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The Quartermaster Corps Operations in The War Against Japan CMH Pub 10-14
The Quartermaster Corps Operations in The War Against Japan CMH Pub 10-14
4/2004
The Quartermaster Corps:
Operat
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
by
Alvin P. Stauffer
SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
DEPOSITORY
JUL 3 2004
Advisory Committee
Charles H. Taylor
Harvard University
General Editor of the Technical Service volumes, Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer, Deputy
Chief Historian.
. . . to Those Who Served
Foreword
This is the fourth and concluding volume of a series which records the experi-
ences of the Army's Quartermaster organization in World War II. The first two
volumes of this group describe the problems and achievements of the Quarter-
master Corps in the zone of interior and the third, still in preparation, will relate
operations in the war against Germany. This volume tells the story of Quarter-
master supply and service in the war against Japan in the Pacific. The principal
Quartermaster function during World War II was to supply items commonly
required by all Army troops —
food, clothing, petroleum products, and other
supplies of a general character — regardless of their duties. In the Pacific, as else-
where, Quartermaster supply responsibilities included the determination of re-
quirements, the procurement of the items needed both from the United States
and from and the storage and distribution of items after they
local producers,
had been received. Quartermaster troops also furnishednumerous services, in-
cluding the collection and repair of worn-out and discarded articles, the provision
of bath and laundry facilities, and the identification and burial of the dead. The
author has concentrated in this volume on the many problems which were inevi-
table in a distant and strange environment, and his narrative naturally reflects the
viewpoint of the troops and the commanders in the field.
ALBERT C. SMITH
Washington, D. C. Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
15 February 1955 Chief of Military History
The Author
Alvin P. Stauffer holds a Doctor of Philosophy degree from Harvard Uni-
versity.For seven years he taught history at Simmons College, Boston, and then
joined the staff of the U.S. National Park Service in Washington, where he
produced many studies of historic sites administered by that agency. In 1943 he
became a member of the Historical Branch, Office of The Quartermaster General.
Dr. Stauffer prepared several treatises dealing with the Quartermaster Corps in
the United States in World War II. One of these, Quartermaster Depot Storage
and Distribution Operations, has been published in the monographic series entitled
QMC Historical Studies. Since 1952 Dr. Stauffer has been Chief of the Historical
Branch, OQMG.
Preface
For that reason the needs of these readers have been constantly borne in mind.
The writer hopes particularly that the volume may furnish Quartermaster officers
with facts that will prove useful in planning future field operations and in training
Quartermaster troops.
No attempt has been made except in a very general way to tell the story of
strategic decisions and tactical actions. In a work comprising part of the historical
series on the UNITED STATES IN ARMY WORLD WAR
II, that story
would have been redundant. A consistent effort has been made to analyze
Quartermaster activities in the three major territorial commands in the Pacific,
whether these activities were conducted at higher headquarters, in base sections,
or by Quartermaster troop units in support of combat operations. As the area
in which the U.S. Army played its most important role in the war against Japan,
the Southwest Pacific Area has been treated at greater length than have the two
other major territorial commands —
the South Pacific Area and the Central Pacific
—
Area but these areas are by no means neglected and many of their activities are
dealt with in detail. In order to clarify the perplexing production and trans-
portation problems presented to quartermasters as they procured, stored, and
distributed supplies and equipment, this volume gives considerable attention to
economic matters. At times the account of the activities of the Corps may appear
lacking in homogeneity, but this impression is unavoidable in view of the wide
diversity of Quartermaster tasks.
It should not be concluded from a reading of those sections which contain
detailed descriptions of some of the troubles encountered in distribution activities
that these difficulties were typical. They are discussed at length only because they
demanded so large a share of the time and energy of supply officers and presented
knotty problems not susceptible of easy solution. If the reader is occasionally
tempted to think that distribution activities were usually marred by inadequate
Pacific problems, and keen sense of literary refinement, this volume would have
been far less substantial than it is. The writer is also greatly indebted for sound
advice and constructive criticism to Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer, Deputy Chief Historian
in the Office of the Chief of Military History during the writing of this manuscript,
and to his successor, Dr. Stetson Conn. Some thirty officers, most of whom had
participated in the activities of the Quartermaster Corps in the Pacific, read all
or part of the manuscript. Of these officers, Col. James C. Longino, Assistant
Quartermaster of the Sixth Army in the war against Japan, and Brig. Gen. Herbert
A. Hall, formerly chief of the Management Division in the Office of The Quarter-
master General and now commanding general of the Utah General Depot, made
particularly valuable recommendations.
Mrs. Charlesette Logan, Mr. Irvin R. Ramsey, Miss Helene M. Bell, and Mrs.
Hadasel W. Hill of the Historical Branch, Office of The Quartermaster General,
in addition to typing many performed the arduous task
drafts of the manuscript
and interpolations made by the author.
of interpreting the countless deletions
Special acknowledgments must be made to Mr. Joseph R. Friedman and
his aides in the Editorial Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History, particu-
larly Mr. David Jaffe, the editor, and Mr. Allen R. Clark and Dr. Vincent C. Jones,
the copy editors, who painstakingly prepared the manuscript for the printers; to
Maj. James F. Holly, who provided maps to guide the reader through the Pacific;
to Maj. Arthur T. Lawry and Mr. Henry U. Milne, who searched in remote
corners for the pictures with which to illustrate this volume; and to Mrs. Faye F.
McDonald and Mrs. Anne Mewha, who typed the final copy.
XI
Contents
Chapter Pag e
I. THE PHILIPPINES— THE OPENING OPERATIONS 1
Central Pacific 95
Chapter Page
INDEX 343
Maps
No. Page
1 The Pacific Areas 47
2. New Guinea Inside back cover
xiv
Illustrations
Page
Troop Formation on Bataan 16
Quartermaster Corps Baker i g
Surrender to the Japanese 33
Storage Facilities in Australia 52
Salvage and Reclamation Activities 68
Quartermaster Truck Company Motor Pool 74
Section of the Quartermaster Salvage Depot 79
Clothing and Equipage Building 39
Cannery Operations in Australia 109
Storage of Meat 114
Vegetable Market Center 119
Quartermaster Farms 131
Thatched Roof Warehouses 161
Open Storage of Quartermaster Items 163
Prefabricated Refrigerated Warehouses 167
Damaged Subsistence 179
Corrugated Fiber Cartons 181
Open Storage of Canvas Items 205
Bulk Petroleum Products Storage 216
Field Bakeries in Operation 230
Laundry Facilities in the Southwest Pacific 233
Fumigation and Bath Company 238
Salvage Operations 242
Palletized Supplies 265
Trucks Operating From the Beaches 269
Small Boats Operating Close to Shore 272
Quartermaster Pack Train 282
Class III Supply Dump 285
Camouflaged Jungle Suit 295
All illustrations in this volume are from U.S. Department of Defense files.
xv
THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS:
OPERATIONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
CHAPTER I
When Japan boldly opened war on the ding further fortification of the Philippines
United States in December 1941, the Quar- and by calling for a reduction of naval arm-
termaster Corps (QMC) in the Philippines, aments that would give Japan control of
like other U.S. Army components, was ill western Pacific waters.
1
July of a new command, the U.S. Army the strength of this force was set at 75,000
Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). It troops by 1 December 1941, at 90,000 by 1
embraced all American military activities January 1942, and at 150,000 by 1 April
in the Far East and absorbed both the Phil- 3
1942.
ippine Department, U.S. Army, and the The Philippine Army itself had scarcely
Commonwealth Army, which was to be any supplies or equipment. For this lamen-
mobilized in force and integrated into the Commonwealth Govern-
table situation the
service of the United States.
ment as well as the United States was re-
Implementation of this ambitious defen- sponsible. That government had in fact
siveprogram required huge quantities of
American equipment and supplies, partic-
2
( 1 ) Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines,
ularly for the Philippine forces, which were
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
designed to be the major source of military (Washington, 1953 ), pp. 8-30, 61-71. (2) Maurice
manpower. They were to furnish about Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for
Coalition Warfare, UNITED STATES IN ARMY
150,000 men by 1 April 1942, when the WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 2-3.
combined strength of American ground and (3) Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar
made elaborate plans for the future defense poses, but that body did not take favorable
of the islands asan independent state, but action on this proposal until after Pearl
its implementation of these plans had pro- Harbor. 4
ceeded slowly and in early 1941 the regular All this meant that in the summer of 1941
military establishment included only a few USAFFE had no funds for expenditure in
thousand troops. There were somewhat the United States in behalf of the Common-
more than 100,000 reservists, but as a whole wealth forces. When it became necessary to
they had received only inadequate training. obtain supplies from the United States for
Creation of a truly modern army would the hastily assembling Filipino soldiers, the
have put an almost unbearable strain on Chief Quartermaster was thus unable to
the limited financial resources of so poor a requisition supplies direct from the depot
land as the Philippines. Throughout the at San Francisco, as was the normal prac-
1 930's the Commonwealth Government tice. Instead he submitted his requisitions to
had consistently maintained that as long as the OQMG. Since this office also had no
the United States retained political control money for the Philippine Army, it sent them
and with it power to determine whether the on to the Chief of Staff. Though he author-
Filipinos were at peace or war, that country ized the needed purchases with special U.S.
had the primary obligation for defense. Ac- Army from the President's
allocations
tually, after the Tydings-McDuffie bill be- Emergency Fund, the unusual procedure
came law, the United States had not only held up approval of the requisitions until
done virtually nothing to strengthen the is- after the Filipino forces had begun mobili-
5
lands' defenses but had established the prin- zation on 1 September. Even within the
ciple that American funds for equipping islands the OCQM
was hampered in its
and supplying Filipino forces could be spent procurement of supplies for these forces by
only in the archipelago and only under the the requirement that the Commonwealth
supervision of the Commonwealth. Worst Government approve all contracts for "open
of all, it had appropriated no money for market'' purchase or manufacture. Never-
these forces even under these narrow con- theless a considerable number of such con-
ditions. In August 1940 and on several sub- tracts were made for articles of outer
6
sequent occasions President Manuel Quezon clothing.
had appealed to the American government In addition to sending requisitions for
to make available the credits that for some Filipino requirements to the United States
years had been accumulating in the U.S. the OCQM submitted others covering the
Treasury both from duties levied on Philip-
pine sugar imported into the United States
*
( Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines:
1 )
18,000 to 22,000 troops. Among the food OCQM had investigated the availability in
items requisitioned were dehydrated vege- the Philippines of items that would be par-
tables and boneless beef, both of which, re- ticularly useful for support of combat troops
cent tests in the archipelago showed, had in wartime. It found that no steel drums
special value in combat. 7 for distributing gasoline in the field could be
Though low shipping priorities had been obtained. Nor were there any individual
assigned to such Quartermaster supplies as rations for soldiers who might be cut off
food, clothing, and items of general utility, from their normal sources of supply. On
most of the articles requisitioned for the learning this General Drake immediately
Regular Army and the Scouts arrived before requisitioned 500,000 C rations and enough
the Japanese invasion. The situation was 55-gallon drums to handle 1,000,000 gal-
quite different with respect to defense re- lons of gasoline. Both drums and combat
serve and Philippine Army supplies. Early rations had high shipping priorities and ar-
in October the War Department notified rived at Manila late in June. Gasoline had
Brig. Gen. Charles C. Drake, the Chief not been requisitioned. Nor was it included
Quartermaster, that the first shipment on in the defense reserves since there were am-
his requisitions for these supplies would ar- ple commercial stocks in the Philippines and
rive in Manila late in the month and that the local oil companies had agreed to meet
shipments would continue until the follow- all emergency requirements. The War De-
ing spring. General Drake obtained suffi- partment nevertheless filled the drums with
cient wharfage in the Manila Port Terminal gasoline before they were shipped. Its ac-
Area to discharge the vessels, but the ship- tion proved very fortunate, for when the
ment did not arrive at the scheduled time. defenders of Luzon withdrew to Bataan in
Nor did it come late in November when a late December, they had little more gaso-
10
convoy was again expected. At the begin- line than was in the filled drums.
ning of hostilities, it was at sea, bound for When the drums reached Manila from
the Philippines, and was then diverted to the United States, the OCQM
put them
Australia to lessen the danger of capture by with the rations in defense reserve storage
8
the Japanese. No Quartermaster supplies at Fort William McKinley on the eastern
requisitioned for the Commonwealth Army outskirts of Manila; at Fort Stotsenburg,
and the defense reserves ever reached the sixty-five miles northwest of Manila; and
Philippines. When war came, the defense re- at Camp Limay in Bataan on the shores
7
of Manila Bay. The latter installation served
(1) Drake Rpt, p. 3. (2) Morton, Fall of
Philippines, pp. 62-63. as the principal depository for defense re-
8
Typescript Monograph, James R. Masterson,
U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Drake Rpt, p. 3.
Area, 1941-1947, p. 2. OCMH, 1949. Ibid., p. 4.
.
Preparations, pp. 413, 428-45. (2) Henry L. Stim- storing Quartermaster supplies on Bataan.
son and McGcorge Bundy, On Active Service in
Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers
1948), pp. 388-89. "Drake Rpt, pp. 5, 21; App. A, Rpt, Col
,n
( 1 ) Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Irvin Alexander, Sup Problems of USFIP, p. 1
Diaries (New York: William Morrow and Co., App. E, Rpt, Col Richard G. Rogers, Traffic Con-
1946), p. 24. (2) Wainwright, Story, p. 13. trol Opns, p. 4.
THE PHILIPPINES— THE OPENING OPERATIONS 7
As a result, when M Day arrived for the army, or communications zone Quarter-
Philippines on 8 December, the Corps in- master units were scheduled to be inducted
stead of beginning the movement of sup- as such into this force until the spring
plies to the peninsula as the discarded plan of 1942, and none had been mobi-
so
had directed, accelerated shipments to the lized when A school was
hostilities started.
advance depots and to the railheads and set up at Manila in November, primarily
motorheads of the fighting forces. 18 Stocks for the instruction of Philippine Army di-
originally designed largely for the defense of vision quartermasters in the handling of
Bataan were now scattered over much of supplies, but this enterprise bore little fruit,
central and southern Luzon. For some days for all division quartermasters were then at-
the only Quartermaster supplies on Bataan tending a command and staff school at
were those sent to Camp Limay several Baguio, and only subordinate officers were
months before. sent to Manila.
From the very beginning of hostilities the Though the Far East Air Force of about
activities of the Corps in Regular Army and 8,000 men received from the United States
Philippine Scout organizations were handi- during the summer and fall two truck com-
capped by the small number of experienced panies and two light maintenance com-
Quartermaster officers and enlisted men. In panies, these units did not come under the
Fort McKinley; the 65th and 66th Pack Quartermaster functions for almost 100,000
Troops at Fort Stotsenburg; the 34th Light men in the Regular Army, the Philippine
19
Maintenance Company at the Army Port Scouts, and the Philippine Army.
Area in Manila; and the 74th Field Bakery Since a trained Quartermaster force
Company at Fort McKinley. In addition, amounting to at least 4 percent of the total
each military station had separate American troop strength was usually recognized as es-
and Philippine Scout Quartermaster de- sential to efficient supply operations in the
tachments. These detachments had about field, the force actually available, consti-
700 enlisted men all together but they had tuting only slightly more than percent, fell 1
no assigned Quartermaster officers not serv- far below the desired quota. Quartermaster
ing also in other administrative posts. At this responsibilities, moreover, still included ex-
lime Quartermaster troops of the Regular tensive motor, rail, and water transportation
Army and the Philippine Scouts totaled ap- functions that, within a few months, were to
proximately 35 officers and 1,000 enlisted be transferred to the Ordnance Department
men. By 8 December the number of officers and the newly organized Transportation
had been increased to 90 by calling local Corps. Believing that if a large number of
reservists and by detailing line officers. En- experienced officers and men were not
listed strength then amounted to about 1,200 secured before hostilities started, "we would
men, an increase of approximately 200. be lost in the inevitable rush and confusion,"
The manpower situation in the Common- Drake on several occasions during the sum-
wealth Army was much worse. No corps, mer and fall had informed The Quarter-
War came four months sooner than Gen- of stocks from the United States, the
eral MacArthur had anticipated. The Phil- major prewar source of supply, proved in-
ippine Army was still scarcely more than possible; even procurement from neighbor-
half mobilized; only a fraction of the planes, ing islands was hazardous. Thus outside
supplies, and equipment necessary for the sources furnished only a diminishing trickle
ers had been unable in the few weeks avail- a significant replenishment of dwindling
Rainbow Plan to stores.
able after the revision of
finish the preparation of new plans of their There were approximately 10,000,000
own. MacArthur nevertheless hoped that gallons of gasoline in commercial storage on
advance of the enemy from his landing Bataan," The Quartermaster Review (hereafter
cited as QMR), XXVI (November-December
20
Ibid., pp. 9-10. 1946), 12-15, 60, 63.
THE PHILIPPINES—THE OPENING OPERATIONS
Rail tank cars from Manila supplied the if he took the goods. 23 Another incident of
centers, which in turn supplied some thirty far-reaching importance involved the pro-
issue points set up along the main traffic curement of rice. Since there were only
arteries out of Manila. Tank trucks, drums, small military stocks of this vital commod-
22
and cans were all used in these operations. ity,both the Quartermaster Depot and the
In Manila, the largest commercial stor- advance depots bought as much as they
age center in the Philippines, the Quarter- could from local sources. To their dismay
master Depot exploited local supply sources they discovered that rice could not be re-
to the maximum. It stressed particularly the moved from the province in which it had
procurement of subsistence, for from the be- been purchased because of the opposition
ginning it realized that food might become of the Commonwealth Government. Ten
critically scarce. Some was ob-
polished rice million pounds at the huge Cabanatuan
tained from Chinese merchants, and large Rice Central, enough to have fed the troops
quantities of food and other scarce supplies on Bataan for almost a year, and smaller
from ships in Manila harbor. Arrangements amounts elsewhere in consequence never
were made with Armour and Company, passed into military hands. A similar prohi-
Swift and Company, and Libby, McNeill, bition applied to sugar, large quantities of
24
and Libby to take over their stocks of which were likewise held in storage.
canned meats and other foods. In mid-December military food stocks fell
When it became obvious shortly after the substantially short of the 180-day supply
Japanese landings that Luzon might soon for 43,000 men on Bataan that was con-
come completely under enemy control, the templated as a reserve in WPO-3. Yet the
the confiscation of 2,000 cases of canned quired to get into Bataan a 180-day supply
fish and corned beef and sizable quantities
for 43,000 men. Drake was alert to the
of clothing, all of which were held in the
danger of delay and after M Day unsuc-
cessfully requested permission to start stock-
warehouses of Japanese firms. But USAFFE
ing of the peninsula. Despite this rebuff, Col.
disapproved the plan and informed Colonel
Lawrence that he would be court-martialed 23
Drake Rpt, App. A, Col Charles S. Lawrence,
22
Tarlac QM
Depot, pp. 4-5.
Drake Rpt, pp. 17-18; App. A, Rpt, Col Irvin 24
Drake Rpt, pp. 19-20; App. A, Rpt, Col Irvin
Alexander, Sup Problems of USFIP, p. 3. Alexander, Sup Problems of USFIP, p. 2
10 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Alva E. McConnell, Commanding Officer over 1 ,000 tons of Quartermaster goods for
of the Philippine Quartermaster Depot, be- Cebu City, struck a mine off Corregidor Is-
gan the movement of small quantities of land and sank within three minutes. All
food, gasoline, and oil to Bataan some days Quartermaster supplies were lost together
before the order for a general withdrawal with more than 700 persons. This shipping
25
was issued on 23 December. catastrophe, the worst suffered by Ameri-
An equally important preparatory meas- can forces during their defense of the Phil-
ure was the dispatch of a Quartermaster ippines, left the Cebu Depot wholly depend-
officer, Col. Otto Harwood, to the penin- ent upon the Quartermaster supplies that
sula with the mission of dispersing and it could procure in the industrially undevel-
27
otherwise protecting from bombing the food oped southern provinces.
and gasoline stored there the previous sum- On 23 December WPO-3 was put into
mer as part of the defense reserve. After his effect. This action meant that withdrawal
arrival at Camp Limay on 14 December, to Bataan had been decided upon. Brig. Gen.
Colonel Harwood and his Filipino laborers Richard J. Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff,
worked unflaggingly — chiefly at night in or- immediately authorized the movement of
der not to be seen by the enemy. The Amer- Quartermaster supplies to the peninsula but
ican commander selected storage points well at the same time told Drake that the basis
hidden from hostile air observers yet con- of the 180-day Corregidor supply reserve
venient for the supply of troops, locating had been lifted from 7,000 to 10,000 men
them mostly under the cover of large trees and that shipments to Bataan were not to
along the Mariveles Road, which ran across start until all shortages in the Corregidor re-
the southern end of Bataan. Fifty-five- serve had been filled. 28 Drake's first task,
gallon drums, filled with gasoline, were then, was the hurried transfer of additional
camouflaged and placed in roadside ditches. stocks from Manila to the great harbor
Colonel Harwood's work materially facili- fortress. Within twenty-four hours this as-
tated supply operations when the with- signment was completed, but a precious day
drawal Bataan began, but a general
to had been lost in beginning shipments to the
movement of rations and gasoline to the peninsula.
peninsula would have been much more help- These shipments presented what was
ful. Unfortunately, such a movement was under the circumstances the almost impos-
not ordered until nine days after Harwood sible task of moving within one week
26
arrived. enough food and other Quartermaster sup-
During this period the first and only ef- plies from widely scattered depots, motor-
fort was made to forward Quartermaster
heads, and railheads to keep nearly 80,000
items from Luzon to the new but still un-
troops in prime fighting condition for six
stocked depot at Cebu City. It ended in
months. Even with unhindered movement,
disaster on 16 December, when the motor
this would have been a hard task. It was
ship Corregidor, carrying about 1,000 pas-
sengers and a substantial cargo, including 27
Drake Rpt, p. 20; App. A, Rpt, Col Irvin
Alexander, Sup Problems of USFIP, pp. 1-2.
Drake Rpt, pp. 21-22; App. A, Rpt, Col Irvin 28
Brig Gen Charles C. Drake (Ret.), '"No
Alexander, Sup Problems of USFIP, p. 2. Uncle Sam,' The Story of a Hopeless Effort to
""
Drake Rpt, App. A, Rpt, Col Otto Harwood, Supply the Starving Army of Bataan and Corregi-
Storage of Gasoline on Bataan, pp. 1-3. dor" (typescript), pp. 2-3. Hist Br OQMG.
—
was only one fairly usable way into the pen- American state police, and were incorpo-
insula, and that was by water through Ma- rated into the Philippine 2d Division, a com-
nila Bay. Even that route was to be open bat infantry unit, assembling at Camp
for but a single week, and the Corps could Murphy near Manila.
!u
not hope to accomplish in seven days what When hostilities started, Colonel Quinn
under much better conditions would prob- tried to alleviate the shortage of trucks by
ably have taken double that time for the procuring commercial vehicles. He re-
supply of half as many men. quested all automobile dealers in Manila to
Loss of use of the Manila Railroad, run- freeze their stocks. The dealers willingly co-
ning north to Tarlac, was a particularly operated, and Colonel Quinn leased about
heavy blow, for that line constituted the 1,000 cars, mostly trucks. Few trucks in the
chief artery for evacuating stocks from ad- Philippines came with bodies; few even had
vance depots and combat areas. As early as cabs or windshields. But enough of these
1 5 December train and engine crews started parts were improvised every day to equip
to desert their jobs because of increased
thirty or forty vehicles. Yet in spite of
strafing and bombing, and by Christmas not
Quinn's tireless efforts there were never
a single locomotive was in operation. 29
enough trucks to meet military needs. The
WPO-3 had provided for a Department
Philippine Army from
in particular suffered
Motor Transport Service, and in the sum-
mer of 1941 such a service was organized the lack of these vehicles. When that army
started mobilization in September, each of
with Col. Michael A. Quinn, a Quarter-
master officer, as Department transport of- its divisions was assigned twenty trucks from
ficer and commander of the service. In ad- Regular Army stocks. These trucks were
dition to the operation and maintenance of still the only ones held by the Philippine
motor vehicles not assigned to combat units Army when the fighting began. Both Ameri-
WPO-3 had charged the Department Motor can and Filipino field commanders, uncer-
Transport Service with the local procure- tain how or from whom they could secure
ment and the assignment of commercial ve- motor transportation and fearful that they
hicles to field organizations in time of move their men and
would not be able to
emergency. But when Colonel Quinn sub- Motor
materiel, permitted their units to seize
mitted a plan for implementing this pro-
"'Ibid.,App. C, Rpt, Col Michael A. Quinn,
'"
Drake Rpt, p. 28. MTS Opns, pp. 1-3.
12 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Transport Service vehicles carrying supplies hoards of those organizations that followed
33
from Manila to motorheads in the combat his advice.
zone. Unable to halt this practice. Head- The Manila Port Terminal Area, with its
quarters, USAFFE, finally sanctioned it by ships and warehouses, was the main source
authorizing division commanders to requi- of last-minute replenishment of Quarter-
sition vehicles meet their immediate
to master stocks. Upon the declaration of war
needs. Removal of Quartermaster stocks to General MacArthur had directed Chief
Bataan therefore depended mainly upon the Quartermaster Drake to remove all militar-
willingness of combat officers to load their ilyuseful items from warehouses and freight-
31 34
trucks with food, gasoline, and clothing. ers in the harbor. The supplies thus ob-
Unfortunately, while units took all they tained were ready for shipment several days
could, they did not always take what the before the withdrawal to Bataan com-
QMC wanted. The commander of a Philip- menced. Though about fifty truckloads were
pine Scout regiment, when asked to remove evacuated from Manila by land, water
from Fort Stotsenburg whatever subsistence transportation was the chief means of get-
his unit could use, reportedly answered that ting the supplies out of the capital. The
he was "not even interested." 32 Army Transport Service, headed by Col.
Stocks in Manila and at Fort McKinley, Frederick A. Ward, collected all the tugs,
which lay along the Pasig River, seven miles barges, and launches it could find and on
above Manila Bay, could be moved fairly Christmas Day, as soon as Corregidor had
easily by water, but elsewhere the loss of rail been completely stocked, started supplies
transportation and the shortage of trucks moving to the peninsula.
points picked up some rations, but most of carrier could be towed at a speed of only
three miles an hour and the round-trip dis-
the food stocks had to be destroyed. At Fort
tance from Manila to Bataan was sixty
Stotsenburg, only thirty miles north of Ba-
miles. Few barges could make more than
taan, evacuation efforts achieved better re-
one trip in the seven or eight days available
sults, thirty to forty truckloads, consisting
before capture of the capital. In spite of this
mostiy of subsistence, being removed. Some drawback, these vessels had to be employed
gasoline was also saved, but most of it had because, with only three small piers and
to be burned. Perceiving the impossibility of
little handling equipment available on Ba-
sending all food stores to Bataan, General taan, they could be unloaded more speedily
Drake on 27 December advised field force than other craft. Even so, docking facilities
commanders by radio to build up their were so limited that only five barges could
35
stocks, especially of sugar and rice, by discharge their cargoes at one time.
foraging. This expedient, he later estimated, 33
(1) Drake, "No Uncle Sam," pp. 4-6. (2)
added several days' supply to the ration Drake Rpt, pp. 22-23, 40-44; App. A, Rpt, Col
31
Charles S. Lawrence, Tarlac QM
Depot, p. 6 App. ;
Drake Rpt, pp. 20,66-67; App. C, Rpt, Col A, Rpt, Col Irvin Alexander, Sup Problems of
Michael A. Quinn, MTS Opns, pp. 1, 3, 4, and USFIP, p. 3.
Exhibit B. 34
Drake Rpt, App. B, Rpt, Col Frederick A.
32
Drake Rpt, App. A, Col Irvin Alexander, QM Ward, ATS Opns.
35
Activities at Ft Stotsenburg, p. 2. Drake Rpt, p. 28.
THE PHILIPPINES—THE OPENING OPERATIONS 13
At Manila occasional bombings and air The petroleum products were removed, but
raid warnings hampered stowing operations. unluckily for the food supply of Bataan, the
Many stevedores fled at the first sign of Si-Kiang was bombed and sunk before the
37
hostile airplanes over the port area, and flour had been discharged.
some never returned. Radio appeals for vol- The Japanese occupation of Manila on
unteers were made, and about 200 Ameri- 2 January ended the shipment of supplies
cans and Europeans responded. Most of from the capital. Quartermaster items that
them were unused to manual labor, but they reached the peninsula after that date were
worked by the side of faithful Filipinos chiefly those stealthily brought ashore at
through the last three nights of December night from some 100 loaded barges that lay
until all possible shipments had been made. in Manila Bay between Corregidor and Ba-
Colonel Ward estimated that 300 barges taan. These barges contained sizable quan-
sent approximately 30,000 tons of supplies tities of gasoline in 55-gallon drums. There
of all technical services to Corregidor and were also a few oil-company river tankers
38
Bataan. From these shipments came the filled with that fuel.
greater part of the Quartermaster stocks in
the hands of the fighting forces. But time Status of Quartermaster Supplies on Bataan
was too limited to permit the evacuation of
more than a small fraction of the 10,000,000 The scarcity of food on Bataan was truly
gallons of gasoline in commercial storage, alarming. An inventory taken immediately
and as the Japanese approached Manila, after the defending forces had arrived there
these stocks and the gasoline stores at Fort disclosed a dismayingly low supply of a very
39
McKinley were set on fire. Substantial quan- unbalanced ration. There were at normal
tities of food that might have been shipped rates of consumption only a 50-day supply of
had more time been available were like- canned meat and fish, a 40-day supply of
wise left behind.
30 canned milk, and a 30-day supply of flour
On Bataan, Colonel Harwood was re- and canned vegetables. Of rice, there was a
sponsible for the storage of Quartermaster mere 20-day supply. Stocks of such essential
cargoes arriving from the capital between items as sugar, salt, and lard were extremely
24 December and 1 January. Among these low; coffee, potatoes, onions, cereals, bever-
cargoes were approximately 750,000 pounds ages, and and canned fruits were al-
fresh
of canned milk, 20,000 pounds of vege- most For emergency use the
totally lacking.
tables, 40,000 gallons of gasoline in 5-gallon defense reserve of 500,000 C rations was
cans, and 60,000 gallons of lubricating oils available. On such slender stores as these
and greases as well as miscellaneous food- the combined U.S. -Philippine forces hoped
stuffs.Harwood also unloaded the Si- to make a six-month stand.
Kiang, an Indochina-bound ship captured Circumstances clearly demanded severe
at sea with its cargo of approximately rationing. On 6 January half rations were
5,000,000 pounds of flour, 420,000 gallons " Drake Rpt, App. A, Rpt, Col Otto Harwood,
of gasoline, and 25,000 gallons of kerosene. Storage of Gasoline on Bataan, pp. 1-3.
38
Drake Rpt, App. A, Rpt, Maj Thomas D. Pat-
* Ibid.,App. B, Rpt, Col Frederick A. Ward, terson, Gasoline, Fuel Oil, etc.
ATS (1) Drake Rpt, pp. 31-32. (2) Wainwright
39
Opns; App. C, Rpt, Col Michael A. Quinn,
MTS Opns; App. E, Rpt, Col Richard G. Rogers, Rpt, Annex VI ( Rpt of Opns of Luzon Force ) App. ,
G-4 USAFFE,
Drake Rpt, pp. 34-35. (2) Memo, Asst G-4
)
Dept QM Field, 5 Feb 42, sub: Sup, Class I. Phil
11 Jan 42, sub: Visits of Insp, Records AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42).
9-1 1 Jan 42. Phil Records AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42). "Rpt cited n. 43(2).
THE PHILIPPINES— THE OPENING OPERATIONS 15
was a plentiful supply, especially of large issue of salt more often than once every few
47
pythons, whose eggs are considered a deli- days.
45
cacy by some Filipinos. The value
of local food sources on Bataan
Before the war
had been
lucrative fishing in prolonging the defense can hardly be
carried on in Manila Bay, which teemed overestimated. While they did not provide a
with aquatic life, and the naturally QMC wide variety of food, they did furnish con-
tried to tap this rich source of food. It es- siderable additions to Quartermaster stocks
tablished a fishery at Lamao, the center of of meat and rice.
were almost no stocks that could be issued in way. The few available U.S. Army service
48
place of worn-out garments. shoes proved useless, for Filipinos, barefoot
Whereas the U.S. Army and the Philip- most of their lives, had feet far too broad for
pine Scouts were well clad and well these narrow shoes. Commonwealth troops
equipped when they took the field in necessarily reverted to their custom of going
December the Philippine Army even then barefoot. Even such military commonplaces
lacked many essential items. In general, its as shelter halves and tentage were almost
troops had no blankets, helmets, mosquito totally lacking, and their absence caused
nets, or raincoats, all necessities in a malar- considerable hardship in the cool nights of
ial area like Bataan. Their shoes were con- mountainous Bataan. Indeed, the scarcity
ventional Filipino sneakers that the troops of clothing, footwear, and shelter in the
had nearly worn to pieces even by the time Philippine Army played a prominent part
of arrival on the peninsula. As soon as the in the large incidence of malaria, hookworm,
Commonwealth soldiers reached Bataan, and respiratory diseases. 49
they tried to buy footwear from the civilian About 500,000 gallons of gasoline and a
population, but could obtain little in this fairly satisfactory supply of kerosene and
"Drake Rpt, App. A, Rpt, Col Irvin Alexander, " ( 1 ) Wainwright Rpt, Annex XIV (Med Rpt),
Sup Problems of USFIP, p. 4. p. 24. (2) Wainwright, Story, p. 46.
THE PHILIPPINES—THE OPENING OPERATIONS 17
and reclamation services. The Motor Trans- commissioned in the Philippines under au-
port Service set up and ran motor pools and thority of a War'Department radiogram of
motor maintenance and repair shops, and 10 December that gave General MacArthur
the Army Transport Service supervised the extraordinary power of making indi-
movements by water, a responsibility that viduals, civilian or military, temporary
51
included the ferrying of supplies and troops officers.
between Corregidor and Bataan and the The Quartermaster units assigned to the
chartering of blockade-runners and other Regular Army and the Philippine Scouts at
vessels. the outbreak of war were used largely for the
All these operations suffered from the supply of front-line troops. This was the
shortage of officers and enlisted men and major function of the 12th Quartermaster
from the paucity of Quartermaster units. Regiment, less the two truck companies as-
signed to the motor pools, and of the two hostile blockade around Luzon daily became
pack troops. At Lamao and later at Cab- tighter and more menacing and enemy air-
caben the 74th Field Bakery Company pro- craft and naval ships gained more effective
vided about 25,000 pounds of bread a day mastery of the western Pacific. On land and
as long as flour was available. It achieved sea and in the air the Japanese were a bar-
this result by adding to its original meager rier between MacArthur's men and the re-
equipment of six field ovens improvised plenishment of their swiftly dwindling food
Dutch ovens built of rice straw and mud. 52 stocks. This barrier had to be pierced if
pluses of most of the meats, fruits, and vege- for they emitted telltale smoke that would
tables familiar to American soldiers and reveal their presence to the enemy. Small but
which served as a receiving point for supplies fast interisland motor ships had to be used.
coming from the United States; from the Col.Manuel A. Roxas, detailed by President
Netherlands Indies, producers of coffee and Quezon as liaison officer to General Mac-
other tropical products; from Mindanao Arthur, helped Drake obtain such ships from
and the Visayan Islands in the central Phil- the Government and Filipino
Philippine
ippines, still almost entirely in American citizens. All together forty-nine motor ships,
possession, where rice, sugar, tobacco, ba- each with a capacity of 300 to 1,000 cargo
nanas, and mangoes were available; or even tons, were secured by the Army Transport
from the fertile provinces of southern Luzon, Service at Corregidor and Cebu City. Of
which, though now in Japanese hands, pro- that number, a large majority were eventu-
vided rice, sugar, bananas, coffee, citrus ally lost, destroyed, or captured while en-
fruits, coconuts, cattle, pigs, and chickens in gaged in blockade-running.
abundance. Two 400-ton motor ships, the Bohol II
Early in January plans for sending ra- and the Kolambugan, were assigned to the
tions and other scarce supplies through the dangerous run through the mine fields be-
blockade were developed by the War De- tween Corregidor and Looc Cove, the col-
partment and USAFFE headquarters. lecting point for food procured by Ameri-
These plans visualized Australia as the pri- can agents in Cavite and Batangas. Looc
mary source of food, and the Netherlands Cove lay just south of Manila Bay and only
Indies, the central and southern Philippines, from the island fortress. Since
fifteen miles
and the provinces Batangas and Cavite
of itwas in enemy-held territory, these ships
in southern Luzon as secondary sources. The had to make the trip from Corregidor and
Cebu Quartermaster Depot was to be re- back in one night to avoid detection. Ac-
sponsible not only for procurement of sup- cordingly, one of them started out on its
plies in the central and southern islands but hazardous mission on practically every
also for assemblage of supplies brought in moonless evening during the three weeks fol-
from other outside sources and for their lowing 20 January. Japanese patrols were so
shipment to Corregidor. From that island active on shore, however, that American
fortress supplies would be taken under cover agents usually gave the vessels a warning
of darkness across the two miles of water to signal to turn back. The ships actually made
only two round trips apiece and in mid-
53
Bataan.
February had to abandon their operations
Interisland Efforts altogether. Though completed few
they
passages, the vessels did add about 1,600
Large ships were unsuitable for running
tons of food, chiefly rice, to the Bataan food
the blockade between the southern islands 4
stocks.'
and Luzon because they could be too easily
The other motor ships were stationed at
sighted by hostile air and naval patrols and
Cebu City, Iloilo, or other ports that lay
because Corregidor lacked the means of 55
400 miles or more below Manila Bay. Of
berthing and unloading them. Nor could
coal- and oil-burning vessels be employed, 51
(1) Ibid., p. 39. (2) Memo, G-4 for CofS, 18
Jan 42. Phil Records AG 430.2 (11 Sep 41).
M Ibid., pp. 37-39.
55
Drake Rpt, pp. 39-40.
20 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
these ports Cebu City was the most impor- out by the Governor of Panay and General
tant. The Quartermaster depot at that place Drake, the Legaspi on 20 January picked up
since the start of hostilities had been pro- a cargo of foods assembled by American
curing supplies in the Visayan Islands and agents at Capiz, a small but well-protected
Mindanao for shipment north to Corregi- port in northern Panay, and two nights later
dor. Established in November 1941, this delivered its load at Corregidor. It made one
installation had originally been scheduled to other successful run, but on its third trip the
receive from the Manila Depot all the stocks Legaspi, entering a small port in northern
required to feed and clothe the troops in Mindoro for concealment during the day-
the central and southern provinces, troops time,was sighted and shelled by a Japanese
organized as the Visayan-Mindanao Force gunboat. The crew ran the hapless ship
57
under Brig. Gen. William F. Sharp. Now, ashore and scuttled it.
instead of securing rations and clothing from Two other motor ships from the southern
the north, it had to canvass Mindanao and Philippines successfully penetrated the
the Visayan Islands for the supplies needed blockade. The Princessa, sailing from Cebu
not only by the troops in its distribution area City with 700 tons of rice, flour, corn meal,
but also by the 80,000 troops on Luzon. sardines, dried meats, sugar, and pineapple
To carry out this huge new mission, it set juice, all of which had been procured in
up procurement offices in the prov-
district the southern islands, reached Corregidor in
inces of Cebu, Negros Oriental, Negros Oc- mid-February. Later in the same month
cidental, Panay, Bohol, Leyte and Samar, El Cano, carrying 1,100 tons of balanced
and Mindanao. By 10 April 1942, when rations, which the 3,000-ton Army-char-
the Japanese captured Cebu City, it had tered freighter, Coast Farmer,had brought
acquired locally a twelve-month food supply from Australia to Arrakan in northern
for troops in Cebu and Panay, and at least Mindanao, arrived at the island fortress.
a six-month supply for those on other cen- But three other motor ships, also carrying
tral and southern islands. In addition, it had balanced rations from the Coast Farmer,
collected in the hills back of Cebu City and were shelled and sunk by Japanese naval
in warehouses in Cebu Province and in vessels off Mindanao. Ten other motor
Panay and Mindanao some 12,000 tons ships, loaded in the southern islands with
of food, medicine, gasoline, and miscellane- cargo for Corregidor, were sunk by the
ous supplies for shipment to Corregidor. In enemy or by their crews to avoid
scuttled
part these large stocks had come from Aus- capture. Drake estimated that
General
tralia; in part, from the central and south-
56
7,000 tons of food, gasoline, and oil were
ern provinces.
lost on their way to Luzon. He ascribed this
The Cebu Depot utilized the interisland
disaster not only to increased enemy activity
motor ship fleet to start thousands of tons
but also to excessive use of radio communi-
northward. The first ship to perform this
was the 1,000-ton Legaspi. In accord- cation and to failure to observe the strictest
feat
ance with arrangements previously worked secrecy. These ended blockade-run-
losses
blockade-running, and the vessels remained (less one battalion) and their ammunition,
at their moorings until they fell victim to supplies, and equipment but was diverted to
Japanese bombs or naval gunfire or were Darwin in northern Australia because it was
destroyed to prevent seizure. No supplies feared that no Philippine port would be open
<n
reached Corregidor from the outside world to receive it. This fear indeed prevented
during the five weeks before Bataan sur- attempts to send any ships northward dur-
rendered, except for very limited quantities ing the month and a half following the ar-
brought by plane and submarine. These
in American troops in Australia. Yet
rival of
deliveries almost surely helped prolong re- December and early January were perhaps
sistance on the peninsula. Yet in relation to the best times for an attempt at running
Bataan's requirements, they were insignifi- supplies through to MacArthur's men since
cant.
58 the blockade was then far from airtight and
the Visayan Islands were still in American
possession.
Australia
When the Bataan began,
defense of
Meanwhile, U.S. forces in Australia had Drake immediately informed the U.S. forces
been attempting to carry out their part of in Australia, both by radio and by air mail,
the relief program. When they first reached of his pressing need for food. He requested
rs
,;o
OCQM USASOS, History of Major Activities
Drake Rpt, pp. 37-40, 54, 65-66; App.
(l) of the Quartermaster Section (hereafter cited as
A, Rpt, Col John C. Cook, Cebu Depot, pp.QM QM SWPA Hist), I, 3. Hist Br OQMG.
2-3. (2) Wainwright, Story, pp. 166-67. (3) Wain- 61
Rpt of Organization and Activities of USAFIA,
wright Rpt, p. 21. pp. 7-8. DRB AGO.
22 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Cebu and that they be sent in 1 ,000-ton lots shipment of 3,000,000 rations, a 60-day
to facilitate handling. He made a detailed supply for 50,000 men, and of large quan-
breakdown of the required ration in pounds tities of ammunition. Shipments would be
for each component so that the specific made roughly in the proportion of six tons of
needs of the Luzon forces would be known. rations to one ton of ammunition. 64
Having received no reply by the end of The task thus undertaken was a formi-
January, Drake sent a personal letter by dable one. There were few small, fast ships
special courier to Lt. Gen. George H. Brett, capable of carrying enough fuel for the long
Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces voyage of 2,500 or more miles. Moreover,
(USAFIA), emphasizing the
in Australia the few which could meet this requirement
critical scarcity of food and urging haste in were usually unprocurable because all ves-
2
the dispatch of rations. Meanwhile, on 18
1 '
money to "be spent without stint," and a ship could be chartered, its crew was
suggested that "bold and resourceful men," reluctant to embark on so perilous an
well supplied with dollars, fly to islands not enterprise.
yet in Japanese hands to buy food, charter In Australia suitable ships were not pro-
ships, and offer cash bonuses to crews for curable in the early days of the program,
63
actual delivery of cargoes. and the Coast Farmer, which had recently
The Joint Administrative Planning Com- arrived from the United States in convoy,
mittee, operating under U.S. Army Forces was earmarked for blockade-running in
in Australia, thereupon immediately for- spite of its inability to attain a speed of more
mulated plans for blockade-running from than ten knots an hour. It departed from
both Australia and the Netherlands Indies. Brisbane on 4 February with a cargo that
The latter islands were selected because sub- included 2,500 tons of balanced rations, and
stantial amounts of rations and particularly fifteen days later pulled into Arrakan, a port
of ammunition were already there in the which, though inferior, had been selected
hands of American air forces or were at because of fear that the slow speed of the
sea en route to the Dutch archipelago, be- Coast Farmer would prevent it from reach-
cause these islands lay closer to the Phil- ing the finer and better-protected harbor
ippines than did Australia, and because it of Cebu.
was believed that small, fast coasters could One other vessel, meanwhile, the small
be procured easily from local sources. The Filipino freighter Don Isidro, had been ob-
committee set the first objective of both
tained. On the same day that the Coast
Australia and the Netherlands Indies as the
Farmer left Brisbane the Don Isidro sailed
from Fremantle in southwestern Australia
ai
( 1 ) Memo, CQM USAFFE for G-4 USAFFE,
5 Jan 42. ORB AFWESPAC QM 430. (2) Drake,
B4
( 1 Jt Adm Ping Com, USAFIA, 19 Jan
) Min,
"No Uncle Sam," pp. 11-12. 42, sub:Australian-American Co-operation. (2)
Rad, NR 134, CofS WDGS to CG USAFIA, 18
'
their total tonnage was enough to furnish dollars had been placed at his disposal to
the Bataan forces with the supplies needed be spent in any fashion he considered ad-
to prolong their resistance. But while arming visable, and he was empowered to request
of ships and use of dummy stacks and neu- co-operation from all military and civilian
08
tral or Axis flags — in fact, "all imaginable authorities.
These were the Dona Nati and the of his mission. But soon after his arrival at
Anhui, both of which started from Brisbane Soerabaja, Java, he discovered that his ob-
in mid-February and arrived at Cebu early jectives were not to be easily achieved. The
in March. The Dona Nati, it was estimated, U.S. Navy at first would not release any
carried 5,000 tons of rations, and the Anhui, ships, and requests and Dutch
for British
2,500 tons. Two other ships, the Hanyang ships were likewise turned down. Even a re-
and the Yochow, started from Fremantle, quest for small coasters from Singapore met
but mutinies broke out when the dangerous a similar fate, though it was made after the
waters north of Australia were reached, and about to take a final stand
British, obviously
the vessels made for Darwin, where they in Malaya, had retreated across the cause-
were discharged. 67 way that joined Singapore Island to the
mainland. Naval opinion in general plainly
85
(1) Rad, Brett to AGWAR, 25 Mar 42. DRB thought the release of ships tantamount to
AGO Opns Rpts, F-17. (2) Rpt, Col William C. their destruction.'
19
Hutt, QM Base 3, n. d., sub: Hist of Sec, QM Better results attended Robenson's at-
22 Dec ORB ABCOM AG
41-31 Mar 44. 314.7.
(1) Ltr, CG USAFIA to CO Base 3, 20 Jan
68
tempts to procure rations and ammunition
42. DRB AGO Opns Rpts, Material Relating to as cargo for such ships as he might later be
USAFIA History. (2) Ltr, CofS USAFIA to CO
able to charter. Late in January the Presi-
Base Sec 1, 21 Jan 42, sub: Philippine Relief.
DRB AGO Opns Rpts, History of Effort to Sup the
P.I. Bogart Rogers, "Help for the Heroes of
1,8
,:
Rads, CG USAFIA to AGWAR, 11 and 25 Bataan," Cosmopolitan, CXIX (November 1945),
Mar 42. DRB AGO Opns Rpts, Material Relating 46-48.
n Ibid.,
to USAFIA History. pp. 49, 134-35.
24 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
dent Polk, a medium-sized American landing in force. On 14 February, therefore,
freighter, arrived at Soerabaja with a full the Dutch at last released four rusty old
load of these supplies, and after several days one of which, the Taiyuan, Rob-
freighters,
of discussion Robenson obtained permission enson designated for immediate use. Its
to use them. About this time a courier Chinese crew, however, refused to sail.
brought him the report that Drake had pre- Only by offering large bonuses and other
pared for Brett on the plight of the financial inducements was it finally possible
Bataan Force. Robenson found it "pretty to obtain a crew. The Taiyuan sailed on 26
70
shocking." February, the day the Battle of Java com-
Early in February, Rear Adm. William A. menced, with a cargo of 720,000 rations.
72
Glassford permitted Colonel Robenson to It was never heard from again.
use the Florence D, a Filipino freighter con- Though disappointingly few ships ran the
trolled by the U.S. Navy, though he re- blockade to the Philippines, the three that
garded the effort to break the blockade as did arrive there from Australia discharged
a forlorn hope. At the same time the Don about 10,000 tons of rations, or 2,000 more
hidro arrived at Batavia from Fremantle. tons than had been set as a goal for that
Thus, after nearly two weeks of unrewarded continent's initial contribution. In addition,
work, Robenson had supplies and at
finally they landed 4,000,000 rounds of small-arms
least two ships. But a crew had to be se- ammunition, 8,000 rounds of 8 1 mm. ammu-
cured for the Florence D. To get it, Roben- nition, and miscellaneous medical, signal,
son offered the ship's Filipino crew, anxious and engineer supplies. Unfortunately, the
in any event to get home, handsome bonuses, arrival of these ships at Philippine transfer
ranging from more than $10,000 for its points did not materially alleviate the des-
captain to lesser amounts for his subordi- perate plight of the hungry forces on Luzon,
nates, and life insurance of $5,000 to $500. for, of the supplies received from Australia,
All the Filipinos volunteered for the voyage, only the few miscellaneous items and the
and on 14 February the Florence D set sail. 1,100 tons of rations that El Cano carried
About the same time the Don Isidro de- ever reached Corregidor. These rations nor-
parted from Batavia. Both vessels proceeded mally would have represented about a 4-
through the Timor Sea until they reached day supply for about 100,000 soldiers and
Bathurst Island north of Darwin. Here they civilians, but the quantity actually avail-
turned north and on 19 February Japanese able was considerably reduced by the "heart-
planes, roaring overhead on their way to the breaking condition" of the shipment. "Prac-
Netherlands Indies, bombed the blockade- tically all containers were broken and their
runners and left the Florence D a burning, contents piled together" in the holds.
73
sinking wreck and the Don Isidro a disabled Onions and potatoes, transported on the
hulk that had to be beached on Melville deck of the ship, had become so rotten
71
Island. that they were inedible. All the food had to
The Japanese had meanwhile begun to be carefully inspected, and much of it
bomb the chief centers in Java and plainly thrown out before issues could be made.
indicated that they would soon attempt a Drake attributed these deplorable losses to
70
73
Ibid., p. 135. Ibid.,(Dec 45), pp. 70-71, 151-54.
71
71
Ibid., pp. 134-35. Drake Rpt, pp. 69-70.
THE PHILIPPINES—THE OPENING OPERATIONS 25
the use of ordinary commercial packing con- oped. In accordance with MacArthur's re-
tainers of withstanding rough
incapable quest the destroyers would carry 2,375 tons
handling and numerous transfers. But for of rations, 369 tons of ammunition and
a few days Australian canned meat did give other ordnance supplies, 55 tons of medical
the troops on Bataan a little more than their supplies, and 6 1 tons of signal supplies. Un-
usual meager fare. happily for the men now starving on Bataan,
The Japanese invasion of the Netherlands there was not enough time to execute these
Indies and the accompanying increase of plans, for within one month the peninsula
hostile air and naval strength in that area fell. In any event prospects for success were
served to make blockade-running from dubious because of Japanese control of west-
76
the south even more hazardous. Recognizing ern Pacific waters.
the difficulties under which the Army in The institution of this new phase of the
Australia labored in its efforts to help him, effort to supply Bataan did not relieve USA-
MacArthur suggested on 22 February that FIA of its role in the relief program, and
the Philippines be supplied direct from Hon- latein March Marshall was still urging
olulu. He pointed out that the forces in the MacArthur, who had been ordered to Aus-
antipodes had many other responsibilities tralia as commander of the U.S. Forces in
and could not concentrate on Philippine the Far East, to intensify his efforts to re-
supply, to them merely "a subsidiary ef- lieve the Philippines by all available
fort. "
4
Shortly afterwards, Brig. Gen. Pat-
'
The War Department informed Brett that lowing day, jettisoned its cargo. A fifth sub-
an effort to supply the Philippines from marine reached the island fortress with mail
Honolulu was already under way. A con- on 3 May, just before it fell. The carrying
verted 1,000-ton destroyer had left New capacity of all these vessels was limited, for
Orleans for Hawaii and plans for using six they were ordinary torpedo-carrying subma-
8
other converted destroyers had been devel- rines, not cargo carriers.'
75
Rad, GS-588, Hurley-Brett to AGWAR (Mar- FIA, 28 Mar 42. In same.
shall), 4 Mar 42. DRB AGO Opns Rpts, History
78
( 1 Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, pp.
)
was available in any form. On 22 March the tually impenetrable; and the few foot and
ration had fallen to 1 7 ounces, or only about pack were rank with tropical vegeta-
trails
a third of the 46.2 ounces provided in a full tion. From early February most of the de-
ration, and it was recommended that the fense line could be reached only by the
issue be further reduced to 12.67 ounces. 79 arduous process "of clambering in and out"
The Philippine ration underwent a simi- of densely overgrown ravines that "radiated
lar reduction. Daily issues of rice,which like the ribs of a fan from the summit of
served the purpose of flour in the American Mariveles Mountain," six miles south of
81
ration, gradually dwindled from 10 ounces the front.
at the start of rationing to 3 ounces in mid- Limitations on the use of vehicles, caused
March. Stipulated issues of meat or of fish, by the shortage of gasoline, added to the
which, under this ration, was frequently difficulty of delivering supplies on schedule.
substituted for meat, declined in January to Equally serious was the highjacking of food,
4 ounces, 2 ounces less than were prescribed especially by Filipinos, most of whom had
under the U.S. ration. By 23 March Philip- little training or discipline in supply mat-
pine, like U.S., troops were getting only 1.22 ters. Even Philippine Army military police,
ounces of meat or fish. Except for flour, who had been placed along the roads and
which was not issued to Filipinos, other trails to guard against such practices, oc-
foods were prescribed in the same quanti- casionally helped themselves to food from
ties under the two rations. vehicles they had halted, ostensibly to in-
Normal wartime obstacles to equitable spect the cargo. Food was always mysteri-
distribution of subsistence were intensified ously vanishing from supply dumps and or-
by the extraordinary conditions on Bataan. ganization kitchens. Pilferage of this sort
Front-line troops indeed received even less normally would have passed unnoticed, but
80
than the prescribed fare. Transportation rations were so small that soldiers at once
difficulties retarded deliveries and made it detected the slightest diminution and freely
almost impossible to carry supplies in the accused rear echelons of "living on the fat of
stipulated quantities. After January the the land" and division quartermasters of in-
equitable distribution.
only passable road was the coastal route
The provision of fresh meat illustrates
running from Orion on the Manila Bay
how hard it was to furnish front-line troops
side of the peninsula to Mariveles on the
with the prescribed ration."" Fresh meat was
southern tip and then up the west coast on
scheduled to be issued every third day, yet
the China Sea side to Bagac. The jungles
men at the front seldom received any more
covering most of the peninsula were vir-
often than once every week or ten days.
79
Wainwright Rpt, Annex VI (Rpt of Opns
(1 ) Even when they received supposedly fresh
of Luzon Force), Annex 5 (G-4 Rpt), p. 3. (2)
meat, it was as frequently as not maggoty
Drake Rpt, App. A, Col Charles S. Lawrence, Tar-
lac QM
Depot, p. 10. (3) Ltr, CofS Luzon Force or otherwise spoiled. Such deterioration was
to CG USAFFE, 22 Mar 42. Phil Records AG 430
(8 Dec 41). 81
Wainwright Rpt, Annex XIV (Med Rpt),
60
( 1 ) Memo, Asst G-4 for CGBataan Force, pp. 24-26.
12 Mar 42. Phil Records AG 430.2 (11 Sep 41). 83
( 1
) Memo, Asst G-4 for CG Bataan Force,
(2) Memo, CofS for CG USAFFE, 22 Mar 42, 12 Mar 42. Phil Records AG 430.2 (11 Sep 41).
sub: Ration and Motor Fuel Status. Phil Records (2) Memo.-CQM for G-4 USFIP, 23 Mar 42.
AG 430 (8 Dec 41). Phil Records AG 430 (8 Dec 41 )
28 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
inescapable, for the meat had to be trans- no transportation difficulties, little pilferage,
ported in unrefrigerated open trucks on and practically no hoarding. These factors,
hauls that lasted ten or twelve hours during together with the availability of compara-
the heat of the tropical day. The long trip, tively abundant food stores, rendered it in-
moreover, afforded highjackers many op- evitable that the Corregidor garrison often
83
portunities for plunder. actually received better meals than quarter-
By late March, with the blockade com- masters on Bataan could possibly give its
Manila Quartermaster Depot had built up Harbor Defenses ration was well-balanced
on the island fortress a defense reserve of and provided about 48 ounces for Filipinos,
Quartermaster supplies sufficient to last who were normally lighter eaters than U.S.
10,000 men for 180 days. Though there troops. At that time rations on Bataan usu-
were then actually only about 9,000 men in ally totaled only 14 to 17 ounces. Even
the harbor forts, MacArthur on 24 January after the Corregidor rations were reduced on
had directed that subsistence reserves be 1 April, they still greatly exceeded those on
further increased to provide for 20,000 men Bataan, Americans receiving 30.49 ounces
until 1 July 1942. This meant that food and Filipinos 25.85 ounces. These reduced
had to be shifted from Bataan to Correg- rations provided vegetables, fruits, and ce-
idor. Of the substantial surplus thus created reals, 8 ounces of fresh or canned meat, and,
on the island, only a small part was ever for Americans, 7 ounces of flour. In contrast
returned to the peninsula. For a few days to this not insubstantial fare the Bataan ra-
at the very end of the campaign some rations tions for weeks had provided no vegetables,
were belatedly shipped to the starving men fruits, or cereals, only 1.22 ounces of canned
duced, and only two meals a day were served ounces of salt, and /2 ounce of sugar. In the
thereafter. Various factors, however, com- closing weeks of the peninsula campaign,
as supplies were depleted, even these meager
bined to give troops on Corregidor and at
issues were cut or eliminated.
the other forts more and better food than
those on the peninsula. There were virtually The striking disparity between the Ba-
taan and the Corregidor ration was plainly
" (1) Drake Rpt, pp. 67-68. (2) Lecture, Col
Thomas W. Doyle, 25 Jul 42, sub: Recent Combat S5
(1)Memo, 13 Mar 42, and attachments. (2)
Conditions in Bataan and Matters of Interest to Ltr, CofS to CG USFIP, 25 Mar 42, sub: Rations
OQMG of Luzon Force. (3) Memo, CQM for CofS
QMC. 319.25. USFIP,
Apr 42, sub: Reduced Ration, HD M&S Bays.
84
Drake
Rpt, pp. 33-34; App. F, Rpt, Col 1
Chester H. Elmes, QM
Opns, Ft Mills, pp. 2-3. All in Phil Records AG 430.2 (3 Jan 42).
.
demonstrated to the defenders of the penin- cer, but since these supplies did not consti-
sula by incidents like that of 18 March, tute a balanced ration, they had been told
when military police halted a truck laden to retain their stores intact. On 3 April Gen-
with rations for a few Harbor Defenses anti- eral Drake called attention to this situa-
which drew their supplies
aircraft batteries, tion and suggested that the time had come
direct from Corregidor, and discovered that for the marines to consume their own
89
it contained ham, bacon, sausage, raisins, supplies.
canned peas, corn, tomatoes, potatoes, and As the food situation on Bataan rapidly
peaches, none of which were available to deteriorated during March, increasing con-
the other troops defending Bataan, as well sideration was given to the possibility of
86
as large quantities of cigarettes. Such inci- tapping the Corregidor reserves. But these
dents could not be kept secret, and in exag- reserves were based on plans to defend the
gerated form they were reported through- island until 1 July. Unless this date was
out the peninsula to the detriment of an al- altered to at least 1 June, no relief could
90
ready sagging morale. be sent to the peninsula. The date was so
The disparity between the issues of to- altered, effective on 1 April, when the Har-
bacco on Bataan and Corregidor particu- bor Defenses ration was reduced to 30
larly stirred the resentment of the Luzon ounces and the daily shipment of small quan-
Force. In general only one cigarette a day tities from the Bataan reserve was
of food
was issued to soldiers on the peninsula. Oc- started. These measures came too late to
casional efforts were made to issue five to benefit the Bataan forces.
87
men in the front lines. Corregidor, on the By late March these forces, even under
other hand, had a relatively large supply of the prescribed ration that could not always
tobacco, and officers going from Bataan to be supplied, were receiving only about 1 ,000
that island often purchased cigarettes and calories a day. Yet men fighting under
pipe tobacco in substantial quantities. 88 The highly adverse conditions in terrain as for-
shortage of cigarettes on Bataan was relieved midable as that of Bataan required a min-
temporarily early in March by the arrival imum of 3,500 calories, and medical author-
of a million and a half cigarettes that had ities generally agreed that 1,500 calories
been run through the blockade, but this were necessary to perform the barest func-
relief lasted for only a few days. tions of life. The ration, furthermore, was
Another cause for dissatisfaction was the deficient in vitamins A, B, and C, with the
fact that the 1,500 marines on Corregidor result that beriberi affected virtually all
drew their rations from the Harbor De- troops. As early as 16 February, there had
fenses Quartermaster, although they had been "many indications of accumulative
brought their own food supplies. On arriv-
malnutrition." In the morning men's legs
felt "watery" and at intervals pumped "with
ing at the fortress the marines had offered
their dry provisions to the Subsistence Offi- (l) Memo, CQM for G-4, 3 Apr 44. (2)
su
ST Ltr, AG to CG I Corps, 3 Mar 42, sub: Issue Bays, 13 Mar 42, sub: Field Rations. Phil Records
of Cigarettes. Phil Records AG 435.8 (3 Mar 42). AG 430.2 (3 Jan 42). (2) Memo, CQM for G-4
88
Ltr, CO Phil QM Depot to CQM, 17 Mar 42. USFIP, 27 Mar 42, sub: Surplus Subs, Ft Mills.
In same. Phil Records AG 430 ( 8 Dec 4 1 )
30 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
pains that swell and go away again." Break- tempt must be made to run supplies tied
fast restored a normal feeling for an hour up at Cebu and Iloilo through the blockade
91
or so, but lassitude then followed. Be- to Corregidor. According to their tentative
tween mid-February and mid-March a tre- plan, motor ships, lying idle in the central
mendous increase occurred in the number islands since late February, would again be-
of soldiers rendered ineffective because of come blockade-runners. 94 As this daring
malaria, malnutrition, and dysentery. venture would be foolhardy unless a convoy
The commander of the I Corps attributed of planes was provided, MacArthur agreed
these alarming developments to the steady to send aircraft from Australia. Wain-
reduction in the quantity and quality of ra- wright also planned to use the few remain-
quinine and other medicines,
tions, to lack of ing motor torpedo boats as a naval convoy.
and to inadequate clothing and shelter. The Cebu Quartermaster Depot understood
In some degree, he added, 75 percent of that American bombers would arrive about
his command was incapacitated. Since rear the night of 1-2 April, attack Japanese air-
establishments lacked rations to rehabilitate fields along the route to Corregidor, and
shipping and docks at Cebu, against enemy of the 45th Infantry Regiment, Philippine
facilities at Davao, and against Nichols Scouts, revealed that 65 percent of the
Field at Manila. While these attacks were troops exhibited signs of malnutrition.
fairly successful, the small number of bomb- More than half the troops were afflicted with
ers and the meager protection afforded by edema, night blindness, or other symptoms
the six battered pursuit planes available on of dietary deficiency. The "well men," the
Mindanao make it fairly obvious that, if the surgeon continued, were "thin and weak
blockade-running enterprise had been un- from starvation." 9S
91 '
dertaken, would have ended in disaster.
it 111 and undernourished, the Bataan forces
Rations during the final two weeks on could not effectively resist the final Jap-
the peninsula provided less than 1 ,000 calo- anese offensive, which was launched against
ries a day. Rice, more plentiful than other the southern part of the American front on
foods, was now issued to all troops at a daily 3 April. Units gradually disintegrated and
rate of about ten ounces and became the by the 7th were abandoning arms and run-
main food of Americans as well as Filipinos. ning away. Still hoping against hope for
It was indeed relatively so abundant that some kind of relief, General Drake radioed
other available foods were rationed to last The Quartermaster General, Maj. Gen.
as long as it did. The extreme scarcity of Edmund B. Gregory, describing the critical
other items at this time is illustrated by the food shortage and urging that air shipments
headquarters mess of the 45th Infantry of food concentrates be forwarded immedi-
Regiment, Philippine Scouts. Besides rice, ately from Cebu, Australia, and China. '" 1
it received one can of salmon a day for The following day General Marshall radioed
fourteen officers and, occasionally, a small General Wainwright that the Chinese Gov-
quantity of sugar, but never enough to be ernment had volunteered to supply planes
of real significance. Everywhere malnutri- for such shipments. But it was too late to
tion, malaria, and dysentery demoralized relieve the desperate situation, for on this
the defenders. They were no longer capable same day attacking forces outflanked their
of offensive action or even sustained resist- opponents' lines and rendered further re-
ance. The 31st Division, Philippine Army, sistance impossible. On the southern front
which in early February had driven the Americans and Filipinos fled, pursued by
Japanese from its immediate front, had "by enemy infantry, bombers, and tanks. Sur-
lack of clothing, equipment, food, and render was imperative to avert wholesale
medicine been reduced to a demoralized massacre. On 9 April Maj. Gen. Edward
and uncontrollable mob.
11
° 7
The surgeon of P. King, Jr., commanding the Luzon Force,
took this inevitable step, and the valiant re-
the Luzon Force reported that men were
"becoming so weak from starvation that
sistance of the men of Bataan passed into
100
history.
they could hardly carry" their packs. At
the end of March, he noted, examination w Annex XIV (Med Rpt), pp. 44-45.
Ibid.,
99
Rad, Drake to TQMG, 7 Apr 42. DRB
(1)
'"'
Craven and Gate, The Army Air Forces, I, AGO OPD Incoming and Outgoing Msgs. (2)
417-18. Drake, "No Uncle Sam," pp. 23-24.
100
(1) Ibid., p. 10. (2) Morton, Military Affairs,
17
Wainwright Rpt, Annex VI (Rpt of Opns
( 1 )
of Luzon Force), Annex V (G-4 Rpt), p. 1. (2) XI (Fall 1947), 133-35, 144-48. (3) Rad, Wain-
Annex XIV (Med Rpt), p. 4. (3) Annex V (Rpt wright to CG USAFFE, 9 Apr 42. ORB SWPA
of Opns of South Luzon Force), p. 56. AG 319.1 (Opns).
—
32 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
"The capitulation of Luzon Force," its shortage of gasoline was more serious, for
surgeon declared, "represents in many re- it increasingly hampered all activities in-
spects a defeat due to disease and starvation volving motor transportation. But on the
rather than to military conditions." Physical night of 8 April, 50,000 gallons, sufficient to
deterioration, he continued, had progressed last twenty days, remained in Quartermaster
so far that it"became a determining factor dumps. In preparation for surrender on the
in tactical operations." Even if the Jap- following morning all this stock was de-
anese had not launched their final attack, stroyed except for 10,000 gallons which,
surrender in all probability could have been the Americans hoped, the enemy would uti-
postponed only a few days. So bad had lize to transport their weary, starving pris-
102
health conditions become that during the oners of war.
three days preceding capitulation the last
rations were used to feed the troops better Quartermaster Operations on Corregidor
than they had been fed for weeks. Flour,
After the capitulation the Japanese set
which had not been issued for some time,
up on the southern shores of
their artillery
was dealt out at the rate of 2.88 ounces a
Bataan, two miles from Corregidor, and
day. The allotment of 1 .22 ounces of canned
began intensive shelling of that small but
meat, in effect since 23 March, was doubled.
powerful fortress commanding the entrance
So was the rice ration, 17 ounces being
given to Americans and 20 ounces to Fil-
toManila Bay. The three harbor forts
ipinos. When King surrendered, all sub-
Drum, Hughes, and Frank were also sub- —
sistence on Bataan, including 45,000 C
jected tobombardment. During this period
Corregidor became the center of American
rations, held to the end for emergency use,
had been exhausted except for a single issue efforts in the Philippines. Though a pro-
101 tracted defense appeared hopeless, General
of a half ration.
Wainwright determined, if possible, to hold
On the day of the capitulation, no other
the island until at least the beginning of
essential supply was as scarce as rations. It
June.
is had been sufficient
true that there never
mortars or .50-caliber machine guns and
Even in the final weeks on Corregidor
food never became as scarce as it had on
that heavy loss of firearms during the cam-
Bataan at the end, in spite of the fact that
paign had seriously reduced the number of
automatic weapons, but these scarcities were
soldiers and civilians evacuated from the
peninsula immediately before and after the
not so severe as to demand capitulation.
surrender of the Luzon Force had swelled
Ammunition stocks, too, though lacking
antiaircraft shellsand short of artillery shells,
the number of individuals to be fed to about
SURRENDER TO THE JAPANESE. American prisoners sort supplies under the super-
vision of Japanese soldiers, Bataan, 11 April 1942.
bombing and shelling. This huge excavation symptoms multiplied. But it was not physical
ran from east to west for about 800 feet be- exhaustion that brought about the surrender
neath 500-foot-high Malinta Hill; it was ap- as much as it was overwhelming Japanese
proximately 25 feet wide and 15 feet high superiority in planes and equipment. 103
and had lateral branches 150 feet deep, 15 Of the bitter disappointments associated
feet wide, and 15 feet high. When Corregi- with the fall of the Philippines the QMC
dor surrendered on 6 May, this tunnel con- had a full share. In no other campaign in
tained enough food to have provided half the Pacific were men so ill fed and so ill
rations until about 20 June. In view of this clad, and no other campaign was such
in
relatively favorable situation, illness was bitter criticism directed at the Corps. Lack
much less common than it had been on Ba- of food elicited the most vigorous denuncia-
taan. While diarrhea and minor respiratory tion. During the siege of Bataan, according
to Col. Irvin Alexander, an infantry officer
diseases afflicted many soldiers, the more
serious maladies, such as dysentery and beri- 103
( 1 ) Drake Rpt, pp. 53-54; App. F, Col C. H.
beri, rarely appeared. Most of the garrison, Elmes, QM Opns, Ft Mills, pp. 2, 4. (2) Wain-
wright Rpt, Annex VIII (Harbor Defenses Rpt),
however, showed signs of exhaustion, and
Exhibit H, p. 1. (3) Ibid., Annex XIV (Med Rpt),
as enemy activity was intensified, these p. 83.
1
tions beyond its control, not from any neg- a substantial number of trucks had been
lect of duty. It had, in fact, taken every commandeered by combat organizations.
step demanded by long-laid plans for meet- These chaotic conditions forced the to QMC
ing a war emergency. In the summer of 1 94 abandon or destroy an appreciable part of
ithad submitted requisitions to the War De- its subsistence stocks.
partment for defense reserve stocks large Since the food stores of 8 December had
enough to last 50,000 men for six months. not sufficed to furnish full rations for the
At the same time it had sent in requisitions contemplated six-month stand on Bataan,
covering the initial supply and equipment even before suffering heavy withdrawals
of the Philippine Army. Surely, it was not prior to hasty retirement to the peninsula,
a Quartermaster fault that hostilities started nothing that the QMC could have done
before any of these supplies, except 1 ,000,- would have squeezed full rations out of the
000 gallons and 500,000 C ra-
of gasoline scanty supplies. Once on Bataan, the QMC
tions, arrived in Manila. Nor was it the fault had exploited to the maximum the limited
of the QMC
that it was suddenly forced to Moreover, in Mindanao
local food sources.
share nonperishable rations, clothing, and and the Visayas had conducted a heart-
it
equipment, which had been accumulated breaking attempt to send surface ships
for 20,000 Regular Army troops and Philip- loaded with food through the ever tighten-
pine Scouts, with the 60,000 men of the ing blockade.
woefully undersupplied Philippine Army. The failure of outside efforts to replenish
Neither was the QMC responsible for the whether
essential supplies raises the question
failure to store rations on Bataan immedi- thiswas an unavoidable consequence of the
ately after hostilities started, as had been weakness of American military, naval, and
directed by WPO-3. This failure was attrib- air forces in the western Pacific. To a very
utable rather to the decision of higher mili- great extent, of course, it was. Yet the suc-
tary authority to discard WPO-3 and "fight cessful runs made by the few available
it out on the beaches," a change of plan torpedo-carrying submarines — all of limited
that compelled the QMC to disperse food capacity — suggests that the best chance of
101
Drake Rpt, App. A, Col Alexander, Sup Prob- bringing in supplies may have lain in cargo-
lems of USFIP, p. 8. carrying submarines built to handle at least
THE PHILIPPINES—THE OPENING OPERATIONS 35
500 tons as compared with the 1 50 or so tons protracted defense of such easily isolated
transportable by the ordinary torpedo- Bataan and Corregidor. Though
positions as
carrying type. Unfortunately, no cargo- itwas anticipated that both positions would
carrying submarines could be obtained probably come under siege, in which event
either in the Pacific or elsewhere. Finally, they were to be defended as long as was
American weakness in the air rendered sup- humanly possible, planners did not provide
ply by plane impracticable. But had more for unusually large supply reserves. Nor did
airfields, bombers, fighters, and, above all, they foresee that thousands of civilian refu-
more transport planes been available, gees would have to be fed on both Bataan
Bataan, as subsequent experience in Burma and Corregidor. In executing the plans for
demonstrated, could have been provisioned defending Luzon after hostilities had
at least in part by air. started, higher military authorities appear
Generally speaking, supply operations on not to have fully realized at first the pressing
Luzon suggest that in making plans and in importance of assuring rations for be-
executing them too little attention was de- leaguered forces in a blockaded Philippines.
voted to the potential significance of rations
Habits of thought, produced by the almost
in a position as exposed as the Philippines.
universal peacetime abundance of food and
Though the archipelago lay thousands of
the ordinarily routine character of its pro-
miles from its major base, the United States,
curement, doubtless account for this lack of
and at the very end of a supply line that was
highly vulnerable to attack, the War De-
vision. Few survivors of Bataan today would
partment assigned it low shipping priori-
deny that generous subsistence reserves, high
ties until the summer of 1941. Even then shipping priorities for food, and provision
rations still had low priorities, and essential for unforeseen emergencies are imperative
provisions never arrived. In retrospect, safeguards for positions that may be iso-
planning may also be criticized for not rec- lated under comparable circumstances in
ognizing all the logistical implications of the the future.
CHAPTER II
In an industrial age an army operating post in the central Pacific. With only about
far from its homeland is benefited greatly if 420,000 inhabitants, few and a
industries,
it can tap the material resources of thickly highly specialized agricultural system, it was
populated and economically well-developed the least serviceable of the areas as a source
countries. It can then utilize already existing of supply. But it was advantageously located
docks, warehouses, offices, and even resi- for use as a base for offensive operations
dences and employ thousands of civilians in and as a distribution center for forward
rear areas as clerks, stevedores, and ware- areas, and this was the role prewar strate-
house workers. Above all, it can procure a gists had assigned to the archipelago in case
substantial part of its supplies and equip- of a war with Japan. On the eve of the at-
ment from nearby industrial sources. tack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. Army activities
Through the use of all these material and in the islands were still conducted gen-
human resources an army can free its troops erally in peacetime fashion. Consequently,
from building and supply tasks and make its troop strength and supply and service re-
own manpower more fully available for sources were far from sufficient to meet the
combat activities. But the vast Pacific con-
requirements of a major wartime base for
tained few populous and industrialized
operations utilizing hundreds of thousands
areas. At the outset it indeed contained only
men. 1
three areas —Hawaii, Australia, and New
of
QMC in Hawaii in
—
Zealand that could serve as great supply To help the
supporting possible combat
its
activities,
task of
plans
bases for defensive and offensive opera-
tions.While these areas could furnish much had been formulated in 1940 and 1941 for
food, their industrial development was too the enlargement of two main operat-
its
entrance of Honolulu Harbor, and the disabled in Pearl Harbor, a Japanese attack
Quartermaster warehouses at Schofield in force on Hawaii was considered alto-
Barracks, the Army's largest garrison post, gether likely. A cardinal objective of the
20 miles northwest of Honolulu. 2 But lack Army was to make the islands a mighty
of funds and higher priorities given to bastion capable of withstanding a powerful
building activities more directly related to attack. With the disastrous naval losses sus-
combat operations prevented the execution tained by the foe in the decisive Battle of
of these plans, and no substantial additions Midway early in June 1942 making a Jap-
had been made to Quartermaster installa- anese assault improbable, the Army's objec-
tions by the time hostilities began. Even the tive in the following year became the speedy
construction of underground storage tanks transformation of the archipelago into a
for gasoline was delayed until the War De- vast training, rehabilitation, and supply
partment after considerable delay approved area. The year and a half following Pearl
the project. Harbor was, then, a period of intensive
On 7 December 1941 Quartermaster preparations, defensive at first but offensive
covered storage space totaled only 200,000 later, for the QMC as well as for other
square feet and open storage space only Army components.
8,000 square feet, mere fractions of the At the outset the basic peacetime organ-
square footage needed in the coming Pacific ization of the Office of the Department
war. Modern mechanical aids in quick han- Quartermaster (ODQM) remained sub-
dling of supplies — fork-lift trucks, con- stantially unaltered. The Hawaiian Depart-
veyors, stackers, pallets, and cranes — were ment Quartermaster, Col. William R.
completely lacking. 3 Since peacetime requi- White, continued to exercise personal
sitions had been submitted to the San supervision over the formulation of long-
Francisco General Depot sixty days before range plans and the establishment of policy,
anticipated need and had been promptly the Supply Division to. handle day-by-day
filled, military stocks of food, clothing, and routine matters, and the Hawaiian Quarter-
other Quartermaster supplies were large master Depot to serve as the main operating
enough to meet the immediate needs of the agency of the ODQM. As in peacetime, post
42,000 soldiers then in the islands. But they quartermasters consolidated the requisitions
were much too small to support the vastly of units on their reservations and trans-
increased number that was soon to be sta- mitted them to the Hawaiian Depot to be
tioned there or even to make possible a pro- filled from its stocks. If requisitioned items
tracted resistance if the enemy should block- were unavailable at the depot, it, in turn,
ade or invade the archipelago. 4 sent requisitions for them to the San
dling equipment was scarce in the United leased buildings were dispersed throughout
States, it was well into 1943 before depot the Honolulu area rather than concentrated
requisitions could be filled. Meanwhile addi- in one place and partly because the danger
was obtained by leasing
tional storage space of losing all supply of the same kind by
commercial warehouses in the Honolulu bombing required storage of the same item
area and, as first-priority defense installa- in many different locations. This decentrali-
tions were completed, by erection of tempo- zation of depot stocks inevitably caused
rary structures. These structures were about longer hauls and more crosshauls. Though
100 feet wide and up to 550 feet long, con- the relative closeness of Oahu to the main-
siderably smaller than those in the zone of land enabled the depot to obtain more ma-
interior, that is, the United States, where terials-handling equipment than did instal-
standard warehouses averaged about 180 lations at a greater distance, mechanical aids
feet in width and from 1,000 to 1,200 feet even here were never as numerous as in the
in Months elapsed before
length. zone of interior. But in spite of its deficien-
all the
needed space was procured, and cies the installation probably had better
in the
equipment and warehouses than did com-
c
(1) Ltr, AG
400 (1-17-42) MSC-D-M, 22 Jan
42, sub: Sup of Overseas Theaters. (2) Ltr, CG (1) QM Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 56-61. (2) Memo,
7
distributed the requisitioned supplies. The "reefers," made the supply of fresh food a
larger points served also as subdepots, which particularly hard task so that rations were
maintained reserve stocks of specifically as- monotonous. Eventually, more frequent sail-
ings, made possible by the lessening of se-
signed items indispensable to field troops.
rious danger from the Japanese, alleviated
In Area 9, for example, Schofield Barracks 12
this problem.
specialized in the reserve stockage of food,
and Camp Malakole in that of clothing and The Food Problem
general supplies. Points serving as subdepots
for food stocks kept a 30-day store of non- Since Hawaii was no more self-sustain-
perishable subsistence; those stocking cloth- ing than England, the maintenance of an
ing and general supplies kept a 90-day store. ample and varied food supply for both the
and the civilian population was the
military
S
(1)QM Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 57-60. (2) Ltr,
CG USAFICPA to CO Army Port and SvC, 25 Oct 10
(1) AdmO 19, cited n. 9(2). (2) Memo, QM
43, sub: Construction Policy. ORG AGF PAC AG forCofS HHD, 7 Jan 42. ORB AGF PAC AG 463.7
600.1 (Projects, Jun 7-Feb 44). (3) Memo,
1 (Jun 29-Apr 42) (Gasoline).
TQMG for CG ASF, 14 Mar 45, sub: Tour of
11
(1) HHD GO 92, 26 May 42, sub: Establish-
POA and SWPA. OQMG POA 319.25. ment of Kauai and Maui QM Depots. (2) HHD
"(1) HD Fwd Ech AdmO 1, 3 Jan 42, sub: GO 129, Sec. II, 3 Aug 42, sub: Establishment of
Storage of Rations and Gasoline. (2) Fwd Ech HD Hilo QM Depot. ORB AG GO.
AdmO 19, 19 Mar 42, sub: QM
Sup Areas. ORB 12
Rpt, IG Hq HSAC, 24 Sep 42, sub: The Ra-
AGF PAC AG 400 (1942). tion. ORB AGF AG 430.2.
40 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
most important matter handled by the The development of diversified agricul-
ODQM months of the
during the first six ture was handicapped in many ways. Since
war. For decades the Territory had pursued the turn of the century production of tem-
a specialized tropical economy that re- perate-zone fruits and vegetables had been
stricted agricultural production almost en- declining. Farmers were unable to make a
tirely to sugar and pineapples, the commod- profit commensurate with the time and labor
ities with highest cash returns. Temperate- expended, for cultivation of these commodi-
zcne products, the chief elements in the diet ties required costly fertilizers and yielded
of the European and American segment of smaller harvests than on the mainland. As
population; rice, the staple food of the large-scale, industrialized farming became
Orientals; and
and forage for poultry
feeds more prevalent on the U.S. West Coast,
and livestock —all grown in small
these were Hawaiian producers were less and less
quantities that failed by a wide margin to able to compete successfully. The average
meet Hawaiian needs. grower of fruits and vegetables, usually Jap-
The islands, as a whole, imported more anese, owned only about four acres and had
than half their fresh fruits and vegetables, an annual income of only about $500. Un-
poultry, feeds, and cereals, a quarter of their able to afford machinery, he was forced to
meat, and a third of their dairy products. use uneconomic hand methods. He was fur-
More than 90 percent of the rice, white ther hampered by the fact that the lands
potatoes, and canned vegetables, and 100 most suited to vegetables had passed into the
percent of the flour consumed in the islands possession of the large sugar and pineapple
came from the United States
and other out- plantations, so that he was confined in the
Oahu, location of 60 percent of
side sources. main to poor soil in regions of excessive rain-
the Hawaiian population, heart of the pow- fall, where his crops were highly susceptible
erful system of naval and military bases to insect infestation, plant diseases, and va-
15
maintained by the United States, and the garies of the weather.
prime target of any foe attacking the islands, Thelopsided nature of Hawaiian agri-
produced only about 20 percent of its food culture was a condition that the Army could
and depended more on imports than did not ignore, for it meant that the entire pop-
the other islands. 11 Sugar and pineapples ulation, military and civilian, might be
were the only commodities the peacetime
starved by a complete or even partial block-
Army obtained wholly from local produc-
ade. Though the armed forces under these
tion. Hawaii also furnished fairly large
circumstances for a time might be fed satis-
quantites of coffee and fish and small quan-
factorily from their reserves, they could not
tities of fresh fruits and vegetables, milk, and
meat. But the total maintain a protracted defense with a starv-
value of imports from the
United States was usually about six times ing people at their backs. Humanitarianism,
that of food obtained from Hawaii. 14 if nothing else, would oblige them to share
(2) Agricultural Outlook, VI (July 1941 ), 3-11. Sup Prod in Hawaii, 21 Nov 36, incl to ltr, Stanley
14
( 1 ) Joint Defense Plan, HT, Estimate of the C. Kennedy, Interisland Steam Navigation Co,
Situation, HD, 1937, pp. 27-33. to Maj Gen Hugh A. Drum, 27 Nov 36. (2)
(2) Hawaiian De-
fense Project, Revision 1939, QM
Annex, p 2. Ltr, Gen Drum to Stanley C. Kennedy, 1 Dec 36.
ORB AGF PAC AG Defense Plans. Both in ORB AGF PAC AG 403.
PROBLEMS IN HAWAII, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND 41
manding generals of the Hawaiian Depart- own, relying almost wholly on the limited
ment had therefore increasingly stressed the amount available commercially. 18
development of an emergency food program As relations with Japan deteriorated in
for application in a military crisis involving 1940 and 1941, the Service Command fo-
Hawaii. cused increasing attention on acquiring land
When the Department Service Command and storage space in the event of war. Since
Section was established at Headquarters, land and the labor to till it would have to
Hawaiian Department (HHD), in August come from the domain of King Cane and
1935, with the responsibility of planning for Queen Pineapple, the Service Command
civil mobilization in time of war, it was encouraged planters to develop emergency
especially charged with the study of the food programs based on its conception of future
problem in the islands as awhole and on needs. Late in 1940 the Hawaiian Sugar
10
Oahu in particular. The Service Com- Planters' Association, which often exercised
mand collected facts pertinent to the pro- a decisive voice in Territorial affairs, started
and storage of food
duction, conservation, intensive work on such a program. It en-
and conducted experiments showing that listed the co-operation of the pineapple
sweet potatoes, string beans, lima beans, growers as well as the Army and in October
Chinese cabbage, and peanuts could be 1941 completed a plan that provided for the
grown satisfactorily. It determined that in restriction of emergency crops in Oahu to
a war crisis 25,000 acres constituted the four specified plantations, which, since the
minimum amount of land needed to make coastal areas might well be in a combat
17
Oahu self-sufficient in food. Even the zone, were all located in the middle of the
availability of this acreage for cultivation, island. The plan also indicated the tentative
it warned, would not insure an adequate acreage and the crops allotted to each
19
supply of provisions, for the islands ordinar- plantation.
ilyhad on hand only small food stocks and To speed creation of food reserves was
several months would elapse before the another matter of immediate interest to the
emergency crops matured. This phase of the Service Command. Speaking at an Army
problem, the Service Command concluded, Day celebration on 6 April 1941, Lt. Gen.
could best be handled by the creation of a Walter C. Short, Commanding General,
large subsistence reserve. But this solution Hawaiian Department, warned the Hawai-
required more storage space than was pos- ian people of the dangerous status of their
sessed by either the armed forces or the women
food supply and recommended that
civilian economy. Cold-storage warehouses
buy canned products for storage in their
were particularly scarce, for the peacetime
pantries. The press publicized this sugges-
practice of sending perishable commodities
tion, the public responded, and retail sales
direct from incoming ships to retail shops
of food rose about 20 percent during the
largely eliminated the need for such struc- that
following month. Notwithstanding
tures. Even the Army had no space of its
buying subsequently declined, the possible
18
(1) HHD GO 9, 13 Jul 35, sub: HD SvC. necessity of large-scale home storage had
(2) Supp to HHD GO 2, 1935, 2 Mar 36. ORB
AGF PAC AG GO. 18
Ltr, CG HD to Oahu Ice and Cold Storage
41. ORB AGF PAC 430.
17
JC Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt. 19, pp. 3107, Co, 31 Jul
3363. 19
JC Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt. 18, Exhibit 153.
