGAN, which had a
ships. One destroyer was loaded with some 300 tons of POL, rations
and water.. The second destroyer was loaded with 300 tons of ammuni-
tions, water and other supplies. These floating supply dumps were to
parallel the march of the Combat Command and were to enter the MAZAGAN
move north was a risky one.. The overall situation was obscure to
say the least.- His forces were currently in contact with the French
some 25 miles east of SAFI and there were additional French forces
at MOGADOR and MR AKRCH that could be moved against the force left
... It was a risky thing to leave the port and march out
into the great unknown, However, I felt that Colonel Randle
could hold the beachhead with his regiment of infantry backed
by the gunpower of the naval warships in the harbor and at worst
could fight his way to shore and get back on the ships.. So we
went right ahead with the original plan, not knowing the fate
of the forces to the north.
the town. (See Figure 10). Rather than attempt a night attack on
the town the column was held up and plans were made for a coordinated
104
8L,qCKS TONE (- 47IvF) MOVES To
ASSEMBLY AREA 0800, // NOV
EJLEMENfTS
To
E/Z
8RibG6E A T 0620) fl/NoV
i
(3d 5k?.I 67 Arin'd Re .)
r-,QAzq E1'M OW R
I5LACAS 7t
4AIZA GA! V 19001, /V OV, 42
&A.CKS T04'c 2-d BLr)
L ANDS 8NO1V 42~
S-z----47ZNF (RAvo'p EST
y74
8&4 HH A CoMMENCILT.T
'NGS 8 NHOL.4
80
N _SCALE
(Fr °om
-
6-3 19P-
&-Q,BLACrS ro1VE
CC"B" OPPOSE'S MA9RRAAECH
for 00"iout 072400 - 0 Nv)//073 GARRI9SON q'-1o NOV. 1~942
M ARRAI (E Cl-f\\
/0
fron General Patton. The message was a day old and it ordered him
11 November.$ General Harmon now had to act and act fast. He had
four and a half hours to capture MAZAGAN, secure a crossing over the
OUM ER RBIA RIVER at AZE Mv!OUR resupply his command, move forty
the 67th Armored Regiment, which was the Combat Command reserve,
The mission of the battalion was to seize a crossing over the OUM
ER RBIA RIVER and to hold it until the rest of the Combat Command
arrived.
was received from General Patton stating that there would be an armis-
tice and that all attacks were to be stopped at once. Again time was
vital. As General Harmon puts it, iTkt this moment oar tanks had just
started to move up a gentle slope to attack the town. The staff and
myself got into our vehicles and whizzed in all directions trying to
Very shortlyr after the attack on MAZAGAN was halted the gar-
105
In closing the book on the landings at SAFI it is interesting
MOROCCAN operations.
any landing made on a hostile shore. Further, the bulk of the troops
with some tank elements just as the Ist and 2d BLT's of the 47th
The landings at SAFI were not the only landings made by the
106
8 November 1942, other elements of the division were taking part in
3
Harmon, Op cit, p 9.
Opcit, Blackstone Field Order No. 1, p 1.
5
Thid, p 1.
6
Observers Report on Landing Operations of Task Force
Blackstone? ov 8-13 Incl.., byMlvlajor James Y. Adams, p 1.
7
Mlemorandm, Hg., Task Force ""A, Room 2405, Munitions.
Building, Washington D. C., dtd. 22 Oct 42, p 5.
107
17Op c it, Observers Report, by-Major J: Y. Adams., Appendix
III, p 9.
'S~pcitBlackstone Field _Order No: 1; p 3.
31 Ibid, p 3.
320p Observers Report, Major _J. Y. Adams,. p 2.
331idpp 2, 30
39
0p cit, Observers Report,, Major J. Y. Adams,. p 6.
51
Lessons from Operations Torch, Hq, 2d Armored Division,
APO 252, dtd 26 Dec 42, p 2..
109
CHAPTER 7
parted company from the main convoy at 071600 November and proceeded
to the transport area seven miles off the WADI SEEOU.2 The convoy
was late in arriving 'at the transport area, about 080030 November
3
(Saturday) instead of 072300 as scheduled. General Truscottt's
and special units, a total of 9099 officers and men and 65 light
the plans and actual landing operations of GOALPCGT this report will
INTELLIGENCE
110
S d, Reconnoiter to E and NE to ga n contact with hostile
forces in the area: (60 W Longitude, 35 N Latitude), EL KSAR-EL
KBIR-MEKNES-FES-QUEZZANE to protect the North flank and to facil-
itate the subsequent advance of Task Force A to the East and
Northeast ....
reefs. Ridges, wooded with scrub pine, paralleled the ocean. The
exits from these beaches were sandy and difficult for wheeled ve-
hicles, However, inside the SEBOU, there were two beaches suitable
for vehicles; one on the south bank near the coastal defense bat-
7
teries, and another further up the river adjacent to the airport.
