1|Special Proceedings Quiz December 1, 2020

DIMITIMAN, Irish Dale Louise M.

I.

A.

The Supreme Court ruled that Sereno is a de facto officer removable through
quo warranto.

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible

therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that
confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional
qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is
merely holding a colorable right or title thereto.

Hence, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and
her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy,
therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno
from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

B.

The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition
is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto

involving a person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been
for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the
difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action
for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense,
neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The
Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not
preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable
cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will
it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.
2|Special Proceedings Quiz December 1, 2020

II.

The Supreme Court ruled that CA No. 141 is not applicable in the case at
bar. However, the court held that a legal easement of right-of-way exist in favor of
the Government over land that was originally a public land awarded by free patent
even if the land is subsequently sold to another. On the contrary, if the land was
originally a private property, to which a just compensation must be paid for the
taking of a part thereof for a public use as an easement of right-of-way.

In the case at bar, the court concurs that the petitioners are not obliged to pay
just compensation in the enforcement of its easement of right-of-way to lands
which originated from public lands granted by free patent, we, however, rule that
petitioners are not free from any liability as to the consequence of enforcing the
said right-of-way granted over the original 7,759-square-meter property to the 300-
square-meter property belonging to the Spouses Regulto.

The context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, when the
owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical
destruction or material impairment of the value of his property or when he is
deprived of the ordinary use thereof, it is apparent that there is taking of the
remaining area of the property of the Spouses Regulto. The fact that more than half
of the property shall be devoted to the bypass road will undoubtedly result in
material impairment of the value of the property

Thus, the petitioners are liable to pay just compensation over the remaining
area of the subject property, with interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%).
3|Special Proceedings Quiz December 1, 2020

III.

Benjohn Fetalvero is legally entitled to his money claim. However, he still

has to go through the appropriate procedure for making a claim against the
Government.

Under Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, "private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation”. In the case at bar, for
almost 20 years now, the petitioner had been enjoying the use of respondent's
property without paying the full amount of just compensation under the
Compromise Agreement. Fetalvero had been deprived of his property for almost
two (2) decades.

In keeping with substantial justice, this Court imposes the payment of legal
interest on the remaining just compensation due to Benjohn Fetalvero.

Thus, respondent's money claim under the Compromise Agreement should

be adjusted to reflect the interest rates imposed by the Court.
4|Special Proceedings Quiz December 1, 2020

IV.

Yes. There is no error on the part of the Regional Trial Court when it ruled
that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings.

The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to
which they are adhered. Any sub-classifications of real property and divergent
treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be based on
substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of the Constitution is
violated. The Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
For purposes of expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the
buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment between
those two classes of real property infringes the equal protection clause.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay is correct in issuing writ of

possession, which authorized the government to take or enter upon the possession
of the NAIA 3 facilities.
5|Special Proceedings Quiz December 1, 2020

V.

Yes. Considering that the Regional Trial Court of Pili issued the Writ of
Possession in compliance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, and as a ministerial
duty, it cannot be charged with grave abuse of discretion. Absent grave abuse of
discretion, respondents should have filed an ordinary appeal instead of a Petition
for certiorari.

The Court held that there was substantial compliance with the procedural
requirements of the court. Although belatedly filed, the Resolution of the PNB
Board dated Oct. 8, 1997, authorizing Mrs. Amon to prosecute and defend cases
for or against the bank, thoroughly demonstrates the signatory’s authority to sign
and verify the instant Petition. PNB was likewise not obliged to disclose the
alluded case pending before the CA as it was not initialed by the bank and, more
importantly, the subject matter and the properties involved therein are altogether
different.

The contention that the court should not entertain the Petition until a Motion
for Reconsideration has been filed does not hold water where the proceeding in
which the error occurred is a patent nullity.

Thus, a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed with in the instant

case.