42 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
20
been firmly implanted in the public mind. ers, who raised most of the potatoes, to
24
General Short gave strong support to the avoid monetary loss.
bill providing for such purchases and for the accumulation of a 70-day supply for 150,-
construction of warehouses to store them, 000 soldiers and by the withdrawal of the
23 largest freighters from the Hawaiian run to
Congress never took any further action.
supply the forces in Australia and the South
During 1941 the Hawaiian Department 20
Pacific. Since civilian food would be scarce
utilized its procuring authority to give "in-
for at least some months, General Short, as
fant industry protection" to the cultivation
Military Governor of the Territory, a posi-
of potatoes. Hawaiian potatoes cost almost
tion that he assumed on the proclamation of
40 percent more than the mainland variety
martial law on 7 December, created the
but on General Short's request The Quar- OFC
Office of Food Control ) to supervise
(
termaster General approved their purchase. the production, storage, price, and distribu-
Short justified the payment of the higher tion of foods, feeds, forage, and seeds.
price as a defense measure that would help Only naval stocks were exempt from OFC
make Hawaii self-sufficient. Even this price, supervision.
27
he claimed, barely enabled the sugar plant- Just before he was relieved from the com-
mand of the Hawaiian Department in mid-
* Ibid, Exhibit 133.
21 December, Short also appointed an Ad-
(1) JC Pearl Harbor Hearings, p. 3366. (2)
Mid-Pac Hist, Pt. VII, p. 1264.
" Harbor Hearings, Exhibit 133.
JC Pearl -'
Ltr, CG HD to TAG,
4 Apr 41, sub: Authority
- :!
Rpt 1694, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., Seed
(1) S. to Buy Irish Potatoes. ORB AGF PAC AG
430.
Supply for Production of Food for Hawaii. (2) 25
JC Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt. 18, p. 3115.
Congressional Record, Vol. 86, Pt. 7, pp. 7099- -"Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 1336, 1358.
7100. " QMMid-Pac Hist, pp. 33-38.
PROBLEMS IN HAWAII, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND 43
ministrator of Crop Production, who named semble stocks for movement to Hawaii.
four co-ordinators, one for each of the main The OFC advised the FSCC concerning
islands — Oahu, Hawaii, Kauai, and Maui. 2 * shipping priorities and arranged for stor-
These appointments were all made with a age of the reserve. 31
view to the possible implementation of the On 26 January 1942 Colonel White be-
plan for emergency vegetable production. came Director of OFC with full responsi-
When Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons suc- bility for the procurement and distribution
ceeded Short, he decided that sugar and of both Army and civilian subsistence stocks.
pineapple land would not be used for the Up to this time the OFC had set up neither
cultivation of vegetables. He based his de- a rationing nor a price control system. But
cision mainly upon faith in the continued the steadily growing cost of food confronted
even if limited availability of shipping and White with a thorny problem that could no
upon the build-up, already under way, of longer be ignored. Prices had begun to rise
civilian reserves. He was influenced, too, bv with the buying panic of 9 December and
the possibility of converting sugar intomotor in Honolulu by late January had increased
fuel inHawaii in case of need. 29 by 10 to 40 percent. Rice was one of several
The burden of insuring an adequate food staples that showed disturbingly large ad-
supply for civilians thus fell upon the newly vances. Early efforts to check profiteering
established OFC. During December and had stipulated simply that retailers pub-
January Colonel White acted as chief tech- licly display lists of their prices. The day
nical adviser to this office. In addition he after White became Director, OFC termed
was charged specifically with the determina- this system a failure and fixed top retail
tion of civilian requirements and the prepa- charges for rice, potatoes, fish, and cheese
ration of a civilian rationing program. 30 sold on Oahu. Shortly afterwards it began
Though under martial law the OFC had un- to publish in the Honolulu newspapers no-
limited authority over the distribution of tices of permissible prices for a steadily
food, it at first used this power sparingly. lengthening list of foods. As OFC had no
But was deeply interested in the creation
it police staff, enforcement of the published
of an ample reserve. A few days after Pearl charges hinged almost entirely upon the
Harbor President Roosevelt allocated $10,- voluntary co-operation of merchants and
000,000 from his emergency funds for such the willingness of buyers to report viola-
a reserve, and late in the month Congress 32
tions.
approved the establishment of a $35,000,-
Meanwhile inflationary forces were daily
000 revolving fund. The reserve was to con-
becoming more powerful on Oahu. As reef-
sist of a six-month supply of nonperishables
ers departed from the West Coast of the
and a thirty-day supply of perishables. The
United States only at irregular intervals,
Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation
perishable commodities were alternately
(FSCC) acted as buying agent and, by
mid-December, had already begun to as- " :
charges at will regardless of the effect on re- speculative and long-term storage. Since the
34
tail costs. To curb continued profiteering, enforcement of these regulations freed more
the OFC promulgated a new regulation on and more space for essential items, importa-
21 February that for the first time put teeth tion of fresh food was increased.
38
eral factors. One, as already pointed out, the stock of a food item approached or ex-
was the absence of a large cold-storage build- ceeded a six-month supply, part of it was
ing program. Another was the higher pri- distributed through wholesalers and re-
ority given to the stockage and withdrawal placed by purchases from the mainland. A
of Army supplies. A third, and the most im- six-month supply was thus constantly in
42
portant of all, was the steady growth of mil- storage.
itary cold-storage requirements as the num- After fear of a critical food shortage began
ber of troops in the archipelago and other to wane in the spring of 1942, the OFC be-
mid-Pacific islands multiplied. The shortage came more and more an agency whose main
of perishables in Hawaii would have been function was price regulation, a responsi-
alleviated had it been possible to increase bility that involved the enforcement, by mil-
interisland shipping and make public an- itary officers, of military regulations appli-
nouncement of anticipated arrivals at and cable to civilians. General Emmons felt that
departures from the ports of outlying islands such authority was contrary to democratic
that at certain seasons had a surplus of some concepts of the proper relationship between
meats and vegetables. But the prior claims the Army and the civil population. It should,
of other Pacific areas and the shortage of he thought, be reduced to a minimum, par-
reefers made the allocation of enough ves- ticularly since the Territorial press and Ha-
sels impossible, and sailing schedules could waiian merchants were already asking for
not be publicized because this information less military control. Quite apart from these
might be conveyed to the enemy. 39 Because considerations, the Governor believed that
adequate cold-storage resources were lack- sound administration demanded that offi-
ing on the islands, the limited number of cers devote their attention to military rather
ships meant that substantial quantities of than civil affairs. Aware that more rather
exportable surplus spoiled; the unavaila- than less price regulation was probably in-
bility of sailing schedules meant that insuf- escapable under existing conditions, the
ficient time was afforded farmers to prepare Governor nonetheless hoped that it could
commodities for shipment after a Honolulu- be carried out under civilian supervision. 43
bound vessel was known to be in port. 40 His first step toward achieving this ob-
Despite sporadic shortages of meat, but- jective was taken in late May, when, at his
ter, and fresh fruits and vegetables, Hawaii request, the Office of Price Administration
did not suffer from lack of food, for nonper- (OPA) sent several representatives from
ishable provisions were always supplied in the United States to set up an essentially
" Routing Slip, CG HSOS to P&TD HD, 25 Nov Ltr, CofT to CG SFPE, 14 Aug 43, sub: Ha-
42
42, sub: Freight Trans from Outer Islands. ORB waiian Foodstuff Sup Level. ASF File, AGO.
AGF PAC AG 080 (Hawaiian Shipping Co). 43
OPA, OPA in Hawaii, pp. 21-22.
40
Honolulu Advertiser, January 20, 1942, p. 1;
44
(1) Rad, CG HD to CG SOS, 16 May 42.
January 22, 1942, p. 1 March 20, 1942, p. 12.
; (2) Memo, MG TH for all Sees, 2 Jun 42. ORB
41
Ibid., February 18, 1942, p. 10. AGF PAC AG 104.12.
46 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Price Control Section. When this action was can bases at Wake Island and Guam, the
followed in March 1943 by the transfer of strategically located Australian outpost of
control over foods, feeds, and agricultural Rabaul in New Britain, and numerous small
seeds to the Director of Civilian Defense, the islands in the south and central Pacific that
role of the Hawaiian Department Quar- could serve as bases for the defense of their
termaster in civilian food supply was termi- acquisitions and as springboards for further
45
nated. advances.
The OFC never attained the importance To halt the southward thrust of the Jap-
it would have had if Hawaii had been block- anese the Allies had to create a safe supply
aded by sea, but it nonetheless performed an line from the United States to Australia and
essential task. Its operations, involving a New Zealand, the only important sources
far-reaching responsibility for the food sup- of supply below the equator. Such a line, in
ply of a friendly population that was vir- turn, required the establishment of bases
tually without precedent in Army history, on the larger and more strategically located
showed that under comparable circum- island groups that studded the central Pa-
stances in the future it would be necessary cific from Hawaii south to the British do-
to anticipate such problems as rationing minions. In the opening months of 1942,
and price Prewar planners had been
control. therefore, American ground and air forces,
so absorbed with schemes for shifting the often in conjunction with Allied troops, oc-
basis of agricultural production from sugar cupied and transformed New Caledonia,
and pineapples to fruits and vegetables that the Fijis, Samoa, and other islands into air
these matters had received little attention. and supply bases. In Australia and New
In view of the difficulty of interisland com- Zealand they formed the nuclei of organi-
munication, strategic planners should per- zations intended to develop these countries
haps also have given more study to the food into major centers of logistical support for
problems of the outlying islands. offensive operationsaimed at driving the
Nipponese from their recent conquests.
Reaction to Japanese Victories,
December 1941-May 1942 Organization of Areas
Theater
in the Pacific
While the U.S. Army was strengthening
The widegeographical sweep of the war
its position in the great mid-Pacific outpost
against Japan created so many tactical, ad-
of Hawaii and making its brave but futile
ministrative, and logistical problems that
stand in the Philippines, the Japanese were
two major territorial commands, the South-
fast transforming their grandiose scheme for
west Pacific Area and the Pacific Ocean
a Nipponese-dominated "Greater East
Areas, were established to handle them. The
Asia" into a reality. At the time of Pearl
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) embraced
Harbor they held in China the rich north-
Australia, New Guinea, the Philippines, the
eastern provinces, the large coastal cities,
Netherlands Indies except Sumatra, the
and the fertile Yangtse Valley. In the next
South China Sea, and the Gulf of Siam, all
six months they added to these conquests
of which were essential steppingstones on
southeast Asia, Java, Sumatra, the Ameri-
the southern road to Tokyo and all of
" Honolulu Advertiser, March 10, 1943, p. 5. which, except Australia and southern New
PROBLEMS IN HAWAII, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND
R. i/ohnsione
MAP 1
Guinea, early fell into Japanese hands. The tant exception of Hawaii. The Central Pa-
post of Supreme Commander, Southwest cific Area ( CPA )
, stretching from the equa-
Pacific Area (CINCSWPA), was given to tor to latitude 42° north, included the
General MacArthur. The geographically Gilberts, Marshalls, Carolines, and Mari-
vaster Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) included anas in addition to Hawaii and most of the
most of the Pacific. {Map 1) It embraced home islands. The North
Japanese Pacific
tral, and North Pacific Areas. The South Pa- above latitude 42° north. Admiral Chester
cific Area (SPA) extended below the equa- W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pa-
tor, east of the Southwest Pacific Area and cific Fleet (CINCPAC), served as Com-
west of longitude 110° west, and comprised mander in Chief of the Allied Forces in the
New Zealand, New Caledonia, and the Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA). He
Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, and New Hebrides commanded the Central and North Pacific
Islands —roughly Polynesia with the impor- Areas directly from his Pearl Harbor head-
48 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
quarters and Pacific Area
the South the same fashion as it did the United States
47
through a Both Admiral
subordinate. for overseas theaters in general.
Nimitz and General Mac Arthur were re- At the outset many problems had to be
sponsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in solved before Australian supply potential-
40
Washington. ities could be utilized effectively. Internal
Similar defensive and offensive missions was impeded by long distances,
distribution
were assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area inadequate railways and highways, and the
and the Pacific Ocean Areas. Both com- shortage of coasters. Australian industry,
mands were to hold those islands that were moreover, was not highly developed. Many
essential to sea and air communication with manufactured items were either not procur-
the United States, to the defense of North able at all or procurable only after indus-
America, and to the launching of operations trial plants had been converted to the pro-
against the Japanese by sea, air, and land. duction of new articles. Primarily, Australia
They were both to prepare and conduct was an agricultural and a grazing land, but
amphibious offensives. In these areas, as in even in the procurement of food there were
all overseas theaters, the primary mission bothersome problems. Meat and grain prod-
of the QMCwas to support combat opera- ucts, and fruits and vegetables, while ob-
tions by furnishing the supplies and services tainable in considerable quantities, were not
for which it was responsible. always obtainable in the quantity and the
variety needed by the U.S. Army. 48 Vege-
Quartermaster Problems in Australia table production was conducted almost en-
and New Zealand tirely on small, insufficiently mechanized
truck farms and was concentrated near the
In carrying out its mission in the South-
populous southeastern cities, far from the
west Pacific Area, the QMC, like other tech- areas where many American troops were
nical services, used Australia as its first great
first stationed and even farther from New
supply base. On that continent from the
Guinea. Fruit and vegetable canning and
beginning of 1942 to the close of 1943 were
dehydration, essential to the feeding of large
concentrated a major part of the supply ac-
field forces, were both in a rudimentary
tivities of the command. Though New stage of development.
Guinea became the chief base in 1944 and
The widespread shortage of manpower
was replaced in turn by the Philippines at hampered efforts to increase production. Of
the beginning of 1945, the southern conti-
the 7,000,000 people living in Australia, ap-
nent remained to the very end a substantial
proximately 2,300,000 were in civilian occu-
supplier and distributor of essential mili-
pations and 1,000,000 were in the armed
tary items. To the QMC Aus-
in particular services. The extent of the shortage of labor
tralia was important, for the Corps procured
17
Rpt, Brig Gen Hugh B. Hester, 20 Jul 45,
a larger proportion of its supplies in that sub: Proc in Australia (hereafter cited as the
country than did any other technical service. Hester Report), 1942-30 Jun 45, Apps. OQMG
It indeed used that dominion as a zone of
SWPA 319.1.
48
(1) Rpt, Lt Col Lea B. Reed, IGD, 19 Jul 42,
interior for the Southwest Pacific in much sub: Fresh Fruits and Vegetables in Base Sees 1,
2, and 3. ORB AFWESPAC QM
333.1. (2) E.
"John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Of- Ronald Walker, The Australian Economy in War
fensive, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford Univer-
WAR II (Washington, 1949), pp. 2-3. sity Press, 1947), pp. 209-10.
PROBLEMS IN HAWAII, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND 49
for new or expanding war industries is indi- months afterwards, Quartermaster officers
cated by the fact that at the close of 1942, carried out regular transportation func-
roughly 85 percent of the men, 26 percent tions.
51
of the women, and 30 percent of the farm During its period of exclusive responsi-
population were either enlisted in the armed bility for transportation activities, the QMC
services or already engaged in war indus- busied itself with plans for the military uti-
tries. Available labor consisted almost wholly lization of the Australian railway system.
of men over military age, of the physically That system was in general incapable of
handicapped, and of women. Farmers and swift distribution of supplies. It had origi-
manufacturers alike had trouble in securing nally been built and developed by the six
workers. As industry and agriculture ex- Australian states to serve state rather than
panded, some labor was redistributed in line national needs. This fact accounted for the
with shifting wartime needs, and certain system's most serious shortcoming five dif-—
types of artisans were released from the ferent gauges. These varying gauges made
Australian armed services. But labor none- long-distance shipments impossible without
49
theless remained scarce. unloading and reloading, occasionally three
Transportation, which also presented or four times. Traffic repeatedly became
knotty problems, continued during the first congested; in one instance nearly 20,000
four months of the war to be a responsi- tons of freight were stalled on sidings be-
bility of the QMC. That service alone was tween Newcastle and Brisbane. Delays were
charged with the movement of troops, sup- caused also by the lack of motor vehicles for
plies, and equipment by land and by sea.
moving accumulated traffic, by the shortage
In early March the War Department trans-
of cranes and other materials-handling
ferred this responsibility to a Transportation
equipment, and by the difficulty of obtaining
Division in Headquarters, Services of Sup-
workers for prompt handling of freight by
Washington, and in mid-April USA-
ply, in
manual means. The delivery of fresh pro-
FIA General Order No. 40 implemented visions in good condition was particularly
this decision in the Southwest Pacific Area
difficult, for Australia had developed no na-
by shifting transportation functions in that
tional system of distributing perishables and
command to a new agency, the Transporta- had few refrigerator cars. Fresh produce in
5"
tion Service. But until this directive was consequence deteriorated rapidly.
52
companies, but whether these units operated under sub:Trip to Darwin, 28 Mar-8 Apr 42. ORB
the direction of the QMC
or of the Transportation AFWESPAC QM 333.1. (2) Ltr, Dir of Proc to
Corps, which emerged in July 1942, was in practice CG USASOS, 30 Sep 44, sub: Proc of Subs. ORB
a matter for theater and even organization decision. AFWESPAC QM 430.
.
weaknesses. Grading was poor; there were ran north to Brisbane, but they could not
not enough sidings, yards, workshops, or be devoted exclusively to military transpor-
water supply points; and signaling was done tation for more than a few days at a time
mostly by hand. Rolling stock was designed without crippling the economic life of this
to carry loads far below the American rich region upon which the armed services
standard. Boxcars carried only from about depended for coal, steel, munitions, textiles,
8 to 15 tons. Australian trains hauled only and food. 55
about 500 tons, as compared with the 4,000 Motor roads, though compensating in
or more tons sometimes handled in the part for railway shortcomings, were neither
United and had an average speed of
States, good enough nor well enough distributed to
15 to 18 miles an hour. The lack of a re- handle military traffic satisfactorily. Only
serve pool of serviceable locomotives and in heavily populated southern and south-
53
freight cars further retarded movements. eastern Australia, where railways were most
Finally, there were not enough lines to serve efficient and improved highways least
all militarily important areas. Northern Aus- needed, could roads carry a dense traffic.
tralia, strategically significant early in 1942 Elsewhere they were mostly of a dirt type
as the probable initial objective of any at- that swiftly disintegrated under the heavy
tempted invasion, had but a single railroad, loads that had to be hauled to American
running south 300 miles from Darwin to troops stationed at long distances — often
Birdum, with a gap of 650 miles between it several hundred miles —from railways.
56
and the terminus of the central system start- The shortage of suitable trucks further
ing at Port Augusta on the south coast. Dar- hampered motor transport.
win was thus almost isolated from the rest In line with its original mission, the QMC
54
of the country.
at the outset had responsibility for the pro-
So limited was the carrying capacity of
curement, distribution, and maintenance of
the rail system that it could not deliver
motor vehicles and their parts and retained
promptly all the supplies required by mili-
these functions until 1 August 1942, when
tary installations. In April 1942 the main
they were shifted to the Chief Ordnance
line of Queensland system, running
the
57
along the east coast from Brisbane to Cairns, Officer. At first the Corps could obtain
had a daily capacity of only 1,000 tons and few vehicles from the United States and
required twenty days to move could not use many Australian trucks, for
a single di-
they were in general small, few in number,
vision of 15,000 men and their supplies. The
maximum capacity of the Trans-Australian
58
Rpt, n. s., 17 Jul 42, sub: Australian Reserves,
Railway, connecting Melbourne and Perth, App. to Mtg, Allied Sup Council, 13 Jul 42. ORB
AFPAC Sup Council.
was a mere 400 tons a day. Only in Victoria M Lecture, Lt Col George Sutton, Australian
and New South Wales, the heart of indus- Mil Mission, 23 Aug 42, sub: Australian Conditions.
OQMG SWPA 319.25 (Misc Data).
trial Australia, did freight-hauling capacity " (1) WD
Cir 245, 24 Jul 42, sub: Transfer of
:
MT Activities. (2) Erna Risch, The Quartermas-
*
Rpt, Vandcrlip, cited n. 52 ( 1 ) ter Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services,
,4
Mtg, Allied Sup Council, 13 Jul 42. ORB UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
AFPAC Allied Sup Council. (Washington, 1953), Vol. I, pp. 19-22.
PROBLEMS IN HAWAII, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND 51
portion of old and physically unfit men at change-of-gauge points, space was even
among port laborers and from the high rate scarcer. From the outset, therefore, the
of absenteeism, which averaged as much as problem of future storage for ever increas-
1 8 percent at Townsville. Since double and ing military stocks had to be faced. Finally,
pay were given for week-end
triple rates of in 1943 an extensive building program was
work, some longshoremen put in an ap- undertaken to meet American storage re-
pearance only on Saturdays and Sundays. quirements, and a substantial number of
So common did this practice become that
temporary structures were built. 62 Storage
the Commonwealth, with the concurrence
operations were much less mechanized than
of the U.S. Army, finally stopped all week-
those in the United States, and modern
end dock operations. Longshoremen, as a
materials-handling equipment was slow in
group, it was estimated, handled only 6 to
arriving from the zone of interior. Quarter-
10 tons per gang per hour in early 1943 in
master warehousing, though better than
contrast to the 18 to 25 tons handled by
elsewhere in the Southwest Pacific Area,
gangs of American soldiers. In the follow-
never attained as high a degree of efficiency
ing two years the dock workers' average de- 63
61 as it did at home.
clined by about a third. The Quartermas-
ter Corps was concerned with these
In Australia the U.S. Army had to ad-
just operations to a new political as well
its
unfavorable port conditions not only be-
as anew economic scene. While the Com-
cause it had for a time direct responsibility
monwealth Government was eager to help
for water transportation but also because its
supply the American forces, it quite natu-
ability to maintain adequate stocks and to
rally gave prior consideration to its own
distribute supplies and equipment promptly
armed services and itsown citizens. As a
and equitably, like that of other technical
member state of the British Commonwealth
services, depended to a considerable degree
of Nations, it exported substantial quantities
upon speedy handling of cargoes.
of supplies to the United Kingdom. It of
Like transportation operations, storage
course hoped to continue as extensive an
operations had many adverse conditions to
export trade as possible. Since all local
contend with. When U.S. forces first ar-
procurement and much distribution of
rived, private storage space was almost
American supplies had to be carried out
completely filled. Wool warehouses were
through Australian agencies and in con-
almost the only type of commercial storage
formance with Australian policies, the U.S.
available for lease, and they were available Army set up special bodies and procedures
only until the new wool season opened in to co-ordinate the relations between its own
August and September. In the port cities
the Australian Army had taken over most "(1) Memo, CQM for EngrO USASOS, 17
Apr 42. ORB AFWESPAC QM 633. (2) Ltr, CG
of the storage places not needed for mer- USASOS to CG Base Sec 3, 19 Jun 43, sub: Ware-
cantile purposes. In the interior, especially house Construction. ORB ABCOM P&C 633.
63
( 1
) Svc Div (Warehousing Br) for
Memo, Gen
01
(1) Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, pp. Chief Gen Svc Br OCQM, 28 Sep 42, sub:
497-504. (2) Rpt, Deputy Dir Storage Div ASF, Materials-Handling Equip. (2) Ltr, USASOS QM
29 Oct 44, sub: Sup Opns in SWPA. ORB ABCOM to QMBase Sec 3, 12 Jan 43, sub: Stacking
AG Supplies. Machines. Both in ORB AFWESPAC QM 451.93.
54 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
supply organizations and those of the fed- mands. Like Australia, New Zealand proved
64
eral and state governments of Australia. of inestimable value to the U.S. Army.
In spite of the unprecedented problems
that it posed, Australia was an invaluable
Australia and New Zealand not only pro-
sumed in the Southwest Pacific Area and they also paid for them. The detailed ap-
a substantial part of that consumed in the plication of this principle was first worked
South Pacific Area. Until the termination of out in an informal agreement with the
hostilities it poured out rations for American American forces in the spring of 1942. At
use and supplied clothing, equipage, and London, several months later, the United
general supplies in liberal quantities. With- States made a formal arrangement covering
out Australia, the shortage of ocean-going all British dominions and colonies in the
shipswould almost certainly have prolonged Pacific. Under this arrangement Australia
the war against Japan. and New Zealand paid not only for locally
NewZealand, while a less valuable base procured supplies but also for such local
than Australia, had a higher proportion of services as the repair of shoes and type-
arable land, and relative to area and popu-
writers, the dry cleaning and laundering of
lation,provided more food for the armed
clothing, and the provision of water, gas,
services.In New Zealand, as in Australia,
and electricity. In addition these countries
there were shortages of labor, warehouses,
60 bore the cost of building warehouses and
and agricultural and industrial equipment.
other structures for the U.S. forces and paid
Since the smaller dominion consists almost
wholly of two long narrow islands, North the wages of civilians employed by Ameri-
Island and South Island, each about 500 can installations. Eventually, reverse lend-
miles long and seldom more than 1 20 miles lease was applied also in the French pos-
wide, the chief means of assembling local session of New Caledonia, but, owing to
products was by coasters. These vessels were local opposition, not until early 1944.
at first scarce, but enough of them eventually Through the application of this system of
were obtained to meet essential military de- local procurement the United States re-
01
) Memo, CG USAFIA for Heads of Gen and ceived partial compensation for the millions
( 1
Special Staff Sees, 21 Feb 42, sub: Centraliz.ed of dollars that it expended for American
Proc. ORB AFPAC GPA 400.1201. (2) USASOS 06
ORB NUGSEC products needed by its Pacific allies.
Regs 25-5, 16 Dec 42, sub: GPA.
USASOS Regs.
M Rpt, U.S. Sup Mission, 12 May 42, sub:
(1)
66
( 1 ) Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Op-
Conf with Controllers. (2) Rpt 165, Mil Attache, erations for the Period Ended April 30, 1943, pp.
Wellington, 12 Apr 43, sub: Manpower, N. Z. 42-43. (2) Ltr, SPBC to CG USAFPOA, 25 Aug
Both in ORB USAFINC AG 319.1. 44. USAFINC AG 334.
CHAPTER III
in the Pacific
The Quartermaster mission embraced so of another technical service; and carried out
varied an assortment of supply and service the final stage in the distribution of gasoline
functions that an extensive organization was and other petroleum products — issuance to
required to carry it out. In the three princi- the ultimate consumers, the troops in the
pal territorial commands in the Pacific the field.
the Corps outside the combat zone. There contact with normal sources of supply, and
were also storage and distribution centers emergency rations, specially developed
and corps, army, and division quartermas- packaged rations for combat units cut off
ters who supervised the operations of their from their usual means of supply. There
were two field rations, designated as A and
service in these organizations. Everywhere,
moreover, specialized Quartermaster troop
B. The A type, corresponding as nearly as
practicable to the regular peacetime ration
units helped carry out Quartermaster
of soldiers in the United States, contained a
functions.
wide variety of both perishable and non-
perishable foods. In the Pacific, outside
Quartermaster Mission
heavily populated areas, storage and
In general the mission of the Corps was transportation conditions seldom permitted
to provide the supplies and services required the use of the fresh fruits, vegetables,
by all troops, regardless of the branch of the and meats that constituted the very heart
Army to which they belonged. In World of the A ration. The B ration, which
War II this meant that the Corps fed and utilized canned or dehydrated foodstuffs
clothed the Army; provided items of equip- in place of perishables, was of necessity fre-
ment and general utility, whether for per- quently substituted. Front-line fighting
sonal or organizational use, which were not troops customarily ate emergency rations,
so specialized as to lie within the province such as C, D, or K, each of which had been
56 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
developed for consumption during a partic- points for issue by Quartermaster gasoline
supply units. 4
1
ular phase of combat.
The provision of clothing for the Army Quartermaster items were divided into
meant supply not only of the regular service four classes. ClassI comprised those that
uniform of coat, jacket, trousers, shirt, neck- were consumed at an approximately equal
tie, cap, and shoes, but also of variations of daily rate. Food and forage were the prin-
these garments intended to meet the special cipal supplies in this category. In ordinary
conditions of climate and terrain encoun- overseas language "Class I" was the term
tered in the Pacific. It meant, too, supply of applied to rations. Class II included cloth-
scores of other articles, such as head nets, ing, equipment, and other items for which
gloves, work suits, jungle suits, raincoats, the precise quantity of initial issue was set
and ponchos, which filled unusual needs. in Tables of Organization and Equipment
Personal equipment, other than clothing, or other War Department authorizations.
supplied by the Corps embraced such essen- Class III comprised coal and petroleum
tial items as field packs, sleeping bags, and products; and Class IV, articles chiefly —
intrenching shovels. Organizational equip- general supplies —
for which the quantity
ment included tents, stoves, field bakery of initial issue was not prescribed. In the-
equipment, refrigerators, salvage, laundry, aters of operations Class I and III items
and bath equipment, and hundreds of lesser were the ones whose prompt distribution was
items.
2
The numerous general-utility ar- most essential; without food troops could
ticles, known collectively as "general sup- not live and without gasoline a modern army
plies," were employed mostly for the Army's was stopped dead in its tracks. These were
housekeeping. They included common yet in consequence the items upon which quar-
5
essential items like stationery, typewriters, termasters focused their main attention.
furniture and other office equipment, soap, The procurement of supplies required
sanitary goods, chinaware, glassware, and much more than the mere filling of requi-
mess equipment in general. The Corps also sitions. It demanded accurate information
furnished cigarettes, toilet articles, candy, regarding available stocks, anticipated de-
side — the QMC received gasoline and other commercially, how production might be in-
fuelsand transported them, often in 55-gal- creased, and how local goods compared in
lon drums or 5-gallon cans, to distributing quality with those obtained in the United
States.
1
Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization,
Supply, and Services, Vol. I, p. 192.
*
Quartermaster Handbook: Gasoline Supply
'Ibid., pp. 123, 138-39. Company, pp. 31-48.
"(1) FM 10-10, 2 Mar 42, sub: QM Svc in "•
The QMC stored and distributed as well In overseas areas all Quartermaster ac-
collected discarded clothing, shoes, personal in turn submitted to the OQMG copies of
equipment, drums, cans, and ordnance their important directives. But OQMG ob-
—
supplies in fact, all discarded government servers' reports, describing the actual utility
covered the "communications zone," which the size United States functions
of the
embraced the entire Southwest Pacific Area similar to those that long-established Quar-
9
outside combat zones. Within the com- termaster agencies carried out in the United
munications zone, which was divided for States. There the Office of The Quarter-
administrative and operating purposes into master General and the Quartermaster de-
base sections, USASOS controlled all sup- pots had developed over the years agencies
ply establishments, lines of communication, capable of dealing with highly specialized
and other agencies needed for satisfactory problems. The Philadelphia Depot had long
support of troops. To carry out its mission, concentrated on the development and pro-
Headquarters, USASOS, established gen- curement of clothing, the Boston Depot on
eral and special staffs charged with the footwear, and other depots on food and gen-
formulation of supply policies and the di- eral supplies. All these installations as well
rection of their execution. In the Office of as the OQMGcould call upon marketing
the Chief Quartermaster, often called the and technical experts in industry, com-
Quartermaster Section, was lodged respon- merce, agriculture, and the universities for
sibility for supervision of Quartermaster advice, and even before Pearl Harbor they
installations and units controlled by had achieved a high degree of co-ordina-
USASOS, procurement and storage
for the tion between Army requirements and
of Quartermaster supplies, and for distribu- American industrial and agricultural capa-
tion of these supplies to troops within the bilities that materially facilitated their sup-
communications zone. It was alsocharged ply activities when war came.
with distribution of items to the supply The OCQM in Australia started with
points of organizations in combat zones. none of the operational advantages pos-
These points might be warehouses, open- sessedby the Quartermaster Corps in the
storage centers, truckheads, or navigation United States. Yet it occupied in theory
heads set up to receive shipments from a position not unlike that of the OQMG in
USASOS. At the supply points Quarter- Washington. Though circumstances at first
master units, operating under the direction obliged it actually to carry out some Quar-
of tactical commanders, handled and stored termaster operations, it was not set up to
the items of their service and issued them procure, store, distribute, or reclaim sup-
to using units or else transported them to plies and equipment but rather, like the
distributing points deeper in the combat OQMG, to plan, co-ordinate, and control
these activities in accordance with supply
area where using units received them. 10 11
programs approved by higher echelons.
As a planning agency in the procurement
Office of the Chief Quartermaster
field, the Australian OCQM first of all de-
termined theater requirements for Quarter-
The first task of the OCQM in Australia
master items and ascertained what propor-
was the creation of an organization capable
tion of these requirements could be obtained
of performing under the unfamiliar condi-
tions of an alien land in a command twice 11
Rpt, Maj Gen Julian F. Barnes, former CG
6 Nov 42, sub: Organization and
Ac-
USAFIA
Quartermaster Emergency Handbook (Wash- tivities, USAFIA, 7 Dec 41-30 Jun 42. OCMH.
ington: QMR, 1941), p. 265. This report will be cited hereafter as the Barnes
10
FM 10-10, 2 Mar 42, sub: Svc in QM TOPNS. Rpt.
60 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
in Australia and what proportion would the Quartermaster, Maj. Abraham G. Sil-
have to come from the United States; verman, three other officers, and two en-
finally, it arranged for procurement from listed men. Shortly afterwards Major
the indicated source. The OCQM also de- Silverman hired six Australian clerks and
termined how many Quartermaster officers obtained several additional officers on de-
and men were needed and, subject to the tached service from the Air Corps and the
approval of GHQ SWPA, requested them Chemical Warfare Service to help super-
from the zone of interior. In addition it pro- vise the loading and discharge of ships. For
vided for the establishment of bakeries, some weeks transportation matters indeed
laundries, training schools, and storage and demanded as much or more attention from
12
reclamation depots. As a co-ordinating the newly formed section as did any other
agency, it designated particular installations activity. Silverman had no assistant until 9
as storers of specific items. In line with logis- January when Capt. Andy E. Toney arrived
tical instructions issued to it by higher eche- and became Assistant Quartermaster. With
lons it determined the size of stocks in differ- so few helpers, the Quartermaster could do
ent base sections and transferred supplies little except care for immediate operating
15
from one installation to another in order to problems. He centered his efforts mainly
maintain prescribed levels. To meet varying upon the discharge of incoming ships carry-
manpower requirements, it assigned and ing Air Corps equipment and upon the stor-
shifted men and units within the communi- age of supplies in temporary warehouses
13
cations zone. As a supervising agency the near the Ascot racecourse.
OCQM issued operating procedures, tech- The arrival in Melbourne on 2 February
nical manuals, and special directives as of the RPH ("Remember Pearl Harbor")
guides for installations and units and group of officers signalized the beginning of
through frequent inspections checked on the a new phase in OCQM development.
14
execution of its instructions. Though the contingent included only eight
The establishment of the OCQM, like quartermasters, they represented an impor-
that of other technical service headquarters, tant accession of strength. Among them was
was hampered months by a far-reaching
for Col. Douglas C. Cordiner, who served as
shortage of officers and by the confusion Chief Quartermaster until 15 May 1944,
that accompanied hasty efforts to create al- when Col. (later Brig. Gen.) William F.
most overnight sections for which no plans Campbell succeeded him. Another promi-
had been formulated. When U.S. Forces in RPH group was Lt. Col.
nent officer in the
Australia set up its headquarters in Lennon's Herbert A. Gardner, who, later, on 15 June
Hotel in Brisbane on 24 December 1941, 1942, became General Purchasing Agent in
the Quartermaster Section consisted of only Headquarters, USASOS. The OCQM was
12
now moved to Melbourne, but the cramped
(1) Lecture, Col Hugh B. Hester, 16 Nov 42,
quarters it occupied gave no room for ex-
sub: Organization of OCQM. ORB Base A QM
400.291. (2) OCQM OO
116, 5 Dec 42, sub: Or- pansion. As few of the clerical employees
ganization OCQM
USASOS. ORB AFWESPAC accompanied the office in the move from
QM 400.1924.
Brisbane, operations were for a time fur-
" Lecture, Lt Col W. H. Hamrick, 7 Dec 42, sub:
Proc Control. ORB Base A 400.291. QM ther handicapped by the necessity of hiring
"Lecture, Lt Col Edward F. Shepherd, 18 Nov
42, sub: Sup System. ORB Base A 400.291. QM 15
QM SWPA Hist, I,
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC 61
and training a new civilian staff. Because of its requests for units from the zone of in-
the shortage of officers and space a full- terior and its assignments of units to
branches operating in much the same man- lished schools for QMC officers, planned
ner as the OQMG did in Washington could their courses of study, and developed stand-
1
training units and casuals.
'
Australia.'
6
lieved of most of its transportation
March
In early the OCQM moved to and an independent Trans-
responsibilities
more commodious quarters in the Mel- portation Service was set up in USAFIA.
bourne Grammar School where space suf- During its short existence the division
ficed to permit the establishment of a larger created the nuclei of several small sections.
but still relatively small organization. Four One of these sections dealt with the move-
divisions were set up — an Administrative, ment and troops by Australian rail-
of cargo
a Transportation, a Supply, and a Pur- roads and airlines. Another, the Motor
chasing and Contracting Division. The Ad- Supply Section, procured trucks and ar-
ministrative Division performed the routine ranged for the assembly, testing, and dis-
servicesneeded by the whole for the OCQM tribution of vehicles. Late in March a Water
conduct of business. It distributed mail, Section began operations with a staff of
messages, and directives; maintained the about ten veteran shipping men headed by
general files of the entire office; and pro- Col. Thomas G. Plant, who for many years
vided and repaired typewriters, telephones, had served as an executive of Pacific steam-
and other necessary business equipment. All ship lines. This section, as its name implied,
these services were normal functions of an provided for the handling of seaborne move-
administrative unit, but in the OCQM the ments. In order to do this, it chartered
Administrative Division had in addition coasters, lighters, cranes, and docks, and
several responsibilities that in a more highly compiled information about the handling
18
developed organization would have been capacity of Australian ports.
vested in separate divisions. It formulated In April, when the Chief Quartermaster
procedures for the care of military dead and was relieved of all transportation functions
for the handling of budget and fiscal affairs. but those relating to trucks, the Motor
Particularly important were its manpower Transport Section became the Motor Trans-
and training functions. It estimated how port Division until it in turn was shifted at
many and what kind of Quartermaster the end of August to the Chief Ordnance
the particular commodities it dealt with. In The Purchasing and Contracting Divi-
the Supply Division there were three com- sion was engaged chiefly in matters relating
—
modity branches the Subsistence Branch, to the local buying of clothing, equipment,
the Clothing, Equipage, and General Sup- and general supplies. Since during most of
plies Branch, and the Gasoline and Oil 1942 U.S. military organizations obtained
Branch. There was also a Planning Branch their food, gasoline, and oil through the
which collected statistics fundamental to the Australian Army, the division had little
operations of the commodity units. From the to do directly with the purchase of these
recently established base sections it received supplies. In performing its functions it was
rough estimates of the size of Quartermaster guided by the local purchase requests sub-
stocks within their distribution zones, lists mitted by the commodity branches of the
amount of orders out-
of scarce items, the Supply Division. To care for the special
standing, and statements of future supply problems involved in use of different meth-
requirements. Unfortunately, these figures ods of buying, it set up three sections to
were often wide of the mark, for through- handle, respectively, open market transac-
out 1 942 it was usually impossible to obtain tions, formal contracts, and "contract de-
trustworthy inventories or other stock rec- mands." These "demands," covering even-
ords from base sections, which were all in tually by far the greater part of local
the confused state common to rapidly grow- purchases, were simply requests that Com-
ing organizations. The figures, though un- monwealth agencies in accordance with the
satisfactory, of necessity served as the basis reverse lend-lease arrangements negotiate
on which the commodity branches deter- contracts with Australian nationals for
19
(1) OCQM OO 27, 14 Apr 42, sub: Motor 30
QM SWPA Hist, I, 5.
Transport Div. (2) USAFIA Memo 160, 14 Jul 21
Lecture, Col Hester, 16 Nov 42, sub: Organi-
42, sub: Distr of Motor Vehicles. zation of OCQM. ORB Base A QM
400.291.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC 63
specified quantities ofneeded items. Until Of all the Australian procuring agencies
these arrangements were made late in the Food Council affected the operations of
March 1942, most of the supplies for the the Corps most deeply as it was given the
U.S. Army were obtained locally through task of increasing food production on both
24
formal contracts with producers or by pur- the agricultural and the industrial front.
chases on the open market. As contract Another agency important to the Corps was
demands gradually became the ordinary the Allied Supply Council, composed of
means of local procurement, these two several Australian cabinet officers and a
methods of buying fell into disuse and the U.S. representative. It developed plans for
sections handling them ultimately disap- stimulating the Australian economy as a
peared. Another section, however, grew whole. The OCQM also had extensive deal-
more important as local buying rose in ings with the Department of Supply and
volume. This was the Inspection Bureau, Shipping, which handled contract demands
which accepted or rejected products offered for nonmechanical items, and with the De-
22
in fulfillment of contract demands. partment of Commerce, which handled con-
20
The Purchasing and Contracting Divi- tract mechanical equipment.
demands for
sion had close relations with the office of Ordinarily, it had only unimportant rela-
the General Purchasing Agent (GPA), a tions with the Department of War Organi-
component of USAFIA that co-ordinated zation of Industry, which had responsibility
local procurement by the Army, the Navy, for making ample labor available to the
and the Air Forces, reviewing their contract most essential plants, but if this department
demands and sending them in approved directed that workers be shifted from in-
dustries making Quartermaster supplies, the
form to the appropriate Australian organi-
zations.
23
If Commonwealth authorities in
OCQM made known its concern and was
26
sometimes able to stop the proposed action.
turn approved these demands, they made
In June the widening scope of U.S. Army
the necessary contracts with Australian pro-
activities required the establishment of two
ducers. Generally speaking, U.S. agencies
additional OCQM divisions. One of these
actually conducted necessary negotiations
was the Memorial Division, which took over
with the appropriate departments of the the mortuary functions of the Administra-
Commonwealth. In OCQM the Purchasing tive Division. This step was clearly advisable
and Contracting Division formed a Liaison since these activities certainly would grow
Section to work out terms mutually satis- in magnitude as offensive operations were
27
factory to the Corps and to the Australians. undertaken and casualties mounted. The
With the help of other Quartermaster 21
Ltr, J. F. Murphy, Controller General of Food,
agencies this section located producers, as- Commonwealth of Australia, to Allied Sup Council,
certained their productive capacity, laid 12 May
42. ORB AFWESPAC QM 430.
(1) Lecture, Lt Col R. C. Kramer, 14 Dec 42,
25
down specifications, and cared for con- sub: Allied Sup Council. ORB
Base A 400.291. QM
tractual details. (2) Rpt, Allied Sup Council, 15
Sep 43, sub:
First Annual Rpt for Period Ending 30 Jun 43.
" QM SWPA Hist, II, 4-5. ORB AFPAC Rear Ech Annual Rpt.
2J
( 1 ) Historical Record, General Purchasing Lecture, Col Herbert A. Gardner, 18 Nov 42,
26
Agent for Australia, 1942. ORB SWPA AG 400.13. sub: Relationship of QMC
with Other Agencies.
(2) USASOS Regulations 25-5, 16 Dec 42, sub: ORB Base A QM
400.291.
GPA. ORB NUGSEC Regulations. 27
OCQM OO60, 1 1 June 42, sub: Memorial Div.
64 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
other new division, the General Service varying volume of supplies handled by the
Division, constituted a rudimentary control base sections. Another branch of the General
agency, whose establishment was brought Service Division, the Inspection Branch,
about by the desirability of reviewing and performed practically all OCQM inspec-
co-ordinating basic functions scattered tions except those relating to storage and the
through the commodity branches of the acceptability of goods offered under local
Supply Division. 28 Its establishment re- procurement contracts. It investigated such
flected, too, the wartime trend toward a routine but important matters in the base
functional rather than a commodity organi- sections as requisitioning procedures, inven-
zation of the sort characteristic of the peace- tory practices, compilation of lists of scarce
time War Department. In a full-fledged items, and maintenance of employees' time
functional organization the commodity records as well as special problems like pil-
branches were abolished, and administra- ferage of supplies on docks and in ware-
tive units were set up to handle the major houses. A third branch, the Planning and
responsibilities of procurement, storage, and Statistical Branch, was the former Planning
distribution. In this type of establishment a Branch of the Supply Division. It had been
procurement division would be concerned transferred because the statistical informa-
with supervising the buying of all classes of tion it gathered came mostly from the field
supplies assigned to a technical service. In installations with which the new division was
the QMC this meant that such a division chiefly concerned.
29
would deal with all matters relating to food, Since no suitable method of reviewing the
clothing, general supplies, gasoline, oil, and purchase authorizations of the commodity
other Quartermaster items. branches in the Supply Division had been
The functional concept was embodied to developed, that task, too, was assigned in
a considerable extent in the General Service August to the General Service Division,
Division since this unit was given a large which set up a Procurement Control Branch
measure of authority over storage and dis- to accomplish it. This branch analyzed the
and lesser authority over
tribution activities authority for proposed purchases to make
procurement matters. It was particularly sure that procurement regulations were be-
concerned with operations at USAFIA field ing observed determined whether prospec-
;
installations. Its Warehousing Branch was tive costs had been calculated properly; and
charged among other things with the mod- checked the desirability of local procure-
ernization of depot operations. To achieve ment as opposed to procurement in the
this objective, it made frequent inspections United States. Thus responsibility for some
of handling and storage methods and sug- procurement as well as storage and distribu-
gested howthey might be bettered to en- tion problems was lodged in the General
hance the safety of supplies and to conserve Services Division.
10
time and manpower. The Warehousing Although the activities of the OCQM
Branch had as another objective the equi-
increased rapidly during the first half of
table division of warehouse equipment. In 1942, that office was "comparatively much
carrying out this function it planned the
shorter of operating personnel than any
distribution of equipment in line with the
29
(1) Ibid. (2) QM SWPA Hist, II, 6-8.
28
OCQM OO 59, 1 1 Jun 42, sub: Gen Svc Div. 30
P. 9 of n. 29 (2).
—
31
other section." In June was functioning
it old office, and created several functional
with only 33 officers as compared with an divisions.
authorized 107. This substantial discrep- In the reorganization the desirability of
ancy stemmed in part from the establish- co-ordinating and controlling basic operat-
ment of the independent Transportation ing functions, an objective that had already
Service and the consequent loss of about half won recognition in the establishment of the
the Quartermaster officers and in part from General Service Division, received still more
the fact that the War Department for a recognition in the creation of a new staff
time made no distinction between the old agency, the Planning and Control Division,
and the new service and often filled Quar- which exercised general supervision over all
termaster requests for officers with men operations both in the OCQM
and in the
suited for Transportation rather than base sections. This division absorbed the
Quartermaster work. 32 storage and procurement control functions
During the summer QMC operations, of the General Service Division and in addi-
like those of other technical services, also tion gained the right to review and make
suffered, briefly, from the transfer of recommendations about allQuartermaster
OCQM, along with the rest of the former operations. OCQM "operating" divisions,
USAFIA, from Melbourne to the headquar- which meant all Ad-
divisions except the
ters of thenewly established United States ministrative Division and the newly estab-
Army Services of Supply in Sydney. This lished Inspection Division and Food Pro-
move, another of a series that eventually duction Advisory and Liaison Division
brought the OCQM
to Manila, temporarily all three regarded as staff agencies— were
interfered with OCQM activities but did now required to co-ordinate their activities
not halt them.
33
with the policies of the Planning and Con-
In late 1942 the widening scope of mili- trol Division. Besides carrying out its con-
tary activities brought about an almost com- trol functions that unit served as a statistical
plete reorganization of the OCQM. As that clearing house for the whole Corps in the
officehad become in some respects a coun- Southwest Pacific. Its statistical information
terpart on a small scale of the OQMG, the was employed to set up replacement supply
administrative changes were modeled upon factorson the basis of area experience and to
those made Washington office during
in the compute total area requirements for Quar-
the previous spring.These changes wiped termaster items. With its far-ranging func-
out the predominantly commodity organi- tions the new division encroached exten-
zation of the OCQM
and substituted one sively upon responsibilities traditionally in
34
based to a substantial degree upon function. the province of commodity branches.
The reorganization, begun in December Inspection activities, though essential to
1942 and completed in March 1943, elimi- control operations, were not assigned to the
nated the Supply Division, the heart of the Planning and Control Division. They were
31
performed by the Budget, Accounting, and
Barnes Rpt, p. 36.
" (1) Ibid., p. 19. (2) QM
SWPA Hist, II, 91. Inspection Division, commonly called the
In the reorganization the Supply Division prepare for the end of the rationing of
became the Storage and Distribution Di- American troops by the Australian Army
Though that division still had com-
vision. and for the beginning of large-scale re-
modity branches, they were shorn of most verse lend-lease procurement of food. The
procurement functions. The preservation of division was headed by the Deputy Chief
these branches, even with Quartermaster, Col. (later Brig. Gen.)
narrowed respon-
sibilities, represented a compromise between
Hugh B. Hester. It had as one of its prin-
the functional and commodity principles, cipal functions rendering technical advice
but there was no serious breach of function- to the Australian Food Council. 38 This ad-
alism since the commodity branches were vice was aimed chiefly at the inauguration
concerned almost exclusively with the tech- of a large-scale canning and dehydration
nical direction of storage and distribution program and the increase of farm produc-
operations. The only significant procure- tion. The division represented a reversion
ment activity remaining in these branches to the commodity type of organization, for
and it was one that stemmed directly from it was charged with the storage and dis-
the distribution responsibility —was the
tribution as well as the procurement of all
subsistence except fresh provisions, which
requisitioning of supplies needed to maintain
prescribed stock levels. 36 were to be bought by the base sections.
In the Procurement Division were vested With this important exception it was re-
30
QM SWPA Hist, II, 80-85. 3s
OCQM OO 116, 5 Dec 42, sub: OCQM
Ibid. Organization.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC 67
sponsible for the entire U.S. Army food pro- others were set up to supervise reclamation
gram in the Southwest Pacific. 39 and training functions. These activities had
The Food Production Division did not grown so much in magnitude and impor-
remain long in the OCQM. On 27 Febru- tance that they could no longer be managed
ary 1943 and functions were taken
its staff properly by small branches of divisions in-
over by the newly created Subsistence De- terested primarily in other matters. Gar-
pot, headed by Colonel Hester. This instal- ments, shoes, tents, and other commonly
lation, located at Sydney, operated under used items in need of repair were accumulat-
the direct supervision of the Chief Quarter- ing in larger and larger quantities, and more
master and served as the central buying, and more Quartermaster units and casuals
storing, and distributing agency for all food requiring additional training were arriving
except perishables, which continued to be in the area. To cope with these problems,
procured by the base sections. To increase the Salvageand Reclamation Branch of the
farm production, the Subsistence Depot set Supply Division and the Training Branch
up an elaborate organization to offer tech- of the Administrative Division were mate-
42
and
nical help to Australian agriculturists rially enlarged and made divisions.
food processors and through the American The major reorganization of the OCQM
Lend-Lease Administration to import seeds, in the winter of 1942-43 had hardly been
farm machinery, and processing equipment. completed before the reconstitution of
Besides carrying out many of the details of USAFFE occasioned another reshuffle of
local procurement, it requisitioned food OCQM functions. USAFFE had become
from the United States in amounts adequate inactive after the fall of the Philippines, but
to make up any deficiencies in Australian in February it was revived and made re-
production.*' The depot stored huge quan- sponsible for the formulation of supply pol-
tities of rations in branches at Melbourne, icy. The Chief Quartermaster and the heads
Sydney, and Brisbane. These stocks, nor- of other technical services were transferred
mally totaling about a ninety-day supply, to the restored command, and USASOS
formed a reserve constantly available to base became merely an agency for the
in theory
sections for maintaining their food execution of policies made by USAFFE.
41
supplies. For several months the Office of the Chief
In addition to the divisions charged with Quartermaster was located in the revived
the major responsibilities of control, pro- command. At the same time there was also
curement, storage, and distribution, two an Office of the Quartermaster, USASOS,
headed by Col. Lewis Landes. Since Colonel
39
OCQM OO 122, 19 Dec 42, sub: Subs Pro- Cordiner took his key planning assistants
gram.
40
(1) USASOS GO
12, 27 Feb 43, sub: Estab-
with him to USAFFE, the number of of-
lishment of QM
Subs Depot. ORB
AFPAC Gen ficers available to Quartermaster staff di-
Purchg. (2) Hq USASOS Memo 37, 15 Mar 43,
sub: Mission of QM
Subs Depot. AFWES-ORB visions in USASOS was greatly reduced,
PAC QM 430. (3) Rpt, n. s., 5 May 43, sub: and became necessary to consolidate these
it
Organization of QM Subs Depot. ORB AFWES- divisions into a single organization, the Ad-
PAC QM 320.
41
ministrative and Planning Division. Other-
(1) Rpt, Col Cordiner, n. d., sub: Trip to
Sydney, et al., 7-26 Sep 43. OQMG
SWPA 319.25.
(2) Personal Ltr, Col Hester to Col Cordiner, 15
42
(1) OCQM OO 116, 5 Dec 42, sub: OCQM
Nov 43. ORB AFWESPAC 312. QM Orgn. (2) QM SWPA Hist, II, 85-100.
SALVAGE AND RECLAMATION ACTIVITIES in Australia involved sorting, classi-
wise, the pattern set by the basic changes of adjustment to unfamiliar procedures. This
the previous winter remained unaltered. had barely begun when it was interrupted
In October, only six months after Colonel by the administrative modifications accom-
Cordiner left USASOS, he, along with the panying the revival of USAFFE. After a few
other technical service chiefs, was sent back months these modifications were in turn re-
there and given the same he responsibilities scinded, and the organization of the previ-
had formerly been charged with. Colonel ous spring restored. But the shuffling and
Landes' office passed out of existence, the reshuffling of functions had not yet come
divisions eliminated in the spring were re- to a conclusion.
vived, and USAFFE became in the main an
administrative agency, which affected Quar- Centralization of
curement of clothing, equipment, and at Sydney, like the General Depot, as a field
general supplies. Within a few weeks all the agency of G-4, USASOS. This division,
rear-echelon units were combined with the which Colonel Hester served as Director of
Subsistence Depot and the Engineer Depot Procurement, had not only a mission compa-
to form the USASOS General Depot, a field rable to that of the former General Depot
agency of G-4. The new installation, mod- but also shared with the new Distribution
eled on the Subsistence Depot and headed Division, another G-4 field agency in Syd-
by Colonel Hester, was to procure all mili- ney, the functions of computing supply re-
tary supplies obtained in Australia except quirements and issuing procurement direc-
fresh provisions and other items bought by
tives. Whereas the Quartermaster Branch of
base sections. Like the Subsistence Depot,
the Distribution Division determined SWPA
the General Depot was to receive and store
requirements for Quartermaster supplies,
supplies and deal directly with Common-
submitted the directives for local purchases
wealth agencies. 48
of all Quartermaster supplies except food to
The establishment of the USASOS Gen-
the Quartermaster Branch, Procurement Di-
eral Depot meant that the OCQM, having
vision, and informed Headquarters, USA-
lost most of its authority over subsistence,
SOS, of the quantities needed from the zone
now lost effective participation in the buying
of interior, the Procurement Division itself
of clothing, equipment, and general sup-
initiated the contract demands for subsist-
plies. It retained only the responsibility of
computing requirements and informing the ence on the basis of area requirements as
determined by its sister division and on the
basis of quantities procurable in Australia
41
G-4
Periodic Rpt USAFFE for Quarter End-
ing 30 Sep 43.
45
Rpt, Staff Conf, USASOS, 8 Oct 43. ORB 46
Ltr, Col Hester to Col Cordiner, 2 Oct 43.
ABSEC AG 337. ORB AFWESPAC QM 323.71.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC 71
as determined by its own staff. Finally, the still in effect when the war against Japan
Procurement Division had the important ended. 48
task of obtaining from local sources, not only Looking back upon the emergence of pro-
nonperishable foods but also fresh fruits, curement organization in USASOS, Col-
vegetables, meat, fish, milk, bread, ice onel Hester later maintained that the
cream, and other perishables, a function numerous administrative changes had in-
previously performed by the base sections. creased the difficulty of maintaining con-
For the first time all major aspects of the sistent policies and caused so rapid a
buying of food were thus concentrated in a turnover of officers that operations could
47
single organization. not always be accomplished effectively. In
In March 1944, the Procurement Di- his opinion these changes had impaired re-
Sydney and Brisbane. Local buying indeed was obliged to make so many alterations in
its work schedules that production occasion-
became the most important activity of this
below capacity. In his
ally fell substantially
subordinate USASOS command. The Pro-
judgment local
all procurement functions,
curement Division was now given the new
including those of the General Purchasing
tasks of maintaining prescribed stock levels
Agent, should have been consolidated from
and supervising the distribution of supplies
the very outset in one office, as was done in
in the Commonwealth, tasks that the Dis-
the South Pacific, where the Joint Purchas-
tribution Division, just transferred to New ing Board negotiated with the New Zealand
Guinea, had formerly carried out. The Pro-
Government, formulated procurement pol-
curement Division thus became a distribu-
and shipped sup-
icies, and received, stored,
tion as well as a purchasing agency, but
retained its enlarged responsibilities only
it
plies — functions that in Australia were
carried out by the General Purchasing
until February 1945, when, owing to the
Agent, the Procurement Division, and the
comparative decline of local procurement
technical services.
as a factor in area supply, the division was
discontinued. Its distributing functions were
Centralization of Distribution
then returned to OCQM in the Philippines, and Miscellaneous Activities
and its local purchasing activities were taken
over by the Sydney base. This situation was At the same time that the procurement
47
(1) QM SWPA Hist, V, 15-24, 29. (2) Ltr,
activities of the OCQM were being whittled
Dir of Proc to CG USASOS, 11 Mar 44, sub: Proc down in order to concentrate control of these
of Perishables. ORB AFWESPAC AG 430.2. (3)
Conf, 25 Mar 44, sub: Off Min, Base Comdrs Conf, QM SWPA Hist, V, 22-24; VI, 24-25; VII,
24-26 Mar 44, pp. 57-60. DRB AGO PHIL- 3,6.
RYCOM. Hester Rpt, pp. 63-64.
72 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
activities, distribution activities were under- for an agency free to decide on the spot
going a comparable attrition for much the what to do about the increasingly complex
same reason. Early in 1944, when stocks in distribution problems of the advanced areas.
New Guinea had sunk to precariously low These problems were becoming both numer-
levels, the Distribution Division was estab- ous and difficult. Adequate stocks were ever
lished under G-4, USASOS, to attain a harder to obtain as cargo movements were
better balanced division of all military sup- slowed by lengthening distances between
plies throughout the Southwest Pacific. As bases and by the shortage of interisland
an agency untied to any technical service, it shipping. Food stocks in New Guinea had
would, presumably, be uninfluenced by the indeed become so low that equitable di-
special interests of these services and hence vision of rations became a major task of
would be better able to control distribution the new branch. 51
in line with the actual needs of the combat The second step in the northward shift
forces. As the agency charged with over-all of the distribution system came in June,
control of distribution, the new division took when the Distribution Branch was moved
over from the technical services the keep- toOro Bay and made part of the Inter-
ing of consolidated stock records for the en- mediate Section (INTERSEC), USASOS,
tire area and the maintenance of all base sec- which controlled all USASOS units and ac-
tion stores at prescribed quantities. In order tivities in the areas supported by the bases
to facilitate the prompt movement of sup- at Port Moresby, Milne Bay, and Oro Bay.
plies to the installations needing them most, The came two and a half months
third step
the new
division in accordance with priori- later when the Distribution Division itself
Branch was the first step toward moving the Such shops did not exist in New Guinea;
center of the distribution system north from nor would civilian employees accompany
Australia and placing it nearer to the com- 5 '
(1) USASOS GO
43, 23 Mar 44, sub: Distr
bat areas. This action originated in the need of Sups. (2) Rpt, Lt Col Charles A. Ritchie, QM
INTERSEC, 13 Apr 44, sub: Base QM
Conf at
50
(1) QM SWPA Hist, V, 16-18; VI, 19-22. Distr Br, 10 Apr 44. ORB NUGSEC QM 400.
(2) Personal Ltr, Lt Col Walter R. Ridlehuber, 52
Rpt, Brig Gen William F. Campbell, CQM, 10
DISTDIV, to Lt Col Robert W. May DISTBRA Dec 44, sub: Activities of OCQM, Oct-Nov 44.
25 Feb 44. ORB NUGSEC QM 400. DRB AGO TOPNS Folder 211.
.
the OCQM when it was moved to Hol- troops landed in March 1942, a Quarter-
landia. For these reasons the sections han- master office was established to carry out
dling these activities remained in Australia these functions. 54
until April 1945, when
removal of the Each task force quartermaster submitted
Headquarters, USASOS, to Manila made requisitions on the zone of interior for items
available both Filipino clerks and repair not furnished automatically. As no means
shops and made possible the return of the of co-ordinating these requisitions existed,
sections to the OCQM. At the same time they were sent in without reference to the
Quartermaster distribution functions were needs or the stocks of other forces. Despite
again turned over to that office. Since Aus- the fact that the U.S. organizations were
tralia was fast declining as a supply source located only 1,000 miles or so from agri-
because of the thousands of miles that now culturally rich New Zealand, that country
separated it from the bulk of Southwest at first provided them comparatively little
Pacific troops, the OCQM two months later food. The task forces secured most of their
also recovered most of its original procure- most of their other sup-
rations as well as
ment responsibilities. The lengthy process of from the West Coast, 4,000 miles or so
plies
tween the supply functions of the two serv- That service nevertheless employed its
cal service acted as special staff officer as COM, History of the United States Army Forces
well as commander of all elements of his in the South Pacific During World War II, 30
March 1942-1 August 1944 (4 parts), I, 62-67.
service. On New Caledonia, for example,
Hereafter this work will be cited as Hist USA-
within a few hours after the first American FISPA. (2) Historical Record of Headquarters
Service Command APO 502, 10 November 1942 to
53
Mil Hist of Base Sec, USASOS, Jun-Dec
( 1 ) 30 September 1943. ORB USAFINC AG 314.7.
44. (2) Hq Base Sec, USASOS, Hist of OQM, Ltr, CG USAFISPA
s"
to CofS, 27 Feb 43. ORB
Jun 44. DRB AGO Opns Rpts (QM Sec USASOS) USAFINC AG 400.
74 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
dumps, and the clothing warehouses and The acute shortage of junior officers pre-
transported supplies to the limit of its sented a perplexing problem that was finally
capacity. It was directed to haul mate- solved by the establishment of an officer can-
rials, regardless of size, for all technical serv- didate school in New Caledonia and by di-
ices, but its standard 2%-ton trucks were rect commissioning from the ranks. Officers
much too small to carry rails, lumber, land- thus acquired helped fill the needs of under-
ing mats, and other bulky materials. It manned forces. On New Caledonia these
solved this dilemma by trading small ve- officers staffed the clothing and equipment
hicles to the Navy for large ones and in- repair shops, the salvage collection service,
geniously converting trucks into tractors and the graves registration service. They
capable of pulling semitrailers constructed also assisted in procurement which
activities,
from salvaged 6-ton vehicles. The Corps at- for several months included procurement for
tempted to make up for the scarcity of men other technical services since the QMC
by extensive utilization of both combat or- alone among the technical services in the
ganizations and native workers, but tactical South Pacific had a fairly large body of
58
troops were reluctant workers and native officers experienced in such activities.
laborers were unaccustomed to steady appli- All these makeshifts relieved personnel
cation and had little mechanical skill. 57 shortages somewhat, but the situation de-
57 68
Personal Ltr cited n. 54. Ibid.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC 75
manded more fundamental action. By July and for some weeks following the establish-
1942 there were about 60,000 Army ground ment of USAFISPA headquarters at Nou-
and air troops in the South Pacific, and sub- mea in late July, Harmon's still incomplete
stantial reinforcements were on their way. staff was immersed in these problems to the
The Americal Division was then in New exclusion of almost everything else. In any
Caledonia, the 37th Division was in the event it was too limited in numbers and
Fijis, and smaller forces were in New Zea- logistical experience to control supply effec-
land, Efate, Espiritu Santo, Tongatabu, tively. The main body of Harmon's pro-
Bora Bora, Wallis, Upolo, and Tutuila. An jected staff was indeed still in California
Army territorial command was obviously and arrived in New Caledonia only in late
required to supervise and co-ordinate the September. 61
supply of these scattered garrisons. This A plan for centralized supply control, pre-
need was accentuated by the preparations pared by Brig. Gen. Robert G. Breene, As-
for the Guadalcanal campaign. On 7 July sistant Chief of Staff, G-4, was then put
Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Chief of into force. General Breene had soon con-
the Air Staff in the War Department, was cluded that the ordinary G-4 section lacked
therefore appointed commanding general sufficient power
handle the complex lo-
to
(COMGENSOPAC) of the newly created gistics of island warfare and to integrate
U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area Army supply operations with those of the
(USAFISPA He served under Vice Adm.
) . Navy, Marine Corps, and Allied forces. His
Robert L. Ghormley, commander of the plan called for a central command with
South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force more authority than a G-4 section normally
(COMSOPAC), and his responsibilities possessed. This headquarters, commanded
were limited to administration, supply, and by Breene, was set up at Auckland in mid-
59
training of Army ground and air troops. October as the Service Command. Early in
General Harmon's mission included the de- the following month it was redesignated the
termination of Army logistical needs, the Services of Supply (SOS SPA) and moved
supply of Army bases, the procurement, to Noumea in order to be closer to the cen-
through the Joint Purchasing Board ( JPB) ter of operations.
set up by Admiral Ghormley in June, of The mission of SOS SPA was the logis-
materials obtainable in New Zealand, and tical support of Army and other forces that
the requisitioning of other materials from might be assigned to it. This meant in gen-
60
the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. eral the supply of the island garrisons guard-
At the time it was difficult for General ing the lines of communications between the
Harmon to develop a centralized supply sys- United States and the Southwest Pacific and
tem. Though he exercised no control over the support of tactical forces. These forces,
operational plans, Admiral Ghormley and under the direction of Admiral Halsey, ad-
his successor, Admiral William F. Halsey, vanced up the Solomons ladder in a series
Jr., constantly consulted him on tactical of amphibious operations that began on
matters and the disposition of Army forces, Guadalcanal in August 1942 and ended in
59
Hist USAFISPA, 30-36. 61
( 1 ) Personal Ltr, n. s. to Brig Gen Frederick
""Ltr, CofS USAFISPA, sub: Instruc-
7 Jul 42, Gilbreath, 19 Aug 42. USAFINC
ORB 319.1. AG
tions to CG USAFISPA. ORB USAFINC AG
384. (2) Hist USAFISPA, 505-23.
76 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
March 1 944 with the occupation of Emirau, OCQM in USASOS, exercised centralized
63
ninety miles north of New Ireland. The lat- control over Quartermaster operations.
ter operation, in conjunction with that car- The joint operations of the Army, Navy,
ried out at the same time by MacArthur and Marine Corps in the South Pacific
in the Admiralties, gave the Allied forces called for close co-operation in order to re-
control of the approaches to the Bismarck duce confusing duplication of logistical ef-
Sea and enabled them to flank the Japanese forts. The form of this co-operation was laid
stronghold at Rabaul and protect their ad- down in the Basic Logistical Plan for Com-
vance into the waters leading to the Philip- mand Areas Involving Joint Operations.
pines. This operation marked the successful Approved by the War and Navy Depart-
termination of the South Pacific Area tacti- ments in March 1943, it directed the organi-
cal mission. Most of the ground and air zation of joint Army-Navy staffs in the
forces in the area, totaling about 150,000 Pacific Ocean Areas to co-ordinate the
men, were then transferred to General Mac- activities of all supply and service agencies.
Arthur's command, and the South Pacific In the South Pacific Admiral Halsey set up
became essentially a communications zone, a Joint Logistical Board (JLB) to fashion
supplying and mounting out Army and Ma- co-operative supply policies and a Joint
rine Corps forces sent there from the Cen- Working Board (JWB) to carry out these
tral Pacific Area for rehabilitation, training, policies. The decisions of these two boards
and re-equipment preparatory to the Mari- determined the precise scope of Army re-
64
anas and Carolines operations. So extensive sponsibility for supplying other services.
were these tasks that until late 1944 there The QMC was assigned a broader mis-
was little diminution in the magnitude of sion than it had in Army-controlled areas.
62
SPA supply activities. This was particularly true of the procure-
As long South Pacific was an active
as the ment and distribution of food. Before June
operational command, it constituted an ex- 1943 representatives of the Army, Navy,
panding area in which new SOS operating and Marine Corps had met at irregular in-
agencies were constantly being set up and tervals and made informal agreements
old ones enlarged. The most important of roughly defining their respective missions in
these agencies were the service commands this field. After that date the JWB assigned
established on strategically located islands to definite functions to each service. It made
support offensive operations and supply all the QMC responsible for the procurement,
troops in their areas. These agencies, like storage, and distribution of nonperishable
USASOS base sections, operated through subsistence and combat rations for Army,
technical service sections and controlled the Navy, and Marine Corps units, whether
organizations, men, and depots concerned ashore or afloat, and of perishable food for
with SOS Quartermaster activities at
tasks. units ashore. The Navy procured perish-
Headquarters, SOS SPA,
were conducted ables for units afloat and furnished ocean
through the Quartermaster Section of the transportation for all such provisions,
Supply and Salvage Division. This section,
(1) Hist Record, cited n. 55(2). (2) Organi-
83
headed by Lt. Col. Carmon A. Rogers, was
30 June
zational Hist, SOS SPA, from Activation to
the largest agency under SOS, and like the 1943, pp. 1-4. ORB USAFINC AG 314.7.
84
Ltr, CNO to CINCPAC, 8 Mar 43, sub: Basic
,=
Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 1-3, 10-12, 14-19. Logistical Plan. ORB USAFINC AG 400.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC 77
filled before any shipments were made else- the ship's service stores maintained by the
where and that no stocks be earmarked for Navy, soldiers became increasingly dissatis-
other areas. In a conference between the two fied with the Army stores.
areas in late 1943 these recommendations This disparity in the variety and quan-
70
were substantially accepted. tity of articles for sale to the different serv-
Quartermaster procurement for all three ices engendered a sense of discrimination
armed services in the South Pacific was not among the men and hurt their morale.
confined to food. It was applied also to the Toward the end of 1943 the JLB accord-
procurement and distribution of insecticides ingly proposed that the Quartermaster Sec-
for the extermination of the anopheles mos- tion, SOS, buy all post exchange supplies
quito and other insect bearers of malaria, for all the services. This plan was approved
dengue fever, filariasis, and scrub typhus, by both the War and the Navy Depart-
diseases that caused more casualties than did ments early in 1944, but Admiral Halsey
71
the Japanese. Post exchange items consti- never carried it out because he was uncer-
tuted another group of supplies common to tain concerning the future strength of his
72
the three services that the J LB recom- area.
mended be procured and distributed solely The principle of unification was applied
by the QMC. As in other overseas areas, also to the collection and repair of salvaged
each service in the beginning had procured materials, matters of considerable impor-
its own sales items and sold them in its own tance in the South Pacific owing to the
stores. Every Army PX obtained its stock rapid deterioration of footwear and textile
from the United States through individual items, replacement of which was difficult.
I ' *4
supply of three Southwest Pacific infantry almost entirely from the broader responsi-
divisions in the northern Solomons. When placed upon SOS SPA for the sup-
bilities
at the end of the year offensive operations ply of rations and certain other items to
spread to the Philippines, which lay too far Navy and Marine Corps organizations.
west to be readily supported by the SPBC,
its major functions became the "roll-up" The Central Pacific Quartermaster
74
main functions of the Hawaiian Depart-
(1) Hist USAFISPA, 270-79. (2) Rpt, Maj.
staging of troops
Harold A. Naisbitt,
ment were the training and
1 Feb 45, sub: Info Obtained
from QM
SPBC. OQMG POA 319.25. for amphibious operations in other areas
80 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
rather than for offensive activities of its supply. On
Fanning and Christmas Islands,
own, Quartermaster problems were less where the Army had the larger interest, it
complex than those of the southern com- provided Class I, II, and IV items.
mands. No extensive organization was re- After large-scale offensive operations be-
quired for distribution operations or local gan with the attack on the Gilberts, Quar-
procurement as few indigenous items were termaster responsibilities were substantially
obtained and there were no sizable bases increased, for it was then agreed that during
outside Hawaii. such operations the Army would furnish ra-
The Quartermaster Section functioned tions to Navy and Marine forces and pro-
much like similar sections elsewhere, ad- vision these elements at the advance bases
vising the commanding general of the area established as a result of combat activities.
on policy matters and preparing estimates From this time onward, the QMC
fed a
of the men and supplies required to carry steadily rising number of men, including
out the Quartermaster mission. It also dealt eventually more than 1 00,000 marines. The
with day-to-day operations, translating area principal effort of the Corps came, there-
requirements into requisitions, supervising fore, during the last two years of the war,
unit training, and controlling the activities when it handled four to six times as many
76
of subordinate organizations, such as the supplies as it did in the preceding period.
Quartermaster Depots at Fort Armstrong Since the support of combat troops was
and Schofield Barracks, the School for taking up more and more of the time of
Cooks and Bakers, the Quartermaster Sup- and since base oper-
technical service chiefs
ply Areas on Oahu, the service units op- ations were becoming daily more important,
erating these and similar installations, and the Central Pacific Area was reorganized
the Quartermaster units sent to Hawaii for in June 1944 to relieve these officers of
training. The only units of this type not con- routine duties. The functions of Headquar-
trolledby it were those which furnished ters, U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific
Quartermaster services in the outer islands Area (USAFICPA), as the Hawaiian De-
under the supervision of the Hawaiian De- partment had been redesignated in August
partment Service Forces and those which 1943, were divided between two new agen-
were assigned or attached to ground or air cies — Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pa-
forces. Until late 1943, Quartermaster op- cificOcean Areas (HUSAFPOA), and the
erations were, then, in general of a routine Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC).
75
nature.
This reorganization divided the functions of
As in the South Pacific, a Joint Logistics the former Quartermaster Office, Central
Board and a Joint Working Board developed
Pacific Area, between the two new estab-
plans for joint supply. Each service in Ha-
lishments, both of which had their head-
waii filled most of its own requirements, but
quarters on Oahu. 77
the principle of joint supply was applied to
the small advance bases. On Johnston and 70
(1) Mid-Pac Hist, VI, 1038-44. (2) Msg W-
Palmyra Islands, where the Navy controlled 6510, CG CPA to WD, 17 Oct 43. (3) Memo, Dir
of Ping for Dir Stock Control ASF, 27 Oct 43,
all but a few facilities and had the larger
sub: Logistic Support of Naval and Marine Corps
forces, that service furnished all classes of Pcrs in CPA. OQMG POA 400.302.
"(1) Mid-Pac Hist, III, 479-484. (2) QM
QM Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 9-31. Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 85-94, 166-206.
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC 81
The Office- of the Quartermaster, HUS- territory tasks similar to those of the Cen-
AFPOA, headed by Brig. Gen. George E. tral Pacific Base Command. The new com-
Hartman, inherited the planning, policy- mand operated under the general supervi-
making, and supervisory responsibilities of sion of the Quartermaster, HUSAFPOA.
the Office of the Quartermaster, Central It participated in the logistical support of
Pacific Area. It determined area and base the tactical forces operating in the western
stock levels as well as unit and supply re- and supplied garrisons totaling about
Pacific
quirements for combat organizations, super- 130,000 troops on Saipan, Guam, Iwo Jima,
vised the building up of stockpiles by the Angaur, and Ulithi. s "
base commands, and planned the logistical Meanwhile General MacArthur on 6
support of tactical forces and the develop- April 1945 had been given command over
ment of Quartermaster base facilities on all Army troops in the Pacific. This event
newly won islands.
78
As the CPBC was in had little influence on Pacific Ocean Areas
essence a communications zone, the Office supply activities. It merely meant that in
of the Quartermaster in that command the future HUSAFPOA would submit its
that conquered Leyte was mounted. As during the first two years had come to Hono-
the American forces moved toward Japan lulu almost wholly from San Francisco, only
itbecame more difficult to control the sup- 2,000 miles away, and had been distributed
ply of Pacific Ocean Areas troops from now over relatively short distances within the
distant Oahu. When the Okinawa cam- Hawaiian group; partly of the fact that
paign started, Saipan was therefore made shipping in the last two years, when dis-
the headquarters of the new Western Pa- tances became much greater, was never as
cific Base Command, set up to assume in its scarce as elsewhere; and partly of the fact
T
"QM Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 324-36. Mid-Pac Hist, VI, 1148-50.
79
QM Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 338-42. QM Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 324-26, 335.
82 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
that a full-scale Quartermaster organiza- quent shifts in the location of SOS head-
tion existed in the mid-Pacific from the quarters, particularly in Australia, made it
in the two areas below the equator probably and thus intensified the difficulty of build-
never attained as high a degree of efficiency ing up an effective central office. Even more
as those to the north. When American important hampering factors were the re-
troops first came to the south, there was in peated changes in the internal organization
all that enormous territory no central Quar- of central Quartermaster offices again, —
termaster organization to supervise the ac- most notably in Southwest Pacific Area. No
tivities of the Corps and to inaugurate large- one principle of administration was long
scale operations in support of combat troops. followed in USASOS; changes were almost
Such organizations had to be improvised constantly being made, often accompanied
without the benefit of carefully developed by shifts of supervisory officers and a gen-
prewar plans and in the midst of uncertainty eral shuffling of activities within divisions.
as to the precise role the U.S.Army would Apparently, this unsettled state of affairs
play in that part of the world. The confusion often lowered efficiency. It might have been
and doubts of the early months were quite better if a definite administrative principle
naturally reflected in a dangerously under- had been early adopted and then consist-
manned Quartermaster organization. Fre- ently adhered to.
CHAPTER IV
Pacific Bases
The OCQM in the Southwest Pacific and Until late 1943, for instance, each base in
corresponding offices in the other areas Australia was charged with buying perish-
planned, co-ordinated, and supervised able foods and furnishing these items to the
Quartermaster activities, but base sections base in New Guinea for whose supply it
set up throughout the Pacific as need de- was responsible, but the insufficiency of
veloped actually carried out most of these reefer shipping and the increased number of
activities. They were the agencies that re- troops in New Guinea made it difficult for
ceived, stored, and distributed supplies, re- the mainland installations to carry out their
claimed discarded and worn-out articles, assigned responsibilities. This system was ac-
advance installations. Generally speaking, Rear bases in Australia were either aban-
rear bases obtained their stocks direct from doned or operated on a much smaller scale,
local industry and agriculture or from the and advance bases in New Guinea became
United States. Since they supplied inter- intermediate or even rear bases. A similar
mediate and sometimes advance bases as evolution occurred in the South and Cen-
well, they normally maintained larger stores
tral Pacific.
than the other bases. Intermediate bases, lo-
Bases conducted their activities through
cated nearer the combat zone, served in the
technical service sections that handled the
main as suppliers for advance bases. The
supplies and equipment furnished by their
latter installations kept only limited stocks,
particular service. Quartermaster Sections
which they employed to provide needed
operated mainly through storage and dis-
items to the truckheads and navigation
heads of combat zones. All bases, regardless tribution depots located at strategic points
within the base area. Administratively,
of classification, supplied the military units
within their own geographical areas. these installations might be either general
depots handling supplies of all services or
The mission of the bases varied in detail
with shifting strategic requirements, avail- 1
USASOS Logistic Instructions 38, 1 Nov 43,
ability of shipping, and changing locations sub: Distr of Perishables. ORB AFWESPAC AG
of troops concentrations and combat zones. 400.
84 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
technical service depots handling the sup- (Perth), Western Australia; and Base Sec-
plies of a single service. Functionally, they tion 7 (Sydney), New
South Wales. 3
might be in-transit depots, receiving and Until late 1942 the danger of Japanese
classifying inbound and outbound ship- invasion was the major factor in determin-
ments; issue depots, storing stocks for units ing the location and mission of these bases.
within the base area; or reserve depots, serv- It forced the wide dispersion of supplies,
ing as sources of replacement supply for is- which in turn for some months necessitated
sue depots, other bases, and operational the continued operation of the seven origi-
and general supplies procured in Australia task was the supply of the 3 2d Division,
but also all shipments made from the United staged from May to July 1942 at camps
States before August 1943. Despite the about 120 miles from Adelaide. After this
shortage of labor and materials-handling mission had been completed, its importance
equipment the Australian bases were the rapidly diminished. Since Melbourne and
Sydney were the leading industrial and
most efficient ones in the Southwest Pacific,
commercial centers and were remote from
for they had the best ports and most ware-
probable enemy landing points, they became
houses."
the largest receivers and forwarders of mili-
Since Australia at the start of hostilities
tary shipments. In the early months Mel-
had become the communications zone of the bourne served as the main supplier of other
Southwest Pacific, the first bases in that area
base areas. Intermediate depots, stocking
had been set up there. By April 1942 seven advance installations to the north and north-
were in operation, five of which approxi- east, where danger of hostile landings was
mately followed state boundaries. The lead- greatest, were established in the Sydney and
ing commercial center in each base area was Brisbane base areas, at relatively safe sites,
designated as headquarters. Base Section 1 100 to 150 miles from the coast. Advance
(Darwin) comprised the Northern Terri- depots were located mostly in the Townsville
tory; Base Section 2 (Townsville), northern base section along highways running west
ers Towers, Cloncurry, Mount Isa, and Ten- the particular form being determined by
nant Creek between Townsville and the their missions, but there was always a base
Darwin Alice Springs railway. 4 quartermaster who exercised technical su-
As danger of invasion waned and New pervision over all the base activities of the
Guinea emerged as the center of Allied Corps. He usually had certain assistants, of
offensive operations, base activities under- whom the Quartermaster depot officer was
went substantial modification. Those bases possibly the most important. This officer
which had satisfactory ports and lay com- stored and distributed reserve stocks ear-
paratively close both to New Guinea and to marked for other bases and for advance
industrial and agricultural centers handled areas. His work was supplemented by that
more and more supplies while other bases of the base supply officer who issued items
dwindled in importance. Perth and Ade- destined for military units stationed in the
laide were discontinued in January 1943, base area. There were also purchasing and
and though Darwin functioned until July contracting officers, whose primary function
1944, its activities were increasingly con- was the procurement of the few supplies that
fined to supply of the Air Forces. Despite bases were allowed to buy locally for these
excellent portand warehouse facilities at units, and subsistence officers —
actually, per-
Melbourne, the distance of that base from ishable subsistence officers who stored and—
the center of combat operations caused issued fresh provisions and controlled the
gradual curtailment of and it its activities, refrigeration cars and trucks used for deliv-
was finally abandoned in June 1944. As ery of perishables to units in outlying areas.
Melbourne declined, Brisbane and Towns- Finally, there were service center officers,
ville, 1,100 and 1,875 miles nearer New who looked after the miscellaneous activi-
Guinea, expanded and, together with Syd- ties of the Corps.
6
'
where, within their territorial jurisdiction, serve depots were established at Brisbane
supplies reserved for other bases or for and Melbourne, but the Sydney base com-
operational forces in other base areas would mander, maintaining that he should control
be stored or how they would be distributed. reserve installations within his territory, de-
These operations were controlled by distri- layed setting up the prescribed depot. This
bution instructions from the which, OCQM situation caused Headquarters, USASOS,
in turn, was governed by logistical instruc- to reconsider its policy. In November it
that office fought for Quartermaster reserve instructions indicating how Quartermaster
depots under its control rather than under reserve stocks would be distributed."
that of the base commanders. Only by gain- Storage facilities at the Australian bases
ing this authority, the OCQM believed, varied appreciably in serviceability. During
could it really control Quartermaster re- 1942 commercial space of all sorts was em-
serve stocks. Early experience supported its ployed. Quartermaster requirements for
position, for, in the rush to supply troops storage space were then much smaller than
from the scanty stores, materials that theo- they later became, but at this time suitable
retically constituted reserve stocks for other warehouses were so scarce that supplies were
bases were not segregated from those held even kept in empty shops, garages, social
to fill the needs of the particular base in centers —
in fact, in almost any available
which they were located. Hence they space. During 1943 an extensive leasing and
eastern tip of the island, with a daily han- In August the base was activated as U.S. Ad-
dling capacity of 2,500 tons; Port Moresby, vance Base, New Guinea. At this time an-
on the south side of the narrow Papuan other advance station, supervised from Port
peninsula, with 1,500 tons; and Buna, on Moresby, was set up at Milne Bay and des-
the north side, with 1,000 tons. Minor ports ignated Sub-Base A. On establishment both
at Morobe, Salamaua, and Madang han- these bases already had several small
dled together only 450 tons. At most coastal wharves, but neither possessed warehouses,
points lighters provided the sole means of the matter of chief Quartermaster concern,
bringing supplies ashore. In the interior and supplies were stored mostly in impro-
high mountains, steaming jungles, impass- open dumps. At Port Mores-
vised shelters or
able swamps, and kunai grass growing to a by, because of the danger of air raids and
height of 6 or 7 feet covered the island and flooding waters, the dumps were dispersed
made transportation difficult except by na- for greater safety in the hills, three to twen-
Because the means of moving materials they were several miles from the main
on land were so inadequate, 95 percent of port at Ahioma and the sub-ports at
Army supply movements in New Guinea Waga Waga and Gili Gili. Throughout most
were made by ship. This dependence on of 1943 the Milne Bay area served as the
water transportation brought about an ex- major receiving and transshipment center
tensive development of ports and bases.
11
in New
Guinea. In August, with Allied pos-
Since construction of storage facilities could session of Papua apparently secure, it re-
not start until the dense jungle had been placed Port Moresby as Headquarters, U.S.
13
cleared and airstrips, docks, and roads built, Advance Base, New Guinea.
bases were seldom able to handle Quarter- In December 1942, meanwhile, Sub-Base
master supplies B had been started along the still primitive
efficiently in their early
months. With suitable means of storage thus shores of Oro Bay, about 18 miles south of
open or in tents, shacks, and other impro- Conf of Special Staffs. (2) Rpt 6, Capt
Gen and
Robert D. Orr, 6 Jan 44, sub: Rpt on Large Ad-
vised structures. During this period logisti-
vance Base (F). OQMG SWPA
319.25.
cal support of tactical forces of necessity 13
For a complete description of the New Guinea
bases, see Harold Larson and Joseph Bykofsky, The
Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, pp. 433- Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, a vol-
34. ume under preparation in this series.
THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Buna Village and 225 miles northwest of Base F, situated at Finschhafen on the
Milne Bay. Its initial mission was better eastern end of Huon Peninsula, was begun
support for the troops fighting in this area in November1943, shortly after the Jap-
than could be furnished by the fishing boats anese had been driven out. With a fairly
and other small craft that made the long good natural harbor, Finschhafen was de-
tripfrom Milne Bay and discharged their veloped as the major base in New Guinea.
cargo on unsheltered beaches. Following the It replaced Milne Bay as the largest handler
the north coast of southeastern New Guinea, Luzon Campaigns, Finschhafen handled 25
to 35 percent more tonnage than did all the
midway between Milne Bay and Oro Bay,
Australian bases. Yet it never possessed
but it never attained much importance as
buildings and equipment of the high quality
a general distributing base. In May, Port
demanded by the magnitude of its mis-
Moresby, which had declined somewhat in 15
sion.
relative importance, was redesignated Sub-
The development
difficulties besetting the
Base D. Three months later all the sub-bases of Base F encoun-
typified those generally
became full bases operating under the su- tered at New Guinea supply centers. Near-
pervision of Advance Section (ADSEC), impenetrable mountainous jungle rose ab-
USASOS, as the U.S. Advance Base at ruptly only a short distance from shore, and
Milne Bay was then designated. After the buildings and roads were necessarily strung
capture of Lae in September, this area, in out along the coast for miles. Because of
spite of its small unsheltered harbor on Huon the unfavorable hydrographic conditions
Gulf, was developed as Base E. Its major dumps could not be placed just behind the
was not the supply docks, a location that would have made pos-
task of forward forces
sible the most economical handling of sup-
but of the huge Army Air Forces installa-
plies. Instead these installations were usually
tions thirty miles inland at Nadzab, the west-
situated at distances that required con-
ern terminus of the Air Transport Com-
siderable hauling to and from the water-
mand flights across the Pacific.
14
cated partly on that island, off the north- Sixth Army to CG USASOS, 21 Aug 44, sub:
west coast of New Guinea, and partly on Construction Base G. ORB AFWESPAC AG
600.1. (3) Hist, Lt Col Melvin M. Vuksich, 1
Nov 44, sub: Hist Rpt Base H, 25 Sep-25 Oct 44.
11
For an account of the Hollandia Operation,
see Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Phil- (4) Hist, WOIG
Julian P. Barton, 2 June 43, sub:
ippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD Hist Rpt, 25 Apr-25 May 45. Both in Base ORB
WAR II (Washington, 1953). H AG 314.7.
90 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
During the first three years of the war up to that time had supplied mainly their
bases in New Guinea in general were begun own organizations. But the reconquest of
only after operations undertaken in part the Philippines and the projected invasion
for the purpose of winning desirable base of Japan called for the participation of
sites had been substantially concluded. Army, Marine Corps, and Navy forces from
This procedure had retarded the develop- all areas and necessitated the development
ment of forward installations and rendered of bases capable of maintaining these forces.
the supply of tactical forces dependent on An interarea conference, assembled at Hol-
bases located several hundred miles away. landia in November 1944 to discuss this
But it was a procedure necessitated by the problem, agreed that the Philippine bases
lack of ships for accumulating stocks at for- planned by ASCOM
would help support all
ward bases, by the scarcity of building ma- troops who participated in future opera-
terials, and by the existence of still formida- area from which they
tions, regardless of the
20
ble Japanese air and naval forces. After the came. As the Philippine bases would also
reconquest of the Philippines got under way, have extensive responsibilities for the sup-
greater resources were available. At the ply of offensive movements against nearby
same time the employment of the largest objectives, for the rehabilitation of the
U.S. forces yet seen in the Pacific demanded archipelago itself, and for the logistical sup-
bases closer to the combat zones. The Army port of the invasion of Japan, they would
Service Command (ASCOM) was accord- be set up by ASCOM as semipermanent
ingly set up in July 1944 under the Com- installations. The establishment of such
manding General, Sixth Army, to plan the bases was now possible, for ships and build-
logistical support of tactical forces and pro- ing materials were at last available in fairly
vide for the prompt construction of bases. large quantities.
Though Engineer in composition, it
chiefly Base K, the first of the Philippine bases set
contained Quartermaster and other techni- up by ASCOM, was located on San Pedro
cal service sections. It pooled building ma- Bay at Tacloban in northeastern Leyte,
terials, made plans for major bases to be where its installations extended along the
started in the Philippines immediately after shore for some twenty-five miles. Established
the landings scheduled for the fall and win- in October 1944, only two days after the
ter, and gathered men for the erection and first landings, it supported the Leyte cam-
operation of these bases. In the future, there- paign from the beginning. Until Base M
fore, bases were started as soon as possible was activated at San Fabian on Lingayen
after the landings and used Gulf in January, it was the only sizable base
initially as sup-
in the Southwest Pacific Area north of
ply installations for troops fighting in their
19 Biak. Base M, whose activities were even-
vicinity.
had been carried out almost shore, constituted a highly important source
entirely within
distinct areas by troops of each area, South- of supplies in the early Luzon operations
west, South, and Central despite its shallow port, which compelled
Pacific Area bases
the discharge of cargoes direct into landing
10
(1) Engrs of SWPA, 200, 205-07. (2) Ltr,
I,
CG USASOS to CG ASCOM, 25 Jul 44, sub: 20
Ping Div, Office of Dir of Plans and Opns ASF,
Basic Organization Directive. DRB AGO TOPNS. Hist of Ping Div ASF, pp. 11-14.
PACIFIC BASES 91
craft and lighters. As the Lingayen Gulf long tons. Of this tremendous tonnage 25
campaign progressed, sub-bases were set up. to 30 percent was Quartermaster. 23
They supported operations until the region During the Okinawa campaign the tasks
was cleared of hostile troops. San Fernando, of executing the base development plan and
La Union, 30 miles north of San Fabian, of supplying the Tenth Army were dele-
then became the permanent headquarters of gated to the Island Command, a joint or-
Base M. 21 ganization, which operated under that
Early in April 1945 another base, R, was Army. Late in July 1945, following the
established at Batangas, 60 miles south of completion of mopping-up activities, the Is-
Manila. A month later Base S was started land Command, now redesignated Army
at Cebu City, site of a Quartermaster depot Service Command I, was placed directly
in 1941-42, and became supply headquar- under General MacArthur and charged
ters for the southern Philippines, where with the further development of the base,
stubborn fighting was still in progress. De- whose major function was to be the logisti-
spite the fact that engineers were obliged to cal support of the assault on Kyushu. The
remove great piles of wreckage to clear the heavy damage sustained by the harbor fa-
way for these two new bases, supplies in the cilities at the island's only developed port,
thousands of tons were flowing in by June Naha, on the southwest coast, required con-
and continued to arrive until the termina- siderable repair work, which was still in-
tion of hostilities caused a sharp drop in complete when V-J Day rendered unneces-
24
receipts. In October, Batangas was redesig- sary the construction of a large base.
nated Sub-Base R under Base X, the huge
Manila installation. The following month South Pacific
22
Cebu became Sub-Base S.
Base X, by far the largest supply instal- While the continental dimensions of Aus-
lation in the SWPA, served as principal sup- tralia and the long coast lines of New
porting point for operations in the Philip- Guinea and the Philippines allowed a good
pines, Borneo, and other East Indies islands deal of freedom in selecting sites for supply
and for the planned assault against the bases in the Southwest Pacific, the land
Japanese home island of Kyushu. It was not masses of the South Pacific outside New
formally activated until early April 1945, Zealand were so few, so small, and so unde-
but rehabilitation and construction of docks, veloped that the choice of sites was con-
warehouses, and open storage areas had fined to a handful of island groups for the
started soon after the recapture of Manila most part without permanent structures of
in January. From April 1945 to January
any sort. Supply bases had to be built hur-
1946 it handled more supplies than any riedly under adverse conditions not unlike
other SWPA base ever had, receiving and those in New Guinea.
discharging a monthly average of 380,000
(1) Engrs of S WPA, I, 310-11. (2) Masterson,
23
21
(1) Engrs of SWPA, I, 309. (2) Hist, Maj Transportation in SWPA, App. 44.
(1) AFWESPAC, Semi-Annual Rpt, 1 Jun-31
24
John 29 Aug 45, sub: Mil Hist, Base
F. Shelton,
M QM Base
Sec. ORB
314.7. M Dec 45, pp. 5-6. (2) Rpt, Maj Gen Frank A.
22
(1) Ltr, CO
Base R to CG Phil Base Sec, 29 Heileman, ACofS G-4 AFWESPAC, 21 Jul 45,
Apr 45, sub: Storage Construction. ORB Phil sub: Weekly Rpt of Activities, G-4 Sec. ORB
Base Sec 633. (2) Engrs of SWPA, I, 310. PHILRYCOM AG 319.1.
92 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
During the first half of 1942, when it was a varied menu. The absence of central food
feared that Japanese forces would seize New depots, furthermore, had caused an uneco-
Caledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa, the Army nomical utilization of limited shipping facil-
envisaged Auckland and Wellington, the for vessels from both Australia and
ities,
principal distribution centers of New Zea- the West Coast were often obliged to stop
land, as major supply bases that would serve at several bases in order to deliver their
as rear depots in much the same way as the cargoes. Finally, the lack of such installa-
leading Australian ports did. But inability tions had at times forced the Southwest Pa-
of the Japanese to carry offensive warfare cific Area to hold food bought in Australia
into theSouth Pacific and the inauguration for the South Pacific Area in ware-
in August 1942 of the American attack on houses already strained to handle South-
Guadalcanal, 2,000 miles from New Zea- west Pacific Area stocks. The ration depots
land, altered the original conception of that furnished, at least in part, a solution to all
country's role and brought about the de- these problems. They relieved the Southwest
velopment of New Caledonia, 1,000 miles PacificArea of storing most purchases made
nearer the combat zone, as the chief South for the South Pacific Area and both the
Pacific base. Yet as far as local procure- Southwest Pacific Area and the San Fran-
ment of Quartermaster supplies and the dis- cisco Port of Embarkation of deliveries at
tribution of food were concerned, New Zea- widely scattered points. Above all, they fa-
land became the principal rear base. assembly of ration components
cilitated the
From the Quartermaster standpoint the in one place as well as their shipment to
ration storage centers, established in April advance bases as fully balanced rations.
1943 at Auckland and Wellington, consti- The choice of Auckland and Wellington
tuted the most important installations in as ration storage centers was almost inevi-
New Zealand. Operating under the Joint table, for, though these ports were not cen-
Purchasing Board, they stored both locally trally situated with respect to other bases,
procured foods and those received from they had modern means of handling sizable
Australia and San Francisco. They shipped cargoes. With few exceptions specially built
perishable provisions to all South Pacific temporary structures were used to hold non-
bases and nonperishables to all bases except perishables. Cold-storage space for perish-
Bora Bora, Aitutaki, and Tongareva. 25 Be- ables was leased from commercial firms. At
fore the establishment of these centers the the peak of their activities the ration depots
provision of balanced rations had been a stocked approximately a ninety-day supply
26
difficult task. Since the zone of interior and of provisions.
nized with those from New Zealand, it had soldiers and marines. The 1st Marine Di-
rarely been possible to combine the com- 2a
( 1 ) Msg, QMSO SOS SPA to CofS, 5 May 43.
ponents from the three supply sources into (2) Ltr, Pros JPB to CG SOS SPA, 29 Apr
44, sub:
Sup Level for Ration Depot. (3) Personal Ltr, Col
85
Memo, CG SOS for CG SPA, 26 Apr 43, sub: Harry C. Snyder, JPB to "Dear General," 9 May
Subs Depots. ORB USAFINC Subs. 44. All in ORB USAFINC QM 430.
PACIFIC BASES 93
vision and part of the 37th Infantry Division place the chaotic system of autonomous
stopped there in June and July 1942, and bases, this depot maintained reserve stocks
the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions were there for the entire South Pacific Area as well as
for some months in the following year. On items for the current supply of troops in New
the termination of the New Georgia opera- Caledonia. Before its establishment few sup-
tion, the 25th and 43d Infantry Divisions plies had been readily available to fill opera-
came to New Zealand for rehabilitation. tional needs or even for ordinary replenish-
The New Zealand Service Command sup- ment needs. During this period many items
27
plied all these forces. could be obtained only by requisitioning
The French dependency of New Cale- them from the United States, a time-con-
donia, rich in nickel mines, was developed suming process that took three or four
as the main receiving, storage, and trans- months. In emergencies bases and even com-
shipment base in the South Pacific not only bat units were combed for required articles.
because it lay 1,000 miles nearer the combat When located, these supplies often had to be
zone in the Solomons than did New Zealand shipped from several different points to meet
but also because, except for Auckland and requirements in full. After the President
for Suva and Lautoka in the Fijis, it had at Coolidge sank off the New Hebrides in Oc-
the outset the only satisfactory docking fa- tober 1942, leaving a regimental combat
cilities in the entire area. Even these facili- team and a Coast Artillery unit without
ties, located at the capital, Noumea, were equipment, it took four months of scouring
inadequate for wartime needs since they base and unit stocks to reoutfit these or-
29
consisted of but two piers capable of han- ganizations.
dling together only four ocean-going ves- The SouthPacific General Depot at first
Warehouses were similarly inadequate,
sels. tried tomaintain a 30-day reserve of non-
and civilian labor was limited in quantity. perishable food for 300,000 men, a 30-day
An extensive construction program was reserve of other supplies for 150,000 men,
undertaken to provide badly needed ware- and stocks sufficient for the complete re-
houses, but shortages of workers and build- equipment of selected types of combat units.
ing materials retarded its execution, and Once the ration depot in New Zealand came
New Caledonia never acquired storage fa- into full operation, the General Depot was
cilities commensurate with its extensive sup- relieved of responsibility for storing large
28
ply responsibilities. food reserves, and in October 1 943 its mis-
In the New Caledonia Service Command sion underwent further modification. Three
the South Pacific General Depot, organized categories of stocks were then established
in May 1943 under the supervision of the stocks, both current and reserve, for troops
Quartermaster Section, was the installation in New Caledonia; reserve supplies for other
that had the most to do with Quartermaster bases; and special stockpiles of organiza-
items. Set up as a major agency of the cen- tional equipment for the whole area. Stocks
tral supply system then being created to re- for other bases included a 30-day supply
27
of clothingand equipage and stores of pe-
USAFISPA Hist, IV, 734-36.
Ltr, COMSOPAC to Comdr U.S. Naval Forces
28 troleum products and general supplies in
inEurope, 2 May 43, sub: Construction of Bldgs ir
New Caledonia. ORB USAFINC AG 600. 28
USAFISPA Hist, pp. 686-87.
94 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
quantities set from time to time by Head- anas and the Palaus. These installations
quarters, SOS SPA. 30 The General Depot were assigned this role because Central
also furnished a substantial part of the sup- Pacific Area bases were too few, too small,
pliesand equipment for combat operations and too remote from the combat zones to
and for the rehabilitation of combat units. shoulder the whole burden of supporting
Next to the base in New Caledonia, the these offensives. In the operations against
one in Guadalcanal was the largest in the Saipan, Guam, and Tinian in the Mari-
South Pacific. After the victorious termi- anas in the summer of 1944, the forward
nation of the protracted campaign for bases mounted approximately 40,000 ma-
Guadalcanal in February 1943 that island rines, provided them on their departure with
was fashioned into a vast mounting out, supplies for 30 days, and maintained a 30-
training, and rest area and the major sup- day reserve supply for emergency shipment.
ply base in the Solomons. In October it In the Palaus operation the Guadalcanal
became the headquarters of the newly es- base, besides supporting Army units, fur-
tablished Forward Area, whose principal nished the 1st Marine Division with gaso-
function was the logistical support of com- line and oil and maintained reserves of these
bat operations. Although the boundaries products to meet any emergencies that might
32
of the Forward Area varied with the shifting arise.
tactical situation, they always included the Aside from New Caledonia, New Zea-
bases on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, the Russells, land, and the Forward Area bases, the most
and, except at the very beginning, those in active bases in the South Pacific were those
the New Georgia group. As the largest of in the New Hebrides. This archipelago lay
these bases, Guadalcanal was the main sup- 550 750 miles southeast of Guadalcanal,
to
plier of the operations that won New directly astride the routes to Rabaul and
Georgia, Vella Lavella, Arundel, Bougain- Australia. For this reason Efate and Espi-
ville, Green Islands, and Emirau. In
the ritu Santo, the southernmost and the north-
January 1 944 at the height of the Bougain- ernmost of the larger islands, were fashioned
ville offensive Forward Area was sup-
the into advance bases early in 1942. Both in-
porting nearly 200,000 Army, Navy, and stallations attained considerable importance
Marine Corps troops in the northern Solo- as stations for air groups that provided land-
mons. 31 based support during the Guadalcanal
After the combat mission of the South offensive. Efate remained primarily an air
PacificArea had been completed, the For- station. Quartermaster operations there were
ward Area bases gave logistical support to confined chiefly to the supply of gasoline
the Central Pacific campaigns in the Mari- and the reconditioning of 55-gallon drums.
30 In the last half of 1943, Espiritu Santo de-
(1) Ibid., 686-91. (2) Organizational Hist Svc
of Sup South Pacific Area, 1 Apr-30 Jun 43, pp. veloped into a major source of logistical sup-
29-30.
31
( 1) Ltr, COMSOPAC to COMAMPHIB- M (l) USAFISPA Hist, IV, 768-73. (2) Cpl
FORSOPAC, 18 Control of Sup,
Jul 43, sub: Arthur P. Schulze, "Quartermaster Operations
Guadalcanal. (2) Personal Ltr, Brig Gen A. J. Guadalcanal Style," QMR, XXIV (May-June
Barnett to Maj Gen Maxwell Murray, 30 Nov 42. 1945), 24-25, 106-07. (3) Hist of the South Pacific
Both in ORB USAFINC AG 319.1. Base Command, II, 262-74.
PACIFIC BASES 95
port for operations to the north and north- of ocean. It was not only remote from opera-
13
west/ tional areas; it was also crowded with scores
The Fijis constituted a sizable supply of thousands of troops in training for am-
base only in the first year of the war. Be- phibious warfare, and its depots had little
cause of their strategical location on the air space for operational supplies. Its chief port,
and shipping routes between the United Honolulu, was nearly always congested.
States and Australia, American troops were These unfavorable conditions did not ma-
sent there shortly after Pearl Harbor. Since terially hamper supply activities as long as
the islands were too remote from the scene the command was a staging and training
of fighting tobecome a transshipment point, rather than an operational area, and most
the main function of the archipelago's Serv- Central Pacific troops were stationed in
ice Command became the supply of local Hawaii. But the Gilberts offensive of the
forces. This task grew steadily less important winter of 1943-44 disclosed the inadequa-
as the number of troops dwindled from cies of Hawaii as a supporting base. The
about 30,000 in 1942 to 7,000 in April strain placed upon its storage facilities at
34
1944. that time indeed forced the hurried comple-
tion of a program for building additional
Central Pacific warehouses. Even then the long distances
that separated Hawaii from the Marianas
Except for Hawaii, land areas in the Cen- and the Philippines precluded its employ-
tral Pacific in general consisted of irregular ment as the area's chief supporting installa-
formations of narrow coral reefs enclosing tion for operations against these objectives.
large These formations, called
lagoons. For this reason its main function gradually
atolls, were few in number, were separated
became the transshipment of cargoes to
from each other by formidable distances, more advantageously located bases.
36
and were too diminutive for development as When the southern Marianas were occu-
large supply bases. At best most of them pied in mid- 1944, the Central Pacific Area
could support only a limited number of
came into possession of two islands, Saipan
troops. Owing to these handicaps, few is- and Guam, well suited for development as
lands could be employed to supply forward major supply bases. Saipan, approximately
3 '
forces.
3,500 miles west of Honolulu and 1,400
Even Hawaii was not truly well fitted to miles east of Manila, measured only 12/2
combat troops.
serve as a supporting base for
by 5/2 miles, but about two thirds of its
Between it and the nearest areas of possible area could be utilized for supply or staging
American offensive operations in the Gil- purposes. Lying within bomber range of
berts and Marshalls lay two thousand miles
Japan, it became both an air and supply
"U) USAFISPA Hist, IV, 736-41. (2) Rpt, cific. From late 1944 until the Japanese sur-
CofS Fantan (Fijis), 1 Oct 42, sub: G-4 Pers Rpt.
ORB USAFINC AG 319.1.
30
Ltr, Maj Harold A. Naisbitt to TQMG, 20
(1) QM Mid-Pac Hist, App. I. (2) Mid-Pac Jan 45, sub: Info from QM
CPBC. OQMG POA
Hist, VIII, 1684. 319.1.
96 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
render it ranked not far behind Hawaii in master supplies; and 5,800 miles from Milne
the volume of Quartermaster tonnage. It Bay, for many months the center of logisti-
stored a sizable proportion of the supplies cal operations in New Guinea. Goods moved
for the Okinawa operation, and, after be- from San Francisco to Australia and thence
coming the headquarters of theWestern Pa- to bases in the north were carried 8,000
cific Base Command in April 1945, it main- or more miles before they reached points of
tained much of the reserve stockage built up issue. In terms of shipping time a trip from
37
for the Olympic operation. In the year San Francisco to Brisbane and return often
following the seizure of Guam, airstrips were required as much as four or five months.
built there; Apra Harbor was developed for A from New York to Liverpool and re-
trip
medium-sized cargo ships; and extensive turn, on the other hand, took only about
storage facilities were constructed. By V-J fifty-five or sixty days. The time required
Day Guam, too, had developed into a major to deliver goods was thus two
in Australia
moved forward over a pre-existing network Logistical activities in the American drive
and highways.
of railroads, navigable rivers, across France to the Rhine were confined
Thus supply in Europe "was like a single almost entirely to the maintenance of com-
rubber hose growing larger in diameter as bat troops, but similar activities in the Pa-
the immensity of operations increased." But cificwere only intermittently carried out for
in the Pacific each major advance was an this More frequently, they aimed at
purpose.
building up the materiel for another am-
amphibious assault on a primitive shore and
phibious landing. This meant that supplies
each fresh landing "a completely new sup-
were handled more frequently than in the
ply operation. " Pacific supply was "like a
European Theater of Operations, that their
lawn sprayer with a new stream of supply
3S
movement was less smooth, and that more
for every new patch of land occupied."
man-hours were expended in getting them
3S 39
Anon., "Ships Are the Workhorses of the Pa- into the hands of fighting forces.
cific," Quartermaster Training Service Journal
3
(hereafter cited as QMTSJ), VII (22 June 1945), " Ltr, Capt Orr to Capt Clinton Morrison,
p. 4. OQMG, 17Oct 44. OQMG SWPA 319.25.
CHAPTER V
Local Procurement in
the Pacific
In no other theater of operations did local American rations. But there were neither
procurement become quite as extensive as sufficientQuartermaster officers nor service
in the Southwest Pacific and South Pacific units to handle procurement, storage, and
Areas. Even in Great Britain, local pur- distribution operations and no immediate
chases did not compare in quantity with prospect of securing adequate reinforce-
those in Australia and New Zealand. Dur- ments from the United States. There were
ing 1943 and 1944, for example, these two no American depots or railheads for storing
countries together furnished the major part and distributing subsistence, no prior ar-
of the meat consumed by the U.S. armed rangement with the Commonwealth for
services below the equator. Australia alone American purchases of local products, and,
provided about fifteen times and New Zea- because of the policy of relying as far as
land about nine times the amount procured possible upon Australian resources, little im-
in Great Britain. Acquisition of such locally portation of food from the United States
produced meat represented a substantial except for the comparatively small amounts
saving in shipping space. Purchases made brought in by newly arrived units. Even
in Great Britain, on the contrary, had scant these shipments could be employed only
effect on the shipping shortage, for 80 per- sparingly, for they were needed to build up
cent of the meat obtained there in 1943 the indispensable ninety-day reserve for
and 1944, the years of peak procurement, For the time
emergency and tactical use.
came from Argentina, 7,100 miles away. 1
somewhat differently. When the first U.S. gard to clothing, equipment, and general
troops arrived in the dominion, the QMC supplies, the specifications for which were
hoped that it could provide them with too highly specialized to permit procure-
ment by any organization not familiar with
'(1)
Karl R. Cramp, Historian, Base Sec 7,
USASOS, Food Production in Australia and their use in the U.S. Army, QMC assumed
American Co-operation in Wartime, Ch. XX, pp. responsibility from the outset.
29-32; Ch. XXII, Apps. A-C. (2) Ltr, TQMG to
Although Australian agriculture and in-
Dr. D. A. Fitzgerald, Special Adviser WFA, 2 Jun
45. DRB AGO 400.12 (Overseas). dustry furnished the bulk of locally ac-
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 99
quired supplies during 1942, "distress" or and means of distribution to carry out its
way. The United States was given first pri- Containing only twenty-four basic items, it
ority on American shipments and second lacked the variety and the balance furnished
priority on Dutch and British shipments. by the thirty-nine items of the United States
No complete figures are available on the ration. it was on a money
Moreover, as
tonnage or value of supplies received by the rather than a commodity basis, it varied in
QMC, but there is no doubt that it secured both quantity and quality with fluctuations
substantial quantities of food and general in market prices. Some common American
supplies which proved valuable in the alle- favorites, such as coffee, rice, spaghetti, fruit
viation of shortages and the build-up of re- juices, and fresh and canned fruits and vege-
serve stocks, particularly of general sup- tables, were served only rarely while fre-
the Australian ration and that would per- scribed quantities, and
weresubstitute items
mit the selection of the menu for U.S. organ- not always available. Frequently, there were
izations to be made from a wider range of shortages of milk, canned vegetables, and
foods than was provided for Australian sol- condiments. Too many pumpkins, onions,
diers. The Commonwealth immediately squashes, and turnips were offered, and too
pointed out that this proposal envisioned a few greens, tomatoes, sweet potatoes, apples,
pears, oranges, and grapefruits. To meet
5
more generous fare than it furnished its own
troops. Such a fare, it contended, would American objections the unsupplemented
impair the morale of Australian soldiers, rationwas twice modified to furnish more
especially if they were stationed in the same beef,lamb, and pork in place of the less
camp with American units. popular foods and those already furnished
Both approved a U.S. ration
sides finally in more than sufficient quantity. The first
ble to carry out in its entirety the arrange- From time to time Colonel Cordiner,
ment respecting supplementary purchases. Chief Quartermaster in the Southwest Pa-
But there was protracted delay in the estab- cific Area, pointed out the need for ex-
lishment of the canteens from which these panded production of scarce foodstuffs and
purchases were to be made, and even after for better inspection of meat and dairy prod-
the canteens were opened they did not ucts. His suggestions could not be put
always carry sufficient stocks to meet Ameri- quickly into effect, however; months must
can requirements. The partial failure of the elapse before production could be increased
attempt to obtain extra ration components and improved inspection methods applied. 10
was attributable to supply shortages and to The slow rate at which U.S. Army sub-
the fact that Australians never regarded sistence reserves were being accumulated
these items as an essential part of the daily also disturbed Colonel Cordiner. Some
ration and thus as something that had to be Quartermaster officers alleged that this con-
furnished. They treated the stocking of can- from the fact that the Com-
dition resulted
teens rather as Americans did the stocking monwealth Army, fearing that it might be
of post exchanges, that is, as something to be accused of hoarding food, deferred the
done if procurement and distribution re- placement of requisitions involving substan-
sources were not needed to handle more tial expenditures of money until supplies
7
important supplies. Perhaps it was too were actually needed. Because of this timid
much to expect that any army would try approach, these officers claimed, the small
energetically to feed the soldiers of another food-processing industry could not operate
army better than its own, even if that army and vegetables, fruits, and
at full capacity,
was a close ally. Moreover, even had the meats were going to waste when they might
Australians redoubled their efforts they be canned for future consumption. The
could hardly have met U.S. requirements QMC, it was contended, should take a more
in full, for important categories of subsist- aggressive role in matters that affected the
ence, such as fresh and canned vegetables, procurement of food, particularly in the
masters in some localities entered the open cultural machinery, and other lend-lease
market, but their un-co-ordinated pur- materials needed from the United States to
11
chases raised prices, hampered procurement expand canning and vegetable production.
by the Commonwealth, and did little to Increasingly, the OCQM
felt that Ameri-
American ration.
9 can interests would be served best by the
better the
prompt establishment of depots for the stor-
7
Memo for Files, 9 Oct 42, sub: Statement by
age and distribution of U.S. rations and by
Lt Col R. C. Kramer. ORB AFWESPAC QM 430.
8
Memo, CQM for Lt Col Edward F.
( )
the submission of its food requirements di-
1
Shepherd, 20 Mar 42. (2) Rpt, Col Cordiner, 9 purchasing agencies of the Com-
rect to the
May 42, sub: Sup at Base Sec 2. Both in OQMG
SWPA 319.25. (3) Ltr, QM Base Sec 4 to CQM, monwealth Government rather than to the
3 Jul 43, sub: Rations. ORB AFWESPAC QM ORB
430.2. "Memo, GPA for CQM, 6 Oct 42.
orities, larger allocations, and increased pro- locally procured food was acquired under
12
duction. the reverse lend-lease agreement, and so cost
The provision of food through Australian the United States nothing. Though other
Army channels had never been more than supplies and many services obtained locally
a stopgap imposed by temporary conditions. for the American forces were also paid for
OCQM was convinced that the sooner the by the Australian Government, the procure-
U.S. Army
set up its own rationing system ment of food was the largest operation un-
the better, if for no other reason than the der reverse lend-lease and the most striking
fact that, as American forces advanced evidence that lend-lease brought financial
northward toward Japan, they would no benefits as well as financial loss to the
longer be in close proximity to Australian United States.
forces and would be entirely dependent Because of the active participation of the
upon their own resources. By early 1943 the Commonwealth, procurement procedures
time for the establishment of such a system in the Southwest Pacific differed somewhat
was opportune since a considerable number from those in the United States. The Gen-
of Quartermaster officers qualified to handle eral Purchasing Agent, acting as the official
the varied operations connected with ra- representative of all American procuring
tioning had at last reached Australia. On 15 services in dealings with the Common-
February, therefore, General MacArthur wealth, determined over-all policy and co-
notified Prime Minister John Curtin that ordinated American supply requirements
the U.S. Army would start the procurement, with Commonwealth and State purchasing
storage, and distribution of subsistence for its bodies. The Quartermaster Corps actually
troops as soon as possible. By April the new conducted the "follow-up" of its contract
system was in effect in most parts of the demands. Only if its efforts were unavailing
13
country. in hastening deliveries did it appeal to the
General Purchasing Agent for official inter-
Procurement of Subsistence in Australia vention with Australian procuring agencies.
While as a general rule it carried out routine
Early Problems inspection of fruits and vegetables offered
to the American forces, it might and often
The most noteworthy feature of the
did callupon the Veterinary Corps to per-
American rationing system was that, while
form this service. That corps had complete
12
Memo, CQM for G-4 USASOS, 3 Jan 43. ORB responsibility for the inspection of meats,
AFWESPAC QM 430.2. dairy products, and all other products of ani-
" ( 1 ) Ltr, CG USASOS to CQM, 8 Feb 43, sub:
Distr of Rations. (2) Memo, same for CINCSWPA, mal origin.
12 Feb 43. (3) Ltr, CINCSWPA to PM of Aus-
Of the procurement tasks performed by
tralia, 15 Feb 43. All in ORB AFWESPAC QM
430.2. the QMC none was more important than
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 103
the encouragement of a large agricultural units made the provision of fresh vegetables
production. As early as February and March an almost impossible task. Even where can-
1942 Quartermaster officers had surveyed ning plants were well established, as in the
the producing potentialities of Australian fruit, corned beef, jam, and jelly industries,
farms and concluded that except for green they produced for small local rather than na-
coffee, cocoa, tobacco, and a few minor tional markets. Moreover, they often em-
items, sufficient food could be obtained from ployed faulty processing methods. Dehydra-
Australian farms to meet the needs of 500,- tion was confined to the drying of a few
000 troops. 14 But it soon became apparent fruits, such as raisins, peaches, and apricots.
that, though Australia could produce vir-
To meet Quartermaster requirements, it had
tually all types of foodstuffs, it could not im-
to be extended to vegetables containing high
mediately furnish them in the quanti-
all of
percentages of water. Though dehydration
ties desired by the QMC
and still satisfy
sometimes made it hard to cook foods in a
civilian requirements and those of the
palatable form, it reduced weight and vol-
United Kingdom and other Allied coun-
tries. Present crops would first have to be ex-
ume and so conserved ship and storage
panded and new types introduced. As the re- space. The extent of this saving is indicated
quired labor could not readily be diverted by the fact that vegetables had a shrinkage
from war industry, the most promising solu- ratio of between 20 to 1 and 5 to 1 and
tion was the greatly increased mechaniza- fruits, of between 10 to 1 and 3 to 1. In ad-
tion of agriculture. In addition, corrective dition to saving space, dehydrated products
steps had to be taken to end the shortage of had the notable virtue of needing little if
15
fertilizers, fungicides, weedicides, insecti- any refrigeration or canning.
cides, and seeds, most of which were im- To help solve the problems of food pro-
ported, and to disseminate information re- duction, the QMC
in mid- 1942 began the
garding the cultivation of sweet corn and assembly of a staff of food technologists,
other crops little grown in Australia. Above headed by Maj. Maynard A. Joslyn, who
all, failure to produce the varieties of was called from a teaching career at the Uni-
vegetables best suited to canning had to be versity of California to shoulder this respon-
remedied. If these deficiencies were to be sibility.At the outset the Commonwealth
corrected, a drastic transformation of agri- Government perhaps did not fully appre-
culture was inescapable. ciate the value of the young science of food
16
Industrially, the principal obstacles to an technology. Late in the year, however, the
increase in the food supply were the inade- appearance among American troops at Iron
quate number of vegetable canning and de- Range in Queensland of one or two cases of
hydration plants and the lack of equipment botulism traced to unsanitary canneries
needed to establish such plants. Yet canned
15
1 )
Rpt, Capt Maynard A. Joslyn, 25 Oct 42,
and dehydrated vegetables were indispensa- (
ORB ABCOM
sub: Vegetable Dehydration Plants.
ble to troops in forward and combat areas GP&C 400.9. (2) Ibid., 2 Nov 42, sub: Vegetable
since the shortage of refrigeration on ships,
Dehydration. ORB AFWESPAC QM
432. (3) Rpt,
Capt Theo J. Pozzy, 7 Nov 42, sub: Canning Con-
at New Guinea bases, and in the hands of ditions. ORB AFWESPAC QM400.252.
19
Rpt, Robert S. Scull, 23 Jun 43, sub: Canning
u
Rad, USAFI A to WD, 1 9 Mar 42. Program. ORB AFWESPAC 400.252. QM
104 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
strikingly demonstrated the potential use- growing of "mother seeds," upon which the
17
fulness of the specialists. development of an abundant local supply
When the Subsistence Depot began op- depended. In these matters the Agricultural
erations in February 1943, these specialists Branch gave invaluable assistance. It helped
were put in charge of the branches set up to the Commonwealth Vegetable Seeds Com-
handle production problems. The most im- mittee order the proper varieties from the
portant branches were those in the Food best American suppliers; it produced a type
Production Division, whose functions in- of hybridized sweet-corn seed fitted to Aus-
cluded collaboration with Australian official tralian conditions; and, when necessary, it
bodies, technical advice to farmers, canners, intervened with American lend-lease au-
and dehydrators, and inspection of locally thorities to establish the Commonwealth's
purchased food. 18 These branches survived needs. Its help was perhaps most useful in
the subsequent administrative changes af- the inauguration of large-scale cultivation
fecting the procurement of subsistence and of"mother seeds." During 1942 and early
co-operated effectively with the Common- 943 the United States filled about half the
1
wealth and the states in innovations that Commonwealth's requirements, but by mid-
transformed Australian agriculture and food 1944 local production sufficed to meet most
19
processing. requirements.
For proper protection of seeds after
they had been planted, weedicides were es-
Vegetable Production
sential, but Australian farmers, having little
pert on soil cultivation and farm machinery and onion crops were among those most
and for some years a teacher at the Uni- damaged by obnoxious plant growths. Their
versity of California, had as its main task cultivation had indeed been materially re-
the better utilization of existing resources. duced because sufficient labor could not be
At the very beginning it helped provide found to do the weeding manually. This sit-
farmers with vegetable seeds, the major pre- uation was not improved until the Agri-
requisite for larger crops. As many normal cultural Branch, in co-operation with the
sources of seed imports were cut off, Aus- Australian Council of Scientific and Indus-
tralia looked to the United States for the trial Research, developed special weed-kill-
filling of its requirements, but Common- ing sprays that substantially increased the
wealth authorities knew yield ofboth carrots and onions. The United
little of the Ameri-
States also provided fungicides to prevent
can market and had scant experience in the
the rotting of seeds during the germination
17
(1) Memo, DCQM for CQM USASOS, 10 period, but farmers, unfamiliar with such
Jan 43, sub: Insp of Canned Food. (2) Ltr, CG
USASOS to Controller Defence Foodstuffs, 12 Jan 19
( 1
) Memo, Capt Milton D. Miller for Maj Theo
43. (3) Ltr, Controller Defence Foodstuffs to CG Pozzy, Subs Depot, 21 May 43, sub: Green Pea
J.
USASOS, 18 Jan 43. All in ORB ABCOM P&C Seeds. ORB AFWESPAC QM 464.8. (2) Ltr, Veg-
400.252. etable Seeds Com
Maj Cobb, Subs Depot, 2 Aug
to
,s
( 1 ) Subs Depot Memo 18, 13 Apr 43, sub: Or- 43, sub: Vegetable Seeds. (3) Memo, Vegetable
ganization of Hq Subs Depot. (2) Rpt, n. s., 5 May Seeds Com for Maj Belford L. Seabrook, Subs De-
43, sub: Organization of Subs Depot. AF- ORB pot, sub: Seed Rqmts. Both in ORB ABCOM P&C
WESPAC QM 320. 464.8.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 105
preparations, utilized them but slightly until had turned out a sizable quantity of equip-
a special effort was made in mid- 1943 to ment, but in 1940 and 1941 most of them
20
call attention to their value. had been converted to armament produc-
Another major achievement of the food tion. Major Seabrook visited the plants and
production program was a protracted and concluded that, if they were promptly re-
finally successful drive for the expansion of converted to the manufacture of farm imple-
vegetable acreage, an effort carried out in ments and provided with models of the latest
the main by the Agricultural Engineering American equipment, they could furnish the
Section of the Subsistence Depot. The favor- bulk of Australian requirements. The chief
able outcome of this drive was attributable stumbling block to higher local production,
almost wholly to mechanization, a process he believed, was the failure of the Common-
that, because of the greater stress at first wealth to recognize that food as well as guns,
placed by the Commonwealth on the pro- tanks, planes, and ships constituted a mu-
curement of canning and dehydrating equip- nition of war — according to Seabrook, "the
ment, did not start on a large scale until primary munition of war." Because of this
1943. Early in that year it became obvious failure, top priorities for the acquisition of
that, if more mechanical aids were not speed- plants, manpower, and materials went to
ily obtained, the higher agricultural pro- the supplies and equipment recognized as
duction planned for the 1943-44 season munitions, and food production received
could not possibly be attained. Unfortu- only odds and ends. Major Seabrook fur-
nately, theUnited States could supply only ther claimed that "endless delays, extreme
a fraction of Australian needs, for it was caution and miserly approach" marked the
confronted by enormous demands not only handling of the "mechanization, develop-
from its own farmers but also from other ment and expansion of the vegetable indus-
21 22
Allied countries. try."
Faced with a breakdown in the vegetable The Commonwealth Government de-
production program, the Agricultural Engi- layed action on Seabrook's recommenda-
neering Section began a concerted drive for tions for some weeks, but meanwhile it took
greater mechanization. Its chief, Maj. Bel- a census of the country's farm machines and
ford L. Seabrook of the 20,000-acre Sea- ascertained the total manufacturing capac-
brook Farm in southwestern New Jersey, ity of the factories which had formerly made
one of the most intensely mechanized veg- agricultural equipment. Finally, in July it
etable-growing units in the United States, ordered the reconversion of these plants and
23
requested the immediate adoption by the declared food a munition of war. Once
Commonwealth program looking to in-
of a
these decisions were made, the Australians
determined to production of more
start the
creased manufacture of farm machines in
than thirty different types of equipment.
Australia itself. Before 1939 the large agri-
The Agricultural Engineering Section gave
cultural machinery plants of that country
technical advice on retooling and other man-
20
Cramp, Food Production, Ch. XII.
21
(1) Min, Australian Food Council, 31 Jul 42.
22
Cramp, Food Production, Ch. XIII, pp.
(1)
(2) Rpt, Australian Food Council, n. d., sub: Natl 12-15. Memo, Maj Belford L. Seabrook for
(2)
Vegetable Production Plan. (3) Ltr, to BaseCQM Col Hugh B. Hester, 20 May 43, sub: Farm Ma-
Sec QM's, 16 Mar 43, sub: Vegetable Crops. All chinery. ORB AFWESPAC QM 403.3.
in ORB AFPAC Sup Council. 23
Cramp, Food Production, Ch. XIII, pp. 22-31.
106 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ufacturing problems that arose in duplicat- graders. Sufficient machines indeed did not
ing machines sent as models from the United become available until shortly before the
2'
States. termination of hostilities.
1
During 1943
Probably the most valuable machine was and part of 1944 the lengthy delay in com-
the Farmall H
Tractor which, with its at- mencing the manufacture of farm equip-
tachments, made possible the mechanization ment combined with the scarcity of farm
of practically every phase of vegetable cul- labor to make greater vegetable production
tivation from plowing to harvesting. With a formidable task. To some extent the
a single Farmall H Tractor, Seabrook esti- shortage of tractors was relieved by pooling
mated, only two men were required for those available and allocating them to the
every 75 or 100 acres. But extensive retool- production of the most essential crops. But
ing was needed for its production, and plant thiscould not be done without causing a
managers hesitated to embark on so costly comparative decline in the harvest of such
an enterprise. Eventually, Seabrook's per- commodities as sugar, production of which
sistent optimism induced them to undertake had previously been well mechanized. For
the difficult task. Whereas American firms that reason this expedient was used spar-
27
in peacetime ordinarily took two to four ingly.
some technical assistance from the Agricul- anized vegetable production. Its most effi-
tural Engineering Section, started produc- cient utilization required tracts of at least
24
tion within six months. Local plants also 75 acres, and preferably 500 acres, yet the
turned out the Farmall A Tractor, which average vegetable farm contained only
had fewer attachments. The Farmall H about 5 acres. Before the novel machines
Tractor was employed most effectively on could be employed most advantageously,
tracts of 500 or more acres, while the Farm- tracts of suitable size had to be secured. To
all A was employed mainly on smaller some extent this objective was accomplished
tracts.
25
by bringing large farms under the produc-
In addition to tractors, Australian plants tion program and combining groups of
turned out harrows, mowers, cultivators, small farms into projects that carried out
plows, pea and bean harvesters, weeders, machine operations without respect to indi-
28
dusters, sprayers, and highly specialized vidual holdings.
equipment for fruit and vine crops. But In order to teach farmers how to derive
time was needed to adapt plants to the pro- the maximum from the new equip-
benefit
duction of these machines. At best Aus- ment, the Subsistence Depot conducted an
tralia could not fill all its needs, and the extensive educational program that directly
United States finally had to furnish a num- or indirectly reached most of the rural
ber of tractors, corn planters, and potato
population. Although mechanization was
24
(1) Ibid., Ch. XIII, pp. 31-33; Ch. XIV. (2) stressed, such problems as irrigation, har-
Rpt, Capt Louis E. Kahn, 28 Nov 43, sub: Weekly
Rpt, Hq SvC Base Sec 7. ORB AFWESPAC QM 26
Cramp, Food Production, Ch. XIII, pp. 33-37.
403.3.
17
( 1)Min, Australian Food Council, 9 Feb 43.
w Rpt, Maj Belford L. Seabrook, 16 Dec 44, sub: ORB AFPAC AG 334. (2) Walker, Australian
Farm Machinery Fid Day. ORB AFWESPAC Economy, p. 201.
413.18.
28
Cramp, Food Production, Ch. XIII, pp. 9-15.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 107
vesting, and the use of fertilizers and in- vegetables, in too small quantities. In spite
secticides were not neglected. Since the de- of considerable gains in acreage sown in
partments of agriculture in the Australian peas, string beans, and tomatoes, shortages
states had the closest contacts with farmers, of these popular vegetables were particularly
the program aimed chiefly at the indoctri- conspicuous; much of the increased produc-
nation of the key men in these agencies, but tion apparently had been absorbed by house-
it also reached individual farmers through wives and other claimants. Yet the vastly
lectures, radio broadcasts, motion pictures, increased availability of vegetables as a
leaflets, and, above all, through field dem- whole was a highly significant accomplish-
onstrations carried out by American tech- ment brought about in the face of exas-
nicians in the main vegetable-growing dis- perating perplexities. American soldiers
tricts. The high degree of success attained might not always have peas and potatoes,
by the educational program is attested by corn and lima beans, but they did not go
the doubling of the cultivated area. From hungry normally, they were more than well
;
30
1934 to 1939 an average of 254,000 acres fed.
was sown yearly in vegetables. By the
1943-44 season more than 520,000 acres Canning
were under cultivation. The number of
The canning program, obviously, was
acres devoted to green peas, for example,
rose from 13,353 to 66,440, or almost 400 controlled to a considerable extent by the
percent, and similar gains were made in the supply of vegetables, but at the outset the
production of string beans, tomatoes, car- primary problem was an industrial one,
rots, and beets. 29 how to get an adequate number of well-
Remarkable though these increases were, run canneries into operation. At first Com-
they did not provide adequate quantities of monwealth authorities were often obliged to
some of the most acceptable vegetables. utilize plants that not only were remote from
vegetable-growing districts but also were
This shortcoming was attributable to in-
creased civilian demands, to the delays in managed by former fruit canners who had
the inauguration of the mechanization pro- scant knowledge of vegetable canning and
gram, and to the natural reluctance of farm- frequently applied to it the less exacting
31
techniques of their old occupation. These
ers to substitute unfamiliar for familiar
crops.Perhaps there was also at first failure techniques were particularly faulty in fail-
on the part of Americans and Australians ing to provide enough heat in the canning
process. Since vegetables are nonacid foods
alike fully to realize that a rise in total vege-
and so less able than fruits to resist bacterial
table production did not in itself suffice to
meet U.S. requirements; such a rise, to be 10
( 1 ) Memo, Capt Albert E. Bester, Jr., for
most beneficial, had to include adequate CQM, 26 Sep 43, sub: Analysis of Class I Sups.
(2) Memo, Maj Hubert W. Marlow for CO
quantities of acceptable varieties. By Oc- USASOS Gen Depot, 14 Oct 43, sub: Analysis of
tober 1943 it had become obvious that vege- Advance Base Inventories. ORB ABCOM GP&C
400.291.
tables lacking in popularity were being ob- Function of
F. Foote, n. d., sub:
31
(1) Rpt, J.
tained in too large quantities; acceptable Canning and Tinplate Board. ORB AFPAC Sup
Council. (2) Rpt, Australian Food Council, n. d.,
(1) Ibid., Ch. X, pp. 18-27. (2) Hester Rpt, sub: Equip for Canning. ORB AFWESPAC QM
p. 8. 400.252.
108 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
growths, more heat had to be applied to prominent food technologist, as director. He
them in order to kill all harmful matter. set up a highly efficient organization that
The canning methods in use were further carried out its functions in canneries as well
defective in that they did not insure the re- as laboratories, rejecting not only all food
tention of vitamins and minerals indis- found unfit for consumption but also im-
pensable to good health. Preservation of properly seamed cans. The effectiveness of
these essential substances depended upon an the unit was demonstrated by the absence
adequate supply of fresh vegetables of of any serious cases of food poisoning after
34
proper maturity, prompt canning after har- its creation.
vesting, and exclusion of oxygen during the In the meantime ambitious expansion
heating process to prevent destruction of plans were formulated, but it soon devel-
vitamins, but these requirements could sel- oped that they could not be fully carried out
dom be fully complied with. Recently picked as shortages of manpower and machinery
vegetables were rarely available in the de- delayed the completion of new plants and
sired quantities sincegrowing areas were the re-equipment of old ones. Canneries, in
not close enough to processing plants, and fact, never became numerous enough to
vegetables were of necessity hauled over keep pace with fast rising military require-
long distances with a rapid decline in nu- ments although by the close of the war sixty
tritive value. Finally, processors' lack of were in operation, several times the peace-
familiarity with the seaming, soldering, and time figure.
3 "'
The frequent inability to util-
closing of cans resulted in the production ize existing plants to full capacity was as
52
of easily damaged containers. Proper in- detrimental to production as was the lack of
spection might have corrected these weak- enough plants. Operations were repeatedly
nesses, but inspectors, like canners, were disrupted by shortages of cans, of machinery
for the most part former fruit men ill in- for closing containers, and of wood ship-
formed about vegetable processing. Speci- ping cases. So acute was the world-wide
fications based on the best canning practices had
scarcity of tinplate that Australia never
might have been set up to serve as sound more than a few weeks' supply of cans, not
guides, but such specifications were not at
33
enough to allow the uninterrupted flow of
first available.
containers in a seasonal industry like vege-
Early in 1943 these difficulties led the 36
table canning.
Commonwealth to request the assignment of
experienced Quartermaster and Veterinary 34
( 1 ) Memo, DCQM for CQM, 10 Jan 43, sub
officers to the enforcement of better operat- Insp of Canned Foods. ORB ABCOM P&C 400.252.
(2) Memo, CQM for G-4 USASOS, 18 Feb 43.
ing practices. The Subsistence Depot there-
ORB AFWESPAC QM 323.71. (3) Subs Depot
upon established the Laboratory and Inspec- Memo, 8 Mar 42, sub: Insp of Canneries.
83
(1) Cbl, U.S. Lend-Lease Mission to Secy of
tion Branch in the Food Production Division
State, 13 Feb 43. ORB AFPAC
Rear Ech Canning
with Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Carl R. Fellers, a Equip. (2) Ltr, CQM USAFFE to QM USASOS,
11 Mar 43, sub: Food Production. ORB AFWES-
32
Min, Australian Food Council, 1 1 Oct 42, PAC QM 400.252.
for CO Subs Depot,
38
pp. 4-8. ( 1 ) Memo, Food Mfg Unit
33
(1) Rpt, R. S. Scull, 23 Jan 43, sub: Canning 17 Sep 43, sub: Bottlenecks. ORB AFWESPAC QM
Program. (2) Memo, "H. B. H." for Maj R. W. 430. (2) Rpt, L. G. Roth, Controller of Vegetable
Hughes, 4 Feb 43, sub: Laboratory. ORB ABCOM Sups, 1 Jul 44, sub: Vegetable Canning Program.
P&C 632. ORB ABCOM P&C 432.
CANNERY OPERATIONS IN AUSTRALIA were performed under the supervision of
Qiiarteimaster inspectors.
no THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Nevertheless ever larger quantities of cabbages, and carrots, none of which were
canned vegetables became available. Of the truly acceptable as a steady diet. On the
increased production the American services other hand, favored vegetables, such as to-
alone took 56,000,000 pounds, five and a matoes and corn, were procured only in
half times the total amount turned out in much smaller percentages than the program
39
the last prewar year. Even this substantial called for. As months necessarily elapsed
quantity did not quite match American re- before supplies arrivedfrom the United
quirements, but the most serious shortcom- components of the menu
States the vegetable
ing was not that the amount furnished to remained unbalanced throughout 1944.
the U.S. Army often below the amount
fell The operations of the fruit-canning in-
ordered from the United States and shortly volume was not attributable to any indiffer-
afterwards completely revised its procure- ence on the part of the canners but rather
40
ment schedule in line with ascertained to the unavailability of the necessary fruits.
39
its establishment the Subsistence
Depot therefore set up a Meat Section in fell far short of the 77,400,000 pounds re-
its Food Production Division to help the quired. In 1944 the packers, with both more
packers. This section was headed by Maj. experience and more equipment, better than
George V. Hallman, who for twenty years doubled their contribution, furnishing 90,-
had worked in the packing industry in both 000,000 pounds. 43
North and South America. After surveying Despite this decided spurt, the program,
existing plants he concluded that with better like that for canned vegetables, was unable
equipment Australia could produce the to provide the variety desired by the QMC.
canned meats known to Americans chili — Corned beef and corned beef hash, old Aus-
con carne, corned beef hash, ham and eggs, tralian favorites, continued to be supplied in
luncheon meat, Vienna sausage, meat and the largest quantities, in 1944 constituting
beans, and vegetable stew and hash. The over 36 percent of the canned meats turned
Commonwealth approved the production of over to the U.S. Army. This disappointing
these items and in 1944, at American re- result stemmed in the main from the reluc-
quest, added pork sausage, pork and beans, tance of packers to plunge into the large-
41
and roast beef with gravy to the list. scale production of unfamiliar items for
In trying to meet U.S. Army requirements which no substantial postwar demand was
packers were handicapped by seasonal vari- discernible. As in the case of canned vegeta-
ations in the meat supply, which made it bles, USASOS eventually obtained some re-
hard to maintain a smooth flow of canned lief through procurement in the United
44
products. Australia normally had an ex- States.
duction for the American forces soared from 29-32. (2) Memo cited n. 38. (3) SWPA Hist, QM
a mere 1,300,000 pounds to 43,800,000 V, 34-36.
Rpt, Commonwealth Dehydration Com, 5
45
( 1 )
pounds. Huge though this gain was^it still Nov 42, sub: Vegetable Dehydration Program.
ORB AFPAC Sup Council Vegetable. (2) Rpt,
11
( 1 ) Cramp, Food Production, Ch. XX, pp. Capt Maynard A. Joslyn, 18 Dec 42, sub: Existing
10-12. (2) Ltr, CQM USAFFE to QM USASOS, Dehydrators. ORB AFWESPAC QM 400.252.
4 Jul 43, sub: Canned Meat Products. ORB (3) Memo, Joslyn for Maj Theo J. Pozzy, 12 Apr
AFWESPAC QM 430. 43, sub: Delay in Dehydration Program. ORB
ABCOM P&C 400.254. (4) Ltr, Food Mfg Div
42
Rpt, Maj George V. Hallman, 10 Nov 43, sub:
Meat Canning Program. ORB AFWESPAC QM to CO Subs Depot, 17 Sep 43, sub: Bottlenecks.
430. ORB AFWESPAC AG 430.
112 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
In 1 942 there were in use only a few hastily year, 36 percent of thecabbage production,
converted and unsuitably located fruit-dry- 26 percent of the onion production, and 50
ing plants, which turned out less than 2,- percent of the beet production. Except for
000,000 pounds of dehydrated vegetables, potatoes, allotment of which equaled Amer-
and those of inferior quality. With the es- ican requirements, even these relatively gen-
tablishment in early 1943 of the Dehydra- erous allocations represented only about 43
tion Branch at the Subsistence Depot, tech- percent of what the QMC had requested. 47
nical advice about the selection of vege- Owing to the difficulty of supplying per-
tablesand the improvement of processing ishables in the Southwest Pacific, Austral-
methods became available for the first time. ian canners and dehydrators were called
New plants were built largely in accordance upon to furnish meat, fruit, and vegetable
with plans submitted by the Dehydration components of the special rations prepared
Branch, and in 1944 production was six for advance, particularly
combat, troops cut
times that of two years before. Dehydrated off from normal sources of supply. They
potatoes formed about 70 percent of the even provided these components for stand-
total output. Cabbages and carrots were ard field rations, especially those issued
the other vegetables dehydrated in the larg- north of Australia where only small quanti-
46
est quantities. ties of perishables could be handled. Ra-
The American services received only a tions of the C type, composed in the main
comparatively small percentage of all this of canned and dehydrated elements, were
production. Of the 1943 output of 5,000,- the only ones assembled entirely from Aus-
000 pounds they secured a mere 620,185 tralian products.
48
the U.S. Army 25 percent of the dehy- many years large exports of these meats had
drated potato production for the coming figured conspicuously in the antipodean
46 economy, but in 1940 the shortage of bot-
( 1 ) Cramp, Food Production, Ch. XVIII, p. 46.
(2) Hester Rpt, p. 9. (3) Walker, Australian toms led to sharp curtailment of shipments
Economy, p. 210. (4) Rpt, Capt Joslyn, 2 Nov 42,
sub: Vegetable Dehydration. ORB AFWESPAC 47
(1 ) Cramp, Food Production, Ch. XVIII, pp.
QM 432. (5) Memo, Joslyn for Maj Pozzy, 10 36-37. (2) Rpt, 1st Lt Harold D. Van Wagenen,
Apr 43. (6) Ltr, Joslyn to CO
Subs Depot, 21 13 Apr 43, sub: Dehydrated Vegetable Program.
Jul 43, sub: Dehydration Program. (7) Rpt, Jos- ABCOM P&C 400.254.
lyn, 29 Feb 44, sub: Future Dehydration Policy. Ltr, CO Subs Depot to CG USASOS,
,H
( 1 )
7 Jul
(8) Memo, Joslyn for Col Hugh B. Hester, 10 Jul 43, sub: Subs Reqmts. ORB AFWESPAC QM
44, sub: Major Joslyn's Accomplishments. All in 333.1. (2) USASOS Regulations 30-16, 28 Feb 44,
ORB ABCOM P&C 400.254. Sec. II, sub: Daily Ration Issues.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 113
cause of the scarcity of pork, ham, and Army for the express purpose of reducing
bacon and their popularity with American cold-storage needs. Introduction of this
soldiers, the production of these meats was commodity, unknown in Australia, became
especially fostered. The Commonwealth a primary responsibility of the Meat Section
furnished feeds to hog raisers at low prices of the Subsistence Depot. Boneless beef
and bought their animals at levels guaran- eliminated not only bones but also fats and
49
teeing substantial profits. cuts of slight nutritive value. Whereas car-
In spite of the fact that total meat pro- cass beef in storage orshipment was hung
duction rose from 900,000 tons in 1941 to on hooks with considerable room between
1,030,000 tons in 1944 and shipments to each carcass, boneless beef was packed in
the United Kingdom remained at relatively 50-pound boxes, permitting compact utili-
low levels, American requirements
filling zation of space and reducing freezer-space
was not an easy assignment. One reason was requirements by about 60 percent and
>:
that civilian consumption grew rapidly after weight by about 25 percent.
1940, yet, except for pork and a few other As in the United States, the principal
food products, remained unregulated until stumbling block to the procurement of bone-
January 1944, when rationing was at last less beef was the reluctance of meat packers
for each person over nine years of age and quired to bring out a product for which
there was no commercial demand. Boneless
half as much for persons under nine. The
beef was at first so hard to procure that
shortage of freezer space also complicated
the Commonwealth had to prohibit its dis-
the supply problem. In peacetime, heavy
tribution to troops in Australia in order to
exports had kept refrigerated space clear of
make enough available for deliveries to ad-
oldmeat and enabled a few plants to fill all
vance bases. The supply problem was partly
demands for cold storage. But with the ar- solved by Commonwealth guarantees of re-
rival of strong American forces large stocks munerative prices, but sufficient boning fa-
had to be held for weeks at a time in order
M ) Memo, 2d Lt Louis E. Kahn for Lt Col
1
to assure adequate military supplies during (
producing state. The U.S. Army itself con- Boneless Beef. (2) Ltr, CQM
USASOS to Base
Sec 3, 26 Jan 43, same sub. Both in AFWES- ORB
4
" Walker, Australian Economy, pp. 199-201. PAC QM
431.
,v7- •/#
i*
STORAGE OF MEAT forced the adoption of such expedients as the burlap cooler in which
water dripping over burlap kept the temperature down (above) and the salting offresh meat
cuts (below).
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 115
cilities never became available. This defi- from a carcass than had formerly been
54
ciency was worsened by the vast increase obtained.
in demand during the last two years of hos- The Subsistence Depot hoped that simi-
tilities, when the Australian Army, favor- lar cutting rooms could be established in
ably impressed by the product, ordered siz- all the Australian base sections, but the
52
able amounts. packers opposed such action. They claimed
There was also difficulty in procuring that the Melbourne experiment competed
pork carcasses cut, according to Ameri- directly with their products, aggravating
can custom, into hams, loins, shoulders, the shortage of skilled cutters and making
spareribs, and bacon ready for cooking ithard for them to turn out cuts in the
by field organizations, and beef carcasses cut American style. Their objections, together
into steaks, roasts, and stews. Meat had with the danger of contamination because
never been prepared in this fashion in Aus- of the lack of refrigeration in the Melbourne
tralia. Wholesalers had always provided boning room, led to its abandonment early
pork, for example, to retailers in the form of in 1944. At that time the packers agreed to
Wiltshire sides, that is, entire sides except make cuts of the types wanted by the U.S.
for the heads, and they hesitated to make Army, but the Australian Treasury disap-
cuts in the American style because of the proved as too high the prices set by the pack-
increased cost and the scarcity of qualified ers and so delayed the venture for several
carvers. Yet mess butchers could not use months. 55
Wiltshire sides economically, for they had The American forces did not always ob-
few proper cutting implements and only lim- tain the cuts they preferred, it is true, but
ited training in carving carcasses. Because Australia did furnish a large amount of
of their inexperience they discarded bones beef.During 1942 and 1943 it provided
53
that still held a good deal of edible meat. 16,700,000 pounds of the carcass variety
In the Melbourne base section, as else- and 7,440,000 pounds of the boneless va-
where, there was very much wastage of
riety. Whereas the supply of the latter prod-
meat. To correct this defect, the Quarter-
uct consistently fell below American needs,
master and the Veterinarian set up a so-
that of carcass beef approximated require-
called "boning room," which was really a
ments until late 1943 when Australian pro-
"cutting room," for little deboning was done
duction, though increased, did not suffice to
there. Its operations, carried out mostly by
fill demands treble those of 1942. Civilian
Australian civilians recently trained as cut-
rationing, put into effect in January 1944,
ters, relieved mess cooks and attendants in
the Melbourne area of tasks for which they helped tide over the shortage in military
were ill fitted and made possible the pro- 54
(1) Ltr, 1st Lt Thomas Watson to Base
J.
curement of about 10 percent more meat Sec 4, 15 Apr 43, sub: Example of Waste. ORB
AFWESPAC QM 430. (2) Rpt, QM Base Sec 4,
52
( 1 ) Ltr, Lt Col John T. Taylor, IGD Base 26 Apr 43, sub: QM Activities Base Sec 4. ORB
Sec 3, to Col C. H. Barnwell, Jr. Hq USASOS, 16 AFWESPAC QM 370.43. (3) Ltr, Base Vet Base
Jan 43, sub: Boneless Beef. (2) Memo, for QM Sec 4 to CG USASOS, 23 Jun 43, sub: Boning
Exec Off for Sup USASOS, 15 Mar 43. (3) Rpt, Room. ORB ABCOM P&C 431.
Col Cordiner, 26 Apr 44, sub: Rpt of Inspection. 55
Rpt, Maj George V. Hallman, 4 Jan 44,
( 1 )
All in QM 431.
ORB AFWESPAC sub: Base Sec 4 Boning Room. (2) Personal Ltr,
Memo, CQM for Capt Norman
53
H. Myers, 25 Col Hugh B. Hester to Dir Gen of Food Sup, 17
Aug 42. ORB AFWESPAC QM 430. Apr 44. Both in ORB P&C 431. ABCOM
16 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
stocks. As the number of American troops the turkeys served at Thanksgiving and
in forward areas steadily grew throughout Christmas dinners in 1942. Later, the qual-
1944. the acquisition of more freezer ship- ity of poultry offered U.S. services gradually
ping space, rather than an inadequate sup- improved, and in 1944 purchases climbed
ply of beef, became the primary problem. from only 240,000 pounds in the previous
In June lack of such space forced the stor- two years to about 2,000,000 pounds. 59
age in Australia of about 30,000,000 pounds
56
of carcass beef. Flour, Sugar, and Rice
Next to beef, pork products constituted
the largest group of meats supplied to the Flour was procured in greater volume
U.S. services, amounting in the peak pro- than any other foodstuff. In 1944 alone the
curement year of 1944 to about half the QMC obtained about 219,000,000 pounds.
beef procurement. During those twelve As one of the world's largest exporters of
months 11,980,000 pounds of bacon, 11,- the commodity in prewar days Australia
790,000 pounds of ham and 9,460,000 had no trouble in meeting even such huge
pounds of pork were supplied. Sizable demands. Yet U.S. Army bakers contended
though these amounts were, they were still that the flour, because of its low gluten
considerably less than the American forces content, made smaller and less acceptable
wanted. 57 loaves than did the American variety. When
major producer of lamb
Australia, as a the latter was available, they mixed it with
and mutton, could easily have supplied equal quantities of local flour to obtain bet-
these products, but American preference for ter bread. But this expedient was possible
other meats kept procurement at a low level, only to a limited degree, for until late 1 944
less than a million pounds having been se- about 90 percent of all flour used in the
cured during the first two years of reverse Southwest Pacific came from Australian
60
lend-lease operations. Not until well into mills.
1943, when hope of obtaining pork prod- Sugar, too, was almost entirely Australian
ucts in desired quantities had almost van- in origin. There were ample local supplies,
ished, was much lamb and mutton taken. and with the aid of civilian rationing at the
Yet even in the following years Americans restricted but still liberal scale of one pound
got only slightly more than 10,000,000 per person a week, service requirements
pounds, or less than 9 percent of all local were met in full. Even the shortage of sea-
meat purchases. 58 sonal laborers for harvesting the crop in the
Generally speaking, the poultry industry principal growing areas in northern Queens-
could provide few chickens and turkeys, for land and of freight cars for transporting the
they were Australian luxuries ordinarily raw sugar to the refineries in the south inter-
available only in the better hotelsand res- fered but little with production for the mili-
61
taurants. Those sold commercially were un- tary forces.
bled, incompletely plucked specimens most 68
Ch. XXII, pp. 21-23.
Ibid.,
soldiers found distasteful. Many rejected 60
(I) Ibid., pp. 42-43. (2) Ltr, Base Surg to CO
Base Sec 3, 29 Nov 43, sub: Bakeries. ORB
5H
Cramp, Food Production, Ch. XXI, pp. 18-19 AFWESPAC QM 633.
27-33. 61
Memo, Philip Grassick for Col Herbert A.
"Ibid., pp. 21-23, 33.
w Gardner, CQM USASOS, 8 May 42, sub: Sugar
Ibid., p. 33. Rpt. ORB AFWESPAC QM 436.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 117
quantities of the cereal, service demands and of these sections requested contracts calling
sizable exports to Ceylon and New Zealand for pasteurization and tuberculosis-free
absorbed most of the crop. American sup- herds, but dairy farmers would not accept
ply officers, looking forward to the liberation these provisions unless they received com-
of the Philippines, expected that in the first pensation for diseased animals and substan-
year of reoccupation the Filipinos would re- tially higher prices to cover the expense of
quire 200,000 tons of rice, an amount so pasteurization. Local and state milk offi-
64
large that, in view of the world-wide scar- cials in the main supported the dairymen.
city, it could probably be secured only by The prolonged inability to iron out dif-
extreme effort. They suggested that the Aus- ferences over tuberculin tests was the major
tralian Government stockpile the cereal for obstacle to better sanitary conditions, but
future use, but heavy current demands the suggested extension of pasteurization
62
made such action impossible. presented a scarcely less formidable barrier.
Many farmers regarded pasteurization as
Dairy Products merely a costly luxury to be used only in sup-
plying American troops and discarded as
The Australian dairy industry produced soon as the war ended. Finding progress in
milk primarily to make butter and cheese
"Ibid., p. 199.
rather than to sell for liquid consumption. 04
( 1 ) for CQM USAFIA,
Memo, ACofS G-4
It was not a fully developed industry, and 12 May 42. ORB AFWESPAC QM 433. (2)
its operations were handicapped by the dis- Memo, Proc Div USASOS for GPA, 6 Apr 43,
sub: Milk in Cairns. ORB AFWESPAC QM 434.
" ( 1 ) Rpt, Col R. C. Kramer, Jt Sup Bd GHQ (3) Rpt, L. T. Maclnnes, Dept of Commerce and
SWPA, 7 Oct 44, sub: Rice. ORB AFPAC AG Agriculture, 2 Feb 44, sub: U.S. Milk Specifica-
430.2. (2) Walker, Australian Economy, p. 211. tions. ORB ABCOM P&C 434.
THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ridding herds of tubercular animals slow, representing most of the Australian produc-
the QMC agreed to accept milk from ap- tion — was obtained. 67
434. (2) Memo, Vet Sec for Subs Sec, 20 Oct 44, 25-27. (2) Ltr, Subs Depot to USASOS, 21 Aug
sub: Tuberculin Free Herds. Both in ORB ABCOM 43, sub: Milk Ingredients. ORB AFWESPAC QM
P&C 434. 434.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 19
comparatively restricted quantities, small sion, USASOS, acting through market cen-
and monotonous issues of fresh vegetables ters at Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, and
were the frequent lot of troops in forward Townsville, carried out procurement on the
6*
areas. basis of requisitions submitted by the Dis-
A partial solution of the problem was tribution Division, USASOS, for supplies in
found in the market center system, which forward areas and by the base sections for
started in the zone of interior in 1941. This Competition for pro-
issues in Australia.
system was up in the Southwest Pacific
set
Army elements was thus
duce among U.S.
in April 1944 and became the only market On
terminated. 1 July competition with
center system established in an overseas area. an end, when the
the U.S. Navy came to
It introduced centralized procurement not
responsibility for obtaining perishables for
only of fresh fruits and vegetables but also new buy-
the sister service also passed to the
of the other perishables — meat, poultry,
ing system. Since the market centers ac-
fish, butter, eggs, and other dairy products. quired warehouses for long-term storage of
Under this system the Procurement Divi-
perishables and established reasonably regu-
lar schedules of reefer sailings, hurried pur-
''"
(1) Memo, S&D Div for CQM USASOS, 10
Feb 43, sub: Mkt Cen. ORB AFWESPAC QM chases were less often necessary. Advance
414.1. (2) Ltr, CG USASOS to CQM, 14 Dec 43, procurement in bulk and in wider variety
sub: Proc of Perishable Subs. ORB AFWESPAC AG
430. became the customary practice, making pos-
120 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
sible the creation of sizable reserve stock- more than 47 percent. Indeed more ship-
on
ages. ping space was saved in procurement of sub-
At times lack of refrigeration afloat and sistencethan in procurement of any other
ashore made it impracticable to take all the group of supplies, Quartermaster or non-
fresh fruits and vegetables offered commer- Quartermaster. Monetarily, too, it was of
cially. In the first quarter of 1945, General the highest significance, for the value of the
Hester estimated, these deficiencies pre- food bought was estimated at $217,432,301,
vented the procurement of 35,000,000 or 28.5 percent of the total purchases of
72
pounds of potatoes, 12,000,000 pounds of $759,369,137 for the U.S. Army.
other vegetables, and 12,000,000 pounds of Australia provided the Southwest Pacific
7
fruits. "
Nevertheless during the nine months Area with the bulk of its subsistence, fur-
the market centers operated in 1944, they nishing 90 percent or more of some items.
obtained all together 32,000,000 pounds of Its provision of fresh foods was particularly
fresh fruits and
107,000,000 pounds of significant, for almost no perishables were
Apples and oranges were
fresh vegetables. received from the United States. Had not
purchased in greater volume than were Australia filled this gap in military supplies,
other fruits, followed in descending scale by American soldiers would have been forced
pears, bananas, pineapples, and lemons. to live out of cans much more than they did.
Potatoes alone accounted for more than 70 The most serious deficiency was the absence
percent of the total procurement of fresh of a wider range of canned and fresh pro-
71
vegetables. visions. In a few instances, moreover, the
food provided fell below desirable standards
as considerable adjustment had to be made
Evaluation of Local
between the specifications worked out for
Subsistence Procurement
purchases in the United States and the ac-
The procurement of subsistence, both tualities of Australian productive conditions.
perishable and nonperishable, was of prime Had more ocean tonnage been available,
importance in the reverse lend-lease pro- quartermasters probably would have pre-
gram. Of the estimated 3,617,000 measure- ferred to import some items from the zone of
interior in order to obtain ration compo-
ment tons of supplies acquired for the U.S.
nents familiar to American soldiers. But
Army from the beginning of 1942 to 30 June
this fact did not mean that the reverse lend-
1945, food accounted for 1,704,389 tons, or
lease program failed. On the contrary, it
09
Memo, Lt Col R. W. Hughes for Col Hugh
( 1 ) constituted themajor Quartermaster asset
B. Hester, SvC Base Sec 7, 16 Dec 43. ORB
in the Southwest Pacific. Without it the
ABCOM P&C 432. (2) Ltr, CO SvC Base Sec 7
to CO Base Sec 4, 15 Jan 44, sub: Proc of Perisha- QMC could not have carried out its mis-
bles. ORB ABCOM AG
400.12. (3) USASOS sion of feeding the U.S. Army. However
Memo 32, 10 Apr 44, Sec. II, sub: Mkt Cens. (4) exasperating the recurrent shortages of in-
Ltr, OIC USASOS Mkt Cen to U.S. Navy, 26 Jun
44, sub: Proc of Perishable Subs for U.S. Navy. dividual items were, these were minor mat-
Both in ORB ABCOM
P&C 434. ters in comparison with the all-important
70
Ltr, Brig Gen Hugh B. Hester to ABSEC, CG fact that Australia furnished more than
11 May 45, sub: Loss of Proc of Perishable Subs.
ORB ABCOM GP&C 430.291. ample means of feeding troops well. The
71
Proc Div USASOS, Proc in Australia, II, Mkt
72
Cen Sec, pp. 4-8. Hester Rpt, pp. 4-5.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 121
procurement of subsistence through the re- few years many industries were expanded to
verse lend-lease program was indeed per- fillAmerican needs.
haps the most arresting example of suc- At the outset Quartermaster procurement
cessful Australian-American co-operation. of clothing and general supplies was under-
While true that the United States was the taken in an atmosphere of confusion. One
major beneficiary of this joint action, officer succinctly described this period in the
modern farming methods. In the normal ments were somewhat confusing. Most troops
were shipped expecting a tropical destina-
course of events a dozen years or more would
tion. Troops were also being evacuated from
probably have been necessary to bring these Java, nurses were arriving from the United
developments to the stage they had reached States, Bataan and elsewhere without any
by V-J Day. uniforms. The situation was serious and
winter was coming on. 74
Procurement of Clothing and General Further complications were injected by the
Supplies in Australia continued lack of technicians capable of
handling the matter of most immediate sig-
The procurement of clothing and general
nificance, theprocurement of clothing for
supplies, like that of subsistence, entailed a
troops who had come clad in cotton and
concerted Australian-American effort. As in
found that they needed wool. In these early
the case of rations necessitated a major
it
from the industrial plants of Sydney and Yet there were still annoying problems,
76
Melbourne and from the United States. of which shoe production was perhaps the
Late in March the OCQM Purchasing most pressing. The shoe industry had ample
and Contracting Officer presented his first manufacturing capacity, but its footwear
contract demand, one for nurses' clothing, came in full sizes only and in but two widths,
to the Australian Government. Among other whereas American shoes were manufactured
items needed at that time were 480,000 in half sizes and multiple widths. In order
pairs of shoes, 740,000 pairs of woolen to turn out American types the whole in-
socks, 760,000 woolen garments, and 200,- dustry had to be re-equipped and reor-
000 mess kits. Only the opportune arrival ganized. This feat was eventually accom-
in April of a set of Munson made pos-
lasts plished with technical help from the
sible the submission of a contract demand General Supplies Branch of the OCQM
for shoes. Sincefew other lasts or patterns Supply Division and with extensive impor-
were available, the Purchasing and Con- tation of American machinery. 79 Another
tracting Officer relied upon Australian problem was the relatively low price level
Army technicians to develop specifications at first set for shoes by the Australian Con-
for clothing similar in design and color to tracts Board. Manufacturers considered the
that provided for troops in the United prices too low to compensate adequately for
States. Data required to make the thirty-five the heavier cost of producing American
sizes of shirtsand the various sizes of trous- footwear; some even claimed that they were
ers, jackets, and overcoats had to be recon- asked to operate at a loss. Not until prices
structed from memory, for precise figures satisfactory to the industry were finally es-
were not available and stock items were not tablished was full production attained. 80
manufactured with enough uniformity to
77
In addition to standard service shoes Aus-
furnish exact information.
tralian plants provided hobnailed shoes and
As the year progressed, this basic infor-
a special type distinguished by a rubber
mation finally arrived from the United
clump sole with a tread similar to that of
States. In many instances, however, Ameri-
an automobile tire. Production of Army
can specifications were modified to fit the
footwear continued until late 1944, when
distinctive characteristics of local industry
large shipments of newly developedcombat
and the available materials; in a few in-
shoes arrived from the United States and
stances manufacturing methods were al-
made possible the release of the plants to
tered. The rapid progress made in the pro-
the U.S. Navy. At that time about 60,000
curement of Class II and IV supplies is in-
pairs of shoes a month were being turned
dicated by the fact that the end of 1942 saw
out for Army use. In the previous two and a
10
( 1 ) Memo, CQM for AcofS USAFIA, 25 Mar half years approximately 1,500,000 pairs of
42, Refugee Cargo.
sub: OQMG SWPA 319.1.
(2) Memo, GPA for CofS
78
USAFIA, 7 Jul 42, sub: Hist Rpt of GPA, 11 Mar-14 Oct 42, pp. 25-
Distress Cargo. ORB AFWESPAC Distress Cargo. 44.
70
OQMG SWPA 400.13.
( 1 ) Pp. 2-3 of Browne Lecture, cited n. 74. Proc in Australia, Sec on Gen Sups, pp. 17-19,
(2) Memo, CQM for Col Herbert A. Gardner, 18 21.
Apr 42. ORB AFWESPAC QM 421. 80
QM SWPA Hist, II, 111.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 123
shoes had been produced, enough to fill a requirements were deliberately kept as low
81
substantial part of military needs. as possible,wool cloth had became so scarce
Theprocurement of socks supplied by early 1943 that manufacturers, after sup-
another example of successful local procure- plying the Australian services, had hardly
ment. Despite the fact that the Australian enough material to make one suit a year for
spinning capacity was limited, the mills pro- each male civilian. Severe restrictions on
duced a total of nearly 8,000,000 pairs of public buying, however, enabled the U.S.
standard lightweight Army socks. At its Army to obtain 420,000 pairs of trousers for
peak 1944 production ran at the rate of
in enlisted men. This was not a large total, but
350,000 pairs a month. This satisfactory it reflected not so much an unavailability of
figure was not attained without considerable cloth formore trousers as the Southwest
reorganization of the hosiery industry, PacificArea restriction which confined the
which had no previous experience in turn- wearing of woolen uniforms to the winter
ing out a light wool sock that differed season in Australia. Before production be-
markedly from the Australian Army heavy- gan, a special cloth was developed to dif-
ribbed type designed to fill an oversized ferentiate U.S. from other Allied soldiers,
shoe. At first each manufacturer had differ- and were taught to cut trousers in
tailors
ent shaping, sizing, and pressing boards. the American manner —
not an easy task, for
This lack of standardization caused socks mass production of clothes was virtually un-
nominally of the same size to vary somewhat known in Australia, where men usually wore
as to fit and obliged the General Supplies custom-made suits. The task was, in fact,
Branch to prescribe standard sizing boards. so hard that the fit of locally tailored trou-
Persistent shortages also affected hosiery sers seldom complied with Army standards.
operations unfavorably, the scarcity of good In mid- 1943, therefore, contract demands
dyes forcing mills to produce socks in natu- were canceled and never renewed. 83
ral colors of the yarn while the scarcity of Slightly more than 1,100,000 wool
chemicals to prevent shrinkage often kept knitted shirts, a type new to Australia, were
hose from giving satisfactory service. 82 produced for U.S. Army use. Considered
When the procurement of woolen gar- excellent for the tropics because they en-
—
ments began, there was paradoxically, in abled air to penetrate the garment, they
the world's chief wool-exporting country — were made along the lines of an ordinary
bottleneck in the supply of wool. This ex- cotton khaki shirt. But neither shirt nor
traordinary situation originated in the fact outer knitwear firms could at first make the
that the United Kingdom throughout the wool shirt to the satisfaction of American
troops. Shirt manufacturers could not han-
war took the entire wool clip except for the
dle a knitted fabric properly as their opera-
amount needed to produce cloth in Aus-
tives had no training in feeding a knitted
tralia itself. Since estimates of Australian
fabric through an ordinary sewing machine,
M
(1) Ltr, 162d Inf to I Corps, 5 Feb 43, sub: and knitwear firms, unused to making shirts,
Svc Shoes, Australian Manufacture. (2) Ltr, I could not produce a well-fitting article. The
Corps to USASOS, 25 Apr 43, sub: Rubber Clump
problem was finally solved by the develop-
Soles. (3) Ltr. I Corps to Hq SWPA. All in ORB
I AG 421. (4) Hester
Corps Rpt, p. 18. ment of a new sort of knitted garment,
"USAFFE Bd Tent Rpt 97, May 45. OQMG
SWPA 333.1. QM SWPA Hist, III, pp. 103-04.
124 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
which could be worn either inside the trou- brooms and brushes; 6,500,000 feet of steel
sers as a shirt or outside as a sweater and strapping; and several hundred million
which could be made with comparatively printed forms. In addition to furnishing
84
little trouble. the U.S. armed services with these general
Blanket production involved only minor supplies, the Commonwealth provided laun-
difficulties, and more than 1,000,000 were dry and dry cleaning services to American
87
procured at a cost of only about $2.50 each, troops stationed in Australia. This pro-
a price much below that in the United curement was not accomplished without
States. Longer and narrower than Ameri- frequent delays, stemming from the unde-
can-made blankets, they nonetheless were veloped state of Australian industries, nor
85
well liked. without accentuating the already serious
Both the shortages of materials needed to shortage of manpower. It involved, too,
comply with U.S. specifications and the the shipment from the West Coast of mate-
special requirements of American forces in rials, component parts, and machines and so
the Southwest Pacific led to the introduc- diminished the saving of cargo space that
tion of several new items. One of these was was the justification of local procurement.
a semi-British battle jacket developed as a Despite these drawbacks general supplies
substitute for the American field jacket. were obtained from Australia in fairly large
Some 270,000 of the new type were pro- volume until the close of 1944. At that time
duced. A mess kit, using malleable steel the availability of these items in greater
hot-dipped with tin in place of aluminum, quantities from the United States, the con-
a very scarce metal in Australia, was also tinued shortage of interisland shipping, and,
made. 8
''
which rose
quantities. Soap, production of forbid the procurement of items that re-
400 percent during the war, was provided quired additional demands on Australian
to the extent of 15,000,000 pounds. More manpower, importation of unfinished ma-
than 33,000,000 feet of rope were also fur- terials, parts, or processing machinery, or
88
nished. The production of so large a quan- construction of new plants. The new limi-
tity demanded the complete reorganization tations had little on the procurement
effect
of the cordage industry, which was suddenly of food, daily becoming scarcer in the
called upon to increase its output several United States. But at the end of 1944 con-
fold. Other products supplied in consider- tract demands for general supplies were
term contracts were entered into early in space was saved by local procurement, and
the Joint Purchasing Board ceased to ship
the war for the purchase of all surplus fresh
all the flour, sugar, and canned goods it
vegetables. After a season or two farmers
bought. By the beginning of 1945 these
discovered that they received proportion-
products filled its warehouses, and the
ately more for their efforts if they grew cab-
board made heavy cuts in its purchases of
bages. The acreage sown in cabbages mul-
all nonperishables. But it continued to ob-
tiplied and their flow to South Pacific troops 98
tain fresh foods. Visiting Auckland in Feb-
increased to so great an extent that eventu- ruary, Quartermaster General Gregory
ally substantial quantities were dumped at found that about 60,000 tons of nonperish-
sea because troops would no longer eat cab- ables as well assome fresh meat were then
bages and these vegetables could not be stored there. He urged that these stocks be
stored satisfactorily in unrefrigerated ware- forwarded to New Guinea and the Philip-
houses. Though vegetable acreage eventu- pines or else sent to the United States.
Either method of shipment, he pointed out,
93
( 1 ) Ltr, JPB to COMSOPAC, 21 Aug 43, sub:
Food from N.Z. during 1944. ORB USAFING AG 05
Hester Rpt, p. 8.
430. (2) Personal Ltr, A. H. Honeyfield, Manager, w Ltr, JPB to CG SOS SPA, 9 May 44. ORB
Internal Marketing Division, New Zealand Govern- USAFINC AG 334.
ment, to Dr. Lawrence V. Burton, 30 Jun 44, sub: "7
Hist of USAFISPA, pp. 388 89.
Vegetable Sups. ORB ABCOM P&C 432.
08
(1) Rpt, n. s., 5 Jan 45, sub: Redeployment
w ORB USAFINC AG
Ltr, Maj Maynard A. Joslyn to CG Base Sec 7, in N. Z. 319.1.(2) Personal
26 Feb 45, sub: Food Proc in N.Z. ORB ABCOM Ltr, Gen Gregory to Maj Gen Carl A. Hardigg, 4
P&C 400.12. Feb 45. DRB AGO ASF File 2A.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 127
would relieve the shortage of fresh meat and procurement. 102 Practically all the fresh
canned vegetables that had developed in meats and vegetables consumed in the South
the United States because of heavy ship- Pacific came from New Zealand, even
ments to American troops overseas and to though that country furnished less than half
civilians in liberated territories." of all the subsistence consumed in that com-
difficult to carry out the recommendations Nowhere else in the Pacific could Quar-
in their entirety since equitable allocation termaster supplies be procured in as wide
of vessels between the active western Pa- a range as in Australia and New Zealand.
cific and the inactive South Pacific was im- The few items obtained locally outside these
possible, and the New Zealand Government countries consisted almost entirely of food-
was reluctant to sanction large shipments Only on Oahu was such procurement
stuffs.
to points outside the South Pacific Area. In of any real significance; here sufficient fresh
spite of a few substantial movements to ac- and canned pineapples, pineapple juice,
tive operational centers in mid- 1945, much granulated sugar, cane syrup, and other
food remained in Auckland storage when sugar products were obtained to fill mid-
hostilities ended.
101 Pacific needs for these goods. When the lo-
cal supply of meats and vegetables in Hawaii
In spite of the fact that the full utilization
exceeded civilian requirements, as it did at
of New Zealand resources was impossible
certain seasons, those items were also ac-
after the closing months of 1944, supply
quired but never in quantities ample enough
movements from that country in 1943 and
to form more than a small part of area re-
most of 1944 prevented the shortage of bot-
quirements. More important was the pro-
toms from becoming worse. During the curement of coffee, which sufficed to supply
whole war the Joint Purchasing Board the forces in the Hawaiian group.
