What is ontological relativity? Does it pose it a threat to the project of philosophical analysis?

In the introduction to their collection of essays on relativism, Hollis and Lukes write that

ontological relativity is a strong and heady brew (Hollis & Lukes 1982, 10). This is a rather apt

description. I think that it is inarguably a very strange doctrine to be confronted with - even if

you are eventually convinced by it - and it has ramifications for our view of objects, for our

epistemology, for our definitions of truth and meaning - namely, for entire project of

philosophical analysis - which I think many of us would find hard to swallow. However, though I

believe it has problems as an idea, I do not believe it to be a threat to philosophical analysis.

Firstly, I will look give an exposition of what ontological relativity is. Secondly, I will examine

and critique the role of objects in this view, drawing on criticisms from Rosner and Levin,

arguing that the consequences of ontological relativity for language and metaphysics are

problematic. Finally, I will propose that Quine’s view can be rejected. Following Heal and

Tännsjö, I will show that Quine’s view is not inevitable and relies on assumptions that we

needn’t accept. If we can simply reject ontological relativity, then it is not a threat to

philosophical analysis.

In order to understand ontological relativity, it will first be necessary to establish a few

things. Quine takes a behaviourist view of meaning, which means that he thinks that the meaning

of language is interpreted solely by publicly accessible evidence, namely behaviour. Quine

contrasts this with another view:

Uncritical semantics is the myth of a museum in which the

exhibits are meanings and the words are labels. To switch

languages is to change the labels. (Quine 1968, 186)

This view presumes determined meanings, a meaning over and above whatever is contained in

human behaviour. Rejecting this view, Quine makes clear, naturally leads to a lack of

determinacy. Having made this step, Quine says that we recognise that “there are no meanings,

nor likenesses nor distinctions of meaning, beyond what are implicit in people's dispositions to

overt behavior” (Quine 1968, 187). An example of such indeterminacy is given in Word and

Object. He looks at a case of radical translation, by which he means translation from a language

spoken by a previously uncontacted tribe (Quine 2013, 56). This example, in summary, involves

a translator in such a radical context noticing that the word ‘gavagai’ has been uttered at the

passing of a rabbit. If the translator has an understanding of assent and dissent, then they can

attempt to figure out whether the word ‘gavagai’ does indeed translate into English as rabbit

(Quine 2013, 56-8). However, there are a number of possible ways we can translate the word.

Instead of translating it as rabbit, for example, we might translate it as undetached rabbit part or

rabbit stages. Quine shows how these different readings are, at some level, indistinguishable

from one another:

If you take the total scattered portion of the spatiotemporal

world that is made up of rabbits, and that which is made up

of undetached rabbit parts, and that which is made up of

rabbit stages, you come out with the same scattered portion

of the world each of the three times. The only difference is

in how you slice it. (Quine 1968, 189)

In this radical context, we do not have enough of the language to distinguish between these

different readings, and so we cannot know that our translation of “gavagai” as “rabbit”, rather
than “rabbit stage” or “undetached rabbit part”, is correct. This holds for any possible translation.

It is not certain what the term refers to. However, indeterminacy is not limited to this radical

context. Quine maintains that there is indeterminacy even among speakers of the same language:

we can systematically reconstrue our neighbor's apparent

references to rabbits as really references to rabbit stages,

and his apparent references to formulas as really references

to Godel numbers and vice versa. We can reconcile all this

with our neighbor's verbal behavior, by cunningly

readjusting our translations of his various connecting

predicates so as to compensate for the switch of ontology.

(Quine 1968, 199)

Even further, it applies to our understanding of our own use of language. Indeterminacy at every

level of comprehension - of people speaking foreign languages, of people speaking our own

language, and even of our own use of language - is a problem. As Quine puts it,

We seem to be maneuvering ourselves into the absurd

position that there is no difference on any terms,

interlinguistic or intralinguistic, objective or subjective,

between referring to rabbits and referring to rabbit parts or

stages; or between referring to formulas and referring to

their Godel numbers. Surely this is absurd, for it would

imply that there is no difference between the rabbit and

each of its parts or stages, and no difference between a

 formula and its Godel number. Reference would seem now

to become nonsense not just in radical translation, but at

home. (Quine 1968, 200)

Ontological relativity is Quine’s solution for this problem.

