Girard Reclaimed: Finding Common Ground between Sarah Coakley and René Girard on

Sacrifice
Author(s): Chelsea Jordan King
Source: Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture , Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring 2016),
pp. 63-74
Published by: Michigan State University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/contagion.23.1.0063

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 Girard Reclaimed
Finding Common Ground between Sarah Coakley
and René Girard on Sacrifice

Chelsea Jordan King

University of Notre Dame

T
he reception of the thought of René Girard in theological discourse has
been anything but uniform. Some have praised his theory for its simplic-
ity and the scope of its explanatory power, while others have critiqued
its apparent negative anthropology and claim to universality. Girard is known
for articulating what he has termed “mimetic theory” and, more controversially,
for arguing that the mimetic desire particular to human beings leads to violence,
which can only be attenuated by a sacrificial system that has arisen alongside
human culture. Girard has faced numerous critiques against his theory in gen-
eral, and has received backlash for his suspicion of and subsequent distancing
from, the language of sacrifice. In some Christian circles, this distancing is
unacceptable on theological grounds. For both traditionally and scripturally,
Christ’s saving work on the cross has been referred to as a sacrifice. In this
paper, I examine one such Christian theologian, Sarah Coakley, who seeks to
both critique Girard’s theory and offer her own positive construal of Christian
sacrifice. In Sacrifice Regained, Coakley critiques Girard’s theory for its apparent
reduction of the notion of sacrifice to violence. While admitting that Girard
has developed his theory to make room for a more positive understanding of
Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, Vol. 23, 2016, pp. 63–74. ISSN 1075-7201.
© Michigan State University. All rights reserved.

63

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64 Chelsea Jordan King

mimesis and sacrifice, Coakley maintains that Girard ultimately offers us a nega-
tive theory of sacrifice.1 After deconstructing Girard’s theory of sacrifice, Coak-
ley puts forward her own, constructive theory. Her claim is bold. She argues
that “the latest deliverances from evolutionary biology . . . provide us with an
intriguing impetus to re-­consider the rationality of Christian faith precisely as
sacrificial.”2
This paper proceeds in two parts. My aim in the first part is to perform a
close reading of Coakley in which I argue that she misreads Girard on a number
of important points, including the relationship between mimetic desire and
rivalry, and Girard’s apparent “ontology of violence.” In the second part of this
paper, I outline Coakley’s defense of sacrifice by explaining her appeal to the
biological concept of cooperation and altruism. Despite Coakley’s critiques
of Girard, I argue that Girard’s scapegoat mechanism serves as a paradigmatic
example of the very type of evolutionary cooperation for which Coakley argues.
Because Coakley does not wish to regain a notion of sacrifice that perpetu-
ates violence, however, it is my final contention that Girard’s more developed
account of sacrifice can greatly enrich Coakley’s defense of a specific kind of
sacrifice as evinced in her essay, “In Defense of Sacrifice: Gender, Selfhood, and
the Binding of Isaac.”

PART I: THE CRITIQUES

Coakley’s main critiques against Girard are found in her 2012 Gifford Lec-
ture, “Sacrifice Regained: Reconsidering the Rationality of Christian Belief.”
She begins by acknowledging the significant impact that Girard’s theory
of sacrifice has had on the wider intellectual culture. According to her, it is
oftentimes appropriated without criticism, including Charles Taylor’s own
Gifford Lectures.3 Coakley, however, distances herself from this uncritical
approval of Girard and claims that his theory “positively bristles with theoretical
problems.”4
We must note Coakley’s acknowledgement that there has been a devel-
opment in Girard’s overall thought. However, this does not stop her from
critiquing an earlier version of Girard’s theory that is admittedly obsolete. This
acknowledgement of Girard’s development indicates that Coakley’s critique
may be focused on the reception of Girard, rather than Girard himself. She
writes that early Girard is “what we all remember,” and early Girard argues that
there is a “primary violence deeply encoded in the roots of human nature.”5

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Girard Reclaimed 65

She then offers a brief explanation of Girard’s mimetic theory. Because I

will be assessing the way in which she critiques Girard, it is helpful to quote
her in full:

I want what you want, goes the theory, because all desire copies from others
(“mimetic desire”); when this rivalry leads to violent feelings, which it inevitably
does, each again mirrors the other in such negative affect (“mimetic doubling”),
until a dénouement is reached (“the mimetic crisis”). This showdown of potential
mutual violence can only be dealt with by purging it away on a chosen scapegoat
(“The Single Victim Mechanism”).6

Coakley impressively condenses Girard’s entire theory into a few sentences.

