RULE 36 – JUDGMENT, FINAL ORDERS and ENTRY THEREOF

G.R. No. 193397, January 25, 2017

ESTRELLA MEJIA-ESPINOZA AND NORMA MEJIA

DELLOSA, Petitioners, v. NENA A. CARIÑO, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file an

action for annulment of judgment or final orders under
extraordinary circumstances. The question before us in this
petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 dated November 26, 2009 and Resolution2 dated August
3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89905, is
whether the same remedy may be used to annul court processes
pursuant to a final and executory judgment whose validity is not
being questioned. We hold that it cannot.

Petitioner Estrella Mejia-Espinoza (Espinoza) was the plaintiff in

an action for ejectment against respondent Nena A. Cariño
(Nena) before the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan
(MTC). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1420. The case
was consolidated with another ejectment case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1419, involving Espinoza and one Alberto Cariño
(Alberto) covering a different property.3 On August 25, 1998, the
MTC rendered a joint decision in favor of Espinoza. It ordered
Nena and Alberto to vacate the respective properties and to pay
rents from time of default, litigation expenses, and attorney's'
fees.4 Nena and Alberto separately appealed the joint decision to
the Regional Trial Cout of Dagupan City, Branch 43 (RTC Branch
43), which reversed the decision only with respect to Civil Case
No. 1420 and dismissed the case against Nena for lack of cause
of action.5 On Espinoza's petition for review, the Court of Appeals
Special Seventeenth Division6 (CA 17th Division) reversed the
decision of the RTC Branch 43 and affirmed the MTC
decision.7 Nena sought to elevate the case to us on certiorari, but
we denied it as a result of Nena's failure to file her petition for
review within the extended period. An entry of judgment was
issued on December 3, 2003.8

Espinoza filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution before

the MTC, which Nena opposed.9 The MTC granted the motion on
October 14, 200410 and subsequently issued a writ of execution
on March 10, 2005.11 Sheriff Vinez A. Hortaleza (Sheriff
Hortaleza) served the writ upon Nena on March 16, 2005.12 When
Sheriff Hortaleza proceeded to the property subject of the
ejectment suit, he found out that Nena had voluntarily vacated
the place and turned over the padlock to one Gertrudes Taberna,
Nena's caretaker. Thus, Sheriff Hortaleza was able to peacefully
turn over the propetiy to co-petitioner Norma Mejia Dellosa
(Dellosa), Espinoza's attorney-in-fact.13 Sheriff Hortaleza then
levied a separate commercial lot owned by Nena to cover the
monetary awards for rent, litigation expenses, and attorney's
fees, and correspondingly issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of
Real Property14 scheduled on September 26, 2005.

On September 19, 2005, Nena filed a complaint captioned as

"Annulment of Court's Processes with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or
Prohibition, and Damages" before the RTC of Dagupan City, which
was raffled to Branch 41 (RTC Branch 41).15 Nena argued that
she was deprived of the opportunity to ask for reconsideration of
the order granting Espinoza's motion for issuance of writ of
execution because she was not furnished a copy of the order. She
claimed that Espinoza, through Dellosa, illegally caused the
demolition, without a special court order, of a one-story building
which Nena allegedly constructed on the land subject of the
ejectment suit. Furthermore, she questioned the levy on her
commercial lot for being premature, as well as the computation of
the judgment debt.16

In her Answer,17 Espinoza emphasized that the writ of execution

was properly served and received by Nena on March 16, 2005,
and that Nena had already removed all her personal belongings
from the premises weeks before the service of the writ. With
respect to the demolition of the one-story building, Espinoza
claimed that it was the previous owners of the land, the
Penullars, who built the structure. On the levy of the commercial
lot, Espinoza asserted that it was proper due to Nena's continued
defiance of a final and executory judgment.18

In its Decision,19 the RTC Branch 41 dismissed the complaint for

lack of cause of action. It opined that the issue on the alleged
irregularity of the issuance of the writ of execution was rendered
moot by its implementation. It noted that Nena had already
voluntarily relinquished her possession of the property-including
the building-before the demolition. The RTC Branch 41 also found
that the levy on Nena's commercial lot was proper because
Sheriff Hortaleza found no personal properties belonging to Nena.
With regard to the computation of the amount, the RTC ruled that
the sheriff was guided by the decision in the ejectment suit.
Finally, the RTC Branch 41 held that Nena availed of the wrong
remedy; instead of a petition for annulment under Rule 47, Nena
should have filed a petition for relief from judgment under Rule
38.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals Fourth Division (CA 4th Division)

reversed the RTC.20 It held that Nena correctly filed the petition
for annulment with the RTC of Dagupan City in accordance with
Section 10 of Rule 47. It brushed aside the RTC Branch 41's
ruling that Nena availed of the wrong remedy because according
to the CA 4th Division, regardless of the caption of the pleading,
Nena had a cause of action accruing from the violations of her
rights. The CA 4th Division opined that because Nena did not
receive a copy of the order granting Espinoza's motion for
issuance of writ of execution, it "did not become final and
executory insofar as [Nena] is concerned."21 The CA 4th Division
concluded that the writ of execution was "premature and without
legal basis"22 and, therefore, void.23 Next, the CA 4th Division
ruled that the levy on Nena's commercial property was void
because the dispositive portion of the CA 17th Division Decision in
the ejectment suit did not mention any monetary award. Lastly,
the CA 4th Division held that Nena was entitled to damages
because the one-story building was demolished without the
benefit of a writ of demolition as required by Section 10(d)24 of
Rule 39.25 The CA 4th Division then remanded the case to the RTC
for the determination of the amount of damages that Nena is
entitled to.26

After the CA 4th Division denied Espinoza's motion for

reconsideration, Espinoza filed this petition tor review
on certiorari.27 She asserts that the issuance of a writ of
execution based on a final and executory decision is a ministerial
duty of the MTC, and that Nena was nonetheless given her day in
court when she filed her opposition to the motion for execution.
She also faults the CA 4th Division for failing to properly
appreciate the dispositive portion of the CA 17th Division Decision
in the ejectment suit. In that case, the CA 17th Division affirmed
the MTC Decision, which in turn ordered Nena to vacate the
premises and to pay rentals, litigation costs, and attorney's
fees.28 Espinoza likewise disputes the necessity for a writ of
demolition because Section 10(d) of Rule 39 only applies to
"improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or
his agent." Espinoza maintains that since it was the Penullars who
constructed the building, the provision is inapplicable. In any
case, Espinoza contends that Nena's claim that she built the
building was unsubstantiated.29 Finally, Espinoza argues that
Nena is estopped from questioning the validity of the writ of
execution because she already voluntarily surrendered possession
of the property.30 In her Comment,31 Nena reiterates the
reasoning of the CA 4th Division that the court processes were
void.

II

A petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47

is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only under
certain exceptional circumstances. Under the Rules, there are
three requirements that must be satisfied before a Rule 47
petition can prosper. First, the remedy is available only when the
petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of the petitioner.32 This means that a Rule 47
petition is a remedy of last resort-it is not an alternative to the
ordinary remedies under Rules 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, and
45. Second, an action for annulment of judgment may be based
only on two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.33Third, the action must be filed within the temporal
window allowed by the Rules. If based on extrinsic fraud, it
must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic
fraud; if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before
it is barred by laches or estoppel.34 There is also a formal
requisite that the petition be verified, and must allege with
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as
well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.35

The averments of Nena's complaint a quo, however, do not make

out an action for annulment of judgment or final order. It was
therefore inaccurate for both the CA 4th Division and the RTC
Branch 41 to characterize it as a Rule 47 petition. While the non-
compliance with the requisites laid down in Rule 47 is glaring-
there is neither any averment in the complaint showing prima
facie compliance with the aforementioned requisites nor even a
reference to Rule 47-the first thing the lower courts should have
considered is the subject of the complaint. Nena is challenging
the MTC's order granting the issuance of the writ of execution,
the writ of execution itself, as well as the sheriffs notice of levy
and notice of sale on her real property. Clearly, these are not the
judgments or final orders contemplated by Rule 47. A final order
or resolution is one which is issued by a court which disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been detemined by the
court.36 Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul the levy and
sale at public auction. Neither does it apply to an action to annul
a writ of execution because a writ of execution is not a final order
or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court
in the enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a
judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the
losing party.37

The proper remedy for Nena was to file a motion to nullify the
writ of execution and notices of levy and sale before the MTC,
instead of instituting a new complaint before the RTC.38 This is
because the execution of a decision is merely incidental to the
jurisdiction already acquired by a trial court. As we explained
in Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato:39
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the
parties but continues until the case is terminated. Whatever
irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the
alias writ of execution should be referred to the same
administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is
because any court which issued a writ of execution has the
inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors
of its ministerial officers and to control its own
processes.40 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Ostensibly, Nena's complaint before the RTC may be viewed as
one for prohibition and damages insofar as it also prayed for the
issuance of a permanent injunction and award of damages. While
a petition for prohibition may be an available remedy to assail the
actions of a sheriff who performs purely ministerial functions, in
excess or without jurisdiction,41 the filing of the aforementioned
motion with the MTC is still a precondition to such action. This is
because the motion is the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law."42

Therefore, while the RTC Branch 41 is partially correct in

dismissing the complaint for being the wrong remedy, it
incorrectly identified a petition for relief under Rule 38 as the
proper recourse. The correct remedy is a motion to nullify court
processes filed with the MTC.

III
Even assuming that Nena availed of the appropriate remedy, her
complaint is still without merit.

Nena sought to annul the writ of execution because she did not
receive a copy of the MTC order granting the issuance of the writ
of execution. Yet, she received a copy of the writ without any
protest and voluntarily vacated the premises and turned over
possession to Espinoza's representative. These actions evince
Nena's recognition of and acquiescence to, the writ of
execution; she is therefore estopped from questioning its
validity. After all, she is fully aware of the finality of the decision
in the ejectment case and that execution of the decision is its
logical consequence. "[W]hen a judgment has been satisfied, it
passes beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and the end
of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation
thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable
discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces to and
voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking
an appeal therefrom."43 Furthermore, as a result of Nena's
voluntary compliance with the writ, any issue arising from the
issuance or enforcement of such writ is rendered moot. Injunction
is no longer available to question the transfer of possession to
Espinoza, as the act sought to be enjoined is already fait
accompli.44

Nena's contention that her failure to receive a copy of the order

deprived her of the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration is without legal basis, because she is not entitled
to file a motion for reconsideration in the first place. We have
repeatedly held that once a judgment becomes final, the
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
execution and its issuance is the trial court's ministerial
duty.45 When a prevailing party tiles a motion for execution of a
final and executory judgment, it is not mandatory for such party
to serve a copy of the motion to the adverse party and to set it
for hearing. The absence of such advance notice to the judgment
debtor does not constitute an infringement of due process.46 Ergo,
it follows that the opportunity to move for reconsideration of an
order granting execution is likewise not indispensable to due
process. This renders of little significance Nena's lack of
opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration. In fact, such
motion for reconsideration may be considered as a mere dilatory
pleading, as it would serve no other purpose than to frustrate the
execution of a final judgment. In any case, the MTC actually gave
Nena more than enough opportunity to contest Espinoza's
application for execution when it allowed her to file her opposition
to the motion for execution and heard the parties' arguments on
the matter.

We are convinced that Nena's complaint for annulment of court

processes, filed six months after she voluntarily complied with the
writ of execution, was a mere afterthought designed to evade the
execution of a decision that has long attained finality. Public
policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory,
and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the
fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing
party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at
naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies
with finality.47

The CA 4th Division ordered the remand of the case to determine

the amount of damages Nena is entitled to as a result of the
demolition of the one-story building without a special writ of
demolition. It relied on Section 10(d) of Rule 39 which prohibits a
sheriff from destroying, demolishing or removing any
improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor
without a special order of the court. We agree with the view of
the CA 4th Division that the special writ for the purpose of
demolition is required even if there is already a writ of execution,
and that a demolition performed without a special writ may serve
as basis for an independent civil action for damages.48 However,
the CA 4th Division overlooked one crucial fact in this case: Nena
admitted that she has previously filed a complaint for damages in
relation to the alleged illegal demolition. In her Memorandum
filed before the RTC Branch 41, she categorically stated that "the
illegal demolition of her building was already the subject of an
earlier complaint for damages that she asked her counsel to
prepare."49 Thus, her complaint, insofar as it sought the award of
damages based on the demolition, is dismissible on the ground
of litis pendentia.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by Espinoza, the CA

4th Division merely assumed that Nena was the builder of the
one-story building. Apart from the bare allegations in her
pleadings and her own testimony, the records are bereft of any
evidentiary basis to support her claim. There are two elementary
rules in litigation that the CA 4th Division failed to apply. First, the
party who alleges must prove his case.50 Since Nena is seeking
reimbursement for the building she allegedly constructed, it was
incumbent upon her to prove by preponderance of evidence that
the building was constructed at her own expense, more so since
Espinoza disputes Nena's ownership of the improvement.
However, Nena failed to present any tax declaration, receipt for
construction materials, or testimonies of the workers who
physically built the structure which would tend to substantiate her
claim that the building was constructed at her expense. Second,
questions of fact must be resolved according to the evidence
presented.51 The general rule is that courts must base their
factual findings on such relevant evidence formally offered during
trial. Recognized exceptions to this are matters which courts can
take judicial notice of,52 judicial admissions,53 and presumptions
created by law or by the Rules.54 Here, we find nothing under
Philippine law that creates a presumption that improvements on a
land were made by the lessee (in this case, Nena). On the
contrary, Article 446 of the Civil Code provides that "all works x x
x are presumed made by the owner and at his expense, unless
the contrary is proved." Therefore, in the absence of such
contrary evidence, the CA 4th Division cannot expediently assume
that the building was constructed by Nena.
 C

Finally, one of the grounds relied upon by the CA 4th Division in

annulling the writ of execution was because it purportedly failed
to conform to the judgment which is to be executed. It pointed to
the absence of any mention of monetary award in the dispositive
portion of the CA 17th Division's Decision in the ejectment suit
that became final and executory. We cannot sustain this
unreasonably narrow reading of the fallo.