...begin by picturing us at home in our language, with all its

predicates and auxiliary devices… In these terms we can

say in so many words that this is a formula and that a

number, this a rabbit and that a rabbit part, this and that the

same rabbit, and this and that different parts. (Quine 1968,

200)

In other words, we can meaningfully refer to things, but only relative to a particular system.

However, Quine reaffirms that reference is a nonsense outside of that system. In ‘Ontological

Relativity’ he writes that there is no fact of the matter (Quine 1968, 193, 199). Eve Gaudet, in

‘Quine’s Notion of a Fact of the Matter’, interprets this as meaning that there is no reality that

supports one translation manual over another, as long as they are all behaviourally equivalent

(Gaudet 2006, 191). Though we might agree that reference is a nonsense outside of a particular

system, Paul Teller suggests that Quine is pushing a much stronger claim:

Quine wants to suggest that in an analogous way, the

objects of reference themselves… [are] relative. This line

of interpretation seems forced upon us… by the fact that if

Quine does not intend such an interpretation, the analogy to

 the relativity of space and time is singularly inept and

misleading. For in the case of space and time, the matter or

relativity extends beyond anything to do with the referential

apparatus and applies to the objects of reference. (Teller

1973, 297).

It is to the relativity of objects that we now turn.

One element of ontological relativity is what Quine calls ‘global ontological

structuralism’ (Rosner 1996, 236). Rosner sums up this idea as follows:

as long as we preserve the structure of our theory through a

one-to-one reassignment of objects to terms, we can replace

our familiar ontology with a radically different one, yet

leave the evidential support of our theory undisturbed

(Rosner, 236).

As Quine writes, ‘structure is what matters to a theory, not its choice of objects’ (Quine in

Rosner, 237). This view is dependent upon Quine’s conception of objects:

the very notion of an object at all, concrete or abstract, is a

human contribution, a feature of our inherited apparatus for

organizing the amorphous welter (Quine in Rosner, 237)

Objects then are merely the parts that make up our conceptual scheme. For Quine, the objects are

neutral nodes that can be swapped at will. Therefore, there truly is no difference between rabbit,
rabbit stage, or rabbit part, as long as they occupy the same structural position in a conceptual

scheme; i.e. as long as they fulfill the same function. As Rosner notices, it seems that such a

view disconnects ontological commitment from the evidence (Rosner, 238-9). If the ontology

can be arbitrarily switched about without disturbing the evidential structure of the theory, then

the ontology itself is not relevant. Moreover, if the ontology is irrelevant, then a certain part of

our language would seem to be irrelevant. This worry has been expressed by Mark E. Levin, who

parodied ‘Ontological Relativity’ in a paper called ‘Length Relativity’. Whilst parodying Quine,

he humorously warns against asking the native directly what he means, because his own remarks

about what he means are irrelevant (Levin 1971, 166). Later, having finished his parody, he

writes that we have to presume, given ontological relativity, that our remarks will be compatible

with any ontology assigned to us. He even goes as far as to say that Quine is committed to the

following analogue: ‘If you took all the yard-boards in the world, they would all be 3 feet long,

39.37 centimeters long, etc’ (Levin 1971, 173). Ontological relativity, rather than solving the

‘absurd position’ which Quine referred to above, seems to enshrine it as a law. We seem to be

maneuvering ourselves into the absurd position that there is no difference between 3 feet and 39

centimeters. The problem becomes even more acute when you consider substituting objects with

radically different metaphysical implications, like “rabbit” for “rabbit illusion” or “instantiation

of the rabbit universal”. Since objects are neutral, the radical metaphysical differences between

these phrases are meant to be merely apparent. However, Rosner proposes that objects are not

neutral, and that such radical substitutions could actually make for a worse theory:

An ontology of sets of quadruples of numbers is thus an

inadequate substitute for our physical object ontology

because the items in the substitute ontology cannot cause

 our surface irritations. Explanatory considerations commit

us to the position of physical objects… (Rosner, 241)

If ontological relativity were unavoidable, if it were forced on us by the scientific evidence, then

I think it would be a detriment to philosophical analysis. However, I do not believe that

ontological relativity is undeniable. In fact it can be avoided rather easily.