> The chief drawback to the coastal beaches was the poor weather with
its resultant high surf which was normal for this time of year. In
fact the weather forecast called for only one or two calm days in
Critical terrain features (See Figure 11) were the WADI SEBU, high
ground to its north and south, and the lagoon. The WADI SEBOU wound
down by PORT LYAUTEY and the KENITRA Airfield enclosing the latter on
three sides. On the fourth side was the high ground which extended
between PORT LYAUTEY and the lagoon. The river was navigable by
crossed a sand bar which had a depth of water of 191 feet maximum
at high water and only 13 feet at low water level. Its banks, other
111
ATLANTIC OCEAN
RED
F/IURE]]l D AT *N
®7.Svie/
PLANY
Sub-7skrfce L
GOAL P0 ST/
T opf Ar-e
L
I/
y
-< 4/94y7
?y¢
LL
31-a
° r?
,, ,EBERLY
®'
I-. -/
S'c O vf' Soot
\x
Jrush ~FOREgST
opf0C 3
;iC
r~jt
/*IA RA f
ro
\',
RAVFN CoAnkiOak
(j,
YE LLOI
(1>
JI /
Qo (3i
I p
2 3 s .
I A4i/es
1? x22
north and swamoy on the south side, Across the river, inside the
was fringed with precipitous, wooded, cliffs which merged into soft
sand rising from the beach. Between the north end of the lagoon and
the WADI SEBOU, a distance of about 1700 yards, was a ridge which
The KASBA was an old masonry fort which had been built by the Portu-
guese centuries ago on the edge of a high cliff above the river mouth,
10
about a mile inside the jetties. The KASBA and the adjacent defen-
sive area had to be cleared before landing craft could enter the river
to land tanks on BRO UN BEACH, and before we could advance on the air-
port. At the lower end of the lagoon the high precipitous ground
dividing it from the beaches was broken by a neck of loti ground, ap-
proximately 175 yards wide, through which ran the coastal road which
here turned inward to PORT LYAUTEY. Southward from this neck of land
the inland cliffs continued for from 5,000 to 7,000 yards although
second avenue of approach and the troops advance astride the coastal
11
highway and then turn North up the East side of the lagoon. How-
ever, this approach would be so easy for the enemy to defend with a sma
South in this sector. A good beach was located eight miles South of
112
the river wv;.here it appeared that exits could be found for vehicles
and enemy defenses would liihcly be weak. North of the river there
were steep sand dunes and shale slopes leading inland some 1400 yards
or defenses in this area. Inlahnd of the sand dunes there was an area
of rough high ground which cornhandcd the river ard the low ground on
the Southern bank, incluiinrg the airport. This was probably difficult
teries and the airfield. It was clear that some troops should be
forces who would be operating to the South. These troops should in-
approximately 4,000 yards from the sand dunes; after which it sloped
down to Highway 206, which crossed the WADI SEBU Northeast of PORT
113
(1) Beach patrol units
battalion of tanks).
with AT guns in the South, and that a portion of our tanks had been
courses of action were considered and it was decided that it was ex-
tremely probable that the enemy would defend strongly the two bottle-
neck exits from the beaches at either end of the lagoon. This would
114
be followed by stiff resistanc. further inland with the main French
forces on the high ground just South of the airdrome, Probable enemy
the Southern end of the lagoon guarding the defile, with the remaining
less two companies, held in the town of PORT LYAUTEY; and two complete
x Land all forces to the South; assemble them with supporting tanks and
artillery and move out as a unit for the airdrome. The advantages of
this plan were simplicity and landing away from the enemy defenses.
take most of D Day to land and assemble and we would run the risk of
115
from landing. Its disadvantages were that it entailed a considerable
risk, required highly trained troops, was likely to got out of hand,
for not planning to use them on the high ground East of the lagoon
116
without them." 1 7 Uncertainty of beach conditions required delay in
OPERATIONAL PLAN
(BCT) of the 60th Regimental Combat Team and supporting units were
RED 2 with one reinforced rifle company on each beach and execute
117
2d BCT, with Naval Demolition Party, land at 0400Z on GREEN
detachment.
drome at 1100.
1st BCT land one reinforced rifle company each, at BLUE and
first established:
the SEBOU as soon as possible after the coast batteries were silenced
the advance of the 2d BCT and then after landing the Raider Detachment
BLUE, or YEL0. (as the situ ti-n indicated); furnish minih ijm troops
three BCTs with the provisions that one of these destroyers would
planned, chiefly on the coast defense batteries and SVI of the air-
119
were placed on the naval gunfire support by General Truscott.
and destroyers) could fire on any enemy batteries firing seaward but
for not more than three minutes without checking fire. Destroyers
22
only could fire at any enemy gun firing on approaching boats.. All
other fires were to be on call from the SFCP or plane spotters on tar-
gets of opportunity.
support. Its missions were somewhat the same as doctrine today would
field on return from initial missions. Provision was also made for
included:
120
any of the close support missions assigned naval aviation above.
the SANGAIAON while the army planes of the 33rd Group consisted of
this ship. When its crew discovered, at NENPORT hNEWS, that she was
to carry such a lethal cargo they jumped ship. Mr. Leslie, Naval
Liaison Officer, asked for volunteers from the NORFOLK naval prison,
and got them. The CONTESSA, by this time, had missed the convoy so
she crossed the ATLANTIC unescorted and made it on the 8th of November,
each individual and vehicle in the assault waves was to take with him
gallon cans per vehicle; two filled canteens of water per individual
and two 5-gallon water cans in each boat.26 It was planned to load
ashore they were to take the supplies up on the beach and drop them.
put in dumps.27
121
Evacuation plans covered casualties, burial, salvage, cap-
unit use and general salvage to BCT dumps. Captured material such
situation, and if riot necr ssary, evacuated to BCT dumps. Ris were
to be turned in to PFvI enclosures established by 540th Engineers on
the assault waves from the three leading transports, This plan
122
The overall logistic plan called for continuation of un-
half of the Sub-Task Force staff from CLYMER to ALLEN was lost for
four hours. About 0430 they finally boarded the ALLEN and im-
inally planned and that the two French speaking members of the
123
Meanwhile the unloading had continued. The waves formed
up when ready and were convoyed in near the shore by the three
guide boats.
