Manila Prince Hotel v.

GSIS

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Keywords: Filipino First Policy, Self-executing provisions, Constitutional Law, National Economy and Patrimony,
Nationalism, Separation of Powers

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and Mandamus.

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Title: G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

Parties: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, Petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, Respondents.

Citation: Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997. (n.d.). Retrieved November 4, 2019, from
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1997februarydecisions.php?id=86.

Ponente: J. Bellosillo

Syllabus: National Economy and Patrimony; When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.—On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
 eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

Ruling: It is a self-executing provision.

Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces
itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Manila Hotel forms part of national patrimony.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of
the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION AND OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
 to RENONG BERHAD, and to accept the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts
and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

Letter Complaint of Concerned Citizens Against Solicitor General Devanadera, Atty. Rolando Faller, and Atty. Santiago
Varela

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Keywords Disbarment, Disciplinary Action, Anonymous Complaints

Nature of the Case Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment/Disciplinary action.
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Title A.M. No. 07-11-13-SC, June 30, 2008

Parties CONCERNED CITIZENS, Complainants, vs. SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA, ATTYS. ROLANDO
FALLER and SANTIAGO VARELA, Respondents.

Re: Letter Complaint of Concerned Citizens Against Solicitor General Devanadera, Atty. Rolando Faller, and
Atty. Santiago Varela, A.M. No. 07-11-13-SC, June 30, 2008. (n.d.). November 3, 2019, from
Citation https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/jun2008/am_07-11-13-sc_2008.html.

Ponente J. Carpio Morales

Syllabus Section 1 of Rule 139-B (Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys) of the Rules of Court requires that the
complaint against an attorney must be verified.—Section 1 of Rule 139-B (Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys) of the Rules of Court requires that the complaint against an attorney must be verified. In Fernandez
v. Atty. Novero, Jr., 393 SCRA 240 (2002), however, this Court held that failure to verify the complaint
constitutes a mere formal defect, and the Court may “order the correction of the unverified pleadings or act on
 it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served.”
Facts An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown author
and must be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.

The Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) received on September 5, 2007 an unverified letter-complaint dated
August 26, 2007 written by “Concerned Citizens” and addressed to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. The letter
contained a complaint for disbarment/disciplinary action against former Government Corporate Counsel
(GCC), now Solicitor General Agnes Vst. Devanadera and Alberto C. Agra and other lawyers of the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), for “engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities”
during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections, and for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Solicitor General et al. filed their separate comments, praying for the outright dismissal of the complaint for
being anonymous and contrary to the intent of Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Issue Whether or not an anonymous complaint can be dismissed outrightly.

Ratio The Court will not thus shirk from its responsibility to mete out proper disciplinary punishment to lawyers who
are shown to have failed to live up to their sworn duties; but neither will it hesitate to extend its protective arm
to those the accusation against whom is not indubitably proven. For a lawyer’s good name is, in the ultimate
analysis, his most important possession.

An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown author.
However, a complaint of such sort does not always justify its outright dismissal for being baseless or
unfounded for such complaint may be easy of verification and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated
and established by other competent evidence.

A reading of the letter-complaint shows that the allegations are vague. And the attachments thereto are mere
photocopies, not to mention the plaint of the Solicitor General et al. that they were not furnished copies of the
annexes to the August 6, 2007 complaint. The Court is thus inclined to, as it does, dismiss the complaint.

Fallo WHEREFORE, the August 26, 2007 complaint against former Government Corporate Counsel, now
Solicitor General Agnes Vst. Devanadera, and Attys. Rolando Faller and Santiago Varela of the Office of the
 Government Corporate Counsel is DISMISSED.

Williams v. Enriquez

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Keywords Legal Ethics, Legal Research

Nature of the Case Administrative Case in the Supreme Court. Unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and Conduct Unbecoming of an
Attorney.
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Title A.C. No. 6353, February 27, 2006

Parties SPOUSES DAVID and MARISA WILLIAMS, Complainants, vs. ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Respondent.