However, attempts at brevity oftentimes bring about distortions and misunder-
standings. After describing mimetic desire, she continues to state, “when this
rivalry leads to violent feelings . . .” It is clear that “this rivalry” refers to mimetic
desire. While subtle, Coakley here conflates mimetic rivalry with human desire
as such. Girard’s mimetic theory is highly nuanced, however, and a distinction
must be made between mimetic desire in general and what Girard has termed
“acquisitive mimesis.” Broadly speaking, mimetic desire is a phrase used to
describe the way that human beings desire insofar as that desire is always medi-
ated by another. There is no linear form of desire from subject to object; rather,
desire is triangular and always mediated by a model.
Acquisitive mimesis is the phrase Girard uses to describe a “desire
whereby I imitate the desire of someone else for an object and so enter into
rivalry with that person for the object.”7 James Alison helpfully explains that
acquisitive mimesis is but one modality of desiring in the human repertoire of
desire. Thus, Girard is not putting forward an “ontological acquisitive mimesis
as human desire.”8 In other words, human desire itself is not acquisitive mime-
sis, and so it is not inherently violent. In an interview with Rebecca Adams,
Girard goes so far as to claim that mimetic desire in itself is good. Jesus himself
advocates mimetic desire, “so the idea that mimetic desire itself is bad makes
no sense.”9 Girard admits that at times he occasionally does use the phrase
“mimetic desire” when he really means acquisitive mimesis. However, he also
claims that mimetic desire, “even when bad, is intrinsically good, in the sense
that far from being merely imitated in a small sense, it’s the opening out of
oneself.”10
With this in mind, we may continue outlining Coakley’s critique of Girard’s
theory:

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66 Chelsea Jordan King

herein lay the very origins of religion and of culture, according to Girard: culture
itself is formed and stabilized by the scapegoat mechanism.11

In my view, this is a correct reading of Girard’s understanding of the scapegoat

mechanism and its role in forming human culture. But the next move Coakley
makes is less warranted:

Ergo: sacrifice is essentially violent, and violence is foundational not only to human
nature but to the very possibility and stability of society. Gone, in effect, is the
story of the Fall from a primary innocence: the Fall here is the foundational state of
the human—­a sort of debased pessimistic Calvinism strangely married to the
Freudian id.12

Because Coakley’s language here is a bit rhetorical and provocative, I believe it

is helpful to delineate her argument as follows:

P1: Culture itself is formed by the scapegoat mechanism.

P2: The scapegoat mechanism is a violent process.
Conclusion: Sacrifice is essentially violent and violence is foundational to
human nature and the possibility and stability of society.

There are two consequences that she thinks follows from her reading of Girard:
there is no sense of a positive anthropology, and there is no room for a fall from
an innocent state because a fall is foundational to what it means to be human.
P1 seems to be a correct reading of Girard. P2, however, is questionable. Rather
than claiming that the scapegoat mechanism itself is a violent process, it is more
appropriate to claim that it functions as a way of promoting and sustaining
peace among human beings. Ultimately, the sacrificial system that is put in place
by the scapegoat mechanism is regulated by laws and customs so as to prevent
society from violently destroying itself. To a certain extent, it is a violent pro-
cess, but we must keep in mind that it allows humans to function peacefully
together as a society because they work together to perform these ritual acts.
The conclusion that Coakley draws is also questionable. It is not correct to
claim that, for Girard, sacrifice is inherently violent. It is correct to claim that
primitive sacrifices are violent, especially those that involve human sacrifice.
However, to claim that violence is foundational to human nature is a misreading
of Girard’s theory, even if one acknowledges the violence present in primitive
sacrifices. Violence may be foundational to human culture, but it is not founda-
tional to human nature. Once we understand this distinction properly, there is

