1. I’m going to present the case of Ejercito vs.

Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, 509 SCRA

190

Wherein the petitioner is JOSEPH VICTOR EJERCITO and the respondents are SANDIGANBAYAN AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The facts and antecedents of the case are as follows:

The Special Prosecution Panel filed before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry
Bank (EIB, formerly known as Urban Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce documents
relating to Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account of President Estrada. The Sandiganbayan granted
the request.

A  subpoena duces tecum  is an Order that requires a witness to bring documents, books or other items
under his/her or their control, that he/she or they bound by law to produce into evidence.

Estrada filed a Motion to Quash the subpoenas claiming that his bank accounts are covered by
R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated
therein. He further claimed that the specific identification of documents in the questioned subpoenas,
including details on dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by an earlier illegal
disclosure thereof by the Export and industry bank and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the Urban Bank. The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded,
the prosecution in the case may not be allowed to make use of the information. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion.

THE FIRST ISSUE is Whether petitioner’s Trust Account No. 858 is covered by the term "deposit" as
used in R.A. 1405 or the bank secrecy law?

RULING OF THE COURT: YES. The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term “deposits,”
as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the
trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term “deposits” used
therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor
relationship between the depositor and the bank. If the money deposited under an account may be
used by banks for authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates
a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts
which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the
country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between
Estrada and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers “deposit, placement or investment of
funds” by Urban Bank for and in behalf of Estrada. The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858,
was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold
that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that
could otherwise be invested by banks in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.

The phrase “of whatever nature” proscribes any restrictive interpretation of “deposits.”
Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to
money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further shows that the law was not
intended to apply only to “deposits”in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been
no need to add the phrase “or invested. Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust
Account No. 858.

SECOND ISSUE is whether the Trust and Savings Accounts of Estrada are excepted from the protection
of the Bank Secrecy Law?

RULING OF THE COURT: YES. The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being
recognized exceptions thereto, as above quoted Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions
apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation.

Estrada contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his accounts are
not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. He is wrong. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be
excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from
the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any
person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to
his duty, is open to public scrutiny. An examination of the “overt or criminal acts as described in Section
1(d)”of R.A. No. 7080 would make the similarity between plunder and bribery even more pronounced
since bribery is essentially included among these criminal acts. Plunder being thus analogous to bribery,
the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.

The plunder case now pending with the SB necessarily involves an inquiry into the whereabouts
of the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President Joseph Estrada. In light then of this
Court’s pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank
accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but must include those accounts to which the
money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to have been transferred. Trust
Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 in the name of petitioner fall under this
description and must thus be part of the subject matter of the litigation.

In sum, exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President Estrada is
analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2) applies because the money deposited in
petitioner’s bank accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same plunder case.

THE THIRD ISSUE is Whether the "extremely-detailed" information contained in the Special
Prosecution Panel’s requests for subpoena was obtained through a prior illegal disclosure of
petitioner’s bank accounts, in violation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

RULING OF THE COURT: NO. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” principle, which states that once the
primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the first place,
R.A. 1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides
that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom
inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, there is no basis for applying the same in this case since the primary
source for the detailed information regarding petitioner’s bank accounts—the investigation previously
conducted by the Ombudsman—was lawful.

2. I’m going to present the case of China banking Corporation vs. Ortega, 49 SCRA 355

Wherein the petitioners are CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG and the respondents
are WENCESLAO ORTEGA and VICENTE G. ACABAN

The facts and antecedents of the case are as follows:

Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest Development
Corporation. To satisfy the judgment, the Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the B &
B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation (CBC).

Bank account garnishment means that a collection agency is legally allowed to remove money from
debtor’s account to repay an outstanding debt, and is usually a last resort that creditors turn to when
debtors repeatedly ignore requests to pay back what they owe. 

Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and
served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether
or not there is a deposit in the CBC of B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit,
to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong
refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the
disclosure of any information concerning to bank deposits.

THE ISSUE IS Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court processes
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No.
1405.

RULING OF THE COURT: NO. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit of B
& B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to
inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in
the China Banking Corporation only for the purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank
would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently clear that
the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its
being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and
the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is
hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment
of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into
cash and depositing the same in a bank.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.

3. I’m going to present the case of Salvacion vs. Central Bank, 278 SCRA 27
Wherein the petitioners are KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru FEDERICO N. SALVACION JR. and
EVELINA E. SALVACION which was the parents of the victim and the respondents are CENTRAL BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT

The facts and antecedents of the case are as follows:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, persuade and induce
petitioner Karen Salvacion, who was a 12-year old girl to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child
once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after
policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the
Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: Dollar Check No. 368
COCOBANK Bank Book, Dollar Account which was China Banking Corp., his ID , Philippine Money
amounting of P234.00 cash, Door Keys 6 pieces, Stuffed Doll or Teddy Bear used in seducing the
complainant.

On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli,
Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for
four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil
Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989,
the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.

Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her
gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the American,
trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said American tourist
Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist
was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a
favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which
amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may
continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the
money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This
questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her
parents fully deserve.

