I.

Ashton Kutcher and Mila Kunis were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their
union, they begot two children, namely: Wyatt and Dimitri. On May 13, 1994, Mila
Kunis filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which
was granted in a Judgment issued by the Regional Trial Court on April 24, 1995.

On August 19, 1996, Ashton filed before the RTC a verified petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mila on the ground that the latter is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations,
alleging as follows:

a. They got married over the objection of Mila’s family;

b. Their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents’ continued
interference and attempt to break up their union;
c. Greatly influenced by her mother, Mila, even at the early stage of their
marriage, already treated Ashton with contempt without the love and
respect due him as her husband;
d. When Ashton started a Milk Tea business, Mila ridiculed him instead of
giving him encouragement;
e. Later on, his business became successful and he was able to embark
upon another business venture – a pharmaceutical company which
became very successful;
f. Mila then became very interested and began to interfere in the operation
of the business, however, because of her bad attitude, the employees
were aloof;
g. Mila resented the fact that her husband got along well with the employees;
as a result, she quarreled with her husband causing the latter
embarrassment;
h. Mila even suspected that the income of the business was being given to
her husband's relatives;
i. their continued fighting persisted and affected their children;
j. Efforts at reconciliation proved futile because their differences had
become irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990, Ashton
decided to live separately from Mila; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition
for dissolution of their property relationship; and the petition was granted
in 1995.||

QUESTION 1: What are the guidelines in the interpretation and application

of Article 36 of the Family Code? Explain. (3 pts)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Supreme Court, in a plethora of cases, has laid down the guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit: (1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff and
any doubt should be resolved in favour of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against the dissolution and nullity, (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Hence, the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological and not physical although its manifestations and symptoms may be
physical. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, (4) such incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable, (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage
and the non-compliance of said essential marital obligations must be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision, (6)
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines should be given respect by the courts albeit not
controlling or decisive, and, finally (7) the trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel of the state.

QUESTION 2: The marital obligations of husband and wife include the

mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide
support for the family. Is disagreement on money matters a sufficient
ground to declare a marriage null and void? Explain. (2 pts)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, disagreement on money matters is not a sufficient ground to declare a

marriage null and void.

While it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife

enumerated under the Family Code include the mutual responsibility of the
spouses to manage the household and provide support for the family, which
means that the compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the
management of the income and expenses of the household, this is not a
sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void. To conclude that a spouse
is psychologically incapacitated to perform his or her obligations as a husband or
wife, the petitioner-spouse must prove that the other spouse is found to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties of the marriage.

In the instant case, what has been established is that the aversive
behaviour of Ashton and Mila towards each other is a mere indication of
incompatibility brought about by their different family background as well as their
attitudes which developed after their marriage. The totality of the allegations
presented in the present case does not show that Mila’s personality disorder is of
the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as the
jurisprudence to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of
complying with the essential marital obligations. Hence, any doubt should be
resolved in favour of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.

QUESTION 3: If you are the judge, how will you decide the case? (5 pts)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Considering the guidelines enunciated in the case of

Republic vs Court of Appeals and Molina, I will dismiss the case and decide in
favour or Mila as Ashton failed to comply with the evidentiary requirement that
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts.

II.

In 1997, Sps. Juan and Juana purchased 3 unregistered parcels of land in Cavite
City. They were previously owned by Generoso, Emperio and Tanding,
respectively.

After the said purchase, Sps. Juan and Juana, caused the survey and
consolidation of the parcels of land and the 3 parcels were consolidated into a
single lot — "Lot 3" — with a determined total area of nine thousand five hundred
seventy-seven (9,577) square meters.

In 2002, the Sps. filed with the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Lot
3. In relation thereto, the DENR, upon order of the court, submitted its Report to
the RTC. The Report relates that the area covered by Lot 3 "falls within the
Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 13 of Cavite City per LC 12 3013
certified on March 15, 1982." Later, the Sps. submitted a Certification from the
DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
attesting that, indeed, Lot 3 was classified as an "Alienable or Disposable Land"
as of 15 March 1982.