104
habitants, most of whom were engaged in possession of territory that in peacetime had
nickel mining, it normally had little surplus helped supply the American forces stationed
food. Coffee was abundant, however, and there. But the Philippines of the war's clos-
quartermasters set up a coffee-roasting plant
ing months were islands devastated by the
that at times furnished as much as 75 per- contending armies. They were unable to pro-
cent of the daily issue. Since farmers had vide for themselves adequately, let alone
no modern means of cultivation, arrange- give the United States much economic as-
ments were made whereby the Foreign Eco- sistance. During the reconquest factories,
nomic Administration (FEA), the Ameri- mills, warehouses, ports, even crops, suffered
can civilian agency responsible for the immense damage from bombing, shellfire,
procurement of supplies from foreign looting, and willful destruction by with-
sources, provided technical advice, seeds, drawing Japanese. To restore production,
fertilizers, and and maintained
insecticides seeds and agricultural plants as well as in-
pools of tractors, plows, and seeders. In re- dustrial equipment had to be imported, and
turn for these services approved farmers of- mills and warehouses repaired and in some
fered their surplus produce for sale to Quar- 109
cases rebuilt.
termaster collection points. 106
In spite of these hindrances to the quick
The were the third most important
Fijis
acquisition of supplies, General MacAr-
source of supply in the South Pacific, pro-
thur's headquarters in October 1944 au-
viding up to 30 June 1 945 about $6,382,000
thorized a procurement organization in the
worth of food under reverse lend-lease agree-
Philippines modeled on that in Australia.
ments. 107 Procurement in other island groups The General Purchasing Board operated
was unimportant. In a few instances tropical pretty much as did the corresponding board
products were obtained by barter with the in Brisbane and Sydney while the Philip-
local populations. Tobacco, pipes, twine, pine Commonwealth performed functions
fishing equipment, pocket knives, soap, similar to those carried out by the Australian
105
Government. The immediate task of the
Ibid.
,0
" ( Ltr, I Island Comd to BEW, 4 Jul
new organization was the purchase of com-
1 )
43,
sub: Vegetable Growing. ORB modities, not so much for American soldiers
USAFINC 432' AG
(2) Ltr, SOS SPA to SvC Noumea, 23 Jul 43, as for destitute civilians and Filipino em-
sub: Proc of Coffee. ORB USAFINC AG 435. (3)'
Rpt,
New
n. s., Dec 43 (?), sub: Vegetable Growing in
108
( 1 ) Ltr, QM USASOS to CQM USAFFE, 25
107
Caledonia. ORB USAFINC AG 432. Mar 43, sub: Foraging Parties. ORB AFWESPAC
G-4 Sec, SPBC, XII Bimonthly Lend-Lease QM 403.3. (2) QM
USASOS Tech Memo 44, Jul
Rpt, 1 Jul-31 Aug 45, Sec. III. ORB USAFINC 43, sub: Bartering in Pac Islands.
AG 319.1. 109
Hist of Ping Div ASF, V, 73-104.
LOCAL PROCUREMENT IN THE PACIFIC 129
ployees of the Army. Procurement of Quar- islands. Unfortunately, only a few ounces
termaster supplies was rendered doubly dif- could be procured for each American
111
ficultby the stipulation that buying should soldier.
not cause hardship to the Philippine people,
a requirement that automatically precluded Army Farms
the purchase of such scarce items as beef,
In addition to obtaining supplies in the
pork, fish, and dairy prod-
chickens, eggs,
ucts. Another hampering stipulation was commercial centers of the Pacific areas, the
the requirement that the Commonwealth QMC attempted to increase the amount of
local procurement by fostering wherever
schedule of permissible maximum prices be
strictlyadhered to. This policy effectively practicable the operation of Army vegetable
barred procurement of sugar, fruits, and farms. These projects would, it was hoped,
vegetables, for these commodities were han- furnish fresh provisions for local, particu-
dled almost exclusively on the flourishing larly hospital, consumption. In the Central
Pacific the coral soil did not lend itself to
black market where they commanded exor-
bitant prices far exceeding those officially agricultural production, but below the
allowed. Yet enough food and cigarettes equator more propitious conditions permit-
were obtained to supply the wants of Fili- ted the establishment of farms at some of
pino guerrillas and civilian employees of the island bases. Smaller tracts, dubbed
the United States.
110 "gardens," were occasionally cultivated by
begun to improve, and it became possible A host of troubles plagued both base and
to buy a few supplies for American troops.
unit enterprises. Limited in size, most of
Two large breweries, whose equipment and them produced hardly enough vegetables to
raw materials were provided by the QMC, supply nearby hospitals. 112 In some areas sat-
furnished beer to post exchanges, while re- isfactory cultivation hinged upon irrigation,
cently repairedManila plants supplied soap yet few of the smaller islands had a depend-
and those traditional Philippine products, able water supply. The absence of approved
rope and cordage. At this time the Pro- tables of organization and equipment for
curement Division, operating in the Philip- agricultural projects further hampered cul-
pine Base Section, reported that it had ob- tivation by making it difficult to obtain agri-
tained avocados, papayas, camotes, and cultural machines and insecticides and by
pineapples but that black market prices in necessitating theemployment of islanders
general still prevented the acquisition of having no knowledge of vegetable cultiva-
enough fresh vegetables to feed even the tion. Even managers of farms often lacked
ings, begun on a small scale early in 1943, alcanal, second; and those in the northern
were designed to determine what fruits and Solomons, third.
vegetables grew best on the island. In Feb- As the number of troops throughout the
ruary 1944, owing to the rapid rise in troop Solomons area declined steadily after Feb-
strength in the Solomons, the project was ruary 1945, the number of acres under cul-
put on a mass-production basis. By Septem- tivation on Guadalcanal correspondingly
ber, 3 officers and about 75 enlisted men and fell. By June it had shrunk to about 425.
250 local laborers were cultivating 1,800 Other South Pacific farms located on Es-
acres, approximately half the total area piritu Santo, Efate, Bougainville, New
then tilled by the armed forces in the entire Georgia, and New
Caledonia at their peak
cultivated all together between 1,000 and
South Pacific. The next six months consti-
1,200 acres. Unit gardens added still an-
tuted the period of maximum production. 118
other 400 or 500 acres.
Since a high yield in a short span of time was
Before the recovery of the Philippines the
the main objective, no effort was made to
Southwest Pacific Area conducted only a
11:1
Rpt,
Lt Joseph F. Kusek, 9 Sep 43, sub:
1st 1 10-acre farm at Port Moresby and small,
1,4
ORB AFWESPAC
Agricultural Survey. 403. QM ephemeral projects at Dobodura, Oro Bay,
1) 1st Lt Curtis
( H. Dearborn, History of
Quartermaster Farm, San Miguel, Tarlac, P. I., 20 and other places in New Guinea. At the
Apr 46. (2) Ltr, SvC Espiritu Santo to SOS SPA,
18 Nov
43, sub: Vegetable Project. ORB USA- m (l) Hester Rpt, pp. 14-16. (2) Hq USAF
FINC 430. (3) Ltr, QM Svc
for Base Comdr Base Guadalcanal, Final Close-Out Rpt, pp. 16-17.
D, 9 Dec 43, sub: Native Labor. ORB Base D 117
Hq USAF Guadalcanal, Final Close-out Re-
291.2. (4) Ltr, QM INTERSEC for CQM USA- port, Exhibit 11. This exhibit lists the specific vari-
SOS, 14 Dec 43, sub: Farming at Base D. ORB eties of seeds used on the Guadalcanal farm and in-
AFWESPAC
nr
QM 403. dicates the suitability of each type for use under
'
( 1 ) Ltr, CNO
to BEW, 12 Sep 42. ORB USA- climatic conditions similar to those on the island.
FINC AG 334. (2) Ltr, JPB to COMSOPAC, 12 118
(1 ) G-4 Periodic Rpt, 4 Nov 44, p. 7. ORB
Jan 43, sub: Exploitation of SPA Bases. DRB AGO Espiritu Santo AG 319.1. (2) Hist of SOS SPA,
Drawer 374 (A46-305). 1 Apr-30 Jun 44, pp. 25-26.
wr*&SSB*y^£^^£itf
QUARTERMASTER FARMS on Guadalcanal (above) and Espintu Santo (below) were
among many such projects in the South Pacificfurnishing fresh vegetablesfor the Army.
132 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
height of its productivity in September and ing been harvested in the previous four
121
October 1944 the Port Moresby enterprise weeks.
harvested in each month more than 00,000 1 The reasonably satisfactory results
pounds of vegetables, mostly of the varieties achieved by the San Miguel venture dem-
grown on Guadalcanal. During this period onstrated that even under relatively unfa-
lettuce was grown in amounts that permit- vorable conditions vegetable farming in the
ted the issuance of one pound a week to each tropics could be moderately productive.
man at the base. With the shift of opera- The comparative success of this project, like
tions to the Philippines the Port Moresby that on Guadalcanal, was attributable to
farm was abandoned, and most of its equip- expert supervision, use of a sizable tract of
ment transferred to the new and larger land, and the employment of a large body
119
project at San Miguel in Luzon. of civilian laborers. Had similar conditions
Started in April 1945 and continued alter prevailed generally on military farms, they
might have become significant sources of
V-J Day, the San Miguel farm occupied
fresh food. Actually, they never attained
part of a large sugar plantation. According
was the large-
more than local importance because they
to its historian the project first
were hastily embarked upon in answer to
scale venture in vegetable production "ever
temporary exigencies rather than in re-
carried out to any degree of success" on
sponse to plans carefully prepared in ad-
12 1
Luzon. Owing '
for a 2,000-acre farm. Only those vegetables farms, and other minor features, the Quar-
them to the limit permitted by their agricul- nished more Quartermaster supplies in parts
tural capacity and internal necessities. By of that theater than did the United States.
wise abandonment of traditional methods of During the entire war local sources provided
buying perishables and by bold substitution nearly 30 percent of Quartermaster items in
of the market center system in the midst of the Southwest Pacific. 122 A procurement sys-
war, the QMC in the Southwest Pacific tem that achieved so remarkable a result
contributed heavily to satisfactory procure- despite all the difficulties inseparable from
ment operations. dealing with suppliers unfamiliar with
Though home sources provided the bulk American requirements and ill equipped to
of Quartermaster items issued in the Pacific, meet vastly increased demands cannot but
this circumstance should not detract from be considered of outstanding merit.
the major importance of local sources. At 122
( 1 ) Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, App.
times in 1942 and 1943 they actually fur- 21. (2) Hester Rpt, p. 3.
CHAPTER VI
5
overseas area adequate stocks, the War De- tine replacement demands.
partment determined for each theater the In the Southwest Pacific each of these
amount of reserve stores it needed to replace reserves consisted of a 90-day supply, and
supplies that units brought overseas with both together constituted what was called
them and to maintain a margin of safety. the "maximum reserve." As the South Pa-
These reserves, varying from theater to cific Area's greater proximity to the West
theater with their diverse requirements, Coast enabled it to obtain quicker deliveries
were expressed in terms of "days of supply," than the Southwest Pacific Area, its operat-
one day's supply being the amount needed ing reserve was only a 60-day supply and its
to fill the replacement demands of a theater maximum reserve only a 150-day supply.
for one day. In both areas the distinction between the
War Department directives of early 1942 emergency and the operating levels became
established a 90-day level for Quartermaster blurred in practice. The tendency, particu-
stocks in the Southwest Pacific. These in- larly in regions with few well-established
structions did not make it clear whether bases, was to treat all stores as available for
supplies on order or in the hands of troops either routine or emergency issue and to
were to be included in the authorized re- make the maximum reserve the actual op-
serves. Headquarters, USAFIA, assuming erating reserve. Insofar as the concept of an
that such supplies were to be included, emergency reserve had reality, it was in-
found that under this interpretation the long creasingly as a stockage held for the use
delays in forwarding shipments of Quarter- of task forces incombat operations.
master cargoes from the West Coast made Until the last year and a half of the war,
Quartermaster supplies on order so large a both emergency and operating reserves of
part of the permissible stock level that stores Quartermaster items in the Southwest Pa-
actually in the Southwest Pacific were likely cific continued to be based generally on a 90-
to be inadequate to furnish a suitable day level. Lower levels were set for items that
margin of safety. For that reason it rec- were not issued regularly but only under un-
ommended that the total of allowable usual conditions. Thus field rations, con-
Quartermaster levels be doubled to a 180- sumption of which depended upon the vary-
day supply. The War Department not only ing conditions that governed the supply of
did this; it went further and definitely ex- regular A rations in the field, particularly in
cluded from the reserves all supplies on combat operations, were stocked in accord-
order or in the hands of troops. It also di- ance with rough estimates of probable con-
vided the reserve into two parts: one, an sumption during a 180-day period. The
"emergency or minimum reserve," and the maximum reserve for B rations was a 144-
other, an "operating reserve." The emer- day supply; for C rations, a 24-day supply;
and for D rations, a 1 2-day supply. Some-
6
gency reserve was composed mostly of sup-
plies stored in ports and depots. In theory
it was used to meet abnormally large re-
5
(1) Ltr, AG 400 (1-31-42) MSC-D-M to CG
USAFIA, 2 Feb 42, sub: Sup of USAFIA. (2)
placement needs stemming from tactical op- MC-SP-M CG AGF
Ltr, AG 400 (4-27-42) to et
erations, transportation breakdowns, or the al., 26 Apr 42, sub: Sup of Overseas Depts,
depletion of the "operating reserve." The Theaters, and Separate Bases. (3) Ltr, AG 400
(7-11-42) MS-SPOPS, 20 Jul 42, sub: Overseas
latter reserve, stored in all echelons of sup-
Sup Levels. All in ORB AFWESPAC AG 400.
ply, contained the items needed to fill rou- 6
QM
SWPA Hist, II, 19, 22-23.
36 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
times special circumstances required the es- The War Department at the same time
tablishment of levels higher than those nor- formally redefined the emergency level as
mally authorized. The seasonal character of a reserve specifically designated for combat
the canning industry and the impossibility of forces. Stockage of this reserve "in echelon,"
deliveringcanned foods at a uniform rate it declared, envisioned "the assembly of ade-
throughout the year, for example, made it quate supplies immediately behind combat
necessary to permit stockage of more than operations to insure a constant flow."
9
formally authorized amounts of these foods Under this definition the emergency reserve
at peak production periods. 7 could no longer be considered available for
—
During 1944 two factors the vastly in- any unforeseen needs that might arise except
10
creased requirements brought about by the those connected with combat operations.
invasion of the European Continent and the As 1944 advanced, the procurement of
growing shortage of supplies of all sorts became more
supplies in the United States
—
throughout the world compelled the War and more difficult, and in December the
Department to lower authorized operating War Department again reduced Quarter-
reserves for Quartermaster items. In Janu-
master stock levels. By this time Pacific quar-
ary the build-up for the Normandy landings
termasters themselves considered a reduction
forced a reduction in the Quartermaster op-
of authorized stocks necessary, for mate-
erating reserves in all Pacific areas to a 30-
rials consigned to advanced supply points
day level. In the Southwest Pacific and
could not always be stocked there and had
South Pacific Areas emergency reserves,
to be diverted to rear bases where they were
which were becoming comparatively more
not needed and where storage space was al-
important as the scope of tactical operations
ready at a premium. 11 In any event increased
widened, were reduced only to a 75-day level
shipments direct from the West Coast to the
for food and petroleum products, or two and
island bases made further reductions of per-
a half times the operating reserves for these
missible levels feasible as well as desirable.
supplies.Emergency reserves for clothing,
In the Southwest Pacific the total reserve,
equipage, and general supplies were actually
operating and emergency, for food, cloth-
lifted to a 120-day level, this high figure
ing, and general supplies was set at a 90-
being set because deliveries from the West
day supplv. As compared with January fig-
Coast were often held up by low shipping
ures, this represented a 15-day reduction for
priorities. In Hawaii the level for food and
subsistence and a drastic 60-day cut for
petroleum products was a 30-day supply and
clothing, equipage, and general supplies.
for clothing, equipage, and general supplies,
The reserve for petroleum products was
a 60-day supply. For forward areas in the
placed at an 85-day level, a decrease of only
Central Pacific, the corresponding figures 12
20 days.
were a 60-day and a 90-day supply. 8
" Ibid.
7
Ltr, AG 400 (8 Jul 44) OB-S-SPOPI-M, 10 "'QM SWPA Hist, V, 9.
Jul 44, sub: Overseas Sup Levels. ORB AFWES- 11
Min, Conf of Gen and Sp Staff Sec USASOS,
PAC AG 400.23. 22 Aug
44, pp. 1-2. ORB AFWESPAC AG 334.
s
Ltr, AG 400 (11 Jan 44) OB-S-E-M, 20 Jan u Ltr, AG
400 (12 Dec 44) OB-S-E-I, 29 Dec
44, sub: Overseas Sup Levels. ORB AFWESPAC 44, sub: Overseas Sup Levels. ORB AFWESPAC
AG 400.23. AG 400.23.
SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES 137
ventory figures. Deliveries from Australian number of soldiers Colonel Cordiner insisted
and New Zealand sources of supply could that the authorized basis was too low to in-
hazards
authorized a troop basis of 125,000 men
repeatedly lowered agricultural
until 1 October and of 150,000 men from
production and because labor and materials
shortages in swiftly expanding industrial
17
(1) Memo, DCS GHQ SWPA for DCS
USAFFE, Subs Demands on Aus-
15 Jan 44, sub:
plants made adherence to production sched- tralia. ORB AFPAC AG 430.2. (2) Ltr, Col R. C.
ules almost impossible. Nor was it possible Kramer, Jt Sup Survey Bd, to CINCSWPA. ORB
AFPAC AG 400.
15
Ltr, 8 Jul 43. ORB AFWESPAC QM 370.43. 18
(1) Barnes Rpt, p. 32. (2) Memo, CQM for
"SOS SPA Memo 173, 23 Oct 44, sub: Stock G-4 USASOS, 2 Aug 43. ORB AFWESPAC AG
Control, QM Sup. 400.
SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES 139
that date to the end of the year. Scarcely pened, the zone of interior and the Pacific
had it taken this action when it lowered the areas used different troop figures, the editing
basis to1 1 0,000 men for requisitions on the and filling of requisitions became a longer
21
zone of interior but, somewhat paradoxi- process.
cally,retained the 150,000-man basis for Troop strength, whether current or pro-
procurement operations in Australia and for jected,was only one element in the calcula-
determining theater supply levels. Since An equally important
tion of requirements.
these levels were based on a larger number element was accurate replacement factors.
of troops than were used for requisitions on These factors were simply numbers ex-
the zone of interior, Quartermaster stocks pressed in fractions or decimals, which rep-
often could not be built up to the authorized resented the replacement need for a single
level and therefore appeared in "a rather issued article during a specific period of
bad light." 19 For this reason Cordiner sug- time. If it was desired to ascertain the re-
gested that the basis for procurement from placements for the shirts of 100,000 troops,
the United States again be lifted to 150,000 each of whom had been two
initially issued
men, a figure that would soon represent the and the replacement factor represent-
shirts,
actual strength of the theater. This change ing a months requirement was .20, total
was made, but at the same time the troop requirements were calculated merely by
basis for theater supply levels was raised to multiplying the 200,000 shirts in the hands
200,000 men. While more supplies could of the troops by .20. Accurate replacement
thus be obtained from home sources, it was factors were particularly needed for clothing
still frequently impossible to bring Quarter- and general supplies, which were not con-
20
master stocks up to authorized levels. sumed with the regularity characteristic of
In December the War Department di- rations and, to a lesser extent, of petroleum
rected that the ports of embarkation edit products. But factors that mirrored wartime
overseas requisitions on the basis of the num- replacement needs with reasonable accuracy
ber of men actually in the theater. This could of course not be obtained before the
development led USASOS to direct that the theaters of operations had developed a body
troop basis for requisitions be set at 135,000 of issue experience. Until well into 1943
men, approximately the number then in both the Pacific areas and the San Francisco
the command, but 15,000 less than the fig- Port of Embarkation utilized OQMG fac-
ure set just a month before. Until authority tors based mainly upon the peacetime issues
was finally granted in the summer of 1944 of the Regular Army in the United States,
for the inclusion in the troop basis of units which, obviously, did not reflect combat
ordered to proceed to the area, requisitions 22
conditions in the tropics.
were based roughly on actual strength, but Fully alive to the need for more accurate
not without considerable discussion between factors, the Pacific areas after mid- 1943
the Pacific areasand the port of embarka- used their accumulating issue experience as
tion concerning what constituted "actual a check on published factors and as a basis
strength. " Whenever, as sometimes hap-
21
( 1 ) Memo, CQM for G-4 USASOS, 22 Dec
19
Memo, CQM for G-4 USASOS, 2 Nov 42, sub: 42, sub: TRB. ORB AFWESPAC AG 400. (2)
TRB for Rqmts. ORG AFWESPAC AG 400. QM SWPA Hist, II, 28-30.
for CQM, Ltr, Rqmts Br Mil Ping Div OQMG to TQMG,
22
20
Memo, G-4 USASOS 30 Nov 42,
same sub. ORB AFWESPAC AG 400. 9 Aug 43. OQMG SWPA 400.
140 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
for the compilation of experience tables. If Pacific requisitions, was authorized to utilize
these tables were to be accurate, a sharp dis- not only its own resources but also those of
tinction had to be drawn between replace- its subports — Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle,
ment and initial issues, but such a distinction Port Rupert (British Columbia), and New
was often impossible since initial issues fre- Orleans — and of its supporting depots,
quently came from the same stocks as did which stocked supplies for movement to the
replacement issues and supply installations Pacific on its call.
seldom distinguished between the two types In the Overseas Supply Division (OSD)
in their stock records. Yet if the War De- at San Francisco, as at other ports of em-
partment was to work out its supply plans barkation, there was a Quartermaster
intelligently, it had to differentiate between Branch, which dealt directly on technical
recurrent and nonrecurrent issues. It there- matters with the OQMG
in Washington.
fore insisted that theaters of operations ex- That branch had functions analogous to
clude initial issues from replacement statis- those of a zone of interior depot, being re-
tics. But its efforts to apply this principle had sponsible for completing Quartermaster
slight success in the Pacific because the overseas requisitions and for storing and in-
haste accompanying initial issues and the specting supplies handled in transit at the
scarcity of qualified accountants did not per- port. In addition to editing requisitions to
mit careful bookkeeping. For this reason see that the quantities ordered complied
Quartermaster experience figures were with prescribed stock levels and allowances
23
never very accurate. of equipment and supplies and that they
Because of the many uncertain elements were not excessive in relation to the prospec-
that entered into the preparation of requisi- tive troop strength of the requesting area,
tions — incorrect doubt as to the
inventories, the Quartermaster Branch ordered the
basis of troop strength, doubt as to the pre- needed items from the port's "initial" or
cise quantities procurable from local sources, "primary" supply sources, which were as-
inability to forecast combat, shipping, and certained from OQMG
charts showing the
storage losses, and lack of wholly suitable particular installations that served as pri-
—
replacement factors requisitions mirrored mary and secondary sources of supply for
Quartermaster requirements only approxi- each major item required at San Francisco
mately. Yet, usually, they were not too far and its subports. These installations ordi-
from the mark. Of more importance was the narily were interior storage depots, but the
prompt shipment of requisitioned items port might be a supply source since
itself
from the United States.
it stocked limited quantities of Quartermas-
or some other western installation usually ordinating overseas problems but included
served as the primary supply source. For such purely local operations as storing Quar-
New Orleans the sources were southern or termaster stocks kept at the port for overseas
middle western depots. The Quartermaster shipment, compiling stock records, and fol-
Branch instructed the supplying installation lowing up orders on supporting installations
to forward the item to the port that it des- to see that supplies were delivered as
27
ignated as shipper; it also indicated the promptly as possible. Owing to limited stor-
date by which the item had to arrive in age space, port stocks were confined to fast-
order to meet sailing schedules. If the pri- moving which a ninety-day work-
items, of
mary source could not furnish the required ing supply, based on both past and prospec-
item, it forwarded the order to a secondary tive shipments, was normally prescribed.
25
source for completion. The Quartermaster Branch submitted req-
Throughout the war the Quartermaster uisitions for the initial stocks of these items
Branch, like other technical service branches direct to the OQMG; once that office had
at the port, suffered from an organizational filled these orders, it automatically replen-
system that assigned to it not only too few ished supplies on the basis of the port's pe-
officers in general but too few officers of riodical stock status reports.
28
field grade who could handle important Hampered by its small staff and nu-
problems with promptness and authority. merous functions and the complications
In this respect the San Francisco branch introduced by the receipt of requisitions
was worse off than its sister branch at the from three major areas, the Quartermaster
New York Port of Embarkation. In June Branch in San Francisco could not always
1945, when the volume of supplies moving edit overseas orders promptly nor maintain
to the Pacific was fast nearing the peak as complete records of actions taken on req-
levels earlier handled at New York, Quar- uisitions as were needed for effective con-
termaster officers in the Overseas Supply trol over the supplies flowing into the port.
Division at San Francisco consisted of only
Its follow-up action was sporadic. Gener-
one major, three captains, and seven lieu-
ally speaking, it took no immediate action
tenants. At a corresponding period in the when a supplying depot indicated its in-
activities of the New York Port the Quar- ability to deliver items within the stipu-
termaster Branch, Overseas Supply Divi- lated time; instead, the branch waited for
sion, had one lieutenant colonel, three ma- thirty days after the deadline. Had a more
jors, six captains, and twelve lieutenants. aggressive follow-up system been feasible, it
Civilian employees at New York, too, were might have substantially diminished the
proportionately more numerous. 26 The number of tardy deliveries.
29
branch at San Francisco also suffered from The inadequate organization of the Quar-
the fact that its functions were not confined, termaster Branch was only one of several
as were those of the branch at New York, causes for slow completion of requisitions.
to supply policy, editing requisitions, and co-
27
Ibid., pp. 9-10.
26
WDSB 10-182, Apr 45, sub: QM Sup Sources. w Ltr, CG ASF to TQMG
et al., 29 Nov 43, sub:
28
Control Div OCT ASF, 15 Jun 45, Survey of Stockage at SFPE. OQMG
400.
Pac Sup, pp. 24-25. OCT HB POA. 29
Survey of Pac Sup, pp. 24-25.
142 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Railroad and storage deficiencies were also stocks at supporting depots,though generally
During 1942 most Quar-
in part responsible. meeting prescribed levels, were still too small
termaster stocks for shipment through San to match demands, and the other was
Francisco were held in the Utah General the slowness of the OQMG in handling req-
Depot at Ogden, nearly 1,000 miles to the uisitions that the port had forwarded for
east. Because of the distance between the assignment to eastern and middle western
two installations and the fact that shipments supply points. That office took, on the aver-
tc and from three other depots at Ogden age, twenty-two days to assign such requisi-
congested the thin railway network leading tions; it sometimes distributed an order for
to the West Coast, Quartermaster supplies among
a single item several depots. The
could not always be delivered promptly. On board found that the completion of a spe-
several occasions this situation led to short- cially assigned requisition took, on the aver-
ages in the food stocks at the port. When age, 116 days, or 26 days more than the
tardy deliveries continued into 1943, the 32
theoretical limit. Partly on the basis of the
newly warehouses of the California
built
board's findings the OQMG established a
Quartermaster Depot at its substation in special organization for handling overseas
Tracy, about 45 miles southeast of Oakland, requisitions and restricted as far as possible
were utilized for overseas stocks in order
the dispersion of orders for single items
to bring them closer to the port, and the among depots.
responsibilities of the Ogden installation for The provision of more space for Quar-
storing such stocks were substantially re-
termaster overseas supplies posed serious dif-
30
duced.
ficulties, for there was hardly any unallotted
In the autumn of 1943 a special board storage space in the western third of the
of officers was appointed to study the prob-
country. Eventually, 900,000 square feet
lem of "delinquent" requisitions, defined as were assigned to the QMC in Umatilla
those which, after ninety days, were still
Ordnance Depot at Hermiston, Oreg.
not ready for shipment from San Fran-
250,000 square Navajo Ordnance
feet in
1
cisco.' It found that, in October 1943, 5.1 Depot at Flagstaff, Ariz. and a like amount
;
pot,and the other depots increasingly be- Roland C. Batchelder, an OQMG observer
came feeders for the port of embarkation. 33 then in the Southwest Pacific, estimated that
These changes, while they made for more it took "from 120 days to infinity" to get
efficient use of existing resources, left un- Quartermaster supplies to that area. He
touched several factors that delayed the fill- found that as a result some Quartermaster
ing of orders. Even after Quartermaster stocks had been depleted. 33 Deliveries to
supplies arrived in port, thus theoretically the South Pacific and Central Pacific Areas
completing a requisition, they, along with were slightly faster, taking on an average
many other military items, were often held thirty to sixty days less than those to their
up by the need for special loadings for im- sister area.
pending tactical operations and by the diffi- Early in 1 944 several large Southwest Pa-
culty of equitably allotting the limited num- cific Area requisitions were delinquent. In
ber of bottoms to fifty or more receiving March only 5,000,000 of 12,000,000 rations
points located thousands of miles from the ordered nine months before had been deliv-
West Coast and at considerable distances ered. The delay was caused mostly by the
from each other. Low priorities, assigned to high shipping priorities held by the Euro-
Quartermaster items by Pacific area com- pean Theater of Operations, then busily pre-
manders, constituted another important paring for the Normandy landings, and by
cause for delayed movements of supplies. the fact that the War Department, expect-
This factor, Colonel Cordiner asserted, was ing Australia to fill most of the Southwest
responsible for the fact that Quartermaster Pacific requirements for food, did not al-
supplies often could not be loaded even ways have enough rations stored on the West
when they were on dock awaiting move- Coast to meet large demands promptly. In
ment. "By the time the next sailing oc- May 1944 an order for 10,000,000 rations
curs," he added, "other high priority items led the War Department to request that it
roll inand Quartermaster supplies still re- be told informally well in advance if large
main [unloaded]." M These unfavorable orders were about to be submitted officially.
conditions affected clothing and general Such prior information, it pointed out,
supplies in particular, and in November would enable it to begin early planning for
36
1942 large quantities of such supplies requi- the shipment of the necessary supplies.
sitioned in early May were undelivered It was not merely requisitions involving
though most of them had by then arrived large quantities that remained uncompleted
in San Francisco. Colonel Cordiner esti- for fairly lengthy periods. Requisitions for
mated that four to six months were required small quantities, too, often remained un-
37
(1) Ltr, CQM
to QM
Base Sec 3, 19 Dec 43, 39
For a fuller treatment of the shipping situation
sub: Subs Shpmts from U.S. ORB AFWESPAC 1944 and early 1945, see Chester Wardlow,
in late
QM 400.226. (2) Conf, Base Comdrs USASOS, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Or-
24-26 Mar 44. DRB AGO. ganization, and Operations, UNITED STATES
38
Conf, Staff Conf Hq USASOS, 15 Mar 44, ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951),
pp. 9a-9c. ORB AFWESPAC QM 337. pp. 291-98.
SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES 145
the Southwest Pacific Area were being held grounded on automatic supply as well as
in interior depots for future movement, 80 area requisitions. Automatic supply meant,
percent or more of the Quartermaster sup- simply, that ports of embarkation at regular
plies earmarked for the Pacific Ocean Areas intervals shipped selected items in quanti-
were being loaded on schedule. 40 ties derived from their own estimates of
On the whole, belated shipments re- future overseas requirements. This system
sulted from causes beyond the control of was confined in the main to articles con-
either port or depots and often from causes sumed at a fairly constant rate. A reason-
originating in the Pacific commands them- ably accurate estimate of future needs for
selves. Such shipments, it is true, contrib- these articles could, it was thought, be pre-
uted to the unbalanced stockages that pared merely on the basis of overseas troop
characterized Quartermaster activities in strength and the amounts already shipped.
the Pacific, but they constituted merely one Of Quartermaster supplies food items
all
try to draw up accurate requisitions in the Since the full directive did not reach
opening months of their activities when — Colonel Cordiner he was left in doubt
they were undermanned and had few means whether clothing, equipment, and general
of accurately estimating either stocks on supplies were to be shipped automatically.
hand or supplies necessary to maintain es- His efforts to clarify this question brought
tablished levels —
War Department pro- <-J
declared that automatic shipments of cloth- By June the availability of more and
ing, equipage, and general supplies were more Australian food rendered the auto-
being made on the basis of 78,000 men in matic system almost unworkable for that
Australia and 17,000 men in New Cale- class of supply. The only ration components
donia. Finally, on 12 June, more than four then needed in quantity from San Francisco
months had been
after the original directive were coffee, tea, cocoa, canned fish, tobacco,
issued, the War Department radioed that and a few other nonperishable elements of
47
these supplies were being furnished only on the B ration. The position of clothing and
44
requisition. Meanwhile, to be certain of general supply stocks was less satisfactory
receiving such items, Colonel Cordiner because of the prolonged uncertainty as to
early in May had submitted requisitions whether these items were being furnished
based on the requirements of 150,000 men. automatically and because shipments made
This confused situation contributed to a in January and February were based on
delay of some weeks in building up essential 78,000 men, whereas the area had actually
45
reserves. supplied more than that number owing to
By the 1942 it was obvious
late spring of its responsibility for furnishing many items
that automatic supply was not working well to the South Pacific Area. For a time cloth-
in the Southwest Pacific. Excesses appeared ing and general supplies became so scarce
in some stocks and shortages in others. In that issues were adequate only because some
part these imbalances resulted from the diffi- units arrived with replacement stocks and
culties encountered at the San Francisco distress cargo furnished substantial quanti-
Port of Embarkation in calculating replace- ties of needed articles.
48
ment needs correctly. Marked variations In the South Pacific, as in the Southwest
in actual troop strength figures from those Pacific, automatic supply did not prove en-
used by the port distorted its estimates, and tirely satisfactory. The longer the system
further distortions were introduced by un- lasted the more unmanageable became the
predictable day-by-day fluctuations in the shortages and excesses. The fact that short-
consumption rate and by the impossibility ages were the same at most supply centers
of forecasting losses from ship sinkings, air precluded the better balancing of stocks by
attacks, inferior packing, unsuitable storage, using excess accumulations of one center for
and widespread pilferage. Most of all, stocks filling the shortages of another. In January
were unbalanced because of increased de- 1943 the Quartermaster, SOS SPA, sub-
mitted special requisitions on San Francisco
liveries of supplies bought in Australia and
to bring all his stocks up to prescribed levels,
New Zealand. As the port of embarkation
lacked complete information regarding such 49
( 1 ) Adm Ping Com USAFIA, Mar 42,
Min, Jt
pp. 2-3. ORB AFWESPAC QM 430.2. (2) Memo,
" (1) QM SWPA Hist, II, 18-19. (2) Control Maj R. W. Hughes for Lt Col Edward F. Shepherd,
Div ASF, Development of the U.S. Supply Base in OCQM USASOS, 15 Jun 42. ORB AFWESPAC
Australia, p. 44. QM 400.
"Rad, AGWAR (Somervell) to USAFIA, 28 17
Memo
cited n. 46(2).
Apr 42. DRB AGO. **
Questionnaire,
( 1 )
HQ
USASOS, 29 May 42,
,r
'Rad, AGWAR (Somervell) to USAFIA, 10 sub: Sup Spstem. ORB AFWESPAC 400. (2) QM
June 42. DRB AGO. QM SWPA Hist, II, 20.
SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES 147
but several badly needed shipments did not stowed in order to secure maximum carry-
49
arrive until July. Not until the following ing capacity. Since solid stowing was the
month did requisitioning wholly supplant primary aim, items for different destinations
50
the automatic system. and items of the various technical services
were unavoidably intermingled. To make
matters worse, overworked stevedores some-
Shipment of Organizational
times had to move cargo directly from in-
Equipment and Supplies
coming freight cars and hurriedly dump it
51
The movement of organizational items into the holds of waiting vessels.
constituted a special form of automatic These practices made the delivery of the
companied by the items needed for initial Noumea, New Caledonia, reported in late
issues and by a sixty-day replacement stock April 1942 that shipments were so mixed
of Quartermaster items. This method of that whole cargoes had to be discharged in
prevented the movement of organizational led General MacArthur late in May 1943 to
supplies in thesame convoy with the out- inform the San Francisco Port of Embarka-
tion that for the time being all unit-marked
going troops and forced the dispersion of
supplies would be stored and, like other
such cargo among other convoys, some of 53
supplies, be issued only on requisition.
which did not leave the West Coast for days
To Pacific quartermasters the ideal solu-
or even weeks after the troops had sailed.
tion for this confused situation was "unit-
The port was also often obliged to resort loading," that is, the transportation of all
to "commercial loading" of organizational organizational cargo on the ship that car-
supplies — that is, the cargo was solidly
SWPA, pp. 270-
51
Masterson, Transportation in
4,1
( 1 ) Memo, TQMG for ACofS for Opns SOS, 75.
27 Nov 42, sub: New Caledonia G-4 Rpt. OQMG 51
( 1 ) Personal Ltr, Lt Col Joseph H. Burgheim
POA 319.1. (2) Memo, QM SOS SPA for D/SS, toCol Cordiner, 29 Apr 42. (2) Personal Ltr, Col
21 Jun 43.ORB USAFINC G-4 430. Burgheim to Gen Gregory, 24 Feb 43. Both in
''"Ltr, AG 430 (4-23-43) OB-S-SPOPI toCG OQMG POA 319.25.
SPA, May 2 43, sub: Subs Sup, SPA. ORB M Rad,
CG SWPA to CG SFPOE, 27 May 43.
USAFINC AG 400. ORB AFWESPAC QM 400.
148 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ried the troops, or at least in the same con- clared Capt. Robert D. Orr, OQMG
voy, but this solution in general proved im- observer, "it is almost an impossibility that
practicable. The Transportation Corps the men and would show up
the equipment
directed the port of embarkation to apply at the same port same time unless they
at the
55
this method of loading as far as possible, but are together." This state of affairs, though
variations in the carrying capacity of troop exasperating to quartermasters whose stocks
transports and in the amount of unit sup- might be unbalanced, was under the cir-
plies and equipment were too great to per- cumstances unavoidable.
mit it as a standard practice. Since relatively In the last two years of hostilities delays in
more troops than supplies could be carried the arrival of organizational cargo grew
in a convoy, complete unit-loading was shorter, but some and other organi-
divisions
usually feasible only if some organizations zations — from Australia as well as from the
were left behind. Later in the war port con- —
United States continued to reach New
ditions in San Francisco at times allowed Guinea without essential equipment. 5 Fre- *5
"selective loading," that is, the segregation quently, even tents and cots, indispensable
of shipments by technical service and by to the proper housing of troops, were not
general class of supply. Under this system available for three weeks or more after units
of stowage, space was left in holds of vessels had arrived. In such cases, quartermasters
so that items could be taken off without in the base sections where the affected units
moving the whole cargo. But the system was landed issued these items from area replace-
so time-consuming, tied up so many vessels, ment At times when many organ-
reserves.
and so aggravated the shortage of bottoms izations were arriving in New Guinea, these
54
that it could be used only sparingly. reserves were indeed used mainly not for
In many instances the large number of the replacement purposes for which they
Pacific ports receiving supplies continued to had been established but for initial issue to
57
force the shipment of consignments for two incoming units. Yet cots and tentage were
or more ports on the same vessel but with always in heavy replacement demand be-
the whole cargo to be discharged at a single cause tropical mildewing hastened their de-
port. The latter procedure was particularly terioration. They were needed in the first
likely to be adopted if there was a large place because of the absence of permanent
quantity of high-priority supplies for one structures and the necessity of protection
port and a small quantity of low-priority from the torrid sun, torrential downpours,
supplies for another port. In that event all deep mud, and disease-bearing insects.
the cargo was likely to be discharged When large initial issues were added to these
wherever the high-priority supplies were normal replacement requirements, acute
consigned. Quartermaster items destined for
M Ltr Gen Nov
the Milne Bay base were repeatedly landed 32, Capt Orr to Doriot, 13 44.
OQMG SWPA 319.25.
at Finschhafen; in this event, distribution of H QM SWPA Hist, V, 44.
57
Quartermaster items from Milne Bay might ( 1 ) Personal Ltr, Col Cordiner to Col D. H.
shortages occasionally appeared. These sion of most tents to the ETO for its pre-
would not have been particularly trouble- invasion supply build-up, even this arrange-
some if units had returned the tents and cots ment could not always be followed. 60
when their own equipment finally arrived, Throughout most of 1944 units in New
58
but they seldom made such returns. Guinea were staged with inadequate tent-
Late delivery of other types of organiza- age or with tentage that would normally
tional equipment also inconvenienced units. have been discarded as worthless. In the
Shortages of mess equipment, for example, spring the arrival of a whole division and
impaired the ability of units to feed them- smaller organizations with but limited
selves properly, but it did not make as deep quantities of clothing and equipment mate-
inroads on area stocks as did belated receipt rially complicated supply conditions At .
of textile materials. In June 1943 the Base Finschhafen stocks of tents, cots, jungle
Quartermaster at Port Moresby reported clothing, trousers, jackets, and socks were
that his stocks were "being daily depleted wholly exhausted. In early April the Base
by initial issues of cots, mosquito bars, and Quartermaster reported that shortages of
other critical items to troops arriving from clothing, equipment, and general supplies
the U.S. and the mainland." He added had reached "alarming proportions." He
that "something drastic will have to be done added that it was "a physical impossibility
to insure that troops either arrive here fully to initially equip task forces or other units
61
equipped or that our stocks be increased at from maintenance stocks."
once to meet their needs." 59 From the standpoint of the QMC, the
Since ships could seldom be totally unit- most unfortunate result of belated deliveries
loaded at San Francisco, General Mac- of organizational cargo was the arrival of
Arthur October 1943 suggested that at
in Quartermaster units without their operat-
least tentage and cots accompany troops de- ing equipment. This deficiency was espe-
parting from the United States. Maj. Gen. cially serious in late 1944, when the cam-
Charles P. Gross, Chief of Transportation, paign for the recovery of the Philippines
replied that converted passenger liners, was beginning and the support of Quarter-
which normally served as troop carriers, did master units was badly needed. In Decem-
not have enough cargo space to accommo- ber, for example, the 156th, 157th, and
date these supplies but that small transports, 158th Bakery Companies landed at Hol-
which had served as freighters in peacetime, landia, but their baking equipment had been
could often stow these items for discharge "shipped to an island in the Pacific Ocean
with organizations. MacArthur then re- areas and no equipment was available with-
quested that, if cots and tents could not ac- in the Theater for issue inasmuch as
. . .
company a unit, they be forwarded before the activation of four Quartermaster bakery
62
the troops embarked. Owing to the diver- companies had depleted" all oven stocks.
nically experienced units were thus often lost tions of established procedures there would
for weeks,and their members were in the be, the War Department maintained, no
main employed as laborers on port jobs. De- need for supplies to accompany units. In-
spite their lack of training for such tasks, sofar as the Quartermaster Corps was con-
these troops carried out essential assign- cerned, it concurred in these recommenda-
ments that the Transportation Corps, suffer- tions with reservations as to the movement
port of combat forces rather than to rear- The new system went into effect on 1 Oc-
area activities. But when these units landed tober. By making what were actually initial
without the tools for carrying out their mis- issue stocks of clothing, equipment, and
sion, it was taken over by organizations op- general supplies part of the authorized re-
erating at busy supply bases. Quartermaster placement reserves, it appreciably eased the
67
pressure on Pacific stocks.
m Rpt, Capt Philip F. Hurt, 22 Jan 45, sub:
( 1 )
"5
Ltr cited n. 55. supply, chiefly from island bases. The Ad-
(1) Ltr, G-4 SWPA
to CG USAFFE, 17 Sep
44, sub: Svc Organizations. ORB USAFFE AG " Rpt, Brig Gen William F. Campbell, 10 Jan 45,
321.2. (2) Rpt, 169thCO QM
Bn, Mbl, 25 Nov 44, OCQM,
sub: Activities of Dec 44, p. 9. DRB
AGO.
sub: Hist, 26 Oct-25 Nov 44. AGO. DRB 07
QM SWPA Hist, V, 9-10.
SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES 151
miralties operation illustrated how costly in erational forces, the "block system of sup-
both time and labor this method of support ply" was developed to simplify and stand-
could be. Supplies for that offensive were ardize at least the provision of replenish-
loaded in San Francisco, discharged and re- ment items needed by operational troops
loaded at Brisbane and again at Oro Bay. after the small stocks accompanying them
Part of the cargo even underwent this waste- on their first landings had been exhausted.
ful procedure a third time at Finschhafen. This system was distinguished by use of West
There were two major reasons for all this Coast ports, rather than inadequate Pacific
rehandling. For one thing, since regular bases, for shipments direct to combat areas
cargoes from the United States and Aus- without rehandling, and, above all, by the
tralia usually contained items for base re- eventual development of various "blocks"
serve stocks as well as for combat operations, of supplies. Each block consisted mainly or
the two groups had to be separated. For wholly of one general supply class, such as
prompt
another, the incessant pressure for food or clothing. All types were based upon
turnabout of freighters made some re- standardized lists of items prepared by the
handling inevitable. Unloading could be technical services, each service determining
averted only by keeping fully laden vessels which of its items, if any, were to be in-
in port for weeks and utilizing them in effect cluded. The quantities of the individual
as floating warehouses —
an unsatisfactory items provided for each type were ordinarily
practice that intensified the scarcity of bot-
expressed in terms of the requirements of
toms on the West Coast. 68 In other respects,
1,000 men for a given period of time and
too, the system of supplying combat areas
could thus be raised or lowered in line with
from Pacificwas defective. Since
bases
the particular requirements of an operation.
bases did not have an adequate number of
Once established, the types could be requi-
service troops, vessels departing for opera-
sitioned from the zone of interior in sup-
tional areas were seldom loaded in a fashion
port of one operation after another simply
that facilitated rapid discharge. Classes of
supply were mixed, and individual items
by submission of the numbers or code names
assigned to the required types. The block
were hard to locate because of the frequent
system thus eliminated to a considerable ex-
inaccuracy of manifests and stowage plans.
tent the tedious process of determining pre-
Among Quartermaster items such essential
supplies as ration components and replace- ciselywhat items and how much of each was
ment parts for warehouse, bakery, and cook- needed for the resupply of each new opera-
tion and of then requisitioning them from
ing equipment were often among those
which could not be found readily. Worst of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.
In some respects the new system was indeed
all, undermanned and overworked bases
were often obliged unloaded low- analogous to automatic supply. It had the
to leave
further advantage of making possible the
priority items, such as clothing. 69
adoption of standard plans for the stowage
In an effort to correct some of these
of each type of block.
weaknesses in the logistical support of op-
Block shipments enabled everyone "from
c8
Min, Base Sec Comdrs Conf, 24-26 Mar 44,
the task force commander to the officer in
pp. 24-25. DRB AGO, ASF Files.
69
Ibid., pp. 26-30. charge of a warehouse or on duty at a dock"
152 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
to ascertain readily from published lists and nage handled at USASOS bases by 15
71
stowage plans "what was on each vessel and percent.
where it was loaded." This advantage, as- By then block ships had become so im-
serted Lt. Col. Fred W. Greene, whose ac- portant in the replenishment of Quarter-
71
QM SWPA Hist, VI, 15.
Sixth Army AdminO 18, 16 Jul 45, Annex I,
70
Greene, QMR, XXVI (January-February QM Plan, p. 2. ORB Sixth Army G-4 560
1947), 36. (Olympic) .
SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES 153
petroleum cargo consisted principally of oils, mediately a wholly acceptable listing of the
greases, kerosene, and range fuel. At first most essential supplies. 76
motor and diesel fuel oil were included, but The standard block vessels in any particu-
as considerable amounts of these items were lar operation carried the same items, an ar-
shipped with the initial assault troops and rangement known as "spread or
balanced
loading." This method of shipment had the
dispensed in bulk by shore installations, they
virtue of distributing risks, forif one vessel
were eventually eliminated.
was sunk, all supplies of the same type were
Sixth Army experience early revealed a
not lost. For this reason standard block ships
need for larger quantities of some items
were utilized mainly for resupply move-
than had been originally carried in standard
ments during the opening stages of an opera-
blocks. was found that more
At Leyte it
tion, when danger from the enemy was
petroleum products and more shoes and greatest. Actually, they were "assault stage
clothing should have been provided. There ships." Leaving the United States on a stag-
was even need for such prosaic articles as gered schedule, they reached their destina-
pencils, ink, typewriters, and writing paper. tion at more or less regular intervals during
To meet these proven requirements, a thirty- the firstmonth or two of a campaign. If
day replacement stock of scarce items of conditions were favorable, they landed their
clothing, footwear, and general supply items cargoes at once ; if unfavorable, they lay off-
which helped promote individual morale shore until called forward for discharge. 76
or organizational efficiency was added to the After standard block ships provided ini-
cargo.
74 tial replacement stores of the most com-
In terms of bulk, petroleum products con- monly used items, "solid block ships," so
called because they usually carried only one
stituted from the outset more than half the
class of supply,brought in most of the items
standard block. Rations formed the next
needed for resupply. Twelve types of these
largest class of supply while clothing and
vessels were developed for Southwest Pacific
general supply items made up a considerably
Area participation in the planned Olympic
smaller part. In June 1944 petroleum prod-
operation. Type B, for example, was to
ucts totaled about 4,800 measurement tons; carry B rations, combat rations, and PX
rations, about 2,500 tons; and clothing and articles; Type C, all kinds of petroleum
general supplies, only about 250 tons. By products in drums, which would be landed
the following February the need for larger early in the operation, when bulk-dispensing
loadings of the latter category was more installations would not yet be functioning;
fully recognized, and it in general consti- Type D, discharging its cargo after the land-
tuted a substantially larger proportion of ing had been secured, was to carry petro-
the cargo. Such variations were unavoidable leum items not handled by bulk installa-
in view of the experimental nature of block tions; and Type E, clothing and general
movements and the inability to develop im- supplies. Altogether the Southwest Pacific
Area developed more than 100 blocks,
7<
(1) Ibid. (2) Min, Base Sec Comdrs Conf,
3-5 Mar 44, pp. 57-59. ORB AFWESPAC AG " Memo, CO Base M for ACofS G-4 Sixth
334. (3) Ltr, CG USASOS CG INTERSEC, 6
to Army, 28 Feb 45. ORB Sixth Army Journal, Vol.
Jul 44, sub: Sup of Alamo Task Forces. ORD III.
ABCOM AG 420. "Ltr cited n. 71.
54 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
which, if properly distributed among the entirely of B rations, of which about 170,-
various sorts of resupply ships, would give 000 were carried a Q-2 ; block, consisting of
almost any desired loading.
77
90,000 rations of the 10-in-l type, 54,000 C
The PacificOcean Areas also developed rations, and 36,000 K rations, or 180,000
a large number of blocks, but they did not combat rations in all, enough to fill the de-
employ a standard block vessel under that mands of 6,000 men for 30-days; a Q-3
name. They did obtain, however, the equiv- block, made up of 100,000 special twenty-
alent of this vessel by carrying on identically ounce rations, based on the customary
loaded freighters all classes of supply except Okinawan diet and intended for civilians
petroleum products, which were handled by made destitute by battle damage; and a Q-4
the Navy. Blocks were based at first on the block, composed of emergency supplies, such
requirements of 1,000 men for 20 days, but as D rations, flight rations, hospital rations,
as the magnitude of operations grew, a 30- and salt tablets, and of a few items always
day period was applied. In Pacific Ocean in heavy demand, such as bread and coffee.
Areas operations from the Gilberts to Iwo Four blocks were set aside for clothing, foot-
Jima the principal Quartermaster blocks wear, and general supplies of all sorts —
were those designated A, AA, A-l, A-2, A-3, Q-5 block, providing clothing, tentage,
A-4, B, and C-l. Block A consisted of in- laundry supplies, and shoe repair equip-
dividual and organizational equipment; ment, all of which had formerly been fur-
block AA, of B rations, combat rations, and nished by A-l, A-2, and A-3 blocks; a Q-6
ration accessory packs; block A-l, of a wide block, devoted to field range repair parts;
selection of clothing and general utility ar- and two special blocks, consisting, respec-
ticles; block A-2, of laundry supplies; block tively, of PX items and miscellaneous spare
79
A-3, of shoe repair supplies; block A-4, of parts. Enough supplies to last 30 days were
field range repair parts; block B, of B ra- to accompany the assault troops going to
and block C-l, of PX items. 78
tions; Okinawa, but in computing replenishment
On the basis of combat experience the needs a 30-day safety factor, designed to
Tenth Army and the Central Pacific Base compensate for combat and other unforsee-
Command Ocean
thoroughly revised Pacific able losses, was provided by assuming the
Areas blocks for the impending Okinawa total loss of initial supplies and calculating
campaign, which was expected to be a more replacement requirements from L Day, the
formidable undertaking than any previous date of the first landings, rather than from L
offensive against Japanese forces. Old blocks plus 29. Block ships would thus carry enough
were combined form new ones, and the
to materials to take care of emergency as well
80
listings of items and quantities were dras- as ordinary replacement requirements.
tically modified. The new blocks included In previous operations resupply ships,
four for subsistence — a Q-l block, composed coming from the United States at intervals
"
7
Min, Base Sec Comdrs Conf, 3-5 Mar of five to ten days,had arrived offshore
( 1 ) 44,
p. ORB AFWESPAC AG 334. (2) Ltr, CG
56. shortly after an operation started. In the
USAFFE to CG USASOS, 14 Dec 44, sub: Sup of
U.S. Forces in SWPA. ORB AFPAC GPB. 3 Sixth ( )
78
(1) QM
Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 253-54, 259. (2)
Army AdminO 18, QM Plan, 16 Jul 45. Ltr, Tenth Army to CG Army Garrison Force
CG
'*
The components of these blocks are given in Okinawa, 12 Jun 45, sub: Loading of Resup Ships.
that section of the Appendix of the QM Mid-Pac ORB Tenth Army AG 400.
80
History pertaining to Chapter II, Section 3. Tenth Army Action Rpt, 11 -XVI- 14.
SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES 155
Okinawan campaign it was planned to ob- speedy discharge of cargoes and from poor
82
tain greater flexibility of shipping move- transportation conditions on shore.
ments by assembling the vessels at regulat- The proper stowage of cargo, especially
ing stations on Ulithi in the Carolines and rations, was perhaps the most vexatious
at Eniwetok in the Marshalls and calling problem connected with the block system.
them forward as supplies were needed on The QMC
was concerned primarily with
shore. Because provision of normal field easy accessibility of supplies for rapid dis-
rations was expected to be difficult during charge according to established unloading
the first few weeks of the operation, twice But the order of loading was not
priorities.
ships arrived with heavy deck cargoes and block ships. Though helping to furnish items
with miscellaneous equipment placed in the not obtainable from frequently unbalanced
holds on top of Quartermaster supplies. base stocks, they furthered the unbalancing
This method of stowage, it was estimated, of stocks in Pacific commands as a whole.
ships arrived without the expected packaged items obtainable in Australia and New Zea-
rations. In large measure this omission was land created on the area level excess sup-
responsible for the shortage of emergency plies of flour, sugar, and other foods heavily
rations during the Leyte operation. procured For a time in
in these countries.
During the drive on Manila in January the summer 1944 standard block ships
of
and February 1945 the base at Lingayen therefore ceased to carry these components
Gulf reported that although standard block and filled the space thus left vacant with
ships, just in from the United States with several hundred tons of cargo so stowed as
1,525 tons of rations, were "having deck to be easily discharged at bases in New
loads and top loads discharged, they are Guinea. On arriving at these installations
not capable of producing any Class I sup- the general cargo was taken off and the
87
ply while once solid rations are reached it missing components added.
is possible to discharge 500 tons of rations Some officers charged with the distribu-
85
per day from a single ship." Though an tion of food in the Southwest Pacific be-
average of 795 tons of rations a day was lieved that this attempt to solve the prob-
unloaded from all vessels between 19 Jan- lem of area stock levels did not go far
uary and 24 February, or 95 tons more than
enough. They even doubted the wisdom of
the average daily requirements of 213,000
block shipments direct to operational areas.
men, the rate of issue fluctuated because of
Col. Fred L. Hamilton, director of the Dis-
the irregular rate of daily discharge, and
tribution Division, contended that these
occasionally fell a good deal below the de-
shipments gave his agency too little latitude
sired amount. In both the Southwest Pa-
cific and the Central Pacific wider utiliza- in controlling the supply of food. He recom-
tion of block ships loaded solidly with ra- mended that all rations from the United
tions was suggested as the proper solution. 86 States be sent to Australia and placed in
83
subsistence depots, which would assume full
( 1 ) Ltr, Vet to Surg INTERSEC, 25 Mar 44,
sub: Shpmt ofFood to New Guinea. ORB ABCOM responsibility for providing complete rations
P&C 430. (2) Memo, CTO
for G-4 USASOS, 26 to all consuming would mean
centers. This
Apr 44, same sub. ORB AFWESPAC AG
430.2.
West Coast
that block cargoes leaving the
"'
(1) Sixth Army Leyte Rpt, p. 243. OCMH.
(2) Rpt, Maj Robert E. Graham, 1 Dec 44, sub: for combat zones would contain no food.
King II Opn. USAFINC ORB
370.2. AG
*"
Memo cited n. 75.
MT
( 1 ) Personal Ltr, Col Cary B. Hutchinson to
Tenth Army to CG CG Col Fred L. Hamilton, 14 Jul 44. (2) Ltr, CG
H
" See, for example, Ltr,
Army Garrison Force Okinawa, 12 Jun 45, sub: USASOS to CG SFPOE, 5 Aug 44, sub: Class I
Loading of Resup Ships. ORB Tenth Army AG Items for Resup Ships. Both in ORB AFWESPAC
400. AG 430.2.
SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES !57
Maj. Gen. James L. Frink, Commanding moved northward, this contrast became
General, USASOS, maintained that this more marked. 90
plan would cause delay and unnecessary re- Finally, block movements had the disad-
handling in getting food to consuming vantage of increasing the workload of the
88
troops. Accordingly, it was never put into already heavily burdened San Francisco
effect. Partial loading in New Guinea was Port of Embarkation. That installation had
itself feasible only so long as that island was to handle alterations made in block compo-
the center of combat activity in the South- nents by the ordering areas and assemble the
west Pacific. As operations shifted to the blocks as the supplies came in from the
Philippines, where there were at first no fully depots. Resupply movements, in fact, trans-
functioning bases, it was abandoned and ferred from West Coast
Pacific bases to the
ships departed from the United States com- ports much paper work required to
of the
pletely loaded. get replenishment supplies into the hands of
91
There was still another objection to block operational forces.
movements. If used indefinitely for resup- Despite its disadvantages the block system
plying operational areas, they created short- materially alleviated the difficulties encoun-
ages and excesses in these areas as well as in tered in the supply of combat troops and in
the theater as a whole. Colonel Greene esti- the handling and storage of materials at in-
mated that three months at the maximum, — adequately equipped bases. The value of
five months —
constituted the longest period block ships was attested by Col. James C.
for which they could be profitably em- Longino, Deputy Quartermaster of the
ployed. By the end of that period unpredict- Sixth Army during its most active combat
able requirements and losses the bane of — period. They were, he declared, far superior
all forms of automatic shipment would — to the ordinary vessels from Australia that
throw stores out of balance. Normal requisi- supplied operational forces before the ad-
tioning would then be necessary to adjust vent of the block system. As many Quarter-
89 master items, unavailable at Australian
stock levels.
Rations shipped direct to consuming cen-
bases, were supposedly stocked in New
Guinea, these vessels had often been routed
ters were naturally fresher than food stocks
to advance bases in order to complete their
built up at established bases by the slow
cargoes. But the bases, according to Lon-
processes of ordinary requisitioning and
gino, "either couldn't or didn't balance the
held in warehouses for many months. Block 92
Nor were mate-
cargo as contemplated."
shipments in consequence often created a always unloaded at the designated
rials
divergence in the age of food eaten in for- points; sometimes, because most of the sup-
ward and rear areas. As early as August plies were consigned to one service at a
1944, Captain Orr noted that stocks at and single point, the entire cargo was discharged
west of Finschhafen were fresher than those there. This practice added to shortages and
in areas east of that base. As operations
"°Rpt 18, Capt Orr, 30 Aug 44, sub: Misc QM
S8
(l) Memo, CQM for G-4 USASOS, 13 Jul Matters, p. 3. ORB NUGSEC QM 319.
44, sub: Resup Ships. ORB AFWESPAC AG 430.2.
91
Ping Div, Office of Dir of Plans and Opns, ASF,
( 2 ) Personal Ltr cited n. 87 ( 1 )
Hist of Ping Div, ASF, II, 197-98.
89
Greene, QMR, XXVI (January-February
92
Personal Ltr, Col Longino to Gen Doriot, 23
1947), p. 70. May 45. OQMG SWPA 319.25.
158 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
excesses existing at advance installations, that despite the difficulties encountered in
and meals became unbalanced. "Protests the movement of cargoes from the West
from long suffering troops," declared Colo- Coast the Army in general had been satisfac-
nel Longino, "brought replies that the bases torily supported. However exasperating the
had been supposed to do thus and so." But delays met in completing requisitions and in
there was "little or no improvement," he handling automatic supply, organizational
continued, "until we began to receive bal- shipments, and block movements, supply ac-
ance loaded resupply ships from the U.S. complishments compared favorably with
If credit can be given to any one individual those of the Civil War, the Spanish- Ameri-
for that, he should certainly have a DSM." 93
can War, and World War I. This was espe-
Similar in some respects to automatic cially true, once American industry had
supply, block loading was superior to that been fully geared to peak military produc-
system in that it "permitted theaters to con- tion and more ships had become available.
trol quantities and the rate of flow by order- Logistical troubles in the Pacific resulted
94
ing blocks forward as needed." It thereby more from internal problems than they did
corrected in part the most flagrant weakness from supply deficiencies at home. Insofar as
of the older system, the absence of overseas weaknesses appeared in support from the
control over the incoming stream of ma- zone of interior, they had been produced
terials. Though block loading unbalanced largely by incomplete preparedness for war
theater stocks, it did not do so quite as waged simultaneously against two powerful
rapidly as automatic supply. For several and widely separated foes who had so
months was a reasonably efficient tool.
it strongly intrenched themselves in vast con-
This fact led some observers to believe that quered territories that their home citadels,
it might solve the problem of supplying the main sources of their military strength,
newly established overseas areas during the could not be reduced without first liberating
period when they were still too unorganized distant lands in protracted and difficult
to secure stocks by normal requisitioning. campaigns. In part, too, supply failures re-
Colonel Greene suggested that block loading sultedfrom planning and organizational de-
might also be employed to stock isolated fects inevitable in an untried army just
army or division supply points far from dis- learning in the hard school of experience
tribution bases. "Unless," he added, "our what the problems of amphibious warfare
concept of war is completely changed, sup- were and how they ought to be dealt with.
ply by the block-ship system will be among The vast volume of supplies shipped to
the first of our new developments to be Pacific destinations attested to the vigorous
utilized in the event of another conflict." 95 support the zone of interior rendered the
forces fighting Japan. From the beginning
In evaluating the work of the zone of in- of 1942 to the close of that year, Quarter-
terior in supplying Quartermaster items to master cargo shipped from the United States
the Pacific areas, the most important fact is
to the Southwest Pacific amounted to 353,-
m
Ibid. 023 measurement tons, or 47 percent of total
"'
Ping Div, Office of Dir of Plans and Opns, Army movements of 767,589 measurement
ASF, Hist of Ping Div, ASF, II, 200.
05 tons. Quartermaster shipments in 1943
Greene, QMR, XXVI (January-February
1947), 36, 70. came to 466,763 tons, representing only
SUPPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES 159
about 16 percent of the 2,802,877 tons of often held in port for days. But the most
—
Army cargo a marked decline in the Quar- important consideration was that, whether
termaster proportion, probably caused by speedily or slowly, Quartermaster supplies
increased reliance upon Australian produc- and equipment were made available to the
tion. In the following months, as troop Pacific areas. Valuable though local pro-
strength soared and local procurement fell curement became in the Southwest Pacific,
in importance, Quartermaster cargo it furnished from the outset of hostilities to
reached much higher levels. In 1944 it the end of June 1945 only 1,704,389 meas-
amounted to 1,863,654 tons and in 1945 to urement tons of Quartermaster supplies as
the end of June to 1 ,354,658 tons, represent- compared with the 4,038,098 tons shipped
96
ing nearly 30 percent of all Army cargo. from American ports during the same pe-
From the standpoint of the QMC the most riod.
97
Quite obviously, Quartermaster sup-
serious drawback in the movement of its port in the Pacific largely depended on sup-
cargo was that a large part of it had low plyfrom the United States. Without it, the
shipment priorities and was consequently Corps could not have carried out its mission.
Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, App. 21. (1) Ibid. (2) Hester Rpt, p. 3.
CHAPTER VII
The distribution of Quartermaster ma- and equipment were needed for similar
forward bases and supply points was
teriel to tasks at new bases. Frequently, Engineers
marked by unusual difficulties stemming could do no more than put up the frame-
partly from the perishable nature of many work of Quartermaster buildings; some-
items and partly from the unfavorable con- times they could not do even this. Quar-
ditions under which distribution activities termaster units themselves, with the help
were conducted. Nowhere in the forward of native laborers, were often obliged to
areas were truly appropriate storage facili- complete what Engineers had started; occa-
ties available. Outside Oahu, New Zealand, sionally, they even had to erect the structures
and Australia what passed as "covered" from start to finish. Such emergency opera-
storage seldom furnished adequate protec- tions seldom furnished storage suitable in
tion. Actually, most supplies were kept more either quality or quantity.
or less in the open, where they were exposed For six months or more after the estab-
to the destructive effects of tropical heat, lishment of a base, most Quartermaster sup-
moisture, and insects. Poor packing, which plies were placed in open dumps. The pri-
did not adequately protect supplies from mary consideration in choosing the location
rough handling and the hazards of tropical of these dumps was that they be situated as
storage, further intensified distribution near as possible to landing points in order to
difficulties. facilitate prompt discharge of vessels and in-
sure maximum utilization of available
Quartermaster Storage trucks. As areas surfaced with concrete, as-
phalt, cinders, or crushed stones were sel-
Plans for Quartermaster storage in for- dom in existence during this period, supplies
ward areas usually called for nothing more
were simply dumped on the ground, where
than insubstantial, quickly built structures,
they were exposed to the full glare of the
which were assigned the lowest building pri- sun, soaked in the rain, and bogged down
orities. By the time the Corps of Engineers
in the mud. Owing to the need for quick
had completed airfields, docks, roads, hos- discharge of ships and the comparative
pitals, and higher headquarters, months had scarcity of service troops, supplies were at
often elapsed, and construction materials times hurled into these dumps without seg-
STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROBLEMS 161
walls unnecessary. This expedient enabled properly arranged it permitted air to circu-
trucks to drive directly alongside stacked late and dry out the stacks. The other ex-
supplies and so eliminated wide central pedient was the "paulin oasis," formed by
5
aisles. placing a canvas-covered, rooflike frame
Some bases used quonset huts and pre- directly on top of the stack. Two men could
fabricated wood or steel warehouses, but easily move this frame from a depleted pile
these structures were never available in large to a new pile. If lack of tarpaulins forbade
numbers and on the whole were not very these expedients, salvaged matting might
practicable. Generallymeasuring only about be laid horizontally on the stacks as make-
7
20 by 120 feet, they provided little space. shift protection.
They had, moreover, no floors. As the tin At most bases, particularly in the first
roofs generated too much heat to permit the half of the Pacific war, shortages of mate-
rials and manpower and widespread igno-
4
( 1 ) Ltr, COMSOPAC to Comdr
U.S. Naval
Forces in Europe, 2 May 43, sub: Construction of
rance of the principles of tropical storage
Bldgs in New Caledonia. ORB USAFINC AG 600. resulted in poor stacking and hastened the
(2) Hq SOS SPA, Storage in Tropics, passim, 1
Oct 43-31 Mar 44. DRB AGO
Vault SPA (Or- 6
( 1 ) Anon., "Storage at Guadalcanal," QMTSJ,
ganizational Hist, SOS SPA). VI (22 December 1944), 12. (2) Pp. 13-17 of Rpt
5
( 1 ) Ltr, QM Base A to CQM USASOS, 9 Oct cited n. 4(2).
43. (2) Daily Diary, Capt Thomas J. Doyle, Field 7
( Rpt, Lt Col R. C. Kramer, 9 Sep 43, sub:
1 )
Inspection Team, 12 Jan 44. Both in ORB Trip New Guinea, 30 Aug-7 Sep 43. ORB
to
AFWESPAC QM 319.1. (3) Rpt, Lt Col D. B. AFWESPAC AG 430. (2) Anon., "Storage at
Dill, n. d., sub: Observations in SWPA and POA, Guadalcanal," QMTSJ, VI (22 December 1944),
Oct-Dec 44. OQMG POA 319.25. 12.
OPEN STORAGE OF QUARTERMASTER ITEMS caused rapid deterioration oj
outer containers, (above) and lack of dunnage materials forced the use of coconut log ramps
(below).
164 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
deterioration of supplies. Food containers temperatures, which accelerated food spoil-
in boxes, improperly piled solidly together, age. Subsistence, it was estimated, deterio-
sweated and rusted, disintegrating canned rated twice as fast at 90° F. as at 70°, and
meats and vegetables by releasing acids; four times as fast as at 50° or 55°. For this
these acids ate into the tin, seeped out, and reason it was sometimes recommended that
contaminated other cans. Damage from this shipments of rations to operational areas be
cause was appreciably increased when tar- limited to the smallest amounts consistent
paulins were thrown over the stacks in such with the tactical situation. 9
a way
as to cover the sides and prevent the The disastrous effects of prolonged out-
pilesfrom drying out. Another hindrance to door storage on poorly protected subsistence
good stacking was the scarcity of dunnage, a were vividly described by an OQMG ob-
scarcity so great that stocks were often put
server on his return to the United States
directly on the ground, thus increasing the
from New Caledonia late in 1943:
spoilage of food in the lower layers. In the
South Pacific Area, ramps of coconut logs I saw two huge dumps in the open with no
protection from the weather except for some
placed about a foot apart were often sub-
untreated tarps placed on the piles very care-
8
stituted for ordinary dunnage. lessly. In many cases they had blown off. In
First priority on Quartermaster covered others, they only partly covered the stacks;
space was accorded to combat rations, and in some instances they were open at the
top. Most of them had been there for over a
sacked sugar, flour, salt, rice, condiments,
year, and some for eighteen months. I can't
and other foods especially liable to irrepa- tell you how many cases, but for the sake of
rable damage. If sacked flour, for example, something to figure on as a basis, consider
was not well protected, it became moldy shiploads ....
and insect-infested within a few weeks. The condition of these stores is ten times
Drummed and canned petroleum products worse than covered by any report we have
seen. ... In the center of some of the stacks
were stored on high ground in the open, as
solid fiber cases were just like mush. Wooden
were general supplies not liable to rusting. cases were so rotten the wood could be mashed
Until covered space became available in between one's fingers. Many cans were com-
large quantities, even tinned foods were cus- pletely covered by. rust. The center of the
tomarily piled in the open. During his trip
stacks looked like a big mold culture. One
can breaks and spreads its contents over sur-
to New Guinea Major Fellers found that rounding cans; and mixed with water and
60 to 70 percent of the canned fruits, veg- mold it multiplies until a huge area is af-
etables, juices, meats, and evaporated milk fected. ... I saw one disposal dump that
was still outdoors. Though the Army called contained over 100,000 cans of spoiled prod-
10
uct.
canned foods "nonperishable," they were
actually in varying degrees perishable. Huge Better means of storing nonperishable
losses of these products occurred because of foods were provided toward the end of hos-
corrosion and rusting, puncturing of con- tilities. In February 1945 General Gregory
tainers during handling operations, and high found such food supplies in New Guinea
8
(1) Anon., "Storage at Guadalcanal," QMTSJ, "P. 7 of Rpt cited n. 1(2).
VI (22 December 1944), 12. (2) Rpt, Capt Her- 10
Rpt, Capt W. W. Bailey, n. d., sub: Containers
man C. King, 4 Nov 43, sub: Packaging and Pack- in Open Storage, incl to Memo, Packaging and Crat-
ing of Subs in New Caledonia, pp. 2, 4-5. OQMG ing Sec to Chief Storage Br OQMG, 3 Nov 43.
POA 400.162. OQMG 457 (Containers).
STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROBLEMS 165
fairly well warehoused except at the Hol- Later, they were kept in thatched shacks
landia base, which had been set up only in or in warehouses. At Guadalcanal 40 shacks,
11
the previous June. Here, five months after about 85 feet long and 28 feet wide, were
General Gregory's visit, 75 percent of the employed. To protect clothing from damp-
ration stocks, mostly canned subsistence, still ness, floors were provided in all these build-
remained in open storage. They all had, ings. Ramps of coconut logs, on which in-
however, tarpaulin protection, which, in a coming supplies were placed before being
15
similar stage ofdevelopment at the earlier tallied in, connected the buildings.
leveling the ground and installing drainage As the agency mainly interested in refriger-
systems at the dumps set up for these sup- ation, the QMC determined cold storage re-
plies. By the time projects holding higher quirements and presented them to the Corps
priorities were completed, many stores had of Engineers for procurement. In the
become water-soaked and irretrievably dam- Southwest Pacific Area the QMC also allo-
aged. To a lesser extent other bases experi- cated refrigeration among supply centers
14
enced similar difficulties. and Army units. In the Central and South
Since textile and leather goods were par- Pacific Areas no agency was at first clearly
ticularly liable to mildewing and other forms responsible for this function, and distribu-
of tropical deterioration, they were, if at tion became badly unbalanced. This prob-
all under cover. If nothing
possible, placed lem was finally solved by making the Island
better could be found while a base was first Commanders responsible for the allotment
being set up, they were put in storage tents. of available equipment.
The scarcity of cold-storage space con-
11
Rpt, Gen Gregory, 14 Mar 45, sub: Trip to
Pacific. OQMG POA 319.1. tinued throughout the war. In April 1944
12
Ltr, Off of Surg to QM
Base G, 13 Jul 45, sub:
the Southwest Pacific Area set the refriger-
Temperature of Stored Subs. ORB Base G 430. QM
13
Ltr, USAFNORSOLS to AFWESPAC, 15 Jul ation needs of military organizations at
45, same sub. OQMG POA 430.
14
"Army Supply Problems Southwest Pa-
in the
15
Anon., "Storage at Guadalcanal," QMTSJ, VI
cific," QMR XXII (May-June 1943), 35. (22 December 1944), 12.
166 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
250,000 cubic feet, to be furnished by units larger refrigerators Central Pacific Area de-
with a capacity of 220 cubic feet or less; of mands 863 units had been completely
for
distribution centers at 1,000,000 cubic feet, filled. South Pacific Area requisitions for
to be provided mostly by 660-cubic-foot 177 small refrigerators and 400 large re-
units; and of ports at 2,000,000 cubic feet, frigerators had been entirely met. The War
centers had about 260,000 cubic feet, or a could not be wholly met before 1 Decem-
fourth of what they needed; and ports had ber. The War Department hoped to com-
approximately 764,000 cubic feet, or some- plete requisitions for 1,235 units of the
what more than a third of their require- larger refrigerators by 1 August, but actu-
10 17
ments. ally it was not able to do so.
nonportable type, this solution proved im- ing concentrated at more advanced instal-
19
possible. Alleviation of the cold-storage lations.
situation at Finschhafen thus depended Prefabricated warehouses with a capacity
mostly on shipments of portable refrigera- of 600 and 1,800 cubic feet provided most
tors from sources outside New Guinea.
lb
of the refrigeration at many bases. These
Permanent cold-storage warehouses of units could be readily disassembled and
the standard 80-by-200-foot type, capable moved, and for this reason were especially
of holding 100,000 cubic feet of provisions, desirable in the Pacific. The base at Finsch-
hafen eventually employed about fifty
were not built at bases outside Oahu. Nor
1,800-cubic-foot refrigerators and that at
were smaller permanent types employed
Oro Bay about thirty.At Saipan and Guam
except at Port Moresby and Milne Bay. Be-
this type of refrigerator was also utilized but
cause of their relatively large size these struc-
in lesser quantities. Though valuable be-
tures could be run economically, but it took
cause of their portability, knockdown
refrig-
months to build them. By the time they were
erators entailed the operation and mainte-
in full operation, supply activities were be- nance of comparatively large numbers of
ls
( ) Min, Conf on Refrigeration, 8 Mar 44. engines for the limited amount of space they
1
enough to store a day's supply of meat for kinds became larger in quantity and better
one division, was employed but rarely. De- war continued, it never
in structure as the
signed primarily for extensive land areas fullymet Quartermaster demands. Accord-
supplied with modern highways, it could ing to Southwest Pacific Area logistical
not be operated efficiently in the Pacific be- standards Quartermaster Class I, II, and IV
cause combat operations were carried out supplies required twenty square feet of cov-
so largely on territory lacking fully devel- ered space per ton, but island bases could
oped road systems. Even for the transporta- never provide this much space. In May 1944
tion of perishables from bases to supply Lt. Col. Charles A. Ritchie, Quarter-
points only ten to twenty-five miles away master of the Intermediate Section, USA-
these vans seldom proved satisfactory. On SOS, which allocated physical facilities in
Mobile, which were established to operate 1,350,000 square feet were demanded on
the refrigerated semitrailers, were in fact the basis of standard requirements and
utilized principally for storage of perishables 675,000 square feet even under Colonel
22
received from shipside rather than for trans- Ritchie's revised estimate. Depending on
portation of these products. In New Cale- which statement of requirements was taken,
donia a refrigeration platoon, serving in this the QMC thus had only about one fourth
fashion, proved essential to the operations or, at best, one half of the covered space it
of hospitals and medical units. It also set up needed at Milne Bay. This condition typi-
and repaired fixed refrigeration equipment fied those prevailing at other island bases.
were used sparingly in combat operations. troops for manual operations necessitated
fullest possible use of time- and labor-sav-
20
(1) QM Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 271-72. (2) Rpt,
ing equipment. Unfortunately, the proper
Capt Orr, 25 Jun 44, sub: Answers to Question-
naire, 14 Jun 44.
21
OQMG SWPA 319.25. conditions for employing this equipment did
(1) Rpt cited in n. 20(2). (2) Rpt, 1st Lt I. F.
Legrand, 11 Jan 43, sub: Refrigeration Survey. -Weekly Opns Rpt, QM INTERSEC, 19 May
ORB AFWESPAC QM 414.1. 44. ORB NUGSEC QM 319.1.
STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROBLEMS 169
not exist in the forward areas. Standard letsare available. Fork trucks and other
solid-rubber-tired fork-lift trucks, the most
equipment are mis-used in the mud and
24
coral. . . ,
Pacific were seldom so surfaced, these trucks were procurable and owing to the locally,
tired fork-lifts, which operated fairly well materials and warehouse equipment were
in soft areas, were, indeed, the only type obtained from the West Coast. Thousands
suitable for the island bases, and they did of fairly skilled civilians, too, were avail-
not arrive until well into 1944, and then able both for the construction of covered
only in numbers too small to help appre- storage facilities and for routine depot op-
ciably.
23
The employment of tractors and erations.Even at the early bases, particu-
trailers with dual wheels and oversize tires some warehouses were built from imported
could operate in muddy dumps, but this materials soon after these installations were
type of carrier, like fork-lift trucks, was hard opened. Usually, some hard-surfaced roads
to procure. So were roller conveyors, use of and storage areas were available, making
which materially reduced the manpower re- possible more effective utilization of fork-
Matters. OQMG SWPA 319.25. (3) Rpt, Maj Covered Storage at San Fernando de La Union.
Harold A. Naisbitt, 1 Feb 45, sub: Info Obtained (2) Ltr, Base K to PHIBSEC, 13 May 45, sub:
From QM SPBC. OQMG POA 319.25. Sup Installations. Both in ORB PHIBSEC 633.
170 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ucts, clothing, and general supplies varied the beginning supplied clothing and general
from place to place, but the trend was supplies to all American forces in New
29
strongly toward replenishment on the basis Guinea, chiefly through Port Moresby. In
of requisitions prepared by the bases them- February 1943, following the establishment
selves.
26
of bases at Milne Bay and Oro Bay, the sup-
Whether inventories or requisitions fur- port of troops in the huge island was divided
nished the impetus for distribution, approx- between the Brisbane and Sydney base sec-
imately correct stock records were essential tions. While Brisbane supplied Port Moresby
to satisfactory supply. Yet, owing to the with all its Quartermaster needs, Sydney
lack of qualified technicians this condition filled the comparable needs of the two new
could not always be met. At Milne Bay in installations, which in turn supplied the
north shore of New Guinea. During the en-
30
November 1 943 no records of clothing and
general supply stocks could be maintained, suing months insufficient stockages at Syd-
and "little was known as to the actual goods ney and swift growth of troop strength in
2T
on hand.'' So extreme a condition was un- forward areas made it increasingly hard for
usual, but Colonel Cordiner believed that that installation to support its large distribu-
"inventories were generally never more than tion area.For this reason its responsibilities
50% correct." "How," he wrote, "anyone were lessened by charging other base sec-
can expect to maintain a proper level with- tions with direct support of the large supply
28
out inventories is beyond me." By March points set up for ground and air troops near
1 944 more accurate records were being kept Oro Bay; Townsville provided rations while
everywhere and from that time incorrect in- Brisbane provided clothing and general
31
ventories became less significant as a factor supplies.
in unbalancing stocks. The principal weakness in this system of
In the Southwest Pacific the determina- definitely charging designated Australian
tion of distribution routes was a more com- base sections with the supply of one or more
plex matter than in either the Central advance base sections was the impossibility
Pacific, where the installations in the Hono- of keeping Australian installations con-
lulu area constituted the main transship- stantly stocked with all the items needed by
ment centers, or in the South where
Pacific, their distribution areas. When the arrange-
the ration depot in New Zealand and the ment was originally set up, USASOS rea-
general supply depot in New Caledonia lized that this problem might develop but
served as the principal transshipment points. felt that the shipping shortage necessitated
In Australia, Base Section 3 at Brisbane in such a method of supply. It had at least the
26
( 1 )
Ltr, Advance Base USASOS to CG Alamo 29
(1) USASOS Memo Sep 42, sub: Ra-
43, 14
Force, 12 Jul 43, sub: Sup of Advance ORB
Bases. tions for Port Moresby. (2) Advance
Memo, QM
PHIBSEC 400. (2) Ltr, CQM USAFFE to QM Base for QM d. (3) Rpt, Maj Gor-
Base Sec 3, n.
USASOS, 21 Aug 43, sub: Sup Levels. ORB PHIB- don Phelps, 12 Dec 42, sub: Shpmts to New Guinea.
SEC 400.23. (3) Rpt, Maj Hubert W. Marlow, 14 Both in ORB AFWESPAC 333.1. QM
Oct 43, sub: Inventories at Advance Bases. ORB 30
Ltr, USASOS to Advance Base el al., 15 Feb
ABCOM GP&C 400.291. 43, sub: Sup of New Guinea. ORB AFWESPAC
27
QM Alamo Force
Ltr, to CQM, 2 Nov 43. QM 400.
ORB AFWESPAC QM 312. "USASOS Logistic Instruction 33, 17 Jun 43,
Ltr, to QM Base Sec
28
7, 9 Nov 43. ORB AF- sub: Sup of Forward Areas. ORB AFWESPAC QM
WESPAC QM 400. 400.
STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROBLEMS 171
virtue of requiring vessels to call at only responsible for co-ordinating the movements
one port and of thus facilitating prompt and of its own supplies. The OCQM, for exam-
solid loading. The alternative method of ple, received requisitions or inventory fig-
making movements from whatever Austral- ures from the New Guinea bases and issued
ian bases had the largest stocks of needed directives to base quartermasters in Aus-
items was rejected, for it required that sup- tralia instructing them what to ship, when
plies be picked up at several ports, with loss to ship, and where to ship. This system lasted
32
of valuable shipping time. only until the beginning of 1944, when the
The method adopted likewise
actually newly established Distribution Division un-
proved wasteful. Food, for example, was dertook the task of controlling all supply
generally procured in southeastern Aus- movements from the United States and Aus-
tralia, but most of it was not shipped from tralia to New
Guinea, and the Distribution
there to the advance bases. Instead, wasit Branch, Milne Bay, that of controlling
35
sent north by rail or water to Brisbane and movements within New Guinea. Central-
Townsville, where it was discharged, stored, ized control, whether by the Distribution
reloaded, and shipped to the New Guinea Division or the OCQM, proved to be a vast
bases supplied by these installations. This improvement over the rigid system of sup-
the already overloaded railroads and need- The question of administrative control
3
lessly tied up water transportation.' In Sep- was only one of those which demanded so-
be possible if it were given control over the demanded solution. Generally speaking, the
movements of its supplies. Under this sys- offices of base and service command quarter-
tem the OCQM would direct that shipments masters had Quartermaster shipping sec-
all
be made from the Australian bases best tions to look after the movement of Quar-
equipped at the time to send supplies to New termaster supplies to advance areas. Their
Guinea. In general, rations would be moved major functions were to arrange for the
from Sydney, clothing and general supplies scheduling of the necessary shipping, to as-
from Brisbane, and drummed petroleum semble and deliver Quartermaster cargoes
products from both Brisbane and Sydney, at the designated ports, and to maintain
but any of these supplies might be moved item-by-item records of all water move-
from any point chosen by the OCQM. 34 ments, supplemental to those of the Trans-
This system was adopted in November portation Corps, in order that lost cargoes
1943, when each technical service at Head- might be quickly duplicated. In Australia in
quarters, USASOS, became for a short time the early days, as in San Francisco during
the same period, Quartermaster supplies
32
Ltr, Subs Depot to QM ADSEC, 1 Sep 43. ORB with low shipping priorities, though on dock,
AFWESPAC QM 430. movement
M Personal Ltr
to Col Hester, 8 Sep 43. ORB could not always be booked for
AFWESPAC QM 430.
34
( 1 ) Memo, CQM for G-4 USASOS,
10 Sep 43,
35
( 1
) Ltr, USASOS to ADSEC et al., 24 Jan 44,
sub: Distr Responsibilities. (2) Personal Ltr, Col sub: Distr of Sups. (2) USASOS Memo 27, 31
Cordiner to Col George Grimes, 9 Nov 43. ORB Mar 44, same sub. Both in ORB AFWESPAC AG
AFWESPAC QM
400. 400.
