People vs Aleta

Facts:
 On appeal is the July 9, 2007 Court of Appeals Decision 3 affirming with modification the October 25, 2001
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, with station at Bangui, convicting accused-
appellant Marcelo and his sons-co-appellants Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo and Jovito, all surnamed Aleta, of
Murder in two cases.
 Two Informations dated June 21, 1994 for the death of Celestino Duldulao (Duldulao) and Fernando Acob (Acob)
were filed against accused-appellants:
 The victim Acob was the son of appellant Marcelo’s sister Marina Acob (Marina), while the other victim Duldulao
was the victim Acob’s father-in-law.
 While the deceased Acob’s mother Marina was at the community center of Barangay Nagsurot, Burgos, Ilocos
Norte on May 22, 1994, she heard a commotion at the yard of appellants. Soon after returning home, she told
Acob that there was a quarrel at appellants’ compound.
 Against his mother’s pleas, Acob repaired to appellants’ compound. Marina followed and upon reaching
appellants’ compound, she saw her nephew appellant Rogelio striking her son Acob twice at the left cheek and
at the back of his head with a piece of wood, causing Acob to fall on the ground. She thereafter saw Rogelio
striking Acob’s father-in-law Duldulao twice on the face drawing his eyes to pop up, and again on the head
causing him to fall on the ground.
 Rogelio then ran towards the family house whereupon Marina heard gunshots. Rogelio’s brothers-co-appellants
Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand and their father Marcelo at once began clubbing Acob and Duldulao with pieces of
wood, mainly on the face and head, as well as on different parts of their bodies.
 Even while the victims were already lying prostrate on the ground, Marcelo, Jovito, Marlo, and Ferdinand
continued to hit them. And when Rogelio emerged from the house, he got another piece of wood and again
clubbed the victims.
 As found by Dr. Arturo G. Llabore, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation-Regional Office,
San Fernando, La Union who supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the bodies of Acob and Duldulao on
June 3, 1994, the two victims suffered multiple abrasions, lacerations, open wounds, contusions and fractures
on their face, head, scalp, arms, legs and thighs; that Acob’s death was due to "hemorrhage, intercranial, severe,
secondary to traumatic injuries, head" while Duldulao’s was due to "hemorrhage, intercranial, severe, secondary
to traumatic injuries, head, multiple;" that both victims could have died within one (1) hour after the infliction of
the injuries; and that because of the severity and multiplicity of the injuries sustained, the same could not have
been inflicted by only one person.
 Upon the other hand, appellants Ferdinand and Marlo interposed self-defense and defense of relative,
respectively. Additionally, Marlo invoked voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Marcelo, Rogelio and
Jovito invoked alibi.
 In arriving at its Decision, the trial court held that although what triggered the incidents was never explained,
Acob and Duldulao died as a result of the attacks on them, qualified by abuse of superior strength and cruelty.
 In brushing aside Marlo’s claim of self-defense and Ferdinand’s defense of relative, the trial court held that,
assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, the same ceased when the
victims were already on the ground after Marlo hit them; and that force beyond what was necessary to repel the
aggression was employed when the victims were repeatedly clubbed.

Issue: Was there conspiracy in the murder case?

RULING:
 It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor
ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the
former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused
attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.
  The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of
the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.The
nature or quality of the weapon; the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the
aggressor as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and the place and the occasion of the assault
also define the reasonableness of the means used in self-defense.
 Marlo did not thus intend to merely repel the alleged attack. He wanted to be sure that the two victims would
not survive.
 That Ferdinand sustained a ½ to 1 centimeter deep stab wound in the thigh does not necessarily prove that he
acted in self-defense or that Marlo acted in defense of a relative. 15 Parenthetically, the knife, allegedly used by
Acob which Marlo claims to have taken, was not even presented in evidence.
 As for the alibi of Marcelo, Rogelio and Jovito, for it to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. 16 That
they were in Marcelo’s house attending to a relative who was allegedly having difficulty breathing, did not
render it impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crimes, the house being a mere 13.5 meters
away,17 more or less. Besides, it is impossible that they could not have noticed the commotion that preceded
and attended the incidents.
 It bears noting that appellants enjoyed superiority in number (five) over the two victims, clearly showing abuse
of superior strength and that the force used by them was out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the victims.
 More. Contrary to the contention of appellants, conspiracy was present during the attack. When two or more
persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred. And where there is conspiracy, the act
of one is deemed the act of all.