To recall, the MTC rendered a joint decision against Nena and

Alberto in the consolidated ejectment cases. The MTC ordered
both to vacate the respective premises and to pay the
corresponding rentals, litigation costs, and attorney's fees.
The fallo reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
in:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Civil Case No. 1419 ordering defendant ALBERTO CARIÑO to

vacate the premises in question; to pay plaintiff ESTRELLA
ESPINOZA Four Hundred Fifty (P450.00) Pesos a month, as
reasonable rental of said premises from the time of default until
defendant vacates the same; One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos as
litigation expenses; Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as
attorney's fees in addition to costs of suit; and

2. Civil Case No. 1420 ordering defendant NENA CARIÑO to

vacate the premises in question; to pay plaintiff ESTRELLA
ESPINOZA Four Hundred Fifty (P450.00) Pesos a month, as
reasonable rental of said premises from the time of default until
defendant vacates the same; One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos as
litigation expenses; Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as
attorney's fees in addition to costs of
suit.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Nena and Albetio filed separate appeals with the RTC, which also
consolidated the cases. In its Joint Decision, the RTC Branch 43
reversed the MTC ruling in Civil Case No. 1420 and decreed that
"the case against Nena Cari[ñ]o is hereby dismissed for lack of
cause of action." However, it upheld the ruling against Alberto,
and ordered that he be ejected from the premises and increased
the amount payable as rentals, litigation expenses, and attorney's
fees.56

Espinoza then elevated the case to the CA 17th Division only with

respect to the dismissal of the case against Nena Albetio did not
appeal the decision against him. Eventually, the CA 17th Division
reversed the RTC Branch 43 and affirmed the MTC Decision.
The fallo of the CA 17th Division Decision
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the
Joint Decision dated January 2, 2001 of the court a quo is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, only insofar as it decreed the
dismissal of the ejectment case against respondent Nena
Cari[ñ]o. Accordingly, the Joint Decision dated 25 August 1998 of
the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan is hereby
AFFIRMED insofar as it decreed the ejectment of Nena
Cari[ñ]o.57chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After attaining finality, the CA 17th Division Decision became the
basis of the writ of execution issued by the MTC. In turn, the writ
was the basis of Sheriff Hortaleza's notice of levy and notice of
sale. In her complaint a quo, Nena never questioned her liability
for rentals, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses in accordance
with the MTC Decision. She only questioned the allegedly
erroneous computation of the judgment debt. The CA 4th Division,
however, held that "[n]owhere in the dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals' Decision was it mentioned that an award is
granted nor the amount specified."58 This is blatant error on the
part of the CA 4th Division. The CA 17th Division Decision, in no
uncertain terms, affirmed the decision of the MTC. Hence, the
awards for rentals, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees stand.
When an appellate court affirms a trial court's decision without
any modification, the execution must necessarily conform to the
terms and conditions of the trial court's fallo.59
It appears that the CA 4th Division interpreted the statement that
"[the MTC decision] is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it decreed
the ejectment of Nena Cari[ñ]o" to mean that only the order
to vacate is affirmed. This, however, is clearly not the intent of
the phrase. It must be noted that both the MTC and RTC Branch
43 Decisions were joint decisions. Thus, to clarify that its decision
will not have any effect on the judgment against Alberto who did
not appeal-the CA 17th Division deemed it appropriate to tailor the
dispositive portion as specifically applicable to Nena only. If the
CA 17th Division intended to do away with the monetary awards,
then it would have explicitly stated its modifications in the
dispositive portion. Furthermore, there is nothing in the body of
the CA 17th Division's Decision that would tend to support the
deletion of the awards for rentals, litigation expenses, and
attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

November 26, 2009 and Resolution dated August 3, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89905
are REVERSED and SET ASlDE. The Decision dated April 10,
2007 of Branch 41 of the Regional. Trial Court of Dagupan City in
Civil Case No. 2005-0317-D is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 142345             August 13, 2004

THE HEIRS OF FERRY BAYOT, namely, SIMPLICIO BAYOT, JERRY

BAYOT, MARICRIS BAYOT, TERESA OBIAL and ROSIE
PALADO, petitioners,
vs.
ESTRELLA BATERBONIA and ANGEL BATERBONIA, respondents.
 DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Heirs of Ferry Bayot of

the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44106 which
denied their motion for clarification of its November 8, 1995 Decision.2

The Antecedents

The Buayan Townsite Subdivision located in General Santos, Cotabato,

was owned by the Board of Liquidators. During the period of August 6,
1948 to August 6, 1951, the Board of Liquidators had the property surveyed
by Simplicio Cagampang. Lots No. 4116, 4117 and 4118 were located
along Magsaysay Avenue.

In 1954, Estrella Baterbonia acquired Lot No. 4118 and occupied the
property. In the meantime, the Bureau of Lands approved the Cagampang
survey plan on May 29, 1959. In 1962, Ferry Bayot acquired Lot No. 4117
consisting of an area of 550 square meters from her aunt and took
possession of the property.

During the period of 1963 to 1964, the Board of Liquidators had the
property resurveyed by the Calina Survey Office and, in the process, the
numbering of the lots was altered. Lot No. 4116 under the Cagampang
survey became Lot No. 4115 under the Calina survey, while Lot No. 4118
became Lot No. 4117. The resurvey plan prepared by the Calina Survey
Office was not, however, approved by the Bureau of Lands.

On July 6, 1966, Baterbonia filed an Application for a Miscellaneous Sales

Patent over her property. On her belief that the Calina resurvey plan had
been approved by the Bureau of Lands, she indicated in her application
that her property was Lot No. 4117. Her application was approved. On
October 17, 1966, a Miscellaneous Sales Patent was executed over Lot
No. 4117 of the Calina survey in her favor, on the basis of which she was
issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (P-28221), (P-10766), (P-
1702). The title contained the technical description of Lot No. 4118 under
the Cagampang survey.
Twenty-three (23) years later, or on October 30, 1989, Bayot filed a
Complaint against Baterbonia for reconveyance of Lot No. 4117. Bayot
claimed that she had been in possession of Lot No. 4117 of the
Cagampang survey, but that Baterbonia had the same titled in her name.
She admitted during the hearing that Lot No. 4116 under the Cagampang
survey was already owned by Yap Mabuhay.

On March 22, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment against Bayot and in
favor of Baterbonia ordering the dismissal of the complaint. However, in the
body of its decision, the court directed Baterbonia to file a petition in court
for the correction or amendment of OCT No. (P-28221), (P-10766), (P-
1702), thus:

… So that Ferry Bayot would not be prejudiced by the continued

existence of Estrella Baterbonia’s title to Lot No. 4117, which is not
hers, but Ferry Bayot’s, because such fact (the continued existence
of Estrella Baterbonia’s title to Lot No. 4117) would prevent Ferry
Bayot from filing an application to secure title for said Lot No. 4117,
the Court directs Estrella Baterbonia to file a petition in court for the
alteration or amendment of her title, pursuant to Section 108 of P.D.
No. 1529, within a reasonable time.3

Bayot filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, but on April 14,
1993, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion. The decision was
then appealed with the Court of Appeals, which rendered judgment on
November 8, 1995, affirming the decision of the trial court. Upon the denial
of her motion for reconsideration, Bayot filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 12799, which was denied
due course. Entry of judgment was made on September 12, 1997.4 In the
meantime, Bayot died intestate.

On February 29, 1998, the petitioners, the heirs of Bayot, filed a "Notice
and Claim of Implied Trust" with the Register of Deeds of General Santos
City, claiming that Baterbonia held the property covered by the said title in
trust for their predecessors. The respondents, Spouses Angel and Estrella
Baterbonia, opposed the application, contending that the CA, in its final and
executory Decision of November 8, 1995, ruled that constructive or implied
trust in the instant case was inapplicable. The Register of Deeds annotated
the claim as Entry No. 307463.5 The respondents filed a motion to cancel
the said entry, alleging that no constructive or implied trust in favor of Bayot
or his heirs was created by reason of their continued refusal to file a
petition for alteration or amendment of title as directed by the Regional Trial
Court and CA. The RTC granted the motion of the respondents.

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a motion on February 8, 1999 with the CA

(Fourth Division) for clarification of its November 8, 1995 Decision. They
prayed that the CA clarify its decision and direct the Spouses Baterbonia to
comply with its order directing them to file a petition for a correction or
amendment of OCT No. (P-28221).6 On September 10, 1999, the CA
denied the motion, holding that the assailed decision had already become
final and executory.7 The motion for reconsideration thereon was, likewise,
subsequently denied on January 24, 2000. Hence, this petition.

The petitioners contend that, under its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 44106,
the CA directed respondent Estrella Baterbonia to file a petition with the
appropriate court for the amendment of title within a reasonable time,
pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.8 They relate
that the respondent was allowed to keep her title as basis for the filing of a
petition in court for correction of title.9 They insist that the order of the CA
under its decision was for the respondents to merely utilize their title as
basis for the correction and/or amendment thereof, and not to perpetually
keep the same. They allege that, as such, the respondent was not given
any option nor discretion to dispose of or to convey the title to anyone.
Citing Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners claim that if
a judgment directs a party to perform a specific act and the party failed to
comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at
the cost of the disobedient party.10

In their comment, the respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed on

the ground that the November 8, 1995 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 44106 had long become final and executory. They contend that the
order of the CA in its decision directing them to file a petition in the court for
the amendment of their certificate of title, pursuant to Section 108 of P.D.
No. 1529 was unnecessary, considering that the technical description in
OCT No. (P-28221), (P-10766), (P-1702) was, in fact, the property
contained in Lot No. 4117 under the Cagampang survey, approved by the
Bureau of Lands on May 29, 1959. They further allege that the fact that the
lot number was erroneously stated in their title was unimportant.
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not a decision
which has become final and executory precludes the filing of a motion for
the clarification thereof; (b) whether or not the decision of the CA is
ambiguous; and (c) whether or not the respondents may be compelled to
file a petition for alteration or amendment of their title to reflect the correct
lot number of their property.

The petition is meritorious.

Even if its decision is already final and executory, the CA retains jurisdiction
to clarify any ambiguities caused by any inadvertent omission or mistake in
the dispositive portion thereof. For this purpose, the appellate court may
resort to the pleadings of the parties, its findings of facts and conclusions of
law as expressed in the body of the decision.11 In Republic Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,12 we held that a final
and executory judgment or the fallo thereof may be clarified or rectified by
an amendment because of an ambiguity arising from inadvertent omission
of what might be described as a logical follow-through of something set
forth in the body of the decision of the court and in the dispositive portion
thereof.

In this case, the trial court and the appellate court ruled that Ferry Bayot
was not entitled to a reconveyance of the property because the
respondents were its lawful owners as declared therein, although
erroneously numbered as Lot No. 4117 based on the unapproved Calina
survey. However, the petitioner was the owner of Lot No. 4117 of the
Cagampang survey, and unless the lot number under OCT No. (P-28221),
(P-10766), (P-1702) under the names of the respondents was corrected
and amended as Lot No. 4118, the petitioners would never be able to apply
for and secure title over the property under their names. Hence, both the
trial and appellate courts directed respondent Estrella Baterbonia to file a
petition in court for the correction or amendment of the said OCT pursuant
to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 and, for this purpose, allowed her to keep
the owner’s duplicate of the said title as basis for the filing of the said
petition. The appellate court, in fact, emphasized that:

One final point is the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred
in directing them to file a petition in court for the alteration or
amendment of their title in order to correct the technical description
 as well as the number of the lot in accordance with the approved
Cagampang Survey.

A petition to amend or alter a certificate of title is allowed under Sec.

108 of P.D. 1529 "if any error, omission or mistake was made in
entering a certificate of title" or "upon any other reasonable ground."
Hence, there maybe a correction of technical description of lands
covered by a certificate of title (Domingo vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 361)
provided that the original decree of registration be not thereby
reopened and the "title or other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value and in good faith" be not thereby impaired.
(Nadela and Jaca vs. Cabras, 70 Phil. 392).

In the present case, the technical description and the lot number used
by the defendants were based on the unapproved Calina Survey
plan; hence, necessarily it should be amended to reflect the correct
description as well as the lot number under the Cagampang Survey.

The disposition by the trial court of the issue as to the non-

cancellation of OCT No. (P-28221) (P-1702) raised in the present
case appears reasonable and fair under the admitted circumstances
of the case.13

The filing of the petition was ordered by the courts for the benefit of the
parties, to avoid any confusion on the precise property covered by the said
title. Unfortunately, however, both courts, through inadvertence, failed to
include in the fallo of their decisions the order directing respondent Estrella
Baterbonia to file the said petition. Such inadvertent omission must be
rectified by an amendment of the dispositive portion of the decision of the
CA. The bare fact that the petitioners filed their motion in the CA for
clarification of its decision only after the lapse of some years is of no
moment. Technicality should not prevail over considerations of substantial
justice.14

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

respondents are ORDERED to file the appropriate petition in court within
thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision for the amendment of the lot
number of the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (P-
28221), (P-10766), (P-1702) from Lot No. 4117 under the Calina survey to
Lot No. 4118 under the Cagampang survey, pursuant to Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174542, August 03, 2015

KAREN GO, Petitioner, v. LAMBERTO ECHAVEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 30, 2006
Decision1 and August 15, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals3 (CA) in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 77310.