After fulfilment of the jurisdictional requirements, the government, through the

Office of the Solicitor General, filed the lone opposition to the respondents'
application on 13 May 2003.

The Sps. allege that their predecessor-in-interest i.e., the previous owners of the
parcels of land making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous, uninterrupted, open,
public [and] adverse" possession of the said parcels "since time immemorial." It
is by virtue of such lengthy possession, tacked with their own, that respondents
now hinge their claim of title over Lot 3.

During trial on the merits, the respondents presented, among others, the
testimonies of Generoso and the representatives of their two (2) other
predecessors-in-interest. The said witnesses testified that they have been in
possession of their respective parcels of land for over thirty (30) years prior to the
purchase thereof by the respondents in 1997. The witnesses also confirmed that
neither they nor the interest they represent, have any objection to the registration
of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.

In addition, Generoso affirmed in open court a Joint Affidavit she executed with
Teresing. In it, Generoso revealed that the portions of Lot 3 previously pertaining
to her and Teresing were once owned by her father, Mr. Valentine and that the
latter had "continuously, openly and peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute
owner" such lands even "before the outbreak of World War 2."

To substantiate the above testimonies, the respondents also presented various

Tax Declarations covering certain areas of Lot 3 — the earliest of which dates
back to 1948 and covers the portions of the subject lot previously belonging to
Generosa and Teresita.

On the other hand, the government insists that Lot 3 still forms part of the public
domain and, hence, not subject to private acquisition and registration. The
government, however, presented no further evidence to controvert the claim of
the respondents.

QUESTION NO. 4: If you are the judge, rule on the case. (10 pts)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If I am the judge, I will deny the Application for Registration of Lot 3.

The law allows the original registration of “imperfect” titles to public land
acquired under the Public Land Act. In so doing, certain requirements have to be
complied with, to wit: (1) That the subject land forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, (2) that the applicants, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim
of ownership, and (3) that such possession and occupation must be since June
12, 1945 or earlier.

In this case, the applicants were not able to satisfy the third requisite. An
examination of the evidence applicants presented reveals that the testimonies of
applicants’ predecessors-in-interests and/or their representatives were patently
deficient as none of them testified about possession and occupation of the
subject parcels of land dating back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Rather, the said
witnesses merely related that they have been in possession of their lands for
over thirty years prior to the purchase thereof by respondents. The Joint Affidavit
merely contains a general claim that Valentine had continuously, openly and
peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute owner” the parcels Generoso and
Teresing even before the outbreak of World War 2 which lacks specificity and is
unsupported by any other evidence. Second, the supporting tax declarations
presented also fall short of proving possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The earliest declaration submitted by the Sps. Juan and Juana was issued only
in 1948 and merely covers the portion of Lot 3 previously pertaining to Generosa
and Teresita.

Indeed, the evidence presented by the respondents does not qualify as

the “well-nigh incontrovertible " kind that is required to prove title thru possession
and occupation of public land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Clearly, respondents
are not entitled to registration under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529.

(Republic v. Santos, G.R. No. 180027, [July 18, 2012], 691 PHIL 367-382)

III.

Sta. Ana Builders insured the shipment of its cargoes with Sam Insurance Inc.
Sta. Ana Builders also engaged the services of Kevin’s Customs Services for the
withdrawal of its cargoes from pier to the warehouse. Kevin Customs Services
engaged the services of Barbie’s Brokerage Corporation for the use of its
delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Sta. Ana Builder’s warehouse. The
goods were loaded to the trucks owned by Barbie’s Customs Services, driven by
its employees. One truck did not reach its destination. It was later on recovered
but without the goods. Sta. Ana Builders filed with Sam Insurance Inc. a claim for
insurance indemnity and the latter paid. Sam Insurance Inc. then filed a
complaint for damages against both Kevin’s Customs Services and Barbie’s
Brokerage Corporation for the loss of the subject cargoes.