First contact was at 0523 on PLUE BEACH where a search light was
turned on and shots were heard (probably the Scout Boat shooting
the light out). Second contact was at 0545 when shots were heard,
a red flare was lighted and a searchlight on the North jetty il-
detail which was to cut the net or boom in the mouth of the SEBOU
jackets and two Naval officers and was commanded by Lt. Col. Henney
ordered the retreat before the mission was completed.32 This report
will now trace the actions of the three Battalion Combat Teams.
BLUE BEACH rather than on BLUE and YELLQN as planned. They moved
1045, they occupied the initial beachhead and set up road blocks
French tanks and infantry which resulted in our loss of two anti-tank
124
Key:7
7.
\ ~KPOUR 12
NUNN&T~
ID7
7~k
7'
4OAL P oswq
rct G
r
Sli
XA
\\
2K. 7
YELLOW
squads and French loss of three tanks. The remainder of the 1st
BCT advanced North about 2000 yards along the ridge East of the
..
lagoon, where it was stopped by machine gun and mortar fire about
noon. The hostile machine guns were located and removed by mortar
and Naval gunfire late in the afternoon. The Battalion dug in and
outposted its position for the night. Just prior to dark, General
Truscott visited the ist BCT and ordered contact with the 2d Bat-
talion, 2000 yards to the North, and an advance at dawn on the airport,
He also told ist BCT that the Force Reserve was on'its way to report
and that the 3d ALT would take over protection of the South flank.
was 5-7 feet high. Two assault companies advanced toward the
Lnd the SAVANNAH. "These ships were attempting to silence the two
138 mm guns before they could molest the transports."34 After much
confusion the Battalion crossed the lagoon, occupied the high ground
South of the lighthouse and cleared the area around the KASBA. By
the airport, before reduction of the KASBA had been completed, and
cinity of the native village and drove it back to the slopes South
125
sustained, artillery and anti-tank weapons had not arrived, and the
Battalion was in danger of being cut off from the beaches. Quickly
..,The Battalion CO, seeing that the fire was coming from
the immediate vicinity of the river, decided to land his entire
Battalion on RED BEACH. Unfortunately, the landing boats failed
to make the corr ct turn and the entire Battalion landed four
miles North....
The Battalion moved rapidly inland from the point of landing and by
moving the vehicles from the beach until late evening when a road
and AT guns did not arrive until 1400 the following day. Owing to
the fact that the rubber boats had been left in the half-tracks at
the beach, the Battalion made no serious attempt to cross the river,
command of the infantry and anti-tank elements there with the mis-
sion of holding . rench forces South of Route 214 East of the lagoon.
Only seven tanks had been landed because there were only seven tank
landing craft and these were able to make only one trip due to the
surf.
126
Naval gunfire suoport during the day consisted of counter
sage wia.s sent to admral Kelly informing him of the situation and
to SFCPs.
the first day were the bre,@kdoin in signal cormmnunication and the
movement of the transports 15 miles out to sea when fired on. Lack
sive time for trips by landing craft so that the unloading proceeded
slowly.
127
...Conditions on the beaches during the night presented
a scene of undescribable confusion. Surf was rising so that
about half the craft landing were not able to retract, Exit
from beaches was possible only for track vehicles, vehicles
and stores were piling up so fast the shore party could hardly
keep them above high water mark. Elements supposed to land on
GREEN BEACH or to land later when BRON BEACH might be open
were landing on BLUE BEACH, wandering around seeking their re-
spective units in darkness broken only by the glare of naval
signal lamps and flashlights to seaward... 3
light, and by 0830 was on the high ground South of the Iv'EHDIA-
South of this road and in the woods to the East, it made no fur-
70th Tank Battalion was detached from 3d ALT about 1430, ordered
not renew its advance until 2300, after receipt of further orders
result of the preceding days fight and each company could ac-
count for only 30-50 men. Several ineffective attempts were made
attempts to seize OCRFEN BEACH were repulsed and the French de-
tachments were driven from the ridge West of the lagoon. Trenches
128
South of the KASBA were cleared during the day, largely through
opened fire and silenced machine guns on the hills overlooking the
rubber boats late in the afternoon, Company I was pushed across the
river to the vicinity of the airport, but withdrew and dug in on the
and led them into position on foot. Just after gettig into
These French tanks were from the re~serve at RABAT,, 41 They took hull
defilac *oesr tons and opened fire at about 100 to 300 yards range,
The F-_- rchi _,r_ cold not penetrate the front ermor of the US light
which placed 5-inch1 shells from the SAVAHN-IAH on the French tanks.