The assailed CA decision dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition4 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and ruled that
Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental
committed no grave abuse of discretion in: (i) granting the
respondent's Motion for Execution, and in issuing the Writ of
Execution on May 12, 2003; and (ii) denying the petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration5 on May 27, 2003. The challenged CA
resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Karen Go (Go) is engaged in buying and selling motor

vehicles and heavy equipment under the business name Kargo
Enterprises (Kargo). Nick Carandang (Carandang) is Kargo's
Manager at its General Santos City Branch.6redarclaw

On December 20, 1996, Kargo7 and Carandang entered into a

Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase8 (lease contract) over a
Fuso Dropside Truck (truck). The lease contract stipulated that
Kargo would execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the truck upon
Carandang's full payment of five equal monthly installments of
P78,710.75.9 If he failed to pay any of the installments,
Carandang should return the truck and forfeit his payments as
rentals. The lease contract also prohibited Carandang from
assigning his rights, as lessee-buyer, to third persons.10redarclaw

Carandang failed to pay the installments11 prompting Go to

demand the return of the truck.12 Carandang, instead of returning
the truck, sold it to respondent Lamberto Echavez (Echavez)
without Go's knowledge. Later, Go learned about the sale but did
not know to whom the truck was sold.13 Hence, on April 30, 1997,
Go filed before the RTC a Complaint14 for Replevin, docketed as
Civil Case No. 97-271, against Carandang and John Doe.15

The RTC issued the Writ of Replevin; and on May 17, 1997, the
sheriff seized the truck from Echavez.16redarclaw

On August 5, 1997, Echavez filed his Answer17 with Cross-Claim

and Counterclaim. Echavez denied knowledge of the lease
contract, and claimed that he bought the truck in good faith and
for value from Kargo through Carandang.18 According to Echavez,
Go could not deny Carandang's authority to sell Kargo's trucks
because she represented to the public that Carandang was
Kargo's manager.

In his counterclaim,19 Echavez alleged that from the time the

truck was seized, he had missed many of his deliveries for his
seeds and fertilizer business causing him actual damages in
terms of unrealized income amounting to P10,000.00 per
week. For his cross-claim, Echavez prayed that Carandang
should be held liable if the RTC ruled in Go's favor.20redarclaw

Carandang, however, failed to answer the Complaint and the

Cross-claim despite receipt of summonses. Hence, the RTC
declared him in default.
After trial on the merits, the RTC held Go and Carandang
solidarity liable to Echavez for damages. The RTC found that: (i)
Echavez purchased the truck from Kargo, through Carandang, in
good faith and for value; and (ii) Go is estopped from denying
Carandang's authority to sell the truck. The dispositive portion of
the February 11, 2000 Judgment reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and considering the

preponderance of evidence in favor of the defendant Lamberto
Echavez, the complaint against him is hereby DISMISSED. Upon
convincing proof of the counterclaim, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the plaintiff and defendant Nick Carandang to
jointly and severally pay or indemnify herein defendant Lamberto
Echavez of the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. P10,000.00 per week as actual damages

from the time the subject motor vehicle was
seized from defendant Echavez, that is, on
May 17, 1997;

2. P300,000.00 by way of moral

damages;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

3. P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4. P50,000.00 as litigation expenses and P50,000.00

as attorney's fees, exclusive of the sum of
P3,000.00 as appearance fee for every hearing.
The damages and attorney's fees awarded by the
Court is pursuant to the ruling by  the  Supreme 
Court  in National  Power Corporation vs. CA,
GR#  122195, July 23, 1998; and to restitute
unto defendant Lamberto Echavez the motor
vehicle seized on replevin or to refund to the
said defendant, the payment made for the said
vehicle and to pay the costs. [Emphasis supplied.]
On February 29, 2000, Go moved for reconsideration arguing that
the RTC failed to consider the Lease Contract, and that the actual
damages awarded to Echavez were not supported by evidence.

On April 17, 2000, the RTC granted in part Go's Motion for
Reconsideration holding Carandang liable to Go for the truck's
value22 plus damages. The RTC, however, maintained that
Echavez is entitled to his counterclaim.23 Thus, the April 17, 2000
Order preserved the dispositive portion of the February 11, 2000
Judgment but added a new paragraph ordering Carandang to pay
Go damages, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees.24redarclaw

On April 25, 2000, Go appealed the Judgment to the CA,

docketed as C.A. G.R. No. CV-68814.

Meanwhile, on Echavez's motion, the RTC allowed partial

execution of the Judgment pending appeal. Thus, on May 5,
2000, Go delivered to Echavez another truck as substitute for the
truck previously seized.25redarclaw

On June 4, 2002, CA. G.R. No. CV-68814 was dismissed since

Go had failed to serve and file the required number of copies of
her appellant's brief.26 Go moved for reconsideration, but the CA
denied her motion. Thus, on October 2, 2002, the CA entered in
its book of entries the dismissal of CA. G.R. No. CV-68814.27

On April 8, 2003, Echavez moved for execution of the RTC's

Judgment. Before the RTC could act on the Motion for Execution,
Go filed a Motion for Clarification28 alleging that the
P10,000.00 per week award: (i) will roughly amount to
P1,600,000.00, which is more than double the truck's value; (ii)
erroneously assumed that the truck was "continually (sic) hired
and running without maintenance for a period of nearly three
years"; (iii) "is not an 'actual' damage;" and (iv) is inequitable,
highly speculative, and will unjustly enrich Echavez. Pending
clarification, Go prayed that the RTC hold the issuance of the writ
of execution.
Echavez opposed Go's motion for being dilatory.

In her Reply with Manifestation,29 Go argued that the February

11, 2000 Judgment, as modified by the April 17, 2000 Order, is
unenforceable because it contains materially conflicting rulings.
Go argues that since the RTC held Carandang liable on the lease
contract, it also upheld the provision30 prohibiting Carandang
from assigning his rights to third persons. In effect, the RTC
invalidated Carandang's transfer of the truck to Echavez and
recognized Go's ownership. Thus, the counterclaim should be
dismissed because Go, as owner, had the right to recover the
truck from Echavez.

On May 12, 2003, RTC Judge Downey C. Valdevilla denied Go's

Motion for Clarification and Manifestation, and issued the Writ of
Execution. Go moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied her
motion.

On June 4, 2003, Go filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction & Temporary Restraining
Order alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in executing a
Judgment that: (i) contains materially conflicting rulings; and (ii)
will result in Echavez's unjust enrichment. Go prayed that the CA
stop the RTC from implementing the Writ of Execution.

The CA's Decision

In its Decision dated March 30, 2006, the CA denied Go's petition
for certiorari.

The CA ruled that the RTC's Judgment does not contain materially
conflicting rulings. Go merely failed to grasp the correctness of
the ruling.31redarclaw

The CA reminded Go that in the main case, she sued two

defendants: (i) Carandang, in his capacity as buyer of the truck;
and (ii) Echavez, as possessor and owner of the
truck.32 According to the CA, the RTC can give due course to the
complaint against Carandang and dismiss it in so far as Echavez
is concerned.33  This is because, unlike Carandang, Echavez
successfully proved his defense and counterclaim.34 Considering
that there is nothing to clarify, the RTC's execution of Judgment
did not constitute abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion.

The CA opined that the award of P10,000.00 per week as actual

damages is exorbitant. However, it admitted that its opinion no
longer matters because the Judgment had already become final.

Go moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied her motion.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari

Go claims that the RTC decided the case contrary to law,

jurisprudence, and regular procedure calling for the exercise of
this Court's power of supervision.35 She argues
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. The February 11, 2000 Judgment, modified by the April 17,

2000 Order, did not finally resolve or dispose of the action
because the RTC made two conflicting rulings which, unless
clarified, renders the Judgment unenforceable.36redarclaw

2. An execution of the award of actual damages, amounting to

P10,000.00 per week from May 17, 1997, will amount to an
unjust enrichment of the respondent.37

Thus, Go prays, among others, that this Court: (i) set aside the
RTC's Judgment dated February 11, 2000, and its Order
dated April 17, 2000; (ii) nullify all proceedings in respect to
the execution in Civil Case No. 97-271; (iii) declare Go not
liable on Echavez's counterclaim.38redarclaw

The Case for the Respondent

Echavez claims that the RTC's Judgment does not contain

materially conflicting rulings, hence, there is nothing to
clarify.39 According to Echavez, the present petition should be
dismissed because it seeks the "recalibration" of the RTC's
findings of fact and law.40 Echavez points out that this Court is
not a trier of facts, and that a petition for certiorari cannot
substitute for a lost appeal.41redarclaw

The Issues Raised

The parties' arguments, properly joined, present to us the

following issues:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1) Whether the February 11, 2000 judgment, as modified by the

April 27, 2000 order, contains materially conflicting rulings.

2) Whether the actual damages awarded to Echavez can still be

modified.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

The Judgment does not

contain materially
conflicting rulings

We are not persuaded by Go's claim that the Judgment, as

modified by the April 17, 2000 Order, contains two materially
conflicting rulings.

Go has read too many assumptions in the April 17, 2000 Order.
The RTC never invalidated the sale between Carandang and
Echavez; it simply recognized Carandang's obligations to Go for
breach of contract. The lease contract bound only Go and
Carandang because Echavez was found to be a buyer in good
faith and for value.
The flaw in Go's argument springs from her misconception that
Echavez's counterclaim is a component part of the main action.
The Rules of Court define a counterclaim as any claim which a
defending party may have against an opposing party.42 Sec. 1,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court also states that the term "plaintiff
may refer to the counterclaimant or cross-claimant while the term
"defendant" may refer to the defendant in the counterclaim, or in
the cross-claim. Thus, when Echavez filed his Counterclaim
in  Civil Case  No. 97-271, he became the plaintiff in the
counterclaim, while Go became the defendant.

We also note that Go's complaint against Carandang is separate

from the complaint against Echavez because they were not sued
as alternative defendants. As the CA correctly put it, Carandang
was sued based on the lease contract; while Echavez was
impleaded as possessor of the truck.

In effect, there are four causes of action in Civil Case No. 97-
271: first, Go's complaint against Carandang based on the Lease
Contract; second, Go's complaint against Echavez, as possessor
of the truck; third, Echavez's counterclaim against Go;
and  fourth, Echavez's cross-claim against Carandang.

Considering that the four causes of action are independent from

each other, the RTC can grant Go's complaint against Carandang
but dismiss that against Echavez, and at the same time, grant
Echavez's counterclaim and cross-claim against Go and
Carandang, respectively. These rulings are not incompatible with
one another.

What would be incompatible is a decision favoring Go's complaint

against Echavez, and at the same time awarding the latter's
counterclaim. This is because Echavez's counterclaim is
compulsory in character, or one that arises as a consequence of
the main action. Thus, had Go's case against Echavez been
sustained, it would mean that Go was entitled to the possession
of the truck and that its seizure could not have injured Echavez.
That is not the case here.
The February 11, 2000 Judgment
had attained finality and had
become Immutable

To "clarify" is to free the mind of confusion, doubt or

uncertainty, or to make something understandable.43 Although Go
prays for "clarification," We note that her objective is to petition
this Court to modify the judgment award and ultimately, to nullify
or at least, reopen Civil Case No. 97-271.

We point at the outset that the February 11, 2000 Judgment, as

modified by the April 27, 2000 Order, became final and executory
on June 19, 2015, or 15 days following the dismissal of C.A. G.R.
No. CV-68814.44 At that point, the Judgment had become
immutable, and hence could no longer be changed, revised,
amended, or reversed.45redarclaw

The rule, however, admits exceptions: first, the correction of

clerical errors; second, the making of  nunc pro tunc entries
which causes no prejudice to any party; third, an attack against
a void judgment; and. fourth and last, supervening events that
render execution unjust and inequitable.darclaw

Clerical errors cover all errors, mistakes, or omissions47 that

result in the record's failure to correctly represent the court's
decision.48 However, courts are not authorized to add terms it
never adjudged, nor enter orders it never made, although it
should have made such additions or entered such
orders.49redarclaw

In other words, to be clerical, the error or mistake must be

plainly due to inadvertence or negligence.50 Examples of clerical
errors include the interchange of the words "mortgagor" and
"mortgagee,"51 and the correction of the dispositive portion to
read "heirs of Joaquin Avendafio" instead of "heirs of Isabela
Avendano."52redarclaw
Nunc pro tunc is Latin for "now for then." Its purpose is to
put on record an act which the court performed, but omitted from
the record through inadvertence or mistake.53 It is neither
intended to render a new judgment nor supply the court's
inaction.54 In other words, a nunc pro tunc entry may be used
to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it
speak what it did not speak but ought to have
spoken.55redarclaw

A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect. It does

not divest rights and no rights can be obtained under it; all
proceedings founded upon a void judgment are equally worthless.

Void judgments, because they are legally nonexistent,57 are

susceptible to collateral attacks. A collateral attack is an attack,
made as an incident in another action, whose purpose is to obtain
a different relief. In other words, a party need not file an action
to purposely attack a void judgment; he may attack the void
judgment as part of some other proceeding. A void judgment or
order is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head.58 Thus, it can never become final, and could be assailed at
any time.

Nevertheless, this Court has laid down a stiff requirement to

collaterally overthrow a judgment. In the case of Reyes, et al. v.
Datu,59 We ruled that it is not enough for the party seeking the
nullity to show a mistaken or erroneous decision; he must show
to the court that the judgment complained of is utterly void.60 In
short, the judgment must be void upon its face.edarclaw

Supervening events, on the other hand, are circumstances that

transpire after the decision's finality rendering the execution of
the judgment unjust and inequitable.62 It includes matters that
the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because
such matters were not yet in existence at the time.63 In such
cases, courts are allowed to suspend execution, admit evidence
proving the event or circumstance, and grant relief as the new
facts and circumstances warrant.64redarclaw

To successfully stay or stop the execution of a final

judgment, the supervening event: (i) must have altered or
modified the parties' situation as to render execution inequitable,
impossible, or unfair;65 and (ii) must be established by competent
evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the
conclusive effects of a fined and immutable judgment.66redarclaw

The award can no longer be

modified because it is not covered
by any of the exceptions

The challenged award is not a clerical error because it is exactly

what Echavez prayed for.