172 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
and even if booked, could not always be early 1943 scores of idle vessels awaiting
39
placed on board the available ships. For that discharge filled the harbor. Comparable
reason alone the maintenance of adequate conditions existed at Guadalcanal, Espiritu
stocks at advance bases was occasionally Santo, and the Russells in their early days
very difficult. Quartermaster shipping sec- and even later during periods of active com-
tions nevertheless tried to place as many of bat. The naval convoy system as well as
their supplies as possible on the scheduled congestion at base ports lengthened turn-
36
vessels. about time. In the Southwest Pacific, for
When enough ships were not on hand for example, vessels from Australian ports as-
the transportation of all supplies awaiting sembled at Townsville and awaited con-
movement, the whole chain of distribution voy to their destinations, a procedure that
might be disrupted. In that event shipments held up movements for several days or more.
could not be spaced at the intervals required These delays were occasionally so prolonged
for the regular flow of supplies, and materi- that "entire shipments" of potatoes and
als piled up at bases. Cargoes were either onions carried as deck cargo deteriorated. 40
not delivered in the expected quantities or Frequently, from 1,000 to 5,000 sacks of
were delivered only after protracted delays. these vegetables were lost. After leaving
Shortages then appeared in stocks at ad- Australian waters ships bound for the north
vance bases and were reflected in unbal- shore of New Guinea or for neighboring
anced issues to troops. These weaknesses in islands were collected at Milne Bay, the
the distribution system could not easily be naval control center for these areas; their
elminated because of the world-wide ship- dispatch from this point hinged on the tacti-
ping shortage. At no time did the Army in cal situation and on the readiness of forward
the Southwest Pacific Area control enough bases to handle their cargoes. Both these
bottoms to meet its supply requirements factors might force postponement of sail-
37
without difficulty. The situation was simi- ings. If, for example, there were two reefers
lar in the South and Central Pacific Areas. bound for Lae, a port which could handle
In March 1944, for example, the Army in only a single reefer at a time, one vessel
the latter area required 93 vessels yet had would be held had proceeded
until the other
38
only 63. to its and discharged its cargo.
destination
The tying up of ships for days or even Between 24 May and 18 July 1943 hostile
weeks by making them await discharge at air and naval activities plus delays in com-
poorly equipped bases often aggravated the pletion of port facilities at Oro Bay pre-
scarcity of cargo space. At the still unde- vented any vessels carrying Quartermaster
veloped port of Noumea in late 1942 and supplies from leaving Milne Bay for that
:,
°
(1) QM SWPA Hist, IV, 9-10. (2) Ltr, QM base. A
huge backlog of all sorts of Quar-
USASOS to Base Sec QM's, 30 Jun 43, sub: Han- termaster commodities accumulated at the
dling Shpmts to Advance Bases. ORB AFWESPAC
QM 400.2. 39
Duncan S. Ballentine, U.S. Naval Logistics in
Masterson,
''
Transportation in SWPA, pp. the Second World War (Princeton, N. J.: Prince-
217-82. ton University Press, 1947), pp. 118, 123-24.
" Weekly Min, Vessel Allocation and Cargo 10
Personal Ltr, Brig Gen Edward B. McKinley to
Subcom, 22 Mar 44. AG 304 (Jt Ship Opns). Gen Gregory, 11 Nov 44. OQMG
POA 319.25.
STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROBLEMS 173
control center, and when ships bearing the equator of much needed vessels for sup-
Quartermaster items were finally called for- plying perishables to distant installations and
41
ward, twenty sailed within three weeks. combat forces.
The Central Pacific Area felt the reefer
shortage less keenly. Its favorable position
Refrigeration Afloat
resulted principally from the relative prox-
Just as lack of refrigerated space ashore imity of Honolulu to the West Coast, a fac-
hampered Quartermaster supply on land, tor that allowed the shipment of substantial
so did the shortage of refrigeration afloat amounts of perishable subsistence from San
hamper the distribution of perishables by Francisco. The Cold-Storage Co-ordinating
Committee, composed of representatives of
water. In prewar days the military forces
the Navy, Army, War Shipping Adminis-
in Hawaii and the Philippines had secured
tration, and Hawaiian civilians, periodically
most of their fresh food from local commer-
determined what proportion of cargo space
cial sources. The Army in consequence had
on Hawaiian-San Francisco
reefers in the
no fully refrigerated vessels. It had indeed
pool was allocated to Army, to Navy, and
only the limited cold-storage space needed
to civilian requirements. When distribution
to keep food for passengers and crews of
of perishables among these three consuming
the troop transports that sailed to Honolulu
elements became maladjusted, the commit-
and Manila. Shortly before Pearl Harbor
tee transferred space from one element to
the Maritime Commisssion had contracted
another in order to restore the proper bal-
for the building of refrigerated vessels under 43
ance. During the first two years this sys-
the emergency defense program. Deliveries
tem usually provided Army troops in Hawaii
on these contracts started in May 1942, but,
with about two cubic feet of food per man
since perishables for the South and the
per month. After the drive across the Cen-
Southwest Pacific Areas came almost wholly
tralPacific started, reefers were diverted
from Australia and New Zealand, most of
from the Hawaiian-San Francisco run in
the new ships were assigned to the Atlantic
42 order to care for the needs of the fleet, ad-
service. This allocation of reefers made pos-
vance bases, and combat forces, whose sup-
sible better utilization of available vessels
ply became the paramount consideration,
because the short Atlantic runs permitted
and the allowance of perishables for soldiers
the delivery of fresh provisions to Great
and sailors in Hawaii was slashed by 50 per-
Britain and North Africa in larger quan-
cent to one cubic foot per man per month.
tities than could have been made to the
In spite of these restrictive measures a short-
southern Pacific areas within the same pe-
age of about 550,000 cubic feet in Central
riod of time. But it deprived troops below
Pacific Area reefer requirements had de-
"(1) Pp. 1-2 of Rpt cited n. 1(1). (2) Rpt, veloped by March 1944. At this time top
Col Cordiner, 18 Aug 43, sub: Inspection Trip, on deliveries of perishables was
priority
3-17 Aug 43. OQMG SWPA 319.25. (3) Ltr, Vet
to Surg INTERSEC, 25 Mar 44, sub: Shpmt of granted to hospitals, forward installations,
Food to New Guinea. ORB ABCOM P&C 430.
42
Lt John D. Keser, "Perishables to the Pacific," "CINCPOA Ser 03201, 20 Dec 43, sub: Cold
Army Transportation Journal, V (March-April Storage Co-ordinating Com. ORB AGFPAC AG
1949), pp. 17-18. 430.
174 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
combat vessels, and ships carrying amphib- rely chiefly on its own efforts, the area dur-
44
ious forces. ing 1942 converted some barges and other
The South Pacific Area depended mostly small vessels into reefers, but they could
on the Navy reefer fleet, which was too small not even the requirements of the small
fill
to maintain regular distribution of perish- forces then in New Guinea. During the
ables out of New Zealand. Small refriger- following two years the reefer fleet was
ated vessels for transshipping fresh provi- gradually reinforced by about thirty small
sions to remote points in the northern Sol- craft from the United States, mainly "lak-
omons were particularly scarce. Even the ers," which averaged about 12,000 cubic
large and relatively accessible base in New feet in capacity. Though these vessels,
Caledonia repeatedly went without fresh called "X-ships," were indispensable to dis-
45
eggs and vegetables. In January 1945 re- tribution activities, they were slow, between
sponsibility for deliveries of fresh provisions twenty and thirty years old, and in poor con-
in the South Pacific Area and the Central dition. About a fifth of them were ordi-
PacificArea was divided between the Army narily laid up for repairs. The normal
and the Navy. The Army was charged with turnabout time between Australia and New
delivery of fresh and frozen provisions to Guinea early in 1943 amounted to thirty-
all U.S. whether ashore or
servicemen, eight days, a period so long that part of
afloat, in the Gilberts and the Marshalls. the cargo usually spoiled before reaching
47
The Navy was charged with deliveries else- its destination.
where in the two areas outside Hawaii and Late in 1943, two relatively fast ships,
the Line Islands, where each service sup- which had been used to carry troops on
plied its own men.
46
At this time standard leave between New Guinea and Australia,
allowances governing the distribution of per- became available for transportation of fresh
ishablesamong the forward installations subsistence. These leave vessels each had
were established in order to foster more about 45,000 cubic feet of refrigerated space
equitable For soldiers
distribution. and that could be spared for base supplies.
ashore outside Hawaii 1 .5 cubic feet
sailors Since their turnabout time was approxi-
per man per month were allowed for those ; mately 18 days, both ships together had a
afloat, 1.75 cubic feet. In general these al- carrying capacity of about 160,000 cubic
lowances were met. feet a month, only a little less than the 166,-
48
The Southwest Pacific Area, as in many 000 cubic feet of all X-ships. Owing to
other matters, suffered more than the others quick turnabouts, leave vessels had the ad-
from the shortage of reefers. Obliged to vantage of transporting perishables with
little deterioration, but their rigid sailing
44
(1) Mid-Pac Hist, VI, 1095,
1099, 1103; schedule, permitting only three days for
VIII, 1738-39. (2) Weekly Min, Vessel Alloca-
tion and Cargo Subcom, SFPOE, 22 Mar 44. AG loading, did not allow enough time to fill
334. (3) CINCPOA Ser 06818, 21 Nov 44, sub: all refrigerator space. This shortcoming was
Reefer Allocations.
45
ORBAGFPAC 430.AG
Rpt, Brig Gen Walter A. Wood, Jr., n. d., sub: 47
( 1
) Ltr, Chief Engr USASOS to CO's Base
Materiel and Equip Problems for Ping Div, ASF. Sees, 18 Oct 43, sub: Reefers. ORB AFWESPAC
DRB AGO Folder "Wood —
Actions Resulting from AG 441.5. (2) Min, Base Sec Comds Conf, 3-5
Pacific Trip." Mar 44, pp. 74-76. ORB AFWESPAC AG 334.
"CINCPOA Ser 081, 3 Jan 45, sub: Responsi- 48
Ltr, CG USASOS CG
to USAFFE, 20 Oct 43,
bility for Sup of Perishables in SPA and CPA. ORB sub: Perishables to Advance Areas. ORB AFWES-
AGFPAC 430. PAC QM 312.
STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROBLEMS 175
especially serious at Sydney because of poor X-ships to supply other bases. The point at
stevedoring. In March 1944 it was reported which the leave ships were loaded was de-
that leave vessels had never once left Aus- termined by the degree of congestion at
tralian ports fully loaded; every month they Australian ports and by the cargo. Beef was
had run with 35,000 40,000 cubic feetto taken on mainly at Townsville and Bris-
of cold-storage space, or approximately 25 bane; and potatoes and onions at Sydney.
percent, empty. Maj. Gen. James L. Frink, Melbourne, though a good source of all
commander of USASOS, therefore ordered kinds of fresh provisions, lay too far from
49
that loading time be extended to five days. New Guinea to be employed extensively save
A further measure of relief was obtained by fast naval vessels.
51
in August 1943, when the Navy made un- Lakers and leave and naval craft together
used refrigeration on the USS Mizar, a for- could not supply perishables in the required
mer commercial reefer, available for trans- quantities. Because of incessant demands for
porting fresh provisions to Milne Bay. At the fresh meats their distribution of this item
same time the Navy agreed to bring perish- constituted perhaps the most acute problem.
ables to that base whenever its refrigerator Five meat issues a week, or twenty-one is-
vessels had vacant space. Advantageous sues a month, were prescribed in the forward
though this arrangement was, its benefits areas. But General Frink reported in Febru-
could not be fully realized, for the Army did ary 1944 that, though every resource was
not have enough small reefers to transship being tapped to meet this standard, no more
all the fresh subsistence consigned to other than six issues could be made. He calcu-
New Guinea bases and Sixth Army supply lated that the provision of twenty-one issues
points on Goodenough, Woodlark, and for the 355,000 troops then in the forward
Kiriwina Islands. Navy reefers nevertheless areas demanded at least 219,250 cubic feet
furnished sizable quantities of food that of reefer space. Yet after allowing for ships
otherwise would not have been secured. In under repair and for turnabout time, there
March 1944 it was estimated that Quarter- were available for meat only 97,500 cubic
master supplies occupied every month be- feet, or about 120,000 cubic feet less than
tween 80,000 and 100,000 cubic feet. One requirements based on twenty-one issues a
particularly favorable aspect of the arrange- month. Of the remaining reefer space, 12,-
ment was the virtual absence of spoiled food, 400 cubic feet were used for fresh eggs;
an advantage attributable to the fast speed 1 1,100 for fresh fruits; 88,700 for potatoes
50
of the ships as well as to refrigeration. and onions; and 11,800 for other vege-
52
During most of 1944 the two Army leave tables.
sub: Distr of Perishables. (2) Ltr, QM DISTBRA Sup of Advance Bases. ORB AFWESPAC QM 312.
toCG INTERSEC, 5 May 44, same sub. Both in (2) Ltr, USASOS to USAFFE, 18 Feb 44, sub:
ORB NUGSEC QM 430. Air Shpmts of Meat. ORB AFWESPAC 431. QM
°*
Masterson, Transportation in SWPA, pp. 397- (3) Rpt 9, Capt Orr, 4 Jul 44, sub: Special Type
99. QM Orgns, p. 14. OQMG
SWPA 319.25.
STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROBLEMS 177
daily book these movements with the Fifth inaccessible by either land or water, were
Air Force, which handled the transship- supplied about twice a week by parachute
ments at Port Moresby, the supplies were packs containing rations and equipment.
open storage until all formally booked
left in Many weeks would have been required to
cargoes had been cared for. On 6 August deliver these items over rough jungle trails,
1943 an observer at that base found 54,000 but one plane sometimes supplied as many
pounds of Quartermaster supplies awaiting as twenty outposts on a single trip lasting
shipment; some of this accumulation had only a few hours.''
been there since 1 2 July. When the supplies
were finally started on their way to Dobo- Packaging and Packing
dura, no tallies or other shipping docu-
ments accompanied them and no notifica-
The unusual danger of deterioration to
which many supplies were exposed in the
tion of their impending arrival was sent to
Pacific made proper packaging and packing
the consignee. Accordingly, no trucks were 61
of the utmost importance. In some instan-
on hand to receive them, and the items were
ces better packaging and packing consti-
simply unloaded and left unguarded on the
tuted the most practicable method of cop-
field, where they became the easy prey of pil-
ing with storage and distribution hazards.
ferers until trucks could be found to move
7 Since there were too few research and de-
them."'
velopment technicians to permit designing
In spite of such difficulties, which were
of improved packs in the Pacific, this task
probably unavoidable accompaniments of
unstandardized methods of shipments, air
was primarily one for the OQMG
in the
"Rpt, Base Sec 2 Liaison Office, Sub-Base D, to Forward Bases. ORB AFWESPAC QM
430.2.
9 Aug Air Shpmts to Sub-Base B.
43, sub: ORB '"
By official definition "packaging" referred to
AFWESPAC
r
430. QM the means by which the product itself was contained
* Memo, Capt R. T. Murphy "packing," to the exterior or shipping container.
for Col John P.
Welch, Advance Base D, 6 Sep 43, sub: Air Shpmts. Harold W. Thatcher, The Packaging and Packing
ORB AFWESPAC QM 430. of Subsistence for the Army (QMC Historical
"'"P. 14 of Rpt cited n. 56(3). Studies 10, April 1945), p. 14, n. 7.
178 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
in the paper, fiber, and cloth containers of such an extent that an additional 225,000
retail trade and packed in fiber cartons, displacement tons of shipping would be re-
usually without overpacking. Corrugated quired. It was also pointed out thathuge
fiber containers, which were used mostly quantities of lumber, which was daily be-
for packing canned goods, were strong coming more scarce, would be needed and
enough to insure safe delivery in the zone that, in any event, neither canners nor de-
of interior, where there were few handlings pots had sufficient equipment for nailing
and plenty of covered storage space, mate- wooden boxes. These cogent arguments
rials-handling equipment, and trained em- compelled the OQMG to substitute metal-
ployees, but they lacked the strength to strapping for overpacking of fiber con-
63
withstand the hard usage of overseas areas tainers.
and deteriorated rapidly in hot, humid Temperature changes during the long
climates. In the beginning no substitutes voyage from the West Coast caused cans
for fiber containers were available in ade- containing fruits and vegetables to sweat
quate quantities. and rust. Once had arrived
these supplies at
In March 1942 the OQMG authorized their destination and had been placed in
the use of a recently developed and sup- open storage, they were subject to three
posedly weatherproof solid fiber container, additional weather hazards excessive heat, :
which during the following summer pro- torrential rains, and high humidity, which
vided the principal shipping carton for sub- rusted metal cans, broke fiberboard boxes,
sistence going overseas. The new container rotted wooden containers, and fostered the
made possible substantial savings in space, rapid growth of mold cultures on food, tex-
weight, and scarce materials, but unfavor- tiles, and leather goods. The prolific insect
able reports from abroad soon belied its life further endangered poorly packed
04
reputation for strength and resistance to supplies.
moisture and caused a notable reduction Quartermaster supplies in the Pacific
in its use. In an effort to give more protec- were handled at least three to five times if
tion to fiber containers of all sorts, the they were brought straight from the United
OQMG late in July directed that as a tem- States to a point of consumption; if trans-
porary expedient depots overpack them in shipped from base to base, they might be
wood.'" These installations opposed this handled ten or more times. Colonel Cord-
innovation, claiming that it made heavy de- iner estimated that food was commonly han-
mands upon scarce labor and materials and dled eighteen to twenty-six times en route
required nearly 15 percentmore warehouse from Australia to a point of consumption in
and shipping space than was needed by sup- New Guinea. Combat rations might go
through several tactical operations without
plies which were simply moved in fiber car-
being issued and in consequence be handled
tons. In defense of their position the de- 5
as many as forty times.'' Poorly packed food
pots pointed out that the overpacking of the
03
30,000,000 solid fiber containers then Thatcher, Packaging, pp. 61-62.
"'
Ibid., pp. 5-6.
scheduled for movement overseas would in- Rpt, Cordiner, 2 May 43, sub: Trip to
""'(1)
crease the space occupied by each box to New Guinea, 13-24 Apr 43. ORB AFWESPAC QM
463.7. (2) Rpt, Capt King, 24 Dec 43, sub: Pack-
62
Tel, TQMG to QM Depots, 28 Jul 42, sub; aging and Packing Subs in New Caledonia. OQMG
Overpacking. OQMG 457 (Containers). SWPA 400.162.
DAMAGED SUBSISTENCE in a storage shed at Milne Bay, New Guinea (above) and in
the hold of a ship carrying rations (below).
180 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
suffered heavy damage in being loaded and Throughout 1942 and most of 1943
discharged by sling nets. This damage was Pacific quartermasters commonly described
particularly heavy if cargo vessels were dis- the outer packing of subsistence items as
charged as swiftly as possible in order to "completely worthless." 68
A survey of bases
reduce turnabout time. Containers were between Hawaii and New Caledonia in the
then tossed five or six feet from trucks into spring of 1942 disclosed that corrugated
a net spread on the ground, often landing fiber cartons in outdoor storage fell apart as
on corners or edges. When the net was lifted soon as a heavy downpour hit them. In the
or dropped, it crushed and then pushed the humid Fijis they disintegrated even in ware-
69
boxes in all directions. Diagonal pressures houses. On the docks at Wellington car-
threw the load on the weakest points of the tons, awaiting transshipment to Guadalca-
cartons, frequently denting or puncturing nal, became wet and broke open. Flour,
inner containers. sugar, rice, coffee, cereals, and baking pow-
Time and again available mechanical der, flimsily packaged for sale in grocery
equipment and service troops did not suffice stores, fell out and covered the docks with a
to handle peak loading and discharging de- mushy deposit. Even wooden packing cases
mands, and untrained islanders, who could were not entirely adequate. 70 Tightly fas-
not be expected to exercise much care, were tened with nails, they lacked resilience and
necessarily employed to do the job by hand. broke up more quickly under rough han-
During the first two years, moreover, dan- dling than did less rigid boxes. Straps did not
ger of bombing repeatedly forced the hasty afford much protection they were too light
;
discharge of vessels at night, with severe in weight and too few in number, only one
losses of supplies. In August 1943 one ob- ordinarily being placed around the short
server in New Guinea concluded that the circumference of a container, whereas a
greatest injury to poorly packed items oc- minimum of two was needed. 71
66
curred during operations of this sort. The Pacific quartermasters regarded the in-
Guadalcanal offensive illustrated the rough ner packagings, with the exception of tin
usage to which Quartermaster items were cans, as no better than the outer packs.
subject under such circumstances. Owing
Col. Joseph H. Burgheim, Task Force
to the presence of many enemy planes and Quartermaster in New Caledonia, scath-
ships,supply vessels might have to move
ingly described them as "a complete waste"
at amoment's notice and consequently did of funds.
72
Salt and sugar, shipped in cloth
not drop anchor. Lighters were brought bags, were often already half dissolved by
alongside after nightfall, and cargo was
simply flung overboard to waiting boats. In
'"
Ltr, TFQM New Caledonia to CQM USAFIA,
29 Apr 42. OQMG SWPA 319.1.
some instances makeshift piers were built Gn
(1) Ltr, CG HHD to CG SFPOE, 2 May 42,
sub: Shpmt of Subs in Pasteboard Containers.
to receive it, but usually only beaches were
67 OQMG 430. (2) Ltr, CG USASOS to CG SOS,
23 Sep 42, sub: Packaging Subs for SWPA. ORB
available.
AFWESPAC QM
430.
""Rpt, Maj Carl R. Fellers, 21 Aug Lecture, Col Robert C. Kilmartin, USMC, 19
70
43, sub:
Subs Spoilage in SWPA. ORB ABCOM GP&C Nov 42, sub: Solomon Islands. OQMG POA 319.1.
400.33 (Lend-Lease). 71
Memo, Maj William B. Harmon for Col John
"'
Min, Subcom of Container Co-ordinating Com T. Harris, New Cumberland QM Depot, \i Oct
on Fiber Boxes, Drums, and Cans, pp. 3-5. OQMG 42, sub: Packaging for SWPA. OQMG 400.162
R&D. !2
Ltr cited n. 68.
CORRUGATED FIBER CARTONS used for packing soon disintegrated in the rains
of
the South Pacific Area, and afforded little protection for their contents.
'
M
182 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
moisture on arrival at advance points. Sim- Frequently, cans had to be issued with no
ilarly packaged flour and rice frequently certainty as to the age or even the contents.
became moldy and full of weevils. Though Packing and packaging deficiencies, how-
fiber cans furnished more protection, they ever caused, obliged Quartermaster and
did not provide safeguards against exces- Veterinary personnel to devote countless
sive humidity for the salt, sugar, baking hours to the separation of unspoiled from
soda, and corn starch they usually held. spoiled food. Once this chore had been
Nor were they structurally strong enough to completed, more hours had to be spent in
withstand hard usage and were therefore the repacking of usable cans earmarked for
73
often dented and pierced. shipment to advance bases or combat areas.
—
Composite cans fiber containers with Sometimes the shortage of lumber made re-
metal ends —
were employed for packaging packing impossible.
75
cocoa, gelatin, spices, condiments, baking Because of the numerous hazards to which
powder, tea, and hard candy. These con- Quartermaster items were liable, better
tainers, particularly the larger ones, proved packaging and packing, obviously, had to be
unsatisfactory because of the weak joint be- developed. Subsistence in general had to be
tween the fiber sides and the metal tops and packed to protect it an entire year or even
bottoms. In some shipments of large five- longer, for reserve supplies accumulated at
pound cocoa cans the metal bottoms came bases and, as operations advanced, were
off practically all the containers. A behind for protracted periods of
either left
stronger joint could not be developed with- time or dragged through new cam-
else
out use of a side wall disproportionately paigns. Combat rations in particular might
thick in relation to the size of the contents. be stored for many months; consequently,
Even glass containers, used for syrup, they needed protection for at least two
76
pickles, vinegar, jams, jellies, and concen- years.
trated butters, wefe not fully satisfactory, In Washington the OQMG tried to de-
for a high percentage always broke in ship- velop more durable outer containers. It es-
74
ment. pecially sought a fiber box equaling nailed
Despite the fact that tin cans were in gen- wooden boxes in packing performance.
eral considered fairly reliable, they were Corrugated fiberboard manufacturers, eager
easily punctured. As these containers were to become once more competitive in the mil-
unlacquered, they were also liable to rust. itary container market, undertook the de-
thermore, moist labels speedily disintegrated strength, all-kraft solid fiber container with
and once the label was gone, there re- a sisal outer layer, and the other, a corru-
mained no ready means of identifying the gated container in which sisal was used in
contents or learning the date of packing. the construction of the kraft paper itself.
Both cartons, it was claimed, surpassed proof solid fiber boxes. Not until the summer
nailed wooden boxes in resisting rough of 1943 were V-boxes made in substantial
usage. Dropped 50 times in a testing drum volume, and even then the output was not
to simulate rough handling in a ship's hold, commensurate with requirements. The
then immersed in water for twenty-four QMC, indeed, never obtained all the V-
hours, and finally again tumbled in the drum boxes it would have had if production had
until they broke, two all-kraft containers sus- not been curtailed by continued manufac-
tained 315 and 526 falls and a sisal-kraft turing difficulties. V2- or V3-board often
container 569 falls before they failed. The had to be used when the superior VI grade
78
weatherproof solid fiber container survived was preferable.
only 21 falls and the nailed wooden box 222 V-containers did not reach Pacific bases
falls. in numbers until the close of
significant
Using "V" for "Victory," the OOMG 1943. Employed principally for food items,
termed the new materials "V-board" and they withstood handling hazards well, and
at the close of 1942 issued specifications for most observers believed them superior in this
three grades. VI grade, based on the super- respect to wooden boxes. If V2-boxes were
strength, all-kraft, highly water-resistant provided with sleeves, they were suitable for
fiber box used in the tests, furnished the best packing canned goods, but the sturdier VI-
grade; it was made entirely of virgin fibers boxes were preferred for emergency rations
and had a bursting strength of 750 pounds and other items stored over long periods of
per square inch when dry and 500 pounds time. The less durable V3-containers proved
when wet. The V2 grade, made from both most satisfactory for such fast-selling PX
virgin and used fibers, had a bursting and fruit juices.
articles as beer, soft drinks,
strength of 500 pounds per square inch, Efforts were made to send V - and V2-boxes 1
either wet or dry. The V3 grade, with a as far as possible to forward areas and V3-
strength of 400 pounds if dry but only 150 boxes to rear areas; but the mixing of all
pounds if wet, made merely a superior three grades in shipment made this difficult.
weatherproof solid fiber container. Sleeves, Since V-boxes lacked the rigidity of wooden
fitted over the V-containers from end to end, cases, they did not stack as well and some-
appreciably increased resistance to hard times collapsed if they bore the weight of
usage. Further protection was given by two a superimposed load or if not fully packed.
metal straps tightly drawn at right angles to They were most suitable when used for foods
each other. Later a third strap was added for packaged in tin cans or other strong inner
still more protection." containers capable of helping boxes with-
Production of V-containers was at first stand stacking pressures. V-containers were
severely circumscribed by the limited ca- also inferior to wooden containers in that
pacity of box factories, the shortage of fiber they were more easily damaged by mois-
pulp, labor troubles, and the inability of the ture. The new boxes retained heat longer
OQMG to issue procurement directives in than did those made of wood, but ex-
time to obtain delivery by the desired dates. cessive spoilage was seldom observed. In
For some months these handicapping fac- spite of the inferiority of V-containers in
tors forced the continued use of weather- some respects, their superiority in space-
77 7S
Thatcher, Packaging, pp. 65-68, 82-83. Ibid., pp. 70-73.
184 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
saving qualities, ease of handling, and, above peas —a multiwall paper sack lined with
all, resistance to hard usage, more and more asphalt moisture barriers. Originally, these
79
won them acceptance. products had been shipped in burlap or
During 1943 the developed the OQMG osnaburg, that is, coarse cotton, bags, which
conception of "amphibious packing" to in- furnished only slight protection against han-
dicate packing that could be easily carried dling hazards, moisture, and insects. Tin
and that could withstand exceedingly rough containers would have been more satisfac-
usage and about ninety days of exposure to tory, but the growing shortage of tin plate
the elements. In practice the term implied prohibited their extensive use. After the
a relatively low poundage and the employ- spring of 1942, five-ply multiwall sacks with
ment of superior outside packing materials. two asphalt barriers were prescribed as the
Amphibious packing, designed originally outer containers. The plies from inside to
for tactical operations, was actually applied outside consisted of one layer of natural
to most of the subsistence sent to the Pa- kraft; one layer of duplex, waterproof, as-
cific late in the war. As far as possible pack- phalt-laminated kraft; two layers identical
ers employed the freshest food. They pre- with the first two; and, finally, a fifth layer
with sleeves, but, if these cartons were un- ond type of outer sack, the laminated paper-
available, they substituted nailed or wire- osnaburg-paper bag, which afforded more
bound wooden cases. Because of the re- protection against moisture than the first,
peated necessity for carrying combat rations was authorized. It consisted of creped kraft
by hand, packers restricted the weight of paper laminated with asphalt to osnaburg
amphibious packs to about 40 pounds in cloth, which, in turn, was laminated with
contrast to the 50 to 60 pounds of other asphalt to creped, wet-strength-treated kraft
packs.
s"
paper. Both types of multiwall sack were
packing food items, the OQMG developed The contents of multiwall bags were
a special container for flour, salt, sugar, packaged in sacks of cotton sheeting. In the
powdered milk, rice, and dry beans and 60-pound sack there were usually 12 inner
bags containing 5 pounds each, or 6 bags
'"
( 1 ) Ltr, CG USASOS to CG Base Sec 7, 4 Jan
containing 10 pounds each, or one bag con-
44, sub: Subs Packed Amphibiously. ORB ABCOM
AG 430. (2) Rpt, Capt Horace Richards, 26 May taining 50 pounds, the precise size of the
44, sub: Caledonia. ORB
Trip to New ABCOM bag depending upon the standard unit em-
P&C 457. (3) Ltr, Dir of Proc USASOS to CG
USAFFE, 20 Jun 44, sub: Packaging of Australian- ployed in distribution of the product. Flour
Procured Sups. ORB AFPAC GPA 400.161. (4) and sugar were shipped in 50-pound bags
Ltr, CG USASOS to CG ASF, 1 Jul 44, sub: Pack-
ing of QM Sups. ORB ABCOM AFWESPAC QM and salt, which was in less demand, in
2
430. smaller bags."
""
( 1 ) Memo, S&D Div for DQMG for Sup Ping,
8 Jan 43, sub: Rpt on SPA. OQMG POA 319.1. S1
OQMG Tentative Specification 103, 23 Feb 43.
(2) Ltr, TQMG CG USASOS, 17 Jul 43, sub:
to s2
( 1 ) Memo, Subs Br for S&D Div OQMG, 5
Amphibiously Packed Rations. ORB AFWESPAC Nov 43, sub: Packaging QM Overseas Items.
QM 430.2. OQMG SWPA 400.162. (2) Rpt cited n. 79 (2).
STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROBLEMS 185
neries in Hawaii.
si *5
Lecture, Col Isker, Army Food Conf, 2 Apr
for Research and
46, sub: Field Svc is the Best Lab
In the spring of 1944 millions of con- De'v. OQMG334.
tainers, lacquered or enameled on the out-
""
Chicago QM
Depot, QMC
Tentative Specifi-
cation 107, -20 Mar 43, sub: Marking Cans for
vl
Thatcher, Packaging, pp. 41-45. Overseas Shpmt. OQMG 400.1141.
186 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
which the pack was ligent labor."
m Owing to the failure to in-
ticularly the year in
87
made. Embossing of cans for citrus com- dicate clearly the contents of boxes, the
modities created a fresh problem, for the wrong item or incorrect quantities of the
embossing die occasionally fractured the right item were often issued. Fewer mark-
container and permitted acid liquid to ings — and these in larger letters — were what
spread over and rust the can. A more seri- Pacific quartermasters wanted. They ob-
ous fault was the repeated failure of con- jected in particular to the small 4- to J/2-
I
tracting plants to indicate the name of the inch lettering of the name of the product
product and the date of packing, omissions and to its appearance on only one side and
that rendered identification of contents and one end of the container. They wanted this
the consistent provision of fresh foods al- identification placed on both sides and both
88
most impossible. ends in 3- or 4-inch letters and the number
Marking of outside containers for move- and weight of units in the container and the
ment overseas, like that of tin cans, received date of packing similarly indicated in
wholly satisfied. Col. James C. Longino States in climate, terrain, and social and eco-
probably expressed the prevailing opinion nomic development as were those of the
when he claimed that markings were too Pacific.
from depots in the United States to Pacific Eventually, employment of rust preventa-
bases some bales always disintegrated be- tives solved this problem.
cause of torn coverings, rusted metal straps, Many items of clothing and general util-
and crumbled waterproof paper. In spite ity were shipped in V-cases, usually of the
mishaps advantages of baling far
of these V3 type. As some of these items could not
outbalanced disadvantages. 93 be solidly packed, the comparatively weak
" :t
( ) Memo, CQM forCG USASOS, 1 Nov 43, containers often collapsed under pressure.
1
ORB AFWESPAC AG 430. (2) Rpt, Capt King, Boxes containing shoes were especially sub-
14 Nov 43, sub: Packing of QM
Sups at Noumea.
OQMG SWPA 319.25.
01
P. 10 of Rpt cited n. 65 (1).
188 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
mishap. So were those which held
ject to this dry cereals and occasionally for dehydrated
helmets, for these articles, because of their vegetables, frequently admitted moisture.
irregular shape, could not be fitted snugly Since package sizes and shapes were not
into a case and were so heavy they gradually rigidly standardized, it was hard to pack
broke down their containers. If cartons containers snugly, and considerable uncer-
holding soap became wet, they disintegrated tainty often prevailed as to the number of
97
because the soap dissolved and weakened packages in a container.
the interior of the boxes. In the Philippines Outer packs proved even less satisfactory
in 1944 and 1945 rain damaged socks, uni- than inner containers, being larger and
forms, stationery, and toilet paper, if they more unwieldy than those from the United
95
were not strongly packaged. Such losses States. Steeldrums, weighing 250 pounds,
brought about various suggestions for deal- were occasionally used for flour. As late as
ing with the problem. One observer recom- May 1945 an observer from the Chicago
mended that the sides of V3-boxes be Quartermaster Depot found many New
strengthened sufficiently to prevent collapse Zealand products packed in unmanageable
under heavy loads. Another observer pro- 1 50-pound containers or 1 00-pound wooden
posed that V-containers be utilized only for cases."* The wooden boxes, generally
food and nailed or metal-strapped wooden employed Southwest Pacific to pack
in the
cases for Class IIand IV supplies. But the supplies consigned to advance areas, proved
most common recommendation was that unsuitable because the softwood required to
V3-boxes be utilized solely for articles so make was unobtainable, and
superior cases
shaped as to strengthen resistance to stack- the brittle lumber employed as a substitute
96
ing pressures. broke easily. Late in 1943 lumber for pack-
ing purposes became so scarce in Queens-
Packing and Packaging land that the crates necessary for the de-
Locally Procured Supplies livery of fresh vegetables in edible condition
could not be provided. In contrast to Aus-
The new packaging and packing meth- tralia, New Zealand had a relatively plenti-
ods were applied insofar as was feasible to ful supply of softwoods appropriate for the
commodities purchased in Australia and production of wood containers. That coun-
New Zealand. But technical inexperience try indeed had a surplus for exportation to
and shortages of raw materials retarded the its large neighbor.
99
Both New Zealand and
introduction of American innovations. At Australia suffered from recurrent shortages
the start inner containers for subsistence
"T
were comparable to and as unsatisfactory as Rpt, Capt King, 23 Dec 43, sub: Packaging
those employed in early shipments from the and Packing of Sups from Australia and New
Zealand. ORB NUGSEC 400.162. QM
United States, but by the close of 1943 "*
Rpt, Capt Lyle M. Richardson, Jr., Aug 45,
better ones had been introduced. Lacquered sub: Class I Sup in the Pacific, p. 14. OQMG Mil
tin cans were extensively employed. Square, Ping Div.
""
( 1 ) Ltr, CG USASOS Gen Depot to CG
four-gallon cans, employed for flour and I'SASOS, 7 Oct 43, sub: Recasing of Subs. ORB
10
NUGSEC QM
400.16. (2) Ltr, CG Base SvC Base
""
7th Div Opns Rpt King II, G-4 Sec, p. 48. Sec 7 to CQM
USASOS, 2 Nov 43, sub: Amphibi-
(1) Rpt 3, Capt Orr, 20 May 44, sub: Rpt on ous Shpmts. (3) Memo, Lt Col T. J. Pozzy for
the Letterpress Opn. OQMG SWPA 319.25. (2) Col Hester, Proc Div USASOS, 3 Jun 44, sub:
Ltr cited n. 79(3). (3) Rpt cited n. 23(2). Wooden Shooks. Both in ORB NUGSEC 457. QM
STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, AND PACKING PROBLEMS 189
of wire, nails, and straps for bracing wooden Some tentative conclusions can be drawn
boxes. USASOS and SOS SPA therefore with regard to the problems treated in this
imported these indispensable materials from chapter. Few of them were susceptible of
the United States but never received all they ready solution; indeed, under the unfavor-
wanted. From home sources, too, came able conditions encountered in advance
,
"shooks,' that is, sets of box parts, ready to areas a large number were almost if not
be assembled, and small quantities of V- quite insoluble. Building materials and
board.
1 ""
The Southwest Pacific Area tried skilled labor for constructing storage facili-
to interest Australian manufacturers in the ties at island supply centers were almost
production of V-containers; its efforts, how- totally absent, and Quartermaster construc-
101
ever, came Considerable quan-
to naught. tion at best had only low priorities. Had
tities and other baling materials
of burlap more ocean-going vessels been available,
were procurable below the equator, but more building materials could have been
lack of compression machines prevented imported, and had procurement of refrig-
their extensive use, and balable supplies erated facilities and small prefabricated
were necessarily packed in three-ply wooden warehouses been conducted with greater
102
boxes. vigor, more of these desirable means of stor-
Since the new and better packaging and age could have been obtained. But even if
packing methods developed in the zone of these conditions had all been met, they could
interior could not be widely applied to items have ended storage perplexities only in part.
obtained in Australia and New Zealand, Manpower shortages and low priorities
supplies from these countries in general would have precluded immediate assem-
could not resist rough handling as well as bling of prefabricated buildings, and the
those from the United States. Furthermore, normal necessity for prompt discharge of
since they were less compactly packed, they vessels would have forced resort to open
occupied more cargo space. Despite these storage. The possibility of relief was further
drawbacks Quartermaster packaging and complicated by the repeated shifting of the
packing constituted one of the brighter as- center of supply activity to the newer bases,
pects of QMC distribution activities. The whose undeveloped state made open storage
improved methods appreciably alleviated virtually obligatory for many months.
handling problems, prolonged the storage With the comparatively limited number
life of most supplies, saved cargo space, and of cargo vessels, supply troubles would have
been considerably eased could air transpor-
pointed the way for still further betterment.
tation have been employed more freely.
""'
Memo, Capt Horace Richards Col R. W.
for Lt
Hughes, Proc Div USASOS, 12 Jul 44, sub: Pack-
What was most needed was more cargo
ing. ORB NUGSEC QM 457. planes, more cargo parachutes, and better
"" Capt Horace Harding Dir of Proc
( 1 ) Ltr, to
delivery technique. There was not enough
USASOS, May 44, sub: 26 Trip to New Caledonia.
ORB ABCOM P&C 457. (2) Ltr cited n. 79(3). time during the war to fill these require-
(3) Ltr, CO USASOS to Dir of Proc, 21 Sep 44, ments in more than small part, but the
V-cases. ORB ABCOM P&C 457.
sub:
102
( 1 ) Memo, Lt Col W.
R. Ridlehuber for P&C QMC did learn how valuable planes might
Office, QM Sec, USASOS Gen Depot, 29 Sep when other means of
be as supply carriers
43, sub: Packaging of Sups. 400.16. QM (2)
transportation hadbecome unavailable or
Memo, n. s., for Col Cordiner, 5 Nov 43. Both in
ORB AFWESPAC QM 400.16. unusable. That knowledge was to be ap-
190 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
plied in the postwar years to the develop- and packing. Actions then taken to correct
ment of better air cargo methods. defects proved their value and served as
The potential packaging and packing guides to still greater improvements in the
problems of overseas areas had not been postwar era. The development of sturdier
fully comprehended before Pearl Harbor, V-containers in particular pointed the way
but early wartime experience quickly re- to much better fiberboard cartons. From its
vealed the wastefulness of flimsy packaging trials the QMC had indeed learned much.
CHAPTER VIII
receive all the gasoline they wanted, but held by the 41st Division in the Oro Bay
no operation
lack of this vital fuel halted area at this time revealed that 40 to 50
and never more than temporarily incon- percent of the evaporated milk, 20 to 40
venienced fighting troops. Provision of percent of canned fruits, and 20 to 25 per-
Quartermaster items thus in general caused cent of canned vegetables were unfit to eat.
but slight trouble for supply officers. It was One observer concluded that at least 40
the problems associated with shortages percent of the rations in the Southwest Pa-
sporadic though they usually were — which were then "spoiled or unconsumable."
cific
demanded of quartermasters the greater In September it was estimated that losses
month. 2 In the South Pacific, too, losses creased somewhat after mid- 1943, they re-
accumulated at a prodigious rate. In the mained high. In March 1944 the War
first eight months of 1943 the Veterinary
Department estimated that 12 percent of
Service condemned about 3,500,000 pounds such food moved in the previous year from
and enormous quantities
of evaporated milk the United States to the South Pacific and
of
3
canned fruits and vegetables. Only 1 7 percent of that moved to the Southwest
6
Hawaii escaped wholesale condemnations Pacific could notbe accounted for. In the
of stored food. twelve months between 1 May 1943 and 30
Heavy subsistence losses resulted not only April 1944 in the latter area, the Chief
from storage in the open and from inferior Quartermaster's record, covering food from
packaging and packing but also from such Australia as well as the United States,
causes as shipping accidents and enemy at- agreed with the War Department figure.
tacks. Unit messes were notoriously waste- It ascribed losses to the following causes:
ful of food; their cooks often had neither spoilage, 5.44 percent; shipping accidents,
training nor experience in the preparation 5.44 percent; pilferage, 3.40 percent; ex-
of meals and were in general lax in the per- cess issues, 1.36 percent; and unknown
formance of their duties, neglecting to sepa- causes, 1.36 percent. This estimate did
rate spoiled from unspoiled meats and vege- not include losses in combat and in unit
than were given in the estimates." In March ties in that part of the world. As General
1944 condemnations at Port Moresby, Frink pointed out, shortages developed in
where storage conditions were compara- New Guinea not so much because items were
tively good, amounted to 2,143,000 pounds, scarce in the Southwest Pacific Area as a
or 16 percent of all the food examined. Yet whole as because they could not be sent to
wholesale condemnations had been made at the proper places in the proper quantities
this base only nine months before. All but proper times. Area-wide stocks of such
at the
10,000 pounds of the 541,000 pounds of commodities as flour and sugar were in gen-
canned corned beef and all but 8,000 of the eral more than ample to fill all requirements,
410,000 pounds of canned beets were pro- yet they were repeatedly unavailable at ad-
10
nounced unfit to eat. All of the C and J ra- vance bases and to troops in the field. More
tions, all but a tiny fraction of the D ra- or less chronic scarcities indeed existed only
tions, all the hominy, dried apples, and in boneless beef and some of the more popu-
assorted biscuits werecondemned. Less than lar vegetables, but such scarcities were made
5 percent of the canned tomatoes and of the more acute by the tendency of island installa-
raisins were found edible, and 70 percent of tions to issue these favored items in sizable
the margarine and much of the canned quantities as long as they were available.
orange juice and dehydrated vegetables This failure to conserve limited stocks did
were unusable. 9 Wholesale condemnations, much to promote the "feast-and-famine"
like those at Port Moresby, lend weight to cycle characteristic of many unit messes. A
the belief that even in 1944 the total loss of directive of February 1944 ordered base
nonperishables in the Southwest Pacific may commanders in New Guinea to prepare
have run as high as 25 percent. Because of monthly menus which would be based on
slightly better storage and handling condi- actual stocks and expected receipts and
tions, losses in the South Pacific may have which would the amount
list of each item
been 5 to 10 percent lower. For comparable to be served at every meal. Because of the
reasons the Central Pacific Area probably uncertainty of receipts, this method of con-
had an even smaller wastage. trolling issues proved futile. Bases themselves
usually ignored the menus and continued,
Supply of Subsistence in Advance Areas much as in the past, to overissue popular
11
items.
Heavy subsistence losses were one of the Ration problems in New Guinea came to
main causes for what was perhaps the major a climax in late 1943 and early 1944. Usable
Quartermaster problem in the Pacific re- — cargo space was then at a low level in rela-
current scarcities of some food items at ad- tion to the rapidly rising troop strength, and
vance bases and in combat zones, particu- combat units were often stationed at unex-
larly in New Guinea. But this problem was
pected and widely scattered points for which
not produced by any single cause; it de-
no adequate supply plans had been formu-
veloped out of the whole complex of condi-
lated. Weeks sometimes passed before work-
tions that hampered Quartermaster activi-
,0
Conf 15 Mar 44, sub: Min of Special Staff
8
Memo, CQM for G-4 USASOS, 16 Feb 44, sub Sees Hq USASOS. ORB AFWESPAC QM 337.
ing enough stocks for troops in training, at Declining Port Moresby was the only base
rest camps, and in operational zones. These that had enough flour, and it had double its
essential in view of the variety they gave to short, was almost without fresh meat. Even
the menu. 1 '
day supply of fruit juices whereas Lae had larger but still inadequate quantities. Port
but a 1-day supply. At Milne Bay corned Moresby stocked a 12-day supply; Milne
beef and C rations were "hopelessly in ex- Bay, an 11 -day supply; and Lae, a 5-day
cess" of any conceivable requirement, but supply. But at Oro Bay and Finschhafen
18
more acceptable items, like coffee, canned butter stores were wholly depleted. Ten
fruits, sugar, cheese, and dehvdrated pota- days later levels of perishables in general
toes and onions, had been almost exhausted, showed only a slight rise. Whereas stocks of
and the base Quartermaster was begging for beef and butter at Port Moresby had passed
16
their replenishment. the 30-day level, and enough beef had been
The maldistribution of perishables was received at Oro Bay to set up a 27-day level,
even worse than that of nonperishables. other perishable stores at these bases and
Acute shortages of fresh provisions prevailed Milne Bay showed little if any change. At
everywhere in New Guinea. For days and Lae and Finschhafen the status of stocks had
even weeks early in 1944 lack of reefers at so deteriorated that neither installation had
19
Milne Bay held up the transfer of perishables any sort of fresh provisions.
to forward installations. On 31 January During the rest of 944 both perishables
1
neither Port Moresby nor Oro Bay had any and nonperishables remained more or less
fresh beef or poultry, yet these two bases to- unbalanced, but shortages were never so
gether were responsible for provisioning marked as in the opening months of the
103,000 of the 232,000 men in New Guinea. year. Some excess stockages appeared at
Finschhafen then had only a 2-day supply Port Moresby and Milne Bay as these in-
stallations were left farther and farther to
of these provisions, and Lae only a 7-day
the rear of combat operations. The new
supply. Even the 14-day supply at Milne
and growing bases at Finschhafen and Hol-
Bay fell short of the amount needed for reg-
landia, however, continued to encounter
ular supply. Bacon and ham were as scarce
difficulty in matching supplies and require-
as beef and poultry. Finschhafen had a
ments. At Finschhafen on 15 May, there
mere 1-day supply; Oro Bay, a 2-day sup- was only a 2- or 3-day supply of such staples
ply; Milne Bay, a 5-day supply; and Port as canned meat, canned and dehydrated
Moresby, a 7-day supply.
17
New Guinea, in fruitsand vegetables, flour, coffee, evapo-
rated milk, and sugar. No cigarettes and
'Rpt, Col R. C. Kramer, 10 Mar 44, sub: Trip
to Advance Bases. ORB AFWESPAC AG 430.2. only a single day's supply of other tobacco
'"Ltr, QM DISTBRA to DISTDIV USASOS,
5 Feb 44, sub: Subs. ORB NUGSEC QM 430. ,s
Ibid.
17
Memo, Dir of Distr for G-4 USASOS, 3 Feb Memo, Dir of Distr for G-4 USASOS, 13 Feb
"'
44, sub: Perishable Subs Levels. ORB NUGSEC 44, sub: Perishable Subs Levels. ORB NUGSEC
QM 430. QM 430.
196 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
20
products were on hand. Though such low these items there was an abundance. Con-
stock levels occurred but rarely, food was sequently, troops did not suffer from hun-
seldom obtainable in the variety needed for ger but only from lack of the varied diet to
satisfying meals. which they were accustomed.
Unbalanced stockages were reflected in When bases received deliveries of fresh
subsistence issues at bases, but to a slighter provisions in excess of their refrigerator ca-
extent than at the supply points of the com- pacity, they were obliged to issue the sur-
bat forces dispersed along the north shore plus quickly in order to keep it from spoil-
and on the outlying islands. This disparity, ing. For this reason troops at Oro Bay, be-
while in the main a consequence of dis- tween 22 and 24 November 1943, were daily
tribution difficulties, resulted in part from served nineteen eggs and bountiful portions
the natural tendency of bases to take for of beef and butter. Such fortunate soldiers
their own troops a disproportionately large were said to be on a "prince and pauper"
share of what was available. Higher eche- fare, for they gorged themselves for several
lonsand other organizations that controlled days and then went back to a dreary fare of
airplanesemployed them to bring coveted canned goods. 23
food and tobacco direct from Australia. As the Sixth Army moved westward to
The "silent blessing" given to this practice Aitape and Hollandia in April, tn Wakde
by the commanding officers of these organ- and Biak Islands in May, and to Noemfoor
izations stimulated the discriminatory Island and Sansapor in July, stringing new
21
traffic. supply points along the far-flung north
Troops near bases were in general
at or shore, distribution difficulties were intensi-
fed somewhat better than those in advance fied. Biak lay 815 miles west of Finschhafen
units, but even they usually received only and 345 miles west of Hollandia. Noemfoor
a monotonous fare. This fact is illustrated Island and Sansapor, respectively, 435 and
by the slim issue of perishables at Finsch- 645 miles west of Hollandia, were still more
hafen in December 1943. During the whole remote. From May to July troops beyond
month there were but five servings of bone-
Finschhafen had to be supplied with fresh
less beef, one of turkey, especially made at
provisions largely by air. But heavy tactical
Christmas, six of eggs, three of potatoes, and
demands on available planes made impos-
three of butter. For several weeks in Feb-
sible any substantial abatement of the scar-
ruary and March 1944
was obliged
the base
to confine its meat issues to canned corned
city of perishables. The few air shipments
gave only scattered and temporary relief to
beef hash and meat and vegetable hash and
stew and its vegetable issues to canned cab-
ground troops. Lt. Col. Clarence E. Reid,
quartermaster of the U.S. forces at Biak,
bage, beets, carrots, and tomatoes. 22 Of
commenting on shipments to his area, as-
20
Rpt, QM INTERSEC USASOS, 20 May 44, serted that they were nearly always brought
sub: Weekly Opns Rpt. ORB NUGSEC QM 430.
21
XIII AFSC, War Critique Study, I, 73. Li-
to the air base on nearby Owi Island and
brary of Congress. that several days elapsed before he learned
22
( 1 ) Ltr, QM Base F to CQM USASOS, 30
Dec 43, sub: Perishable Subs. ORB NUGSEC QM 23
( 1 ) Personal Ltr, Col Elmer F. Wallender to
430. (2) Memo, Col Cordiner for Lt Col J. D. Ja- Col Cordiner, 1 Dec 43. ORB AFWESPAC QM
cobs, 29 Feb 44, sub: Subs Problems. OQMG 312. (2) Ltr, CQM to INTERSEC, 22 Dec 43,
SWPA 319.25. sub: Distr of Perishables. ORB NUGSEC QM
430.
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 197
24
that they had come in. Even air organiza- flights resulted in a slight betterment of ra-
tions, if actively supporting combat opera- tions, but Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, com-
tions, were not much better provisioned than mander of the Sixth Army, maintained that
ground organizations. Early in August, for at least fourteen planes were needed to in-
instance, Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, com- sure an ample supply of perishables for for-
manding the Thirteenth Air Force at Noem- ward elements. He suggested that four
foor Island, reported that his troops had planes be run regularly to Aitape, an equal
received no perishables by sea for two number to Biak, and two each to Wakde
months and only sporadic shipments by Island, Noemfoor Island, and Sansapor.
plane. His men, he declared, had "to forage Tactical requirements precluded such an
27
perishables almost entirely" from relatively allotment of aircraft.
well-stockedNavy shore organizations. 25 Even the limited quantities of perishables
Only when air units were not actively en- in forward areas could not always be dis-
gaged in operational missions could they tributed equally among units. In May, for
utilize their transport craft to obtain perish- example, three small shipments consigned
ables. They might then bring fresh provi- to the Humboldt Bay-Tanahmerah Bay
sions not onlyfrom Australia but also from region arrived by water and were all issued
New Guinea bases, which lacked reefers to to the 41st Division at Humboldt Bay. The
supply all the forward points in their dis- 24th Division and other organizations at
tribution areas. Air units with the necessary neighboring Tanahmerah Bay received
means of transportation often asked these none; even the hospital there had no fresh
bases for the unshipped provisions, and food. The explanation of this inequity was
some of the bases acceded to these requests. the presence of better landing places at
Ground troops considered such action un- Humboldt Bay, the absence of roads be-
fair because it diminished the already small tween that point and Tanahmerah Bay,
stocks available for their supply,and bases the inadequate dump and cold-storage
were finally instructed not to comply with equipment in the latter area, and the na-
these requests unless authorized to do so by
tural tendency to provide first for the forces
higher authority. 26
most easily reached. But whatever the
In mid-August the Fifth Air Force allo-
causes, the surgeon of I Corps declared that
cated six planes to the regular transporta-
the resultwas a ration incapable of main-
tion of fresh provisions for ground and air 28
taining good health. Early in August Maj.
troops alike. These planes flew from Finsch-
Gen. Frederick A. Irving, commander of
hafen or Hollandia to forward areas and
the 24th Division, reported that poor sup-
carried on each trip about 5,000 pounds of
boneless beef, salted ham, or butter. Their 27
( 1 ) Personal Ltr, Gen Krueger to Maj Gen
Ennis C. Whitehead, 22 Aug 44. ORB Sixth Army
21
Memo, QM USF Biak for QM Alamo Force, AG -430. (2) Rpt, QM
Base G, 6 Sep 44, sub:
15 Jul 44. ORB Sixth Army AG 333 (Investiga- Perishables Shipped to Forward Areas. ORB Base
tion 41 ). G QM 430.2.
L
"'Ltr, CG Thirteenth AF to CG FEAF, 10 Aug * (1) Rpt, Capt J. J. Sullivan to CG USF APO
44, sub: Army-Navy Perishables. ORB AFWES- 24, 26 May 44, sub: Rpt of Investigation APO 24.
PAC AG 430.2. ORB Sixth Army AG 333 (Investigation 47). (2)
2,1
QM NUGSEC to QM Base A
See, for example, 24th Inf Div G-4 Journal, 1 Jun 44. ORB Base G
et al., 19 May Unauthorized Issues of QM
45, sub: QM 319.1. (3) Smith, Approach to the Philip-
Sups. ORB Base F QM 400. pines, pp. 77-83.
198 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ply during the previous four months had dia concluded that "technically all units are
"made the use of prepared rations, rather getting ample food" but that "actually they
than the balanced field ration, necessary for are not, as the ration issued has been mainly
extended periods/' Some units, he declared, 'C ration and after several days the troops
31
were forced to eat packaged rations "exclu- can not eat it." Some companies had been
sively for extended periods." Not until the for days entirely without flour, sugar, coffee,
end of June, he added, had conditions mate- milk, butter, salt, and types of canned vege-
29
rially improved. tables that their men would eat.Mess ser-
At that very time, however, the surgeon geants had even been obliged to request food
of the 1881st Engineer Aviation Battalion, from air, service, and other favorably sit-
which was performing heavy manual work uated organizations outside the regiment.
on a 24-hour-a-day schedule seven days a Some of these noncommissioned officers re-
week, reported that the unit's rations were fused to beg rations, for they regarded such
still unsatisfactory. During the previous action as degrading to combat units. Offi-
four weeks, he declared, the ration had cers and men alike felt "highly incensed by
been constantly deficient in quantity by 30 what they consider to be a grossly unfair
to 40 percent. This considerable deficit bore distribution of rations," and their anger was
with particular severity on organizations, intensified when food-seeking sergeants re-
which, like the battalion, operated on a 24- turned with reports of organizations eating
hour schedule and daily served five meals. roast beef and maintaining "their own PX
To compensate for the vitamin deficiency where ice cream and other delicacies are sold
32
caused by the total absence of fresh foods, to the troops of the unit only."
the surgeon issued each man two vitamin The sense of being discriminated against
tablets a day. According to Maj. W. G. was especially aggravated by the disparity
Caples, who commanded the battalion, hun- between Army and Navy rations. Through
ger was undermining the health of his men, naval supply channels construction bat-
some of whom had already been hospital- talions and other Navy on shore ob-
units
ized. Yet the battalion was no worse off tained fairly well-balanced and appetizing
insofar as the quantity of its rations was meals even when nearby Army units were
concerned than were many other units sup- eating an unpalatable fare. This fact is not
plied by the 24th Division at Tanahmerah surprising, for logisticians have long recog-
Bay. That division had only a 7-day supply nized that organizations having the readiest
of unbalanced rations ashore and afloat and access to superior means of transportation
only five trucks to distribute this limited are better supplied than are those less for-
supply to units widely scattered along tunately situated, and there is no doubt that
the coast. 30 the Navy possessed more and
means better
Early in July an officer investigating the of shipping rations than did theArmy. The
exceptionally bad ration supply of the 34th larger naval vessels all had ample refriger-
Infantry Regiment bivouacked at Hollan- ation capacity from which perishable pro-
visions were taken for sailors on shore.
'"'
Ltr, Gen Irving to CG
Corps, 6 Aug 44. ORB
I
Base G QM
333 (Investigations 52). 31
Rpt, 2d Lt Harry T. Grube, 8 Jul 44, sub:
" (1) Rpt, Capt Walter S. Hunt, 23 Jan 44. (2) Result of Investigation. Sixth Army AG 333
ORB
Rpt, Maj. W. G. Caples, 23 Jun 43. ORB Base G (Investigations 41).
QM 333 (Investigations 52). 32
Ibid.
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 199
Naval units occasionally had so much fresh Meanwhile the rations served to the 1st
food they bartered their surplus stores with Cavalry declined in quality. In May that or-
Army Such marked contrasts
organizations. ganization, still in the Admiralties several
between the subsistence of the two services weeks after having finished its tactical op-
aroused bitter criticism and angry discon- erations there, complained that during the
tent among hungry soldiers. To some ex- previous sixty days it had received fresh beef
tent similar reactions, varying in intensity at only three meals. "Every man," Maj. Gen.
with the quality of were en- Army rations, Innis P. Swift, commander of the division,
countered among troops nearly everywhere asserted, "is sick and tired of corned beef
33
in the Pacific. and corned beef hash." There was no bak-
Few forward organizations were ever as ing powder whatever, and only enough flour
37
bad off as those in the Hollandia-Tanah- for one issue of bread a day. There was no
merah region from May to August 1944. flour at all for rolls, biscuits, pancakes,
Most combat troops received enough food dumplings, pie crust, or cake, nor was there
to provide a full ration if bulk alone was any lard or lard substitute. Scarcely any
considered. The experience of the 1st sugar, milk, salt, or fresh fruits and vege-
Cavalry Division typified that of the ma- tables were available. The men, General
jority combat organizations in New
of Swift added, "say that dehydrated foods
Guinea. Though this division had ample are all right for about a week, but after that
food, it in February 1944 the de-
proposed they are nauseating." "The only way," he
letion of canned beets and parsnips from concluded, "to get a square meal is to get
the menu and recommended in place of some Jap souvenirs and trade them to the
3b
canned cabbage, carrots, and beets more CB's."
beans, peas, corn, asparagus, and sweet po- During 1 944 report after report from the
tatoes. Instead of so much corned beef it Sixth Army stressed the continued prepon-
wanted more Vienna sausage. It also desired derance of canned corned beef, corned beef
more yeast and baking powder and more hash, carrots, cabbages, and beets in ship-
macaroni and chili powder. 34 USASOS ments from Australia. The monotony of
headquarters was unable to act favorably meals was intensified by extensive use of
on these proposals. Australian vegetable wholly packaged rations, usually C rations,
production was so lacking in variety which contained too many unattractive
that beets and parsnips could not be components and less than stipulated
eliminated. To prevent waste, it asserted, amounts of some acceptable items. In one
35
"these stocks must be consumed." Low shipment of 600,000 C rations to Biak two-
Australian production of the other items thirds of the meat components consisted of
wanted by the 1st Cavalry also precluded 39
3 '5
corned beef hash.
their delivery in larger quantities.
As the year closed, startling disparities
53
(1 ) Ltr, CG 1st Cav Div to CG Alamo Force, still existed in perishable stocks. In Novem-
3 May 44. ORB Base F QM 430.2. (2) Ltr cited
n. 25. (3) Ltr, TQMG to Senator Robert A. Taft,
37
Ltr, Gen Swift to Maj Gen Edwin D. Patrick,
2 Apr 45. OQMG POA 430. Alamo Force, 3 May 44. ORB Base F QM 430.2.
38
" Rpt, Conf on Rations 1st Cav Div, 9 Feb 44. Ibid.
ORB AFWESPAC AG 430.2. 3,1
See, for example, TWX, CG USASOS to CO
35
Ibid., 3d Ind. 1NTERSEC, 27 Aug 44. ORB AFWESPAC AG
36
Ibid., 4th Ind. 430.
200 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ber, Thirteenth Air Force groups at Sansa- 41 pounds, and in August 18 pounds. But
por received only l/2 pounds per man of stocks of butter and fresh vegetables re-
perishables, nearly all fresh meats, whereas mained low. 41
groups on Guadalcanal in October received
115 pounds per man, of which about 27 Class II and IV Supplies
pounds were pounds were
fresh meats, 69
fresh vegetables, and 9 pounds were butter. The distribution of Class II items (cloth-
Throughout their stay at Sansapor, Thir- ing and equipage) and Class IV items (gen-
teenth Air Force groups received only small eral supplies, that is, articles of general util-
and fluctuating quantities of perishables. In ity) was ordinarily a less important matter
September they were issued 2/2 pounds per than that of food and Class III items (pe-
man of fresh meat, in October 8 pounds, troleum products), for troops could operate
in November IV5 pounds, in December 12 over lengthy periods of time with limited
pounds, and in January 6 pounds. The quantities of clothing and general supplies
groups on Guadalcanal fared much better, but could not long survive without food nor
obtaining in three successive months 29, 17, conduct modern warfare without gasoline.
and 37 pounds of fresh meat. Apart from To the procurement and distribution diffi-
the chronic distribution difficulties, these re- made Class II and IV supply a
culties that
markable inequalities sprang from the ne- hard task was added, then, the lack of a
cessity of supplying air units at Sansapor sense of urgency.
through the Quartermaster section of an
infantry division already burdened with Shortages
countless routine duties, from the fact
that New Guinea bases were called upon to
From the outset recurrent and sometimes
acute scarcities appeared in these classes.
give heavy logistical support to offensive op-
By October 1 942 they were almost depleted
erations in the Philippines at a time when
there were still many troops to be supplied
in New
Guinea. Stocks in Australia were
then limited and unbalanced, but the quar-
in New Guinea itself, and from the rapid
termaster at the Brisbane base assembled
decline of Guadalcanal as a supporter of
forward and combat elements and the con- 2,500 tons of supplies to meet the needs of
the advance bases. Unfortunately, he could
sequent availability of more rations for
obtain neither vessels nor planes for their
troops on Guadalcanal itself. 40 Around
Sansapor the scarcity of perishables and the movement, and meanwhile the advance
dearth of variety in canned foods meant that bases clamored for replenishment. At the
end of three weeks, space for part of the
both air and ground forces had for a time
cargo was finally allotted on northbound
almost nothing to eat but C rations, dehy-
vessels, but until well into the following
drated vegetables, and spam. Not until the
year similar instances of shipping delays oc-
Philippines were reached, did rations be-
come much June 1945 members
better. In
curred — much more often than for other
42
Quartermaster items.
of the Thirteenth Air Force on Leyte each
received 25 pounds of fresh meats, in July 41
Ibid.
42
Ltr, QM Base Sec 3 to CQM USASOS, 3 Dec
40
XIII AFSC, War Study Critique, I, 73, 77. 42, sub: QM Critical Items. ORB AFWESPAC
Library of Congress. QM 400.
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 201
salvage equipment, field ranges, mess out- lacked socks and other articles of clothing,
fits, portable typewriters, and duplicating and troops supplied by it could obtain none
and stencil-cutting machines. Without these of these vital items. Fifth Air Force units
supplies administrative, storage, cooking, solved the problem for themselves by send-
laundry, and salvage activities were gravely ing one of their crash boats high-speed —
handicapped. At some bases it was indeed motorboats used to rescue survivors of forced
impossible to provide all Quartermaster landings of aircraft at sea — to Port Mores-
services. Even such indispensable items by in order to obtain the missing articles.
as trousers, jackets, work suits, bedding, and USASOS, supposedly in possession of ves-
dinnerware were scarce. Inevitably, these sels for transferring materials by water, was
shortages increased tremendously the per- thus placed in the anomalous position of
sonal discomforts of troops in New Guinea.* 4
seeing the air force supply the shipping for
While it was true that such widespread this purpose. Late in April Class II and IV
shortages of essential items were usually stocks at Lae were still generally far below
authorized levels. The Intermediate Section,
a USASOS Regulations 30-12, 16 Mar 44,
(1)
USASOS, attributed this unfavorable situ-
sub: QM Clo and Individual Equip. (2) Ibid., 21
Jul 44.
" Rpt, Ping and Control Br OCQM USASOS, 45
Ltr, CG Fifth Air Force to CG ADSEC
30 Mar 43, sub: QM Stocks. ORB AFWESPAC QM USASOS, n. d.,sub: Shortages of Expendables.
400. ORB AFWESPAC QM 400.226.
202 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ation to the unusually heavy demands made return of clothing had produced the ap-
49
by the Fifth Air Force on the base's limited pearance of scarcity.
distress, but with a few exceptions scarcities bility of gas warfare by the enemy during
disappeared once the base was fully a coming operation, protective clothing was
48
operative. shipped with the troops. Since impregna-
In the Central Pacific Area, shortages tion lessened the resistance of textiles to de-
presented even less of a problem. Soldiers' terioration, the better types of storage were
complaints sprang more from allegedly in- at first used for clothing so treated. But as
adequate allowances of socks, underwear, itbecame increasingly improbable that the
work Japanese would embark upon gas warfare,
suits, and towels than from actual
such storage was devoted more and more to
scarcities. The survey of the Pacific Ocean
ordinary clothing in heavy demand, and
Areas, conducted by the OQMG late in
protective clothing was often simply placed
1944, revealed a general demand among in the open, with all the hazards this pre-
troops for larger issues of these items. Com-
sented. Even under good conditions the
menting on this finding, one officer main- serviceability of impregnated garments sel-
tained that allowances had proved ample
dom exceeded twelve months. Better
for normal needs but that lack of laundry
methods of impregnation, adopted in the
facilities and the consequent delay in the
zone of interior late in 1944, lengthened
40
Memo,
( 1 ) QM AD VON Fifth AF for DIST- the useful life of such garments, but few
BRA USASOS, 13 Mar 44. ORB AFWESPAC QM
312. (2) Ltr, CG INTERSEC USASOS to DIST- 49
( 1 ) Rpt, Field Progress Br OP&C Div OQMC,
BRA, 29 Apr 44, sub: Class II and IV Sups. ORB Nov 44, sub: POA QM Opns. (2) Rpt, Lt Wil-
NUGSEC QM 400. liam B. Seininger OP&C Div OQMG, 9 Dec 44,
QM SWPA Hist, VII, 63-64.
47
sub: Trip to POA. (3) Rpt, QM CPBC, n. d., sub:
"Memo, QM SOS SPA for D/SS, 21 Tun 43 Questions on QM Opns from OQMG. All in
ORB USAFINC G-4 430. OQMG POA 319.25.
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 203
garments impregnated after that date ar- most conspicuous color. In the South Pacific,
rived in the Pacific. The apparel handled protective clothing was stored in sheet metal
by the QMC was therefore particularly warehouses, but these structures were little
susceptible to deterioration. The storage better than open storage for they furnished
52
problem was worsened as a result of the no ventilation except through the doors.
fact that many garments issued to indi- Even after protective garments were no
vidual troops on their departure from the longer issued to individual soldiers, such ap-
United States or later in the Pacific areas parel continued to be kept at bases, ready
were turned in to the bases. This addi- for issue if chemical warfare broke out or
tional burden on the bases was necessitated there was strong evidence of its imminence.
by inability of units to furnish adequate If operational commanders approved, im-
safeguards for apparel that soldiers indif- pregnated clothing was also carried as unit
ferently cast aside because of the unlikeli- equipment in combat. As a further protec-
hood of gas warfare. Even a well-inten- tive measure, chemical processing com-
tioned soldier found hard to take good
it panies, which began to arrive in the South-
care of his protective garments, for if he west Pacific in June 1943, accompanied
put them in a clothing bag, they imparted large operational forces to impregnate cloth-
50
a sickening odor to his other garments. ing in case of need. When American troops
The process of turning in impregnated landed on Leyte, however, most of the pro-
apparel was a troublesome task that de- tective apparel in the Southwest Pacific
manded the collection of hundreds of arti-
Area was still stored at Hollandia. A consid-
clesfrom individual soldiers. After transfer would of necessity have
erable period of time
to Quartermaster salvage warehouses, "im-
elapsed before these stocks could have been
pregnated clothing of all types, sizes, and
delivered in the distant Philippines, where
colors" was likely to be "jumbled in wild
American troops had only the impregnated
disorder, and interspersed with gas masks,
51 garments carried as unit equipment. In the
shoe impregnite, and protective covers."
Pacific, fortunately, the general conviction
Months sometimes elapsed before sufficient
men could be spared to sort the mess, clean that the Japanese were unable to start gas
dirty garments, and store the whole lot. At warfare proved correct. The disturbing po-
Port Moresby in April 1943 protective cloth- tentialities unpreparedness nonetheless
of
ing was piled in the open and protected by suggest the need for a method of handling
tarpaulins that left six feet of the side walls protective clothing that will maintain large
exposed to the weather. Many garments, stocks in close proximity to operational
particularly shirts and gloves, were already areas.
53
ORB AFWESPAC QM
1
CMLO Base Sec 3 to CCMLO sub: Issue of Prot Clo. (2) Memo, Lt Col Jasper
Prot Clo. (2) Ltr,
L. Cummings for Col R. C. Kramer, Jt
Sup Bd
USASOS, 7 Nov 43, same sub. ORB AFWESPAC
QMM 420. SWPA, 8 Feb 45, sub: Impregnated Clo. Both in
Ltr cited n. 50(2). ORB AFPAC AG 421.
204 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Tentage and Tarpaulins staging and replacement camps had to be
maintained at each base for casuals, for units
Several factors combined to make tentage
coming to the island for assignment, and for
chronically scarce. In addition to the sizable units during their staging and rest periods.
inroads made on base stocks by issues of
At these camps tents, whether occupied or
tents to organizations coming from the
not, had to remain standing, ready to ac-
United States without those supposed to ac-
commodate any troops which might arrive.
company them, 54 tents lost through the wear Encampments had to be kept also for men
and combat operations had to be re-
tear of
on leave or on their way to or from Australia.
placed. Whole divisions sometimes had to be Finally, although not authorized by prevail-
re-equipped. This need arose after the 1st
ing allowances, tents had to be furnished for
Marine Division arrived in Australia, fresh offices and administrative and supervisory
from the savage fighting on Guadalcanal, staffs at new bases and even at some old
and after the 3 2d Division lost the bulk of ones.
58
its tentage during the early operations in The rapid deterioration of canvas was as
New Guinea. 55 Another serious drain on the important a reason for shortages as unau-
available supply was produced by the efforts thorized issues. In mid- 1943 an Australian
of units, "through hook or crook," as one scientific mission investigating the condition
officer expressed it, to "obtain tentage in and equipment found
of military supplies
56
excess of their true needs." that almost all in New Guinea
tents
During 1942 and 1943 assembly and hos- leaked.
59
It concluded that the main ex-
pital tents were virtually unprocurable in
planation for this defect was "the prevalent
the Southwest Pacific because of their un-
and continual high humidity, which pre-
authorized employment for mess and stor-
vents any effective drying of stores which
age purposes. Hospital tents were so scarce become damp, and causes frequent and un-
early in 1943 that shelter could not be pro-
avoidable condensation even on stores well
vided for all and wounded. 57 Tents
the sick protected from the rain."
60
Moisture satu-
for housing troops were hard to obtain, rating tentage over prolonged periods facili-
partly because the established allowances
tated the growth of molds, which, in turn,
employed by ports of embarkation in edit- produced holes in the fabric. Canvas in
ing requisitions were based on the require- was often so badly riddled that,
storage
ments of settled areas with permanent when was wholly unserviceable.
erected, it
dwellings available for the use of soldiers Lack United States un-
of rotproofing in the
rather than on the requirements of areas til mid- 1944 heightened the damage, par-
destitute of such dwellings. In New Guinea ticularly in poorly packed, stored, and ven-
OPEN STORAGE OF CANVAS ITEMS for prolonged periods in the South Pacific Area
frequently rendered them unserviceable.
less. Had not sizable numbers of thatched the tropics. Early in 1944, therefore, the
huts been utilized as offices, warehouses, and OQMG urged the Pacific areas to take spe-
living quarters, a truly critical housing prob- cial storage precautions, but even before this
lem might have developed. 61
advice had been received, both the South
Tropical deterioration affected tarpau- and Southwest Pacific Areas had begun to
mildewproofing, but though much was mildewing. These remedial measures al-
learned about the problem, it was not pos- leviated but did not solve the problem, for
sible before the end of hostilities to apply complete tropicproofing could not be un-
satisfactory protection to materials sent to dertaken with the limited means available.
In any event no known methods offered
61
William Lawrence White, "Deterioration of
complete protection against fungi. At the
Quartermaster Fabrics in the Tropics," QMR,
XXVI (November-December 1946), 16-17,63-65. close of the war it was still reported that
206 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
"even under the best storage conditions" all Australian Army, whose storage huts in gen-
02
types of canvas swiftly deteriorated. eral were not as well ventilated as those of
its ally. Molds were particularly liable to
gus growths were most likely to develop on schedules listing the proportions in which
shoes lying in poorly aired structures, but the various sizes of clothing and shoes were
moldy footwear never became quite as much to be procured, was perhaps the major
cause. The inaccuracy of tariffs is not sur-
of a problem for the U.S. Army as for the
prising in view of the issue of almost 6,000
62
(1) Rpts, 1, 2, and 3, R. S.Penniman, Wesco sizes of shoes and garments of all sorts to
(Australia) Proprietary Ltd., 15May, 30 Jun, 30
Aug 43, sub: Tentage Coloration and Preservation.
men and physiques. At best
of varying ages
ORB AFWESPAC QM
424. (2) Conf, 13 Oct the published tariffs were no more than
43, sub: Tropicproofing and Packaging. ORB rough approximations of the number of
AFWESPAC QM 400.16. (3) Ltr, TQMG to
sizes required by an army whose average
QM Depots et al., 20 Jun 44, sub: Storage of
Tentage. ORB AFWESPAC QM 424. (4) Memo, age and weight were constantly changing
G-4 43d Inf Div for Dr. Mann, WD Obsr, 15 Mar and whose component organizations had
44, sub: QM Sups. OQMG POA 319.25. (5) widely differing needs. The tariffs were use-
Ltr, CG
7th Inf Div to CG
USAFPOA, 19 May 45,
sub: Tropical Deterioration. Tenth Army ORB ful as guides in the procurement of sized
AG 400. items for depot stocks but had small value
03
Magee, Service Materiel Under Tropical Con-
ditions, pp. 74-75. **
Ibid., pp. 70-74.
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 207
needed. Sometimes, however, tariffs neces- regionsand the broadening of soldiers' feet
sarily served as the standard of distribution. wearing of ill-fitting
as a result of protracted
They were so employed in the early days of shoes might invalidate previous calculations
the Pacific areas before supply officers had of requirements by increasing the demand
gained knowledge of the sizes normally in for small and
trousers jackets and wide
demand among their troops and when the shoes. The procurement of footwear in Aus-
zone of interior had no more reliable basis tralia further complicated the distribution
for making the automatic shipments pre- of shoes in the proper sizes since that
scribed during this period than the national dominion for nearly two years provided
66
size tariffs. Such use of tariffs was also made shoes in but three widths.
when a base simply requisitioned clothing The disproportion between the sizes of
and footwear in bulk without specifying the clothing received by issuing organizations
desired percentages of different sizes. As and those which they actually needed is il-
late asAugust 1944, some Pacific bases still lustrated by a delivery of trousers and jack-
had such inadequate data on the require- ets made by the John Foster to the 6th In-
ments of the organizations drawing supplies fantry Division at Wakde Island, a ship-
from them that 40 percent of their requisi- ment by the division's com-
described
tions merely requested bulk shipments. mander, Maj. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick, as
Since organizations seldom required sized "fairly representative" of prior movements
67
goods in the proportions stipulated in the of clothing received at that place. Despite
tariffs, they received an assortment of sup- the fact that only 23 percent of the com-
plies that did not fully meet their needs. mand required jackets of sizes 38 or larger,
Worst of all, these shipments had a cumula- 6,861 of the 7,891 jackets delivered by the
tive effect, for, as they continued, the initial John Foster, or 87 percent, were of these
discrepancies were compounded and ex- sizes. The contrast between requirements
cesses and shortages accentuated.' 15 and deliveries of trousers was equally
Several other causes contributed to the marked. Only 5 percent of the division
unbalancing of stocks of sized items. Limited needed large sizes, but 3,802 or 49 percent
time for loading cargoes and unavailability of the 7,482 trousers delivered fell into this
of shipping space occasionally resulted in category.
68
movements from the West Coast that con- Similar reports of shortages in small sizes
sisted of only a few sizes. Once cargoes ar-
and excesses in large sizes came from all
rived in the Pacific, distribution among the
parts of the Pacific. Surveys conducted in
widely scattered supply points in line with
the Sixth Army, in the seven largest bases of
local requirements was often impossible, for
area shortages might force the substitution ""(1) Memo cited n. 62(4). (2) Personal Ltr,
Brig Gen James L. Frink to Brig Gen Alexander M.
15
( 1 ) Memo, CQM for Col Herbert A. Gardner, Owens, OQMG. OQMG SWPA 420.
18 Apr 42. ORB AFWESPAC QM 421. (2) Memo, "7
Ltr to CG Sixth Army, 8 Oct 44, sub: Clo on
C&E Br for S&D Div OQMG, 15 Aug 44, sub: John Foster. ORB Sixth Army AG 420.
Shortage of Clo in SWPA. OQMG 420.
'"•
Ibid.
208 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
the South Pacific Area, and in the divisions on the experience of that organization and
passing through Hawaii revealed that no- requested that it be used in the assembling
where did stocks of clothing and footwear of future shipments. The OQMG in Wash-
accurately reflect actual needs. In Hawaii ington asked the San Francisco Port of Em-
local conditions intensified the shortage of barkation to make the downward or upward
small sizes, for native inductees were pre- adjustments in stock levels required by the
dominantly Japanese, Filipinos, Hawaiians, new schedule. But even then the size prob-
and mixed breeds, who were all of slight lem was not solved, for requirements fluctu-
physique and required small sizes in much ated as new troops arrived and old ones
larger quantities than did troops from the departed and always varied somewhat from
72
United States. 69 division to division.
Lacking enough of the small sizes, the
QMC was of course obliged to issue the Spare Parts
larger sizes. Had units possessed the means
of altering poorly fitted garments, the result- Throughout the war technical services
formed a major segment of the Quarter- stallations. A similar system operated in the
77
master mission until January 1944, when Pacific areas.
these duties were shifted to the Ordnance Centralized procurement had the advan-
Department. The Corps, however, con- tage of facilitating the concentration of the
tinued to obtain parts in the United States thousands of materials-handling parts in a
and distribute them to theaters of opera- few depots, but it still left many troubles un-
74
tions. The importance of materials-han- solved. There were no official lists of re-
dling equipment, at times called "the placement parts, for the War Department
keystone of the entire supply structure," can had not developed its own specifications for
75
hardly be Every technical
overstated. most types of materials-handling equipment
service used such equipment for warehous- and had simply procured commercial
ing supplies and loading and unloading models, the complete cataloguing of whose
shipments. Unless replacement parts were parts required months. Manufacturers' lists,
available, the whole supply process might be which were used in the meantime, were in-
delayed. Col. Henry W. Bobrink, chief of complete and inaccurate and did not cover
the Stock Control Branch in the OQMG, all models, and even these lists were not
exaggerated only slightly when he declared always available at Pacific bases. At best it
that "the greatest problem facing the Quar- was not easy for requisitioning agencies
termaster Corps is of spare parts for either overseas or in the zone of interior to
76
materials-handling equipment." order the proper parts; sometimes it was
Overseas areas encountered difficulty impossible. Manufacturers added to pro-
from the very outset in obtaining parts for curement troubles by arbitrary substitution
such equipment from the zone of interior. of new parts not interchangeable with old
Parts manufacturers simply did not possess ones. Not until June 945 —too 1 help late to
the means of meeting quickly the fifteenfold overseas areas — could the OQMG provide
increase in demand that stemmed from huge the chief means for adequate requisitioning,
military purchases; moreover, for some fairly complete and accurate manuals that
months early in the war the wanted OQMG catalogued materials-handling parts, sup-
machines rather than replacement parts. plied the nomenclature and stock numbers
The problem was further magnified by the indispensable for proper ordering, and indi-
absence of a centralized parts procurement cated what parts were interchangeable.
program until one was established in May Since detailed information regarding these
1943 under the administration of the matters was lacking during most of the war,
OQMG. Before that date depots had tried requisitioning was everywhere pretty much
with scant success to buy parts as they were "a shot in the dark proposition."
needed. Distribution, too, was at first decen- Several additional factors accentuated
tralized, parts being stored at all supply in- the unreliability of requisitions. One was
74
WD Cir 35, 28 Jan 44, sub: Maint of Ma- 77
( 1 ) Ltr, ACofS for Opns ASF to TQMG, 20
terials-Handling Equip. Feb 43, sub: Spare Parts. OQMG SWPA 451.93.
75
Ltr, CG CPBC to CG SFPOE, 9 Sep 44, sub: (2) Memos 35-82-43, 1 May 43, and W5-9-43,
AG
Parts for Materials-Handling Equip. OQMG POA 15 May 43.
451.93.
78
(1) P. 14 of Rpt cited n. 58. (2) Ltr, CG
70
Memo for CG ASF, 17 Jan 44, sub: Stock INTERSEC to CG
ASF, 6 Oct 44, sub: QM
Control. OQMG 400.291. Opns in SWPA. OQMG SWPA
400.
210 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
the absence of figures from overseas experi- pletely filled ; only eight had been more than
ence showing probable future requirements. half filled. On the twenty requisitions sub-
Another was the inaccurate inventorying of mitted between the beginning of June and
stocks both in the United States and in the the end of August nothing had been re-
Pacific. Because of the large number of ceived on nineteen and only 1 percent on
parts, estimated in the thousands, and the the other. A survey of materials-handling
lack of an accepted nomenclature applica- parts overseas, conducted in February 1944
ble for identification purposes, these defi- by ASF headquarters, revealed that tardy
ciencies were almost insoluble. Reliable had delayed
deliveries in the Central Pacific
inventories were particularly difficult to the loading and discharge of interarea car-
make in the Pacific because the similar ap- goes. A year and a half later incomplete
pearance of many different parts led men, requisitions were still causing marked
80
untrained in their handling, to store them shortages.
with the wrong items. Proper marking of Difficulties, similar to those encountered
on their
parts, especially as to identification, were
in obtaining materials-handling parts,
shipment from the United States would encountered with
Quartermaster other
have alleviated this problem, but such parts. Some bases possessed no catalogues
marking was applied to only about 75 per- whatever for commercial types of refriger-
cent of movements. Still another factor ren- ators and typewriters, for mimeograph,
dering requisitioning difficult was the broad ditto, and adding machines, or for baking,
fluctuation in demand brought about by and sewing and other reclamation equip-
the wide variations in age of equipment in ment. These installations found it hard to
use. The consequent uncertainty about requisition needed parts. At least one base
future requirements made the submission was obliged as late as the beginning of 1945
of accurate requisitions an almost impossi- to compile its own catalogues for all type-
ble task. Actually, there was no normal rate writers and bakery equipment and for sev-
of issue for most items. 79 81
eral kinds of office machines.
An equally serious cause of shortages,
During 1942 and 1943 deliveries of parts
along with these inaccurate requisitions, was
for the Ml 93 7 field range were confined
the slowness and inadequacy of deliveries
almost entirely to the sets of essential parts
of materials-handling parts from the United
that accompanied shipments of ranges from
States. These deficiencies are illustrated by
the United States. These sets, which pro-
the high proportion of requisitions from the
vided an initial stock, were made up in the
Central Pacific Base Command that re-
erroneous expectation of a roughly equal de-
mained largely or wholly unfilled. At the
mand and were "most wasteful
for all parts
beginning of September 1944 no deliveries
of parts with little turnover and totally in-
whatever had been made on eleven of the
thirty-one requisitions submitted between 1
s0
( 1 ) Memo, Rqmts Div ASF for TQMG, 22
January and 31 May. Not a single one of Feb 44, sub: Parts for Materials-Handling. OQMG
POA 451.93. (2) Ltr, CPBC to SFPOE, 9 Sep
the other twenty requisitions had been com- 44, same sub. OQMG POA 451.93. (3) Ltr cited
n. 79.
79
Ltr, CG CPBC to TQMG, 6 Aug 45, sub: 81
Ltr, Maj Harold A. Naisbitt to TQMG, 8 Mar
Improvement of Spare Parts Sup in POA. OQMG 45, sub: Observations on Gen Sups. OQMG SWPA
POA 400.4. 319.25.