129
Four French tanks were destroyed and the rest withdrew. For his
to his DSC. About 0815 Company C, 70th Tank Battalion and one sec-
the 70th's tanks were knocked out when they were ambushed by French
tanks.. The French waited until they could fire at the side of the
tanks reappeared but were again driven off after several hours running
fight. Company C,. 70th Tank Battalion was detached at about 1430 to
PORT LYAUTEY.
very bad, some 18 feet high, so that more than 70 landing craft
were lost on the beaches. When landing had to stop late in the
afternoon, the imperative necessity for taking the KASBA and opening
the river the following morning was obvious. The naval detail to
remove the net was again requested and successfully accomplished the
mission under fire about 0230. Heavy rains during the latter part
130
Operations D plus 2 (T, sdy, 10 Fov 4
toward the airport at 2300, 1 ond-y night Progress was slow due
their attack all units of the 1st Battalion lost direction to such
an extent teat only Company r was a-ble to find its way back to the
enemy machine guns near the POhT LYA 'UTEY- LBthII Road and had taken
them out in the dark with bayonct'sz Later those two companies had
lost direction and found thmos e2;.vos at daylight near the South edge
of tow;n, They had taken many pris oners from the 1st and 7th Regiment
Commander got separa Led froni his unit. Next morning he was captured,
but later escaped and made his way back. 45 Some time after daylight,
Howitzers during the night, attacked about 0625, The attack drove
machine gun and mortar fire from the Fort, Dive bomber attack was
131
to indicate target. "Bombers came over, recognized the target and
Planes were on air alert at the time. Our troops were within 100
yards of the point of impact of the bombs when they struck. This
attack took place at 1050 and upon completion the 2d BCT was ordered
noon of the 9th, (Monday) however, due to swamp, a very black night and
enemy artillery, the company dug in on the river bank to wait for day-
light. Shortly after daylight, Tuesday, the company seeing the DALLAS
moving up the river, advanced on the airport and assisted the Raider
During the night the remainder of the Battalion had worked East of the
airport and attacked the bridge fNortheast of PORT LYAUTEY. The bridge
was heavily guarded by French artillery and machine guns and the 3d
Battalion was forced back to the North. This artillery fired on the
DALLAS the following morning but she quickly silenced it with 5-inch
guns. Naval fire support from off shore and dive bombers assisted in
bridge. "The two Eastern spans of the bridge were blown out by the
7
French at 1007,"4
nore tanks, the Reconnaissance Platoon and one platoon of 443 CA (AA)
132
were landed and joined the 3d ALT' before daylight. No enemy action
moving North on the RABAT-PORI' LYAUTEY Road. Six of our tanks were
sent East of the road into the woods. They were accompanied by two
behind the ridge West of the road, Fourteen French tanks remained
on the road and six went into the woods where they were attacked
by our six tanrks and tvwo assault guns. The French were driven back
on the road to the South,0 Naval gunfire wes placed on their po-
the South. Again naval gunfire as placed on their position and they
were forced to withdraw South. IYaone of our tanks were damaged by enemy
action, It was estimated thca4t the enemy lost seven tanks, four by our
fire and three byr naval gunfire. About 1600 four tanks were or-
possible enemy cavalry troops. No enemy were located and the patrol
was sent out again and contacted elements of the 1st Battalioin. No
North and East of PORT LYAUTEY. "WPhen it was learned that the PORT
LYAUTEY' field was secured Lt. Col. William-1L-. MIomyers P-4Os were
the airport.
133
Logistics. With the clearing of the KASBA and the airport
and opening of the net across the SEBOU, the river was opened for
traffic and both BROWN BEACH and the airport (BROJw 2) could be
used for landing more troops and supplies. "During the afternoon
lowing morning. At 0200 a message was received from our G-2, then in
.' the hands of the French, that Major General Mathenet had orders to
cease all resistance, and desired to see General Truscott at any time
0800, 11 November 1942. Orders were issued to cease firing and re-
Cessation Of Hostilities
134
far as we were concerned it was not a question of French sur-
possible means; that our sole purpose was to strike at the common
enemy, the Axis Powers, and all who stood with them; that French
areas not occupied by American troops, pledging only that they would
and use of the port by American forces. Except for the latter, each
side was to remain generally in the area occupied at the time. This
in the PORT LYAUTEY sector, This report will now concern itself
1.35
NOTES FC1 CHAPTER 7
31ajor
Carl E. Bledsoe, "Observer Report"., p 5
4y
4As o called 60th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), divided
into three Battalion Combat Teams (BCT).
5
Brigadier General Lucian K. Truscott Jr., "Operations
Report, Sub-Task Force GOALPOST,"from 8-ll
Nov 42, Appendix E..
6
M1orison, op cit, History US Naval Operations, p 116.
7
See BROWIN and BRON 2 WACHES on Figure 11.
9
lbid, passim.
10,
Morison, op cit, History US Naval Operations, p 117.
1 2
Ibid, passim.
13
bid, Appendix B.
16bid, Appendix B.
1 7Ibid, Appendix B.
1
Ib, Opn 0 No 1, par 3.