Citation Williams v. Enriquez, A.C. No. 6353, February 27, 2006. (n.d.). Retrieved November 3, 2019, from
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/feb2006/ac_6353_2006.html.
Ponente
J. Callejo, Sr.
Syllabus Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Legal Research; Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a
lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence—indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to know it
or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law; A retired judge should know that it is
his duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Supreme Court on the issues and legal
problems confronting a client; In championing the interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not
only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyer’s oath, but should likewise espouse legally sound
arguments for clients, lest the latter’s cause be dismissed on a technical ground.—As pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be
updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence. Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as
if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As a retired judge, respondent should have
known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal
 problems confronting a client. In this case, the law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution,
the most basic law of the land. Implicit in a lawyer’s mandate to protect a client’s interest to the best of his/her
ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate
in continuing legal education programs. Thus, in championing the interest of clients and defending cases, a
lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyer’s oath, but should likewise
espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latter’s cause be dismissed on a technical ground.
Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws.
Facts Respondent (Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez) is the counsel of record of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 13443 pending in
RTC Dumaguete. Spouses Marissa Williams and spouse David Williams bought the subject lot.

He charged Marissa Williams with falsification of public documents on the basis that Marissa, a “Filipino,
married to David W. Williams, an American Citizen, lost her citizenship when she married the latter.

Petitioners demand disciplinary action against respondent for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful acts because the respondent cited outdated material in his complaint affidavit against Marissa and
knowingly applied the same in perverse fashion to argue that Marissa lost her Filipino citizenship when she
married David.

Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution provides that she would not lose her citizenship through marriage
unless she renounces the same in a specific act. Atty. Enriquez quotes the more outdated law, declaring that
her act of marrying was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship.

As a retired judge, respondent should know that the false charge against petitioners will not prevail.

Respondent claims that the complaint for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert attention from the criminal
charges against the complainants, that the charges against him have no factual basis, and that Marissa was
no longer a citizen of the Philippines as a result of her marriage to David Williams

IBP Commissioner’s Findings (Rebecca Villanueva-Maala) ruled that the respondent was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six months

Issue: Whether or not the respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six
 months.

Ruling: There is no evidence shown by the respondent that complainant has renounced her Filipino citizenship.
Lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal developments (Canon 5). Canon 5 requires that a lawyer be
updated in the latest news and jurisprudence.

As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest
rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a client. In this case, the respondent
misconstrued no less than the Constitution, the basic law of the land.

The penalty recommended by the Commissioner is too harsh; the power to disbar or to suspend must be
exercised with great caution. The penalty of reprimand will suffice.

Fallo WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T.

Enriquez is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study
the opinions he may give to his clients. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
Bustos v. Lucero

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Keywords: Substantive Law, Remedial Law, Criminal Law, Procedural Law

Nature of the Case: Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and mandamus.
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Title: G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

Parties: DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga,
Respondent.

Citation: Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948. (n.d.). Retrieved November 3, 2019, from
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1948/oct1948/gr_l-2068_1948.php.
Ponente: J. Tuason

Syllabus SECTION 11 OF RULE 108 AS PROCEDURAL.—As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also
procedural. Evidence-which is “the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on
which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings"-is identified with and forms part of
the method by which, in private law, rights are enf orced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law
transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidencea nd practice. (State vs. Capaci, 164
So., 419; 179 La., 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can
not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence
embodied in these Rules.
Facts The petitioner appeared at the preliminary investigation after being informed of the criminal charges against
him. He pleaded not guilty. Petitioner then moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her
witnesses could be examined and cross examined in the manner and form provided by law.

The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to petitioner’s motion invoking Section 11, Rule 108, as follows:

Section 11. Rights of defendant after arrest. After the arrest of the defendant and his delivery to the court, he
shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be informed of the substance
of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or
evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to
writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.

[Note that under the above Rule, it was not stated that the defendant has the right to cross-examine the
complainants witness or witnesses]

The justice of the peace sustained the objection.

In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and the case was forwarded to the CFI-
Pampanga. Petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice
of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony.
 The motion was denied, and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted with the
Supreme Court. The SC denied the petition for mandamus citing Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano:

Section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace to grant or deny the
motion to cross-examine the complainant’s witness. While section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant’s right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority,
inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth. The
defendant cannot, as a matter of right, compel the complainant and his witnesses to repeat in his presence
what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Supreme Court on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court infringes Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Issue Whether or Not Section 11 deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive rights.
Ratio We cannot agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an
adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right.

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.

Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations.

Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights
and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer;
as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for
their invasion.

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the
 punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the
steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.

Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.

Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary
investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to
offend against the constitutional inhibition.

Fallo Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.