In his counterclaim, Echavez alleged that he suffered actual

losses "in the amount of not less than P10,000.00 weekly in
terms of unrealized income reckoned from the time the truck was
seized by the sheriff."67 During trial, Echavez offered
documentary exhibits68 to prove such losses; and the RTC, in
turn, admitted those pieces of evidence,69 ruling that "it cannot
help but agree with defendant Echavez that he has suffered
actual loss of income." Obviously, there was no inadvertence,
mistake, nor omission here.

A nunc pro tunc entry cannot be recognized in this case.

Go argues that, in granting the award, the RTC assumed that the
vehicle was hired and was continually running for three years,
which is contrary to the normal usage and practice in the
transport industry. We note that "normal usage and practice in
the transport industry" is a not matter adjudged in the original
decision. Thus, had Go's motion been granted, the RTC would
have required the parties to prove what consists "normal usage
and practice in the transport industry." Such modification is
not nunc pro tunc because it supplies findings of facts and law not
included in the original judgment.
Moreover, a nunc pro tunc entry should cause no prejudice to
either party. Apparently, the diminution of the award is
prejudicial to Echavez because he would be deprived of a right
already vested in him by the Judgment.

Neither does the award render the judgment void.

Go failed to prove that the judgment is utterly void. On the

contrary, the judgment has complied with all the requisites of a
valid decision70 and has fully satisfied the requirements of due
process.71redarclaw

Go insists, however, that this Court should take a second look at

the propriety of the award because it would result in Echavez's
unjust enrichment. This, we cannot do.

We agree with the CA that some might opine the award to be

exorbitant. However, variance in opinion does not render the
award wrong, much less void. Considering that the judgment is
already final, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted by the court that rendered it or by
the highest Court of [the] land.72redarclaw

Lastly, Go did not allege in her petition, much less establish by

competent evidence, that the parties' situation changed after the
judgment became final.

Nonetheless, we note that during the judgment's partial

execution, Go delivered to Echavez another truck as replacement
for the one previously seized. To our mind, this event did not
change the situation of the parties because: (i) the restitution of
the truck is a separate award from the actual damages; and (ii)
Echavez's receipt of the replacement truck did not recompense
him for the unrealized income he suffered since May 17, 1997.
We realize, however, that while the Judgment specifies the day
Go must begin paying Echavez PI0,000.00 per week, it does not
say until when she is obligated to pay.73redarclaw

This Court puts on record that Go never alleged that the award is
vague for this reason. Instead, her Motion for Clarification argues
that "a rough computation of the [award] will amount to more
than One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos" and that the
amount "assumes that the vehicle is continually hired and
running without maintenance for a period of three years." These
arguments show that even Go understood the meaning of the
award— that the PI0,000.00 per week covers only three years, or
156 weeks counted from May 17, 1997, up to May 5, 2000.

In any case, what is clear to us is that Go never introduced any

competent evidence to prove that the RTC executed the judgment
unreasonably or to the point of absurdity.

Considering that there is no issue affecting the Judgment,

Echavez is entitled to a writ of execution as a matter of
right.74 Accordingly, the RTC did not commit abuse, much less
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution, and in
denying Go's Motion for Clarification and Manifestation.

Finally, we note that Go's petition for certiorari was filed on June
4, 2003. Had it been filed after A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC came into
effect, the CA would have been constrained to rule on whether
the petition for certiorari was prosecuted manifestly for delay or
was too unsubstantial to require consideration.76 In these
instances, the CA might have ordered Go and his counsel to pay
treble costs. As a word of caution, lawyers should study their
grounds carefully, lest they waste the precious time of the courts.

WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we

hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM in toto the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2006, and the Resolution dated
August 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 77310. Costs against
petitioner Karen Go.
SO ORDERED.

RULE 37
FIRST DIVISION
[ A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-4308-RTJ),
October 18, 2017 ]
ATTY. EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, PETITIONER, V. JUDGE
EMMANUEL P. PASAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 38,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint[1] for gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, gross inefficiency and/or neglect of duty filed by Atty. Eddie
U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong) against Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal
(Judge Pasal), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 38, relative to Special Civil Action No. 2013-184,
entitled Henmar Development Property, Inc. v. Judge Michelia O.
Capadocia, Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Opal, Misamis Oriental
and Heirs of Enrique Abada represented by his wife and children, et al.
The antecedent facts of the instant administrative complaint are recounted
below.

On June 21, 2012, the heirs of Enrique Abada (Abada's heirs), represented
by his wife and children, filed a case for Quieting of Title, Recovery of
Possession, Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33060,
and Annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Opol, Misamis Oriental, against
Atty. Tamondong's client, Henmar Development Property Inc. (Henmar),
docketed as Civil Case No. 2012-06-04. Subsequently, Henmar, through
Atty. Tamondong, filed an Omnibus Motion (Ad Cautelam) which prayed
for, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint based on the
following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of Henmar; (b)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and/or improper venue; and (c)
prescription and/or laches. In an Order dated March 26, 2013, the MTCC
denied the motion to dismiss of Henmar. Henmar filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was also denied by the MTCC in an Order dated July
4, 2013.
Aggrieved, Henmar filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)[2] before the RTC, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2013-
184. The case was raffled to Branch 38, presided by Judge Pasal.
On December 23, 2013, Judge Pasal issued a Resolution[3] dismissing the
Petition for lack of merit, for the following reasons:
This court holds that the denial of the dismissal by the public respondent
falls short of the foregoing to justify the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari and prohibition.

On the first ground, the public respondent acted well within her jurisdiction
when she ruled that summons was validly served and jurisdiction over the
person of Henmar was validly obtained. True, the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure enumerates specific persons who may validly receive summons
for or on behalf of corporations. In the case of E.B. Villarosa and Partner
Co., Limited vs. Herminia I. Benito, et al. (G.R. No. 136426, August 6,
1999) the Supreme Court emphasized that the list of persons who validly
receive summons for a corporation is exclusive and should be strictly
followed. However, this is but one side of the jurisprudential spectrum in the
interpretation and application on the rule of service of summons on
corporations. On the other side of the spectrum is the opinion of Justice
Regalado (p. 225, Remedial Law Compendium Volume 1, 6 th ed.) that
service of summons to a secretary who is not the official corporate
secretary is binding on the corporation when the same is seasonably
received by the corporation. Said opinion became a binding precedent
when the same was integrated by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the
case of BPI vs. Sps. Santiago (G.R. No. 169116, March 28, 2007). It thus
appears that the strict interpretation of the rule on service of summons to
corporations espoused by the earlier E.B. Villarosa case has been modified
by the subsequent BPI case where the Supreme Court went as far as to
pronounce that "there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of
service of summons". The law therefore gives sufficient latitude for judges
to exercise discretion in determining whether there was valid service of
summons.
Whether or not there were sufficient grounds to declare substantial
compliance is irrelevant in a certiorari proceeding as this is not an error of
jurisdiction but an error of law which is a proper subject for appeal. Even
assuming that the requirements for substantial compliance of service of
summons were not present, there is no showing that the public respondent
acted arbitrarily or despotically.

On the second ground, petitioner points out that jurisdiction over the case
lies outside of the territorial jurisdiction of respondent court which is limited
to the Municipality of Opol. The property involved in this case is described
in the title and the decree as located in Iponan which is part of the city of
Cagayan de Oro. This argument however conveniently ignores the fact,
which the public respondent took judicial notice of that the title and the
decree refer to a cadastral survey conducted in 1933 when the Municipality
of Opol was not yet in existence. It was only in 1950 that Opol came into
existence. A trial is therefore necessary to determine the political
boundaries of said new municipality and determine whether the subject
property lies within the court's jurisdictional borders.

Finally, on the issue of prescription, jurisprudence has established that an

action for reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible when the plaintiff
is in actual possession of the property (Leyson et. al. vs. Bontuyan, et. al.,
G.R. No. 156357). In this case, private respondents alleged that they were
in actual possession of the property until they were ousted from the same
in 2008. Prescription therefore commenced to run only in 2008. Since the
present action was filed in 2012, the action has not yet prescribed.
Henmar filed a Motion for Reconsideration[4] of the foregoing Resolution,
and Abada's heirs filed their Opposition/Comment to the Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]
In an Order[6] dated February 24, 2014, Judge Pasal deemed the Motion for
Reconsideration of Henmar as already submitted for resolution. However,
even after more than six months, Judge Pasal had yet to resolve the said
Motion.
Hence, Atty. Tamondong initiated the instant administrative complaint
charging Judge Pasal with gross ignorance of the law and/or gross
incompetence.

Atty. Tamondong contends that Judge Pasal's Resolution dated December

23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184 is legally erroneous, insisting
that: (a) the MTCC has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Henmar
as the summons was improperly served on the clerical/secretarial staff of
another corporation, the Radio Mindanao Network, Inc.; (b) the MTCC does
not have jurisdiction over the subject property because said property is
located in Cagayan de Oro City and not in the Municipality of Opol; and (c)
Henmar has been in possession of the subject property, plus, the
document/agreement which Abada's heirs seek to enforce against Henmar
had been executed on April 22, 1968, so the complaint filed by Abada's
heirs before the MTCC only in 2013 is already beyond the 10-year
prescriptive period under the Civil Code for filing an action based on a
written contract. Atty. Tamondong asserts that Judge Pasal, in ruling
against Henmar and dismissing its Petition, showed gross and manifest
ignorance and incompetence; and also Judge Pasal, "with all his too
glaring, unfounded and unjustified rejection of the factual and legal
grounds"[7] raised by Henmar in its Petition, was unduly favoring Abada's
heirs.
In addition, Atty. Tamondong questions Judge Pasal's failure to seasonably
act on and resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar and avers
that Judge Pasal's inaction on said Motion for more than six months
constituted gross inefficiency and/or gross neglect of duty.

In his Comment,[8] Judge Pasal invites attention to his Resolution dated

December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184, which he claims
to be self-explanatory as it amply cites the applicable rule, jurisprudence,
and opinion of an eminent author. Judge Pasal also points out that the act
Atty. Tamondong complains of, i.e., the dismissal of the Petition in Special
Civil Action No. 2013-184, is judicial in nature and, in fact, Atty. Tamondong
has already elevated the same before the Court •of Appeals. Judge Pasal
lastly reasons that the exercise of one's judicial discretion in accordance
with law, no matter how unfavorable it might be to a party, does not
constitute gross ignorance of the law.
Atty. Tamondong filed a Reply to Comment[9] reiterating the supposed flaws
in Judge Pasal's Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil
Action No. 2013-184. According to Atty. Tamondong, there is no dispute as
to the authorities cited by Judge Pasal in said Resolution and the only
problem is the absence of facts and/or evidence for their application. Atty.
Tamondong further argues that the appeal of Judge Pasal's Resolution
before the Court of Appeals is not a barrier to the present administrative
complaint against Judge Pasal since these two remedies can proceed
independently and be resolved separately from one another. The
administrative complaint concerns Judge Pasal's fitness to remain in the
Judiciary and not the merits of Special Civil Action No. 2013-184. Atty.
Tamondong additionally alleges that by being completely mum on the
matter, Judge Pasal has impliedly admitted his failure to timely resolve the
Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Deputy Court
Administrator Raul Bautista Villanueva, submitted a Memorandum[10] dated
June 7, 2016, recommending as follows:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration
of the Honorable Court that:
a. The instant administrative complaint against Presiding Judge
Emmanuel P. Pasal, Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro
City, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

b. Respondent Judge Pasal be found GUILTY of gross inefficiency

and/or neglect of duty arising from undue delay in resolving a motion and
be FINED in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) with
a WARNING to be more punctilious in the observance of the
reglementary periods for resolving pending motions in his court as a
repetition of the same infraction shall be dealt with more severely; and

c. The charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondent Judge

Pasal is DISMISSED for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit.
The Court, in a Resolution[11] dated August 17, 2016, resolves, among other
matters, to re-docket the instant administrative complaint as a regular
administrative matter.
In their respective Manifestations,[12] the parties agree to already submit the
administrative complaint for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
The Court fully adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

On the charge of gross ignorance

and/or gross incompetence
There is no merit in Atty. Tamondong's charge of gross ignorance of the
law and/or gross incompetence against Judge Pasal.

Atty. Tamondong's sole basis for his charge is Judge Pasal's Resolution
dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184 dismissing
the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which Atty. Tamondong filed on
behalf of his client, Henmar. In said Resolution, Judge Pasal determined
that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in denying the motion to dismiss of
Henmar in Civil Case No. 2012-06-04. Atty. Tamondong though is adamant
that the MTCC should have dismissed the complaint of Abada's heirs
against Henmar in Civil Case No. 2012-06-04 on the grounds of (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the person of Henmar; (b) lack of territorial jurisdiction over
the subject property; and (c) lack of jurisdiction over a prescribed action.
Judge Pasal issued the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special
Civil Action No. 2013-184 in the exercise of his adjudicative functions, and
any errors he might have committed therein cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies.[13] The issues of jurisdiction being argued by Atty. Tamondong
are judicial matters, which again can only be decided upon through judicial
remedies. A party's recourse, if prejudiced by a judge's orders in the course
of a trial, is with the proper reviewing court and not with the OCA, through
an administrative complaint.[14]
The Court declared that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a
judicial remedy exists and is available. The acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. A judge cannot be civilly,
criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, provided he acts in good faith.[15]
The Court also expounded in Flores v. Abesamis[16] that:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against
errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which
may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or
admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or
substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or
after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and
appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which
may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious,
despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special
civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition,
a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings
and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory
of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well
as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are
pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the
judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is
only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into
his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or
closed.