19
Ibid, Opn 0 No 1, par 3f.
20
Ibid, Opn 0 No 1, par 3g.
136
21
Morison, opoit, History US Naval Operations, p 117.
22
Tru.cott 00i Operations Report, Annex 4 to Opn 0
No 1, Naval Gunfire Plan.
23
Ibid, Operation Order No 1, par 3e(l)(c)
2
;esley Frank-Craven and Jaines Lea Cate, The Army Air
Forces in World War II Vol II (Chicago, University of Chicago
press, 191+9 ; 'p 75:
2
5Morison, op cit, History of US Naval Operations, p 11.'
26m
±ruscott, op cit, Operation Report, Admin-0 No 1.
27
Bledsoe, op cit, Observer Report, p 17.
2
$Truscott, op cit, Operation Report, Annex 1 to Admin 0 No 1
29
Bledsoe, o cit, Observer Report, passim:
30
Ibid, p 5,
31
Truscott, op cit, Operation Report, p 7,
3 2 Morison, op cit, History of US Naval Operations, p 122.
33
Ibid, p 122.
3 Ibid, p 124.
35
1id, p 122.
3
8Ibid, pp 126-127; and Truscott, op cit, Operation Report,
p 10.
3 9Brigadier
General Harry H. Semmes, Personal Letter to
Chief of Committoe No. 25, 30 December 1949.
40
bid, passim.
41
Colonel Percy G. Black; G-2 of Western Task Force, Personal
Letter to Lt. Col. Jack F. Willie., 28 February 1950.
137
~Truscott, op ct,. Cpe ration Report, :Item 9,. Operations
3d ALT, p 1.
43Q c t, Ins-tructiona1 Phramplet, p 17,
441'i~dp 3-7..
45 Tr.scott,
op ci GOperat ion Report, Item 3 , Operations
1st BCT, p 6.
46 Ibd 2
49
4Craven and Cafe, op olt, Trhe . rnV Air Forces in World Tear II,
p 77.
138~
CHAPTER 8
Conclus ions
was available for planning and training; and that equipment was at
the uncertain reaction of the enemy posed problems which are not
ing.
soon after the assault waves. The armor-protected fire power and
The reason more tanks were not used was primarily due to a shortage
of landing craft. Tanks must land over the beaches and be immned-
as hostile armor appeared upon the scene, tanks can render close
139
erected by the enemy to delay the advance of the infantry. Tank
on enemy positions located near the beach. Once hostile tanks ap-
force.
the enemy may, and most probably will, destroy or seriously damage
all port facilities within the threatened area, plans must be made
140
made available to the arim orod units ashore to procure their POL
rcqu iro gents, The mere fact that fuel and lubricants are available
that force inland rath er than along the coast. As it was, the bulk
Arr -iored units of combat comand size and larger are well
141
particular action, (attack on MAZAGAN), also illustrates several
as:
mission.
it had as major fighting elements, one light tank battalion, one med-
142
In the landings at PORT LYAUTEY-EHDIA, tanks were used
support weapon.
avoidable changing of plans at high level after the loading had be-
Recommendations
ing every year. Tank and infantry units must work together on these
fire, and tank fire. While overhead fire may be dangerous, it will
pay off. An observer report states that the fire of friendly guns
affected the tankers less than the infantry possibly "due to the
fact they (tankers) were more accustomed to the larger guns firing."
oarting the near shore. There is no time for this on shipboard due
143
to security restrictions, Troops must have the eapons they are
landis took place there wefas tho natural priority call for combat
means to operate. The lesson from this woas, and is, to always load
a unit1 s organic equip _mnt on the same ship on zhich the unit travels;
vent spipttinxg all the eggs in one baskt t and the loss of that item
continuous.
14l-.
Boats should be pooled and under centralized control. Con-
unload other supplies. The loss of time by boats standing off await-
on the beaches and docks not only created a bottleneck but a decided
14 5
Transport Quartermasters should be superior officers, thor- -
units making the landing. The average officer does not know much
about the combat loading of ships, nor can he learn this in two
Such TQV's (maritime) should remain with that ship and load it, un-
ment and supplies be on hand when the actual loading is executed and
personnel.
146
In summation, the lessons learned from the TORCH operation
forms before this operation and some are even today prevalent in
extent the same problems, and such problems are not unique to the
so encountered can be solved long before the first troops hit the
beaches. The answer is training and good sound planning coupled with
violent application.
147
APPENDIX I
ORDER OF BATTLE
I. Friendly Forces
2d Armored Dvision
603d TD Battalion
609th TD Battalion
702d ID Battalion
58th FA Bn
62d FA Bn
3d Infantry Division
Co A, 36th Amb Bn
3d Ord Co (IMMl)
Co A, 23d. i Regt
Co C, 67th QPI Bn
Co D, 67th QVI Bn
144th CD Co (Trk)
71st Sig Co
72d Sig Co
FRIEN DLY ORDER OF BATTLE BY TASK FORCE
60th Im Regt
60th FA Bn
3d Infantry Division
(1) SAFI
Two Cols, 2d Foreign Legion Inf
ATO Btry s,
To 2d Fore ign Legion kirty (8-75mm H-ow)
"No Ca'
1s, 2d Moroccan Riflemen
(2) Y TU4MECH
b. F~iDALA area
TERRAIN 4_'A'ALYSIS
personal files.