Jacqueline Miller Thomason identifies a series of theses which lead to ontological

relativity. The first of these is the indeterminacy of reference (Thomason 1971, 50-1). Now,

since indeterminacy arises from Quine’s behaviourist theory of meaning, we should examine this

a little more closely. Torbjörn Tännsjö thinks that Quine’s behaviourism, and the resulting

indeterminacy, leads Quine into nihilism (Tännsjö, 206). Jane Heal’s conclusions about Quine’s

views, though she does not explicitly call him a nihilist, seem to concur with Tännsjö. In her

book Fact and Meaning, she writes that though Quine is willing to allow us to attribute reasons,

beliefs, meaning and truth to our utterances, he does not believe that attributing intensions to

ourselves is in any way meaningful. As Heal puts it,

What is really occurring… is that we are caused to make

certain noises in ways which then cause us to make other

noises and so forth (Heal 1989, 81).

Heal goes even further, noting that even the previous remark (‘What is really occurring…’) is

itself such a noise.

Even for it, I am not allowed to explain what my taking

seriously amounts to in any way which goes beyond the

 fact that I am disposed to utter it. We thus end up… unable

to take seriously anything we do (Heal, 81).

The strong and heady brew is looking all the more heady and strong; all the stronger, since we

are now not limiting ourselves to ontological relativity alone. Ought we to drink down such a

draught? It seems that in doing so we would strip our philosophical project of much that gives it

life. I contend that we ought to reject Quine’s view, not merely in light of the consequences, but

also because it is not the only possible reading of the scientific evidence, as Heal points out.

The sciences Quine cites, physiology, theory of natural

selection… tell us nothing directly about meaning… They

do indeed tell us a great many things about light waves,

retinas, nerves… But we cannot superimpose upon the

picture built up in these terms some story about meaning…

without making further assumptions which are not supplied

by physiology or natural selection theory. (Heal, 82).

Tännsjö also thinks that Quine is making a leap when it comes to indeterminacy. Quine thinks, as

we have said, that many incompatible translations can all fit the same observed behaviour and

that there is no way to decide between them. Tännsjö replies that this is merely the

underdetermination of theory. We may never be able to know which is correct, but that does not

necessarily mean that there is no fact of the matter (Tännsjö 2002, 206-7). This is a leap that

Quine makes, and there is no reason that we have to follow him. The same holds with

ontological relativity. The underdetermination of theory by actual evidence is self-evident.

Naturally, we do not have a complete evidential account. However, Quine believes that theories
are underdetermined by all possible evidence. This leads to the belief that there is no fact of the

matter, since, no matter how much investigation we do, we will never be able to decide between

differing theories that adequately explain the available evidence. There is no reason to accept

that theories are underdetermined by all possible evidence. As Tännsjö says, Quine has never

provided an argument for this thesis (Tännsjö, 212-13). Instead of Quine’s behaviourist view of

meaning then, perhaps we ought to accept the museum. This is precisely what Tännsjö proposes

that we do, and for the following reason:

In the first place, this is what, prephilosophically, we do

believe. It takes philosophical argument to convince us that

there are no definite meanings of what we say. And, as we

have seen, the philosophical arguments to this effect do not

look very convincing (Tännsjö, 215-17).

Ontological relativity is not something that we are consigned to and that we have to work

around. There are good reasons to reject it, and seemingly no strong reason that should compel

us to accept it.

In summary, this essay has been an attempt to show the problems of ontological relativity

and how to avoid them. Firstly, I explained how ontological relativity is arrived at by way of

indeterminacy of translation and behaviourism. The indeterminacy of translation, which

threatens to make reference a nonsense, is solved by ontological relativity, which means that

reference makes sense in a particular framework, but that outside of that framework there is no

fact of the matter. We cannot determine which of our theories is correct, only if a theory explains

all of the evidence. Secondly, we examine the consequences of this view for objects. Ontological
relativity also entails that objects in a theory are neutral and can be swapped 1-to-1 for other

objects without disturbing the theory. Using criticisms from Rosner and Levin, I argued that

these substitutions blur the distinctions between objects, even ones which are radically different,

and may result in worse theories. Thirdly, I proposed that ontological relativity can be easily

avoided by rejecting Quine’s view of meaning and instead positing definite mental meanings.

Since Quine’s view is not forced upon us by the scientific evidence, as Heal explains, and since

there is no clear philosophical reason for accepting it, as Tännsjö shows, we have no reason not

to stick with our intuitive account of meaning. This would avoid ontological relativity all

together, and therefore it is no threat to philosophical analysis.

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Word Count: 2544

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Relativism. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1-20.

Levin, M. 1971. ‘Length Relativity’, The Journal of Philosophy, 68: 164-174.

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