QUESTION NO. 5: Can Sam Insurance Inc. subrogate the rights of Sta. Ana
Builders? Explain. (5 pts)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Sam Insurance Inc. is subrogated to the rights of the insured, Sta.
Ana Builders.

Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with

reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the
rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or security.
Under the Article 2207 of the New Civil Code, “if the plaintiff's property has been
insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the
injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
wrong-doer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by
the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party
shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or
injury.

As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, Sam Insurance

Inc. has the right to seek reimbursement from either Kevin’s Brokerage
Corporation or Barbie’s Customs Services or both for breach of contract and/or
tort.

(Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. v. Glodel Brokerage Corp., G.R. No.

179446, [January 10, 2011], 654 PHIL 67-82)

QUESTION NO. 6: Can Kevin Customs Services be held liable? If so, what
are its liabilities? (5 pts)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Kevin’s Customs Services can be held liable.

Well-settled is the rule that where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery
may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable,
and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No
actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary

since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party,
they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage
under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

Here, Kevin Customs Services is liable because of its failure to exercise

extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Barbie’s Brokerage Corporation
would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the cargoes to the
designated destination. It should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods
to Barbie’s Brokerage Corporation by taking precautionary measures, such as
providing escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Kevin’s
Customs Services should, therefore, be held liable with Barbie’s Brokerage
Corporation.

(Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. v. Glodel Brokerage Corp., G.R. No.

179446, [January 10, 2011], 654 PHIL 67-82)

IV

Annie was born with an imperforate anus. Two days after her birth, she
underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine
out through the abdominal wall, enabling her to excrete though a colostomy bag
attached to the side of her body.

On May 1995, then 3 years old, Annie was admitted at the Ospital ng Cebu for a
pull-through operation, which was conducted by several surgeons and
anaesthesiologists, including Dr. Lumo. During the operation, Annie experienced
bradycardia, and went into a coma which lasted for 2 weeks and when she
regained consciousness, she could no longer see, hear or more. Agitated by her
daughter’s helpless and unexpected condition, Mary lodged a complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutor’s Office against the attending physicians.

The RTC rendered its judgement finding Dr. Lumo beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. Applying the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor, the Judge reasoned ―where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if
due care had been exercised, and inference of negligence may be drawn giving
ride to an application of res ipsa loquitor without medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred.‖
QUESTION NO. 7: Is the Judge correct in applying res ipsa loquitor on this
case? Why? Or why not? (10 pts)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in this case is

inappropriate.

In order to allow resort to the doctrine, the following essential requisites

must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.||

In this case, although it should be conceded without difficulty that the

second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent
and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Lumo, and that the
patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty
of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. It may be
argued that the fact of losing sight, hearing or more would not ordinarily occur in
the process of a pull-through operation, but such fact alone did not prove that the
negligence of Dr. Lumo or any of his attending physicians had caused the injury.
The fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was
probably caused by someone’s negligence. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is
inapplicable in this case.

(Solidum v. People, G.R. No. 192123, [March 10, 2014])

V.

Research scientist Raven was a frequent customer of Loreto’s Bar and

Restaurant of Dumaguete City. On March 28, 1995, Raven went to Loreto’s and
ordered two (2) bottles of beer. Thereafter, she ordered pizza and a bottle of
Sprite. His additional order arrived consisting of one whole pizza and a bottled
softdrink Sprite with a drinking straw, one end and about three-fourths of which
was submerged in the contents of the bottle, with the other and the remaining
third of the straw outside the bottle, as is the usual practice in eateries when one
orders a bottled softdrink.

Raven then took a bite of pizza and drank from the straw the contents of the
Sprite [b]ottle. She noticed that the taste of the softdrink was not one of Sprite but
of a different substance repulsive to taste. The substance smelled of kerosene.
She then felt a burning sensation in his throat and stomach and could not control
the urge to vomit. She left her table for the toilet to vomit but was unable to reach
the toilet room. Instead, she vomited on the lavatory found immediately outside
the said toilet.

Raven was rushed to Silliman University Medical Clinic for medical attention.
While at the ER, Raven again vomited before the hospital staff could examine
her. Raven had to be confined in the hospital for three (3) days.