People vs Lopez
Facts:
 Jaime Lopez, Rogelio Regalado and Romeo Aragon (appellants) were charged of Murder by an Information filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao del Sur
 At around 3:30 P.M. of April 25, 1996, appellant Rogelio Regalado (Regalado), who was outside Bantogan 3
Tailoring, a tailoring shop at Bandola street corner Villaluz, Hinaruan, Surigao del Sur, called out: "You let
Bonjong come out so we could measure his courage!," referring to Edencito Chu (Chu) whose nickname is
"Bonjong." Chu thereupon emerged from his mother’s bakery, Purity Bakery, fronting the tailor shop, put his
arms around Regalado’s shoulders and asked for forgiveness. Regalado, however, pushed Chu’s arms aside,
drew a curved four to five inches long knife as he uttered "Putang Ina, ka Jong!" and stabbed Chu below the left
nipple.
 As Chu ran towards Villaluz street, Regalado chased him and picked up two pieces of firewood along the way
with which he hit Chu.
 Appellant Jaime Lopez (Lopez) in the meantime surfaced from a house beside the tailoring shop and, armed with
a hunting knife, joined the chase.
 Soon appellant Romeo Aragon (Aragon) also surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and also joined the
chase.
 The three appellants caught up with Chu at the corner of Lindo and Bandola streets at which Aragon boxed Chu,
causing the latter to fall. Aragon kicked Chu. Lopez then stabbed Chu several times as Regalado looked on. When
Chu was no longer moving, the three appellants left. Chu expired before reaching the hospital.
 The defense presented evidence of Chu’s supposed reputation as a bully who picked fights for no reason and
who had an existing criminal record.
 Branch 29 of the Bislig City RTC found the three appellants to have killed Chu, qualified by treachery which
absorbed "abuse of superior strength"
People vs Amodia

Facts


People vs Lagat
GR No. 187044, Sept 14, 2011

Facts:
 Renato Lagat and James Palalay were charged with the crime of Qualified Carnapping for stealing Jose Biag’s
tricycle and killing him in the process which occurred on April 12, 2005 at 2 o’clock in the morning
 On the same day, the two accused were caught by the PNP in possession of Biag’s tricycle, loaded with Stolen
Palay
 The accused ran immediately when they saw the PNP approaching them
 The accused themselves led the PNP to where they dumped Biag’s body
 After the prosecution rested its case, appellants filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground that they are not
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, citing that their rights during the custodial investigation were impaired when
no counsel arrived for them, making all the testimonial evidence inadmissible.
 Only circumstantial evidence were gathered by the prosecution like appellants were caught in the possession of
Biag's motorcycle, they ran after police came after them, bloodstains of Big on his motorcycle. The CA ruled in
favor of the prosecution.

Issue: Whether or not the there was conspiracy between the accused in the commission of the crime of qualified
carnapping

Ruling:

To justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a
way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that are inadmissible, show that the
circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond
reasonable doubt. We considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:

First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day that it, together with its owner Biag, was
reported missing.

Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen tricycle packed with cavans of palay
allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.

Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the moment they saw the Alicia PNP
approaching them.

Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in possession of Biag’s tricycle.

Fifth, Biag’s wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers were found in the tricycle upon its inspection by the Alicia PNP.

Sixth, Biag’s body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done on him, while his tricycle had
traces of blood in it.

The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order
to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two accused conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from their conduct
before, during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a common purpose and design. 54 The pieces
of evidence presented by the prosecution are consistent with one another and the only rational proposition that can be
drawn therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.

When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the carnapping, the crime of carnapping is
qualified and the penalty is increased pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:

Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two
of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.) (Emphasis ours)