As stated by the trial court in its decision, Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the
Court believes that it was undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which
could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated,
as in fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos
High School, Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the
school authorities of the said High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that
they might be implicated in the case.

Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the
public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable
segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some measures to
encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to
some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central
Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties
are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is
such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be
exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking
Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign
currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action
for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of
respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman
sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is
only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings
petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no
other alternative but to follow the same.

THE ISSUE HERE WAS Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?

RULING OF THE COURT: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of
execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such
amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic
basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned
law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The
intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and
the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors
and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a
transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just
a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article
10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”

4. I’m going to present the case of China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 511 SCRA 110

Wherein the petitioner is CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and the respondents are THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE "JOSEPH" GOTIANUY as substituted by ELIZABETH GOTIANUY LO

The facts and antecedents of the case are as follows:

Jose Gotianuy accused his daughter Mary Margaret Dee of stealing, among his other properties,
US dollar deposits with Citibank N.A. amounting to not less than P35,000,000.00 and US$864,000.00.
Mary Margaret Dee received these amounts from Citibank N.A. through checks which she allegedly
deposited at China Banking Corporation (China Bank). He likewise accused his son-in-law, George Dee,
husband of his daughter, Mary Margaret, of transferring his real properties and shares of stock in
George Dee's name without any consideration. Jose Gotianuy, died during the pendency of the case
before the trial court. He was substituted by his daughter, Elizabeth Gotianuy Lo. The latter presented
the US Dollar checks withdrawn by Mary Margaret Dee from his US dollar placement with Citibank. 

Upon motion of Elizabeth Gotianuy Lo, the trial court issued a subpoena to Cristota Labios and
Isabel Yap, employees of China Bank, to testify on the case.

The Regional Trial Court ruling: As the foreign currency fund is deposited with the movant China
Banking Corporation, the disclosure only as to the name or in whose name the said fund is deposited is
not violative of the law.

THE ISSUE IS Whether or not petitioner China Bank is correct in its submission that the Citibank dollar
checks with both Jose Gotianuy and/or Mary Margaret Dee as payees, deposited with China Bank,
may not be looked into under the law on secrecy of foreign currency deposits.

RULING OF THE COURT: The law provides that all foreign currency deposits authorized under Republic
Act No. 6426, as amended by Sec. 8, Presidential Decree No. 1246, Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well
as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034 are considered absolutely
confidential in nature and may not be inquired into. There is only one exception to the secrecy of foreign
currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed upon the written permission of the depositor.

The Court of Appeals, in allowing the inquiry, considered Jose Gotianuy, a co-depositor of Mary
Margaret Dee. It reasoned that since Jose Gotianuy is the named co-payee of the latter in the subject
checks, which checks were deposited in China Bank, then, Jose Gotianuy is likewise a depositor thereof.
On that basis, no written consent from Mary Margaret Dee is necessitated.

In this case, there is no issue as to the source of the funds. Mary Margaret Dee declared the
source to be Jose Gotianuy. There is likewise no dispute that these funds in the form of Citibank US
dollar Checks are now deposited with China Bank. As the owner of the funds unlawfully taken and which
are undisputably now deposited with China Bank, Jose Gotianuy has the right to inquire into the said
deposits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 October 1999 affirming the Order of the RTC, Branch 58, Cebu City dated 16 April 1999
is AFFIRMED and this case is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for continuation of hearing with
utmost dispatch consistent with the above disquisition. No costs.

5. I’m going to present the case of PCIB vs. Court of Appeals , 255 SCRA 299

Wherein the petitioner is PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK or PCIB and the
respondents are COURT OF APPEALS and RORY W. LIM

The facts and antecedents of the case are as follows:

Rory Lim delivered to his cousin Lim Ong Tian (Spouses Lim) PCIB Check No. JJJ 24212467 in the
amount of P200,000.00 for the purpose of obtaining a telegraphic transfer from petitioner PCIB in the
same amount.  The money was to be transferred to Equitable Banking Corporation, Cagayan de Oro
Branch, and credited to private respondent’s account at the said bank.  Lim signed the check with a
stipulation “In case of fund transfer, the undersigned hereby agrees that such transfer will be made
without any responsibility on the part of the BANK, or its correspondents, for any loss occasioned by
errors, or delays in the transmission of message by telegraph.

When the checks were presented for payment, five of them bounced for insufficiency of
funds, while the remaining three were held overnight for lack of funds upon presentment. Consequent
to the dishonor of these checks, Equitable Bank charged and collected the total amount of P1, 100.00
from private respondent.  The dishonor of the checks came to private respondent’s attention only
on April 2, 1986, when Equitable Bank notified him of the penalty charges and after receiving letters
from his suppliers that his credit was being cut-off due to the dishonor of the checks he issued.
Upon verification by private respondent with the Gingoog Branch Office of petitioner PCIB, it
was confirmed that his telegraphic transfer (T/T No. 284) for the sum of P200,000.00 had not yet
been remitted to Equitable Bank, Cagayan de Oro branch. In fact, petitioner PCIB made the
corresponding transfer of funds only on April 3, 1986, twenty one (21) days after the purchase of the
telegraphic transfer on March 13, 1986.