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 211
adequate for parts with high turnover." 82 introduced another perplexing problem, for
In mid- 1944 maintenance stocks began to USASOS possessed no information about
arrive in slightly larger quantities. Never- their parts and hence could not requisition
theless the Sixth Army reported in Septem- them properly. Because of all these per-
ber that many units still had no field range plexities shore refrigeration, never avail-
parts and were encountering trouble in pre- able in adequate quantities, became still
3 84
paring meals.* Shortages in this field in- scarcer.
deed continued to plague troops until the Poor packing led to considerable corro-
very end of hostilities. sion of parts, but by early 1945 packing by
Refrigeration parts, too, were decidedly Quartermaster depots in the zone of inte-
scarce. In January 1944 more than fifty rior had improved tremendously, and parts
refrigerators at Oro Bay were inoperative. were arriving in better condition. Those
Requisitions submitted by this base three packed by manufacturers, however, were
months before remained totally uncom- sometimes so badly corroded as to be un-
pleted. Later in the year Finschhafen re- serviceable. This was notably true of type-
ported that its requisitions for laundry as writer, sewing machine, and shoe machinery
well as refrigerator parts — requisitions parts shipped in cheap paper envelopes that
which had been forwarded to San Fran- went to pieces after one or two handlings. 85
cisco six to twelve months before were still — The problem of fairly distributing all the
unfilled and that much equipment in con- many parts that made up an assembled type-
sequence could not be used. Officers at this writer among the countless issuing and using
base, according to Captain Orr, had aban- agencies was never solved. The absence of
doned hope that these would requisitions manufacturing sources in the Pacific areas
ever be completed. Some relief was af- and the broad dispersion and huge numbers
forded by makeshift parts fabricated by of typewriters mainly accounted for this fail-
local Ordnance troops, but many indis- ure, which at times kept hundreds of ma-
pensable items could not be manufactured chines out of use and even interfered with
on the spot. "Cannibalization," that is, the the transaction of administrative business.
tearing apart of damaged equipment to ob- By mid- 1944 the number of unserviceable
tain vital parts, was frowned upon but in typewriters in the Southwest Pacific had
emergencies was extensively practiced. grown so large and so few using agencies had
From time to time conditions similar to means of repairing them that a spare parts
those at Finschhafen prevailed at other Pa- depot was set up at Brisbane to rebuild
cific bases. In October USASOS noted worn-out machines. The protracted delays
that small motors for electrically driven incurred in shipments to a point as distant
refrigeratorsand sealed motor units for from advance bases as Brisbane led in Au-
household refrigerators were acutely scarce gust to the establishment of a comparable
everywhere in New Guinea. Commercial depot at Finschhafen. Early in 1945 still
Repair of Typewriters. (2) Sec IV USASOS Memo into fighting forces, tanks and mechanized
85, 29 Aug 44, same sub. Both in ORB AFWESPAC
AG (1) QM SWPA Hist, VII, 71-72. (2) Ltr, CG
sft
400.
s:
88
QM SWPA Hist, VII, 69-72. USAFMIDPAC to TQMG, 6 Aug 45. OQMG POA
Rpt 4 (Okinawa series), Capt Orr, 15 Jul 45, 400.4.
sub: QM Opns on Okinawa. OQMG POA 319.25. "°
Ltr cited n. 89(2).
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 213
artillery could not be operated, generators their requirements from oil company re-
could not furnish power for communications serves and from the military supply centers
equipment, field ranges could not bake of its ally. Even imports consigned to the
bread, and combat troops could not be pro- American forces were turned over to the
vided with hot food or electric light. Australian Army. This was true not only
Petroleum products consisted of various of tanker shipments but also of U.S. Army
categories — kerosene, fuel oil, diesel oil, 55-gallon steel drums, widely used for trans-
lubricants, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, porting and storing petroleum products.
and unleaded gasoline for ranges and
field These were usually called 44-gallon drums
radar equipment divided — in turn into dif- since the imperial gallon, used in Australia,
ferent grades, which were ail covered by contained roughly 5 U.S. quarts, instead of
Army specifications. Because of their indis-
4, as did the American gallon.
01
routine" had been set up for the issue of gas- reason the two armies agreed late in the year
oline. Petroleum stocks in the main Austra- that the QMC would distribute petroleum
lian dumps, this officer declared, were badly supplies to all American troops outside the
classified, and frequently drums bore no Australian mainland.""
marks identifying the contents or indicating Under the new system the OCQM calcu-
the date of filling. Some products, used lated all the petroleum requirements of the
solelyby the U.S. Army, could be located Southwest Pacific Area except those for the
and only by having Americans
identified
Air Forces and submitted requisitions cover-
search the dumps. Moreover, no adequate
ing these requirements to Australian sources.
means existed for determining future or even
Base section quartermasters received the
current requirements. 93
supplies from the Australian Army in main-
In mid- 1943 an especially unfavorable
land ports and arranged with cargo control
Milne Bay and Oro
situation developed at
officers for their transportation northward.
Bay. numbers of American
Increasing
troops were then being scattered through
In New Guinea the base quartermasters
these areas, but the Australian stations did kept records of consumption and stocks on
particular organizations from the time they "(1) Ltr cited n. 91(2). (2) Memo for the
Records, Nov 43, 1 sub: Handling Class III Sups.
were shipped from Australian ports until
ORB AFPAC G-4 463.7. (3)OCQM Tech Memo
02
(1) Ltr, CQMto G-4 USAFIA, 13 Jun 42,
85, 28 Nov 43, sub: QM Class III Sups to Advance
sub: Gasoline-Alcohol Blends. (2) Ltr, USA- QM Bases.
quired in moving gasoline and oil from bulk flect the changed operational conditions.
storage to using elements. The QMC The revised factors, published in February
1945, were as follows:
"
brought petroleum products to Air Forces
as well as other supply depots, but airmen Class III Supplies U.S. Gallons
97 Total 1.38841
unloaded, stored, and issued these supplies.
Fuels:
In carrying out its responsibility for de-
Motor (all purposes) 0. 830
termining petroleum requirements, the 150
Unleaded gasoline 0.
OCQM used consumption factors based on Diesel oil 0. 320
previous use, logistical instructions, kind of Kerosene 0. 028
operation, conditions under which future Engine oils:
OE-10 0.0015
consumption would probably occur, and ex-
OE-30 ... 0.0360
pected losses from enemy action. Since the
OE-50 0. 0075
elements that went into the establishment of
Lubricant, GO 90 0.0120
factors varied constantly with operational Greases
plans and geographical shifts of troops, the General purpose CG- 0. 00208
Wheel bearing WB-2 0. 001 14
factors themselves underwent frequent
Water pump 0.00019
changes. The consumption factors, issued
.
by the Chief Quartermaster in September The QMC found the fair distribution of
1944, expressed the requirements in U.S. petroleum products among using elements
gallons per man per day for the principal less baffling than that of rations but a diffi-
occasional scarcities of coastal tankers for but 2,068,900 barrels, less than 17.5 per-
service between the northern bases; the cent of that in Australia. Of this total 763,-
shortage of drums; inadequate drum-filling 900 barrels were devoted to fuel oil, 760,-
plants; and insufficiency of cargo space for 900 to aviation gasoline, 290,850 to diesel
55-gallon drums from Australia. oil,and 253,250 to motor gasoline. 101
The unsatisfactory means of bulk distri- Even this restricted capacity could not
bution outside the populated regions of the always be utilized efficiently. At some ports
Southwest Pacific forced sea-going tankers the water was so shallow that large vessels
to discharge most of their cargoes at large could not approach the storage tanks; at
Australian commercial terminals, which al- others the tanks were so small that vessels
ways had capacity available for military use. could unload only part of their liquid car-
Normally, they could handle between 10,- goes. In such cases, vessels had to put in at
000,000 and 12,000,000 U.S. barrels. At another port. What was needed was more
the end of March 1945, their capacity to- small tankers for movement between bases
taled 1
1 ,962,839 barrels, five times the num- and between bases and forward supply
ber available even then in the rest of the points, and more oil barges which could be
Southwest Pacific Area. Of this huge towed from Australia for delivery of cargoes
amount, about 4,158,922 barrels were al- in shallow harbors to tanks of limited ca-
lotted to motor gasoline, 2,746,770 to fuel pacity.But these requirements could seldom
102
oil, 2,432,774 to diesel oil, 1,598,613 to be wholly met.
aviation gasoline, and 1,026,769 to kero- When the U.S. forces returned to the
100
sene. Philippines, the means of transshipping pe-
Not until mid- 1943 did the construction troleum products from New Guinea to the
of bulk storage tanks start at the New Guinea new area of operations and of storing them
bases, and then only on a limited scale. Since proved unequal to the vastly increased de-
these bases were to be used but slightly after mands. In this emergency Base on Leyte K
the campaign for recovery of the Philippines could supply only purely local requirements.
had started, large, permanent facilities were Conditions in the Philippines, in fact, bore
not wanted. Instead the Army built small or a marked similarity to those encountered in
medium-sized tanks, capable of handling New Guinea in the early days. In March
100-octane aviation gasoline, a few addi- 1945, six months after the invasion of Leyte
tional grades of gasoline, and two or more started, only 399,500 barrels, or less than a
kinds of fuel and diesel oil. Where airfields fifth of even New Guinea's low capacity,
were located within a radius of about twenty could be stored, and stock levels had fallen
miles of bulk storage centers, pipelines were below a proper margin of safety. Extensive
At the fields
laid to supply aviation gasoline. construction, much of it permanent and
themselves small bolted tanks were built for aimed at providing storage for 2,029,000
dispensing gasoline to trucks, which deliv- barrels, was begun in and about Manila on
ered the fuel to planes. In the islands out- its reoccupation, but until the very end of
which occupied about 75 percent more In order to save shipping and facilitate a
space than did an equal quantity of fuels more even distribution of oil supplies in fu-
carried by tankers. In October 1943 ture exigencies, the QMC recommended
drummed motor gasoline was being issued that units entering advance areas no longer
at Oro Bay alone at the rate of 26,000 gal- take along the standard 60-day supply but
lons a day, or 780,000 a month. If this huge only a 15-day supply if they were going to
amount could have been moved by tankers, points with bulk storage and only a 30-day
about 5,000 ship tons would have become supply if going to points using drummed
available for other supplies.
1 "4
A year later, products. This suggestion led late in 1943
after storage tanks andhad been
pipelines to the adoption of the principle that only
built at Milne Bay, Oro Bay, Lae, and troops bound for regions without established
Finschhafen, the Chief Quartermaster esti- bases would be accompanied by Class III
mated that the new had
distribution system items; the exact amount would be deter-
cut requirements for motor gasoline drums mined by the special conditions surrounding
from 286,000 to 133,000. In terms of ship- each movement. 107
ping the saving represented 44,000 measure- Proper supply of petroleum products
"5
ment tons.
1
In addition to using more hinged more on the availability of 55-gallon
cargo space, drumming of petroleum prod- drums than of cargo space. Unfortunately,
ucts had the disadvantage of requiring the these containers were in poor supply on ac-
services of many more men than did the count of the inadequate equipment for re-
system of bulk storage and transportation. pairing them, the belated inauguration of
The high priorities assigned to petroleum large-scale shipments from the West Coast,
products normally meant that drums could and the small amount of Australian produc-
be shipped promptly from Australia to ad- tion. The shortage was intensified by the loss
vance bases. Occasionally, cargo space was of 20 to 30 percent through rough handling
indeed available in more than necessary —
and failure to replace bungs a particularly
quantities.Yet at times there were not serious omission, for it permitted the en-
enough vessels even for Class III supplies. trance of dirt and water, which rusted con-
In September and October 1943, for exam- and rendered fuel unusable. Even if
tainers
ple, about 80,000 filled drums were tied up drums exposed to the weather were not
at Sydney alone. So badly crowded was the rusted, thorough cleaning with special
base section there that it temporarily sus- equipment was necesary before they could
be safely used. Nevertheless this indispensa-
"» QM SWPA Hist, VI, 45-49; VII, 74-84.
(1 )
(2) Rpt cited n. 100. ble task was often neglected. As a conse-
""Ltr, QM ADSEC to CQM, 23 Oct 43, sub:
Bulk Storage at Base B. ORB AFWESPAC QM "" Memo, CQM for G-4 USASOS, 28 Oct 43,
463.7. sub: Class III Sups at Advance Bases. ORB AF-
105
Memo, CQM for G-4, 4 Sep 44, sub: Class III WESPAC QM 463.7.
Sup Levels. ORB AFWESPAC QM 463.7. ""QM SWPA Hist, IV, 50.
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 219
quence many old containers were in unsatis- As petroleum needs rose late in 1943, the
factory condition. At Lae early in 1945 number of available drums, though still in-
Quartermaster inspectors found that most adequate, also rose. At the same time cargo
of the 21,000 drums held enough sediment, space was allotted on a more liberal scale.
water, and other injurious substances to pre- But the full benefits of these favorable de-
ins
clude issue to combat units. velopments could not be realized because of
Because of these circumstances drums at the lack of drum-filling plants. This de-
times became
hard to obtain that pre-
so ficiency indeed threatened to become a seri-
scribed replacement levels could not be ous handicap to smooth supply. For some
maintained in advance areas. In August weeks it was impossible to fill all drums or
1943 these areas needed more than 330,000 utilize all assigned shipping space. Addi-
containers yet could obtain only 164,000, tional filling plants were hastily built at bulk
leaving a deficit of 166,000. By December terminals in Australia, and for the first time
the shortage had increased to 240,000. such were constructed in New
plants
Building of more storage tanks would have Guinea. It was nearly a year, however, be-
reduced such deficiencies but not wholly fore these measures solved the drum-filling
111
eliminated them, for a growing proportion problem.
of available gasoline and oil had to be The shortage of containers remained to
drummed and kept as a reserve stock for the end a major difficulty despite constant
new bases and tactical organizations lack- efforts to increase their availability. Direc-
"1
ing bulk equipment.
1 '
to the formation of gum deposits. For this often prevented compliance. Attempts to in-
reason rotation of stocks was strictly enjoined crease the number of serviceable drums by
in order to insure the issue of usable supplies. reclamation of damaged containers were
Some stocks nonetheless became too old for mostly nullified by want of adequate equip-
safe utilization, and in May 1944 USAFFE ment.'
1 "'
The construction of additional
directed that stores six months old could not drum-manufacturing plants in Australia
be issued until representative samples had produced better results but still not enough
11 "
been tested and found satisfactory. containers. In this contingency requisition-
"*
( 1 ) Ltr, Maj Gen John A. Chapman ALF 111
(1) Memo, CQM
for G -4, 6 Dec 43, sub:
to CQM USASOS, 15 Aug 43, sub: Class III Stock Class III Sup in New Guinea. (2) Rpt, CQM, 3
Levels. ORB AFWESPAC QM 463.7. (2) Ltr, Col OCQM,
Apr 44, sub: Activities of 1 Jan 31Mar 44.
Cordiner Col J. D. Jacobs, 1 Dec 43. 3 Memo,
to 1 ( ) Both inORB AFWESPAC QM 314.7.
n. s., for the Records, 3 May 44, sub: POL Han- Ltr, CQM to QM ADSEC USASOS, 6
1,2
( 1 )
dling Policy. Both in ORB AFWESPAC 463.7. QM Nov 43, sub: Handling of Class III Sups. ORB
(4) Rpt, CG Base E, 8 Mar 45, sub: Hist Sum- AFWESPAC QM 314.7. (2) Memo, POL Office
mary, Feb 45. ORB Base E AG Mil Hist File. for POL Pers Base B, 29 Mar 44, sub: SOP. (3)
"'"
Ltr cited n. 108(1). Memo, same for Tank Wagon Drivers, 31 Mar 44,
,
'"
Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 24 Mar sub: Instructions. Both in ORB AFPAC G-4 463.7.
44, sub: Rotation of Gasoline. ORB AFWESPAC (4) OCQM Tech Memo 10, 28 Feb 45, sub: Class
QM 463.7. III Sups.
220 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ing on the San Francisco Port of Embarka- bulk transportation facilities. In the Pacific
tion was plainly advisable, but the policy of there were no long pipelines and no railroad
exhausting local resources before tapping tank cars, such as were used in France to
those of the zone of interior led to postpone- bring gasoline close to the front, where it
ment of this action until the close of 1943, was placed in storage tanks and decanted
when 250,000 drums were ordered. 113 into 5-gallon cans for issue to consumers.
Of the two principal types of 55-gallon Service troops found that 55-gallon drums
—
drums 14-gauge, galvanized heavy drums afforded most practicable means of
the
and light ungalvanized drums the heavy — transporting fuels in forward areas and
drums were much better. If these con- often in advance areas. This practice was
tainers received good care, they withstood particularly widespread in the opening
many trips and an indefinite number of re- months of hostilities when practically all pe-
fillings. Even in exceptionally rugged coun- troleum products were received in drums.
try they went through about fifteen trips be- The extreme scarcity of men who could be
fore needing repairs. Light drums, on the spared for decanting fuels into 5-gallon cans
other hand, could not endure much rough at this time was still another reason why
handling. They were particularly unsuitable it proved expedient to use the large con-
in forward areas where most of them re- tainers under the same conditions in which
quired general repair after three or four the ETO utilized the smaller ones. Com-
114
trips. paratively unfamiliar with the handling of
Despite the scarcity and other disadvan- cans,most quartermasters came to prefer
tages of 55-gallon containers, they served a drums to cans on the ground that they
greater variety of purposes in the Pacific quickened handling and refueling opera-
115
than anywhere else. In most overseas the- tions.
aters they were used simply for storage at Another reason for extensive use of the
bases, but below the equator they were also larger containers was the difficulty of pro-
used for the much different task of supply- curing 5-gallon cans locally. Delivery of
ing gasoline to motor vehicles in the field.
300,000 cans from Australian sources was
Such employment expected by 1 October 1942, but few were
ofdrums was contrary to
received on that date. Gasoline supply com-
U.S. Army policy, which prescribed 5-gal-
panies in consequence often had no contain-
lon cans for this operation. It was a prac-
ers other than 55-gallon drums and of neces-
tice that constantly surprised men from the
sity adjusted their activities to these recep-
European Theater of Operations, where 5-
tacles, which they equipped with hand- or
gallon cans were looked upon as the most
motor-operated pumps. But a special effort
desirable means of fueling vehicles in com-
was made to provide vehicles outside
bat zones. This departure from ordinary
Australia with at least eight filled 5-gallon
procedure stemmed mainly from the lack of
cans as an emergency reserve. Continued
1,3
May 43, sub: Trip
(1) Rpt, Col Cordiner, 2 employment of drums as the standard unit of
to NewGuinea. ORB AFWESPAC 463.7. (2) QM supply became unavoidable when USASOS
Ltr cited n. 101(1). (3) Ltr, Base B to CQM, QM
28 Oct 43, sub: Svc Station Tankage. ORB AF- headquarters late in 1943 decided not to
WESPAC QM 633.
114
Rpt, n. s., 23 Feb 44, sub: 55-Gal Survey.
1,5
USAFFE Bd Rpt 197, 2 Feb 45, sub: QM
ORB AFWESPAC QM 463.7. Questionnaire.
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 221
order from the United States the machine by as much as 90 percent. Vehicular tanks,
tools needed to increase Australian can pro- the I Corps also reported, were filled faster
duction — a decision based upon the already from drums equipped with hand-operated
established preference for drums and the or motor-driven pumps than from cans to
vital need of conserving local tin resources which a nozzle tube was attached to avoid
116
for the canning of food. an excessive and dangerous waste of gaso-
The problem of handling bulky 55-gallon line. Filling the tank of a 2/2 -ton truck
drums was solved in various ways. If winches from cans took, according to the I Corps,
and fork-lift trucks were available, they were about thirty minutes. When a drum
used to load the containers on cargo trucks; equipped with a hand pump was used, only
if they were not available, drums were man- five minutes were necessary. The corps
ually rolled onto trucks with the help of further pointed out that the cleaning and
planks. Pipes, attached to the drums, drew care of cans consumed much more time than
fuel into vehicular tanks and, when neces- did that of drums. Tops, for example, had
sary, into 5-gallon containers. When used to be screwed tightly on eleven times as
for the latter purpose, each pipe was fitted many small as large containers in order to
118
with several nozzles to facilitate simul- prevent water from mixing with gasoline.
117
taneous fillings of more than one can. Because of the advantages claimed for
Early in 1945 the Corps asked many in-
I 55-gallon drums they remained the stand-
fantry officers whether they desired the gen- ard containers for unit supply until hostili-
eral substitution of 5-gallon cans for 55-gal- ties ended. On Okinawa gasoline supply
lon drums. All these officers, the corps re- companies indeed "had considerable diffi-
ported, said no, arguing that drums were culty in getting units to take motor gasoline"
much the better containers. On a 2/2 -ton in the 5-gallon cans included in assault
truck with a 1-ton trailer cans could carry shipping to meet unexpected emergencies.
only 875 gallons whereas drums could carry "Only by forcing" their issue "could stocks
1,375 gallons, or 500 gallons more, thus ma- be reduced."
119
Except during the first few
terially reducing the number of trucks
days, there was, actually, no demand for
needed in transporting gasoline. Drums also
small containers. This fact was attested by
made possible comparable savings in labor,
the turning in of 35,000 cans at one sal-
for eleven times as many small as large con-
vage dump and 20,000 at another.
tainers were required to load, unload, and
store the 1 ,000 gallons daily issued to an
1
Supply in the South
infantry division. Use of these containers, it
and Central Pacific
was claimed, cut the time for loading trucks
The distribution of petroleum products in
m (1) USAFIA Memo 124, 18 Jun 42, sub:
4-Gal. Cans. (2) QM SWPA Hist, I, 45. (3) Rpt, the South Pacific did not differ essentially
n. s., 25 Oct 44, sub: QM Class III Monthly Rpt. from that in MacArthur's command. In
ORB AFPAC G-4 457. New Zealand, as in Australia, local sources
117
( 1 ) Transmittal Sheet, R&D Br to Opns Br
Mil Ping Div OQMG, 16 Oct 44, sub: Capt Orr's supplied American troops. Army forces else-
Rpt 19, 10 Aug 44. OQMG SWPA 319.25. (2) Ltr, Army, 28 Mar 45,
1st Lt Russell J. Terpenny, OQMG Obsr, to
118
Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Sixth
OQMG, 8 Aug 45, sub: T/O&E's. OQMG POA sub: 5-Gal. Cans. ORB Sixth Army AG 463.
1,9
400.34. Rpt cited n. 88.
222 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
where depended upon products shipped in pacity remained rather limited. The Guadal-
by the U.S. Navy for the use of all armed canal base could unload only 1,000 drums
services. At the island bases the per- QMC a day and Green Island only 800. Yet the
formed much the same functions as it did in South Pacific Area, like MacArthur's com-
New Guinea, receiving the products from mand and for much the same reasons, never
tankers or supply depots and issuing them to experienced a truly serious shortage.
consumers. The most notable difference was In the Central Pacific the petroleum sup-
the responsibility of the Corps for supply- ply situation was similar to that in its sister
ing not only Army troops but also shore- area to the south. Perhaps the most note-
based Marine and Navy units and New worthy difference was the continued de-
Zealand ground forces. At each base petro- pendence of the Army in Hawaii upon local
leum products were pooled for the benefit commercial firms, which distributed gaso-
of everyone. For this purpose Marine as well line to military storage tanks in the Hono-
as Army storage depots were utilized.
120
lulu region. Elsewhere the Navy carried out
The Navy seldom had enough tankers or this task.
come easier.
121 assigned to operational forces picked up the
At that time a drumming plant, with a supplies. Finally, salvage repair companies
monthly capacity of 4,000,000 gallons, was reclaimed damaged or deteriorated con-
122
tainers.
built at Espiritu Santo to supply forward
areas. By working three shifts a day, this Gasoline supply companies, by far the
it had been prepared that much of its train- ing points and in 55-gallon drums, supplied
ing proved valueless. It stored as many as all other kinds of fuels and lubricants, and
200,000 drums of gasoline, oils, and greases often helped the Engineers operate bulk in-
at one time and supplied both local issues stallations. In short, nearly all the major
on the base and shipments to forward areas. Quartermaster Class III operations were
Yet the "company had no training whatso- centralized in the gasoline supply companies.
ever" in the receipt, loading, unloading, During 1944 a novel Quartermaster unit,
drumming, storage, and inventory of ship- the petroleum products laboratory, ap-
124
ments. Men had to be trained for all these peared in the Southwest Pacific. Staffed by
tasks,and a special stock record section, about three officers and fifteen enlisted men,
composed of checkers and record clerks, set itconducted its main operations at a semi-
up. Not all the work of the company was permanent base laboratory but carried a
completely unrelated to its training. It trans- three-ton chemical trailer, which served,
ported gasoline and oils to outlying filling when necessary, as a mobile laboratory on
126
stationsby 2,000-gallon tank trucks and beachheads or at supply points. Before
hauled gasoline by tanker to points 20 miles the war ended, had been
units of this kind
from the bulk distribution center. During employed by the Southwest Pacific Area at
a 9-month period the company filled 75,000 several bases and in the Philippine offensives
drums at a specially built plant. and by mid-Pacific combat forces on Oki-
In early combat operations one or two nawa. The laboratories had been created by
gasoline supply platoons were attached to the War Department to insure that only
each task force; later, one or two companies products of the proper quality were issued.
were used. Even in tactical operations the Such units were especially needed in the
units served more as depot than transport- Pacific. Drummed Class III supplies re-
peatedly arrived with identifying marks
ing agencies, usually stocking a 30-day sup-
obliterated, making it impossible to know
ply for ground forces. Hauls from beaches
the age of the product or its octane number.
or docks were generally short, and trailers,
Fuels and lubricants, long in storage, might
and 5-gallon cans were
gasoline dispensers,
contain water, rust, or gum that rendered
in consequence seldom used. Not until they
them unserviceable. Products captured from
reached Luzon, with its fairly good road net,
the Japanese might have been deliberately
123
Rpt, Col Charles R. Lehner, Sixth Army QM, contaminated before abandonment. Only
13 June 44, sub: QM
Questionnaire for AGF Obsrs.
24
Ltr, CO
834th QM
Gasoline Sup Co to 'USAFFE Bd Rpt
,2r
197, 2 Feb 45, sub: QM
QM Base G, 24 Sep 54, sub: T/O for Gasoline Questionnaire.
Sup Co. ORB AFWESPAC Base G 322.3 (Unit
120
T/O&E 10-547, 25 May 43, sub: QM Petro-
Orgn). leum Products Laboratory.
224 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
laboratory tests could resolve the doubts Pacific quartermasters knew little of this
raised by these possibilities. method of preservation and the method it-
At bases petroleum products laboratories self was not fully developed. Whether sized
inspected samples of all shipments brought articles could have been furnished in pro-
in by tanker, checked the accuracy of mark- portions more accurately reflecting troops'
ings on incoming containers, and periodi- needs is doubtful. Because of their diverse
cally examined stored items for signs of national origins, U.S. troops represented
deterioration and departures from sound nearly all the world's peoples, and no
storage practices. The laboratories even country-wide table of sizes was likely to
examined containers at filling stations. Cap- mirror very exactly those actually required
tured supplies were inspected not only for in any one unit. The main reliance should
contamination but also for evidence of geo- have been put, not on country-wide, but on
graphical origin. Insofar as their equipment organization, tables. Yet even had such a
permitted, mobile laboratories operated in shift been made, many organizations could
much the same manner as base laboratories, not have compiled size tariffs in time for
but their more limited resources occasion- their special needs to be reflected in pur-
ally forced them from the bases
to seek help chases in the United States. Nor would this
in determining octane numbers. 127 shift have settled the distribution problems
that often forced the issue of ill-fitting
Some of the problems discussed in this
clothing.
chapter would have caused less trouble if
Most of the more complicated supply
they had been better understood at the out-
problems dealt with in this chapter could
set of hostilities. The shortage of spare parts
not be easily solved. Some of those posed by
could almost certainly have been remedied
recurrent shortages in forward areas were
had the Corps realized sooner how scarce
they would become. If parts had been pro- indeed so difficult that it is hard to see how
cured more aggressively in the zone of in- the QMC could have done much more than
terior in 1942 and if at the same time it did to alleviate them. The roots of these
storage of these articles had been centralized problems mostly lay in causes that tran-
in fewer installations both in the United scended the capacity of a single technical
States and overseas, much of the trouble service to produce a solution. They were
later encountered might have been averted. found in the world-wide character of the
Heavy losses of supplies, too, might have conflict that made it impossible for even so
been materially reduced had the principles highly industrialized a country as the United
of tropical storage been more generally dis- States to furnish everywhere enough distri-
seminated and had stocks been more closely bution facilities; in the concentration of
guarded in order to diminish pilferage. If military preparations in pre-Pearl Harbor
more and better tropicproofing had been ap- days on the requirements of a war against
plied to textile and leather goods, they Germany, with the result that full compre-
would have deteriorated less rapidly, but hension of the logistical needs of a Pacific
war was achieved only belatedly; in the
I27
AFWESPAC OCQM Tech Memo 28, 9 Jul
early decision to assign troops fighting Ger-
45, sub: SOP for QM Petroleum Products Labora-
tories. many a higher supply priority than those
CLASS I, II, III, AND IV SUPPLY PROBLEMS 225
fighting Japan; in the extraordinary physi- recognized as vital to the successful outcome
cal conditions under which the Pacific war of a tactical operation offered much less
was waged and ; in the tendency, inevitable difficulty. A notable illustration of this is
Morale-Building Services
Besides procuring, storing, and distrib- ery, laundry, bath, salvage, or graves regis-
uting supplies and equipment, the QMC tration companies to the Pacific. If field
also performed other services that were im- forces operating there obtained these serv-
portant to the combat forces it supported. ices during this period, it was only through
It baked bread, fumigated and laundered improvisation. When appropriate units did
clothing, provided baths, assembled, classi- arrive, they were too few in number. They
fied, and repaired worn-out and discarded had been set up in expectation of utilizing
items, and performed all duties connected large numbers of civilian helpers, but since
with the care of the dead except one, col- there was an almost complete lack of suitable
lection of bodies on the battlefield. Of these workers outside the British dominions and
services only two —
baking bread and re- the Philippines, they could not operate in
pairing salvaged items had supply con- — the contemplated manner.
notations. The others were significant
1
Equipment not always well adapted to
chiefly because they promoted sound morale Pacific conditions proved another hamper-
and good health. Care of the dead had in ing factor. With the exception of bakery
addition a sentimental value, for it repre- and graves registration outfits, these serv-
sented a determined effort even under battle ices depended mostly on large, heavy equip-
conditions to carry out time-honored ment carried in trailer-vans. This equip-
funerary customs. ment was often so cumbersome that it could
In the peacetime Regular Army the not be transported over difficult terrain and
Quartermaster services were mainly fur- of necessity remained in one place, regard-
nished under contract by commercial bak- less of the location of the troops it was
ers, launderers, repairers, and morticians. meant to support. Much of this equipment,
But in wartime, civilian contractors were be- moreover, could not be adapted for use by
yond the reach of combat
and Quar- forces, operating units that were necessarily small
termaster companies were formed to supply because of the wide dispersion of troops and
these services. In December 1941 the crea- because of the tactical exigencies of jungle
tion of these units had just started, and for and island-hopping warfare. In amphibi-
more than a year few were ready for over- ous fighting, when assault forces of varying
seas use. The first fully trained units went sizes sometimes landed on separate beaches
to North Africa. For more than two years and fought more or less independently of
the War Department sent scarcely any bak- each other, inability to break up equipment
units employing heavy trailer-carried ma- a readily portable model that permitted a
chines could seldom function with maxi- company to be broken up into sixteen sec-
mum efficiency even when they were lo- tions. Each section had two ovens, and each
cated not far from the battle area. The prac- operated independently of the others. This
keeping that area as free as possible
tice of flexibility, so much greater than in most
of noncombat elements naturally forbade other service units, was perhaps the out-
the operation of service units there. If ac- standing feature of the bakery company. 2
tivities pertinent to a service had
to be con- Disadvantages as well as advantages were
ducted were dele-
in the battle zone, they involved in the use of the Ml 942 ovens.
gated to infantrymen who were assigned They were hard to clean and keep in repair.
such tasks as the collection and the trans- They broke down repeatedly because of lack
portation of abandoned articles and human of spare parts, and, like other pieces of bak-
3
remains to assembly points where salvage ing equipment, were difficult to ship. Be-
and graves registration detachments picked fore an island jump was made, a company
them up. had to stop production, crate its thirty-two
ovens, sixteen dough-mixers, and other uten-
Bakery Operations
sils for forward movement, and obtain
Of the Quartermaster services
special
thirty-six 2/2 -ton trucks or their equiva-
none was more useful than provision of
lent for transporting this cargo to the docks.
fresh bread. Fresh bread, many field com-
Sometimes low shipping and landing pri-
manders maintained, was the most impor-
orities delayed its departure. On arriving
tant component of the ration. It represented
at the combat area bakers had to locate,
about 10 percent of the food consumed by
unpack, and reassemble the equipment and
U.S. troops and was the only major element
of the ration normally served three times once more obtain trucks and set up an op-
every day. Soldiers probably resented its ab- erating center. During this whole period,
sence from a meal more than that of any lasting for weeks, no bakery bread was pro-
other food. But the frequent servings ex- duced. If combat units wanted bread, they
4
pected by them required processing in the had to bake it themselves.
field, something not necessary for other ra- Quartermasters in the European theater,
tion components, which came already pre- where British mobile baking equipment
pared for cooking or heating in mess kitch- rather than Ml 942 ovens was generally
ens. Processing, in turn, demanded a spe- used, contended — probably correctly — that
ployed sixteen dough-mixing machines and Field Range Parts. ORB AFWESPAC QM 400.312
(Rqmts). (3) Rpt, Capt Orr, 25 May 44, sub: Rpt
thirty-two gasoline-burning ovens, called 3 (Letterpress), pp. 28-32. OQMG SWPA
Ml 942 field bake ovens, which repre- 319.25.
Rpt, Lt Col John MacManus, Jul 45, sub: Bread
4
terpress). OQMG
SWPA 319.25. (2) Ltr, CG 8
Ltr, Deputy AF Com to CG ADSEC USASOS,
USASOS to TQMG, 8 May 45, sub: Redeployment 20 Sep 43, sub: Bakeries for Advance Areas. ORB
of Bakery Cos. (3) Ltr, TQMG
to CG POA, 17 AFWESPAC QM 433.
Apr 45, same sub. Both in ORB AFPAC QM 321 "See above, pp. 149-50.
(QMC). to CO Base Sec 3, 29
,0
1 (Ltr, Base Surgeon
)
'
Memo,
( 1 ) QM
Base Sec 3 for Base Svc Comd, Nov ORB AFWESPAC QM 633.
43, sub: Bakeries.
13 Nov 43, sub: U.S. Army Bakery. (2) Rpt, Base (2) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CO Base F, 31 Jul 44,
Sec 3, n. d., sub: Major QM
Activities, 22 Dec 41- sub: Yeast and Baking Powder. ORB Sixth Army
31 Mar 44, p. 9. ORB ABCOM AG 314.7. AG 433.
MORALE-BUILDING SERVICES 229
or more of this indispensable ingredient cut and haul it could not be spared from
11
spoiled. other duties. Despite this problem and roads
Still full production
another hindrance to so poor as to be at times completely im-
was the absence an abundant supply of
of passable, hospital patientsand combat sol-
pure water. Many streams were contam- diers were each provided with 7 ounces of
inated, and there was no piped water, such fresh bread daily and other troops with 5.6
as forces operating in thickly populated ounces. Elsewhere, chiefly because of late
countries found almost everywhere. Cans landings, operational experience was occa-
were at first virtually the only water-carry- sionally less favorable. In Mindanao no bak-
ing equipment authorized by the War De- ery bread was issued for more than a month.
partment, but they were too small to pro- Most troops on Okinawa waited for six to
vide a satisfactory method of delivery. Late ten weeks before they received any. As late
in the war large collapsible tanks and a as L plus 45 the daily issue even to combat
250-gallon trailer were added to company soldiers and to the ill and wounded averaged
equipment, but some observers thought that only about 4.8 ounces a day; not until L
three more trailers were needed in order to plus 100 did all troops receive the standard
12 13
give one to each platoon. quantity.
Operational plans usually assigned baker- When comparatively large issues were
ies higher shipping and landing priorities made, whether in combat areas or at rear
than they gave to laundry, bath, and sal- bases, the explanation was usually the con-
vage companies. They also tried to provide tinuous operation of all available equip-
an adequate number of bakeries but the ment. Hard-pressed bakeries did not confine
constant shortage of appropriate units gen- their activities to the eight to sixteen-hour
erally prevented this. Nevertheless combat daily range normally found outside the Pa-
forces on the whole fared rather well. In cific but made bread twenty-four hours a
the fighting on New Guinea bakeries were 14
day. Constant operation was almost cus-
at work within a few days after the initial
tomary in the Southwest Pacific where a unit
assaults had been launched. On Leyte the
often supplied double the number of men it
first one arrived on A plus 4, but it had no
was supposed At Biak seven bakery sec-
to.
baking equipment and was obliged to use
tions, set up to care for 17,500 men, landed
the most readily obtainable substitutes, old
1917 wood-burning ovens, ordinarily con- on D plus one and immediately began
round-the-clock operations. Four months
sidered archaic. Wood was
for these ovens
hard to secure, not because timber was later, they had lost only four days' produc-
scarce but because the extra men required to tion —one day for welding equipment pep-
11
( 1 Anon., "Flour 4- Water
) Ingenuity GI + — 13
Ltr 30, Capt Orr to Col Doriot, 26 Oct 44.
( 1 )
Bread," QMTSJ, III (24 December 1943), 5. (2) OQMG SWPA 319.25. (2) USAFFE Bd Draft
Anon., "Chow Talk," Infantry Journal, LVI (April Rpt, 19 Jan 45, sub: Answers to Questionnaire. QM
1945), 53. ORB AFPAC AG 333.1. (3) Rpt, A A Rep USA-
FFE Bd, 18 Jan 45, sub: Questionnaire. ORB
QM
(1) Rpt, Sixth Army QM, 13 Jun 44, sub:
12
QM Questionnaire, 30 Mar 44. ORB AFPAC Pa- AFPAC Pac Warfare Bd File. (4) Rpt 4 (Okinawa
cific Warfare Bd File. (2) Rpt, Capt H. F. Stewart, series), Capt Orr, 15 Jul 45, sub:
Opns on QM
30 Nov 44, sub: QM
Obsvr's Rpt 2 to USAFFE Okinawa. POA 319.25. (5) Island Comd
OQMG
Bd. (3) Rpt, 1st Lt Russell J. Terpenny, 25 Sep 45, Rpt Actn Rpt Okinawa, 8-XV-16.
" Pacific Warfare Bd Rpt 34, 17 Aug 45, sub:
sub: Review of T/O&E's. Both in OQMG POA
400.34 (T/O&E's). QM Questionnaire. ORB Pacific Warfare Bd File.
FIELD BAKERIES IN OPERATION at Port Moresby (above) and at Milne Bay
(below).
MORALE-BUILDING SERVICES 231
pered with Japanese shot and three days be- ingredients. On Kiriwina Island, off north-
cause they had no flour. At that time 56,000 eastern New Guinea, they used fermented
troops, or more than three times rated ca- coconut milk in place of yeast. When there
pacity, were being supplied. 15 Almost was not enough Guadalcanal
flour at the
equally remarkable records were achieved base, they used either 60 pounds of raisins to
at rear bases. In July 1944, for instance, 100 pounds of flour or half flour and half
baking was being done at Finschhafen for wheat cereal. Under similar conditions cooks
94,000 soldiers by a unit supposed to supply of the 41st Division found ground up hard
16
only 40,000. biscuits suitable. At Saidor and elsewhere
Overtime work did not in itself provide an in New Guinea bakers, lacking water, drilled
18
adequate supply. If enough equipment was wells.
not available, units had to improvise sub- By ingenuity and almost constant utiliza-
stitutes to prevent a complete halt of pro- tion of available ovens, then, bread was pro-
duction. Even lack of ovens did not vided. It is difficult to see how a greater
necessarily mean that bakers did not bake. production could have been obtained from
This fact is illustrated by three detach- such limited resources. Under conditions
ments, each of fifteen men, which were sent like those in the Pacific the only way to in-
to the New Hebrides to supply 16,000 crease the supply quickly would probably
troops but found that they had no ovens or have been through the issue to field forces
dough mixers and few other utensils. They of bread baked and canned by commercial
employed scrap lumber to fashion mixers contractors in the United States. After the
and clean clothing to proof loaves. They war there were, indeed, some who favored
scoured the islands for ovens and finally lo- this idea. They argued that the canning of
cated several old Dutch ones imported at bread was, obviously, the modern way to
some long-forgotten date. Since there were supply that product. It would, they con-
too few of these valuable finds to fill all de- tended, save manpower and shipping space
mands, they devised substitutes from 55- and insure a smooth flow of supply at less
gallon oil drums, an expedient occasionally cost. The Army would have to give up
used elsewhere. The front of a drum was cut baking just as the American family had. But
out and a steel plate welded into it as a opponents of the plan maintained that there
shelf on which bread could be baked. In the was no substitute for freshly baked bread
absence of pans the dough was put directly as a builder of morale. The canned variety,
on the plate. The stopgap ovens each held they pointed out, became moldy and was
about eight 2-pound loaves. They burned inferior in taste and flavor and so less ac-
out in two or three weeks, but new ones were ceptable to soldiers. Moreover, there would
17 actually be no saving in shipping space, for,
speedily made.
Bakers were almost equally proficient in excluding water, unbaked bread ingredi-
the improvisation of substitutes for scarce ents occupied considerably less space than
they did when baked and enlarged by fer-
,r,
Ltr cited n. 13(1).
'"
( 1 ) Ibid. (2) Min of Conf of Gen and Sp Staff
,8
(1) Anon., "Baker— Guadalcanal," QMTSJ, V
Sees Hq USASOS, 4 Jul 44, p. 8. (1 September 1944), 5. (2) Anon., "Island Hop-
''
Anon., "Flour+Water-f Ingenuity GI Bread," = ping Bakers Supply Sixth Army," QMTSJ, VIII
QMTSJ, III (24 December 1943), 3-5. (3 August 1945), 18.
232 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
mentation and by the addition of air and Once a tactical organization had been
19
water. In the end it was determined to alerted for combat activity, laundry service,
make no basic change in the system of sup- like bakery service, ceased —frequently for
plying bread in the field. The best solution six to eight weeks while laundrymen pre-
to the problem of inadequate issues seemed pared for and made the trip and set up a
tobe more and better baking equipment new installation. Trailers ordinarily arrived
equipment that would be made available some days after the initial assault had been
more promptly than it had been in World delivered, but even then they could not be
War II. landed if trails had not been developed on
shore. They were, in fact, immobilized un-
til engineers had built a passable road to a
Laundry Service
point with sufficient water for cleaning pur-
21
Laundry which carried and oper-
units, poses. The extent to which some organiza-
ated their essential equipment, such as wash- tions lacked service by the 37th
is illustrated
ers, tumblers, and water heaters, on heavy Division, cam-
which participated in the
trailers, supposedly furnished the services paigns for New Georgia, Bougainville, and
required by hospitals and by individuals Luzon. In July 1945 its quartermaster re-
in the field. In the Pacific they actually did ported that during his three years overseas
this for hospitals,which had priority, but the division "had no laundry service at all
there were too few of them to do much work in the field." It enjoyed, he added, "only
for individual soldiers. The number of pieces one two months' period during which laun-
handled for troops, though greatly exceed- dry facilities were available for about 10 out
ing that handled for hospitals, nevertheless of 100 officers of Field Grade. Our blankets
represented only a small percentage of the were laundered once in three years." 22
total number in need of cleaning. If the While not many organizations fared as
ordinary unit of two trailers worked sixteen badly as did the 37th Division, infantry
hours a day, seven days a week, each trailer troops in general were obliged to devote
stillserved only 3,000 soldiers a week at much time to washing their own garments.
the normal rate of about twenty-five pieces In the Southwest Pacific between Febru-
a man. In many places, moreover, no trail- ary and June 1945 it was estimated that
ers were available. Even if they were, the
such activity consumed about 3,000,000
difficulty of hauling them over rough terrain
man-hours a week. Had eighteen additional
often prevented their location at sites that
permitted maximum service. It is not
laundry companies been furnished, the same
strange therefore that in most parts of the work could have been done in about 205,-
Pacific laundries accepted individual wash 000 man-hours. 23 Whenever portable laun-
only at the low weekly rate of six to eight dry machines were obtainable, they pro-
pieces a man. 20
-'
( 1 ) Ltr, Ldry Off to Base QM
Sub-Base D,
"'Rpt of OQMG Food Conf, Subcom Rpt on 4 Jun 43, sub: Mechanical Difficulties of Mobile
Bakery Activities, pp. 12-13.
x
Ldry Unit. ORB NUGSEC QM
414.4 (Laundries).
(1) USASOS Regulations No. 30-21, 16 Sep (2) Ltr, 1st Lt Russell J. Terpenny, Obsvr, to Gen
42, sub: QMCSvc Ldries. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt Doriot OQMG, 7 Aug 45. OQMG
POA 319.25.
No. 96, 2 Feb 45, sub: QM
Mobile Ldry Equip. "Rpt, DQM 37th Div, 7 Jul 45, quoted in Rpt,
ORB AFPAC Pacific Warfare Bd File. (3) Ltr, Opns Br Mil Ping Div OQMG,
27 Aug 45, sub:
Lt Col C. E. Richards to CG USAFMIDPAC, 6 QM Ldry Svc in Field. OQMG SWPA 414.4.
Jul 45, sub: POA QM
Opns. OQMG
POA 319.25. QM SWPA Hist, VII, 92.
23
LAUNDRY FACILITIES IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC were a problem only
partially solved by unit equipment (above) and Qiiartermaster laundry trailers (below).
234 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
vided a reasonably satisfactory means of sight as Australian sources were unable to
self-service, but in zones of active fighting supply the missing equipment. Not until
they could not be widely utilized. A few washers hastily requisitioned from the
organizations employed unit funds to buy United States arrived late in the year did the
household washing machines in the United hospital platoons prove of much value.
States, and some ingenious soldiers even Large "fixed laundries," capable of car-
improvised washers out of oil drums by rig- ing for 5,000 troops at the peacetime rate
ging jeep motors to revolve them. But most of twenty-five garments a soldier, were
troops simply used soap and a scrub brush."'
4
rarely set up at SWPA island bases, for these
Troops stationed at bases below the equa- bases were looked upon as merely tempo-
tor were not much better off than those in rary establishments. In all New Guinea the
operational areas. Commercial laundries only sizable installation of this type was the
were available in the two British domin- one at Milne Bay. It turned out about
ions, but even in these countries not all 2,400 pounds of dry wash an hour, a pro-
5
military requirements could be filled." The duction so substantial that in the first half
New Guinea bases were much worse off. of 1944 Milne Bay alone among New
Here there were no laundry units at all until Guinea bases laundered clothing for indi-
27
well into 1943. At the end of June 1944 viduals.
the platoons of three recently arrived com- At the outset the South Pacific, like New
panies were divided between the bases and Guinea, had no laundry units. In early 1943
the Sixth Army, but their manpower and a few mobile types arrived, and toward the
equipment were so inadequate that even at close of that year three fixed installations
the bases, except for Milne Bay, they could were built —a 10,000-man-capacity unit in
do washing only for hospitals.'
6
About this New Caledonia and two 5,000-man-capac-
time seventeen laundry platoons, specially ity units, one in the Fijis and another in
8
designed for hospital service, arrived. They Espiritu Santo." In the Central Pacific,
provided welcome manpower but did not mobile laundries were employed almost en-
mitigate the shortage of equipment, for, be- tirely for hospitals. Five fixed installations,
wartime Hawaiian average for comparable highest proportion of men with this griev-
work. Because of this discrepancy there was ance, 65 percent, and Guadalcanal the
a heavy labor turnover, which caused a con- lowest, 20 percent. Authors of the survey
stant shortage of experienced operatives. pointed out as a possible explanation of the
"Special assignments," such as assistance in relatively slight loss on Guadalcanal that
outfitting entire divisions, further delayed this base did not employ the standard pin
laundering for individuals. Usually, soldiers' method of individual identification. Instead,
wash was not returned for about two weeks. six to eight men put their dirty clothes in
Most troops preferred commercial firms, a single bundle, which made one washer
which charged more than Quartermaster load; when the bundle was returned, each
laundries, but which lost fewer articles and man picked out his own belongings. In gen-
returned bundles sooner and in cleaner and eral the pin method was not a suitable
more wearable condition. In December means of identification. The reason, the
1944 it was estimated that such firms did surveyors suggested, may have been that
more than half the washing for troops in the shortage of manpower made it impos-
Honolulu. " A comparable situation existed form a group of specialists with no
1
sible to
in other localities where troops could find duties other than the sorting and marking
civilians to clean their clothing. In the lib- of clothing. They noted that men who per-
erated Philippines outside Manila in July formed these tasks usually also operated
1945, when military laundries were still washers and dryers and had too little time
3*
scarce, 90 percent of the soldiers had their to carry out any of their duties efficiently.
soiled garments cleaned by Filipino Seventy percent of the soldiers who were
women." asked if some other kind of laundry had
Army service in general provoked criti- proved superior to Quartermaster service
cism similar to that in Hawaii and the gave affirmative answers. They endorsed at
Philippines. Late in1944 a survey of six least one of these alternatives -civilian or —
Pacific Ocean Areas bases, which on the Navy establishments, washerwomen, or
33
whole were better supplied with Quarter- "myself."
master laundries than most parts of the Pa- Though some of the criticism leveled at
cific, showed that, while these units served Quartermaster laundries reflected mainly
about 78 percent of the troops, there were the time-honored propensity of soldiers to
many complaints about the inferior work. find fault with their lot, there was ample
The most common objection was the fre- justification for many of the complaints.
quent failure to return all pieces. Forty- After inspecting the Pacific bases in the
five percent of the soldiers questioned de- spring of 1945, Quartermaster General
clared that items were missing the last time Gregory declared that "the poorest job
their bundles were returned. Oahu had the being done by the Quartermaster Corps"
was its laundry service. Noting that troops
'"
( 1 Lt William B. Seininger
) Rpt, OP&C Div
"after a comparatively short period of fight-
OQMG, 9 Dec 44, sub: Trip to POA. OQMG POA
319.25. (2) Ltr, Capt H. W. Taylor to Gen Doriot ing" particularly needed the boost given to
OQMG, 21 Jul 45. OQMG MIDPAC 331.5.
l
(1) Ltr cited n. 30(2). (2) Rpt, Lt Col C. E. '-'Rpt, Field Progress Br OP&C Div OQMG,
Richards to CG USAFMIDPAC, 6 Jul 45, sub: Nov 44, sub: POA QM Opns. OQMG POA 319.25.
POA QM Opns. OQMG POA 319.25. n:
'
Ibid.
236 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
morale by clean apparel, he urged the in- an average of 1,900,000 a week. Even then
creased utilization of fixed laundries as a full service was supplied to only about
remedy. 14 During the following summer an 40,000 men, a bare 6 percent of the total
installation of this type, able to care for number in the tneater, and of these men
38
15,000 men, was completed at Saipan, but few were combat soldiers.
the poor water supply prevented its opera- Progress toward better service for infan-
5
tion. " At this time several other isolated trymen was nevertheless being made as the
bases had authorized fixed laundries, but the war drew to a close. An OQMG observer
higher priorities given to more urgent proj- wrote that at Okinawa "for the first time"
ects prevented the construction of these in a Pacific offensive fairly satisfactory
30
establishments. laundering was done for individuals. But
Even had a larger number of fixed laun- even there minimum service could not be
dries been built, they would have benefited started until about L plus 50 when the first
chiefly only the troops at rear bases. Combat laundry unit arrived. It adopted the Guadal-
soldiers would have derived no advantage. canal system of having small groups turn in
As it was, individual service remained at their soiled garments in a single bundle and
the end of the war, as it had been at the so materially simplified its task. Shortly be-
outset, the most conspicuous weakness of fore fighting ceased, a second unit came into
the laundry service. In the South Pacific operation and made it possible to furnish a
between 1 July 1943 and 30 June 1944, the certain amount of service to 70 percent of
3"
longest period covered by adequate figures, the troops.
only 66,000 troops were cared for even at Had the war in the Pacific lasted longer,
the low rate of six pieces a week." Statistics the arrival of units from Europe would
for the last eight months of hostilities in doubtless have led to vastly improved in-
the Southwest Pacific reveal that in Jan- dividual service. The fact that on the whole
uary 1945 some 775,000 pieces were washed this service remained unsatisfactory until
every week for hospitals, which had about the very end suggests that the QMC may
38,000 beds, but only about 125,000 pieces have made a mistake in giving the few avail-
for troops. This very low figure stemmed able laundries cumbersome equipment that
principally from the complete or partial could not be transported readily and that
stoppage of laundry combat activities in required operatives with considerable skill
areas. Between February and May more and experience. Perhaps it should have
units came into operation, and the number given more thought to the large-scale issue,
of pieces handled more than doubled to particularly to combat organizations, of an
easily portable washer that any soldier could
11
Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 14 Mar 45, sub:
have operated. Such a machine would al-
Tour of POA and SWPA. OQMG POA 319.25.
*'
Ltr, QM HUSAFMIDPAC to TQMG, 20 Jul most surely have produced better results
45, sub: Visit to Forward Areas. OQMG POA
319.25.
:,H
38
QM SWPA Hist, VII, 92-94.
Rpt cited n. 29. ™ Rpt 4 (Okinawa series), Capt Orr, 15 Jul
( 1 )
than did the expedients actually employed freshly sterilized and cleaned by neighbor-
"
in the field. Certainly, the frequent utiliza- ing laundries. 4
tion of household washers implied that sim- Between the two world wars no need ex-
ilar machines, better fitted to field condi- isted for an agency that would carry out
tions, might have been at least a partial military sterilization of the 1918 type. Not
solution. until the hectic days of 1941 and 1942
brought the prospect of renewed battle on
Bath, Sterilization, lice was such an organization the Quar- —
and Fumigation Operations termaster sterilization and bath company
created. Equipped along World War I lines,
InWar Department theory, if not always it was designed to operate with laundry com-
in Army practice, bath, sterilization, and panies in combat zones and with salvage re-
fumigation units worked in conjunction with pair companies in rear areas. Its most im-
nearby laundries, which washed and reissued portant piece of equipment was a heavy
clothes turned in for sterilization or fumi- trailer-van, which carried water-heat-
gation. Their major function, again in War ing machinery, a dozen showers, and a large
Department theory, was ceaseless war on sterilization chamber. In early tests this ve-
head and body lice. Wherever these insects hicle proved much too ponderous for easy
were prevalent, bath units were responsible movement on poor or congested roads. The
for their eradication. In France during ensuing demand for greater mobility and
the decision reached in late 942 that methyl
World War I, lice, facetiously dubbed 1
a collapsible fumigation chamber trans- ity among soldiers, many requests for bath
ported on a comparatively small truck in- units without fumigation chambers were
stead of a bulky sterilization chamber trans- submitted to the zone of interior. But few
ported on a heavy trailer-van. The fumiga- arrived,and troops were often obliged to
tionchamber was intended, primarily, for wash themselves in streams, often unsani-
employment in combat areas. In rear areas tary, carry water in buckets to their tents,
44
a specially developed rubber bag, about or even bathe out of a helmet. Occasion-
twenty-five by sixty inches, was used for de- ally, enterprising soldiers improvised hot
lousing. The clothes of six to eight soldiers, showers, based on the ever valuable 55-gal-
together with an ampul of methyl bromide, lon drum. Such improvisation also required
were placed inside the bag, which was then a portable air compressor or tire hand pump,
sealed. The ampul was broken from the out- steel pipe, valves, nipples, hose, and, finally,
side, and in about forty-five minutes the re- ration cans for the shower heads, usually
42
leased gas fumigated the garments. three in number. The first step in the con-
World War II actualities soon dispelled struction of this novel device was to make a
the belief that large-scale delousing opera- rock base open on one side so that a fire
tions would be required. Conditions over- could be built under the drum. Next, the
seas were unfavorable to infestation by lice. shower heads and steel pipe were put to-
These insects became most prevalent in static gether and suspended from a tree or other
warfare in which large bodies of men lived overhead support. The valve stem and hose
together for months in dirty, congested quar- connection were then installed. Care was
ters; the danger from them was at its height taken to insure that the air pressure in the
in cold winter weather when soldiers, espe- drum never exceeded twenty pounds; other-
cially in northern countries, were likely to wise the container would burst. If an air
live in ill-ventilated surroundings. But none pump could not be found, a gravity instead
of these conditions were common in the open of a pressure device might be used. Though
warfare of 1941-45, with its almost constant highly ingenious, these improvisations were
movement of troops, and there was in conse- too inconvenient and complicated to be
quence slight need for sterilization or fumi- undertaken often. They accordingly offered
gation equipment. This was particularly true no real solution for the lack of showers.
45
in the tropical Pacific areas — a fortunate The Leyte campaign saw a fumigation
circumstance because they had no bath com- and bath company functioning for the first
43
panies until late 1944. time in a Pacific offensive. With little need
It was rather the lack of the bath units for fumigation activities, this unit operated
carried by these companies that soldiers in almost solely as a provider of baths. Since
the Pacific felt most keenly. Each unit con-
44
Rpt 2, Col Rohland A. Isker, 10 Apr 44,
(1)
tained twelve to twenty-four showers, and Observations in SWPA. (2) Ltr, Capt Orr
sub:
since showers enjoyed tremendous popular- to Col Doriot, 17 Oct 44. (3) Rpt 18, Capt Orr,
30 Aug 44, sub: Misc Matters. All inQM OQMG
'-OQMG Tng Cir No. 14, 17 Jun 43, sub: QM SWPA 319.25.
Fumigation and Bath Co (Mobile). 4 "'
achieved, constituted a minor consideration. All salvage activities hinged on the abil-
Three types of units —salvage collecting ity of collecting units to gather worn-out
companies, salvage repair companies, and and discarded articles. In quiet areas these
salvage depots —were used in theaters of units assembled supplies and equipment
operations. Collecting and repair companies turned in by troops at weekly or other des-
were semimobile units that were usually as- ignated intervals. In combat areas they
picked up articles, non-Quartermaster as
50
TM 10-260, 15 Mar 43, sub: QM Salvage—
TOPNS. well as Quartermaster, that infantrymen in a
51
(1) WD Ltr AG 400.74 OB-S-SPUPT-M, 19 necessarily unsystematic fashion had gar-
Aug 43, sub: Return of Overseas Salvage. (2) WD
Memo 30-44, 28 Jul 44, sub: Salvage and Scrap to C2
TM 10-260, 15 Mar 43, sub: QM Salvage—
be Returned From Overseas. TOPNS.
SALVAGE OPERATIONS included the use of shoe repair trailers capable of operation in
forward areas (above) and rear area clothing repair shops at salvage depots (below).
MORALE-BUILDING SERVICES 243
nered on the battlefield and transported to ages of special equipment for some tasks.
assembly points. When fighting ceased, col- A notable example was the almost complete
lecting troops entered the combat area and absence of magnet cranes and other ma-
with the assistance of labor troops conducted chines needed for the salvage of accumula-
the first careful search for supplies lost or dis- tions of scrap metals, estimated in the sum-
carded in the heat of battle. As salvage ac- mer 1942 to total 50,000 tons, which
of
cumulated at the assembly points, collecting were badly required for steel and other metal
54
teams separated it into the main general plants in the United States.
classes of supply and removed it to salvage The South Pacific Area, hard pressed for
dumps. Here, aided by troops from other manpower, placed salvage and reclamation
technical services, they further divided it among its most dispensable services, and
into four classes determined by degree of these activities were at first virtually un-
usability. Class "A" comprised new supplies known even in improvised form. During
and equipment; Class "B," serviceable arti- the Guadalcanal campaign few items were
cles in need of minor restoration. These two recovered from the battlefield, for not many
classes were if possible handled by repair combat soldiers could be spared for this task.
units operating in the field and sent back Some clothes in need of major renovation,
to the organization from which they had it is true, were collected in anticipation of
come. Unserviceable materials, which could the early arrival of repair units that never
be made usable by major repairs, formed came, but no sustained effort was made to
Class "C." Class "D" consisted of unre- gather such articles despite the danger of a
claimable items — items which could not be severe clothing shortage among troops none
55
restored but which might contain badly too well clad at the start of the campaign.
needed spare parts or scarce materials. Four months on Guadalcanal
after fighting
Classes "C" and "D" were both handled had ceased, salvage operations in the South
53
by salvage depots. Pacific were described as "practically non-
In the South and Southwest Pacific lack 56
existent." There were still no collecting
of sufficient units, qualified technicians, and
units and but one repair platoon and
essential equipment as well as trying physi-
two repair detachments. Though scantily
cal conditions prevented the performance of
equipped, these small units furnished the
salvage activities precisely in accordance
nucleus for the Quartermaster-operated
with this procedure. was mid- 1943 before
It
base salvage services that were set up in
the first salvage organizations arrived, and
then they came only in small numbers. In September 1 943 for the benefit of the Army,
the Central Pacific the presence on Oahu Navy, and Marine Corps. The opportune
of qualified troops, fairly elaborate equip- arrival of two collecting companies and ad-
ment, and commercial service firms enabled ditional repair organizations greatly facili-
the QMC to carry out routine salvage and 54
( 1 ) Memo, QM for CG Hawaiian Dept, 28
reclamation activities pretty much along
Jul 42, sub: Scrap Metal. (2) Ltr, CG Hawaiian
prescribed lines. Even here there were short- Dept to CG SOS, 11 Aug 42, sub: Salvage of
Scrap Steel. Both in ORB AGF PAC AG 400.93
M ) USASOS Regulation 30-10, 15 Sep 42, sub: (Salv).
( 1
QMC Salvage Activities. (2) Ibid., Feb 43. (3) "Anon., "Salvage Saga: Guadalcanal," QMTSJ,
USAFFE Bd Rpt 190, 15 May 45, sub: QM Sal- V (27 October 1944), p. 24.
56
vage Collecting Co, T/O&E 10-187. Ltr cited n. 28(2).
244 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
tated the inauguration of these new activ- Guinea to transport the recovered supplies.
ities. One collecting company was assigned After the Australian bases had received the
to the Guadalcanal base, and notwithstand- items, additional weeks elapsed before re-
ing that it had few trucks and scarcely any pair work could be started. These delays
equipment for obtaining scrap metals, it postponed for months the reissue of badly
"gave the island a clean sweep from one end needed articles and at times obliged advance
to the other," and assembled a huge mass bases to distribute so much new equipment
57
of materials from the former battlefield. in place of that turned in for repair that
The only advantage the Southwest Pa- total issues of some items increased by 50
5"
cific had over its neighbor was that a ma- percent.
jor segment of its forces was stationed in The establishment of repair centers in
Australia where the Commonwealth Army New Guinea would have made costly rec-
for many months collected, stored, and dis- lamation in Australia unnecessary, but dur-
tributed salvage items for the U.S. forces ing the first half of the war this manifestly
and where commercial firms did much of desirable step could not be taken. Machines
the repair work on shoes and tents. The em- for reclaiming such important items as shoes
ployment of civilians for sewing and other and tents were almost unobtainable. Even
reclamation jobs further eased the situation if they had been procurable, there were few
by making possible the establishment of siz- technicians qualified to operate them. Pend-
able salvage depots. Because of these favor- ing the arrival of salvage outfits, the QMC
able circumstances the QMC in Australia therefore set up footwear and clothing re-
was able to carry out reclamation activities pair schools in Australia to train troops and
on a rather substantial scale. °* civilians who were to be sent north.''" In
Until late 1943 the position of the Corps June 1943 New Guinea's first repair shop,
in New Guinea was no better than in the which handled footwear, began operations,
South Pacific. At the advance bases, details but the establishment of reclamation centers
composed of both combat and service troops in general proceeded slowly.
01
In October
working under the direction of a Quarter- the Fifth Air Force quartermaster reported
master sergeant collected repairable items
that 26,000 troops in the Port Moresby re-
from military units at designated times, clas-
gion still had no way of having shoes
sified them, and then, since there were no
mended. Men who
wore out soles of their
means for making even minor repairs,
he wrote, "must draw a new pair
shipped them to Australia — a wasteful but shoes,
which is of course a big waste."
62
both the South Pacific and the Southwest Despite the inadequacy of facilities for
Pacific steadily rose as experienced techni- minor repairjobs, some sort of repair sec-
cians and appropriate equipment finally ar- tionwas available to most units in New
rived, but even then available resources did Guinea by mid- 1944. Unfortunately, these
not match the magnitude of the task. The shops were often located many miles from
problem of how sal- to maintain minimum troop concentrations. This drawback, to-
vage services with limited means remained a
gether with other supply problems, usually
constant source of trouble. At the end of
made it impracticable to return to original
April 1944 there were in the whole South-
wearers any apparel except shoes; other
west Pacific only four repair companies and
items were commonly turned over to bases
one collecting company, whereas current 66
for redistribution in bulk.
troop strength demanded at least six collect-
ing and nine repair companies. Even the Meanwhile facilities for making major
lone collecting company had come only in repairs in the island had been provided. At
the preceding February.
03
Milne Bay in November 1943 the 28th Sal-
The newly arrived units, all semimobile, vage Depot Headquarters Company started
were divided among the bases and troop the first fixed installation in New Guinea
concentration points outside Australia. Re- formajor repairs on material shipped from
pair units could not operate trailer-mounted forward bases. This company had enough
equipment in forward areas and in conse- skilled operatives to supervise a thousand
quence could not function as the mobile or more civilian employees, but since there
64
organizations they were meant to be. members
were few candidates for jobs, its
Usually, these units removed their equip-
served as artisans rather than as foremen.
ment from the trailers and put it in thatched
Because of its small labor force, the depot
huts or temporary buildings at advance
turned out only about 30 percent of the work
bases. This action facilitated operations by
that a fully manned establishment would
providing workers with better ventilation
have normally produced.'
17
A large part of
and more space. These advantages, in turn,
it was in very poor con-
the clothing sent to
made possible the elimination of the pro-
dition, muchbeyond reclamation. The
of it
tracted rest periods needed in the tropics by
added repair and disposition burdens thus
men who labored in poorly ventilated
15 laid on the depot were attributed to the
trailers.'
"hard service" that apparel received in the
'"
( 1 ) Memo, Reclamation and
Salvage Div for field, to "failure of unit commanders to
Ping and Control Div USASOS, 26 Feb OCQM turn in" unusable garments before they
43, sub: Reclamation and Salvage Problems. ORB
AFWESPAC QM
337. (2) Rpt, Reclamation and were "completely beyond repair," and to
Salvage Div OCQM
USASOS, 23 May 44, sub: the protracted storage of material awaiting
Salvage and Reclamation Activities, Apr 44. ORB
AFWESPAC QM 319.1. m Ltr, Col Walter T. O'Reilly, USAFFE Bd, to
Ltr, CG USASOS to CG
"4
ASF, 18 Jul 44, sub:
QM Repair Installations. OQMG SWPA 331.5.
CG AGF, 20 Aug 44, sub: Information. ORB QM
,ir
'
Ltr, QM USASOS to CQM USAFFE, 22
AFPAC Pacific Warfare Bd File.
Mar
( 1 )
that in the previous thirty days a high pro- therefore, be derived from collecting units,
portion of clothing had been found to need and a main objective of salvage and recla-
repair; at that time, in fact,
mation operations, the speedy reissue to field
50 percent of
organizations of repaired articles, could be
shoes required mending, 31 percent of
achieved only in part.
work suits, 26 percent of trousers, 18 per-
Collecting units nevertheless carried on
cent of shirts, 17 percent of socks, and
their regular activities in the Leyte cam-
^Ltr, CO 28th QM Salvage Depotto CO paign. A platoon landed on A plus 9 and
INTERSEC USASOS, 8 Apr 44. ORB NUGSEC
QM 400.9. Field Progress Br OPC Div OQMG, Survey
70
69
CG
Base F to CG INTERSEC USASOS,
Ltr, ofPOA QM Opns, Nov 1944, SR 3-4, 7. OQMG
3 Aug 44, sub: Salvage from Forward Areas. ORB POA 319.25.
NUGSEC QM
400.93. QM SWPA Hist, V, 63-66; VII, 86-87.
71
MORALE-BUILDING SERVICES 247
attached a squad to each of the division mediately valuable articles. Among the
Quartermaster companies. These squads Quartermaster were 1,838 canteens,
articles
employed Filipino helpers and set up as- 1,353 haversacks, kits, 350
1,420 jungle
sembly stations on the routes followed by cases of field rations, and substantial quan-
the trucks that carried salvage back from the tities of shoes, mess and web equipment,
battlefield. The platoon also sent out road- helmets, entrenching tools, and gasoline
side teams to scour bivouacs, dumps, and cans and drums. Among non-Quartermas-
trails. Supplies that could not be put to im- ter articles were 634 rifles, 47 Browning
mediate use went to a base salvage dump. 72 automatic rifles, 26 bazookas, 796 bayonets,
Procedures like those on Leyte were fol- 15,000 rounds of .30-calber ammunition,
lowed in Luzon where a collecting outfit 1,000 rifle grenades, 5,000 hand grenades,
also went ashore soon after the initial 3,330 rounds of 60-mm. mortar ammuni-
73
landings. tion, 1,000 rounds of 81 -mm. mortar am-
At Okinawa low shipping priorities pre- munition, 1,000 rounds of 37- mm. antitank
vented the early support of tactical elements. ammunition, 5 flame throwers, 76 grenade
Not until L plus 30 did a collecting com- launchers, and a miscellaneous collection of
76
pany begin to function. With the help of explosives, radios, and telephones. In addi-
borrowed trucks it cleared abandoned beach tion the company recovered 608 American
dumps, picked up discarded materials dead, buried over 1,000 Japanese, estab-
wherever they could be found, and classi- lished two cemeteries, and in emergencies
fied large accumulations of supplies gath- served as litter bearers, ammunition carriers,
ered bycombat units. 74 The 27th Division and perimeter guards for infantry battalion
employed a large provisional unit, called command posts.
the 27th Combat Salvage Collecting Com- The two provisional repair units on Oki-
pany. This outfit, made up of troops who nawa were typical of those employed in
had battle experience but were medically the closing phases of the Pacific war. One
certified as unsuitable for further infantry was a small shoe repair shop, manned by
duty, was assigned not only the normal troops from a collecting company and a
functions of a collecting unit but also the service unit. Set up on L plus 35, it renewed
gruesome chore of gathering the dead on the about 250 pairs of shoes a day. Even earlier,
battlefield, a duty normally given to combat on L plus 10, a typewriter and office-equip-
soldiers but one they seldom carried out sys- ment repair shop, which utilized seven en-
tematically. The company was divided into listed men from a Quartermaster depot
three platoons, and each platoon was in turn company, had begun to renovate machines
77
divided into three squads for support of at the rate of 450 a month. Valuable
battalions.
75
Though these squads sometimes though these units were, they were too few in
worked under enemy artillery and sniper number and too small in size to perform
fire, they recovered a large variety of im- more than a minor part of the necessary
repairs.
ra
(l) QMTSJ, VIII (21 September 1945), 9.
Throughout the Pacific both air and
(2) Pac Warfare Bd Rpt No. 34, 17 Aug 45, sub:
QM Questionnaire. ground forces deplored the dearth of stand-
"QMTSJ, VIII (10 August 1945), 11.
78
''
Island Comd Actn Rpt Okinawa, 8-XV-25. Ibid.
"•
27th Div Actn Rpt Nansei Shoto, pp. 89-90.
71
Island Comd Actn Rpt Okinawa, 8-XV-25.
248 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
ard repair services in combat areas. They mated that reclamation work during these
particularly lamented the poor means pro- thirty-four months resulted in the reissue
vided for the renewal of shoes, perhaps of enough articles to save the cargo space
the item of apparel that could least easily be occupied by 72,000 ship tons. This work,
dispensed with. Task forces could not carry itfurther reckoned, had saved $19,150,000
with them sufficient stocks of footwear. Nor which otherwise would have been spent on
could they provide for the shipment of ade- new supplies. The theater estimated that
quate replacement stocks during the opera- as of 30 September 1944 reclaimed articles
tion. Repair shops, which might have of clothing and equipage numbered, respec-
K1
alleviated the inevitable shortages, were not tively, 6,880,000 and 4,610,000. By far
ordinarily set up until the fighting had the greater part of these articles had been
ceased. In the interim, the deputy com- reclaimed in Australia. Salvage depots in
mander of the Fifth Air Force noted in the South Pacific manufactured as well as
July 1944, there were occasions when not reclaimed articles. Among
the unusual arti-
enough usable footwear was on hand to were special-pur-
cles that they fabricated
supply all troops. He urged as a corrective pose and odd-size uniforms for the QMC
the early arrival of standard shoe repair and trusses and braces for the Medical
outfits in operational zones. About this time Corps. For some months collecting units in
the Sixth Army quartermaster submitted this theater also carried out graves regis-
82
similar recommendations. But it was never tration functions.
possible to carry out these proposals. 78
Though collection and repair activities Graves Registration Service
were often disappointing to the combat
forces, a considerable mass of scarce ma-
Graves registration units were concerned
with every activity relating to the care of
terials was shipped to the United States for
the dead except the collection of bodies un-
industrial use. In the South Pacific such
der battle conditions. Standard procedures
movements up to the close of March 1944
required that they enter the combat zone
totaled 24,000,000 pounds of heavy and
as soon as it was free of danger, pick up
light ferrous scrap, nonferrous scrap, fired
the bodies that infantrymen had brought
cartridge cases, tires, tubes, scrap rubber,
to collecting stations, and make the first
and airplane parts. 7 " The Southwest Pa- systematic search for remains. Sometimes,
cific Area calculated that between March for reasons of morale and sanitation, hasty
1942 and December 1944 it forwarded burials in isolated spots might be necessary,
34,000 ship tons of salvage. 8 " It also esti- but this practice was discouraged and, if it
proved unavoidable, sketches of the physi-
TK
( 1 ) Ltr, Deputy Comdr Fifth Air Force to CG
INTERSEC USASOS, 21 Jul 44, sub: Salvage cal surroundings were to be made to fa-
Units for Forward Areas. ORB NUGSEC QM cilitate the future location of scattered in-
322.3. (2) Ltr, Sixth Army QM to Pacific Warfare
Bd, 13 Jun 44. ORB AFPAC Pacific Warfare Bd "'
Rpt, CQM USASOS, Nov 44, sub: QM Items
File. Reclaimed and Returned to Stock. ORB AFWES-
7u
Rpt, QM SOS SPA, May 44, sub: Salvage PAC QM 319.25.
Shipped to U.S. OQMG POA 319.25.
S2
Maj Maurice
B. Sinsheimer, Jr., and Capt
*'Rpt, CQM USASOS, Jan 45, sub: Summary George Hallman, "Laundry and Salvage Opera-
F.
of Salvage Opns, Mar 42-31 Dec 44. ORB
1 tions in the South Pacific," QMR, XXIV (Sep-
AFWESPAC QM 319.25. tember-October 1944), p. 35.
MORALE-BUILDING SERVICES 249
terments. Generally, the dead were moved growth, improvised for the express purpose
R5
as soon as possible to cemeteries designated of meeting a series of local emergencies."
by division commanders. Since graves reg- The first of these emergencies arose in Aus-
istration were primarily administra-
units 1942 when bodies began to
tralia early in
tive outfits, they merely supervised burials; accumulate and require suitable disposition.
the actual digging of graves and the trans- In the haste of arranging for the feeding,
portation of remains were functions nor- quartering, and training of the troops who
mally performed by service troops. Every poured into Australia, little attention had
effort was made to identify bodies at least been given to care of the dead. But once
tentatively. This was a simple matter if that problem became urgent a program
identification were attached; other-
tags was improvised. It was based on interment
wise identity had to be determined from in Australia because shipment to the home-
letters, dental work, and fingerprints. If land was barred by the wide dispersion of
remains were badly mutilated, identification troops and by the absence of supplies for
might prove impossible. The units also reg- preserving bodies on a long voyage. Iso-
istered graves, collected personal property lated burials were to cease, and all the de-
of the dead, and arranged for its shipment ceased were to be concentrated in U.S.
to next of kin. Though only one of these Army cemeteries, one of which would be
activities was, strictly speaking, "graves reg- set up in each base section in Australia. The
istration," that term was used to embrace program was to be carried out at Head-
mortuary quarters, USAFIA, and at base sections by
!
trained troops handicapped graves regis- registration units to support tactical ele-
tration throughout the war, particularly ments. Nor was any provision made for
during the first two years. The organization training in the identification of remains, per-
of this service took place piecemeal "under haps the main problem posed by battle
pressure of unforeseen circumstances and dead. The improvised program thus did not
without strict regard to the dictates of high answer the growing need for a policy suit-
s6
level policy. " It was "an indigenous able to combat areas.
**
(1) TM
10-630, 23 Sep 41. (2) T/O&E 10-
ss
Edward Steere, The Graves Registration Serv-
297, 6 Nov 43. ice in World War II (QMC Historical Studies,
84
( 1 Memo, War Plans Br P&C Div for
) Mem 21), p. 33.
Div OQMG, 31Jul 41, sub: Co QM GR OQMG 86
(1) QM SWPA Hist, IV, 80-82. (2) Rpt,
293. (2) "List of Quartermaster Graves Registra- GRO toCQM USAFIA, 21 May 42, sub: Ceme-
tion Units in Army of United States," compiled teries and GR. ORB AFWESPAC QM 333.1
by Organization Sec, Opns Br AGO, 23 Mar 46. (Insps)
250 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Even its proper application in Australia rather than a campaign of maneuver. The
was made difficult by the inadequate mor- combat zone in consequence covered a rela-
tuary standards of commercial undertakers tively small area, and it was easier to es-
and by the inability of local manufacturers tablishtemporary cemeteries than it would
to supply satisfactory caskets. These prob- have been in a campaign that involved con-
lems were in one sense a blessing, for they stant troop movements. In the Urbana
obliged USAFIA to create a small provi- Force the graves registration sergeant
sional organization composed of thirty- "braved the dangers of the Front with a
seven men, most of whom had been squad of men to bring the dead back so
morticians in civilian life. This group was that they would not be buried" in isolated
instructed in the techniques of Army graves spots but concentrated in three small ceme-
88
and then used to supplement
registration teries. On the Warren Front, however, al-
Australian services. While not designed most continual firing by snipers forced the
specifically for battle duty, the organization burial of many dead "where they lay." Not
gave members sufficient experience to
its until early January could these isolated re-
enable them to perform many of the mor- mains be disinterred and a search begun for
tuary tasks demanded in combat. When the the missing. Three details, each made up of
Papuan campaign started, it was fortunate a technical sergeant and five enlisted men,
that this unit existed, for the War Depart- performed these tasks. Frequent consulta-
ment had rejected a theater request for a tion with combatants about the disappear-
single graves registration company, and no ance of soldiers in action materially facili-
trained noncommissioned officers would tated the recovery of bodies, but many of
have been available for service in New the dead remained unlocated. 89
Guinea had the theater itself not already The toward a better graves
initial step
to furnish combat elements with an ade- In the assault on Los Negros in the Ad-
quate number of technicians. Throughout miralty Islands early in 1944, graves regis-
1943 they continued to be assigned to tac- tration troops were so scarce that only one
tical units only in pairs or small detach- sergeant and five privates could be assigned
ments. Working under officers designated to the attacking force, which aggregated
by task force commanders, they directed the more than a division. Normally, a force of
collection and identification of the dead, this size would be entitled to an entire pla-
Regiment. One of them was assigned to troops, and throughout the operation these
each of the four columns into which this troops furnished the bulk of the needed de-
widely scattered organization was divided. tails. Faults in routine handling of burials
Other organizations were even worse off, were common. Many grave markers bore
being wholly dependent for supervision no information whatever; identification
upon inexperienced chaplains and noncom- tags were attached to markers by strings
missioned tactical officers. 91 In all combat rather than by screws; and Japanese bodies
forces perhaps the worst feature was the were not separated from American remains.
extensive employment of front-line soldiers Frequently, no effort was made to identify
in the demoralizing task of handling their the unknown dead. As recording clerks
own fatalities. were generally unavailable, facts needed to
All this contrasted sharply with the con- verify an identification were seldom indi-
temporary situation in North Africa, where cated. Finally, because temporary burial
sites were not mapped, concentration of re-
graves registration, initially on a provisional
mains in cemeteries was delayed. It is sig-
basis,became more and more an activity
nificant that where a larger number of
carried out by specialists. As technically
qualified men was available, as at the ceme-
trained troops in increasing numbers ar-
tery set up on neighboring Manus Island,
rived from the United States in the spring
much less reason existed for criticism. But
and summer of 1943, this trend became
on Manus, as on Los Negros, some burial
particularly marked. In the Southwest Pa-
reports contained no information about the
cific, on the other hand, not a single graves
cause of death and neither listed nor noted
registration unit came until the following
the disposition of personal effects though
November. Its arrival facilitated the division
they might have given valuable clues to
of labor among those who cared for the 93
identity.
dead, but there were still too few technicians
and too many gaps in mortuary supplies."
-'
"3
(1) Ibid., pp. 144-46. (2) 1st Plat 604th GR
Co Hist Rpt, 9 Mar-28 May 44. DRB AGO QM
91
Opn Rpt 162d Inf Regt — Morobe-Salamaua, Co-604-Pl-(1)-0.3 (11525) M. (3) Rpt, Capt
QM
Sec Sixth Army, 8
29 Jun-12 Sep 43. DRB AGO 341-70.2 (21585). James C. MacFarland,
92
Steere, Craves Registration Service, pp. 43, May 44, sub: GR Activities in Admiralty Islands.
57-58. ORB 1st Cav Div 293.
252 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
On both islands the widest departure Pacific. An entire company was available,
from prescribed practices was found in the and one platoon from this unit was attached
disposal of enemy dead. The small mortuary to each division. These platoons accom-
details, barely able to care for American panied assault troops during the critical
bodies, could not give Japanese bodies the phases of the attack and so avoided the mis-
same attention they gave their own. Strict take made at Los Negros. The comparative
adherence to the Geneva Convention pre- abundance of technicians did not mean,
scribing equal treatment of the dead, however, that they were always utilized to
whether friend or foe, was impossible. the best advantage. The G-l after action
report of the 41st Division noted that liaison
Due to the tactical situation at the outset
of the operation it was impossible to bury each between combat commanders and attached
enemy dead separately, and to make Reports graves registration elements had been in-
of Interment. Enemy dead were in front of effective.
97
Probably because of this fact,
allied forward elements and it would have
landing force commanders did not estab-
been impracticable to risk lives in order to
bury enemy dead. When the initial objec- lish any cemeteries during the assault phase.
tives were taken it was necessary to bury the To obviate such lapses in the future, the re-
enemy dead immediately in a number of com- portrecommended that some specialists ac-
mon graves as the bodies had begun to decom- company the headquarters of the division
pose and were a serious menace to the health
to which their units were assigned. It also
of the Allied Forces. 94
recommended that before an operation
Owing to the uniformly heavy Japanese started a short graves registration course
casualties and the swift deterioration of re- be given to chaplains and at least one officer
mains in the hot, insect-laden atmosphere, or noncommissioned officer in each unit
the disposal of enemy dead came to be re- down and including companies. A course
to
garded throughout the Pacific as a matter of that sort, the report noted, had been
of field sanitation rather than of graves reg-
given before the Hollandia offensive and
istration. The customary practice was to
had proved its value.
bury remains as speedily as possible, at times The South Pacific Area had meanwhile
in huge graves that contained several hun-
been coping with much the same problems
dred bodies. 95 Under the prevailing condi-
as had the Southwest Pacific. Like its neigh-
tions there was no feasible alternative. Only boring area, it had established at the outset
theaters, like the European, which had large small burial plots at the island bases, but
pools of civilian labor as well as a relatively it had made no provision, as had been done
plentiful supply of graves registration units in Australia, for a trained group capable
could follow the pattern prescribed at of caring for combat dead. When the first
Geneva. 96 U.S. Army units went ashore on Guadal-
In the thrust at Hollandia in April 1944 canal late in 1942 to relieve the exhausted
graves registration support was provided on 1st Marine Division, there existed not even
Nov 43-30 Apr 44. (2) Steere, Graves Registration, DRB AGO 342-0.3.
08
pp. 137-40. Personal Ltr, Col Joseph H. Burgheim to Gen
9*
Steere, Graves Registration, pp. 111-12, 115. Gregory, 24 Feb 43. OQMG
POA 319.25.
MORALE-BUILDING SERVICES 253
A provisional graves registration unit had burial points, but shortages ofmen and
to be hastily created on the island itself. trucks still necessitated emergency burials
1 "1
Search for technically fitted men unearthed on the battleground.
a field artillery corporal who had been a The opening of offensive activities in the
mortician and he was promptly put in Central Pacific with the attack on the Gil-
charge of the cemetery that had been set berts found that area not much better pre-
up by the Marine Corps. With the help of pared to handle mortuary work than its
six enlisted men and a crew of native la- two sister areas had been earlier. It had no
borers, he corrected the haphazard plot lay- units trained for this work, and even the de-
out in accordance with standard specifica- tachment of 164 Quartermaster officers and
tions. But he could not always follow basic men formed to handle Quartermaster serv-
ices in the Gilberts had no plans for graves
1
for noncombat duties were so scarce that too week course at the Army morgue in Hono-
much concern for the dead might have en- lulu. Scanty though this instruction was, it
dangered the living. Maj. Gen. J. Lawton at least constituted a better preparation
102
Collins, who commanded the 25th Division, than had been made for Guadalcanal.
saw corpses laboriously borne over "terrible In the Gilberts, as well as on other Cen-
trails" under a scorching sun, while tral Pacific atolls, graves registration was
wounded men lay unattended on the battle- influenced strongly by the terrain. Instead
field. This, he maintained, was false senti- of the rugged topography of New Guinea
mentality wholly out of place in war. For and Melanesia, there was firm open ground
this reason troops were directed to bury the that presented few of the barriers to move-
dead quickly in graves "far enough off the ment that were encountered in the jungles
trail so that,'' when it "is extended, a bull- and mountains below the equator. But
dozer does not carry away the cross erected there were also tactical conditions unfavor-
to mark the grave." 10 °
able to care of the dead. The Gilberts cam-
Not until six months after Japanese re- paign was planned as a short, all-out offen-
sistance had been crushed on Guadalcanal, than a prolonged operation like
sive rather
did the first graves registration company that around Buna, and the final death toll
trained in the zone of interior, the 49th, land was expected after only a few days of hard
in the South Pacific. Its members were im- fighting. This fact meant that "Any indif-
mediately attached to provisional units and ference toward prompt removal of the dead,
helped care for those who died in desperately friend or foe alike would be hazardous to
fought battles in the jungles of New health. Where formerly the price of victory
Georgia. Insofar as tactical conditions per- had precluded adequate provision for care
mitted, remains were evacuated to central
101
(
1 ) 25th Inf Div Opns Rpt Central Solomons,
"•'
(1 ) Ibid. (2) Steere, Graves Registration Serv- 16 Aug-12 Oct 43, p. 124. (2) Rpt, 25th Div QM,
ice, p. 45. n. d., sub: QM Opns in Central Solomons and
25th Div Opn Rpt Guadalcanal, 17 Dec 42-5
,nfl
New Georgia. ORB USAFINC QM 370.2.
Feb 43, Sec. V, p. 120. DRB 325-33.4. AGO 102
QM MIDPAC Hist, pp. 105-06, 109-10.