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Girard Reclaimed 67

room for a fall from innocence because human beings are not primarily consti-
tuted by violence. As has been traditionally understood in Western Christianity,
human beings are born into a violent culture (the product of “original sin”), but
it is assuredly not foundational to human nature itself.
Coakley’s critiques thus far have focused on Girard’s anthropology, but she
also offers criticism against his Christology. She contends that Girard faces a
paradox in his assertion that Christ comes to announce the scapegoat mecha-
nism, and simultaneously becomes a scapegoat in the process. According to her,
“this theory of sacrifice surely merely re-­establishes what it purportedly seeks
to critique.”13 However, this is a misunderstanding of how Girard conceives
of the proper revelatory nature of Christ’s death. Girard is clear that Christ is
not a scapegoat in the same sense as victims have, historically speaking, been
scapegoats. To be fair to Coakley, Girard himself is aware that many theologians
misunderstand this very important point. He writes:

Most of the theologians who have reviewed Things Hidden . . . misunderstand this
issue. There were even critics who said that if there was such a thing as a scapegoat
religion, it must be Christianity, since the Gospels explicitly refer to this phenom-
enon! My answer is very simple: precisely because Jesus is explicitly represented as
a scapegoat, Christianity, as a religion, cannot be founded on scapegoating; rather
it is the denunciation of it. The reason should be obvious—­if you believe the scape-
goat is guilty, you are not going to name it as being “my scapegoat.”14

Girard’s insight is that Christ cannot be a scapegoat in the way that Girard has
previously defined it because his innocence is clear for all to see. A scapegoat is
always seen as one who is guilty and thus one who is deserving of blame. Christ
is far from being guilty, as the Gospels are written from the perspective of his
innocence. Girard concludes, “In order to have a scapegoat, one must fail to
perceive the truth, and therefore one cannot represent the victim as a scapegoat,
but rather as a righteous victim, which is what mythology does.”15
Girard’s understanding of sacrifice has developed over the years. In an
interview with Adams, for instance, Girard admitted with great humility that
he had been wrong about wanting to dismiss the book of Hebrews because of
its sacrificial language.16 This is a retraction that oftentimes goes ignored by his
critics. In his later book, Evolution and Conversion, Girard explicitly argues that
the sacrifice of Christ should be recast in terms of self-­sacrifice.17 Moreover, he
claims that Christ’s sacrifice frees us from the necessity of using a specific type of
sacrifice in order to escape violence brought upon by mimetic rivalry.18 Indeed,

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68 Chelsea Jordan King

Girard writes that “[w]e have then to use the word ‘sacrifice’ as self-­sacrifice, in
the sense of Christ.”19

