CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

MODULE 4

HUMAN RELATIONS

QUESTION NO. 37
Briggs & Stratton Ltd. appointed A as its exclusive dealer of farm machineries in La
Union. It appears that during their exclusive dealership agreement, Briggs & Stratton sold
30 units of its farm equipment to a customer in La Union. Is the company liable to A for
damages? If so, what would be the basis of its liability?
Yes. The company is liable for damages because it abused its right. Under Article 19 of the Civil
Code, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
When the company directly dealt with a customer in La Union despite its exclusive dealership
agreement with A, it acted in bad faith resulting in damage to A. The company may not exercise
its right unjustly, or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith; otherwise, it
opens itself to liability for abuse of right. (Seacom, Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Nov. 25, 1999)

QUESTION NO. 38

In his senior year in law school, Romeo received an incomplete grade in one subject. With
this academic deficiency, the school allowed him to take a removal examination on the
subject but the result was not released by his professor until after the graduation
ceremonies. In the meantime, he was allowed to attend the graduation ceremonies during
which he went up the stage when his name was called, and he was handed by the dean a
rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the law diploma. His relatives took pictures of the
occasion and then tendered a blow-out that evening.
In preparation for the bar examinations, Romeo took a leave of absence from his work
without pay. Using his savings, he enrolled at a pre-bar review class and attended it
without fail. When he later learned about the failing grade he obtained in his removal
examination, he immediately dropped from his review class.
a) Is the school liable to Romeo for actual damages?

Yes. In belatedly informing Romeo of the result of his removal examination, particularly at a
time when he already commenced preparing for the bar examinations, the school cannot be said
to have acted in good faith. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the
school by not promptly submitting a student’s grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is
also an act of the school, being his employer. Schools and professors cannot just take students for
granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
b) Is the school liable to Romeo for moral damages?
No. While the school is guilty of negligence and is therefore liable to Romeo for his actual
damages, it is not liable to Romeo for moral damages.
As a senior law student, Romeo should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his
affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these
considerations, it is not correct to conclude that Romeo has suffered untold embarrassment in
attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the
bar examinations. If Romeo was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this
upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school
records, before preparing himself for the bar examinations. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also
certain requirements which prospective examinees must meet. (University of the East v. Jader,
325 SCRA [2000])
QUESTION NO. 39

Sofronio, a married man, misrepresented his status to Beatriz, a young college student.
Because of Sofronio’s protestations of love and promise of marriage, Beatriz surrendered
herself and became pregnant. Is Sofronio liable for damages?
Yes. Sofronio’s act in misrepresenting his status to Beatriz for the purpose of convincing her to
surrender herself is not only contrary to morals; it is also wilful in the sense that there is fraud or
deception. It is clear here that Article 21 of the Civil Code is applicable.
QUESTION NO. 40
In cases involving love affairs, is it necessary that the defendant be a married man or that
he had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff before he can be held liable for damages?
In cases involving love affairs, it is not necessary that the defendant be a married man. Neither is
it necessary that there should be carnal intercourse. What is essential is that the defendant should
have committed an act which is contrary to morals or good customs or public policy and that
there should have been fraud or deception on his part. (Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648)
QUESTION NO. 41

After a brief courtship, Marilou, a Filipina, fell in love with Ahmed, an Iranian student
who is enrolled in one of the universities in Metro Manila. After the couple dated for
several weeks, they agreed to get married. Ahmed visited Marilou’s parents to secure their
approval.
Although Marilou was a virgin at that time, she started to engage in sexual relations with
Ahmed when the latter invited her to live with him at his apartment. After living together
blissfully for a for months, the couple’s relationship began to deteriorate when Ahmed
started to verbally abuse and physically maltreat Marilou. In one of their confrontations
before the barangay captain, Ahmed angrily repudiated his agreement to marry Marilou
and asked the latter to leave his apartment.
In a suit by Marilou against Ahmed, how should the court decide?

The court should rule in Marilou’s favor. The existing rule is that a mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. (Hermosissima v. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960];
Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648) But where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representations to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him sexually, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code not because of
such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Here, it was Ahmed’s fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
Marilou that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him, and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. It was this deception on Ahmed’s part
that made Marilou’s parents agree to their daughter’s live-in relationship with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage. In short, Marilou surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of
every single Filipina, not because of lust, but because of moral seduction. Ahmed though could
not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under Article 337 or Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code because Marilou was above 18 years of age at the time of the seduction.
(Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993)

QUESTION NO. 42

Without A’s knowledge, a flood drives his cattle to the cultivated highland of B. As a result,
A’s cattle are saved, but B’s crop is destroyed. Is A liable for the destruction of B’s crop?
Yes. Article 23 of the Civil Code expressly provides that even when an act or event causing
damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter
shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.
QUESTION NO. 43
Danding is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses. From March 1986
to September 1989, several of his horses won sweepstakes races on various dates and
winning prizes in the aggregate amount of P2 million. Because he was in exile in the United
States, Danding sent letters of demand to the PCSO for the collection of the prizes due him.
However, the then PCSO Chairman consistently replied that the demanded prizes are
being withheld on advice of the PCGG which had earlier issued a sequestration order
against Danding’s properties. Is the PCSO Chairman personally liable to Danding for
damages?
Yes. Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with
malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of one’s duties. Danding’s right to the use of his property was unduly impeded.
While the PCSO Chairman may have relied upon PCGG’s instructions, he could have further
sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that
there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of Danding.
There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The withholding
of the prize winnings of Danding without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a
violation of his property rights without due process of law (Cojuangco v. Court of Appeals, 309
SCRA 602 [1999])