254 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
of the dead, now the menace of disease to the opportune arrival of the first regularly
a victorious force determined the sort of constituted graves registration company in
graves registration program which should the Central Pacific, an event which made
103
be addressed to this situation." possible the attachment of about fifty well-
With quick recovery of the dead thus trainedmen to the task force. Because of
imperative, careful plans were made before thisdevelopment the bodies of most Amer-
the Gilberts assault to achieve this objec- ican combat dead were collected and re-
tive. Combat troops and the 105th Infan- moved to island cemeteries with little delay.
try Band would move remains from the But once again the problem of enemy re-
front to a nearby trail, where labor or re- mains arose. After the assault troops had
serve troops would transfer the bodies to departed from Kwajalein on D plus 6, the
collecting points. Details, directed by pro- chief task was in fact the burial of some
visional graves registration troops, would 4,000 dead Japanese. Even then the vast
then carry the bodies to the island ceme- accumulation of debris and the stench of
tery. If evacuation of the deceased proved decomposition held up this grisly work for
impractical, combat soldiers could make some days. Bodies were sprayed liberally
emergency battlefield burials of known re- with sodium arsenite to arrest nauseous
mains, but only graves registration special- odors and the germination of insects, but
ists could inter unidentified bodies. Thus actual removal of the dead took so long that
one important lesson taught by earlier op- the establishment of defense installations by
erations was to be applied. 104 the garrison force was dangerously re-
106
This mortuary plan could not be exe- tarded. Unless larger and better trained
cuted as planned. Evacuation even of U.S. detachments were employed, a careful after
dead could not be completed during the action analysis warned, the same problem
period of active fighting, for enough troops would arise in future campaigns. 107
were not available to finish the task within In the plan for the Saipan operation, ac-
the short time permitted by swift tactical cordingly, somewhat more generous provi-
developments. Of
equal urgency was the sion was made for graves registration sup-
disposal of thousands of decomposing Jap- port. One platoon was allotted to the assault
anese bodies —
a problem intensified by the force and two platoons to the garrison force.
presence of American soldiers "in the same A notable innovation was the assignment of
area which several hours before was a bat-
responsibility for the actual spraying of Jap-
105
tlefield." Prompt burial of these remains
anese remains to a small sanitary detail com-
was essential, yet in only a few instances
posed of troops from medical collecting
could this task be carried out without con-
units specially trained in this technique.
siderable delay.
The most serious defect in the execution
Mortuary operations in the Marshalls fol-
of the Saipan plan was the shortage of
lowed much the same pattern as in the Gil-
trucks that prevented quick evacuation of
berts. The main difference stemmed from
Jm
106
( 1 ) Rpt, HUSAFPOA, Participation in Kwa-
Steere, Graves Registration Service, p. 134. jalein and Eniwetok Opns, Annex I. (2) QM
101
27th Div AdmO11, 26 Oct 43. DRB AGO MIDPAC Hist, pp. 133-39.
P&O File Drawer 1235.30. 101
Rpt, Lt Gen Robert C. Richardson, 9 Feb 44,
105
Rpt, Hq USAFICPA, 17 Jun 44, sub: Par- sub: Visit to Marshalls. ORB USAFPOA Flint-
ticipation of USAFICPA in Galvanic Opn, p. 95. lock Opn.
MORALE-BUILDING SERVICES 255
the dead to collecting points. In a pro- approximate number of enemy dead was
110
tracted battle the number of vehicles would erected.
probably have been ample, but the rapid At time the entire problem of recov-
this
advances and heavy casualties put too much ering human remains was under study in
strain on the slender transportation re- the Central Pacific. Here, as in every the-
ater of operations, the traditional depend-
108
sources allotted to mortuary units.
The evacuation system broke down en- ence upon infantrymen for locating the
tirely on 7 July when a reckless enemy at- bodies of those who fell in battle had yielded
tack left 406 Americans and thousands of poor results. USAFICPA Circular 93, 5
Japanese dead within a single square mile June 1944, attempted a fundamental solu-
of the 105th RCT area. tion of this problem. It authorized the es-
and the collection of bodies which had been Circular 93 was followed as closely as pos-
badly shattered by mortar fire made it im- sible in subsequent Central Pacific opera-
possible to complete collection of these dead 112
tions.
in than 4j/2 days, notwithstanding the
less
On Leyte, for example, the provisional
amount of personnel and transportation in-
graves registration company assigned to the
volved. This delay in evacuating our dead is
believed to have had a depressing effect on
XXIV Corps was assisted by an attached
the morale of troops in the area, and was the fieldsalvage unit that carried out no sal-
subject of adverse comment by individual vage work until its mortuary chores had
Marines. " 8 1
been The Southwest Pacific
completed.
forces on Leyte attempted no such basic
An estimate, described as "undoubtedly
innovation. Though two graves registration
conservative," placed at more than 7,000
the number of Japanese interred in mass
platoons — one for each infantry division
were provided, no reserve whatever was
graves. More than 200 civilian internees
available at corps or army headquarters,
helped carry out this grim task. Generally
and supervision over the care of the dead
speaking, a deep trench was dug with a became a responsibility of division quar-
bulldozer, and Japanese bodies were laid
termasters.
113
were to be assisted as much as possible by action that perhaps indicated a trend to-
117
field salvage units. ward early consolidation of burials in a
The 96th Division plan for evacuating corps or army That a general develop-
plot.
remains on Okinawa is noteworthy, for it ment of this sort would have saved consider-
provided graves registration technicians in able time and labor in handling bodies was
zones of action. In all tactical units of this the final judgment of Island Command
division a "burial and graves registration headquarters. "Terrain and tactical condi-
officer" was
be appointed. In battalions
to tions on Okinawa," it maintained, "war-
and higher echelons he would be helped by ranted a larger consolidation of burials than
a "burial and graves registration section." occurred." Under comparable circum-
While battalion sections were to be made stances in the future, it concluded, "burials
up wholly of combat personnel, regimental should be consolidated."
120
sections would include three enlisted men At Okinawa graves registration, which
from the graves registration platoon serving had been steadily improving since the days
the division and twelve laborers from the of Buna and Guadalcanal, reached perhaps
attached Quartermaster service company. the peak of its accomplishments in the Pa-
The division Burial and Graves Registra- cific. Three years before, few quartermas-
tion Section would include the attached ters, let alone combat commanders, had
platoon less individuals on detached duty known much about graves registration, for
and have as its major function the super- it was a wartime service, the practice of
118
vision of all mortuary activities. which had become an almost forgotten art
Graves registration on Okinawa in gen- between 1918 and 1 94 1 But experience was
.
eral proceeded according to pre-landing a first-rate teacher, and with it came knowl-
plans. Eight temporary cemeteries, includ- edge and comprehension. Gradually, too,
ing two of the Marine Corps, were estab- fairly well-trained units arrived, but there
lished. They contained altogether 9,227 were never enough of them. In the Pacific
graves, the largest number for any Pacific war as a whole, the persistent shortage of
operation. Of this number only 328 were these units, the rapid deterioration of bod-
unidentified. The 96th Division made more ies, and the frequent failure to provide
burials than any other Army organization graves registration troops early in an opera-
119
1,643, of which 1,601 were Army dead. tion, caused a high percentage of isolated
At no time were bodies transported more burials, inadequately marked graves, and
than twenty miles, a distance too short to re- incorrect recording of facts regarding the
quire a shift in the control of evacuation and dead. Most important of all, there was a
burial from the division to a rear echelon, as larger proportion of unrecovered bodies and
had been done on Luzon. At the end, the unidentified bodies than in better manned
27th and 96th Divisions were evacuating theaters. All these shortcomings rendered
dead to the Island Command Cemetery, an more difficult the postwar tasks of searching
XXIV Corps AdmO 10, 10 Feb 45, sub:
1,7
Opn forand recovering the unlocated dead, of
Iceberg, Annex Love, par. 2. DRB AGO P&O identifying the unidentified, of verifying old
Drawer 1238:33.
m identifications, and, finally, of disposing of
96th Div FO No. 12, 5 Mar 45, sub: Opn
Iceberg, Annex 11, App. 6. DRB AGO P&O remains in accordance with relatives' wishes
Drawer A1237:25.
119
Tenth Army Actn Rpt Okinawa, p. 11-1-38.
120
Island Comd Actn Rpt Okinawa, p. 8-XV-30.
258 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
either in permanent overseas military ceme- inflexible trailer-carried equipment of
teries or in sites selected by the family in laundry, repair, and bath companies. In the
the United States. These tasks might have few instances in which combat organizations
been less formidable had graves registration improvised more suitable units for opera-
units been trained before Pearl Harbor and tional use, the results proved reasonably
shipped promptly to overseas areas and had gratifying, but in general tactical troops
the prewar doctrine that made combat simply went without the services. The care-
troops responsible for recovery of their own lessness with which infantrymen collected
dead been modified to permit the use of tech- salvageable materials and combat dead in
nicians in areas of actual combat. Certainly, battle areas made clear the need for a gen-
the application of similar measures in a new eral reconsideration of the wisdom of assign-
emergency would obviate at least some of ing these duties to front-line soldiers.
the mistakes of World War II. In the Pacific, then, the QMC found pro-
vision of its miscellaneous services a harder
Weaknesses, comparable to those which task than that posed by its supply responsi-
characterized graves registration, also
bilities, and one it accomplished less satis-
marred the performance of other Quarter-
factorily. Some of the difficulties could have
master services. All these services were
been avoided had more service units been
hampered by inadequate manpower and by
available earlier and had equipment been
the tendency to assign units, once they be-
adjustable to the peculiarities of Pacific
came available in the zone of interior, to the
warfare. If had been met,
these requisites
forces in Europe rather than to those in the
graves registration would have suffered from
Pacific. When trained companies did arrive
proved fewer shortcomings, troops would have ob-
in the latter theater, they often ill-
fitted for use by the relatively small, dis- tained more bread, more baths, and better
island warfare. These forces found it par- laundered more satisfactorily and more fre-
ticularly difficult to employ the bulky and quently.
CHAPTER X
The QMC was established and continued system prevailed in the South Pacific. 1
In
in existence for a single reason — to help in- the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur's head-
sure victory in battle by providing American quarters, an inter-Allied, interservice com-
fighting men with essential supplies. If the mand, had much the same role as did
Corps failed to achieve this objective, it CINCPOA. It co-ordinated the logistical
failed in its basic mission. Logistical support planning of USASOS and of the operational
thus became the overriding consideration headquarters —the Allied Air Forces, the
to which all else was sacrificed. Formulation Allied Naval Forces, the Allied Land Forces,
of supply plans for each new operation as and the Alamo Force (U.S. Sixth Army),
it came along was the first step toward pro- it was discontinued in Septem-
which, until
viding such support. As soon as the highest ber 1944, organized special task forces for
headquarters of the armed services in the ground offensives carried out chiefly by U.S.
United States and the Pacific had decided Army troops.
2
upon the seizure of a Japanese-held area In the earliest Pacific campaigns, before
and set the approximate size of the naval, the higher headquarters had become well
air, and ground forces required for such an organized, planning was pretty
logistical
enterprise, Pacific headquarters, in co- much a hit-and-miss affair, but as experi-
operation with the combat organizations ence accumulated it became more and more
assigned to the operation, worked out sup- systematized. At best it was a complex mat-
ply plans in general terms. ter involving the onerous task of adjusting
In the Central Pacific, the J-4 Section of
'(1) Mid-Pac Hist, VII, 47-50. (2) Logistics
CINCPOA had responsibility for supervis- Support for the Unified Command and Overseas
main- Theater, an Address by Maj Gen Herman Feldman,
ing and integrating logistical plans. It
The Quartermaster General, at Army War College,
tained direct contact with G-4, Headquar- Ft Leavenworth, 6 Feb 51. OQMG 352.12.
2
ters, U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pa- The staff of the Alamo Force and of the Sixth
Army was identical. As Sixth Army, it was subor-
cific Area (HUSAFICPA), which, in turn,
dinate to the Allied Land Forces, commanded by
kept in close touch with technical service Australian General Sir Thomas Blarney; as Alamo
Force, it directed operations of ground organizations
officers of its own headquarters and of par-
composed mostly of U.S. Army troops and was sub-
ticipating tactical organizations. A similar ordinate only to MacArthur's headquarters.
260 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
the supporting capabilities of the technical to provide as large a proportion of tactical
services to the precise needs of future cam- troops as possible. In explanation of its re-
paigns. Its difficulty was increased by the ductions in the estimates of the Quarter-
strategic necessity for offensive operations master Section, Sixth Army, General Head-
that followed one another so swiftly as to quarters, Southwest Pacific Area, pointed
afford little opportunity for careful prep- out that the War Department assigned a
arations or for the assembly of supplies in the certain number of troops to the area, out of
desired quantities. Realistic planning was which allotment the area commander was
rendered still harder by the practice of not obliged to select the units he considered most
immediately revealing to participating or- vital to the execution of his mission. As Brig.
ganizations what specific area would be the Gen. Charles R. Lehner, Quartermaster of
objective, a procedure that obliged units to the Sixth Army, noted, this procedure cre-
carry out their planning with a typical ated an unbalanced ratio between combat
rather than an exact objective in view. Even and supporting units. 4 Wherever, according
after the area of attack was identified, logis- to Col. James C. Longino, assistant quar-
tical planning usually had to be conducted termaster of this army, the Corps rendered
without complete information regarding inadequate service, the shortage of support-
5
Japanese strength and the beaches, roads, ing units was largely responsible.
trails, and other physical features that would In the Southwest Pacific Area, after the
be encountered. Absence of definite informa- troop basis had been determined, the Quar-
tion about the exact quantity of certain termaster Section of the Sixth Army selected
types of equipment to accompany an opera- specific supporting units from Quartermas-
tional force was still another complication. ter organizations assigned to USASOS.
For example, data as to the quantity and Until U.S. troops returned to the Philip-
type of vehicles that would have to be sup- pines, task forces ordinarily included only
plied with petroleum products seldom be- from 4,000 to 45,000 men, and the smaller
came available in early planning stages, and —
Quartermaster units squads, sections, and
requirements for Class III supplies were of platoons —
were often the only ones available
necessity roughly estimated on a gallon for provision of Quartermaster services. In
"per-man-per-day" basis rather than on the the larger task forces companies furnishing
more accurate vehicular factors. 3 the more important services were at times
In Quartermaster planning the first mat- augmented by one of these smaller units.
ter studied was the number and types of Units chosen for operational duty continued
units necessary to carry out
Quartermaster to engage in base activities until about ten
functions. These requirements were based days before the task force was scheduled to
not only upon total troop strength but also sail. They were then officially assigned to
upon climatic conditions, the size of the ter- the force for the duration of its mission. In
ritory to be occupied, and the availability of the Sixth Army, Quartermaster officers fre-
water and other public utilities. Whatever quently found that USASOS units needed
estimates were submitted, higher headquar- *
Ltr, Lehner to Chief of Military History, 31
ters nearly always scaled them down in order Mar 53. OCMH.
Col James C. Longino, USA (Ret) to Maj
5
Ltr,
3
OQMG, QM Gasoline Supply Opns, WW II, Gen Albert C. Smith, Chief of Military History, 1
15 Apr 48, pp. 46-49. Apr 53. OCMH.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 261
to be more fully equipped and trained in and grease, the petroleum requirements of
order to carry out combat duties efficiently. tanks, trucks, diesel equipment, field ranges,
As far as possible in the limited time avail- landing craft, and radar equipment, and the
able, these requisites were provided. When, daily demand, expressed in pounds, for each
7
as often happened, regularly established and class of supply. All these charts underwent
trained units were unavailable, provisional constant revision to reflect changing tactical
units were organized to the extent permitted and geographical conditions and the grow-
by the total allotment of troops. If such units ing accuracy of issue figures.
could not be formed, task forces were of ne-
cessity deprived of some services. Development of Special Supply
In the Central Pacific, composite detach- Requirements
ments often filled the gaps left by the short-
age of Quartermaster units. Some of these Amphibious and island warfare required
detachments were made up of men trained special as well as standard equipment and
for almost every sort of Quartermaster oper- forced radical departures from War De-
ation; others contained men qualified for partment Tables of Equipment. Quarter-
only two or three specialties. The composite
master planners indeed found that one of
Quartermaster unit formed by the 7th Gar- their most important problems was the de-
rison Force to serve as part of the base estab- termination of what articles should accom-
lishment in the Gilberts consisted of 5 officers pany assault forces. For example, in August
and 159 enlisted men from service, truck, 1943, when plans were being laid for the
unit."
study of conditions likely to be encountered
in the Gilberts disclosed a need for Quarter-
In calculating its requirements for food,
gasoline, and utility items, the Quarter-
master items normally issued only in small
master Section, Sixth Army, refused to ac- quantities or not at all. The scarcity of
drinking water caused the hasty requisi-
cept published War Department tables of
tioning of 3,000 canvas water buckets,
maintenance requirements as fully appli-
cable to the Southwest Pacific and even 15,000 5-gallon water cans, and 11,000
additional canteens from San Francisco,
questioned War Department estimates of
shipping space requirements per man per
and the necessity for some means of quickly
cutting paths through tangled undergrowth
day for the four classes of supply. On the
led to the ordering of 10,000 machetes.
basis of its own experience the Quarter-
Since some soldiers would be out of touch
master Section developed charts showing
with organization kitchens, the division also
the weights and cubes of the different ra-
tions, the maintenance needs per man per 7
OQMG, Group and Battalion Operations,
day for the principal kinds of gasoline, fuel, World War II (hereafter cited as OQMG, Gp QM
and Bn Opns), 15 Jul 48, pp. 21-24. Four of the
6
QM Mid-Pac Hist, pp. 105-06. charts are published in this document.
262 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
submitted requisitions for 750 cooking out- ing phase of the reconquest of the Philip-
fits, each sufficiently large to provide hot pines. In getting ready for this enterprise,
food for 20 men. To furnish troops with a the division, then on Oahu, worked under
convenient means of washing their mess the general direction of Headquarters,
gear, the Corps of Engineers in Oahu manu- USAFICPA. Its technical service sections
factured 300 hot water heaters. From sal- began determining their logistical require-
vaged cots, tents, and tarpaulins the Hawai- ments in April 1944. The G-4 Section co-
ian Quartermaster Depot fabricated 2,000 ordinated this project. To ascertain his
grenade carriers, each capable of holding needs, the division quartermaster estab-
four missiles. Finally, it bought locally 7,000 lished a special planning section, composed
half-ounce metal containers to enable troops of a captain, a second lieutenant, and a
to carry salt tablets with the least possible sergeant, which acted under his direct super-
8
danger of deterioration. vision. As these, like other divisional plan-
Vital equipment and supplies were not ners were uninformed as to the precise ob-
always obtained with as little trouble as the jective, they assumed an amphibious land-
27th Division encountered, for local manu- ing on a medium-sized island. They deter-
facture and purchase could rarely be ac- mined the requirements for such an attack
complished as satisfactorily as in- Hawaii partly by studying shortages and partly by
during preparations for the Gilberts offen- analyzing supply operations on Kwajalein
sive. Nor, in general, was there much time two months before, paying particular atten-
for procurement of supplies from the United tion to what items had proved satisfactory,
States. Even when the period of preparation what could be eliminated, and what new
was fairly lengthy, scarcities at home often items were needed. Though higher head-
delayed or prevented shipments. New items quarters set the total quantity of each gen-
in particular were be in poor sup-
likely to eral class of Quartermaster supply that
ply, for several months were necessary to could be transported, the 7th Division
start production and the ETO and MTO quartermaster planning group had consid-
usually had first call on available stocks. erable leeway in selecting the items and de-
termining the quantities of each it wanted.'*
Logistical Planning for Operations recommendations, along with those of
Its
Against Yap, Leyte, and Okinawa other technical services, were cleared
through the 7th Division G—$ Section,
The manner in which supply require-
which submitted them to Headquarters,
ments and other aspects of detailed Quar-
termaster logistical planning were ordinarily
XXIV Corps, for approval and consolida-
tion with recommendations of the 96th
developed in the last two years of the war is
Division, the other major combat unit of
illustrated by the preparations made by the
the corps, and for submission to still higher
7th Division for the operation which was
first planned against the island of Yap, one
headquarters. Much discussion ensued be-
of the Caroline group, but which finally tween the various bodies of planners, but
emerged as the assault on Leyte, the open- by late June tentative decisions had been
reached. During the next few weeks changes
" Rpt of Participation of USAFICPA inGalvanic
Operation, 6 Aug 43-Feb 44, Sec. XVIII, pp. "
7th Div King II G-4 Rpt, App. E (QM Rpt),
73-74. pp. 1-2. OCMH.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 263
in tactical plans necessitated minor revisions Unitized loads, commonly termed "sleds"
of supply lists, but in early August, when in the Central Pacific, consisted of a number
Yap was finally announced as the opera- of containers strapped to pallets, that is,
lists were ready for publication. Shipping to permit the entry of the fork of a lift
shortages obliged the task force to limit truck. Such loads made it possible to handle
trucks to half the number authorized in scores of containers as a unit and to utilize
tables of equipment. Once this decision had ship's gear, cranes, fork-lift trucks, and
been made, the office of the division quar- other mechanical aids in raising, lowering,
12
termaster easily calculated gasoline and moving, and stacking supplies. Use of sleds
other petroleum requirements by simply did away with time-consuming manual
taking the estimated average consumption loading of thousands of containers one by
of each type of vehicle under combat con- one. Palletized cargoes were quickly dis-
ditions and multiplying that figure by the charged into landing craft, dragged off on
number of vehicles. " 1
shore, and towed, two or three at a time, by
Meanwhile practically Quartermas-
all tractors over the beach and, if necessary,
ter elements in the 7th Division had become some distance inland. Palletization, in the
engaged in logistical preparations. The Op- words of one observer, eliminated the
erations Section in the office of the division "bucket brigade practices" inseparable
quartermaster made preliminary plans for from hand-carrying. The saving in man-
storing items sent direct to Hawaii from the power reached large proportions. It was
United States, and other sections of the claimed, for instance, that unitization
on the parade ground of the fort, almost scarcity of this equipment, confined their
11 use to amphibious landings where the sav-
monopolized its energies.
ings they effected were most marked. Even
Palletized unit loading, virtually un-
in such operations they diverted so many
known even in commercial circles before
tractors from other essential activities that
the war, was a novel method of speeding up
the handling of cargo by assault forces. Alvin P. Stauffer, Quartermaster Depot Storage
12
sure that they came in the prescribed quan- which, because of the additional time re-
tities and were then placed aboard ship in quired to reach the new and more remote
line with the loading plan. Quartermaster objective, were quickly depleted. On ar-
troops also participated in simulated land- riving at Eniwetok, the assistant division
ings and distribution of items to troops on quartermaster flew to Finschhafen to ob-
shore.
19
tain more of these items -a venture that —
In mid-September 1944, after the divi- achieved partial success. The additional
sion was at sea, word suddenly came that supplies were moved to Manus Island in the
its objective had been shifted from Yap to Admiralties, where the division put them
Leyte. This change intensified logistical dif- on whatever vessels could be made available.
ficulties. Supplies and equipment, ample for Troops on Leyte nevertheless were not sup-
a short operation on a small island like Yap, ported as well as they would have been had
were inadequate for a prolonged battle on that island been the announced objective
20
sizable, stoutly held Leyte. In particular, from the beginning.
more rations, insect repellents, salt tablets, The battle for Leyte had not yet reached
and atabrine were needed, not to mention its final stage when the 7th Division quar-
such items as PX supplies and laundry soap termaster began preparation of supply plans
for individual washing, stocks of all of for the coming Okinawa campaign. Not-
March 1945. On the 4th, shipments to portant supporting unit was the Quarter-
"loading out" points started, and by the master company that formed an organic
25th all supplies for the opening phases of part of the infantry division and had as its
the new operation had been placed aboard primary mission the supply of Quartermas-
ship. Meanwhile the troops and trucks of ter items. In many Pacific operations this
the company had been loaded on twenty- company indeed provided all or nearly all
carry out the combat aspects of its logistical teen or so divisional units. This platoon also
21
plan. had responsibility for handling clothing and
equipment and for checking gasoline and
oil receipts to determine if they met the
Quartermaster Units in Combat Operations
needs of the 1,000 to 2,000 vehicles belong-
Preliminary preparations for operational ing to divisional units. The three truck pla-
supply were only a single phase of logistical toons had as their chief function the trans-
activities. Much more important was the portation of troops, ammunition, rations,
adequacy of the support actually rendered water cans, captured materials, and enemy
to tactical soldiers in battle. This was a mat- dead — indeed, almost anything that had to
ter that depended upon the number of be transported. The Quartermaster com-
Quartermaster troops, the terrain of the pany was charged with guarding Quarter-
combat zone, the availability of roads, trails, master installations, particularly supply
trucks, and human carriers, and the amount dumps, and was therefore designated a com-
of Quartermaster cargo actually discharged batant unit and provided with rifles, ma-
on the beaches. These conditions, which chine guns, grenade launchers, and in-
varied from operation to operation, largely trenching tools. The division quartermas-
ter, operating under the supervision of G-4,
21
Opn Rpt, 7th QM Co, Ryukyus Opn, 1Apr- co-ordinated company operations. His office
30 Jun 45, pp. 3-5. DRB AGO 307-QM-0.3
(25373) M
(1 Apr-30 Jun 45). received and processed requisitions for QM
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 267
items from divisional units, arranged for the pany. The difficulty of attaching extra units
time and place of deliveries, and in close to a division for protracted periods of time
collaboration with G-4 allocated trucks to help the Quartermaster company per-
among divisional activities. Normally, G— form these added tasks further complicated
controlled all vehicles used for tactical the problem. While such units could be and
22
purposes. indeed often were attached to divisions, the
The performed by a di-
tasks actually general shortage of service troops ordinarily
visional Quartermaster company in the Pa- forced their quick detachment and assign-
cific varied markedly from those prescribed ment to base installations. Had Pacific oper-
when this type of unit was established, pri- ational forces been able to follow the ETO
marily with continental warfare in mind. practice of shifting attached service units
In that sort of warfare the service platoon about from division to division as need
would have received supplies at distribution arose, the problem would have been consid-
dumps maintained by army or corps erably less serious, but the necessity of us-
troops, but in island warfare — before the ing separate beaches normally prevented
Philippines were reached —a division, or a employment of such units for supply of sev-
25
reinforced division, usually operated alone, eral organizations.
and the company itself had to set up and Truck platoons, too, performed functions
23
maintain distribution centers. Another somewhat different from those envisioned
difference between island and continental when the divisional company was estab-
warfare was the persistently amphibious lished. A platoon leader, for example, was
character of supply even when conventional supposed to accompany his unit on convoy
land fighting followed
the seizure of a and supervise the maintenance of vehicles.
beachhead. Supply depended upon ships Actually, the dangers encountered in the
which arrived only at irregular intervals. To early stages of combat operations usually
insure the availability of ample stocks, the prevented the convoying of trucks. It was
company had to store if possible a 10- to faster and safer to dispatch them singly or
30-day supply of vital articles instead of the in groups of two at more or less regular in-
1- or 2-day supply common in continental tervals. Platoon leaders were in consequence
areas with good railroad and highway sys- utilized largely for other activities. During
tems capable of delivering freight daily. 24 the operations of the 7th Division, for exam-
Maintenance of such high stock levels ple, these leaders usually supervised Class I,
26
placed a heavier burden on troops and II, and III supply dumps. Summing up his
equipment than the War Department had wartime impressions of the transportation
foreseen when it set up the divisional com- requirements of a division in the Pacific, an
" (1) T/O&E 10-17, 15 Jul 43, sub: QM Army Ground Forces observer declared:
Co,
Inf Div. (2) OQMG
Quartermaster Operations in
Normal transportation assigned a Division
Divisions, World War II (hereafter cited as
inadequate in quantity and type. Age of
OQMG, QM
Opns in Div), 15 Jul 48, pp. 2-9,
is
lected salvaged supplies from battalion and roads little better than foot trails, repre-
regimental collecting points, and a group sented fairly well the conditions under which
of eight men, who assembled all supplies by the QMC carried out its activities. The
item. Graves registration provisional units operations of the 41st Division began on D
were usually considerably smaller. 32 Day, 22 April 1944, when it landed on
White Beaches 1-4 along the shores of Hum-
Division Quartermaster Company boldt Bay. As soon as the first assault waves
just south of White Beach 4 and at the head was widened sufficiently, the detach-
terminus of the road running inland. This ment moved the Class I and III dumps to
unit was to receive supplies shipped in small much better locations in a coconut grove
boats from the other beaches and issue them two miles from the village. By this time the
to the 186th Infantry fighting its way toward arrival of more Quartermaster troops per-
the main objectives, the three Japanese air- mitted the assignment of three officers and
fields along the shores of Lake Sentani. thirty-seven enlisted men to the new
Other Quartermaster troops on the beaches dumps. 35 During the following days most of
to the north supplied the 162nd Infantry the Quartermaster company was concen-
at and about Hollandia by water until engi- trated in the Pirn area, for there was located
neers could build a road to Pancake Hill, the 41st Division's chief supply line —the
more than 3 miles south of the town. 33 road to Lake Sentani. Arrival of these rein-
As in most of the amphibious operations forcements and of service units from the or-
of the 41st Quartermaster Company, lack ganizationsthat had landed on Tanah-
of sufficient labor to handle cargo delivered merah Bay furnished an abundance of
to beach dumps complicated supply
its manual labor for Quartermaster operations.
activities.This difficulty arose because no Transportation problems were not so
assault troops could be spared from tactical easily solved. As was generally true in Pacific
operations and all service troops were turned operations, the principal sources of trouble
over to the beachmaster unloading cargo in were the shortage of trucks and the inade-
the limited time available for this essential quacy of the road system. The Quartermas-
task. Normally, landing craft were dis- ter detachment temporarily met the first dif-
charged only between 0900 and 1 700, when ficulty by repairing and using five captured
naval safety regulations required such ves- Japanese vehicles, but the poor trail to the
sels to pull away from shore. Under these Lake Sentani plain continued to retard
circumstances supplies of were jum- all sorts deliveries. Moreover, gauged by jungle
bled together and hastily shoved on standards, this eighteen-mile trail was a
DUKW's or roller conveyors. This meant long one.
36
Washouts occurred frequently.
that Quartermaster dumps received large On one occasion trucks bound for the lake
quantities of non-Quartermaster cargo that region with rations for the 186th Infantry
held up the issue of rations and other items. 34 were from early morning to late af-
stalled
At Pirn the narrow beach and steep ter- ternoon. Not until vehicles were brought to
rain forced the Quartermaster detachment the other side of the impassable section and
the rations carried across it by hand and re-
33
(1) HistRpt 41st QM
Co for 1944, pp. 1-2. loaded could the food move forward again.
DRB AGO 341-QM-0.1 (28061) M
1944. (2) For
a full discussion of the
Hollandia operation see Worst of all, the road deteriorated rapidly
Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philip- under heavy trucking and frequent rains,
pines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR (Washington, 1953).
II
33
Opn Rpt 41st QM
Co Hollandia Campaign, 15
Apr-19 May 44, p. 3. DRB AGO 341-QM-0.1.
34
Anon., " 'Mission Unexpected' was the Watch-
word of the 41st DQM Company in the Pacific,"
38
Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 17,
QMTSJ, VIII (7 September 1945), 7. 80-82.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 271
and from time to time stretches of this vital the 186th Infantry to live for three or four
supply link had be closed for repairs.
to days mainly on rice and canned fish from
39
Transportation difficulties indeed delayed seized Japanese stores. At Pirn the ration
for some days the removal of the dumps stock steadily dwindled and by 1 May was
from Pirn to the Lake Sentani region, where down to 300 cases. Luckily for hungry
they could have more easily supplied tacti- troops, large quantities of subsistence ar-
cal elements. Finally, the Corps intensified
I rived in Humboldt Bay two days later.
the transportation woes of the Quartermas- Except for a few odds and ends of cloth-
ter detachment by taking over the captured ing and general supplies, the only Class II
vehicles, leaving it again short of vital and IV items available for issue during the
37
trucks. Hollandia operation were those brought in
On White Beach meanwhile oc-
1 there with the assault force. The Quartermaster
curred a conspicuous example of how com- company on 30 April received a small ship-
pletely battle hazards might disrupt logis- ment of blankets and hammocks from
tical plans. On the second evening after the Finschhafen and on 10 May an emergency
landing a Japanese plane scored a direct hit air shipment of some urgently needed arti-
on an ammunition dump, setting off a series cles of clothing and general utility, but aside
of violent explosions that ignited gasoline from these relatively unimportant receipts
stores.For two days the conflagration raged the troops at Hollandia had to get along
virtually unchecked among supplies and with what they had brought with them. A
equipment massed on White Beaches 1 and sizable cargo of these classes of supply did
timated at more than 400,000 in number. true, but it was intended for use by the 41st
The 41st Division was left with scarcely any Division in its next operation — that against
food except that on White Beach 3. This Biak Island, for which Z Day was 27 May. 40
disaster made it necessary to put the ad-
vancing 186th Infantry on half rations, em- Special Problems of Logistical Support
ploy captured Japanese subsistence, and
transfer subsistence from the forces that had It is not too much to say that in the Pa-
landed at Tanahmerah Bay. 38 Even when cific there were no really typical Quarter-
ration cargoes could be assembled at Pirn, master operations in combat. Though these
they could not always be moved over the operations were all similar in that they in-
inadequate roads. In this emergency air volved amphibious campaigns, each new
supply, too, was ineffective. While the Jap- campaign presented details that distin-
a combined Australian-United States as- ginning, moreover, supply over the long
sault on 19 November 1942, presented seri- water route was a perilous undertaking.
ous logistical problems. These problems Few planes could be spared to protect the
sprang largely from lack of complete tactical landing of cargo, and naval support, too,
and logistical preparedness for the cam- was limited. Shallow coastal water, coral
paign which the still weak American forces reefsextending out from shore as much as
hastily undertook in order to regain points 20 miles, and lack of docking facilities for
that in hostile hands would be standing nearly 200 miles south of Buna, further
threats to the safety of the Australian main- handicapped sea-borne traffic. Because of
land. Throughout the operation the main boats— unhap-
these difficulties only small
supply bases, Port Moresby and Milne Bay, pily, —
few in number could be employed. 41
were remote from the scene of fighting Cargo, brought in freighters from Port
respectively, more than 300 and 200 miles Moresby to the newly established base at
by water. Not until almost the very end Milne Bay, was unloaded onto smaller ves-
sels with a capacity of 50 to 500 tons and was large in area, its transportation prob-
shipped to the intermediate bases at Pon- lems somewhat resembled those of the
gani or Oro Bay, respectively, about 35 and smaller islands. Few military groups and —
15 miles below Buna. Here supplies were those usually small ones supplied by air
again transshipped, this time to still smaller operated deep in the pervasive New Guinea
vessels, usually fishing trawlers, carrying jungle. Areas under attack, which were al-
only 10 to 30 tons. These boats then sailed ways located along the coast, became, in
for one of the receiving points set up at effect, islands. In the Papuan campaign
coastal villages close to the combat zone. 42 reliance upon distant Port Moresby and
As these boats sneaked up the coast, high Milne Bay for currently needed supplies,
waves occasionally broke over them, dam- though unavoidable under prevailing con-
aging or carrying overboard considerable ditions, had thus put the assaulting forces
amounts of cargo. But the most ominous too much at the mercy of disrupted trans-
peril in the opening phases of the cam- portation channels.
paign came from hostile planes, which often In subsequent offensives, therefore, the
came and went at will, compelling boats increasing number of specially constructed
to travel under cover of darkness. When the landing vessels, a new type of small craft
vessels arrived at their destination, they capable of discharging supplies directly onto
anchored several hundred yards offshore. beaches, became a major determinant of the
Since Transportation Corps troops were not pattern of logistical support. In accordance
available, Quartermaster troops became with opening
this pattern, supplies for the
mainly responsible for discharging cargoes. stages of an offensive were shipped with the
"Stark naked, with waves pounding over task force and landed during the first few
their heads, they pushed rowboats and na- days. Unless these supplies were destroyed in
tive canoes out through the breakers, trans- combat or otherwise lost, the assault waves
ferred them back to the beach, making were thus freed of dependence on far-off
dozens of exhausting trips without rest in installations during the opening phases of
order to get the vulnerable trawlers on their an operation. The pattern for landing craft
way again before daylight." 43 in the Biak operation of May-June 1944
The Papuan campaign demonstrated was typical of those generally employed.
that, while remote bases might serve satis- Landing schedules, covering the first few
factorily as sources of supply for forces op- days of the attack and listing the kind and
erating in continental areas with suitable number of vesselsand the supplies each
means of transportation, in amphibious would carry, were prepared well ahead of
warfare such bases resulted in supply lines the assault and carried out to the extent
that were too long and tenuous. This was that unloading and tactical conditions al-
true not only of operations on small islands lowed. In the last year and a half of the
but also in New Guinea. Though that island conflict block vessels achieved a comparable
42
result insofar as replacement supplies needed
Rpt, Col Horace Harding et al., 11 Nov 42,
in the latter stages of an offensive were
sub: Visit to New Guinea, 2-9 Nov 42. ORB I
44
Corps AG 384. concerned.
(1) E. J. Kahn, G. I. Jungle: An American
Soldier in Australia and New Guinea (New York: " Maj Herbert E. Gerfen, "Task Force Opera-
Simon and Schuster, 1943), p. 88. (2) Opn Rpt tion,"QMR, XXV
(September-October 1945),
107th QM Det, pp. 1-10. 41.
274 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Use of Landing Craft cer, who ordered it either to await instruc-
in AssaultSupply tions or to pick up from one
specific items
of LST's loaded in "drug store"
eight
Ordinarily, tactical successes permitted fashion with a mixed cargo of supplies likely
landing craft to beach and start unloading to be in demand. If a DUKW
was assigned
their cargoes within a few hours after the the latter task, it discharged its load at the
assault waves went ashore. But even such beach designated by the control officer. Op-
swift discharge of supplies and equipment erations of this sort caused the LST-DUKW
did not always insure the availability of system of initial supply to be called the "drug
items needed by combat troops. The better store" system.
46
cendiary bombs. One fell in the 7th Quar- immobile stocks of these items, sparingly is-
termaster Company motor pool, a second sued in combat, he approved for presenta-
near the office of the division quartermas- tion to the corps quartermaster only such
ter, and a third in an ammunition dump, requisitions as were vital to continued sup-
which "exploded continually for 9 hours and port of tactical forces. Throughout the Leyte
intermittently after that until about 1430 operation the division quartermaster fol-
own and dug into the bank with my hands promptly issued. After USASOS Base K be-
for about 4 hours." Though his foxhole had gan operations, unit requisitions for Class
five large shell fragments in it, he escaped II items were submitted to it every ten days
with only a on a finger "from a piece
blister and filled from its stocks. 50
of hot shrapnel" which missed his hand "by The X Corps had the rare advantage of
a hair, a few shrapnel holes" in his coat, and being able to store many of its supplies in
"minor scratches." 48 Many members of the warehouses at Tacloban, but the XXIV
7th Quartermaster Company were not so Corps, of which the 7th Division was part,
fortunate. Thirteen lost their lives, and fifty was obliged to follow the normal Pacific pat-
49
were wounded. tern of setting up dumps in the open. All
This disaster interrupted but did not stop the disadvantages associated with such ex-
Quartermaster activities. As the task force posed storage areas were intensified by their
widened the beachhead, the distribution hasty establishment under circumstances
points of the company were advanced in that allowed little choice of location. The
order to keep as close as possible to forward principal considerations governing the se-
elements. By A plus 6 the unit had set up lection of sites were accessibility to roads,
two advance points near San Pablo airstrip if any existed, and proximity to the elements
to maintain a 5-day supply of food and gaso- to be supplied. Even firm, dry areas, usable
line. Soon afterward it established a simi- in all sorts of weather, could not be picked
lar distribution point, maintaining a 2-day unless they met these requisites. If the di-
supply, at Dulag airstrip, still nearer the visionadvanced rapidly, supply dumps kept
front. These three drew food
installations pace with it. The nearer a dump was to the
front, the smaller its stockage. Ordinarily,
and gasoline from Quartermaster beach
a forward distribution point contained a 2-
dumps, which, after A plus 7, were turned
day supply of Class I and III items, while a
over to the XXIV Corps Quartermaster.
rear one contained a 5-day supply. Stocks
That officer then assumed the responsibility
were replenished from army or corps sup-
of keeping forward distribution points well
ply points setup at comparatively safe sites
stocked. Units submitted requisitions for
some distance behind the divisional dumps.
clothing and general supplies to the divi-
In mid-November, after elements of the
sion quartermaster. To prevent creation of
7 th Division had moved rapidly down the
,M
Ltr, Capt Robert L. Woodbury to Col Doriot, east coast from Dulag, seized the important
12 Nov 44. OQMG SWPA 319.25.
Hist Rpt 7th QM Co for 944, pp. 3-4.
4U 50
1 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
276 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
town of Abuyog a dozen miles directly south, ply line traversed more than eighty miles.
and struck across the waistline of Leyte to Landing craft ferried supplies down the east
Baybay on the west coast, most of the di- coast to Abuyog, where they were trans-
vision was concentrated in that region. Rear ferred to trucksand hauled over mountain-
dumps were maintained at Dulag and inter- ous roads to Baybay. Here they were trans-
mediate installations at Abuyog; meanwhile ferred to DUKW's or LCM's (landing craft,
large stocks were built up at Class I and mechanized ) and carried to truckheads lo-
III dumps on the west coast in preparation cated at various points along the west coast
52
for a powerful movement northward against north to Ormoc.
the stronghold of Ormoc, where the Jap- Throughout the northward drive of the
anese were gathering reinforcements from 7 th Division all trucks of the Quartermas-
the whole northern part of the island for a ter company and most of its trailers oper-
determined stand. Ten days after the offen- ated continuously as part of the motor pool
sive was launched, these dumps were closed controlled by the divisional G-4. So treach-
and new ones established seven miles up the erous was the road leading from Abuyog
coast. On 7 December, the 77th Division to Baybay that the single Quartermaster
landed just south of the Japanese citadel truck platoon had to be strengthened by the
and joined in the attack. Ormoc fell on the addition of two truck companies from the
10th. For some days the distribution points, Fifth Air Force. On one occasion when the
carrying a 1- to 6-day supply level, cared for road became impassable, the division called
77th as well as 7th Division troops. 51 for an airdrop of motor gasoline. In answer
to this request planes successfully dropped
Land Transportation thirty-seven 55-gallon drums on the beach
at Baybay. Two truck platoons of the Quar-
The 7th Division used all sorts of trans- termaster Company received supplies
portation methods to keep front-line troops brought to truckheads south of Ormoc and
on the west coast of Leyte adequately sup- transported them to divisional distributing
7th Div King II Opn G-4 Rpt, p. 14. Ibid., pp. 14-16.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 277
company were therefore concentrated on During the fighting in the Nassau Bay-
this run." Salamaua region of northern New Guinea
in the summer of 1943, cargo parachutes
troops, aided at times by men from other consisted of rations; of 18 air supply mis-
services, wrapped the supplies of all Army sions, 16 involved the delivery of food. On
components and, when parachutes were only one mission were Quartermaster items
used, attached the packages to these con- other than subsistence carried. The methods
trivances. Several Quartermaster troops ac- of air supply represented a marked advance
companied the planes and at the proper over those employed in the Salamaua opera-
moment expelled the cargo. Receiving areas tions. Three kinds of containers were uti-
on the ground were indicated by panels, lized. The most common type held 192 ra-
smoke signals, and white streamers, but com- tions and loose cigarettes. A smaller type
the cargo dropped without parachute was sion — carried the rations. Occasionally,
irrevocably lost, smashing to bits on strik- could not start for some hours after
flights
ing the ground or else falling not on desig- the scheduled time. In such cases, cargoes
nated targets but deep in the jungle or on were often dropped after infantry units had
inaccessible mountain slopes. Owing to these moved out of the target areas. As in Papua,
mishaps, the troops struggling along on land
Rept, Col Archibald R. MacKechnie, n. d., sub:
55
54
repeatedly went hungry and ill-clad. Campaign of 162d Regt in New Guinea, p. 10.
ORB AFPAC AG 370.22.
53
App. E, pp. 6-7.
Ibid.,
56
Ltr, CG USAFISPA to CG AAF et al., 13
51
32d Div Actn Rpt, Papuan Campaign, Sep 42- Nov 43, sub: Sup by Parachute in New Georgia.
Mar43, pp. 2-8, 16-1 7. DRB AGO 332-0.3 (3365). ORB USAFINC AG 428.
278 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
pilots found it hard to locate these areas. and handling it aboard planes. 59 In the Cen-
In densely wooded terrain supplies fell more tral Pacific Area the Army Air Forces set
frequently in towering trees, 100 to 150 feet up similar organizations. 60
high, than they did on the indicated tar- Air supply equipment and handling pro-
gets, making "discovery of the parachutes cedures, though still crude, were neverthe-
57
hard and their recovery harder." Re- less steadily improved as the war progressed.
trieval of cargoes was further complicated Cargo parachutes were better made and ob-
by lack of troops for protracted searches tainable in larger numbers, and identifica-
and by heavy losses incurred in detaching tion of dropping areas was rendered easier
packs from parachutes caught in tall trees. by aerial photography and radar beams.
Such packs could be recovered only by shoot- "Free dropping" gradually declined as more
ing in two the shroud lines, which ran parachutes became available, and losses of
from the rim of the parachute to the main supplies, though still heavy, decreased corre-
cord supporting the pack, thus permitting spondingly. If a limited quantity of para-
it to fall. The long drop often split food chutes necessitated "free dropping," rations
containers and scattered their contents over packed in cartons were employed in prefer-
the ground. In mountainous and heavy ence to those packed in metal, for the latter
jungle areas of New Georgia, as in the Sala- broke open much more frequently. 61
maua region, only about 50 percent of ra- During the Luzon campaign USASOS
tions were recovered in usable form, but in bases on Leyte kept constantly on hand for
air shipment a ten-day reserve of combat
fairly open country, such as coconut plan-
rations for 20,000 men. Actually, no calls
tations, where parachutes rarely became en-
for any of this emergency reserve came, for
snared in tall trees, losses ran much lower,
stocks on Luzon met all requirements. But
averaging, it was reported, only about 10
58
this did not mean that air supply was not
percent.
extensively utilized. On the contrary, para-
Meanwhile the significance of air trans-
many
drops of regular supplies alone kept
portation as a vital supplement to slower operation against the
guerrillas in active
or temporarily unusable means of opera- Japanese. The Sixth Army reported that
tional supply became better recognized, and 1,319 planeloads, 5,020,000
totaling
higher headquarters tried to organize the pounds, were dropped to isolated units be-
new method of logistical support in a sys- tween 19 January and 30 June 1945. Of this
tematic fashion. General Headquarters, amount, perhaps 40 percent was Quarter-
Southwest Pacific Area, at intervals desig- master in origin. Recoveries varied from
nated certain USASOS bases as stocking 65 to 90 percent, depending upon the ter-
points for items that were to be released rain and the proximity of the Japanese. The
company, whose members were trained in GHQ SWPA to CG Sixth Army et al., 8 Sep 44,
sub: Emergency Air Sup. ORB Sixth Army AG
the specialized methods of packing cargo 400 (Equip).
"°Lt Col Robert Genny, "Air QM
Operations
in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands," QMTSJ
57
Opns of 25th Inf Div in Central Solomons, 16
Aug-12 Oct 43, p. 23. ORB USAFINC AG 370.2. VII (30 March 1945), 14-15.
68
Ltr cited n. 56. 61
8th Army Mindanao Opn Rpt, G-4 Sec, p. 137.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 279
over-all proportion of recoveries amounted pounds, not much below normal require-
04
to about 87 percent, a figure that indicated ments of 510,000 pounds.
a notable advance in retrieval techniques.
Supplies were not only dropped but were Supply Operations on Luzon
also landed in substantial quantities on air-
strips.
02 After the return to the Philippines, con-
Although the emergency food reserve set ditions governing Quartermaster support of
up on Leyte for the Luzon campaign went combat operations became in many ways
untapped, a similar ten-day reserve for 5,000 better than in earlier campaigns. Service
men served as a main source of replenish- units had become more experienced, and
ment on Mindanao.
for the forces fighting hostile interference with supply activities
Withdrawals were indeed so heavy that pre- less significant. These favorable factors, to-
scribed levels could scarcely be maintained. gether with the greater quantity of replace-
B2
Sixth Army Luzon Rpt, G-4 Sec, pp. 53-57. 64
( 1 ) Rad, CO Base K to CG USASOS, 2 May
63
Eighth Army Mindanao Opn Rpt, G-4 Sec, 45. (2) Rad, COMFEAF to COM Fifth AF, 8 May
pp. 189-91. 45. Both in ORB PHIBSEC AG 430.2.
280 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
moved quickly in order to keep pace with During the precipitate dash of the 37th
combat divisions swiftly pursuing retreating Division through the Cagayan Valley of
Japanese. In the twenty-two days after northern Luzon in June 1945 the QMC
the landing at Lingayen Gulf the Class I pushed its dumps ahead almost daily, occa-
and III dumps of the 6th Division were sionally "as far as the front lines, only to be
pushed ahead three times; the last shift fifteen or twenty miles behind in twenty-
67
moved them forward about sixty miles from four hours." The chief obstacle to ade-
their first location. In the next eighteen days quate supply, however, was not the distance
four moves, covering about 100 miles, were of divisional distribution points from the
carried out. The fourth shift required a front but their remoteness from the main
fifty-mile haul of a ten-day store of food and supply depots. The route from these installa-
gasoline. To supply his dumps, the 6th Di- tions, moreover, crossed mountains so rug-
vision Quartermaster drew needed items ged in places that deliveries were sometimes
from Base M
or Sixth Army supply instal- considerably delayed. Scarcities at the front
lations, which, though not fully stocked and could not be alleviated until air transporta-
occasionally situated far to the rear, pro- tion came into use on a large scale during
vided the only sources of large-scale replen- the last six days of June. In that short period
ishment. The Quartermaster Section of the planes landed 1,070,000 pounds of cargo at
Sixth Army tried to place its supply points the airfieldTuguegarao, a Japanese
in
68
within twenty-five miles of the divisional stronghold captured on the 24th. Airdrops
dumps, but because of transportation diffi- supplied scattered tactical units in the north-
culties and the wide area over which troops ern Cagayan Valley until mid-July, when
were scattered, this was not always feasible. the port of Aparri at the mouth
Caga- of the
In a few instances 6th Division quarter- yan River was opened to shipping, and pro-
masters made round trips of 150 miles or visions, ammunition, clothing, and equip-
more to replenish their Class I and III stores ment that had been assembled at nearby
and obtain Class II and IV items requi- Abulug were brought in to meet American
65
sitioned by combat elements. During the needs.
69
rapid advance across the central Luzon Long-distance hauling in Luzon put a
plain to Manila, army and corps as well as severe strainon truck transportation, which
divisional quartermasters met difficulties was relieved but not wholly solved by Engi-
similar to the 6th Division's. For example, neers' prompt rehabilitation of railways and
the 37th Quartermaster Company, which by utilization of vehicles for twenty-four
cared for 32,000 troops, not only maintained hours every day. Unluckily, there were too
regular day-by-day supply but also several few wheeled conveyances, for shipping
times moved up a 30-day reserve stock. "No shortages, as previously noted, allowed truck
sooner," declared its commander, "would units coming to Luzon only half the vehicles
the dumps be established than the QM's by
called for Equipment.
their Tables of
would be far behind the lines."
M Some Quartermaster truck companies had
M 6th
QMCo. Hist Rpt. 31 Jul 44-30 Jun 45, "The Regimental Staff, The 129th Infantry in
Sec. II.
86
DRB AGO 306 0.3. QM World War
a8
II (Washington, 1947), pp. vi-vii.
Col Charles M. Odenwalder, "Lingayen to Sixth Army Luzon Rpt, III, 55.
Manila with the 37th QM
Company," QMTSJ, 69
Eighth Army Luzon Mop-up Opn Rpt, pp.
VIII (27 July 1945), 22. 45-46.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 281
indeed arrived with less than twenty cargo ties,which were met by the employment of
vehicles. Far-flung supply lines forced the about 1 ,000 natives as hand carriers many —
employment of all available trucks for pro- of them Igorot inhabitants of this wild re-
tracted periods without needed repairs and gion. Teams, composed of thirty to seventy
maintenance, a practice that in the long run men, each bearing seventy-five pounds on
seriously reduced the number of usable specially designed packboards, were formed,
vehicles. In mid-February the demand for and for some days these men bore on their
more conveyances became so insistent that backs ammunition, rations, and other vital
combat units loaned some of theirs to Base supplies for the front. The teams made
M so that it could carry out its logistical such tortuous progress that Lt. Col. Law-
responsibilities. In referring to the scarcity rence E. Swope of the Sixth Armv Quar-
of equipment in truck companies, the Sixth termaster Section asserted that a single car-
Army Quartermaster recommended that, if rier could normally supply only three sol-
72
shipping shortages in future operations diers. In the stubbornly contested advance
forced reductions in the number of vehicles, from Lingayen Gulf over mountainous
whole units be eliminated rather than most country to Baguio, formerly the summer
of the vehicles in each of several com- capitol of the Philippines, supply units also
panies.
70 relied heavily upon human carriers. The
Fighting in the mountainous terrain of service company of the 129th Infantry alone
Luzon at times involved slow progress that employed approximately 1,000 Filipinos.
posed logistical problems quite different Among other unusual logistical expedi-
from those of rapid advances. Frequently, ents of the Luzon campaign was the use of
Quartermaster units resorted to hand carry- pack animals, once indispensable compo-
ing, an expedient earlier employed in the nents of every army and still on the out-
71
Papuan, Hollandia, and Leyte campaigns. break of war part of the U.S. military or-
When infantrymen of the 32d Division in ganization in the Philippines. In anticipa-
north-central Luzon were conducting a bit- tion of future calls for animals from the
ter struggle against Japanese powerfully en- field forces, the QMC had early
in Australia
trenched in steep ranges above San Jose, procured hundreds of horses and mules
rations could be carried forward only on and established a remount depot for break-
fifteen-mile-long Villa Verde Trail, a nar- ing them in. Actually, combat organizations,
intent on the utmost mechanization,
row, winding track just wide enough for
put no requests
in beasts of
for these
small vehicles. Owing to the negligible
amount of wheeled traffic that could be burden, procurement ceased, and the depot
accommodated, Quartermaster dumps were closed.
73
On rare occasions when pack ani-
established at several points along its treach- mals were employed in the Pacific, it was
erous course. Since fighting was conducted only to meet exceptional needs. The few
handling horses. Igorots, familiar with the Luzon," QMTSJ, VIII (20 July 1945), 8-9.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 283
master used about 300 of these workers in served as the source of initial issues. Since
handling supplies on the beach and the re- Filipinos were mostly of slight physique,
maining 150 in burying battle casualties. small-sized shoes and work suits were in
As the division advanced inland, the em- particularly big demand. On Leyte such
ployment office moved with it, but in the items of issue were completely exhausted for
interior fewer Filipinos could be hired. several weeks, and everywhere in the archi-
Luckily, need for them temporarily slack- pelago the chronic size problem was
77
ened. From A plus 10 to A plus 23 the divi- intensified.
tured enemy equipment of necessity largely Ashley W. Hancock, "Depot Company at Taclo-
ban," QMTSJ, VII (20 April 1945), 6.
75 7H
24th Div Hist Rpt, 20 Oct-25 Dec 44, Annex Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A.
4, p. 96. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last
76
7th Div King II G-4 Opn Rpt, App. E, pp. Battle, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
7-8. WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp. 403-06.
284 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
the establishment of efficient supporting op- and forward supply points had been set up
erations. Frequent interruptions in the un- to support both Marine Corps operations
loading of rations further unbalanced food in the north and Army operations in the
stores. Such stoppages were caused mostly south. Because of expected delays in con-
by the higher priority assigned to ammuni- structing bulk storage tanks, the first three
tion, which was consumed in prodigious block shipments of petroleum products as
quantities. The discharge of a single ship well as the initial 30-day supply brought
with a cargo consisting mostly of rations in by newly arriving units consisted wholly
occasionally took days. The subsistence sup- of packaged items, 65 percent of which
ply on shore became so limited for a time came in 55-gallon drums. The remaining
that quartermasters could establish no re- 35 percent had been placed in 5-gallon cans
serve and had to issue food on a day-by-day to facilitate handling if trucks should be
basis. Class I dumps in general contained unavailable. Scarcity of service troops was
few B ration components; the remaining the major Class III problem. The QMC
components lay aboard ship. In some sectors had requested four gasoline supply com-
the QMC
had few even of the incomplete panies, but only two were furnished. They
B rations. For several weeks Headquarters, worked on a twenty-four hour schedule and
Tenth Army, and Island Command lived eventually employed forty-eight more tank
on emergency rations so that front-line trucks than were normally provided. Deep
79
troops could have B rations. mud occasionally prevented the trucks from
Within a few weeks discharge conditions entering Class III dumps, and drivers at
improved, and a fifteen-day stock of field times came under fire. Petroleum issues
rationsbecame available. But at the same nevertheless usually matched require-
81
time American penetration to the southern ments.
end of Okinawa put several divisions
twenty-five to thirty miles from Class I Other Problems of Logistical Support
dumps. Since tactical units in this area em-
ployed their organic trucks exclusively for Consumption Rates
carrying ammunition, Quartermaster ve- In all combat operations the amount of
hicles hauled all the food they could direct Quartermaster supplies actually received by
to fighting troops; occasionally, rains and tactical troops hinged upon the quantity
inpassable roads necessitated distribution by transported by assault units and resupply
air. Emergency dumps, established close to vessels and upon discharge, storage, and
the front and supplied by boat, eventually distribution conditions. These determinants
eased the situation.
80 never proved to be the same for any two
Class III items, which in general had a offensives. Even had they been, a precise
statement of consumption rates under op-
higher unloading priority than did rations,
erational conditions could not ordinarily be
flowed smoothly to using organizations. By
made, for such a statement depended on
L plus 15 ample stocks had been landed;
complete records of stocks received and is-
beach dumps were operating satisfactorily;
sued, and the necessarily incomplete organi-
70
Okinawa Island Com Actn Rpt, 13 Dec 44- zation of Quartermaster activities in com-
30 Jun 45, 8-XV-5.
S1
"Ibid., 8-XV-6 to 8. Ibid., 8-XV-14 to 23.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 285
bat zones seldom permitted such recording. corps troops who, much more than divi-
In December 1943 the XIV Corps tried sional troops, were likely to be stationed in
to determine what had been the consump- rear areas where distribution ran into the
tion of the four classes of Quartermaster fewest difficulties. Corps soldiers in general
supply in the New Georgia campaign. The received ordinary field rations at an earlier
table below shows the estimated number of date than did divisional units, which, for
pounds in each class consumed daily by days, often had nothing better to eat than
corps troops alone and by two divisions
packaged combat rations. The dispropor-
composing part of the corps:
tionate consumption of Class II items by
25 th 43d XIV
Q_M Supply Class Division Division Corps troops attached to the XIV Corps, ten- to
Class III 3.8 4.0 5.70 articles. In rear areas stocks of this class
Class IV 0.0 0.0 0. 14 were kept at about normal levels, whereas
units going into combat carried only scanty
The larger figures for the XIV Corps prob-
ably reflected the greater ease of supplying
quantities. Most startling of all was the ab-
sence of any issue of Class IV supplies to
a2
Ltr, CG XIV Corps to CG USAFISPA, 15 front-line soldiers. The table indeed gives
Dec 43, sub: Sup in Jungle Warfare. ORB 1'SA-
FINC AG 422 (Jungle). much justification for the constant com-
286 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
plaint that "Them bastards in the back farther" behind requirements. 84 The com-
areas get all the good stuff." manding general of the XXIV Corps de-
clared that the resultant scarcities ham-
Class II and IV Problems pered both combat efficiency and post-
operational replenishment. Among the
Extremely restricted issues of Class II
replacement factors enumerated by him as
items —and even more of Class IV items
most markedly too low was that for the
generally characterized operational supply.
BAR (Browning automatic maga-
rifle)
This situation was caused partly by the ship-
zine belt, issued and resupplied in accord-
ping shortage, which limited both initial
ance with War Department T/O and E's
and maintenance provision of articles hav-
at a rate only half that of the rifle itself.
ing little direct relation to tactical activities
As this efficient firearm was being utilized
and partly by low priorities assigned to
more and more, the disparity in issues was
delivery of clothing, equipment, and gen- swiftly reflected in a disturbing shortage
eral supplies in combat zones. On Leyte,
of belts. In July 1 945 an OQMG observer's
belated receipt of these items created so
report from Okinawa revealed that BAR
tight a supply condition on A plus 4 that
belts were almost as scarce there as they had
their issue was completely halted in a few been on Leyte. 85 Other important items for
rear areas in order to provide supplies at the
which existing factors proved inadequate
front. Only the opportune arrival of the first
were rubber boots, tarpaulins, tents, port-
block ship carrying Quartermaster cloth-
able typewriters, field ranges, and cooking
ing and equipment prevented an acute
outfits for small groups.
83
shortage. During active fighting the higher
In amphibious operations the heavier,
priorities given to other items often reduced
less used items of individual equipment,
the flow of most Quartermaster Class II and such as blankets, ponchos, and shelter
IV supplies to forward units to a mere halves, were packed in interchangeable
trickle or stopped it entirely. At such times pouches, which base installations did not
only articles directly related to tactical ac-
ship for some days after initial supply ves-
tivitiesor to the soldier's health, such as
sels had departed. Lighter personal equip-
canteens, intrenching shovels, and ammuni-
ment, such as extra garments, shoes, and
were delivered promptly.
tion bags,
toilet articles carried into combat, was nor-
Another cause of unsatisfactory Class II
mally packed in soldiers' individual duffel
and IV distribution was the inadequacy of
bags before departure for the assault area,
the replacement factors applied in deter-
taken aboard ship, and left there tempo-
mining resupply needs. Often they were too
rarily when the troops landed. Neither time
low to match combat losses. Partly because
nor men could be spared to separate these
of this deficiency, Class IIand IV stock
levels during the three months of fighting
84
CG XXIV Corps to CG POA, 19 Mar 45,
Ltr,
on Leyte "gradually dropped farther and sub: Replacement Factors on C&E. ORB QM
Tenth Army AG 475 (QM).
85
Rpt 2 (Okinawa series), Capt Orr, 12 Jul 45,
'"Rpt, Maj Pasquale P. Maiorano, 22 Nov 44, sub: Sup of C and E and Rations on Okinawa.
sub: Obsvr's Rpt (Leyte). OQMG
POA 319.25. OQMG POA 319.25.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS 287
bags by unit, and in an unsegregated state to the units at the front. Generally, even the
86
they were dumped on the beaches. bags that were delivered had previously
During the New Georgia operation, the been "pilfered by troops on the shore" who
after action report of the 43d Division de- ripped open padlocked pouches with a knife
clared, so many bags were discharged not and removed scarce articles. 90 Losses did not
long after the assault waves had landed that always cease with the receipt of luggage by
the beaches became badly congested and the the appropriate units. Soldiers engaging the
handling of other supplies was slowed. In enemy of necessity left their bags in unit
practically all campaigns substantial losses dumps where they underwent further pil-
of luggage occurred on the beaches because ferage. Lacking adequate means of trans-
there was no covered storage to protect it porting and guarding such impedimenta,
from pilferers and unfavorable weather, too tactical units sometimes simply discarded
few men to handle the bags, and there were them.
too few trucks to forward them to the appro- All these losses combined with combat
priate units. As days —
perhaps weeks wear and tear to create large shortages in
elapsed before the interchangeable pouches clothing and individual equipment. On
left at rear basqs were forwarded, they, too, Leyte, though 75 percent of the men in the
were often rifled. 87 383d Infantry had received their duffel bags
Other areas had similar difficulties. Col. and interchangeable pouches by the end of
Archibald R. MacKechnie, commander of the first month, lost and stolen articles were
the 162d Infantry in New Guinea, declared so numerous that the regiment encountered
that the storage of clothing and equipment considerable trouble in supplying shoes, 400
in duffel bags and interchangeable pouches men lacked ponchos, and a quarter of the
generally meant "the complete loss" of these unit had no socks. Yet it was regarded as
88
materials. The 7th Division noted that on better off than units which had received a
91
Leyte its regiments were "utterly incapable smaller proportion of their bags.
of removing all their baggage, and the Divi- In the belief that a ready supply of cloth-
sion Quartermaster lacked transportation ing could be secured only by moving extra
and personnel to accomplish the task." For garments in bulk lots, several divisions in
days the bags remained in open storage, and the Okinawa campaign abandoned the use
in consequence "losses by mildew and rot- of individual duffel bags for each man. The
tingamounted to as much as 75%." 89 The 7th Division was one of thosewhich adopted
96th Division had a similarly disheartening the new method. When it embarked, each
experience in this offensive. Its 1st and 2d man took with him only clothing that he
Battalions did not receive any substantial might need aboard ship. On landing he
part of their duffel bags for four weeks, and put these garments and a few other personal
even then only half of them were forwarded possessions in a small bag. These bags were
se
then collected from each squad and stuffed
Anon., "Class II in the Assault," QMTSJ, VIII
into two larger bags. Sufficient duffel bags
(20 July 1945), 4-5.
87
CG XIV Corps, n. d., Informal Rpt on Opns to carry extra clothing required in the post-
in New Georgia, p. 46. ORB AFWESPAC AG
314.7.
90
Rpt, Lt Col Glenn J. Jacoby, n. sub: QM
d.,
**
Rpt, n. d., sub: Notes of the Campaign of the Activities 96th Inf Div, pp. 5-6. OQMG POA
1 62d Inf Regt in New Guinea, p. 7. 319.25.
88 01
7th Div King II Opn Rpt, pp. 23-24. Ibid., p. 6.
288 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
operational period were also placed in the according to priorities that held up the de-
squad bags. By doing away with the use of livery of clothing and equipment. The de-
interchangeable pouches and individual lays, together with pilferage, caused acute
duffel bags, the number of bags needed by a shortages in some essentials like cots and
division of 20,000 men was reduced to tents. These, scarcities imperiled the proper
3,000, a quantity that obviously could be care of the ill and wounded, but prompt
handled and guarded more easily than establishment of priorities favoring medical
could 20,000. Yet even this compromise did installations alleviated this disturbing situ-
92 94
not correct all faults of the older system. ation.
Pilferage and unexplained losses, though on
a smaller scale, continued. While the new Class I Supply
method did not completely fulfill the hopes
of its originators, Captain Orr, Quartermas- Special problems arose in the supply of
ter observer, thought that it had proved suc- Class I as well as Class II and IV items.
the disappearing bags was probably not tions to take with them the prescribed num-
much nearer a fully satisfactory solution ber of rations. As has already been noted,
than it had been in France in 1918 or in this failure caused much difficulty at the
In other respects, also, the Okinawa op- was also a common source of trouble in
eration reflected an improvement in Quar- other offensives. Nondivisional units in
caliber machine guns in order to protect area underwent heavy artillery fire, and the
their ovens. During the Hollandia opera- first-aid station in the center of the perim-
98
tion part of the 41st Quartermaster Com- eter at one time was filled to capacity.
pany, as has already been mentioned, went Incidents that compelled QMC
troops to
through a destructive Japanese air raid on engage in combat activities scarcely ever
White Beach 1, which caused several cas- arose, but they occurred often enough to
ualties among unit members. This company render almost pointless the venerable wit-
encountered other hazards at Hollandia. ticism that "The only quartermasters killed
Artillery fire imperiled its truck drivers and
in the last war were one who was hit in the
strafing attacks its service troops. When the
campaign ended, ten members of the units,
07
(1) Hist Narrative of 41st QM Co for 1944,
may have made the Corps seem a bit less general lack of the buildings, highways,
"safe" than tradition pictured it, but only railroads, and other commercial facilities
Combat Use
World War II brought in its train in- Jungle Supplies and Equipment
sistentdemands for the development of new
items of supply and equipment and for the Fighting had barely broken out on Bataan
betterment of old items. Military planners before it was demonstrated that the white
color of clothing and equipment imperiled
realized that unless these demands were met,
the lives of the hard-pressed defenders. Men,
at least in part, troops could not properly
clad in white garments, made glaring tar-
cope with the novel and unexpected exigen-
gets for enemy bombers and strafers. Troops
cies of fighting that extended into every
bathing in streams might disclose their posi-
quarter of the globe. In an effort to keep
tions if they did not conceal towels and un-
Quartermaster items abreast of wartime re-
derwear. Neglect of this essential precaution,
quirements, the OQMG in Washington Col. Thomas W. Doyle, veteran of Bataan,
vastly enlarged its research and development informed the OQMG
on his return to the
program. Brig. Gen. Georges F. Doriot, United States in July 1942, caused the death
who, as director of the Military Planning of one of his supply officers. Soldiers wash-
Division, headed this program, from the ing underwear and handkerchiefs, he added,
outset relied heavily upon the advice of tech- would ordinarily throw these telltale articles
nically trained observers he sent overseas to to the ground or dry them on a rock, but this
practice, too, endangered their lives. In day-
obtain firsthand information about the
time anything white "had to be pulled in
capabilities of Quartermaster items and the
1 and covered up." 2 Attempts, not altogether
needs of field forces. From their recommen-
unsuccessful, were made to color white ma-
dations and those of overseas quartermasters
terials with the juice of berries and the tan-
emanated many desirable changes and im-
nin of tree bark. Experience on Guadalcanal
provements. Pacific theater experience and
confirmed the necessity of camouflage, but
suggestions guided the course of much of the
since coffeewas more plentiful there than
research and development work undertaken it had been in the Philippines, it constituted
in the zone of interior.
a
Lecture, Col Thomas W. Doyle, 25 Jul 42, sub:
1
Risch, QMC: Organization, Supply, and Serv- Recent Combat Conditions in Bataan and Matters
ices, I, 76-77. of Interest to QMC. OQMG 319.25.
292 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
3
the main coloring agent. In the United easily portable equipment and their skillful
States the OQMG, aware of the problems utilization of camouflage. Japanese troops,
presented by bleached supplies and equip- it was claimed, moved swiftly and noiselessly
ment in an age of air warfare, began to through the most tangled vegetation, con-
procure olive-drab rather than white under- stantly infiltrating the lines of their over-
wear, socks, handkerchiefs, and towels. Pro- loaded opponents, who were handicapped
duction bottlenecks for some months re- by and inadequately camou-
unsuitable
tarded the delivery of these new materials, flaged garments and encumbered by heavy
but as 1943 progressed, larger and larger equipment that could not be moved with-
shipments of the colored items arrived in out disclosing their presence. To determine
4
overseas areas. what new items might be needed by Amer-
Meanwhile in the Southwest Pacific there ican troops, representatives of GHQ inter-
had arisen the problem of what changes in viewed Dutch and British veterans of the
Quartermaster supplies and equipment, war's opening campaigns and Americans
particularly in the soldier's uniform, might who had lived for years in Pacific islands.
be required by the extraordinary physical On the basis of the jungle lore of these men
conditions found in such places as New a series of recommendations was submitted
Guinea. This problem was complicated by to OCQM USASOS. 5
the marked variation in that island's ter- That agency was advised that the khaki
rain, which ranged from low-lying, insect- cotton uniform and the papier-mache hel-
infested coastal areas through mountains met would both probably be suitable if
and valleys covered with lush jungle they were well camouflaged by mottled
growths and rainforests to high peaks with patches of light green dye or by solid light-
low night temperatures. Most of all, the green coloring. Footwear presented the
problem was complicated by the lack of any main problem. A boot that would last longer
special jungle clothing and equipment ex- than the U.S. Army leather shoe in wet ter-
cept for the bolo, which had been adapted rain, afford better protection against the
from the long knife used by Filipinos for entrance of mud and insects, and give a
cutting their way through tangled under- firmer footing on slippery grass slopes, was
growth. the basic requirement. Such a shoe might
Shortly after the catastrophic collapse of be "of the basketball type, with a strong
the Allied forces in Malaya, MacArthur's canvas top, allowing water to drain out, and
headquarters began to study the whole a thick corded rubber sole," and with the
question of jungle equipment. The disas- sides of the tongue sewed up to the top to
trous Malayan campaign had convinced prevent the entrance of leeches. 6 If a boot
many U.S. Army officers that the smashing of this type could not be furnished, one mod-
tactical success of the Japanese was ascrib- eledupon the hobnailed shoe worn by sol-
able mostly to their light, compact, and was desired.
diers of the Netherlands Indies
That shoe was canvas-topped and leather-
3
Memo, n. s., for Files, 17 Nov 42, sub: Interv
on Jungle C and ESolomons. Jungle Unit Read-
in 5
Memo,
s., for n. CQM
USAFI A, 1 3 Jun 42, sub
ing File, R&D Br, Mil Ping Div OQMG. Changes U.S. Uniform for Jungle Opns. ORB
in
1
Memo, Mil Ping Div for Proc Div OQMG, 28 AFWESPAC 420. QM
Nov 42, sub: Colored Underwear. In same. Ibid.
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE 293
heeled and soled. Both this shoe and the or animal-drawn vehicles especially de-
proposed jungle boot, it was believed, would signed for jungle transportation.'
render leggings unnecessary. Leggings at MacArthur's messages arrived in Wash-
best were unsatisfactory, for, being laced, ington at a time when the OQMG was
they required eyeholes and so permitted the just starting work on experimental jungle
items with the help of Capt. Cresson H.
entrance of insects. Tightly rolled puttees,
Kearny, a former oil geologist, who had
smeared with soap or tobacco juice, were
worked for years in South American jungles
thought to afford better protection.
and since the summer of 1941 had been
Finally, GHQ informed the Chief Quar-
designing and testing jungle equipment in
termaster that in tropical jungles soldiers
Panama for the Caribbean Defense Area.
could not carry as much individual equip-
Kearny had developed many special items
ment as they did in temperate climates and of the sort asked for by the Southwest Pa-
that it would therefore be necessary to Area and some others as well, but few
cific
lighten the weight of loaded packs. This had been fully tested and none were being
goal, was suggested, might be achieved by
it manufactured. Despite the lack of complete
the issue of thinner blankets and by the elim- testing, the OQMG
on receipt of Mac-
ination of gas masks and shelter halves. Arthur's messages quickly placed produc-
Instead of shelter halves troops might carry tion orders and late in August shipped
canvas sheets, each large enough to make a model sets of the equipment by air to the
lean-to tent for one squad. Bolos, mosquito
Southwest Pacific Area for field study by
tactical units. During the next few months
bars, matches in waterproof containers,
this area submitted additional requisitions
emergency rations, and small cooking kits
and by November had ordered more than
could not, it was thought, be discarded.
250,000 sets. Shipments could not be started
Immediate need for jungle supplies and from San Francisco until late November
equipment developed in late July and early
and then only in partial completion of the
August, when enemy landed in the Buna
the requisitions. This long delay meant that
area of northern Papua and advanced south MacArthur could not obtain the equipment
over the mountains toward Port Moresby, a in time for the Buna-Sanananda counter-
development that obviously demanded re- That operation was accordingly
offensive.
taliatory action by U.S. and Common- hand or
carried out with items already on
wealth forces in order to protect the ap- items improvised and produced in Aus-
proaches to Australia. MacArthur, hoping tralia/
that the War Department could quickly fill The QMC in that country for a time
his requirements for special items in the considered the adoption of the Japanese,
coming offensive, sent urgent requests to 7
(1) Rad, MacArthur to CG SOS, 20 Jul 42.
Washington for 150,000 jungle kits. Among AFPAC AG 420. (2) Thomas M. Pitkin, Quar-
the Quartermaster items that he especially termaster Equipment Forces (QMC
for Special
Historical Studies 5, February 1944), p. 206.
wanted, aside from those previously rec-
(1) Pitkin, Quartermaster Equipment for Spe-
8
ommended to the Chief Quartermaster, cial Forces, pp. 200-206. (2) Ltr, to CG TQMG
USAFIA, 24 42, sub: Jungle Equip. ORB
Aug
were gloves, fitted with long gauntlets to
SWPA AG 381. (3) Rad, CofS to CINCSWPA, 14
protect the wrists from insects, and man- Nov42. ORB AFPAC AG 381.
294 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
British, and Australian practice of wearing locallyprocured dye, the main source of
only shorts and open-necked, short-sleeved camouflaging material, speedily faded. 9
shirts. Though Australian officers insisted Since enemy snipers had much success in
that this custom kept their men cooler and picking off soldiers who wore distinctive
more comfortable, the idea of adopting it clothing and insignia or carried visible weap-
for American use was abandoned when re- ons, camouflage was applied not only to
ports were received that 30 percent of the work suits but also to mosquito nets, tents,
Australian troops inNew Guinea were suf- and other canvas equipment, and to per-
feringfrom malaria or from body scratches sonal equipment of light color or shiny ap-
and infections that could have been pre- pearance which might reveal the presence
vented had they been better covered. De- of Americans. Even helmets were covered
spite GHQ's initial preference for the cotton with camouflaged burlap tucked around the
khaki uniform, the OCQM concluded that bottom between the liner and the steel shell.
the herringbone twill Army work
suit was Before the 3 2d Division moved against the
the best garment immediately available for Japanese, it developed a mass-production
jungle warfare. It stood up better than did system for the rapid spraying of materials to
the cotton khaki uniform under the rough be dyed. In accordance with a prearranged
usage of combat areas where soldiers often schedule units brought both their organiza-
had to crawl over the ground and force their tional and individual equipment to the cam-
way through tangled vegetation, and its ouflaging plant, which immediately applied
gray-green color could be more easily cam- the necessary coloring; the units then car-
ouflaged to blend with green foliage than ried away and dried them. The
the wet items
CAMOUFLAGED JUNGLE SUIT. Note the jungle boots worn by the soldier, and the
camouflaged helmet.
dyeing the work suit was challenged. Ac- gin of preference, he declared, was "so
cording to Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, slight" that the decisive elements in the final
commander of the I Corps at Buna, the col- conclusion that camouflaging of work suits
oring "closed the 'breathing spaces' in the ought to be abandoned were the delay and
12
cloth." The dye used to impart a darker the cost of coloring uniforms plus the fact
green to the gray-green shade ran and even- that unfixed dyes faded and ran. 14
tually "got a grayish-green anyway after Besides making a jungle combat uniform
having been in the mud for some time."' 13 out of work suits, the QMC
in August had
In many instances "during the recent ac- arranged for Australian manufacture of
tion," Eichelberger asserted, "the undyed about 2,500 pairs of green sniper shoes,
uniform was less conspicuous than the which were inspired by the apparent value
dyed." In other instances "the dyed uni- of comparable footwear to Japanese troops.
form seemed slightly the better." The mar- These shoes, similar to gymnasium or tennis
° Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to shoes, were to be used by scouting patrols
Tokyo (New York, N. Y. Viking Press, 1950),
: since they made less noise than did service
p. 39.
"Rpt, Brig Gen Jens A. Doe, n. d., sub: Ob-
14
Ltr, CG
I Corps to CG
Sixth Army, 22 May 43,
servations in Sanananda Area, 1-25 Jan 43. OQMG sub: Dyeing Herringbone Twill Uniforms. I ORB
SWPA 319.25. Corps AG
421.
296 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
1 5
shoes.
'
Service shoes, converted into hob- pectations and proved, in fact, ill-adapted
nailed footwear for the sake of firmer footing for general use by combat troops. It slipped
on slippery, stony, and mountainous terrain on roots and wet sloping soil and gave in-
and provided with heel plates and rawhide sufficient protection against stones and poor
laces, were a common foot covering. After support for ankles and arches. Moreover,
troops of the 3 2d Division had their regular the canvas tops shrank. The American Di-
shoes hobnailed, they discovered that the vision in the South Pacific and several
hobs quickly fell out of old leather soles. infantry outfits in MacArthur's command
As far as practicable new shoes were accord- claimed that the boot afforded so little pro-
ingly issued to soldiers about to go into the tection for the feet that severe blisters de-
combat zone. Late in the year small quanti- veloped around the toes. The OQMG
ties of footwear procured in Australia and attempted problem by means
to solve this
hobbed in manufacture became available of removable duck insoles and soft cushion-
and gave less trouble than did the converted sole socks. Both items absorbed moisture and
type, but both varieties disintegrated rapidly perspiration and would, it was hoped, pre-
in the mud around Buna. Constant soak- vent the toes from blistering The Sixth
ing, with no opportunity for complete dry- Army reported that in actual use the insole
ing, quickly rotted the leather, and some shrank and did "not fulfill the requirements
shoes wore out in only ten days. In early of an insole under field conditions." 17
1943 a small quantity of American-made For more than a year the jungle boot, as
service shoes with composition soles arrived well as the service shoe, was regularly issued
in New Guinea. They proved much more to troops going to Southwest Pacific Area
satisfactory than leather-soled footwear and operational areas, but the service shoe more
did not disintegrate so swiftly. 16 and more became the shoe actually worn in
The canvas-topped jungle boot, devel- combat zones. At Humboldt Bay in April
oped in the United States as part of the spe- 1944, for example, most soldiers wore it.
cial equipment for the Pacific, did not One division, it is true, employed the boot,
arrive in New Guinea soon enough to be but an OQMG
observer was told that this
utilized widely in MacArthur's initial of- would not be done in the future owing to the
fensive. It had rubber soles and canvas tops
discomfort caused by the lack of proper sup-
port for the men's arches. The boot, more-
that at least in theory furnished better pro-
over, could not be laced tightly. Its canvas
tection against mud and insects than did
tops chafed the lower legs, and its rubber
regular leather service footwear plus leg-
soles made walking was partic-
tiresome. It
gings, but in field tests it did not meet ex-
ularly unsatisfactory "for marching over
15
(1 ) Ltr, CQM CO QM
Base Sec 4, 10 Sep
to relatively hard surfaces, through jungle de-
42, sub: Assemblage of Jungle Equip. ORB
AFWESPAC QM
420. (2) Personal Ltr, Col Cor-
17
CG SWPA to CG USASOS, 8 Nov 42,
( 1 ) Ltr,
diner to Gen Gregory, 25 Jan 43. SWPA OQMG sub: ORB AFPAC AG 421.3. (2)
Jungle Boots.
319.25. Memo, Ground QM AGF for TQMG, 24 May 43,
" (1) Ltr cited n. 15(2). (2) Rpt, Capts R. N. sub: Extracts from Obsvrs' Rpts. OQMG 421.3.
Brewster and John F. Horton, 41st Inf Div, 26 (3) Memo, TQMG for CGASF, 11 Oct 43, sub:
Sep 42, sub: Observations of 32d Inf Div, p. 4. Gen Brehon B. Somervell's Rpt From Pacific.
ORB AFWESPAC QM
333.1. (3) Personal Ltr, OQMG 333.1 (Somervell). (4) Ltr, CG Sixth
Col George De Graaf to Col Cordiner, 1 Jan 43. Army CG USAFFE, 3 Apr 44,
to sub: Jungle Boots.
ORB ABCOM QM 421. ORB NUGSEC QM 319.
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE 297
void of swamp and similar terrain, or where tain,for few were manufactured in the
any sort of load" was "carried in the United States and Australian production
18 20
pack." But since it allowed water to run went mainly to the Commonwealth'forces.
out as rapidly as it entered and dried quickly, A combat boot, with rubber-
tropical
the boot had substantial value under condi- and heels, was tentatively de-
cleated soles
tions where troops' feet were nearly always veloped by the OQMG
in 1944 and was
wet. Soldiers discharging landing craft ly- well received when tested in the Pacific.
ing in the surf, Engineer troops working in Those who wore had only one major criti-
it
water for hours while they constructed cism — the extremely narrow spaces between
bridges, and men operating in swampy areas the cleats facilitated the accumulation of
usually preferred it. Patrols also like the mud, especially on the heels, which then
boot because it was supple and made little became almost as smooth as plain leather or
19
noise. By the beginning of 1944 its issue to rubber heels. With the correction of this
combat organizations had generally ceased; fault the rubber-cleated boot would prob-
requisitioning from the United States had ably have been better liked than any other
stopped; and remaining stocks were dis- kind of footwear. But it was designed spe-
tributed only to units asking for them. The cifically as an improved jungle boot, and the
service shoe had become the generally ac- war moved out of jungle territory before its
21
cepted footwear for jungle warfare as well development could be completed.
as for other purposes. The original jungle boot, with its high
For combat operations in rough country canvas top, was intended to give the wear-
infantry troops preferred the hobnailed va- er's feet and legs the same protection the
riety of service shoe. While rubber-soled standard canvas leggings did and thus make
footwear was suitable in dry terrain, hob- that item unnecessary. But since the boot
nailed shoes gave a firmer footing and quick- had increasingly fallen into disuse, and the
ened progress in muddy areas, on uplands, service shoe was too low, combat forces had
and in where wet logs, slippery
jungles little protection against deep mud except for
vegetation, and rocky trails abounded. On leggings. most dis-
They were "one of the
22
coral islands ordinary leather soles wore liked items." soaked
They'chafed the legs,
through in a matter of days. Rubber soles, up water, and took too long to put on and
though more satisfactory, sometimes slipped to dry out. Troops, the USAFFE Board
and did not last long under constant use. At noted, "either leave them behind, cut them
Biak rubber-soled footwear wore out in ten down to smaller size ... or put the
days, and fresh supplies had to be flown in trousers inside the stockings." Discarded leg-
and dropped by parachute in order to keep gings, it continued, were found more fre-
one outfit shod. In similar circumstances quently than any other item in salvage col-
hobnailed shoes stood up better and gave 20
(1) Rpt, 158th RCT, 4 Oct 43, sub: Boots.
better traction than did either of the other QM 421. (2) Rpt, G-4, 43d Inf
ORB AFWESPAC
types. They were, however, difficult to ob- Div, 15 Mar 44, sub: QM Sups. OQMG POA
319.25.
18
Rpt 3, Capt Orr, 20 May 44, sub: Rpt on the
21
( 1 ) P. 26 of Rpt cited n. 18. ( 2 ) Rpt 1 7, Capt
Letterpress Opn, p. 23. OQMG SWPA 319.25. Orr, Aug 44, sub: Visit to Australian Army Land
* (1)Ibid., p. 24. (2) Rpt, Lt Col D. B. Dill, n. Hq. OQMG SWPA 319.25.
d., sub: Observations in SWPA
and POA, Oct-Dec "USAFFE Bd Rpt 106, 8 Feb 45, sub: QM
44, p. 2. OQMG POA 319.25. Info. ORB AFPAC Pacific Warfare Bd File.
