50 SPS. GATMAITAN VS.

CA
GR 76500
AUGUST 2, 1991

FACTS: The subject parcel of land was originally registered in the name of the deceased Spouses
Gatmaitan whom were the parents of the petitioner in this case. The siblings Aquilino and Emeteria
executed in favor of the respondents an extrajudicial partition and sale with a right to repurchase in
1952. thereafter, the respondents Sps. Pascual took possession of the said lot and made
improvements thereon.
In 1956, siblings Gatmaitan then again executed an extrajudicial partition adjudication this time to
Aquilino and his wife Lillia Ayton. The OCT was then cancelled and in lieu thereof, the TCT was
issued to Sps. Aquilino and LIllia. Sometime in 1970, the Gatmaitan Spouses executed in favor of
Sps. Pascual an instrument entitled “Bilihan Tuluyan ng Lupa” and the Sps. Pascual continued
possessing the same. In 1972, the Sps. Dealino conveyed back to Sps. Gatmaitan the 1/2 portion of
the lot that was first sold to Sps. Pascual. The ff. Day, the Sps. Gatmaitan then executed a Deed of
Real estate Mortgage covering this same 1/2 portion in favor of Dealino spouses allegedly to secure
a debt. In 1973, Sps. Pascual filed a complaint for reconveyance of the 1/2 portion of the subject
lot. The RTC ruled in favor of them.
ISSUE: WON MERE ALLEGATION WILL SUFFICE AS EVIDENCE.
RULING: NO.
The subsequent document executed by the Gatmaitan spouses in favor of the Pascual spouses
sometime in January 1970, confirms beyond doubt the intention of the former to repurchase not
the whole lot but only half of it. The "Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa," by which the Gatmaitan spouses
conveyed in absolute sale a one-half (1/2) portion of the lot to the Pascual spouses, in effect
confirmed and "consolidated," as it were, the title of the Pascual spouses over the other one-half
(1/2) portion.
It is the position of the Gatmaitan spouses that the aforementioned "Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa" is
not valid for lack of consideration. There is, however, the presumption that an instrument sets out
the true agreement of the parties thereto and that it was executed for valuable consideration. The
Gatmaitan spouses failed to present any evidence showing that this instrument was later on
disregarded by both parties. Mere allegation is not evidence; the presumption of the validity of the
"Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa" was not overturned.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated 17 April 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
51.
Heirs of Marcelo Sotto vs Palicte
G.R. No. 159691 June 13, 2013

Facts: Filemon had four children, namely: Marcelo, Pascuala, Miguel, and Matilde. Marcelo was the
administrator of the Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and Miguel were the predecessors-in-interest of
petitioners. In June 1967, Pilar Teves and other heirs of Carmen Rallos, the deceased wife of
Filemon, filed in the CFI of Cebu City a complaint against the Estate of Sotto seeking to recover
certain properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen, and damages. The CFI rendered
judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of P233,963.65, among other
reliefs. To satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy on execution was effected against six
parcels of land and two residential houses belonging to the Estate of Sotto. The levied assets were
sold at a public auction. Later on, Matilde redeemed four of the parcels of land in her own name
while her sister Pascuala redeemed one of the two houses because her family was residing there.
On July 9, 1980, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Cebu executed a deed of redemption in favor of
Matilde, which the Clerk of Court approved. On July 24, 1980, Matilde filed in Civil Case No. R-
10027 a motion to transfer to her name the title to the four properties. However, the CFI denied
her motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption issued in her favor null and void, holding
that Matilde, although declared in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R as one of the heirs of Filemon,
did not qualify as a successor-in-interest with the right to redeem the four properties. Matilde
directly appealed the adverse ruling to the Court via petition for review, and on September 21,
1987, the Court, reversing the CFI’s ruling, granted Matilde’s petition for review but allowed her co-
heirs the opportunity to join Matilde as co-redemptioners for a period of six months before the
probate court (i.e., RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16) would grant her motion to transfer the title to her
name. In November 1998, the heirs of Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. R-
10027 of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16, praying that the order issued on October 5, 1989 be set
aside, and that they be included as Matilde’s co-redemptioners. After the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration for its lack of merit on April 25, 2000, they assailed the denial by petition for
certiorari and prohibition (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60225). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition on January 10, 2002. Thereafter, they elevated the matter to the Court via petition for
certiorari (G.R. No. 154585), which the Court dismissed on September 23, 2002 for being filed out
of time and for lack of merit. On September 10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo, specifically: Lolibeth
Sotto Noble, Danilo C. Sotto, Cristina C. Sotto, Emmanuel C. Sotto, Filemon C. Sotto, and Marcela C.
Sotto; and the heirs of Miguel, namely: Alberto, Arturo and Salvacion, all surnamed Barcelona
(herein petitioners), instituted the present action for partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu
City, Branch 20 (Civil Case No. CEB24293).2 Alleging in their complaint that despite the redemption
of the four properties having been made in the sole name of Matilde, the four properties still
rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished the funds used to redeem the
properties, they prayed that the RTC declare the four properties as the assets of the Estate of Sotto,
and that the RTC direct their partition among the heirs of Filemon.