PART II: COOPERATION AND ALTRUISM

After addressing the fact that sacrifice has fallen out of favor in theological
discourse—­in part due to Girard—­Coakley directs her attention to evolution-
ary theory in order to “regain” a rational defense of the concept of sacrifice.
She presents the recent findings of evolutionary biologist, Martin Nowak, and
his use of “game theory” in understanding evolutionary dynamics. According
to Coakley, there are current developments within evolutionary biology that
cause a potentially radical meaning-­shift in how evolutionary theory ought to
be understood. Instead of the “Dawkinsian” approach of the selfish gene, or the
simplistic rendition of evolution as a process of individual selection, Coakley
draws our attention to the deeper and more complex dynamics that occur
within populations. Specifically, Coakley brings to light the recent understand-
ing of cooperation and altruism within evolutionary theory, and it is with these
two important concepts that she constructs her rationale of sacrifice.
Evolutionary cooperation, stated in its clearest definition, is “a form of
working together in an evolutionary population, in which one individual pays a
cost (in terms of fitness, whether genetic or cultural) and another gains a ben-
efit.”20 Altruism is defined as a “subset of cooperation,” but should be “reserved
for conditions of additional affective intentionality,” thus: “Altruism is a form of
(costly) cooperation in which an individual is motivated by good will or love
for another (or others).”21 According to Coakley, it is important to note how
revolutionary this understanding is for evolutionary theory. Thus far, evolution-
ary dynamics have been so focused upon the “selfishness” and individuality of
the processes, and so any notion of cooperation or altruism could easily be
explained away or ignored altogether. As Coakley notes, cooperation should
not be intrinsic to evolutionary processes, but it is.22 Cooperation is needed
for construction, and it works alongside mutation and natural selection. By
appealing to the economic understanding of game theory, Nowak is able to
mathematically analyze evolutionary dilemmas in which cooperative options
succeed and are even selected for. The main question driving this new research
is: how does a cooperative choice (which results in the cost of an organism)
become beneficial for the overall population? Defection (which simply means
a choice that results in one’s own benefit) always gives higher payoffs for any

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Girard Reclaimed 69

“strategy” in game theory, but sometimes, cooperation is actually favored in

evolution. Why is this the case?
For the purposes of this paper, we need not go into great detail regard-
ing game theory and the mathematical models that Nowak proposes. What
is significant for us is how Coakley appropriates these developments within
evolutionary theory. For her, cooperation is enough to at least lay the ground-
work for a rational defense of sacrifice. If we can trace cooperative elements
within the natural world itself, then it becomes easier to assert some sort of
“sacrificial logic” within the human realm. There is one final claim that Coakley
makes regarding cooperation that must be taken into account. She admits that
cooperation itself is not intrinsically good. She even adds, “indeed, cooperating
human groups are—­as Darwin himself saw—­capable of inflicting destruction
on other groups, or of being propelled by violent or (what we might now call)
‘unethical’ goals.”23
I would like to propose that Girard’s understanding of the scapegoat
mechanism is one form of cooperation as outlined by Coakley.24 If cooperation
is defined by a form of working together in a population in which one pays a
cost for the larger group, the scapegoat mechanism is in fact a form of coopera-
tion. One member of a group is selected as the cause for violence and is killed.
Recall that there is no intentionality in the definition of cooperation, and thus
it does not matter whether or not the victim chooses to die for the group or
not. In fact, because cooperation exists in the non-­human realm, there need not
be any talk of intentionality. The scapegoat mechanism is a paradigmatic
example of cooperation working effectively. Because of the murder of a vic-
tim, the entire community is brought to peace and can continue to function
until another escalation occurs. The important point to draw here is the fact
that according to Girard’s theory, human beings work together in selecting and
killing the victim. It is a communal process; although it operates on an almost
unconscious level, it nevertheless involves cooperation among those involved,
and it is for the benefit of the larger group. As stated, Coakley herself admits
that cooperative acts are far from being intrinsically good and can be propelled
by violent goals.
It seems clear that something like the scapegoat mechanism can easily fit
within Coakley’s understanding of cooperation. The discomfort she has with
Girard comes down to her belief that Girard presents an anthropology that
is inherently violent. I have already demonstrated that this is a misreading of
Girard’s anthropology, and there is indeed room for a positive understanding
of mimesis. The conflict between Coakley and Girard ultimately arises from a mis-
reading of Girard, which is perhaps due in part to Girard constantly developing