298 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
lections of abandoned web equipment. Light though it was, it still was too bulky
Once soldiers, in violation of sanitary regu- to be carried easily. Most important of all,
lations,had cast them aside, they had no it proved impractical in operational zones.
adequate protection against mud, whether Front-line soldiers, the Sixth Army re-
they were marching, fighting, or working ported, did "not like to sleep above ground
in wet dumps. To provide a substitute, the because of possible aerial bombing" and
OQMG developed a combat shoe whose and "soldiers behind the
hostile infiltration,
distinctive feature was a cuff and buckle line" wanted "to keep out of the way of
top that gave it a height of ten inches as shrapnel." In combat areas, the Sixth Army
compared with the six inches of the service pointed out, it was "essential that troops
shoe. Though production of this new item sleep in fox-holes, dugouts," or slit
25
began in the United States in January 1944, trenches.
few shoes were delivered to the Pacific Despite such reports, which flowed in
areas. A year later the X Corps reported from all parts of the Pacific, the OQMG
23
that everyone "would like to get" some. continued to improve the hammock, sim-
Conspicuous among the pieces of equip- plifying its zipper opening and reducing its
ment shipped from San Francisco in late weight by increased use of nylon. More than
1942 was the jungle hammock, which was 700,000 hammocks were manufactured in
expressly designed for soldiers entering a 1944, and 600,000 were scheduled for 1945
combat area. This hammock was optimis- procurement. These articles, though not
tically expected to take the place of tent, widely utilized by the combat troops for
shelter half, canvas cot, and mosquito net whom they had been developed, neverthe-
in regions where these essential items could less proved valuable in other ways. Rear
not be taken either because they were too areas, recurrently afflicted by severe short-
cumbersome to carry or because of unsuit- ages of tentage and cots, found hammocks
able terrain. One of the chief virtues satisfactory substitutes. During the wet sea-
ascribed to the hammock was that it per- son, when rain fell incessantly for hours,
mitted men to sleep off the ground and so flooding bivouac areas and preventing tents
avoid insects and dampness. Made of a from being pitched, jungle hammocks kept
lightweight duck fabric, it had a false bot- the troops "high and dry during the sleep-
26
tom dead air space and
that provided a ing hours." Some men in rear areas, Lt.
prevented mosquitoes from biting the occu- Col. D. B. Dill, OQMG observer, noted,
pant's back. Attached to and over this bot- consistently preferred them for the better
tom was an enclosed zipper-opening mos- protection they gave against crawling and
quito net, which in turn was fastened to a flying insects and slept in them as often as
rainproof canopy stretched over sticks they could. When constantly employed, jun-
placed in the ground. The hammock itself gle hammocks had one conspicuous disad-
was suspended between neighboring trees. 24 vantage —speedy deterioration, which lim-
This ingenious piece of equipment never 25
( 1 ) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG Adv USAFFE,
fulfilled the high hopes of its originators. 1 Dec 44, sub: Jungle Hammocks. (2) Ltr, CG
USAFFE to CG ASF, 2 Jan 45, same sub. Both in
a Ibid.
ORB AFPAC AG 427.
21
Pitkin, QM Equipment for Special Forces, p.
20
Anon., "Jungle Hammock Pays Off in South
211. Pacific," QMTSJ, VII (19 January 1945), 8.
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE 299
ited their life, according to Dill, to about value that he ordered his headquarters to
27
forty-five days. procure enough Marine-type ponchos to
The poncho, a rectangular, blanketlike supply all soldiers in these two areas. His
cloak made from raincoat material with an instructions were immediately carried out,
opening in its center for the wearer's head, and by the close of the year this equipment
provided some of the services that the jun- was being issued in place of raincoats to
gle hammock had been developed to sup- all troops embarking for the South and the
recommendation, giving the poncho, rarely of them, indeed, valued it so highly that
a favorite item of issue, a high degree of they took it into action with them even
popularity among combat troops in the Pa- though they left their packs behind. But
cific. It served as tarpaulin, as ground sheet they thought it too hot and too heavy for
for sleeping soldiers, as protection for blank- use as a raincoat, officially considered its
ets, as foxhole cover, as rain collector, as principal function. This was not really a
pillow, and as blackout against lights from combat operations the raincoat
loss since in
cigarettes and fuel tablets. Two of them, itselfwas objectionable for the same rea-
fastened together to form a shelter, served sons. The heavy fabric employed in both
in place of a tent. By thus substituting for garments was better suited to temperate
half a dozen or so bulky articles the garment than tropical climates; in jungles it in-
markedly lessened the soldier's load. 28 creased the flow of sweat and interfered
When fighting started on Guadalcanal, with bodily movement to so great an extent
the poncho was not a regular item of Army that neither piece of equipment could be
issue, but early operational experience and worn comfortably in the daytime. On rainy
observation of the high combat utility of nights some infantrymen in quiet sectors did
the Marine Corps version of the cloak con- wear the poncho, but those at the front sel-
vinced quartermasters that its issue to Army dom did. Colonel Dill was nevertheless so
troops was desirable. Accordingly, in the favorably impressed by its general service-
autumn 1942 the
of QMC
in the United ability that he declared no need existed in
States began to ship Marine-type ponchos the tropics for either raincoat or shelter
30
to the Pacific areas, but it did not forward half.
them in quantities large enough for issue to The high opinion of the poncho held by
all soldiers. In October 1943, Lt. Gen. Bre- the infantry and such observers as General
hon B. Somervell, head of the Army Service 2n
Memo, 1st Lt H. E. Sommer for CG Jef-
(1)
Forces, who was then visiting the South Pa- fersonville QMD, 6 Mar 43, sub: Interv with
cific Area and the Southwest Pacific Area, Overseas Pers. OQMG
POA 319.25. (2) Memo,
Col Frank A. Henning, Stock Control Div, for Dir
was so deeply impressed with their general Rqmts Div ASF, 10 Oct43, sub: Unsuitability of
Army Raincoat. OQMG SWPA 422.3. (3) IRS,
27
Rpt cited n. 19(2). Mil Ping Div to S&D Div OQMG, 22 Dec 43,
34
( 1 ) IRS, Mil Ping Div to S&D Div OQMG, 22 sub: Ponchos. OQMG POA 422.3.
Dec 43, sub: Ponchos. OQMG POA 422.3. (2)
:,c
(1) USAFFE BdDraft Rpt, 19 Jan 45, sub:
Personal Ltr, Mai Edwin L. Hobson to Gen Doriot, Answers to Questionnaire. ORB AFPAC AG
QM
14 Jul 45. OQMG POA 319.25. 333.1. (2) Pp. 28-29, 86-87 of Rpt cited n. 19(2).
300 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Somervell and Colonel Dill was not fully cured in Australia and included in ship-
shared by corps troops, division service ments from the United States. The headnet,
troops, artillerymen, and base supply troops, designed to guard the wearer's face and
all of whom operated in rear areas under head, was meant for use by troops when
comparatively favorable conditions. Unlike sleeping and even when fighting, but, as
infantrymen, they did not live for days in there was no way of keeping the netting
close contact with the enemy and the away from the face, few men ever wore
ground. Their work consisted mainly of it. Soldiers, attempting to sleep in the head-
driving trucks, working in supply dumps, net, felt suffocated and soon took it off.
and handling ammunition at artillery posi- Worst of all, it impeded clear vision, partic-
tions. These activities were normally carried ularly during night fighting when most es-
on at some distance from the front, and sential. The glove, made of flannel, was
those engaged in them had little reason for worn even less often than the headnet. It
employing the poncho as a general utility was not only hot and soggy ; it also seriously
item. They had, moreover, free access to the interfered with the handling ofweapons and
equipment for which it served as a substi- ammunition. The almost unanimous ver-
tute. Consequently, they did not overlook its dict of observers was that neither the glove
clumsiness as readily as did infantrymen. nor the headnet, even if markedly improved,
The poncho, in fact, seriously interfered would ever be generally worn. In any event
with the and stacking of supplies and
lifting the availability of mosquito bars in increas-
with all other manual operations. A light- ing numbers and the development of effec-
weight nylon type was developed toward the tive insect repellents rendered other
close of the war, but the Southwest Pacific protective measures less necessary. 32
Area OCQM recommended in May 1945 The U.S. Army machete, a straight,
that in the future raincoats be issued to all broad-bladed knife, 1 8 inches long, replaced
troops in place of ponchos. Combat units, it the shorter, heavier bolo as the main tool
contended, would have no further need for for cutting through tangled vegetation.
the latter articles, for they were to be amply Modeled on machetes developed in South
supplied with shelter halves in preparation America and the West Indies for slashing
for the invasion of Japan. USAFFE ap- cane and clearing out dense underbrush, it
proved the OCQM
recommendation, but depended upon velocity rather than weight
the Sixth and Eighth Armies requested that for its effect. It permitted quicker and
ponchos continue to be made available to easier swinging by wrist action than did the
31
their tactical elements.
bolo type and readily cleared jungles of
The prevalence of malaria-bearing mos- growth that "simply sprang
light, resilient
quitoes early gave birth to a demand for per- away from the slower blow of a heavier,
sonal equipment that would protect troops 33
shorter cutting instrument." It was a par-
from these dangerous insects. Mosquito
ticularly useful tool for making paths
headnets and gloves were accordingly pro-
32
( 1 Personal Ltr, Capt Orr to Gen Doriot, 1
)
31
(1) Rpt, CQM USASOS, 1 Jun 45, sub: Oct 44. OQMG 319.25. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt 118,
OCQM Activities, May 45. DRB AGO F223. (2) 19 Feb 45, sub: QM
Equip and Sups. ORB Pacific
Rpt 2 (Okinawa series), Capt Orr, 12 Jul 45, sub: Warfare Bd File.
Sup of C and E and Rations on Okinawa. OQMG 88
Ltr, TQMG to CG ASF, 25 Oct 43, sub: Jun-
POA 319.25. gle Equip. OQMG POA 319.25.
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE 301
through thick vegetation. Not until the to hold a soldier's hammock, spare cloth-
Philippines were reached and fighting took ing, and rations. On top was a small zipper-
place more and more in the open country opening sack for canteen, medical kit, mess
was it much criticized. Soldiers found little gear, and other small articles. As the pack
need for the machete under these circum- itself was not waterproof, two waterproof
stances and began to discard it, claiming it bags, which could be fitted inside, were de-
was so long when suspended from their belts veloped. One was a small food bag, cylin-
that it hit their legs and caught on brush. drical in shape, five inches in diameter and
Some units in consequence issued only one twelve inches in depth, and weighing only
34
machete to a squad. two ounces, which protected rations from
The flotation bladder was another un- dampness. Each combat soldier received six
usual piece of equipment. Made of rubber- or eight of the bags. They were supposed to
ized fabric, it was planned as a swimming be placed in the jungle pack, but were nor-
aid. It was tucked under the uniform over mally carried on troops' belts and used as
the chest and stomach and inflated, when utility sacks for spare socks, toilet articles,
necessary, by blowing through a small rub- tobacco, matches, knives, can openers,
ber tube. The bladder supplied sufficient
photofolders, and other personal belong-
buoyancy for the wearer to swim deep 36
ings. The second bag, a clothing sack, had
streams when he was fully clothed and
a like evolution. It weighed seven ounces
equipped. Actually, streams were seldom
and was intended to hold sleeping equip-
wide or deep enough to warrant use of the
ment and extra clothing within the pack.
bladder in swimming, but it occasionally
served as a water carrier or an auxiliary can-
In actuality it was used mostly as a field sub-
teen. At Hollandia the soldiers of at least one stitute for the barracks bag, a departure
regiment, fighting in an area where water dictated largely by the demand for the light-
was scarce, met their individual require- est possible pack. A soldier participating in
ments by once a day filling two bladders. an amphibious operation put clothing and
The major service of this piece of equip- other personal articles not required in com-
ment, however, was one not contemplated bat into a clothing bag, marked it with his
by its originators —that of providing an ex- name, and placed it along with those of
cellent pillow for soldiers who otherwise several other men in a duffel bag, which,
36
would not have enjoyed this luxury. presumably, arrived eventually at the cor-
With troops in jungle areas forced to rect company dump. Here he could pick it
carry much of their own equipment, the up during a rest period when he would need
OQMG developed a jungle pack specially its contents.
37
The articles carried in the
designed to lighten their burden. The pack clothing bag generally consisted of a com-
was a water-resistant pouch large enough plete change of apparel plus a blanket,
34
USAFFE Bd Rpt 147, 7 Apr 45, sub: QM 38
( 1
) Ltr cited n. 33. (2) Rpt cited n. 34.
Bull 12. ORB Pacific Warfare Bd File.
37
( 1 ) Pitkin, QM Equipment for Special Forces,
* (1) Ltr, CG
USAFISPA to ASF, 10 AprCG p. (2) Rpt, 1st Lt Robert L. Woodbury, 1
210.
44, sub: Component Parts of Jungle Kit. USAFINC Jun 43, sub: Observations of QM
Activities in
AG 422. (2) Rpt 11, Capt Orr, 15 Jul 44, sub: SWPA, 1 Feb-15 May 43. OQMG SWPA
319.25.
Answers to Questions in Ltrs from OQMG. OQMG (3) Personal Ltr, Col Charles P. Bellican to Gen
SWPA 319.25. Doriot, 8 Aug 45. OQMG POA 319.25.
302 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
towels, and perhaps a few personal The lower part, called the cargo pack, held
possessions. the equipment normally placed in the
p
The jungle pack itself, contrary to the waterproof clothing bag. The upper part,
originators' broad conception of its employ- called the combat pack, contained the items
ment, was utilized only for the few essential actually needed by fighting troops. Toward
needed in a combat zone. In the
articles the end of the Okinawa operation the cargo-
Southwest Pacific, troops normally carried and-combat pack appeared in scattered
in their packs only a poncho, one or two quantities, and front-line troops generally
40
pairs of socks, a pair of trousers, handker- praised it.
combat field pack, it consisted of two parts. tively quiet, they might carry hot food by
hand three or five miles over steep, slippery
38
CG USAFFE
(1 ) Rad, to TQMG, 16 May 44.
ORB AFPAC AG 381. (2) Rpt cited n. 31(2). 40
( 1 ) Risch, QMC: Organization, Supply, and
30
Pp. 42-43, 54-56 of Rpt cited n. 18. Services, I, 126-27. (2) Rpt cited n. 31(1).
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE 303
trails to the troops actively engaging the Overseas areas judged operational ra-
enemy. But if there was much shelling, this tions on the basis of sustenance, palatability,
could not be done.
41
and portability. A relatively high sustaining
Because of all these difficulties special value characterized all the rations but varied
operational rations that could be carried somewhat from type to type according to
by combat troops themselves were exten- differing caloric values and vitamin con-
sively employed. These rations, individually tents. Palatability was beyond question
boxed or canned, contained long-lasting highly desirable, for food discarded because
foods that troops would be able, if circum- of bad taste was no better than no food at
stances dictated, to consume unheated. But all. Since rations that could not be carried
most of the constituents were more palatable easilyby combat soldiers burdened by mili-
if eaten warm, and canned heat was there- tary paraphernalia might be thrown away,
fore provided along with the rations if pos- ready portability, too, was essential. Yet the
sible. Before these rations were standard- importance of both palatability and porta-
ized, they had been scientifically studied by bility was, apparently, not fully appreciated
food experts and tried and pronounced ac- at the time the first wartime rations were
ceptable by soldiers in the United States. developed. Palatability at best was difficult
These tests were ordinarily carried out un- of achievement because the necessity for
der good conditions that could seldom be using nonperishable rations entailed the ex-
duplicated in operational areas. The ra- clusion of all fresh provisions and the inclu-
tions provided for them, moreover, were sion of products specially prepared to give
fresh produced and canned and
rations them lasting qualities —often at the expense
packaged only a few weeks before. They of taste appeal. Nor was portability easily
were unaffected by deterioration, heated attained, for it was hard to combine that
whenever this would enhance their palata- quality with substantial bulk and high
bility, and eaten under comfortable circum- caloric value.
stances, often in regular messes. The origi- When the Guadalcanal and Buna offen-
nal conception of combat rations had been sives started, the C ration was the only op-
that they would be stored in well-protected erational ration on hand in large quantities
warehouses overseas and be not more than in the South Pacific Area and the Southwest
a year old when consumed. Actually, in the Pacific Area. Composed of three meat or M
Pacific areas they were often exposed to the units and three bread or B units, it was seri-
distasteful in appearance that soldiers re- mating that customarily eaten by soldiers.
peatedly threw the whole mass of food away. While some other combat rations were com-
With age the onions, carrots, and meats ac- parable to it in caloric value and vitamin
quired new and less acceptable flavors and, content, they did not always furnish suffi-
according to some consumers, came to look cient bulk and often left partakers still
and taste like "dog food." Most troops found craving food. The C ration, on the other
the soluble coffee unpalatable. Had utensils hand, if entirely consumed, provided troops
been available for heating the hash and with a normal amount of sustenance and so
stew, these components would have been allayed the sensation of hunger created by
vastly improved, but front-line troops sel- an empty or partly empty stomach. This
dom had such equipment. 47 Yet despite virtue, at first inadequately appreciated,
these frequently objectionable features, won increasing recognition as knowledge of
hungry soldiers thoroughly appreciated the the ration accumulated. Another conspic-
C ration was not too badly deteriorated.
if it uous virtue of the C ration was its tin pack-
In the Papuan operations the men of the ing, which warded off deterioration for a
162d Regiment, obliged to live for days on longer time than did the nonmetallic pack-
"bully beef" and hard biscuits, hailed the ing of some other operational rations. Ow-
ration as a delicacy when shipments finally ing to the prolonged storage of subsistence
reached them. 48 under poor conditions, this feature was of
For carrying purposes the C ration had particular importance. The superior pack-
the disadvantages of heavya relatively ing of the C ration and the adequate bulk
weight — about five pounds
an — and of furnished by its constituents led Southwest
awkward cylindrical can that occupied an Pacific Area and South Pacific Area supply
excessive amount of space in soldiers' packs. planners to prefer it to any other operational
These characteristics made the ration un- ration available before the 10-in-l type ar-
suitable for units in contact with or pursu- rived from the West Coast early in 1944. 50
ing the enemy. Troops obliged to carry the Because of this preference and because sub-
53
—
and peanuts and four tea and two milk much as a nutritionally equivalent amount
tablets. To most soldiers this ration had of ordinary subsistence, which is composed
only one attraction —
its small size, which mainly of water, was selected because it
made it easy to carry in their pockets. They helped lighten the load of combat troops and
found it almost inedible when, as was nor- enabled them to carry a larger number of
mally necessary, it was eaten cold. 54 rations. Generous quantities of these com-
Marine Corps experience with subsist- ponents were provided, and the ration in
ence on Guadalcanal paralleled that of the consequence was still rather bulky, weighing,
when packed, more than three pounds.
"(1) Kahn, G. I. Jungle, pp. 109, 113, 118.
(2) Rpt, 1st Lt Robert L. Woodbury, 30 Mar 43,
Though the soldier's consumption of water
sub: Rpt From SWPA, 23-30 Mar 43. OQMG was increased by the quantity needed to re-
400.162.
52 55
Ltr cited n. 15(2). (1) Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 73, 81. (2) Rpt,
53
Ltr, CQM to TQMG, 19 Aug 42, sub: Speci- 1st Lt Robert L. Woodbury, 1 7 Nov 42, sub: Intervs
fications of Australian Emergency Ration. OQMG on Jungle C and E. OQMG
Jungle Unit Read-
SWPA 430.2. ing File. (3) Lecture, Col Robert C. Kilmartin,
"Ltr, QM 41st Div to QM Sixth Army, 1 Oct 19 Nov 42, sub: Marine Opns on Guadalcanal.
43. ORB AFWESPAC QM 430.2. OQMG 352.13.
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE 307
hydrate the dry components, the developers card them. The War Department suggested
of the ration, assuming that drinking water that the weight could be lightened to ten
would at all times be available for this pur- pounds by removing the ration components
pose in ample quantities, anticipated no from their packings and putting them in five
56
need to carry any along. Each ration fur- waterproof food bags. To tactical organiza-
nished about 3,500 calories a day all that — tions thismethod was hardly more accept-
would normally be required and a more — able than the original one, for it added still
varied selection of food than did the C more items to be looked after. 57
ration. Besides substantial amounts of seed- Even more objectionable than the weight
less raisins and dried peaches and prunes, of the jungle ration was the inconvenient
the jungle ration contained salted peanuts, packaging of its constituents. Peanuts,
dry cereal, C biscuits, K ration meat, con- raisins, dried peaches and prunes, cereals,
centrated hard candy, cigarettes, and cocoa, and powdered milk were packaged in all
coffee, and lemon powders. Composed of four-ration or two-ration units. A sealed can
it had the merit of
foods usually served cold, of these products could not be opened to
requiring no cooking utensils. Canned heat obtain food for the first meal without losing
and a canteen were all that was needed to its packaging protection against moisture
warm the beverages. and insects and without exposing its entire
Field tests of the newly arrived jungle contents to the possibility of premature con-
ration evoked both favorable and critical sumption, which in turn would make a
comments. An infantry company at Guadal- varied menu impossible. The meat and bis-
canal described it as "infinitely superior" in cuits were the only major components pack-
palatability "toany other ration issued dur- aged as one-ration units. With its one-, two-,
ing the recent campaign," but pointed out and four-ration packaging the jungle ration
that it did not provide as substantial fare as did not, then, furnish the small, easily port-
did the C This unit also noted that
ration. able breakfast, dinner, and supper units that
the necessary drinking water often was not would have been most serviceable. Nor were
available. Most important of all, it pro- there sufficient noncombatant troops to
nounced the jungle ration too heavy and break down the ration into such units, or
bulky for easy use in combat. If the ration enough small containers available for that
was employed as its originators planned, purpose. Had this been feasible, troops start-
each man would bear in his pack four ing out on combat missions would have been
rations, weighing a total of more than twelve able to take along as many or as few rations
pounds when placed in the waxed carton as pending operations demanded. Actually,
provided for that purpose. This was much if the jungle ration was issued, it meant giv-
too big a load for troops who had to carry on ing troops a four-day supply, even when
their persons weapons and equipment indis- there existed no foreseeable need for so gen-
pensable in combat. If heavy rations were
57
Btry B, 98th FA Bn, to
Ltr, CO Ad- CG
added to their load, many soldiers, as all ( 1 )
peanuts for a meal or a can of powdered inches deep. The size, shape, and weight of
58
milk." Such disheartening results were in- these cartons made them appreciably easier
components were all
evitable as long as the to carry than the cylindrical C ration and
packaged separately. the bulky jungle ration containers. Soldiers
Notwithstanding that the jungle ration, could take with them a two-day supply of
if not deteriorated, was rather palatable, food, which weighed only about as much
supply officers in both the South and the as a one-day supply of C rations; if they
Southwest Pacific came to consider it more desired, they might even carry the cartons
a "picnic lunch" than a really nutritional in their pockets. Lightness was, indeed, per-
ration that could be served to troops day haps the chief merit of the K ration. But
after day. This fact, together with its un- the use of cartons rather than metallic con-
satisfactory packaging, limited its value so tainers had also the disturbing effect of in-
60
much 943 its procurement in
that in early 1 tensifying the danger of deterioration.
the United States was first reduced and then Many supply officers, while approving
stopped. Of the hundreds of thousands of the lightness of the K ration, considered
rations sent to these two theaters, compara- it to be, like the jungle ration, a picnic
tively few were issued to combat units ex- lunch. Its early history gave some justifi-
cept as the fare of reconnaissance patrols cation for this belief. It had been developed
and airdropped cargoes. In rear
as part of in 1941 mainly to satisfy the demand of
areas they were occasionally used to diminish paratroopers for a lightweight ration that
the monotony of other rations. Because of would provide sufficient nourishment during
the restricted demand, most of the stocks the first few days of a landing mission and
eventually spoiled. When, early in 1944, the yet not add unduly to their heavy load of
recently developed and more varied 10-in-l arms, ammunition, and individual fighting
ration became available, USASOS directed equipment. Shortly after the new ration be-
that the remaining stores be disposed of by came available, infantry organizations de-
forced issues twice a month. About the same cided it met their need for compact provi-
time the South Pacific Area started to sal- sions for initial assault troops in amphibious
vage peanuts, raisins, and other edible operations, which, like airborne operations,
components. 59
required men to carry a mass of military
*Rpt cited n. 37(2). paraphernalia. Originally, then, the K ra-
5"
Memo, G-4 43d Inf Div for Dr. Mann,
( 1 )
tion was looked upon as one that would be reported that troops tired of the K ration
utilized onlyduring the first day or two of sooner than they did of either the C or the
an offensive. Its composition in 1942 and jungle ration. 62 The probable reason was
1943 also lent a certain justification to the that K rations, packed in cartons and mostly
description of picnic lunch. Though it packaged with nonmetallic materials, de-
contained more than 3,000 calories in scien- teriorated faster than did tin-packed C ra-
approved proportions of fats, carbo-
tifically tions. After a year's storage C rations gen-
hydrates, and proteins, these constituents erally were shape than K's.
in better
were in a highly concentrated form that fur- The exact proportion in which combat
nished little bulk. After eating them, most troops used the different rations varied ac-
soldiers still felt hungry. cording to availability, the difficulty of the
Despite this shortcoming the K ration fur- operation, the stocks of individual and
nished food in greater variety than did the C group cooking utensils, and the personal
ration of that period. Each meal unit con- preferences of supply planners. Operational
tained chewing gum, dextrose tablets, and orders set up the over-all quantities of sub-
either bouillon or lemon-juice powders, none sistence, but within these limitations organi-
of which were originally included in the C zation commanders determined how much
ration, plus two sorts of crackers in contrast of each ration would be employed. Feeding
to the single C cracker. The supper unit pro- policies consequently varied not only among
vided in addition a small D chocolate bar. divisions but sometimes even among regi-
All three meals at first included meat, veal ments and battalions of the same division.
being furnished for breakfast, spam for din- As far as possible Southwest and South
ner, and dried sausage for supper. For the Pacific Area troops in rear operational areas
sake of variety cheese was soon substituted were supplied with B rations, but these ra-
61
for meat in one of the meals. tions often lacked not only fresh provisions
Troops found some K components unap- but also canned foods, bread, and other
pealing. Despite the fact that nutritionally baked products. Soldiers shifted from the
dextrose tablets constituted an ideal source front to rest camps were if possible issued an
of energy, most men rejected them, thus extra third or half ration. To these men,
illustrating the hazard involved in serving particularly those who had just been on a
unfamiliar foods. In hot weather lemon- C ration fare for one or two weeks, unbal-
juice powders melted into a viscous taffy anced B rations appeared to be simply the
and lost their flavor and most of their vita- old C's. This false conception arose because
mins; even when these powders were fresh, many elements ordinarily included in the
few soldiers would drink the synthetic juice B'swere missing and because hash and stew,
made from them. Long-stored crackers and the two components largely responsible for
meats, too, lost their distinctive taste. Some the C ration's monotony, were often served.
kinds of chewing gum proved objectionable, Sometimes hash and stew provided the only
for their flavors were transferred to un- meat in the B ration. Matters were made
canned food, which in consequence became 62
(1) Ltr, QM USASOS to CQM USAFFE, 27
inedible. On returning from a lengthy in- Jul 43, sub: K ORB AFWESPAC QM
Rations.
430.2. (2) Memo, Maj Carl R. Fellers for CO
spection trip to New Guinea, Major Fellers
Subs Depot, 15 Aug 43, sub: K Rations. ORB
01
Thatcher, Special Rations, p. 56. ABCOM GP&C 430.2.
310 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
worse by the fact that, normally, the meat vation was the inclusion of accessory kits,
in both rations was corned beef. From this each holding twelve cigarettes, matches,
unsatisfactory situation sprang most of the chewing gum, toilet paper, can openers, and
numerous complaints that units had been halazone tablets. These tablets were essen-
fed nothing but C rations for months on tial in Pacific operations because there was
end.
63
no other way of quickly purifying unusable
Criticism of the C ration was aggravated water. Combat troops regretted the reten-
by soldiers' tendency to confuse it with the heavy weight
tion of the cylindrical can, the
unbalanced B's. In the Southwest Pacific of the ration, and the absence from the ac-
Area troops alleged that Australian-pro- cessory kit of salt and atabrine tablets, badly
duced C's, the bulk of those consumed needed because of excessive loss of body salt
during the first half of the war, were inferior through sweating and because of the high
to the American product. This belief, for incidence of malaria.
which there was no clear justification, was Even before the OQMG produced the
widely prevalent, and when, early in 1944, improved C ration, it had developed an-
receipts of operational rations from the other ration, eventually called the 10-in-l,
United States rapidly rose, USASOS can- for feeding hot meals to small groups of
celed its unfilled contract demands on local troops during the short interval they were
64 beyond kitchens but not yet in con-
firms. in areas
In the spring of 1944 the OQMG, in re- tact with the enemy. Under such circum-
sponse to overseas complaints about the C stances the want of kitchens did not exclude
ration, especially in the Pacific, altered that the preparation of hot meals if rudimentary
ration drastically. Variety was substantially cooking equipment, light in weight and
widened by the use of ten instead of three easily portable, was provided. The new ra-
meat components and by the establishment tion, furnishing food for ten men for one
of six different menus, each containing day —henceits name —
was often described
three components. The meals now included as simply aB ration so packed that any re-
such favorites as meat and spaghetti, frank- quired number of rations could be speedily
furters and beans, pork and beans, ham and obtained. If, for example, two hundred sol-
eggs, and chicken and vegetables. Palata- diers needed food for one day, the time- and
bility was further increased by the elimina- labor-consuming assembly of B components
tion of the hash unit, by the substitution of for that number of men could be obviated
a better beef stew, and by the addition of merely by taking out of storage twenty cases
cocoa powder and several candies to the of the new ration. Actually, the 10-in-l ra-
biscuit units.
65
A particularly welcome inno- tionwas somewhat less than a B ration; for
63
( 1 ) Memo, Col John W. Mott OCQM USA- one thing, it had fewer elements, and, for
SOS for GSD, 6 Sep 43, sub: C Rations. ORB another, it used the individually packed K
AFWESPAC QM 430.2. (2) P. 6 of Rpt cited
was
n. 42.
dinner unit for the noon meal. Yet it
64
(1) QM SWPA Hist, V, 37. (2) Rpt, Col certainly more like a B ration than any other
Rohland A. Isker, 20 Jul 44, sub: Subs at Hol-
operational ration. Consisting of five menus,
landia. ORB ABCOM GP&C 430.291.
Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army et al., each of which contained slightly different
66
( 1 )
3 Nov 44, sub: C Ration. (2) Ltr, CG USAFFE breakfastand supper units, it provided a
toCG ASF, 14 Feb 45, sub: C Ration. Both in
ORB XIV Corps AG 430.2. wide range of cereals and canned and de-
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE 311
68
hydrated meats and vegetables and avoided days of the New Guinea campaign." Sup-
the daily repetition of the same fare that had ply officers particularly liked the ease with
been the curse of the old C's. Another fa- which they could issue it to small groups, not
vorable feature, which the 10-in-l ration exceeding 200 in number. When however
shared with the new C's, was the inclusion lack of regular rations forced unit kitchens
of accessory kits.
66
to prepare it for larger groups a use not —
Sixth Army organizations, after they had contemplated by its developers the results —
tested the 10-in-l ration in forward areas for were less pleasing, for the opening of the nu-
periods of pronounced it
more than 45 days, merous small cans required to feed these
well suited either for unit messing or as an groups demanded a good deal of time and
emergency ration for small groups. But they manpower. Tactical situations occasionally
found it ill-adapted to individual consump- compelled the issue of 10-in-l's to individual
tion and hence unavailable as a substitute soldiers in direct contact with the enemy.
for the C, D, or K ration in combat areas When employed, the food elements, not
so
where each man carried his own food. being packed for individual consumption,
Among its virtues testing organizations par- were often wasted. Losses were particularly
ticularly noted' its utility in speeding the as- apt to occur under the stress of battle when
sembly and distribution of B components.
67
men who had lost their appetite for normal
For some months the huge supply build- quantities of subsistence rifled rations for
up for the coming campaign in France held coffee and sweets and threw everything else
west Pacific only in March 1944, and the coupled with the "lack of organization in
modified C ration did not arrive in consid- cooking and messing," caused so much waste
erable amounts until the close of that year. as to demand severe restrictions on future
70
The 10-in-l ration, issued operationally for issues. Yet until the very end of hostilities
the first time in the Southwest Pacific dur- the general availability and great popular-
ing the Hollandia campaign, was warmly re- ity of this ration led to its extensive utiliza-
ceived. Though only small quantities were tion under conditions like those on Leyte.
available, it proved so popular that the C Excessive waste of the 10-in-l ration pre-
type — stocks of which were still of the old vailed in very small as well as large groups.
variety — was employed less widely than in Groups of less than ten men, such as were
previous operations. The 10-in-l ration, found among linemen, bridge guards, truck
Captain Orr informed the OQMG Mili- drivers, outposts, and patrols, were espe-
In November 1944 the widespread popu- the first day or two of an offensive, when
larity of the 10-in-l's and the protracted de- troops did not desire heavier fare. 74 The
lay in the arrival of improved C's caused assault ration, produced only in Hawaii,
the Southwest Pacific Area to consider sus- was distinctively a Central Pacific Area item
pension of further use of C rations, but this of supply. First utilized in the Marshalls
idea was dropped because of the small stocks offensive of February 1944, it was issued to
of 10-in-l's and the promise of early de- Pacific Ocean Areas forces in subsequent
west Pacific Area troops still had few of the during initial landings.
latter type, but Pacific Ocean Areas units In the series of offensives that started with
were reasonably well supplied. 72
In subse- Leyte in October 1944 and ended with
quent operations the new kind was available Okinawa in June 1945, combat rations
in substantial quantities to all organizations. were employed in something like the follow-
It was most often criticized because of the 73
Capt Orr, 6 May
Rpt 1 (Okinawa series), 45,
continued presence of the stew component, sub: QM Activities on Okinawa. OQMG POA
319.25.
(1) Ltr, CG 7th Div to CG USAFICPA, 21
71 74
Ltr cited n. 65 ( 1 ).
72
(1) Rpt, Lt Col Glenn J. Jacoby, 14 Dec 44, Feb 44, sub: Assault Rations. (2) IRS, to QM
sub: QM Obsvr's Rpt (Leyte). OQMG POA CofS USAFICPA, 6 Apr 44, sub: Emergency
319.25. (2) QMSWPA Hist, VI, 35. Candy Rations. Both in ORB AGF PAC AG 430.2.
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE 313
rations. Pacific Ocean Areas troops on Leyte airmen infantrymen required spe-
as well as
cial rations. Before their departure on tacti-
had about a 20-day supply of 10-in-l
rations, 7 days of C, 3 days of K, and 2 days cal or strategical missions flying crews were
each of D and assault rations. By A plus 4, tense, had little appetite, and ate sparingly
many troops were eating 10-in-l's, but this of the food set before them. For this reason
proved premature, for they then had practi- they needed special lunches. Similar lunches
cally no cooking equipment and could not were also required by reconnaissance, trans-
prepare the rations properly. B rations in port, photographic, and other crews, who
general could not be issued before A plus 20 often missed their regular noon meals be-
or 30, for until then sufficient components cause they were away on protracted flights.
had not arrived to make balanced meals and The high altitudes at which all these crews
flew complicated the preparation of lunches.
unit kitchens were not ready to prepare
At a height of 20,000 feet gas in the intes-
them. The rather marked variations among
tines expanded two and a half times and at
units that at times characterized the utiliza-
35,000 feet four times. It was accordingly
tion of rations in combat is illustrated by the
essential to eliminate as many gas-produc-
supplies carried by three divisions in the
ing foods from fliers' fare as possible. Be-
initial assault on Luzon. Organizations
cause of the frequent occurrence of flight
participating in this attack were directed to fatigue,which was noticeably relieved by
take with combat
them a 10-day supply of were also often served
nutritious food, crews
rations in addition to those needed on the a larger evening meal than were ground
76
voyage. Because of failure to comply with troops.
this order some units arrived with only a 3- Flight surgeons agreed that air crews in
day supply. Troops of the 6th Division had general should have a minimum of 3,000
in their packs a 3-day supply of K rations, to 4,000 calories daily; that half the cal-
those of the 37th Division a 1-day supply ories should consist of protein in the form
each of C, D, and K rations, and those of of fresh red and white meat and fresh eggs
the 43d Division a third of a day's supply of that carbohydrates should not exceed 40 per-
C rations, two-thirds of a day's supply of K cent of the total caloric intake ; and that the
rations, and a single day's supply of D worst gas-producers —beans, cabbage, corn,
was not as intense as it had been on Leyte Unfavorable supply conditions did not per-
and regular supplies and cooking equipment mit complete fulfillment of these require-
ments, but the Pacific areas all authorized
became available sooner, the 43d Division
supplementary food issues to flying crews.
was eating 10-in-l's by the second night,
and on the fourth day the 37th Division was 76 Harrold to Col
Personal Ltr, Col Clinton J.
enjoying B rations.
75
Cordiner, Dec 42 (?). ORB AFWESPAC QM
430.2.
" (1) Rpt cited n. 72(1). (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt 77
Memo, Flight Surgeon, I Island Comd SPA,
138, 29 Mar 45, sub: QM Bull 11. ORB Pacific 29 Apr 43, sub: Recommended Diet for Flying
Warfare Bd File. Pers. ORB USAFINC QM 331.4.
314 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
In the Southwest Pacific in November 1 942 occasionally misused the privilege of obtain-
extra issues included fresh fruit juices or ing supplementary rations by procuring
powders, coffee, evaporated or powdered them not merely for flying crews but for all
milk, oatmeal or prepared cereal, sugar, their men. Food intended for 50 persons
and pickles. Fresh eggs and meat, though might actually be distributed to 600, with
desirable, were not included because they the result that the flying crews who most
could be secured only in very limited needed the extra provisions secured little
amounts. As food stocks rose and Air Forces benefit. In February 1944 Colonel Rogers
needs were more fully recognized, the list pointed out that in the South Pacific this
of added issues was expanded to embrace practice caused the use of ships and air
fresh or canned meat, canned tuna fish, de- transports for unauthorized purposes and
hydrated eggs, cheese, butter, flour, baking unjustifiably discriminated against service
powder, yeast, and bread. In the South Pa- troops not assigned to air groups. At a con-
cific supplementary provisions did not fur- ference of AAF and Army supply officers to
nish quite as much variety as in the South- consider these questions as they had devel-
west Pacific Area but did contain more per- oped in the South Pacific Area, Colonel
ishables. Those in the Central Pacific Rogers praised those air commanders who
Area supplied hard candy, canned peaches, had established separate messes for flying
pears, and pineapples, canned orange, and nonflying troops and suggested wider
grapefruit, and pineapple juice, and whole- application of this practice as a partial an-
wheat crackers. In October 1944 this list swer to the problem of morale. His recom-
was broadened to embrace meat, fish, and mendation bore some fruit, but practical
milk. In preparing special lunches the Pa- difficulties in most instances prevented it
cific areas all gave the largest quantities to from being carried out, and the problem
crews of heavy bombers, smaller quantities was never wholly solved in any Pacific
79
to crews of medium bombers, and still area.
smaller quantities to fighter crews. All crews Besides the special rations for troops ac-
shared alike in the heavier servings given tively engaged in air and ground combat
78
fliers at dinner. operations, other special rations were de-
Issuance of supplementary provisions to veloped for hospital patients, laborers, pris-
flying personnel created a morale problem oners of war, and civilian repatriates.
because ground crews and service troops Shortly after the Marshalls campaign the
felt unfairly treated. The sense of discrimina- quartermaster and surgeon in the Central
tion among them was especially strong Pacific Area jointly developed a hospital
when flying crews received better food while assault ration for battle casualties during
eating at the same mess. To prevent a gen- the first few days of an operation. A ration
eral weakening in morale, flight groups of this type was badly needed because none
of those carried by assault troops were va-
78
( 1 ) USASOS Memo 94, Sec. I, 23 Nov 42,
sub: Special Ration for Air Corps Pers. (2) USA- ried or nourishing enough for hospital pa-
SOS Regulations 30-16, Sec. II, par. 2a, 30 Jul 43, tients. The new ration, assembled by Cen-
same sub. Both in ORB AFWESPAC AG 300. (3)
Ltr, HCPA AG (QM) 430.2-S, 27 Mar 44, sub: tral Pacific Area quartermasters and taken
Additional Rations for Flight Pers. (4) Ltr, HCPA
AG (QM) 430.2/17, 18 Oct 44, sub: Flight Ra-
7
"Rpt, Bd of Officers, SOS SPA, 21 Feb 44, pp.
tions. Both in ORB USAFINC AG 403.2. 10-11, 14-15, 18. ORB USAFINC 430. QM
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT IN COMBAT USE 315
ashore by medical units, provided both fluid kind, it requisitioned rations from Quarter-
and soft foods. It contained bouillon cubes, master stocks ; if in cash, it bought the added
oatmeal, canned fruits and juices, dehy- food in the open market. This system
drated soups and eggs, canned boned worked unsatisfactorily, for it left little
chicken, evaporated milk, beverages, sugar, means of supervision over supplementary
and salt. These components, requiring only requisitions, and uncontrolled purchases
water and heating equipment for their prep- from commercial sources reduced the
aration, were packed and as-in small cans amount of perishables available to other
sembled which contained 200
in large units, Army segments and to the Australian pub-
rations weighing altogether about 900 lic. In mid- 1943 buying in the open market
pounds. The hospital assault ration was first was forbidden, and a special hospital or H
used in the Marianas. Southwest Pacific ration scale was set up that provided about
forces also utilized a similar ration from late a dozen items not ordinarily found in the
1944 on. 80 Meanwhile the War Department field ration. The most important of these
had developed a supplemental hospital ra- items were canned roast beef, dehydrated
tion pack, which served the same purpose as soup and vegetables, lentils, powdered
did the hospital assault ration, but it was not malted milk, cookies, syrup, and junket tab-
shipped in quantity to the Pacific before the lets. Dietitians pointed out that the H ration
attack on Okinawa, where both types were was and
deficient in milk, butter, potatoes,
used. As the new ration contained no canned vegetables, which were all highly beneficial
chicken and no dehydrated soups or eggs, it to underweight patients. A special board,
did not provide quite as wide a range of appointed to study this problem, recom-
81
components as did the older one. mended that the daily milk allotment be in-
The question of an appropriate special creased from 1 to 2 pints, that the butter
ration affected hospitals outside as well as ration of 3/£ pound a week be raised by two
inside combat areas. In all three Pacific thirds, that the potato ration be lifted from
areas the ordinary field ration formed the 3 to 5 pounds, and that the fresh vegetables
allowance increased from 4*/2 to 6
be
basis of issues to hospitals outside combat
pounds. None of these foods was obtainable
zones, but it was supplemented whenever
in quantities sufficient to permit the com-
practicable by fresh meats, fruits, vegetables,
plete adoption of the board's proposals, but
and eggs. In the Southwest Pacific the au-
an increase of about 30 percent in the com-
thorized supplement was half a ration in
ponents, if supplies were available, was au-
either kind or cash, as the hospital preferred.
thorized. Because of recurrent shortages the
If an institution took its extra allowance in QMC outside Australia could seldom meet
80
(1) IRS, Surg to QM HUSAFICPA, 18 Apr
the precise requirements of the H ration
serving as stevedores and construction and Rice, as the food most in demand among
storage workers at bases and with tactical native laborers, occupied the dominant posi-
forces. The precise elements composing had always con-
tion in all these rations. It
native rations varied slightly in line with major part of the daily fare of
stituted the
differing dietary habits and availability of Tonkinese and Javanese workers in New
foods. In territories controlled politically by Caledonia and the main element in the deli-
86
an Allied power the U.S. Army utilized the cacies prepared for their fetes. In their
colonial governments as its agents in deal- villages the more backward peoples lived
ing with native peoples. Australian and chiefly on yams, taro, breadfruit, bananas,
Dutch officials in New Guinea, French au- coconuts, fish, wild game, and a few pigs
thorities in New Caledonia, and British ad- and chickens. But during the previous half
ministrators in the Solomons and the New century plantation owners in regions inhab-
Hebrides hired native employees for the ited by these peoples had served imported
U.S. Army and determined the constituents rice to their employees, who came to regard
of their rations on the basis of standards long it as a highly desirable luxury. Col. O. C.
laid down in local laws regulating contract Noel, British Resident Commissioner in the
labor. Generally, the colonial officials re- Solomons, declared that the native regarded
sponsible for the feeding of native laborers rice "as an important part of his compen-
submitted their ration requirements to quar- sation for volunteering for work and any
termasters who, in turn, called upon U.S. decrease of this issue is regarded as a breach
83
supply bases for the necessary foods. of faith." When he returned home on com-
The Solomon Islands labor forces were pletion of his contract, Noel continued, "one
provided a simple ration composed of a of his most valued possessions was his bag
mere handful of components. Besides rice, 87
A quarter century of experience
of rice."
one pound of which was furnished, it con-
on plantations in the Solomons proved that
tained a quarter pound each of corned beef
any diminution of the daily allowance im-
and salmon plus tea, sugar, C biscuits, and
mediately lowered the morale and produc-
plug tobacco, everywhere a native favorite. 84
tivity of workers. This was strikingly illus-
Laborers' rations in New Guinea and the
Central Pacific were based on a larger trated in 1933, when the substitution of
number of constituents than in the Solo- maize on Lever Brothers' plantations halted
mons. If subsistence stocks in these areas practically all operations.
In1945 the necessity of feeding large fruits, 8 ounces of fresh beef, 5 ounces of
numbers of liberated Filipinos put heavy canned fish, 1 .5 ounces of bacon, 1 fresh
pressure on rice stocks throughout the Pa- egg, and small quantities of milk, butter,
cific and brought about a lowering of the lard, tea, curry powder, and spices. As many
daily issue in the Solomons from one pound of these components were scarce, substitu-
90
to three fourths of a pound. The ensuing tions were freely made. The Oriental ra-
discontent speedily forced the restoration of tion, or its rough equivalent, was employed
gating this situation maintained, could suc- other Asians, normally consumed only about
ceed without the cereal.
88
In New Caledonia 2,000 calories a day in contrast to the 2,500
similar efforts to reduce issues, though more to 3,500 calories consumed by Americans,
prolonged, met a like fate. the Geneva Convention of 1929 required
Native rations, on the whole, were defi- that their meals be equal in quantity to
cient in the vitamins and minerals furnished those served U.S. troops in base installa-
by the normal foods of primitive peoples. tions. The Oriental ration met this stipula-
The addition of milk and meat would fresh tion, providing about 2,600 calories.
have been beneficial, but American troops In the spring of 1945 the War Depart-
had a prior claim on these scarce supplies. ment advised the Pacific areas that the
Native laborers, moreover, rejected many world-wide shortage of canned and fresh
common and there was not enough
foods, meats, canned fruits and vegetables, and
time to accustom them to a better diet. On dehydrated potatoes demanded the stringent
Guadalcanal, where the ration was particu- conservation of all these foods. USASOS
larly wanting in variety, extensive use of thereupon directed that the prisoner of war
polished rice, which was deficient in vita- ration be modified by the substitution of
mins, caused an outbreak of beriberi. Since egg powders, macaroni, spaghetti, beans,
the laborers there were familiar with the un- and stews for these scarce products. In July
polished type, it was promptly substituted.
the OQMG developed a new ration for
In New Guinea unpolished rice had been
Japanese prisoners, but USASOS pointed
89
used from the outset.
out that though this ration provided as many
By 1944 the Army in the South-
early
calories as Japanese ordinarily consumed, it
west Pacific was employing enough Chinese
did not supply enough nourishment to com-
and other Orientals to call for the develop-
ply with the Geneva Convention. USASOS
ment of an Oriental or O ration. This ra-
scale, own
accordingly continued to use its
tion was somewhat more varied than the
modeled at that time on the Philippine Army
native rations, providing 16 ounces of rice,
91
ration.
4 ounces of wheat flour, 14 ounces of fresh
vegetables, 5.5 ounces of dried and fresh 90
USASOS Regs 30-16, Sec. II, par. 2e, 28 Feb
44, sub: O ORB AFWESPAC AG 300.
Ration.
M Ibid.
91
Ltr, CG USASOS to CG LUBSEC et
( 1 )
*°
( 1 ) Ltr, CG SOS SPA to Col Hardin C. al., 11 Mar 45, sub: Rations Issued to PW's. ORB
Sweeney, 25 Jul 43, sub: Rice. ORB USAFINC PHIBSEC 430.2. (2) Rpt, J. B. Harper, 13 May
AG 430. (2) Ltr, Surg SOS SPA to CG VII Is- 45, sub: Activities of the OCQM USASOS
Apr 45.
land Comd, 6 May 44, sub: Native Diet. ORB (3') Ibid., 8 Aug 45, same sub, Jul 45. Both in DRB
Guadalcanal 430.2. QM AGO QM Sec USASOS Hist Rpts.
318 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
This ration had been introduced on the whose low wages prohibited them from buy-
American return to the Philippines to meet ing additional food in the black market. The
the requirements of the Commonwealth superiority of the Philippine Army ration,
Army, which was then reconstituted from now more marked than ever, further
the guerrilla units that had carried on weakened civilian morale. In May, Base X
harassing operations against the occupying in Manila reported that its Filipino laborers
Japanese forces. The new ration had a dual were suffering from slight malnutrition and
objective. One purpose was the elevation of that the consequent unrest among them had
Filipino morale by the provision of most of culminated in strikes and wholesale resig-
the nonperishables found in U.S. field ra- nations. Monetary compensation for the re-
tions, which Commonwealth troops re- duction in the rice ration from seven to
garded Another purpose was to
as superior. four ounces did not satisfy the men since
supply some Filipino staples through the "the desire for a good meal" outweighed
94
substitution of canned fish for 20 percent "the desire for small increases in pay."
of the American canned meat component The chief Quartermaster held the inferior
and of rice for 80 percent of the starchy com- labor ration responsible for the inability
ponents. The Philippine labor ration, de- of the U.S. Army to hire more than a quar-
veloped for the thousands of civilians em- ter of the workers needed for a large-scale
95
ployed by the American forces, contained expansion of its supply activities.
larger quantities of rice and fish and smaller Inviting though the ration of Common-
quantities of meat, flour, milk, and vege- wealth soldiers appeared to Filipino laborers,
tables than did the Philippine Army ration it did not always seem so to the Common-
and so reflected more closely the customary wealth soldiers themselves. Guerrilla units,
92
fare of the people. attached to American military organiza-
The loss of huge quantities of food in tions, notwithstanding that they usually op-
Luzon to the ubiquitous black market erated alone in remote fastnesses, felt a sense
obliged the zone of interior to provide many of discrimination because they received less
of the elements in the Philippine rations.
freshmeat and fewer perishables than did
Early in 1945 the growing scarcity of sub-
U.S. troops. Their complaints went un-
sistence in the United States brought about heeded chiefly because they were believed
disturbing deviations from the prescribed
to enjoy unusually favorable opportunities
standards, and in March the War Depart- for obtaining poultry and perishables from
ment ordered the labor ration to be cut farmers.
91
'
wealth Army ration. As a result of their dis- did not have money, food was issued to
satisfaction, they were finally given about them on a relief basis.
amount of fresh meat
half the issued to their
American comrades. 97 Better planning might have avoided the
The liberation of the Philippines brought confusion that accompanied the feeding of
with it still another food problem — that of repatriates in the Philippines. Better plan-
supplying an Occidental ration to several ning might also have avoided some of the
thousand American and European civilians deficiencies found in other supplies and
who had been interned when the Japanese equipment throughout the Pacific. While
occupied the islands. As the advancing U.S. items furnished by the QMC
in general
Army released American citizens, it placed served their purpose well, they would have
its penniless fellow-countrymen, unable to served even better if a full-fledged program
obtain food for themselves, on a liberal ra- aiming at the development of items fitted
tion. Lack of a formal plan for feeding Al- to diverse tactical and climatic conditions
lied and neutral nationals and uncertainty had begun functioning earlier in the
whether control of such rationing belonged OQMG. But such a program could not be
to the Army or the State Department caused established in the period between the two
a good deal of confusion. According to one world wars because inadequate military ap-
report each freed U.S. citizen in April 1945 propriations had to be expended for more
received twenty-eight pounds of subsistence immediately significant projects. When, in
a week while other nationals obtained only mid- 1940, more money became available,
a sixth as much, or four and two-thirds development activities in the OQMG
were
pounds. 98 Such a striking difference could divided among two of its branches, which
not be allowed; a uniform scale for all re- to some extent duplicated each other's work.
patriates was essential. USASOS therefore Not until July 1942 were these activities
centralized in the Military Planning Divi-
recommended a ration of about ten and a 99
sion.
half pounds. Under this proposal that com-
mand would sell rations to the State Depart-
Up to that time OQMG research activi-
ties covered only a comparatively narrow
ment, which in turn would sell them to
range of specifically operational items and
eligible applicants, many of whom now had
aimed chiefly at the development of cloth-
sufficient funds to buy food. General Mac-
ing and equipment for special forces, par-
Arthur approved the plan, but the State De- ticularly those operating in cold climates.
partment lacked the means of setting up Aside from Captain Kearny's experiments
sales agencies. The Army was in consequence in Panama, work on jungle equipment, for
obliged to shoulder the task of selling as example, had been neglected, and when the
well as procuring the rations. If repatriates Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, American
troops, even in the Philippines, had no spe-
(1) Ltr, CO 1st MP Bn (PS) USAFFE to
97
CG USAFFE, 5 Jun 45, sub: Rations. ORB PHIB- cialized equipment for jungle warfare. Nor
SEC AG 430.2. (2) Ltr, CG AFWESPAC to CG did the QMC then have much information
Sixth Army et. al., 10 Jun 45, sub: Perishables for
Filipino Troops. ORB XIV Corps AG 430.2. about what equipment was needed in jungle
m Ltr, CG USASOS to CG USAFFE, 28 Apr 45,
sub: Food for American, Allied, and Neutral Na- 99
Risch, QMC: Organization, Supply, and Serv-
tionals in P. I. ORB PHIBSEC AG 430.2. ices, I, 75-81.
320 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
fighting. Even at the end of July OQMG fered from the swift movement of events
preparations for experimental production of which did not allow time to determine until
jungle items were just getting underway. relatively late in hostilities the characteris-
The hastily assembled equipment rushed to tics peculiar to Pacific combat that might
the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacific affect the serviceability of new items. In a
in the following year to help support jungle few instances the practice of using as many
troops usually represented, not the products standard items as possible in all overseas
of careful testing, but rather of quick de- theaters posed special difficulties for Pacific
velopment of relatively untried items based combat troops. C rations were a notable ex-
on imperfect understanding of the tactical ample of such difficulties. Problems of this
and climatic conditions encountered in the sort might have been eased had items been
oceanic tropics. For at least another year modified somewhat to fit particular condi-
the development of nearly all items used in tions, but would have been a costly and
this
the Pacific suffered from similar lack of time-consuming solution likely to retard pro-
100
adequate experimentation. duction of supplies in the needed quantities.
Many erroneous judgments behind pro- The problems simply did not lend themselves
duction of items having only doubtful or to quick and easy solutions in wartime when
even no utility might have been avoided had speed was indispensable. More carefully de-
it been possible in the years between wars veloped items were the best solution, but
to establish a well-staffed developmental such items could be produced only by a
program on a permanent basis. Through permanent peacetime research and develop-
such a program, a much larger variety of ment establishment, staffed by skilled tech-
experimental items could have been pro- nicians and possessing the elaborate equip-
duced and tested under widely differing con- ment necessary to carry out tests under all
ditions of climate, terrain, and combat. Ac- kinds of unusual conditions. Such an estab-
tually, the QMCdevelopmental program lishment is the best guarantee that in future
started too late, and until 1943 was inade- conflicts the supplies and equipment pro-
quately organized and manned. It also suf- vided by the QMC will fulfill the expecta-
Problems of Victory
The sudden surrender of Japan, officially fident that historians in the years to come will
concluded on 2 September 1945, signalized write of your supply achievements as one of
the miracles of this war.
the complete victory of the United States
No one can say that this or that arm or
and its Allies in the Pacific. In a letter ad- branch of the service achieved victory. The
dressed to Quartermaster troops in Mac-
all credit is shared by one and all alike. But to
Arthur's command,
the Chief Quarter- you of the Quartermaster Corps, the merits
master, Brig. Gen. William F. Campbell, of whose activities and accomplishments I
felicitated members of the Corps on their have been in a position to judge, I offer my
personal appreciation and congratulations for
wartime accomplishments. Proudly, he de-
a job well done. You have every reason to be
clared that though "Victories achieved on proud of your achievements. 1
each new island were carved out by front
Peace brought with it a drastic modifica-
line troops and tacticians," their successes tion of Quartermaster mission. The
the
"were made possible by you who worked chief tasks of the Corps now became the
and sweated eighteen to twenty hours a day supply of troops in the Philippines, Oki-
to see that our troops had the supplies they nawa, Japan, and Korea, the evacuation of
needed when they needed them." He con- rear bases, and the disposition of unneeded
tinued in these words stocks. The Office of the Chief Quartermas-
ter, Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC), which
Food, clothing, and equipment were scarce
in the early days. We were fighting one of two
had been set up as a special staff section in
wars then, and our war was being supplied GHQ AFPAC on 21 August, supervised
from the small end of the supply horn. Under these new whether they were car-
activities,
these conditions yours was not an easy task, ried out by U.S. Army Forces, Western Pa-
but it is to the credit of all Quartermaster per-
cific (USAFWESPAC), or U. S. Army
sonnel in this theater that from the time the
Forces, Middle Pacific (USAFMIDPAC).
2
American advance began in the Solomons in
August 1942, until its culmination in victory On 15 and 16 October the more impor-
on 2 September 1945, not once did our attack tant AFWESPAC quartermasters assem-
falter because of a lack of Quartermaster bled in OCQM to adopt a plan for swift
supplies!
execution of their new mission. They quickly
Never before in any war have supply lines
been so long. Never before has so much been agreed upon a supply program for the
supplied over such distances. I am confident
that logistic experts a few years ago would
1
Adm Div, OCQM GHQ
AFPAC, Military His-
tory, OCQM, GHQ, Army Forces Pacific, I,
U.S.
have said that the execution of the supply App. III. Ltr to All QM Pers in SWPA, 2 Sep 45,
operations you have accomplished in the last sub: QM Achievement in the War With Japan.
four years [was] impossible. I am equally con- 2
Ibid., I, 1-6, and Apps. I and II.
322 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Blacklist Operation, as the occupation on Luzon, other Philippine bases and supply
ofJapan and Korea was called. Since the points were to be abandoned by the spring of
number of troops outside the occupied coun- 1946; for the time being Base would M
tries would steadily decline and stocks built serve as awar reserve depot. Ultimately,
up at the older bases to provide for a larger most stocks would be concentrated at
number of men would then far exceed de- Manila. 4
mands, this program envisioned the maxi- The chief Quartermaster problem in the
mum employment of stores already in the closing of bases was the large amount of un-
Pacific ; only articles otherwise unobtainable needed supplies. When considered in rela-
would be requisitioned from U.S. sources. tion to the number of soldiers, stocks, ex-
Excess stocks from the Philippines and cept of Class III products, stood at high
AFWESPAC rear areas would furnish most levels.There were several causes for this
of the required items, but when practicable, condition. One was the steady decline in
stocks from South and Mid-Pacific as well troop strength as more and more men were
as Southwest Pacific bases would be em- returned to the United States for discharge
ployed. Supplies were to be shipped auto- from the Army. Another was the rapid
matically in block loads adjusted to the size build-up of stores after VE-Day in anticipa-
of the occupational
This system
forces. tion of the early arrival of many thousands
would remain operative until mid-February of men from the ETO. Actually, the ex-
1946, when, presumably, a fairly well-sta- pected reinforcements never came, and in-
bilized troop strength would permit a return stead of sharp increases, sharp decreases ap-
to the normal peacetime method of de- peared in troop strength. Stockages thus be-
livering supplies only in fulfillment of came much more than ample. The absence
3
requisitions. of combat losses further increased excesses,
The conferees discussed at considerable for supply. levels had been set in expectation
length means of carrying out promptly the of such losses. Soldiers indeed required little
"roll-up" of rear bases. They agreed that more than did those in the zone of interior.
Quartermaster activities at bases should be The rapid abandonment of old points of
ended as soon as the troops they supplied troop concentration introduced still another
had been evacuated. Except at Finschhafen complication since bases in New Guinea, the
and Hollandia, activities at New Guinea Solomons, and other isolated areas were
bases would cease about 3 1 December. Hol- quickly reduced to the status of mere stor-
landia would close by 1 February and age places with few or no supply functions.
Finschhafen by March. In the Philippines,
1
With scarcely any troops remaining to pro-
Base R at Batangas on Luzon would pass to tect stocks, pilferage rose and losses from
the control of Base X in Manila and become deterioration multiplied.
5
a temporary storage place for unneeded sup- Obviously, a primary means of eliminat-
plies and equipment that rear areas turned ing excesses in stockages was through a re-
in for disposition. With the single exception duction in the inflow of supplies. During
of Base M
at San Fernando, La Union, also the weeks after VJ-Day the Corps accord-
3
QM Sec AFWESPAC, OCQM Activities, Oct 1
Ibid.
45. DRB AGO TOPNS Rpts File AFWESPAC QM 5
USAFWESPAC, Semiannual Rpt, 1 Jan-30 Jun
F212. 46, p. 25. Hist Br OQMG.
PROBLEMS OF VICTORY 323
ingly withdrew most of its requisitions on property as surplus and return it to the sup-
8
Australia and New Zealand for food, cloth- plying government. Because of the serious
ing, and general supplies. It retained in force shortage of warehouse space in the United
only a few contracts completion of which States, surplus property could not be re-
was necessary in order to provide cold- turned there without specific approval from
weather apparel for men going to Japan and ASF headquarters. The only items exempt
Korea. The Corps also withdrew requisi- from this general restriction were a few
tions on the continental United States for badly needed by American industry. Cotton
items already available in adequate quanti- and burlap bags were the only important
9
ties and canceled the sailing of many block Quartermaster articles in this category.
ships slated to depart from San Francisco Receipt of supplies at still active bases in
6
with cargoes for the occupational forces. the Philippines and on Okinawa continued
The disposition of base stocks presented a for some months to exceed shipments, but
more involved problem than did the elimi- at most of the other bases distribution activi-
nation of incoming shipments. It demanded, ties rapidly dwindled. Even before the Pa-
first of all, the determination of how much cific commands had received Technical
property constituted "surplus," that is, Manual 38-420, they had begun prepara-
property unneeded by any U.S. Govern- tions for the disposition of unneeded stocks
ment agency and thus disposable to civil- at these declining installations. In Septem-
ians, American or foreign. In performing ber G-4, Australian Base Section, organ-
this task, were governed by
Pacific areas ized technical service teams which visited
War Department Technical Manual 38- depots and determined the quantity of sur-
7
420, issued in September 1945. In line with plus stocks and the original cost and present
its stipulations, they first estimated the dis- value of both U.S. -owned and reverse lend-
tribution needs of the bases. Once this had lease surpluses. These teams declared most
been done, quantities of civilian-type Class of the property on the Australian mainland
II, III, and IV items on hand in excess of surplus. Virtually all reverse lend-lease
Pacific needs could be declared surplus stores were in consequence turned back to
without reference to the War Department. the Commonwealth. 1
"
Only a small per-
If fresh provisions or other supplies, military centage was booked movement to
for the
or civilian, were likely to be lost through Philippines and Japan. Owing to the
payment of purchases. By January, revised tration program that would continue for sev-
regulations permitting acceptance of bank eral years and that called for verification of
drafts drawn against dollar balances had the identification of the soldier dead, con-
materially eased the currency shortage in centration of their remains in a few Pacific
New Caledonia, and in Australia and New cemeteries, extensive search for the bodies
Zealand the termination of reverse lend- of those still and eventual return of
missing,
lease agreements and the subsequent use of most of the dead to the United States for
dollars for Army food purchases had pro- burial in places chosen by next of kin. Oth-
vided the currency required by buyers of erwise Quartermaster responsibilities in the
surpluses. Pacific were increasingly like those normally
No fully reliable statistics covering the carried out by the Corps in peacetime posts
disposition of unneeded property in the Pa- overseas. No longer did it find routine ac-
all quarters of the globe. The necessity of ficient troops nor equipment in the Pacific to
preparing for a future clouded by incalcula- repel the invaders. Consequently, though
ble hazards confronted the QMC, like all the North Koreans did not possess formid-
other components of the Army, with a com- able strength, the Army was unable for
plex problem of preparedness such as the three months to fight its way north to the
Records and studies about Quartermaster of all, some Quartermaster records were
Corps activities in the war against Japan apparently destroyed after the war, on the
fall into three general classes U.S. Army — ground that they were not worth preserva-
official records, published works, and manu- tion. Certainly, the disconcertingly wide
script histories. Of these classes, Army rec- gaps that on occasion appear in the docu-
ords are by far the most valuable, and this mentary record of the Corps cannot other-
volume is therefore based mainly upon wise be easily explained.
them. The scarcity of Quartermaster records is
U.S. Army Official Records Philippines. Cut off from the outside world
by a strangling blockade, American forces
in that archipelago in 1942 could use little
The quality of Army records relating to
of the precious space on the few departing
Quartermaster activities varies widely from
submarines and planes to ship records. Most
area to area, from activity to activity, and
of the records remained in the islands and
from troop unit to troop unit. In the early
were destroyed in the final disaster. The only
months of the war, in the South and the
surviving documents of importance to re-
Southwest Pacific as well as in the belea-
search on Quartermaster operations is a
guered Philippines, shortages of office clerks
group of G-4 files, apparently sent to Wash-
and equipment prevented maintenance of
ington from Corregidor before its surrender.
proper records. To some extent these de-
These files, designated USAFFE-USFIP
ficiencies continued until the surrender of
Records, are located in the Departmental
Japan. Higher headquarters, which were
Records Branch (DRB), AGO. They are
usually at least fairly well manned and
especially useful for the study of food condi-
equipped, kept the most complete records.
tions both on Corregidor and on Bataan.
Those at bases varied in quality with the
interest of commanders and the ability of
DRB AGO Finding List 31 gives a detailed
inventory of these documents.
file clerks. Quartermaster troop units at best
The chief source of information on Quar-
maintained sketchy records of little —often termaster activities during the events that
no — historical value. Some of the periodical
culminated in the fall of the Philippines is
historical summaries and after action reports
the series of reports prepared after the war
are illuminating surveys, but most of them by higher commanders and key officers who
were prepared by men who possessed little had spent three years or more in Japanese
conception of what matters had permanent prison camps. The
Chief Quartermaster,
interest. The authors in general stressed mat- Brig. Gen. Charles C. Drake, and Quarter-
ters of merely ephemeral significance; this master officers who had performed a major
was especially true of unit histories. Worst role in supporting the Philippine garrison,
328 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
were brought to the Office of The Quarter- a total of seven weeks at St. Louis in exam-
master General (OQMG) in Washington ination of the overseas records. He selected
to prepare their reports from memory and for shipment on loan to the in OQMG
from notes they had made during their cap- Washington about 140 foot lockers of per-
tivity. These accounts eventually became tinent materials. Informative documents
Annex XIII of Gen. Jonathan M. Wain- were photostated in whole or part in order
wright's voluminous Report of Operations to have exact copies for use in writing. Re-
of USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine production was made on paper five by eight
Islands, 1941-1942. This annex, entitled inches for the sake of greater ease in filing
Report of Operations, Quartermaster and handling.
Corps, United States Army, in the Philip- The records from St. Louis cover with
pine Campaign, 1941-1942, is referred to varying degrees of thoroughness the activi-
in the text of this volume as General Drake's ties of the QMC at higher headquarters.
Report. Despite conspicuous gaps and other The records of U.S. Army Services of Sup-
shortcomings that could not be corrected ply (USASOS) tell the story of Quarter-
under the circumstances, Annex XIII fur- master activities in that Southwest Pacific
nishes the best account of Quartermaster command adequate fashion, but equally
in
activities before and during the fall of the satisfactory material could not be found for
Philippines. It is indeed the only source for the higher supply headquarters of other Pa-
many aspects of these activities. Chapter I cific areas. Files of base sections everywhere
of this volume is of necessity based largely vary substantially in coverage of Quarter-
upon it. A copy of the annex is on file in the master operations, again proving most help-
OQMG. Another copy, attached to General ful as regards General MacArthur's com-
in the Organization Records Branch States Army Forces in the Western Pacific
(ORB), Records Administration Center, (AFWESPAC), which now includes the
AGO, St. Louis, Mo., but have since been records of USASOS for the entire war pe-
removed to the Kansas City Records Center, riod. Other especially useful collections of
AGO, Kansas City, Mo. These materials the Southwest Pacific Area are those of the
provided most of the information on which Australian Base Command (ABCOM) and
this publication is based. The author spent the New Guinea Base Section (NUGSEC),
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 329
which both contain many documents origi- tivities in the Central Pacific during the
nally part of the files of former base sections year after Pearl Harbor.
in these territorial areas. The records of the The Army Records Section, formerly His-
U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), con- toricalRecords Section, Departmental Rec-
tain information on supply matters that re- ords Branch, AGO, in Alexandria, Va., con-
quired collaboration with Australian agen- tains historical records of tactical organiza-
cies or co-ordination between G-4 and tions that operated in the Pacific. The after
the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, action reports of infantry divisions, of the
USASOS. Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies, and of
The best source of documents for the tactical corps, are often highly valuable for
Quartermaster history of the South Pacific Quartermaster history. Nearly all these re-
proved to be the Adjutant General and ports contain both G-4 and Quartermaster
Quartermaster portions of the records of annexes dealing with supply and service
U.S. Army Forces in New Caledonia problems and achievements from the stand-
(USAFINC). These records consist mainly point of the principal logistical offices of re-
of materials from Headquarters, U.S. Army porting organizations. The annexes convey
Forces in the South Pacific (USAFISPA), a reasonably clear picture of Quartermaster
and from Services of Supply, South Pacific support of combat forces in general but ordi-
Area, and are particularly valuable for a narily contain little information about in-
study of supply activities in late 1942 and dividual Quartermaster units in action.
in 1943. Usable information on activities at The study of these units is further ham-
base sections in the South Pacific was also pered by the inadequacy of many after ac-
culled from the Adjutant General files of the tion unit reports.
U.S. Forces in the northern Solomons. During World War II the in OQMG
Documents relative to the QMC in the Washington acquired few documents bear-
Central Pacific during the last half of the ing on Quartermaster activities overseas.
war were conspicuously scarce but for the The most significant materials in its posses-
earlier period were reasonably adequate. sion on the Pacific phase of the war were
Material on the potential dangers to the Ha- reports prepared by observers the OQMG
waiian food supply in wartime and on the itself sent out to study the actual utility of
plans for stockpiling imported food and Quartermaster items under combat condi-
building warehouses for reserve stores are tions and to determine what new items or
printed in Exhibits IP, 133, and 153 of Part modifications of old ones were needed. Par-
1 8 of the hearings of the joint committee that ticularly noteworthy are the reports of Col.
investigated the PearlHarbor attack (79th D. B. Dill, Capt. Robert L. Woodbury, and
Congress, Second Session). Parts 19 and 28 Capt. Robert D. Orr. The latter officer spent
contain testimony about the status of the nearly two years in the Southwest Pacific, a
Hawaiian food supply. Additional docu- longer time than any other OQMG ob-
ments on prewar plans for meeting a food server. Because of his familiarity with the
crisis are available at Kansas City in the special problems of that area, his analyses
Adjutant General section of Army Ground of Quartermaster items are especially illumi-
Forces, Pacific, files. This collection also nating. Pacific documents obtained by the
provides necessary material on supply ac- OQMG are now located in Quartermaster
330 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas signs, patterns, sizes, and tariff tables, of the
in the Technical Records Section, De-
files letting of contracts, and of numerous other
partmental Records Branch, AGO, at Alex- transactions carried out in the process of
andria, Va. Most of the observers' reports buying supplies. This series is also indis-
are filed under 319.25. pensable to a study of the general problems
Papers in this and other bodies of over- of inspecting, marking, and packing supplies
seas documents wherever located were ordi- before shipment. The 400.2 series deals with
narily arranged in accordance with the War the handling, storage, and transfer of items
Department decimal file system. Bulletins, from one point to another. It contains mate-
circulars, manuals, and other general direc- rials relating to depot administration, stock
tives were almost invariably filed under 300, replenishment, reserve stores, and methods
and when these directives are cited in the of warehousing supplies and utilizing space.
text, it should be understood that they were
The 400.3 series, devoted to distribution
so filed unless another location is indicated.
activities, gives information about shipping
The file locations of other cited documents
preparation and filling of requisi-
priorities,
are specifically indicated in the footnotes.
and methods of issuing supplies. Farm-
tions,
Personnel records were placed under num-
ing operations are dealt with under 403.
bers ranging from 200 to 299, each of which
Records about the special problems of gen-
represented a different subject. For example,
documents pertinent to funerals, burials,
eral supplies — mostly hardware — are filed
in the 410-419 series; those dealing with
and graves registration in general were put
clothing, footwear, toilet articles, tentage,
under 293 or its decimal subdivisions. Ad-
and other items of individual and organiza-
ministrative records were assigned numbers
tional equipment in the 420-429 series; and
in the 300-399 series. In this series, aside
those concerning food in the 430-437 series.
from 300, the file numbers most significant
Material on tobacco products is found in
to the student of Quartermaster affairs are
439; on horses, mules, and other animals in
probably 310.1 (office organization) ; 314.7
454; on funeral supplies in 468; on cold
(military history) ; 319.1 and 319.25 (peri-
storage in 486.1; and on laundering and
odical and other reports) ; 320.3 (tables of
repair services in 486.3.
organization); 323.3 (depots); and 333.1
(inspection of posts)
The records of most value to the QMC Published Works
are found in the 400-499 which is
series,
devoted to supplies, services, and equip- The number of books, magazine articles,
ment. It includes much material about the and other published works containing mate-
procurement, storage, and distribution of rial about Quartermaster activities in the
supplies and the characteristics and prob- war against Japan is small and limited in
lems of individual items. The 400.1 series, value. No published volume treats of Quar-
which deals mostly with the selection, adop- termaster activities as such ; most published
tion, betterment, and procurement of sup- works are concerned almost wholly with
plies, is indispensable to an understanding of strategy and tactics and normally make only
the general problems of specifications, de- fleeting reference to logistics. Frequently,
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 331
Quartermaster activities are not even men- ber-December 1946). Bogart Rogers'
magazine articles are con-
tioned. Pertinent "Help for the Heroes of Bataan" in Cos-
fined in the main to The Quartermaster mopolitan, CXIX (November-December
Review and the Quartermaster Training 1945 an article based on information fur-
) ,
prewar planning and food and medical and occasionally shed light on the provision
problems in the Philippines in 1941 and of gasoline and rations. The volume by John
1942 is that of Louis Morton in The Fall of Miller, jr., on Guadalcanal: The First Of-
Major A. C. Tisdelle," edited by Louis Military History, Office of the Chief Quar-
Morton, in Military Affairs, Volume XI termaster, USASOS. It was prepared semi-
(Fall 1947), and Capt. Harold A. Arnold's annually, one of its eight sections appearing
"The Lesson of Bataan," in The Quarter- every six months until 30 June 1945. While
master Review, Volume XXVI (Novem- it is by no means a complete account
of
332 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Quartermaster operations in the Southwest StatesArmy Forces in the South Pacific
Pacific, it gives considerable information not During World War II, 30 March 1942-1
easily accessible elsewhere. For the South August 1944 (4 parts), prepared by the
Pacific there no general study of Quarter-
is G-2 Historical Sections of U.S. Army
master activities quite as rewarding as are Forces in the South Pacific Area, and of
those for the Middle and Southwest Pacific. South Pacific Base Command, contains
But the manuscript History of the United some useful data.
List of Abbreviations
DUKW Amphibian, 2y2 -ton, 6x6 truck, used for short runs from
ship to shore
Ech Echelon
EM Enlisted man
Engr Engineer
Equip Equipment
ETO European Theater of Operations
ExO Executive Officer
FA Field artillery
FEAF Far East Air Force
FM Field manual
Fwd Forward
FY Fiscal year
G-l Personnel section of higher or divisional headquarters
G-2 Military intelligence section
G-3 Operations and training section
G-4 Supply and evacuation section
GD General Depot
GHQ General Headquarters
GO General Orders
Gp Group
GPA General Purchasing Agent
GR Graves Registration
GRS Graves Registration Service
GSD General Service Division
HD Hawaiian Department
HHD Headquarters, Hawaiian Department
Hist History
Hq Headquarters
HRS DRB AGO Historical Records Section, Departmental Records
Branch, Office of The Adjutant General
HSAG Hawaiian Seacoast Artillery Command
HUSAFICPA Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area
HUSAFMIDPAC Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific
HUSAFPOA Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
IG Inspector General
Incl Inclosure
Ind Indorsement
Inf Infantry
Insp Inspection or inspector
Instl Installation
Instr Instruction
INTERSEC Intermediate Section, U.S. Army Services of Supply,
Southwest Pacific Area
336 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Interv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 337
OPD
338 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
S-4 Supply section of regimental or battalion headquarters
S&D Storage and Distribution
Salv Salvage
SB Supply bulletin
SEASFD Seattle Army Service Forces Depot
Sec Section
Stf Staff
SFPOE San Francisco Port of Embarkation
SG Surgeon General
Shpmt Shipment
SOP Standing operating procedure
SOS Services of Supply
SPA South Pacific Area
SPBC South Pacific Base Command
Sq Squadron
SSUSA Special Staff, U.S. Army
Sub Subject
Subs Subsistence
Sup Supply
Supp Supplement
Surg Surgeon
Svc Service
SvC Service Command
sw Secretary of War
SWPA Southwest Pacific Area
T/A Table of Allowance
TAG The Adjutant General
TB Technical Bulletin
T/BA Table of Basic Allowance
TC Transportation Corps
T/E Table of Equipment
Tech Technical
TF Task Force
TH Territory of Hawaii
TM Technical manual
Tng Training
T/O Table of Organization
T/O&E Table of Organization and Equipment
TOPNS Theater of Operations
TQMG The Quartermaster General
Transp Transportation
TRB Troop Basis
Trf Transfer
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 339
Trk Truck
Trp Troop
TWX Teletype message
USAFFE U.S. Army Forces, Far East
USAFIA U.S. Army Forces in Australia
USAFICPA U.S. Army Forces in Central Pacific Area
USAFINC U.S. Army Forces in New Caledonia
USAFISPA U.S. Army Forces in South Pacific Area
USAFMIDPAC U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific
USAFPOA U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
USAFWESPAC U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific
USASOS U.S. Army, Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area
USFIA U.S. Forces in Australia
USFIP U.S. Forces in the Philippines
UTASFD Utah Army Service Forces Depot
UTGD Utah General Depot
VC Veterinary Corps
Vet Veterinary
WAC Women's Army Corps
WD War Department (now Department of the Army)
WDGS War Department General Staff
Whse Warehouse
WO Warrant Officer
WPBC Western Pacific Base Command
ZI Zone of interior
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Salerno to Cassino
Cassino to the Alps
The European Theater of Operations
Cross-Channel Attack
Breakout and Pursuit
The Lorraine Campaign
The Siegfried Line Campaign
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
The Last Offensive
342 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS
Darwin, 21, 23, 24, 30, 50. See also Base sec- Engineers, Corps of, 1 60, 1 65, 2 1 5, 240, 262,294
tions (Australia). construction of QM storage facilities by, 160
Darwin-Alice Springs railway, 85 responsibilities of, for petroleum products, 215
Defense reserves, 3-5, 6, 10, 28, 34, 35 Eniwetok, 265
Dehydration Equipment, individual
advantages of, 103 description of, 56
application of, 111-12, 126 shipment of, in operations, 286-88
growth of, industry in Australia, 1 12 Equipment, jungle. See also names of individual
Dehydration Branch, Subsistence Depot, 112 items.
Department of Commerce (Australia), 63 demand for, 292-93
Department of Supply and Shipping, 63 development of, 293
Department of War Organization of Industry, 63 value of, 294-95, 296-97, 298
Depots Equipment, organizational
types of, 83-84 description of, 56
Depots, ration effect of tardy delivery of, 147, 148, 149-50
functions of, in New Zealand, 92 shipment 147-50
of,
defects of, 300 Hawaiian Department, 79, 80. See also U.S. Army
need for, 293 Forces, Central Pacific Area; U.S. Army Forces,
lack of trained cooks for, 115, 192 New York Port of Embarkation, 141
monotony of, 193, 196, 198, 199, 200 New Zealand, 36, 46. See also Bases (SPA)
Methyl bromide, 237 comparison between Australia and, as supply
Midway, Battle of, 37 sources, 125-26
Military Planning Division, OQMG, 291, 311, 319 geography of, 54
Milk. See Dairy products. value of, as supply source, 54, 126, 127
Nimitz, Adm. Chester W., 47, 48
Miller, Maj. Milton D., 104
Noel, Col. O. C, 316
Mindanao, 19, 20, 26, 30, 31, 278
Noemfoor Island, 196
Mindoro, 20
North Pacific Area, boundaries, 47
Mira Loma Quartermaster Depot, 142
Noumea, 73, 75, 147, 172, 222
Mizar, 175
Morobe, 87
Oahu, 40
Morobe-Salamaua Operation, 251
Office of the Chief Quartermaster, Army Forces
Motor Transport Division, OCQM, USASOS, Pacific, 321
61-62
Office of the Chief Quartermaster, USAFFE. See
Motor Transport Service
also Drake, Brig. Gen. Charles C.
operations of, on Bataan, 17
preparations of, for Philippine defense, 2-8
procurement of trucks by, 1
re-establishment of, March-October 1943, 67-68
responsibilities of, 1
requisitions by, in summer of 1 94 1 3-4
,
Office of The Quartermaster General, 3, 59, 177, methods of, for locally procured supplies, 188-89
178, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 205, 208, 209, Packing, definition of, 177n
291, 292, 293, 296, 297, 298, 301, 302, 304, Packing, clothing, equipage, and general supplies,
306, 310, 311, 317, 319-20 187-88
handling of Pacific requisitions by, 142 Packing, subsistence
relation of, with Pacific areas, 57-58 "amphibious," 184
relation of, with ports of embarkation, 140 commercial, 177-78, 180
survey of POA, conducted by, 202, 235 damage due to poor, 178, 180
Officers, QM efforts to develop better, 178, 182-84
Refrigerated vessels —
Continued Salvage repair units
naval, 174 247-48
effect of lack of,
shortage of, 39, 44, 45, 173-76 equipment and organization of, 241
turnabout time of, 174, 176 hindrances to operation of, 245
"X-ships" ("lakers") as, 174, 175 improvisation of, 244-45, 247
Refrigeration companies, QM, 168 Samar, 20
Regiment, QM, 12th, 7, 17 Samoa Islands, 46, 47, 92
Reid, Lt. Col. Clarence E., 196 San Fabian, 91
Replacement factors San Fernando, La Union, 91
accuracy of, 139-40 San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 37, 75, 92, 137,
definition of, 137 139, 146, 151, 208, 220, 261. See also Quarter-
improvement in, 288 master Branch, OSD, SFPOE.
inadequacy of, for Class II and IV supplies, 286, automatic supply from, 145-47
288 contrast of, with NYPOE, 96
Requirements. See also Replacement factors; delays in shipments from, 143, 144, 147
Requisitions. depots serving as supply sources of, 140-41
computation of, 137—40 role of, in "block ship" system of supply, 157
stock records in relation to, 137-38 space assigned to, for QM
storage, 142
troop basis in relation to, 138-39, 150 subports of, 140, 141
Requisitions. See also Quartermaster Section, San Jose, 281
OSD, SFPOE. San Miguel, Army farm at, 130, 132
delays in completion of, 141-45 San Pablo, 275
preparation of, 137-38 San Pedro Bay, 90
submission of, for combat needs, 261-62 Sansapor, 196
Research and development, 291, 319-20. See also Schenectady Plan, 186
under names of individual items. Schofield Barracks, 37, 39, 80
Reserves, 135, 136 Seabrook, Maj. Belford L., 105
Ritchie, Lt. Col. Charles A., 168 Seabrook Farm, 105
Roads. See Transportation, motor. Seattle General Depot, 142
organization of supply activities in, 58-73 amount of, provided by main supply sources, 120,
supply of SPA by, 77-78 127, 134
Spare parts automatic supply of, from ZI, 145
cataloguing of, 209, 210, 212 distribution of nonperishable, 169, 170, 171, 172
difficulties in shipment of, 187-88 distribution of perishable, 173-77, 279
Supply points, 194, 196, 274, 275, 276, 279-80 Transportation, water. See also Refrigerated
Supply system, European, contrast between, and vessels.
that in the Pacific, 96-97 commercial loading in, 147
Surplus property, 323-25 congestion of, at ports, 172-73, 218, 222
Sutherland, Maj. Gen. Richard K., 21 control of shipments by, 1 70—73
Suva, 93 convoys for, 172-73
Swift, Maj. Gen. Innis P., 199 difficulties of moving organizational equipment
Swift and Company, 9 by, 147-51
Swope, Lt. Col. Lawrence E., 281 discharge of ships in, 283-84, 288
Sydney. See Base sections (Australia). distances as factor in, 85, 96, 196
hindrances to, in Australia, 51-53
Taiyuan, 24 importance of, in New Guinea, 87
Tanahmerah Bay, 197, 198 lack of, as factor in sale of surplus property, 324
Tarlac QM Depot, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12 port facilities for, 84, 87, 91, 92, 93, 144, 180
Tarpaulins problems of, in logistical support, 271-73, 280
deterioration of, in tropics, 205 role of QMC in, 171-72
use of replacement stocks for initial issues of, 148, transfer of, to Transportation Corps, 49, 49n
149 Transportation Corps, 125, 148, 150, 171
Tenth Army, 91, 154, 285 Transportation Division, OCQM, USASOS, 61
Territorial Committee on Food Storage, 42 Transportation Service, USASOS, 49, 61, 65
Thirteenth Air Force Treasury (Australia), 115
199-200
disparity in availability of perishables in, Truck companies
procurement of perishables from Navy, 197 assignment of, to QMC, 49n
Timor Sea, 24 equipment of, 150
Tinian Operation, 94 improvisation of, on Bataan, 17, 18
Tobacco, 29 responsibilities of, for distributing gasoline, 222
Tokyo, 46 Truck companies, QM
Toney, Capt. Andy E., 60 19th (Air Corps), 17
Tonga Island, 47 Tuguegarao, 280
Tongareva, 92 Tutuila, 75
Tongatabu, 75 Tydings-McDuffie Act (1943), 1, 3
Torres Strait, 87
Trans-Australian Railway, 50 Ulithi, 81
opposition to, 70
effect of abandoning, on QM operations, 6-7, 34
provisions of, for Philippine defense, 5
U.S. Forces in Australia, 58, 60. See also U.S.
provisions of, for moving supplies to Bataan, 6
Army Forces in Australia; U.S. Army Services
of Supply.
War Shipping Administration, 173
Ward, Col. Frederick A., 12, 13
Utah General Depot, 140, 142
Warren Front, 250
Washington disarmament conference, 1
V-boxes, 187, 188
Weedicides, 104-05
delays in production of, 183
Welch, Col. John P., 171
development of, 182-83
Wellington, 92
types of, 183-84
Western Pacific Base Command, 81, 96. See also
use of, for packing clothing and general supplies,
Bases (CPA).
187-88
White, Col. William R., 37, 43, 44
use of, for packing food, 183—84
Willard A. Holbrook, 21
Vegetable Seeds Committee, 104 Woodbury, Capt. Robert L., 208
Vegetables, canned Woodlark Island, 175
deficiencies of production methods, 107-08
establishment of new plants for, 107, 108 "X-ships," as type of refrigerated vessel, 1 74, 1 75
lack of variety in, 1 10, 199, 200
production of, in New Zealand, 126 Yane^tse Valley, 46
requisitioning of, from United States, 110 Yap^ 262, 263
Vegetables, fresh Yochow, 23
educational program for increased production of, Yonabaru, 283
106-07
expansion of acreage in, 105 Zone distribution on Oahu, 39
mechanization of production of, 105-07 Zone of interior, 158-59
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