Issue: Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.

Held: Yes. All these judgments and order upholding Matilde’s exclusive ownership of the subject
properties became final and executory except the action for partition which is still pending in this
Court. The judgments were on the merits and rendered by courts having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. There is substantial identity of parties considering that the present
case and the previous cases involve the heirs of Filemon.

There is identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the same, but also between
those in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest. Absolute identity of parties
is not required, and where a shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of relief sought by
one person in a prior case and the second person in a subsequent case, such was deemed
sufficient. There is identity of causes of action since the issues raised in all the cases essentially
involve the claim of ownership over the subject properties. Even if the forms or natures of the
actions are different, there is still identity of causes of action when the same facts or evidence
support and establish the causes of action in the case at bar and in the previous cases.

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these
elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first
and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in
both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in G.R. No. 55076 (the first case),
the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 131722 (the second case), the order dated October 5, 1989 of
the RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027 as upheld by the Court in G.R. No. 154585 (the third case), and
the decision in G.R. No. 158642 (the fourth case) – all of which dealt with Matilde’s right to the four
properties – had upheld Matilde’s right to the four properties and had all become final. Such rulings
were rendered in the exercise of the respective courts’ jurisdiction over the subject matter, and
were adjudications on the merits of the cases.

52 VILLAMOR VS. MANALASTAS

GR 171247
JULY 22, 2015

FACTS: Villamar filed motions for Inhibition to disqualify judge Manalastas based solely on the ff.
grounds:
 A. Manalastas has stood together with Complainant Umale (complainant against Villamar in a
damages and rental suit) as godparents to a common child of a common friend; and
B.) that the law firm of Judge Manalastas’ husband, as counsel of one of their clients,
wrote Villamor on a purported claim appealing to be the very same claims asserted by
Umale himself.
Judge Manalastas denied the Motions for Inhibition since the allegations of Villamar fall short of
the proof required to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake her noble role to
dispense justice according to Ignorance of law and evidence without fear and favor. Villamor filed
for certiorari and pending the same, also file an admin. Case against the same judge with the OCA
for Gross of the Law or Procedure for bias or Partiality and a Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Admin. Case before the RTC. CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: WON VILLAMOR COMMITTED FORUM SHOPPING.

RULING: YES.
To recap, the petitioner anchored his administrative complaint on Judge Manalastas's gross
ignorance of the law. Among the grounds relied upon was Judge Manalastas's bias and partiality,
the same ground used in the Motions for Inhibition, which later became the subject of the Petition
for Certiorari (the CA's resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari is now subject of the present
petition). The petitioner subsequently filed with the RTC the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative Case.
The series of events shows that the petitioner filed the present petition when the administrative
complaint, and very likely, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case were both
pending.
Again, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case and the present petition prayed
for the same relief.
Plainly, the petitioner, in an attempt to increase the chances of preventing Judge Manalastas from
hearing the case, successively filed the administrative complaint, the Motion for Inhibition on
Account of Administrative Case, and the present action.

In like manner, it does not matter that the apparent purpose of the administrative complaint (the
source of the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case) is distinct from that of the
Petition for Certiorari (the source of the present petition). The controlling consideration i s that
they are both geared towards achieving the same goal: the inhibition of Judge Manalastas from
hearing the civil case.

The petitioner cannot hide under the cloak of characterization and labels to escape from the
consequences of his actions.If we allow this, the evil sought to be prevented by the rule against
forum shopping would result.

We remind the petitioner and his lawyer that forum shopping constitutes abuse of court processes,
which tends to degrade the administration of justice, to wreak havoc upon orderly juridical
procedure, and to add to the congestion of the already burdened dockets of the courts.