O 9
52 Terrain.
a, Roadnet.
Inasmuch as the railway only serves a limited part
of French 1,orocco, the roads wore designed as main system
of land-communication. Principal groupings are as follows;
1
n arterial road connecting the Atlantic ports, run-
ning m ostlyT along the coast from Agadir northwards,
and into Tangier,
xcellent roads running inland from ports and serving
great inland town of Marrakech, Mdeknes, and Fez.
Roads traversing the Atlas Foothills; crossing the
Atlas passes.
Secondary roads and tracks serving fertile coastal
areas.
Main Roads--Routes Principales; usually 16 to
20 feet wide and designed to take heavy loads. Will
take two-way military traffic except at bridges and
railway crossings which are usually one-vay. Bridge
crossings represent the main military hazards as they
could easily be sabotaged.
Secondary Roads--Routes Secondaire; about 1321
feet wide, reasonable heavy duty.
Tracks--Pistes--Trails that are cleared and
maintained. Not usable as a rule during rainy weather.
The Moroccan roadnet is d ense, well maintained, and
exceptionally suitable for ilitary traffic. Only possible
bottlenecks occur at river crossings where bridges, as a
rule, are one-way.
From a defensive point of view the roads provide ways
of rapid reinforcement to endangered areas, and in event
of successful beachheads, enemy mechanized progress could
be retarded by destruction of key bridges, particularly on
thle coastal roads and river crossings.
The river Oued-Rbia emptying above Mazagan is a serious
obstacle, crossed byr high bridges. The remaining rivers
are subject to deep water during wrinter mothis only. Hey-
ever, thre crossings of all these, due to deep gorge spanning,
are bottlenecks of transport at all seasons,
Immndiate objective of an invasion force after landing
must be the securing of the vital bridges and thereafter the
important crossroads.
All Routes Principales are good for twro-wray military
traffic. Secondary Routes may be too narrow, for standard
American military traffic, Pistes or trails are all one-
Way.
0. 'stacles.
l: 8o.
Southsido of river, inside of break~water. Fairly
steep gradient as it goes into ship charel.
'Width up to 100 yds, length about 200 yds. Approach
to tov.n- steep and over seawtali.
No. 6. Starts lI
One beach divided by rocks offshore.
No. 7.* midles north of breakwater. Rock in center, each
part Z mile, 4Efoot line, 300 yds offshore. Heavy
surf, probably7 covered at high tide,
October 2, 1:142
Tnitl1s
TO: The Comrnending, Genermls,
2d Arnmored Division; tii l .
Fort Br~gg, VForth Cr onia
*Fci & Ho~ Det Cora- 3324-A Ft.Brrg ;, N.C. CGl, 2d Armd 7 21 7 17-1
bet Comd "B3" 2d Div (3.-1-42)
A rmd. Div (less
det)
*2d Bri 67th .I md 3Z4-B Ft. Bregg, Y1.0. CG, 2d A'rmd 21 277 67 17-2?5
.Regt (w/'etchd Div (7-1-)
Fled (reirf) )
(less Co F)(lss
dots)
*Co B, 41st Armd 3,324-C Ft. rpgg, V.0. CG(T, 2d A rm d 5 164 22 7-27
Irf (less dot) TA V (3-1~-42)
*2d. Plat, Co, C, 82d 3324-F Fit Brogg,, IT.C, CGrt, 2d Prmd 2 44 12 17-37
Armd Ron Bn(reinf) Div (3,..42 )
3. Personnel
b., CuIefied pe:;,,onne1 not mrking the movement wvill be reported to the
next higher herdi-urr'71rs for disnositionG
5,; All personnel affected by this order will be informed that they
will continue to 'heve meil adrrssod rs et present until r-ePeipt of further
Instructions.
re^0d Seor7et".
9. Intutoson Clothi ng, Es-uipment, Supplies r nd Ammnunition.
(p) iDeductions:
Ceps,- winter
Drewers, wool
Over: hoes, rotic
Comfoters, cotton-fillerd
UNC.4IIE
- Additi i:
Glovns, wool on (one nrir ner PA, ^ totrl of two)
Shpes, srrvice (one, nhir ner FT' ^ totrl of thrrr)
S ocks, 1ight wool (threenpi r r r r EU , rtot-lI of s ix)
Blpnke.ts, wool. OD (one nr r ind tvi.du-l, r totel1 of thre e)
(Heirniets, stepl, IMl only ill1 br tekrn)
(b) Det, 142d Prmored Si~gnr1 comn!-n~y rnd Fie . He Det Coribe-t
Commend "B3", 2d !rind Dizv will trko su~ch -prrt of thn orprnizetionrJ. Fruiprnert
of the perent unfits rsd~mr n(ec, ssrry by the Copmrmdin-a Officers thrrrof,
-5-
°y (4) ~Pers -nnrl i.n this movremernt will be rrmridA with not morA thin
one~ worreon ips follows:
(1) A list
of the orgrni zr tonel eruiemrt trk, . by IDtf hrnic r~
indicrte d in pr rgrrenh 9 r (2) (b) rbbve will be m dp 'brthe- Commrn~art~g
of the per(,nt unit# Two copies of the- lists will be furri shed thu orverU
Gener-l, Services' of Supply, the Port Comm'iid'rs end the Force Co-mrndr.