Aggrieved, private respondent demanded from petitioner PCIB that he be compensated for the
resulting damage that he suffered due to petitioner’s failure to make the timely transfer of funds which
led to the dishonor of his checks. PCIB mainly argues that even assuming that the disputed provision is a
contract of adhesion, such fact alone does not make it invalid because this type of contract is not
absolutely prohibited.
Nevertheless, petitioner refused to heed private respondent's demand prompting the latter to
file a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City  on January 16, 1987. In
6

his complaint, private respondent alleged that as a result of petitioner's total disregard and gross
violation of its contractual obligation to remit and deliver the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) covered by T/T No. 284 to Equitable Banking Corporation, Cagayan de Oro Branch,
private respondent's checks were dishonored for insufficient funds thereby causing his business and
credit standing to suffer considerably for which petitioner should be ordered to pay damages.   7

THE ISSUE IS Whether or not the Stipulation can absolve the bank from liability.
RULING OF THE COURT: No. The Court is not precluded from ruling out blind adherence to the terms of
the contract if the attendant facts and circumstances show that they should be ignored for being
obviously too one-sided.

A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-made form
of contract, which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify.  One party
prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his
“adhesion” thereto, giving no room for  negotiation and depriving the latter of the opportunity to
bargain on equal footing. Nevertheless, these types of contracts have been declared as binding as
ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it
entirely.

The factual backdrop of the instant case, however, militates against applying the aforestated
pronouncements.  That petitioner failed to discharge its obligation to transmit private respondent’s
telegraphic transfer on time in accordance with their agreement is already a settled matter as the same
is no longer disputed in this petition.   Indeed, Article 21 of the Civil Code is quite explicit in providing
that “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Freedom of contract is
subject to the limitation that the agreement must not be against public policy and any agreement or
contract made in violation of this rule is not binding and will not be enforced.

6. I’m going to present the case of Sibayan vs. Alda, G.R. No. 233395, January 17, 2018

Wherein the petitioner is NORLINA G. SIBAYAN and the respondents are ELIZABETH O. ALDA,
THROUGH HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RUBY O. ALDA

The facts and antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondent Elizabeth, through her daughter Ruby O. Aida (Ruby) charged Norlina of
unauthorized deduction of her BDO Savings Account as well as for failure to post certain check deposits
to the said accountwith the Office of Special Investigation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (OSI-BSP).
Norlina argued that the charges were only meant to harass her and BDO as Norlina previously filed a
criminal case against Elizabeth, Ruby, and their cohorts, for theft, estafa, and violation of the Access
Devise Regulation Act of 1998.

Meanwhile, during the investigation, parties submitted their respective pleadings. The OSI-BSP
issued a Resolution finding a prima facie case against Norlina for Conducting Business in an Unsafe or
Unsound Manner under The General Banking Law of 2000. OGCLS-BSP then directed Norlina to submit
her sworn answer to the formal charge filed by the OSI-BSP.

Norlina then filed a Request to Answer Written Interrogatories addressed to Elizabeth. She
likewise filed a Motion for Production of Documents praying that the bank to allow her inspect and copy
the Statement of Account of Ruby. She alleged that Ruby is the legal and beneficial owner of said
account in connection to the earlier case of theft Norlina filed against the her.

Unfortunately, the Motion for Production of Bank Documents filed by the Norlina is denied.
Norlina counter-argued that the examination is exempted from the rule on secrecy of bank deposit
because the money deposited in the subject bank accounts is the subject matter of litigation.
 OGCLS-BSP rules otherwise. It said that the present action is an administrative proceeding aimed
at determining respondent's liability, if any, for violation of banking laws and that a deposit account may
only be examined or looked into if it is the subject matter of a pending litigation.

THE ISSUE IS Whether or not the bank account sought to be examined is privileged under Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise known as The Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposit

RULING OF THE COURT: YES. The denial of the motion for production of bank documents pertaining to
the statement of account of Ruby is justified as the bank accounts sought to be examined are privileged.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise known as The Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposit, provides:

Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

Norlina bemoans that by suppressing her right to avail of discovery measures, the OGCLS-BSP
violated her right to due process. She maintains that the administrative character of the proceedings
involved is not sufficient to defeat such right.

Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It
is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. As
established by the facts, Norlina was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to explain her side
before the OGCLS-BSP. She was allowed to submit her answer and all documents in support of her
defense. In fact, her defense of fraud committed by Ruby is sufficiently contained in the pleadings and
attachments submitted by the parties to aid the OGCLSBSP in resolving the case before it. Clearly then,
the Requests to Answer Written Interrogatories and Motion for Production of Documents were both
unnecessary and improper.

7. I’m going to present the case of Marquez vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001

Wherein the petitioner is LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, Union Bank of the
Philippines, and the respondent is ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN

The facts and antecedents of the case are as follows:

The issue here is Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the
questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405). 

RULING OF THE COURT: No. Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and
such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

 In these case, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What
is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the
ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et.
al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the
opening of the bank account for inspection.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that” [e]very
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons” and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. It also holds public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer,
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in
special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual
Property Code.