SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.

MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO

SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15,
1968
FACTS:
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the
Court of Appeals' adverse decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record,
and of estoppel by laches.
Laches
 in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Doctrine of laches or of "stale demands"
 is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society,
the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79
 it has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
 it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order
of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc.
vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659
 it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court.
Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58
 the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution
of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as
well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962;
Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men
Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July
31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of
money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, we would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
MARIE ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, petitioner, vs. FASTFORMS PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondent.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the trial court has jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 94-1788.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994 12 or prior to the
institution of Civil Case No. 94-1788, provides inter alia that where the amount of the
demand in civil cases instituted in Metro Manila exceeds ₱200,000.00, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof is lodged with the Regional Trial Court.

Under Section 3 of the same law, where the amount of the demand in the complaint
instituted in Metro Manila does not exceed ₱200,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original
jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, we specified the guidelines
in the implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides:
"2. The exclusion of the term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court." (underscoring ours)
Here, the main cause of action
 is for the recovery of sum of money amounting to only ₱195,155.00.
 The damages being claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences of this
main cause of action. Hence, they are not included in determining the
jurisdictional amount.
 It is plain from R.A. 7691 and our Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that it is the
Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the instant case. As correctly
stated by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision:
"Conformably, since the action is principally for the collection of a debt, and the
prayer for damages is not one of the main causes of action but merely a
consequence thereto, it should not be considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court."
 While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes
that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively
participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its
authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from
challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has
been rendered.
In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,we held:
 "Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the
lower court x xx in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second
amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision.
Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224
SCRA 477, 491)
 participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking
its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel
from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer
to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question
the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its
motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner raised the
question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right
to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction."
Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas,we ruled:
 "In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996
decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the
petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of
RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
However, private respondents never questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction over
its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-
60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the
reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They
invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the
reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to
raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
 "The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before the
trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA
579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]).
The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment,
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers
Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur
Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995])." (underscoring ours)
G.R. No. 88643             July 23, 1991
HON. ARIEL C. SANTOS, as Labor Arbiter of the National Capital Region, petitioner,
vs.
HON. WILLLAM BAYHON, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, NCR,
BRANCH XXIII, Manila, ATTY. NICOLAS GEROCHI, JR., ATTY. MARJORIE
DOCDOCIL, PRISCILLA CARRERA, respondents.
Jose Espinas for petitioner.
Nicolas A. Gerochi, Jr. for respondent and on his own behalf.

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order, Labor
Arbiter Ariel C. Santos (herein petitioner) questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court to issue a writ of preliminary junction to prevent the enforcement of the writ of
execution in a labor case, and said Judge's order dated May 31, 1989 citing him
(petitioner) for indirect contempt and ordering his arrest for disobeying the injunction.
x xx
Santos and Pambuan filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground that the RTC
did not have jurisdiction over the labor case, for exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the
NLRC (Art. 255, Labor Code) and no injunction or restraining order may be issued by
any court or entity in a labor dispute.
On April 22, 1988, Judge William Bayhon of RTC, Manila, issued an order enjoining
Labor Arbiter CeferinaDiosana and sheriff Jaime Pambuan from enforcing the writ of
execution against the properties claimed by Camera pending the determination of the
validity of the sale made in her favor by the judgment debtor Poly-Plastic Products and
Anthony Ching.
x xx
Santos forthwith elevated the matter to this Court for review on the ground that Judge
Bayhon's arrest order dated May 31, 1989 is a nullity because Art. 254 of the Labor
Code prohibits the issuance of an injunction or restraining order 'in any case involving or
growing out of labor disputes . . . except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of
this Code."
Article 218 speaks of the power of the Commission to issue an injunction due to a labor
dispute, while Art. 264 refers to the power of the same Commission to issue injunction in
case of strikes or lockouts.
Petitioner alleges further that Judge Bayhon has no jurisdiction to cite petitioner for
contempt, for the case grew out of a labor dispute.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that Judge Bayhon has jurisdiction over the third
party claim for respondent Carrera was never a party in the labor dispute between
Anthony Ching (judgment debtor) and the members of the Kamapi (judgment creditors),
and she had no employer-employee relationship with any of them.
The petition has no merit, for the power of the NLRC to execute its judgments extends
only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor (Special Servicing
Corp. vs. Centro La Paz, 121 SCRA 748).
Traders Royal Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 142
 The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only when no third-party
claimant is involved.
 When a third-party, or a stranger to the action, asserts a claim over the property
levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his claim by an independent action in the
proper civil court which may stop the execution of the judgment on property not
belonging to the judgment debtor.
The following rulings of this Court are apropos:
National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Vera, 133 SCRA 259
 When the sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his authority, seizes a stranger's
property, the writ of injunction, which is issued to stop the auction sale of that
property, is not an interference with the writ of execution issued by another court
because the writ of execution was improperly implemented by the sheriff. Under
that writ, he could attach the property of the judgment debtor. He is not
authorized to levy upon the property of the third claimant.
New Owners/Management of TML Garments, Inc. vs. Zaragoza, 170 SCRA 563
 Well settled is the rule that a writ of execution can only be issued against one
who is a party to the action and not against one who, not being a party in the
case, has not yet had his day in court.
Peñalosa, et al. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 177 SCRA 778
 If the disputed property did not belong to the judgment debtor in NLRC Case No.
7-2577-84, it could not be validly levied upon by the sheriff for the satisfaction of
the judgment therein.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Manila had jurisdiction to stop by injunction the
National Labor Relations Commission's sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of
the property claimed by the private respondent, to satisfy the claims of the labor union
against the Poly-Plastic Products.