(2) Tho tote l weight-, ou'bege '-nd plr ce of storrege of rni eeutpment
end supplies merked for shipmrrt to eeo% Port of Embrrketion for this force
will be report(-d to the Commrnding Gen r^1, Services of Supply; the Port
Comrnders Pnd the F.orce Coinninder.
s/ J.A. Ulio
J. A. UU@a,
Mjor Genera! 1,
The .Adjutrmt Generel1.
2 Inclosures
Incl. No. 1 - Instructions Applicr'ble to Units
Ordered Oversees (:frevis ion, of
September 1. 1942) (furnished eddr(essors,
stet nns, end units conet~rrd only)
Inol. No. 2 - (1Annex)
COPIES FURj'IS 1E.D:
The Commending Genelsl1
Army Groun~d Forcens; Srrices of 'Supply;
Fourth Servicr Commrnd;
Alp for Gpnerr l E. N. IHr rmon;
Chief, Armored Force;
The Chiefs of Supply Servic-s, Srrvilcrs of "upply;
The Chief of Trensport- ti.on Corps, Servicps of Supply;
The Divisions of the T'r D-prrtment
Genprrl. Strff. 7
Annex to IM1ovement 0rd~rs, Shipment 3324
UT\ TT Off
VTO E1 ye
Ho& Ho Det Combtt Cmd "tB"
2d Armnd Div (less det) 7 21 7
GROUP? 2
Det. Ho & Ho Co, 67th. Prmd Rrgt 2 14 1.7
Det. Co D, 67lth Armd Regt 1 21 20
Det. Co E, 67th Armid Regt 1 19 19
Det. Co B, 41st Armd Inf 1 19 22
1.P1. Co I,
41st Armnd Inf (less det) 1 24 0
12
Det, 2d P1. Co C, 82d Armd En 0 11
Det. 2d P1. Co C, 17th Armnd Pngr Bn 0 1 1
5th P1. Btry C, 443d Sep CA En (AA) (1+M) (M) 1 34 9
Det, 142d Lrmd S~ig Co 0 0 2
Det. 2d Bn S~'o T~ri.nt Co 67th A rmnd Regt. 0 2 0 .
Totr 1 Group, 2 ~ ' 45 102
UNCLASSWFIEb
(2) Tho units flnd detrchm~ents. in this shi mpnt will tyke such
orgeni rpetionrl end other ruthoriked erruiortent rs
is deeraeid necess-cry by the
Comm-onding. Generrl, 2d l'rmor"Ad Division. Other'e~uipment, vehicles end
their lords will be shi-ned r
s deterrnkned by the Commrnding General, 2d
Prmored Division, rfter consultiltion with the Commrnding Generel, New York
Port' oc kmberkction.
h (3) The following Pdd~tionel itemns will rlso be trken:
(4) P'~rsonnel in this novement will be Prred with not more then
one weapon as follows-:
Yone
Pistols, nutometic Mem~bers of terk crewis rnd drivers of
self-nrooelled miounts only
-Officers of fPld -rd cornp'rry grr-de,
I~ cc 1.45 wrrr-nt offi cers, NICO's of ' 1st three
grhdes (not technioirns) Ell now, ruth-.
orized r rPistol tnder T/BI~ or specirl
list of e. Mior nt, rnd EM now ruth"
orized guans, pub-r,,chine crl-..45
Rifles, c;-l. .30 .. All othe~r R4 of the units --x^(-pt
141903 Medicel p'rrsonr'el
,
Mrsrke d: 3 324-.W-MF D
ON IFIED
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by Authority
MFIED of' Par 2Y, DCi~r ul r 150 dated
TAS I 3M /4
200 lb s
5 lb cons or 25 lb n-ils
Grpo'se, Wrter Ptlmo #1 (2-.109) in 1 10 lb s
lb c-rns
d. Other Instructions.
(3) The totpi w-eight, cubrgne rrd nl'ce of storrge of ell eruip-
ment end supplies nrer-red for shirmernt to the ?-)rt if
Erb~rkrtior for this
movement will be reported to the Comrrnding Generrl, Services of' supply
e nd the Port Commrrnder.
(4) S ep^ rpte irnstructions' coney rn lng the lording of the force
will be issued by the Wf-r Depertment.
THOW4PS T. HA;,DY
Assistrnt Chief ofSte.ff
Op err~tions Division,W.D.G.S.
OFFICIAL:
s/ J. A. Ulio
J. A . U11:1
Msjor Gen Frn l
The Adjutnnt Gener&1.
1.Inclosure-
Inc #1.. -instructions An-picenble yo
Units Ordered Oversees.
(Revisions of Septe'mber 1, 1942)
(furnished Addrpss'hes,Sti'tion end
Units concerned, only)
COIES FLJRrISH D:
The Comme~nding Genrr is,
Army Ground Forces;
Services of Sunoly;
Fourth Service Commpnd;
Ft.. Bra gg, 'N.C.