In the present administrative complaint, Atty. Tamondong admitted that he

already filed an appeal of Judge Pasal's Resolution dated December 23,
2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184 before the Court of Appeals.
Absent any showing that Atty. Tamondong has exhausted all available
judicial remedies and that there is already an entry of judgment in the
appropriate judicial action or proceeding, the Court cannot proceed to
inquire herein into Judge Pasal's administrative liability in relation to said
Resolution.

Moreover, Atty. Tamondong failed to offer proof that in issuing the

Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184,
Judge Pasal was acting in bad faith and unduly favoring Abada's heirs.
Mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is insufficient
because bias and partiality can never be presumed. Also, bad faith or
malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a
party.[17]
On the charge of gross inefficiency
and/or gross neglect of duty
As for the other charge of gross inefficiency and for gross neglect of duty,
the Court finds Judge Pasal administratively liable for undue delay in
resolving the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated December
23, 2013 filed by Atty. Tamondong, on behalf of Henmar, in Special Civil
Action No. 2013-184.

Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary[18] mandates that "[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness."
Decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges. The
speedy disposition of cases is the primary aim of the Judiciary, for only
thereby may the ends of justice not be compromised and the Judiciary may
be true to its commitment of ensuring to all persons the right to a speedy,
impartial, and public trial. To pursue this aim, the Court, through the Rules
of Court and other issuances, has fixed reglementary periods for acting on
cases and matters.[19]
Under Rule 37, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, "[a] motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be resolved within thirty (30) days from the time it is
submitted for resolution."

After the filing by Henmar of its Motion for Reconsideration and Abada's
Heirs of their Opposition/Comment to the same, Judge Pasal issued an
Order dated February 24, 2014 submitting the said Motion for resolution.
The 30-day period for resolution expired on March 26, 2014. However,
Judge Pasal issued the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration
only on June 17, 2014, 113 days or almost four months after the
submission of said Motion for resolution. Notably, Judge Pasal did not offer
any explanation at all for the delay. It is, therefore, undeniable that there
was undue delay on Judge Pasal's part in resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration.
As a frontline official of the Judiciary, Judge Pasal should act with efficiency
and probity at all times.[20] Judge Pasal's unexplained delay in resolving the
Motion for Reconsideration is inexcusable, unwarranted, and
unreasonable.[21] Judge Pasal failed to heed the consistent reminder of the
Court for judges to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the
time honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge
should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of
cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary, lowers
its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Judge Pasal's failure to resolve
the Motion for Reconsideration within the 30-day reglementary period is not
excusable and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions upon
him.[22]
If Judge Pasal found himself unable to comply with the mandatory 30- day
reglementary period for resolving the Motion for Reconsideration in Special
Civil Action No. 2013-184, he could have asked the Court for a reasonable
extension of time to do so. The Court is also aware of the heavy case load
of trial courts, and has allowed reasonable extensions of time needed to
decide cases or resolve pending incidents therein, but such extensions
must first be requested from the Court. A judge cannot by himself choose
to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.
[23]
 Yet, Judge Pasal made no such request for extension of time to resolve
the Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar in Special Civil Action No. 2013-
184.
Pursuant to the latest amendments to Rule 140[24] of the Rules of Court,
undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge, for
which the respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00), but not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
Taking into account Judge Pasal's seven years of continuous service to the
Judiciary and his subsequent, albeit delayed, resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Court agrees with the OCA that the imposition of a
fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) upon Judge Pasal would already
suffice.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law

and/or gross incompetence against Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 38,
is DISMISSED for being judicial in nature. However, Judge Emmanuel P.
Pasal is found GUILTY for his undue delay in the resolution of the Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 filed by
Henmar Development Property, Inc. in Special Civil Action No. 2013- 184,
for which he is FINED in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 199283               June 9, 2014

JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented

by his attorneys-in-fact and acting in their personal capacities,
RODOLFO and RUBY BARTOLOME, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and CAROLINA N.
MORALES, Respondents.
 DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief granted only under
exceptional circumstances.1 To set aside a judgment through a petition for
relief, parties must file the petition within 60 days from notice of the
judgment and within six (6) months after the judgment or final order was
entered; otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed outright.

If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of excusable negligence of

counsel, parties must show that their counsel’s negligence could not have
been prevented using ordinary diligence and prudence.2 The mere
allegation that there is excusable negligence simply because counsel was
80 years old is a prejudicial slur to senior citizens. It is based on an
unwarranted stereotype of people in their advanced years. It is as empty as
the bigotry that supports it.

This is a petition3 for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’

resolutions dated July 27, 20114 and November 10, 20115 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 120251. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners Juliet Vitug
Madarang, Romeo Bartolome, Rodolfo Bartolome, and Ruby Anne
Bartolome’s6 petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order7 denying their petition for relief from judgment.

The facts as established by the pleadings of the parties are as follows:

On January 9, 2001, Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales

filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint8 for judicial
foreclosure of a house and lot located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City.

The Spouses Morales alleged that on March 23, 1993, Spouses Nicanor
and Luciana Bartolome loaned ₱500,000.00 from them. The Spouses
Bartolome agreed to pay within two months with interest of five percent
(5%) per month. To secure their loan, the Spouses Bartolome
mortgaged9 the Bago Bantay property to the Spouses Morales.

The period to pay lapsed without the Spouses Bartolome having paid their
loan. After demand, the Spouses Bartolome only paid part of the loaned
amount.
In the meantime, the Spouses Bartolome died. The Spouses Morales, thus,
filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay property
against Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo Bartolome, and the Spouses
Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome.

The Spouses Morales sued Madarang as the latter allegedly represented

herself as Lita Bartolome and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend
money to the Spouses Bartolome.10

Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate

heirs of the Spouses Bartolome. Ruby Anne Bartolome is Rodolfo
Bartolome’s wife.

In their answer,11 defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real

estate mortgage covering the Bago Bantay property, specifically, the
Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the instrument. They added that the
complaint was already barred since it had been dismissed in another
branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for failure to comply with
an order of the trial court.

In its decision12 dated December 22, 2009, the trial court ordered

defendants to pay the Spouses Morales ₱500,000.00 plus 7% interest per
month and costs of suit within 90 days but not more than 120 days from
entry of judgment. Should defendants fail to pay, the Bago Bantay property
shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.

Defendants received a copy of the trial court’s decision on January 29,

2010.

On February 8, 2010, defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of

the trial court’s decision. They amended their motion for reconsideration
and filed a request for a Philippine National Police handwriting expert to
examine the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s alleged signatures on
the deed of real estate mortgage.

According to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration and its
amendment were pro forma as defendants failed to specify the findings and
conclusions in the decision that were not supported by the evidence or
contrary to law.
As to the request for a handwriting expert, the trial court ruled that the
"reasons given therein [were] not well taken."13

Thus, in its order14 dated May 25, 2010, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration, its amendment, and the request for a handwriting expert.

Defendants received a copy of the May 25, 2010 order on June 24, 2010.

On August 11, 2010, defendants filed a notice of appeal. In its order15 dated

August 13, 2010, the trial court denied due course the notice of appeal for
having been filed out of time. According to the trial court, defendants,
through their counsel, Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon, received a copy of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration on June 24, 2010. This is evidenced
by the registry return receipt on file with the court. Consequently, they had
15 days from June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to appeal the trial court’s
decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal only on August 11,
2010, which was beyond the 15-day period to appeal.

On September 24, 2010,defendants filed a petition for relief from

judgment,16 blaming their 80-year-old lawyer who failed to file the notice of
appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that Atty. Tugonon’s
failure to appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake and an
excusable negligence due to their former lawyer’s old age:

15. Undersigned Petitioner’s counsel is already eighty (80) years of age

and the lapses and failure of their counsel to take appropriate steps
immediately for the protection of his client is a mistake and an excusable
negligence due to the latter’s age and should not be attributable to
undersigned defendants.17

In its order18 dated April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the petition for relief
from judgment. The trial court held that the petition for relief was filed
beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision, contrary to
Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On July 13, 2011, Madarang, Romeo, and Rodolfo and Ruby Anne
Bartolome filed the petition for certiorari19 with the Court of Appeals. In its
resolution20 dated July 27, 2011, the appellate court denied outright the
petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners did not file
a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from
judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition for certiorari.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that the Court of Appeals
denied in its resolution21 dated November 10, 2011. Petitioners filed the
petition22 for review on certiorari with this court. They argue that they need
not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for
relief from judgment because the questions they raised in the petition for
relief were pure questions of law. They cite Progressive Development
Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals23 as authority.

Petitioners add that the trial court erred in denying their notice of appeal.
They personally received a copy of the decision only on August 11, 2011.
They argue that the period to file on appeal must be counted from August
11, 2011, not on the day their "ailing counsel"24 received a copy of the
decision.

A comment25 was filed on the petition for review on certiorari by

respondents Spouses Morales. They argue that the trial court did not err in
declaring pro forma petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s decision.

Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the
petition for certiorari since petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment.

The issues for our resolution are the following:

I. Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of

appeal within the reglementary period is excusable negligence; and

II. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright

petitioners’ petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from
judgment.

The petition lacks merit.

A petition for relief from judgment must

be filed within 60 days after petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order, or
 proceeding and within six (6) months
from entry of judgment or final order

This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of
time. However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a
petition for relief from the date of finality of the trial court’s decision. Rule
38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day
period must be counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final
order. The period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the
six-month period. Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
states:

Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition

provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified,
filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding
was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)

The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and

should be strictly complied with.26 A petition for relief from judgment filed
beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is because a
petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the public policy of
immutability of final judgments.27

In Gesulgon v. National Labor Relations Commission,28 the Labor Arbiter

ordered Mariscor Corporation to reinstate Edwin Gesulgon as chief cook on
board one of its vessels. Mariscor Corporation had notice of the decision on
March 27, 1987, but it did not appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Since
decisions of Labor Arbiters become final 10 calendar days from receipt of
the decision, the decision became final on April 6, 1987.

On February 28, 1989, Mariscor Corporation filed a motion to set aside

judgment with the National Labor Relations Commission. The Commission
treated the motion as a petition for relief from judgment and granted the
petition for relief from judgment. It remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter
for further proceedings.
This court set aside the order granting the petition for relief from judgment
for having been filed beyond the double period required under Section 3,
Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This court explained:

A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two
(2) reglementary periods: (a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days
from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside;
and (b) within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment,
order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required
because provision for a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of
liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode
any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding
must, at some definite time, attain finality in order at last to put an end to
litigation. In Turqueza v. Hernando, this Court stressed once more that:

. . . the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental

considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments of courts must become final at some
definite date fixed by law. The law gives an exception or ‘last chance’ of a
timely petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period
(within 60 days from knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment)
under Rule 38, supra, but such grave period must be taken as ‘absolutely
fixed, in extendible, never interruptedand cannot be subjected to any
condition or contingency. Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet
a condition or contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect),
the equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it were, designed to give the
aggrieved party another and last chance’ and failure to avail of such last
chance within the grace period fixed by the statute or Rules of Court is fatal
. . . .29 (Emphasis in the original)

In Spouses Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Voluntad,30 the Regional Trial

Court of Bulacan rendered a decision against the Spouses Reyes’
predecessors-in-interest. The decision became final on December 8, 1995.
The Spouses Reyes had notice of the decision on May 30, 1997 when they
received a Court of Appeals order directing them to comment on the
petition for certiorari filed by respondents heirs of Voluntad. Attached to the
Court of Appeals’ order was a copy of the trial court’s decision.

On June 21, 2000, the Spouses Reyes filed a petition for relief from
judgment against the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan’s decision. This court
affirmed the dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment for having
been filed out of time and said:

It should be noted that the 60-day period from knowledge of the decision,
and the 6-month period from entry of judgment, are both inextendible and
uninterruptible. We have also time and again held that because relief from
a final and executory judgment is really more of an exception than a rule
due to its equitable character and nature, strict compliance with these
periods, which are definitely jurisdictional, must always be
observed.31 (Emphasis in the original)

In this case, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the trial court’s
decision on January 29, 2010. They filed a motion for reconsideration and
an amended motion for reconsideration, which similarly alleged the
following:

The defendants, by the undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Court,

respectfully allege:

1. That on January 29, 2010, they received the decision in the above
entitled case rendered by this Honorable Court, dated December 22, 2009;

2. That with due respect to the Honorable Court, the decision is contrary to
law & to the defendants[’] evidence presented in court. Hence, this urgent
motion.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court, that

the decision sought to be reversed be reconsidered and another one be
rendered in favor of the defendants.32

Although petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and amended motion

for reconsideration, these motions were pro forma for not specifying the
findings or conclusions in the decision that were not supported by the
evidence or contrary to law.33 Their motion for reconsideration did not toll
the 15-day period to appeal.34

Petitioners cannot argue that the period to appeal should be counted from
August 11, 2011, the day petitioners personally received a copy of the trial
court’s decision. Notice of judgment on the counsel of record is notice to
the client.35 Since petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the decision on
January 29, 2010, the period to appeal shall be counted from that date.
Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on
February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010,
or until August 12, 2010, to file a petition for relief from judgment.

Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on September
24, 2010, the petition for relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6)
months from finality of judgment. The trial court should have denied the
petition for relief from judgment on this ground.

II

Failure of petitioners’ former counsel to

file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is not excusable
negligence

Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from
judgment within the reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that
their former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a
mistake or excusable negligence.

Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition

for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence:

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.

When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is

thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and
in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed

only in exceptional cases.36 It is not available if other remedies exist, such
as a motion for new trial or appeal.37

To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the negligence must
be so gross "that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against."38 This is to prevent parties from "reviv[ing] the right to appeal
[already] lost through inexcusable negligence."39
Petitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal
within the reglementary period was "a mistake and an excusable
negligence due to [their former counsel’s] age."40 This argument
stereotypes and demeans senior citizens. It asks this court to assume that
a person with advanced age is prone to incompetence. This cannot be
done.