As a result of the incident, Raven filed a complaint for damages against Loreto’s
Bar and Restaurant and Coca Cola Bottler’s Phils. Inc (CCBPI). CCBPI filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that Raven failed to allege all the requisites of
liability under Article 2187 of the Civil Code, not even for the law on torts or
quasi-delict to apply against CCBPI; and Raven failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and/or comply with the Doctrine of Prior Resort.
QUESTION NO. 8: Is the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies and Prior Resort to the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD)
necessary for a suit of damages under Article 2187 of the Civil Code? Why?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Prior

Resort to BFAD is not necessary for a suit for damages under Article 2187 of the
Civil Code to prosper.

Under the law, Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet

articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.

Quasi-delict being the source of obligation upon which Raven bases his
cause of action for damages against CCBPI, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable. Such is not a condition precedent
required in the complaint for damages with respect to obligations arising from
quasi-delicts.

(Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Meñez, G.R. No. 209906, [November 22,
2017])

VI

Julio wished to have his land registered under his name. As a supporting proof,
he was able to secure a certification from CENRO and PENRO which contained
references to the original classification by the DENR Secretary stating the said
land is alienable and disposable agricultural land. Further, he was able to secure
a decision from the RTC, the subject of which is his particular land, wherein it is
being referred to as an agricultural land.

QUESTION NO. 9: Julio went to your law office and asked for your advice
as to whether or not he can now have his land registered under his name.
What would be your advice to Julio?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

I will advice Julio that anyone who applies for a registration of ownership
over a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. As a rule, insofar as his
property is concerned, he must prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is an alienable and disposable agricultural land by establishing the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. It is not enough that he
secures a decision from the RTC referring his land as an agricultural land for the
power to declare or reclassify lands of public domain belonged to the President
only. Further, apart from the classification of the land as agricultural, it is not
enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO.

VII
Cristalle, a Filipino national, and Austin, an Australia, got married on August 11,
2000 in Australia pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After 2 years, the parties,
by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their
marriage. Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner Cristalle filed a Petition for
Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC. RTC granted the
petition. The Office of the Solicitor General, on appeal, posits that divorce by
agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code.
Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse," the Office of the Solicitor General posits that only the
foreign spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.|||

For several years, prior 2018, the Supreme Court was consistent in holding that
for Article 26 of the Family Code to apply, the following requisites must be
present: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. Hence, if a Filipino spouse initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree is granted, this should remove him/her
from the coverage of Article 26 of the Family Code. However, in 2018, in the
case of Republic v. Manalo, the Supreme Court held that a foreign divorce may
be recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly obtained, regardless of
who among the spouses initiated the divorce proceedings.

On appeal, CA set aside RTC’s decision. According to the appellate court, the
second of the following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing.
This is because the divorce was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of
the parties, and not by Austin alone. Thus since petitioner Cristalle is Filipino and
she obtained the divorce, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines.
Cristalle filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

QUESTION NO. 10: What is stare decisis? What is the purpose of stare
decisis?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to

doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument. 49 Basically, it is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issues, 50 necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8
of the Civil Code.

QUESTION NO. 11: Did the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it
refused to follow the ruling set forth under the case of Republic vs.
Manalo?

No, the CA did not violate the rule on stare decisis when it refused to
follow the fuling set forth under the case of Republic vs. Manalo.

The interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of

the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar
rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit".

Here, it is noteworthy that Cristalle and Austine obtained a divorce decree,

by agreement, in August 11, 2000 and Cristalle filed the Petition for Judicial
Recognition of a Foreign Judgment on April 5, 2013. It was only in 2018 when
the Supreme Court decided Republic v. Manalo. Therefore, following the
prospectivity application of laws, as well as judicial decisions, the CA did not
violate the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the ruling set forth under
the case of Republic vs. Manalo.

VII

Vivencio died intestate on June 23, 2015, leaving real and personal properties
with an estimated value of Php 2,000,000.00 He was survived by his wife Joela
and their five children, Ineng, Romeo, Jessie, Nerio, Luz. Joela was appointed as
administratix of the intestate estate of Mario.