The Chief of the A~rmored Force;
Distribution Division, SOS;
Ple~ns Division, SOS;
M'ovements Brsench, Plenm Division, 50 ;
The Divisions of'the W~r Deprrtment Generr. Steff.
Epch Stp'tlon Listed in p-r~grRph 1, FOR TNFORMlhTION ONLY.
RGRADED TiC LASI' IM byr Authority of
Par 2, MD Circular 150 dated 28 ~ 46.
Iva j CAS TAS3
Drewers, wool,,
.l.
Of A[1,ft
U SR REGRADED U4C LASSIF IUD by Authority of
Par 2,..M Ci . 150 dated 28 flay,46.
1daj. Cay.TA,
TTTOMS T. iPNDY
I!ssist-nt Chief of Stpf f
Operations Division, 'iN. D. G. S.
OFF1CIPL:
sl J. A. Ulio
J. t. UL TO
Maor Goner-1
The Adjutent Gener'-1
COPIES -FUJRIB'IS HED:
The Conrmndi.ng Gener^ls,
Lrmy Ground FPorces
Services of Suroly
Fourth Service Cor^d
Ft. Bragg, N. C.
The Chief of the Armored Force
Distribution Division, SOS
Plpns Division., SOS
M~ovements Brench', Pl~'ns Division, SOS
The Divisions of the Wr r Depp rtment
Geneorl Steff
Erch Strtion listed in pp'regreph 1,
FOR INvFOMVT I1N ONLY.
REGROAED UNCJASSIAED by Autkir~r y of Par 2, yC-"4 datcu
gg S Dt 1946. 'Ma j Cav. TAB i.
BROOKLYN, N. Y. HW,/a js
1. REFERENCE:
Secret Immedin te Action letter. from, the ,Adjutant Genera 1, WD 27.
(9..30-42)oB.S.E.Mp deteii October 2, 1942, S ubject: As rbove, To: The mmE .d..
ing General a s above, and including others.
NOTE: ATENTTON OF THE UNITS IS DIRECTED TO THE FACT T~FT B.RRaCKS BA-GS P.ND
1MCJRS'BGGEFIDRAGSADKTHNQUPN,
rA~ ASKS AND HELMETS , OINTMENT, PROTE7N V I
INIIa~
.PREN1T E, SH
EPOS,
ELL NT BE
-so
I-
ITS YDC .1ETRS
SUB41T.PS FORCE
GOAL1 POST-
21 October 1942
T1U TTG 1!EMOP2AADIJ)
1. GRBTV L
2. It is believed itht each ship is. sup-plied with certrin Tlotion pidt..
ure Training Films. As Frngerrnts should be mp de with the Executive Officer
for the use of such of these-Pfims rs rr -ppropriete.
44 Signrl Trrining,
OFF IC LA L:
A/ Van H, -pond
VAN H. BOND,
i.Nr.j or, Infantry,
AC of S, G-3
". 3q.
RE~GRADED UNCLASSIFIED by Authority of
P'ar.2 Ciroular 150 dated. 28 r.ay
OFF ICTAL:
s/ H. Wright
H.WR IGHT
Capts in, T, C,
Asst. AC of S, OPD._
DIS TRIBUJTION:
Local
1 CG, AGF
1 -CG, SOS
12. AC of S, G--2 VID
2. - " G-4
.1 - Opns. Div, 1AUD. G.S .
1 - Plans Div, S .0. S.
5 - TA G
5 - CG, End P rmored Div
5 - CG, 4th SC
5 - C of Arnored Force
1' The Surgeon General1
12. C of Ord
12. C of Fin
1 -C of ClkZ
1 -C of Eng
1-C Sig 0
2 -QMG
5 - C of T S erv
1 C of SS Br
-
2. C of Army Exr Serv
1 -IG
1 - PING
1 - CG, Ft Bragg, N.C.
6 -Old Meh Rods Div, 2nd S C
1 - Pass Branch
2.- Movements Br
5 - CO, Ft Hamilton, N.Y.
12. Lt Col Rowland
1 Major Iffllpch
2. .JAG
1 -Posta 1 Officer
2-
__ SFE WAR DEPARTMENT
COPY NO*
We shington
:AuthT T: A. G..
TO: The Comminding Generel8, In3,1 es______
2d Armored Divisions;. :Date: l.24
New York Port of Embirkti on;
The Chief of Trpnsportation Corps,
Services' of-Supply
The Chiefs of Suopiy Services
Lo It is desired ;thpt you take without delry, the Pction for which
you are responlsible to prep~re for foreign service end to move the unit
end detrchments and vehicles listed below to the New Yok~k Port of Embi'rk-
tion (for further movement- by w~ter trrnsriort-stion) 'so es to r'rri've et .-
time to be determined by the, port. cenmrnder. The Commend ing Geiaerel, New
York Port of Emberk-tidn, will inform the rg~ncies concerned of the time
end d-te unit, detrecbments rnd vehicles ocoomn-rying them rre desired Pt
the port,
5', All personnel t~ffected by this order will be informed thpt they
will continue to hnve mail addressed Ps et present until receipt of' further
instructions.
6. Movement to: the port will be' mr~de in' the ni!rner (ril pnd/or motor)
determined by the Commrdng Gener~l, 2d Armored- Division. Pttention invited
to W.D. Circular 193, 1942.