There is also no showing that the negligence could have been prevented
through ordinary diligence and prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by
their counsel’s negligence.41

Petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that
their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s decision on June 24, 2010.42 Since
petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010,43 the trial
court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.

III

The Court of Appeals correctly denied the

petition for certiorari for petitioners’
failure to file a motion for reconsideration
of the order denying the petition for relief
from judgment

In its resolution dated July 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners’ petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment.
We agree with the appellate court.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that no

appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law is available to a party before a petition for certiorari is filed. This
section provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial

functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require. (Emphasis supplied) In Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
v. PIGLAS NFWU-KMU,44 this court ruled that a motion for reconsideration
is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.45 A
motion for reconsideration is required before a petition for certiorari is filed
"to grant [the court which rendered the assailed judgment or order]an
opportunity . . . to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case."46

In this case, a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition
for relief from judgment is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Petitioners failed to avail themselves of this remedy.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for
certiorari.

Contrary to petitioners’ claim, the questions they raised in their petition for
relief from judgment were not pure questions of law.1âwphi1 They raise the
authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the deed of real
estate mortgage and the allegedly excusable negligence of their counsel.

These are questions of fact which put at issue the truth of the facts alleged
in the petition for relief from judgment.47 Petitioners cannot cite Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals48 where this court held
that "[t]he filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the
remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when the issues raised is one
purely of law."49

All told, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in denying

petitioners’ petition for certiorari. The Regional Trial Court’s decision dated
December 22, 2009 is final and executory.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals’ resolutions dated July 27, 2011 and November 10, 2011 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 120251 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 232202, February 28, 2018

DANIEL A. VILLAREAL, JR. (ON BEHALF OF ORLANDO A.

VILLAREAL), Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS
AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

We resolve this petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

assailing the Decision2 dated February 9, 2017 and the
Order3 dated May 17, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 215, in Case No. R-QZN-16-03654-CV.

The Antecedent Facts

In a Decision4 dated October 30, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial

Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 39, dismissed a case
entitled "Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v.
Orlando A. Villareal and other persons claiming Rights Under Him"
in Civil Case No. 21293 for Unlawful Detainer, for being
prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.

On appeal by respondent Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage

System (MWSS), the RTC-Branch 96 rendered a Decision5 on
September 27, 2002 in Civil Case Nos. Q-01-42773 and Q-01-
42773-B, reversing the MeTC's judgment, and ordered, among
others, that:
 1. In Civil Case No. Q-01 -42773, [Orlando] and all
persons claiming rights under him to vacate the
premises located at No. 18, V. Heizer, St., Balara
Filters, Quezon City and surrender peacefully the
possession thereof to [MWSS]; and to pay the amount
of P2,500.00 as reasonable compensation from
November 7, 1997 until the possession is restored to
[MWSS];

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6
On December 15, 2002, the RTC Clerk of Court issued an Entry of
Judgment/Order,7 stating that the RTC Decision dated September
27, 2002 has become final and executory.

Within a period of two years or on May 17, 2004, MWSS filed a

Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution8 with the MeTC.

On July 2, 2004, Orlando Villareal (Orlando) filed his

Comment/Opposition,9 praying that the motion be held in
abeyance pending compliance by MWSS with the provision of
Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279,10 also known as the
Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.

More than 10 years from the filing of MWSS' motion for execution
or on July 28, 2014, the MeTC issued an Order11 in Civil Case No.
35806, granting the motion.

Ruling of the MeTC

On October 26, 2015, the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution,12 for

the satisfaction of the RTC Decision dated September 27, 2002.
In addressing Orlando's prayer, the MeTC held in its July 28,
2014 Order that R.A. No. 7279 does not find application, since
Orlando failed to prove that he falls under the category of
"underprivileged and homeless citizens," who are the
beneficiaries of the said Act.13
Pursuant to the writ of execution, the MeTC Sheriff III sent on
April 19, 2016 a Sheriffs Notice to Vacate and Pay14 to Orlando.

On April 20, 2016, Daniel A. Villareal, Jr. (on behalf of Orlando),

filed a Petition for Certiorari15 under Rule 65 with the RTC-Branch
215, challenging the Writ of Execution dated October 26, 2015
and the Sheriffs Notice to Vacate and Pay dated April 19, 2016.
He argued that the five-year period under Section 6,16 Rule 39 of
the Rules was violated since the execution was done more than
10 years from the finality of the RTC decision.

In response, MWSS filed its Comment/Opposition,17 and

countered among others, that the five-year period under the
Rules within which to enforce a judgment by mere motion run
only against the judgment obligee and not the court that will
resolve/decide it.18 MWSS likewise alleged that Orlando's filing of
Comment/Opposition dated July 2, 2004 caused the delay in the
execution of judgment.

Ruling of the RTC

On February 9, 2017, the RTC, in its Decision19 dismissed the

petition and affirmed the October 26, 2015 Writ of Execution and
the April 19, 2016 Sheriffs Notice to Vacate and Pay.

Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration20 was denied in

the RTC Order21 dated May 17, 2017.

Issue

Hence, this petition, anchored on this sole ground:

WHETHER OR NOT THE [RTC] ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION BASED ON ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF RULE 39,
SECTION 6 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND APPARENT
IGNORANCE OF APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.22
Ruling of the Court
The petition is granted.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that petitioner resorted to

a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and not a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The principle of hierarchy
of courts does not find any application in this case.23

In Ysidoro v. Justice Leonardo De Castro, et al.,24 this Court

differentiated the nature of the remedies provided under Rules 45
and 65 of the Rules of Court in this manner:
[A] review on certiorari under a Rule 45 petition is generally
limited to the review of legal issues; the Court only resolves
questions of law which have been properly raised by the parties
during the appeal and in the petition. Under this mode, the Court
determines whether a proper application of the law was made in
a given set of facts. A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is
strictly confined to the determination of the propriety of the trial
court's jurisdiction — whether it has jurisdiction over the case and
if so, whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been
attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.25
Corollary, under Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules, it is provided
that in all cases where only questions of law are raised, the
appeal from a decision or order of the RTC shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Section 1 of Rule 45 of which provides:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution
of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with
the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth.
Here, it is patently clear that petitioner does not question
whether the RTC has jurisdiction or authority to resolve his
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Rather, he assails the
wisdom of the RTC's very judgment and appreciation in upholding
the MeTC's issuance of the writ of execution in MWSS' favor. The
error relates to a mistake in the application of law and
jurisprudence regarding Section 6 of Rule 39, and not to an error
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This, obviously, is a question of law; consequently,
direct resort to this Court is proper.

Execution may be either through motion or an independent

action. The two modes of execution under the Rules are available,
depending on the timing when the prevailing party invoked his
right to enforce the court's judgment. Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules, states thus:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of
such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may
also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of
its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations.
"Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the
judgment was sought within five (5) years from the date of its
entry."26 This is a matter of right.27 "On the other hand, execution
by independent action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive
period for execution by motion had already elapsed."28 "[T]he
said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular
court."29 "[T]he action must be filed before it is barred by the
statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten (10)
years from the finality of the judgment."30 Corollary, "[a] final and
executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years
or by action for revival of judgment within ten years reckoned
from the date of entry of judgment."31 The date of entry, in turn,
is the same as the date of finality of judgment.32

By jurisprudence, for execution by motion to be valid, the

judgment creditor must ensure the accomplishment of two acts
within the five-year prescriptive period, as follows: (a) the filing
of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and (b)
the court's actual issuance of the writ.33

Here, the RTC Decision dated September 27, 2002 became final
and executory on December 15, 2002. By operation of law,
December 15, 2002 is likewise the date of entry of judgment.
Consequently, the five-year prescriptive period for the execution
of the RTC decision by mere motion must be reckoned from
December 15, 2002.

MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of the RTC

Decision on May 17, 2004. This is within five years from
December 15, 2002 - the date when the decision became final
and executory. Thus, the first act was accomplished.

There is, however, non-compliance with the second act.

We held in Olongapo City v. Subic Water and Sewerage Co.,

Inc.34 that:
In Arambulo v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, we explained
the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to issue a writ of
execution by motion is only effective within the five-year
period from the entry of judgment. Outside this five-year
period, any writ of execution issued pursuant to a motion
filed by the judgment creditor, is null and void. If no writ
of execution was issued by the court within the five-year
period, even a motion filed within such prescriptive period
would not suffice. A writ issued by the court after the
lapse of the five-year period is already null and void. The
judgment creditor's only recourse then is to file an
independent action, which must also be within the
prescriptive period set by law for the enforcement of
judgments.

This Court subsequently reiterated its Arambulo ruling in Ramos

v. Garciano, where we said:
 There seems to be no serious dispute that the 4th alias writ of
execution was issued eight (8) days after the lapse of the five (5)
year period from the date of the entry of judgment in Civil Case
No. 367. As a general rule, after the lapse of such period a
judgment may be enforced only by ordinary action, not by
mere motion (Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court).

 x x x x

 The limitation that a judgment been enforced by

execution within five years, otherwise it loses efficacy,
goes to the very jurisdiction of the Court. A writ issued
after such period is void, and the failure to object thereto
does not validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of
courts is solely conferred by law and not by express or
implied will of the parties.35 (Citations omitted, emphasis and
italics ours and emphasis in the original)
As can be gleaned from the aforementioned discussion, the five-
year prescriptive period reckoned from the entry of judgment
mentioned in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules, should be observed
both by the winning party who filed the motion, i.e., judgment
obligee/creditor, and the court that will resolve the same. Simply
put, the winning party may file the motion for execution within
the five-year period; and the court should issue the actual writ of
execution pursuant to the motion within the same period. After
the lapse of the five-year period, any writ issued by the court is
already null and void, since the court no longer has jurisdiction
over the issuance of the writ.

Records show that after the filing of MWSS' Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution, and Orlando's Comment/Opposition thereto,
the MeTC issued an Order granting the said motion only on July
28, 2014. More than a year after the grant, or on October 26,
2015, the MeTC issued the Writ of Execution. Reckoned from the
entry of judgment on December 15, 2002, more than 12 years
have elapsed after the actual writ of execution was finally issued
by the MeTC. This is clearly beyond the five-year prescriptive
period within which the court may issue the writ of execution. By
then, the MeTC was already stripped of its jurisdiction. Thus, the
writ of execution it issued on October 26, 2015 is null and void.

We can not subscribe to MWSS' insistence that Orlando's filing of

his Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution, caused the delay in the execution of judgment, which
in effect operates as an exception to the rule that execution by
motion after the lapse of five years is no longer allowed.

As discussed earlier, a judgment may be executed on motion

within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it
becomes final and executory. Thereafter, before barred by the
statute of limitations, by action. However, there are instances
where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the
lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions
have one common denominator, i.e., the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred
for his benefit or advantage.36

In Yau v. Silverio, Sr.,37 We stressed that:

[I]n computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the
general rule is that there should not be included the time when
execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a
definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of
error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party
or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor
will extend the time within which the writ may be issued
without scire facias. Thus, the time during which execution is
stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by
any delay occasioned by the debtor.38
In this case, there is an absence of any showing on the part of
MWSS that the execution of the RTC decision was stayed "by
agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the
taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise," or by any
circumstance that would further delay its implementation.

Orlando merely filed a comment to MWSS' motion for the

issuance of a writ of execution. He cannot be faulted in doing so.
There is neither a law nor a rule which prevents him from filing a
comment. Apparently, the delay was not brought about by the
filing of the comment; but instead, the period within which the
MeTC acted upon it.

We conclude this ponencia with a reminder on the significance of

prescriptive period for the enforcement of judgments on the part
of the winning party, as held in Villeza v. German Management
and Services, Inc., et al.:39
The Court has pronounced in a plethora of cases that it is
revolting to the conscience to allow someone to further avert the
satisfaction of an obligation because of sheer literal adherence to
technicality; that although strict compliance with the rules of
procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases
where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of
justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle
of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong or injustice would result. These cases,  though, remain
exceptions to the general rule. The purpose of the law in
prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgment by
action is precisely to prevent the winning parties from
sleeping on their rights. This Court cannot just set aside the
statute of limitations into oblivion every time someone cries for
equity and justice. Indeed, "if eternal vigilance is the price
of safety, one cannot sleep on one's right for more than a
10th of a century and expect it to be preserved in pristine
purity"40 (Citations omitted and emphasis and italics ours)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February
9, 2017 and the Order dated May 17, 2017 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, in Case No. R-QZN-16-03654-
CV, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 233489, March 07, 2018

SPOUSES LARRY AND FLORA DAVIS, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES

FLORENCIO AND LUCRESIA DAVIS, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions
dated May 22, 20171 and August 10, 20172 in CA-G.R. SP No.
150626, which dismissed outright on purely procedural grounds
the Petition for Certiorari of the herein petitioners Spouses Larry
and Flora Davis and subsequently denied their motion for
reconsideration thereof.