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70 Chelsea Jordan King

and changing his thought, and the fact that he himself uses the term “mimetic
desire” interchangeably with “acquisitive mimesis.” Once Girard is properly
understood, however, it is clear that Coakley and Girard do not really conflict. I
further believe that Girard’s theory can greatly enrich Coakley’s own defense of
sacrifice. Coakley wishes to argue for a rational understanding of sacrifice that
does not reduce it to violence and irrationality, and Girard’s more developed
understanding of sacrifice as self-­sacrifice can contribute to Coakley’s desire to
retrieve a specific notion of sacrifice. This is because Girard’s theory allows us
to make a distinction between sacrifices that are unethical (resulting in the
bloodshed of innocent life) and sacrifices that can be constituted as moral and
virtuous. We can call the former “false sacrificial logic,” which perpetuates vio-
lence and silences victims, and the latter can be termed “positive self-­sacrificial
logic.”
In an essay entitled, “In Defense of Sacrifice: Gender, Selfhood, and the
Binding of Isaac,” Coakley offers a feminist reading of Gen. 22:1–­14, and focuses
the exegesis on the character of Isaac, instead of on the traditional protagonist,
Abraham. Isaac is seen as the powerless one in the story, and so a close examina-
tion of the story from his perspective lends itself to a fruitful feminist reading.
As is characteristic of Coakley, she asserts a bold thesis: “I seek to demonstrate
that only sacrifice, rightly understood, can account for a feminist transforma-
tion of the self that is radically ‘theonomous,’ rooted and sustained in God.”25
Note the emphasis placed on sacrifice: “rightly understood.” Coakley argues that
there is a false understanding of sacrifice, and it is false insofar as it perpetuates
“patriarchal violence.”26 This patriarchal violence results in idolatry, power, and
oppression of the weak. Contrary to this is true sacrifice, which is a necessary
purgation “of false desire (leading to life, not death) that occurs when the divine
gift hits the timeline of human sin and asks of us nothing less than complete and
ecstatic commitment to the divine.”27 Thus, in the powerlessness of Isaac, there
is a divine interruption into this violent world. The interruption calls forth that
new way of referring to sacrifice as one of a purgation of desire, an alignment of
one’s will with God, and moreover, a refusal to fall into idolatry.
While the article is primarily concerned with establishing a way of speaking
about sacrifice as it pertains more specifically to feminism in a postmodern con-
text, we can already see the implications it bears upon our discussion of Girard.
In her conclusion, she refers to patriarchal sacrifice as “sacrifice-­to-­the-­world”
which reestablishes the law of patriarchal violence. It is striking how similar
this sacrifice-­to-­the-­world is to Girard’s own understanding of the violence
of the scapegoat mechanism. For Coakley, it takes a divine in-­breaking to
establish a sacrifice-­to-­God,28 which brings about peace, union, and freedom of

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Girard Reclaimed 71

self. This freedom is only free precisely because it depends upon God. In other
words, when the will is aligned with God’s will, it can flourish in true freedom
and selfhood. Alison’s notion of pacific mimesis is quite similar to this concept
of freedom, for in recognizing where one’s being comes from, one is able to
break free from the violence of mimetic rivalry. While these remarks are brief, it
is clear that Coakley herself understands the dangers of misinterpretation that
the term “sacrifice” may carry, and so a distinction must be made between nega-
tive understandings and positive understandings of sacrifice.
What are we to make of this article in light of Sacrifice Regained? Do the
arguments presented in this particular article on Isaac alleviate some of Coak-
ley’s original critiques of Girard? This article was written two years after Sacrifice
Regained and refers to Girard only in a single endnote.29 In the endnote, she
admits that Girard has significantly developed his theory on sacrifice, and it
seems she has a positive understanding of it. She writes, “it should be noted that
in his later work Girard makes significant retractions, allowing for the trans-
formative effects of positive ‘mimetic desire,’ as well as the negative effects of
violent competitive desire.”30 However, she ends the note by referring the reader
to Sacrifice Regained, indicating to the reader that this is where she critiques the
effect that Girard’s theory has had upon philosophy of religion and the sciences.
It remains unclear whether or not Coakley disagrees with Girard, or the way
in which he has been appropriated and received by others. For what does it
mean to critique the effects of a person’s thought? Does the problem lie with the
thought itself, or the way in which it has (assumedly, wrongly) been appropri-
ated? The ambiguity of Coakley’s position on Girard leaves us to draw our own
conclusions.