QUESTION NO. 44

In a criminal trial, the court rendered a decision acquitting the accused of the crime
charged, but without passing judgment on his civil liability. What is the effect of this
acquittal on the civil liability of the accused?
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. In this case, there is no civil liability since a person who has been found
to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act
or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of as contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated by Article
29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is “for the same act or omission.”
For all intents and purposes, the acquittal of the accused was based on reasonable doubt.
Therefore, his civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. Stated differently, it is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or
omission lies. (Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387 [2001])

QUESTION NO. 45

When the accused in a criminal action is acquitted, may a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission still be instituted by the aggrieved party?
It depends. If the acquittal of the accused is on the ground that he did not commit the offense
charged, or what amounts to the same thing, if the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in the
final judgment that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
subsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is, as a general rule, no longer
possible. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. They are: first, where the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony (Arts. 31,
2177, Civil Code); and second, where the law grants to the injured party the right to institute a
civil action which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. (Arts. 32, 33, 34,
Civil Code)

QUESTION NO. 46
Pedro, a Filipino, and Peter, an American, were appointed as resident manager and
managing director, respectively, of a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Due to redundancy in their positions, Pedro and Peter started to have serious differences.
Unable to cope up with his quarrel with Peter, Pedro resigned.
the day of Pedro’s departure, Peter circulated a memorandum to all employees declaring
Pedro as a “persona non grata” and urged the employees not to have further dealings with
him. Pedro retaliated by filing a criminal complaint for libel against Peter, and a civil
action for damages against Peter and the corporation, the latter as Peter’s employer. The
corporation promptly moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that its subsidiary
liability attaches only upon Peter’s conviction for libel and proof of Peter’s insolvency.
Should the court dismiss the complaint?
Yes. Nothing could be clearer than that Pedro is suing the corporation in its subsidiary capacity
for Peter’s alleged defamatory remarks. Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in
cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. In Joaquin v. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 [1964], the
Supreme Court declared that Article 33 of the Civil Code contemplates an action against the
employer in its primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to
enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such civil liability arises only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a
criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any
action brought against the employer before conviction of the employee is therefore premature.
(International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.), Inc. v. Argos, 364 SCRA 792 [2001])

QUESTION NO. 47
What is a prejudicial question? What are its elements?
A prejudicial question is a question which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent to the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. (People v. Aragon, 94 Phil 357 [1954])
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure limits a prejudicial
question to a “previously instituted civil action” in order to minimize possible abuses by the
subsequent filing of a civil action as an afterthought for the purpose of suspending the criminal
action. Under this provision, a prejudicial question has two essential elements, namely: a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
QUESTION NO. 48
H and W own a parcel of land. To secure a loan, they mortgaged the property to a bank.
When the couple failed to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and acquired the property
at the foreclosure sale. One week before the expiration of the one-year redemption period,
the couple commenced an action to annul the foreclosure sale charging that the bank
bloated their loan obligation by including excessive interests, penalties and other charges.
Meanwhile, the one-year redemption period has expired prompting the bank to consolidate
its ownership over the foreclosed property. Not long after, the bank filed an ex-parte
application for writ of possession. The couple opposed the application on the ground that
the annulment case constitutes a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the
bank’s petition for writ of possession. Does the annulment case constitute a prejudicial
question?
No. A prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue that must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed. In the instant problem, there is no criminal
action. Furthermore, the issue in the annulment case is whether the extrajudicial foreclosure is
valid; while in the case filed by the bank for issuance of a writ of possession, the issue is whether
the bank is entitled to the possession of the property after the expiration of the period of
redemption.

QUESTION NO. 49

X was coerced into marrying Y. X sued for annulment. During the pendency of the case, X
married Z. When Z learned of the first marriage, Z sued X for bigamy. X now alleges that
the pendency of the annulment case is a prejudicial question. Is X correct?
X is wrong because the decision in the annulment case is not important. The first marriage will
either be annulled or not. IF NOT ANNULLED, bigamy can prosper.
IF ANNULLED, still bigamy can prosper, for when he married the second time, he was still
married to his first wife, a voidable marriage being considered valid until annulled.

QUESTION NO. 50

X, a married man, is forced by Y to marry her. X then sues for annulment of said
marriage. Y retaliates with a charge of bigamy. After arraignment in the bigamy case, X
promptly moves to suspend the criminal proceedings until after the termination of the
annulment case on the ground that the annulment case is a prejudicial question. Should the
motion be granted?

Yes, because the annulment case poses a prejudicial question. If X was really forced into
marrying Y, then his consent was defective; hence, the second marriage is to be annulled on that
ground. He cannot therefore be guilty of bigamy.