The antecedents are:

On January 29, 1991, the petitioners, as vendees, and the herein

respondents Spouses Florencio and Lucresia Davis, as vendors,
entered into a Contract to Sell over a 500-square meter lot in
Banga, Meycauayan, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-226201 (M) (subject property) for a
consideration of P500,000. As agreed upon, the petitioners gave
the respondents the sum of P200,000 as downpayment while the
remaining balance of P300,000 was made payable in 12 equal
monthly installments. The respondents agreed to execute the
corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale upon full payment of the
purchase price. After full payment thereof and despite repeated
demands, however, the respondents failed and refused to execute
the Deed of Absolute Sale to the petitioners. This prompted the
latter to initiate a Complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages (with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order) against the former before Branch
78 (Br. 78) of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan
(RTC Malolos), docketed as Civil Case No. 581-M-95. A notice
of lis pendens was then annotated at the back of TCT No. T-
226201 (M). In their Answer, the respondents admitted receipt of
the P200,000 downpayment but denied receipt of the balance of
P300,000. They also insisted that the petitioners have no cause of
action against them.3

In a Decision4 dated February 13, 1998, the RTC Malolos

(Br. 78) ruled in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court resolves the

instant case in favor of plaintiffs Larry and Flora Davis and
against defendants Florencio and Lucresia Davis ordering the
aforesaid defendants to:

1. Execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of herein plaintiffs

covering the 500-square meter land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-226201, and cause the necessary
registration thereof to the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan;

2. Pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the following amounts,

to wit:

a. P50,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c. P40,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses;

3. Pay, jointly and severally, the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the aforesaid ruling in its

Decision6 dated August 31, 2004, which became final and
executory on October 2, 2004.7

Accordingly, on May 11, 2005, the petitioners moved for the

execution of the February 13, 1998 Decision of the RTC Malolos
(Br. 78), which was granted. A writ of execution was
subsequently issued.8 Unfortunately, this writ was not
implemented primarily because the respondents already sold the
subject property to Carmina Erana, Spouses Hector and Maria
Victoria Erana, Efren Erana, and Spouses Ma. Lourdes and Romie
Aquino, who were issued new TCT No. 421671 (M). But the notice
of lis pendens was still carried over to the new title. The
petitioners moved for the cancellation of TCT No. 421671 (M) and
for the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue a new certificate of
title in their favor but this was denied on the ground that the new
registered owners of the subject property were not privies to the
case.9

The petitioners were, thus, compelled to file an action for

annulment of title and document against the new
registered owners of the subject property before Br. 15, RTC
Malolos, docketed as Civil Case No. 768-M- 08. In
a Decision10dated March 18, 2011, the RTC Malolos (Br. 15)
ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared TCT No. 421671
(M) as null and void and restored TCT No. T-226201 (M). This
Decision became final and executory on July 23, 2012;11 thus, the
petitioners moved for its execution, which was granted. TCT No.
421671 (M) in the names of Carmina Erana, Spouses Hector and
Maria Victoria Erana, Efren Erana, and Spouses Ma. Lourdes and
Romie Aquino was cancelled and TCT No. T-226201 (M) in the
names of the respondents was restored.12

With this in view, the petitioners filed an Urgent  Ex-

Parte  Manifestation and Motion on July 13, 2016 13 for the
implementation of the February 13, 1998 Decision of the RTC
Malolos (Br. 78) by issuing a writ of execution to direct the
respondents to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor, or
in the absence of the former, to appoint the clerk of court to
execute the same pursuant to Section 10 (a), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. In their Comment, the respondents opposed
arguing that the said Decision cannot be enforced by a mere
motion or by an action for revival of judgment since 10 years had
already lapsed from the time it became final.14 In their Reply, the
petitioners insisted that the period within which to move for the
execution of the aforesaid Decision was deemed suspended with
their filing of an action for annulment of title and document
involving the subject property before the RTC Malolos (Br. 15) to
enable a complete and effective relief in their favor.15

In an Order16dated February 7, 2017, the RTC Malolos (Br.

78) denied the petitioners' Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion explaining that the consequent filing of annulment of
title involving the subject property before Br. 15 does not toll the
running of the period. The writ of execution dated June 17, 2005
was not served on the respondents; thus, the February 13, 1998
Decision of Br. 78 remained unimplemented/unexecuted. This is
the reason why there is a need for its revival unless barred by the
statute of limitations.17

On  certiorari  to the CA, the latter, in its first assailed

Resolution dated May 22, 2017, dismissed the petition
outright as it suffered from serious infirmities, to wit: (1)
petitioners failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC
Order dated February 7, 2017 pursuant to Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court; and (2) except for RTC Order dated February
7, 2017, only photocopies of the pertinent pleadings and
documents accompanied the petition, as required by the aforesaid
rule. The CA held that a Motion for Reconsideration is a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy available to the petitioners to
assail the said Order and it is a condition sine qua non before a
Petition for  Certiorari  may be given due course. The
subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof was denied
for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated
August 10, 2017.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid rulings of the CA, the petitioners filed

the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
raising the allegation that the appellate court committed a grave
and reversible error in dismissing their Petition
for Certiorari notwithstanding that the presiding judge of the RTC
Malolos (Br. 78) was guilty of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Order
dated February 7, 2017.18

There is merit in the instant petition.

Before delving into the merits of the case, it is imperative to first

resolve a procedural issue.

While it is true that a motion for reconsideration is a

condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari, the
purpose of which is to grant an opportunity for the court to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case,19 it is not, however, an ironclad rule as it admits well-
defined exceptions. One of these exceptions is where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court.20 This exception is applicable in the instant case.

To note, in the petitioners' Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and

Motion for the implementation of the February 13, 1998 Decision
of the RTC Malolos (Br. 78), as well as in their Reply, they
vehemently insisted that the period within which to file a motion
for execution of the said Decision was deemed suspended with
their filing of an action for annulment of title and document
involving the subject property before Br. 15 to enable a complete
and effective relief in their favor. But Br. 78 denied the said
Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion reasoning that the
petitioners' filing of another case involving the subject property
before Br. 15 does not toll the running of the period to file a
motion for execution. It is clear therefrom that any motion for
reconsideration would then be superfluous, as Br. 78 had already
passed upon and resolved the very same issue raised in the
Petition for Certiorari before the CA. It is, therefore, a reversible
error on the part of the CA to outrightly dismiss the petitioners'
petition based on that procedural ground.

Turning now to the merits of the present petition, this Court rules
for the petitioners.

Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may

be executed within five (5) years from the date of its entry or
from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of
such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action." Nonetheless, this Court
held that there had been many instances where it allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon
meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common
denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by
actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit
or advantage.21

Here, the decision sought to be enforced became final and

executory on October 2, 2004. Upon the petitioners' motion, a
writ of execution was issued in 2005, which was well within the
said five-year period. The writ, however, was repeatedly returned
unserved and unimplemented. The petitioners later discovered
the reason therefor. The respondents had sold the subject
property to other parties. Worse, a new title has already been
issued to the latter. As such, the petitioners were compelled to
file an action for annulment of title and document against these
new registered owners. Fortunately, the court ruled in petitioners'
favor, which ruling became final and executory on July 23, 2012.
Petitioners consequently moved for its execution resulting in the
cancellation of the title in the names of the new registered
owners and the restoration of the title in the names of the
respondents. Chronologically speaking, the motion for execution
filed on July 13, 2016 was almost 12 years after the decision
became final and executory. Petitioners, however, maintain that
the period during which it was compelled to file another action
involving the subject property just to enable a complete and
effective relief in their favor should not be taken into account in
the computation of the five-year period.

This Court sustains the petitioners' position. Considering that the

delay was not due to the fault of the petitioners but of the
respondents, who deliberately sold the subject property to
another to avoid the outcome of the case filed against them, and
which delay incurred to their benefit/advantage, it is only logical,
just, and equitable that the period during which an action for
annulment of title and document was being litigated upon shall be
deemed to have interrupted or tolled the running of the five-year
period for enforcement of a judgment by mere motion.
Otherwise, the respondents were rewarded for escaping the
fulfilment of their obligation. Therefore, in computing the time
limited for suing out an execution, the time during which
execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be
extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.22 It bears
stressing that the purpose of the law in prescribing time
limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent
obligors from sleeping on their rights.23 Moreover, the statute of
limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act
but cannot do so for causes beyond their control.24 In the case
under consideration, there has been no indication that the
petitioners had ever slept on their rights to have the judgment
executed by mere motions within the reglementary period.

With the foregoing, this Court holds that the CA, indeed,
committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the
petitioners' petition despite its being meritorious.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The CA

Resolutions dated May 22, 2017 and August 10, 2017 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 150626 and the Order dated February 7, 2017 of the RTC
Malolos, Branch 78 in Civil Case No. 581-M-95 are,
thus, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Urgent Ex-
Parte Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioners on July 13,
2016 in said civil case is hereby GRANTED. The RTC Malolos,
Branch 78 is ordered to immediately issue a writ of execution in
favor of petitioners spouses Larry and Flora Davis to execute and
implement the Decision dated February 13, 1998, the fallo of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court resolves the

instant case in favor of plaintiffs Larry and Flora Davis and
against defendants Florencio and Lucresia Davis ordering the
aforesaid defendants to:

1. Execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of herein plaintiffs

covering the 500-square meter land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-226201, and cause the necessary
registration thereof to the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan;

2. Pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the following amounts,

to wit:

d. P50,000.00 as moral damages;

e. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
f. P40,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses;

3. Pay, jointly and severally, the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018

 STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Amended Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its former Decision
dated November 25, 2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines
Norte, granting petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got

married on August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding
rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement,
obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their
marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition
for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision
dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and
recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective
under Philippine Laws.3 On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.

In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA

revisited its findings and recalled and set aside its previous
decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the
following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is
missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.5 This is because the divorce herein was consensual in
nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai
alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the
divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the
Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to
present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal
to her cause.6

On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the

following arguments:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS]

GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SECOND
REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH
OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE
THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY
HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS]

GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE
SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE
OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.7
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband,
designated as Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as opposed to
Judicial Divorce, is the more practical and common type of
divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great disadvantage if
said divorce is not recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is
required in order for her to avail of the benefit under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, since their divorce
had already been granted abroad.8 Moreover, petitioner asserts
that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not
prevent the application of Article 26 for said provision does not
state that where the consent of the Filipino spouse was obtained
in the divorce, the same no longer finds application. In support of
her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of the
Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein the Court held that a Filipino
spouse is allowed to remarry in the event that he or she is
divorced by a Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship.9 As to the issue of evidence presented, petitioner
explains that the reason why she was unable to present
authenticated copies of the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan
relative to divorce is because she was unable to go to Japan due
to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could
obtain a copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the
library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code.
There, she was issued a document which states that diplomatic
missions of Japan overseas do not issue certified true copies of
Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese Law
due to the potential problem in the legal interpretation thereof.
Thus, petitioner maintains that this constitutes substantial
compliance with the Rules on Evidence.10

We grant the petition.

The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark

ruling of Republic v. Manalo,11 the facts of which fall squarely on
point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn
Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named
Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce before a
Japanese Court, which granted the same and consequently issued
a divorce decree dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought
to have said decree recognized in the Philippines and to have the
entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan,
Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a
hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. The trial court,
however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law
does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether
they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country.

On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's

view and affirmed, instead, the ruling of the CA. There, the Court
held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted should not
affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that
"where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." We observed that to interpret the word "obtained"
to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by
the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the
legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is,
specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject
provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place
and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end
of an alien initiated proceeding.12

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the

Court similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner
participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is
assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to
benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article
26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had
already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they
obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry,
petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant

petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our
courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects
thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting
point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws.13 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.14 Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 2415 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.16 Thus,
what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.17

In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not
dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same
admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the
pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese
laws on persons and family relations are not among those
matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated March 3,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence
as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179457               June 22, 2015

WILFREDO DE VERA, EUFEMIO DE VERA, ROMEO MAPANAO, JR.,

ROBERTO VALDEZ, HIROHITO ALBERTO, APARICIO RAMIREZ, SR.,
ARMANDO DE VERA, MARIO DE VERA, RAMIL DE VERA, EVER
ALMOGELA ALDA, JUANITO RIBERAL, represented by PACITA
PASENA CONDE, ANACLETO PASCUA, ISIDRO RAMIREZ,
represented by MARIANO BAINA, SPOUSES TRUDENCIO RAMIREZ
and ESTARLITA HONRADA, ARNEL DE VERA, ISABELO MIRETTE,
and ROLANDO DE VERA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO, SR., and ESPERANZA H. SANTIAGO,
SPOUSES RAMON CAMPOS and WARLITA SANTIAGO, SPOUSES
ELIZABETH SANTIAGO and ALARIO MARQUEZ, SPOUSES EFRAEM
SANTIAGO and GLORIA SANTIAGO, SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO,
JR. and ALMA CAASI, JUPITER SANTIAGO, and JON-JON
CAMOS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision1 dated May 29, 2007 and its Resolution2 dated August 22,
2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79769. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby

GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 14 June 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 54, Alaminos City, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. A-
2750 and the Decision dated 09 November 2001 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bolinao, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 939 are hereby both
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE or lack of jurisdiction.
This decision, however, is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate
action before the proper court by the contending parties herein.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.3

The antecedent facts follow.

On February 14, 2000, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of

ownership or possession with damages against respondents before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bolinao, Pangasinan, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 939.

In their Complaint4 dated January 24, 2000, petitioners alleged that they

are the owners of certain portions5 of a subdivided land located at
Barangay Patar, Bolinao, Pangasinan, denominated as Lot No. 7303, Cad.
559-D, Bolinao Cadastre, with an area of about265,342 square meters.
Along with their predecessors-in-interest, petitioners have allegedly been in
actual and continuous possession and occupation of their respective
portions of the land since 1967, without disturbance from any third person.
Later on, however, they discovered that their respective lots covered by Lot
7303 were already covered by Free Patent Titles in the names of
respondents, except Eugenio Santiago, Sr., which were acquired through
manipulation, misrepresentation, fraud and deceit.

Petitioners also claimed that their open, continuous and exclusive

possession of Lot 7303 for at least a period of thirty (30) years prior to the
issuance of the Free Patent Titles, ipso jure converted it into a private
property. Thus, the Bureau of Lands has no jurisdiction to issue the said
titles which are therefore null and void. In support of their claims, petitioners
attached to their complaint copies of their respective tax declarations. They
also prayed to be declared as absolute owners of Lot 7303, for
respondents to reconvey to them the whole area of the same lot, and for
the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages and litigation
expenses.