During the probate, Joela submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of
the decedent’s estate. Romeo filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it
omitted six lots including Lot 829 located in Cebu City which is covered by TCT
No. 12345. The said Lot 829 is registered under the name of Sps. Vivencio and
Joela.

Joela excludes such property in the inventory considering that they previously
donated such property to their son Nerio during the lifetime of Vivencio. Nerio
presented a copy of the Deed of Donation in August 2000 by his parents Joela
and Vivencio.

QUESTION NO. 12: Is the omission to exclude such property proper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the omission to exclude Lot 829 in Vivencio’s estate for purposes of
probate is not proper.

The law states that every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter,
by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed
in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition.

By express provision provision of the law then, Lot 829, which was alleged
to have been donated by the decedent and his wife to their son Nerio, should not
be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.

(Gregorio v. Madarang, G.R. No. 185226, [February 11, 2010], 626 PHIL 255-
262)

QUESTION NO. 13: Can the probate court decide the questions of title and
ownership?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As a general rule, probate courts, being of special and limited jurisdiction,

cannot act on questions of title and ownership. However, for purposes of
inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of properties of a decedent, probate court
can make a provisional determination ownership, without prejudice to a final
determination through a separate action in a court of general jurisdiction.

VIII

Stefanie and her minor daughter Hassadeh field a claim for support against Mr.
Vincent, alleged illegitimate father of Hassadeh as appeared in the certificate of
live birth. However, Mr. Vincent denied such fact considering that such certificate
of live birth did not contain any proof or his signature showing that he signify to
be Hassadeh’s putative father.
QUESTION NO. 14: Is DNA Test a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to
determine filiation?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, DNA Test is a valid probative tool to determine filiation.

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but
also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support
(as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.
There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

In the landmark case of Herrera v. Alba, the Supreme Court discussed

that a complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile
of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason,
following the highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts
should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity
prior to a paternity inclusion.

Hence, DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity
should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of probability of paternity
is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of probability of paternity is 99.9% or higher,
then there is refutable presumption of paternity.

IX

Jose Rodriguez filed a complaint against Sps. Christian Grey and Anastasia
Steele-Grery alleging that he is the owner of the parcel of land situated in
Caloocan City covered by TCT No. 55979 and has been religiously paying the
real property taxes therefor since November 29, 1974. He and his wife had
immigrated to the USA since 1968 and is now a resident of California, USA and
he only discovered that a new certificate of title to the subject property was
issued by the register of deeds in the name of Elliot, married to Kate Kavanagh,
during his vacation in the Philippines. He further alleged that it was due to a
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by him and his wife, dated
February 16, 1978, which was a result of the fraudulent, illegal and malicious
acts committed by Sps. Grey and the Register of Deeds in order to acquire the
subject property.

Sps. Grey, on the other hand, maintained that they are innocent purchasers for
value, having purchased the subject property from one Jason Tyler, who
possessed and presented a Special Power of Attorney, but without Jose
Rodriguez’s proof of identity, to sell/dispose of the same, and, in such capacity,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 20, 1992 conveying the said
property in their favour.

QUESTION NO. 15: What is an innocent purchaser for value? In this case,
are the Sps. Grey innocent purchasers for value?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who
pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another person's claim. To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and
titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the title to the property. He
need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore
beyond the four corners of the title.||

In this case, Sps Grey were dealing with Jason Tyler who had no title and
possession of the land but, as indicated on the face of his title, whose capacity to
sell was restricted. To prove good faith, Sps. Grey must show that they inquired
not only into the title of the registered owner, Jose Rodriguez, but also into the
capacity of Jason Tyler to sell the subject property. The Special Power of
Attorney contained a defective notarial acknowledgement. Such flaw rendered
the notarial acknowledgment of no effect and reduced the Special Power of
Attorney into a private document. Hence, Sps Grey relying the private Special
Power of Attorney are buyers in bad faith.