CONCLUSION

Coakley maintains that despite the violent “sacrifice-­to-­the-­world” notion of

sacrifice, to reject the concept of sacrifice tout court is a mistake.31 As we have seen
in her Gifford Lectures, her entire project aims at reintroducing the language of
sacrifice into theological discourse. It is my final contention that we can recover
the concept of sacrifice, but it is must be through a Girardian and “Coaklian”
lens. The danger of not recovering sacrifice through a Girardian lens is the vali-
dation of sacrifices that are unjust, in which victims are selected to appease the
Gods. It is clear that Coakley wishes to distance herself from this understanding
of sacrifice. Coakley’s understanding of sacrifice, rightly understood, is key to a
recovery of the language of sacrifice that refrains from patriarchal violence. It is

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72 Chelsea Jordan King

the argument of this paper that both Coakley and Girard offer complementary
accounts of this positive way of framing sacrifice.
Now, if Girard can be blamed for promoting an overly negative view of
sacrifice, I believe Coakley can be charged with offering us an overly positive
understanding of sacrifice that neglects its negative dimensions as presented in
Sacrifice Regained. From a Girardian perspective, we can denounce the violence
of human sacrifice, and affirm the self-­sacrifice of Christ that seeks to put an
end to our violent ways of scapegoating others. Coakley’s approval of sacrifice
in Sacrifice Regained is meant to draw our attention to the positive dimensions
of evolution, which can form the foundation for a positive anthropology in
which sacrifice is done out of love and thanksgiving to God—­where sacrifice
is cast in terms of self-­sacrifice, of altruistic love, of a love that is super-­rational.
Christ, for Coakley, does not sacrifice himself to an angry God that demands
punishment, for this understanding of sacrifice would be the false patriarchal
understanding of sacrifice. It is important, therefore, that Coakley’s Gifford
Lectures be read in the light of her article on the binding of Isaac, in order for
us to have a complete picture of her understanding of sacrifice. This emphasis
upon self-­sacrifice and the deemphasis upon a violent God is precisely what
Girard’s own more developed understanding of sacrifice is aimed at purporting.
Once we have a clear understanding that Girard does not argue for an overly
negative anthropology, but an anthropology that does not shy away from the
negative aspects of being human, we have two scholars whose thought we can
appeal to in order to truly recover a sense of sacrifice that denounces violence
and affirms the goodness of all creation.

NOTES

The research for this article was made possible through the support of a grant from the
John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
1. Sarah Coakley, “Sacrifice Regained: Reconsidering the Rationality of Christian Belief ”
(inaugural lecture as Norris-­Hulse Professor of Divinity, University of Cambridge, 2009).
2. Ibid., 6.
3. Ibid., 9.
4. Ibid., 9–­10.
5. Ibid., 10.
6. Ibid.

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Girard Reclaimed 73

7. James Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong: Original Sin through Easter Eyes (New York:
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998), 13.
8. Ibid.
9. René Girard, in The Girard Reader, ed. James Williams (New York: Crossroad Publishing
Company, 2000), 63.
10. Ibid., 64.
11. Coakley, 13.
12. Ibid., 10.
13. Ibid.
14. Girard, Evolution, 84.
15. Ibid., 85.
16. Rebecca Adams, “Violence, Difference, Sacrifice: A Conversation with René Girard,”
Religion and Literature 25, no. 2 (1993), 28.
17. Girard, Evolution, 214–­15.
18. Ibid., 215.
19. Ibid.
20. Coakley, Lecture 2, “Cooperation, alias Altruism: Game Theory and Evolution
Reconsidered,” Gifford Lectures (2012): 5–­6.
21. Ibid., 7.
22. Ibid., 9.
23. Ibid., 20.
24. This idea was first suggested by Brian Robinette, at Boston College in his course,
“Theology and Science,” Spring 2014.
25. Sarah Coakley, “In Defense of Sacrifice: Gender, Selfhood and the Binding of Isaac,”
in Feminism, Sexuality, and the Return of Religion, ed. Linda Alcoff and John Caputo
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 19.
26. Ibid., 29.
27. Ibid., 31.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 33, n. 9.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 31.

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74 Chelsea Jordan King

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