In their Answer6 dated March 21, 2000, respondents specifically denied the

material allegations in petitioners' complaint and countered that they are
the owners of the land denominated as Lot 7303, Cad. 559-D, Bolinao
Cadastre. They insisted that their acquisition of titles over the land was
regular and done in accordance with law. They also claimed that they and
their predecessors-in-interest are the actual possessors and owners of the
disputed land as shown by their titles7 and tax declarations.8

As part of their affirmative defenses, respondents alleged that the MTC has
no jurisdiction over the case. As the combined assessed value of the
disputed land is more than ₱20,000.00, the case is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19, paragraph 2 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. They
also alleged that titles over the land denominated as Lot No. 7303 has
already acquired the status of indefeasibility as they were issued as early
as 1996, and they were also issued tax declarations over their titled
properties. They claimed to have acquired the land from Eugenio Santiago,
Sr., as shown in the Deeds of Sale which were all duly registered with the
Register of Deeds, Alaminos, Pangasinan in 1991 and 1992. They noted
that the only documents of petitioners are tax declarations which were
issued as "new" in 1990 without any proof of acquisition, hence, inferior to
the Original Certificate of Titles and Tax Declarations issued to
respondents. By way of counterclaim, respondents prayed for the award of
attorney's fees, appearance fees, litigation expenses, and moral and
exemplary damages. They also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint,
and to be declared lawful owners and possessors of the disputed land.

The issues having been joined and the pre-trial conference having been
terminated, the MTC went on to try the case upon the following issues
agreed upon by the parties: (1) Who has a better right to the disputed land?
(2) Who are the lawful owners of Lot No. 7303? (3) Are respondents guilty
of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in obtaining their free patents? (4)
Who between the parties are in prior continuous and actual possession of
Lot 7303? And (5) Are the parties entitled to damages?

On November 9, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive

portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants

[respondents herein]:

1. DISMISSING the above-entitled complaint;

 2. DECLARING defendants [respondents] the lawful owners
and possessors of the land in question, Lot No. 7303, CAD
559-D, Bolinao Cadastre embraced by Certificate of Title Nos.
15818, 15819, 15820, 15754, 15755, and 15756, inclusive;

3. ORDERING all the plaintiffs to jointly and solidarily pay the

defendants [respondents] the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
Attorney's Fee and Litigation Expenses, and to pay cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.9

Dissatisfied with the MTC Decision, petitioners filed an appeal with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 64.

On June 14, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision10 in favor of petitioners,

the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, Judgment is hereby

rendered REVERSING IN TOTO the findings and decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bolinao, Pangasinan, dated November 9, 2001 and that
therefore a SEPARATE JUDGMENT IS NOW RENDERED, to wit:

1. ORDERING THAT:

OCT (FP) No. 15820 – in the name of Jupiter Santiago, denominated as

Lot 7303-E with an area of 50,000 square meters, copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex HH;

OCT (FP) No. 15819 – in the name Efraem Santiago and Gloria Santiago,
denominated as Lot 7303-D, with an area of 50,000 square meters, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex II; OCT (FP) No. 15765 – in the name of
Sps. Elizabeth Santiago and Almario Marquez, denominated as Lot 7303-
F, with an area of 15,542 square meters, copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex JJ;

OCT (FP) No. 15755 – in the name of Sps. Eugenio Santiago Jr. and Alma
Caasi with an area of 50,000 square meters, copy of which is hereto
attached and marked as Annex KK;
OCT (FP) No. 15754 – in the name of Jonjon Santiago denominated as Lot
7303-B, with an area of 50,000 square meters. Copy of which is hereto
attached and marked as Annex LL;

OCT (FP) No. 15818 – in the name of Sps. Ramon Campos and Warlita
Santiago, denominated as Lot 7303-A, with an area of 50,000 square
meters, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex MM;

to reconvey the entire area as stated in their free patent in favor of the
plaintiffs, as the same Free-Patent Titles to defendants [respondents
herein] are now declared VOID and without legal effect;

2. The plaintiffs [petitioners herein], commensurate with their land area

which was lost as a result of the issuance of free patent titles shall then
proceed to divide their respective lands possessed by each or any of them.

3. Ordering the defendants [respondents] to pay the following damages,

jointly and severally in favor of the plaintiffs [petitioners], to wit:

a. The reduced sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS

(₱20,000.00) each for moral damages;

b. The reduced sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS

(₱20,000.00) each for exemplary damages; and

c. The sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00 each as

actual damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.11

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, respondents filed with the CA a petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

On May 29, 2007, the CA granted the petition for review, and annulled and
set aside the Decisions of both the RTC and the MTC on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. For the same reason, the CA declined to resolve and
deemed as moot and academic the other factual issues raised in the
petition.

The CA also ruled that assuming arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction
over the case, it nonetheless has no authority to declare as null and void
the Original Certificates of Title (Free Patents) registered in the name of
respondents because the said titles were issued four (4) years prior to the
filing of the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance. In support of its ruling,
the CA cited the following basic principles in land registration: (a) that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the land in favor of the person whose name appeared thereon; (b)
such indefeasibility commences after the lapse of one (1) year from date of
entry of the decree of registration; (c) the act of registration is considered a
constructive notice to all persons respecting title to land, and such title can
no longer be contested after the lapse of one (1) year from registration; and
(d) a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack, and can be
altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.

On August 22, 2007, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration

of its Decision. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari, raising the sole
issue:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

ANNULLING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ALAMINOS CITY, PANGASINAN, BRANCH 54 FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.12

Petitioners contend that while the MTC of Bolinao, Pangasinan, is without

jurisdiction to act upon the action for reconveyance of ownership and
possession with damages, involving a land with an assessed value of more
than ₱20,000.00, the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, nonetheless correctly
assumed jurisdiction thereon on appeal pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court, as amended. Thus, the RTC Decision should not have
been nullified as a result of the MTC's lack of jurisdiction over the case.
They also point out that even if the CA ruled that the nullification of the
Decisions of both the MTC and the RTC is without prejudice to the filing of
an appropriate action before the proper court, such would result in
multiplicity of suits. This is because the trial court where such action will be
filed anew will just repeat the task already done competently by the RTC.

As to the issue of indefeasibility of respondents' free patent titles,

petitioners argue that an action for reconveyance is still an available
remedy, as the disputed land has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser
for value. They add that the rule on incontrovertibility of a certificate of title
upon the lapse of 1 year after the entry of the decree of registration does
not apply when an action for the cancellation of free patent title is instituted
on the ground that it is null and void for having been issued with respect to
a private property.

Citing the rule that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void,
and produces no legal effects, petitioners contend that the presentation of
either a duly-registered possessory information or a clear showing of their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land,
suffices to strip it of its public character, and render it unavailable for
application for a free patent title. Petitioners assert that since both parties
claimed that they have been in possession of the subject land for more
than thirty (30) years prior to the issuance of the disputed free patent titles,
their claims have the effect of establishing the private character of the
same property. Thus, the only question that remains is who between
petitioners and respondents adequately proved their claim. In this regard,
petitioners posit that the RTC correctly concluded that their evidence is
more persuasive than that of respondents. As to the issue of the immunity
of the disputed titles from collateral attack, petitioners submit that their
action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, is an
appropriate action to directly assail such titles.

For their part, respondents counter that Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court is not applicable in the case at bar, as it refers only to cases where
the lower court (MTC) dismissed a case filed with it without trial on the
merits, and an appeal to the RTC was taken from the order of dismissal. In
which case, according to respondents, the RTC may reverse the dismissal
and, if it has jurisdiction, shall try the case on the merits as if the case were
originally filed with it. Respondents further argue that if petitioners were
indeed unlawfully deprived of their real right of possession and ownership
of the disputed property, they should have filed an accion publiciana or
reivindicatoria with the RTC, and not before the MTC. Theyalso insist that
the RTC has no jurisdiction to declare as null and void the free patent titles
in their names because of the principle of indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of titles after the lapse of one (1) year from the issuance
of a decree of registration.

The petition is meritorious.

In resolving the issue of whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC
Decision for lack of jurisdiction, the Court is guided by the well-settled rule
that "jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over
it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."13

The jurisdictions of the RTC and the MTC over civil actions involving title to,
or possession of real property or interest therein, like petitioners' action for
reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, are distinctly
set forth under Section 19 (2) and Section 33 (3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.– Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by
R.A. No. 7691)

A careful perusal of the allegations in their complaint for reconveyance of

ownership and possession with damages, would show that petitioners
failed to indicate the assessed value of the subject real property. At any
rate, based on the Tax Declarations14 attached to their complaint, the
disputed land located in Bolinao, Pangasinan, has a total assessed value of
₱54,370.00. In line with the above-quoted statutory provisions, therefore,
the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners' civil action involving title to a real
property outside Metro Manila with a total assessed value in excess of
₱20,000.00.

Thus, while the CA is correct in ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over
the case for reconveyance and recovery of ownership and possession of a
land with an assessed value over ₱20,000.00, the same cannot be said of
its ruling with respect to the RTC. Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits despite having no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the
RTC, to wit:

Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.

If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case
without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse
it, as the case may be. Incase of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has
jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was
originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for
further proceedings.

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not
dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the
case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the
admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of
justice.15
In Serrano v. Spouses Gutierrez,16 the Court explained that the first
paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 contemplates an appeal from an order of
dismissal issued without trial of the case on the merits, while the second
paragraph deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the case
was tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however, involve the same
ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction. Verily, the second paragraph
refutes respondents' contention that Section 8, Rule 40 refers solely to
cases where the MTC dismissed a case filed therein without a trial on the
merits and an appeal to the RTC was taken from the order of dismissal.
Therefore, the RTC correctly proceeded to decide the case on the merits
despite the MTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

In contrast, the CA erroneously reversed and set aside the RTC Decision
for lack of jurisdiction.1âwphi1 Indeed, the RTC has appellate jurisdiction
over the case and its decision should be deemed promulgated in the
exercise of that jurisdiction. The RTC’s appellate jurisdiction, as contrasted
to its original jurisdiction, is provided in Section 22 of B.P. Blg.129, as
amended, thus:

SECTION 22. Appellate jurisdiction.–Regional Trial Courts shall exercise

appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or

The above-quoted provision vests upon the RTC the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for
purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction; all cases decided by the MTC
are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount
involved.17 Hence, the CA grossly erred in nullifying the RTC Decision for
lack of jurisdiction, and in declaring as moot and academic the factual
issues raised in the respondents' petition for review when it should have
proceeded to review on appeal the factual findings of the RTC. This is
because the RTC not only has exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitioners' action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with
damages, but also appellate jurisdiction over the MTC Decision itself.
On a final note, it bears emphasis that in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised
by the parties and passed upon by this Court. This restriction of the review
to questions of law has been institutionalized in Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the second sentence of which provides that the petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Indeed,
in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and,
subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the
reexamination of the evidence presented by the parties during trial.18 In
certain exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and
resolve factual issues, viz.:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises,

or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or

impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific

evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
 (k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.19

Not one of those exceptions was shown to obtain in the instant case as
would justify a liberal interpretation of procedural rules and a determination
of factual issues by the Court. A perusal of petitioners' sole assigned error
would readily show that the only issue raised is one of law. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants.20 Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC
Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law. The resolution of such
issue rests solely on what the law [B.P. Blg. 129, as amended] provides on
the given set of circumstances as alleged in petitioners' complaint for
reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages. Meanwhile, the
factual questions necessitating a review of the evidence presented by the
parties are raised in the respondents' petition for review filed with the CA.
An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each
other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.21 Without
doubt, the following issues duly raised before the CA but it failed to resolve
are all questions of fact which are beyond the province of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45:

I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 54, ALAMINOS CITY,

PANGASINAN, ERRED IN ORDERING OCT (FP) NO. 15820 IN THE
NAME OF JUPITER SANTIAGO, OCT (FP) NO. 15819 IN THE
NAME OF EFRAEM SANTIAGO AND GLORIA SANTIAGO; OCT
NO. 15765 IN THE NAME OF SPS. ELIZABETH SANTIAGO AND
ALMARIO MARQUEZ; OCT (FP) 15755 IN THE NAME OF SPS.
EUGENIO SANTIAGO, JR. AND ALMACAASI; OCT (FP) NO 15754
IN THE NAME OF JON-JON SANTIAGO AND OCT (FP) NO. 15818
IN THE NAME OF RAMON CAMPOS, NULL AND VOID, AND
ORDERING THEM TO RECONVEY THE AREA INDICATED IN
THEIR FREE PATENTS TITLES TO RESPONDENTS
(DEFENDANTS IN THE RTC CIVIL CASE NO. A-2750) AND FOR
 RESPONDENTS TO DIVIDE AMONG THEMSELVES SAID
PROPERTY;

II – THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT

FREE PATENT TITLES OF HEREIN PETITIONERS WERE
ACQUIRED THRU FRAUD, HENCE, NULL AND VOID;

III – THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE

VALIDITY OF TAX DECLARATIONS OF RESPONDENTS
(PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 939-MTC, BOLINAO,
PANGASINAN) OVER THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND DID
NOT GIVE DUE CREDENCE OF (SIC) THE TAX DECLARATION
OF PETITIONERS;

IV - THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING

PETITIONERS TO PAY RESPONDENTS DAMAGES AS
SPECIFIED IN SAID DECISION;

V - THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVERSING IN

TOTO THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
BOLINAO, PANGASINAN AND DECIDING THAT PETITIONERS
ARE NOT THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES SUBJECT
MATTER OF THIS CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 939-MTC, BOLINAO,
PANGASINAN.22

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court no longer finds any necessity
to delve into the parties' contentions relative to the principles of
indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of Torrens Titles, and immunity of such
titles from collateral attack. However, a remand of the case to the CA is
necessary in order to fully resolve all the above-quoted factual issues
raised in the respondents' petition for review.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is

GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 29, 2007 and its
Resolution dated August 22, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79769 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, The case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for the prompt resolution of the factual issues raised in the
respondents' petition for review of the Decision dated June 14, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 64.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.