PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JERRY SAPLA: A Critical Analysis

The case of People of the Philippines versus Jerry Sapla (the “Case”) is not of

a novel issue. Indeed, as noted by the ponente in its opening statement,

jurisprudence has vacillated on warrantless search controversy.

The majority opinion in the Case has struck down the conviction of the

accused-appellant who was prosecuted based on evidence that was allegedly

secured and obtained while he was riding a public passenger jeepney which

vehicle was stopped at a checkpoint and a warrantless search undertaken by

police officers.

Framing the issue solely as – “(C)an the police conduct a warrantless

intrusive search of a vehicle on the sole basis of an unverified tip relayed by

an anonymous informant?”, and putting it in context within broad

guarantees of the Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures,

and of the presumption of innocence, the High Court pronounced that the

presented evidence of “four bricks of marijuana contained in a jute sack”

which accused-appellant allegedly admitted to be his ( by prosecutor’s

assertion but which accused-appellant denied), as inadmissible in evidence

under the so called exclusionary rule.

The minority opinion is equally forceful however in their arguments noting

that the framing of the issue reveals mis-appreciation of the issue as simply

that of applying the jurisprudential laid-down guidelines on warrantless

search of a moving vehicle. The dissenting justices raise the question

whether an intrusive search was what has happened as to taint the

permitted non-intrusive search by police authorities of a moving vehicle ( as

an exception to the general rule against warrantless search). Citing the

ruling in California vs Acevedo, a United States Supreme Court decided case,

noting that the doctrine of “moving vehicle exemption” was derived from

United States jurisprudence and applied to Philippine jurisprudence, the

minority opinion reasoned that “(t)he motor vehicle exemption extends to

containers carried by passengers inside a moving vehicle, even if there is no

probable cause to search the motor vehicle itself and the probable cause and

the interest of the police officers has been piqued only by the circumstances

of the passenger and the container he or she is carrying and transporting”

( Dissenting opinion, J. Lazaro-Javier). In other words, the minority opinion

calls for a re-examination of the issue into that of : Whether exigent

circumstances that permit a warrantless search of an automobile would

justify the warrantless search of a movable container? To put it otherwise -

Whether the rule against unreasonable search which admits of exemption of

search of moving vehicle requires the police to obtain a warrant to open the

sack in the movable vehicle (simply because they lack probable cause to

search the entire vehicle)?i The dissenters assert you do not need a warrant.

Additionally, the minority opinion questions whether the reliance on

presumption of innocence maxim applies to the Case since during the

conduct of the search, the accused-appellant was not yet of the status of an

accused.

As debaters would know, the framing of the debate question is critical in

securing an advantage. The way in which we frame an issue largely

determines how that issue will be understood and acted upon. In this case,

the majority opinion framed the argument in the language of shared

aspirations and redress. On the other hand, an analysis of the minority view

reveals that it is founded on assertion of facts even as we know that what is

fact is a subjective take of the events ( i.e. not necessarily a universally

acknowledged truth).
Those in the minority could not be faulted in asking for a re-examination of

the facts and for the appreciation that there was no intrusive search

conducted. Thus, they called attention to and offer a contest as follows -

(a) The police officers did not conduct an intrusive search of the passenger

jeepney. The object of their surveillance and search was targeted to a very

specific individual; (b) The police officers did not rely on an unverified tip.

The tip was verified by a subsequent tip describing in detail the person who

was actually riding the passenger jeepney and the sack he was actually

carrying. The tip was also verified by the exact match of the tip with the

description of the passenger whom the police officers were targeting and

actually approached; (c) The police officers were not just relying on the

"tip." They were acting as well on the bases of the exact match as stated

and their professional experience as regards the route plied by the

passenger jeepney. The police officers were situated along the silk road of

marijuana transportation that the police officers could not have lightly

ignored; (d) Lastly, the police officers relied upon their personal knowledge

of what they were then perceiving to be a suspicious bulky sack and the

actual contents thereof through a visual and minimally intrusive observation

thereof after appellant's act of opening this sack. Accused-Appellant did not

even protest that he was carrying only camote crops or cauliflower or

broccoli or smoked meat, had this been the case.

The minority opinion demands a granular appreciation of what has happened

and a calculated and meticulous application of those facts to the case. They

argue for practicality, of a case-to case resolution, noting the need for a

balancing act. They eschew the majority statement that "our constitutional

order does not adopt a stance of neutrality," and likewise abhor the

majority statement that "the law is heavily in favor of the accused." They

believe that to begin the determination of the Case on those note is to

seriously limit the outcome tantamount to confining the judicial

determination within those parameters.

Along this line, the minority opinion throws stones on the majority opinion’s

grounding the reversal of the conviction on the breach of accused’s

presumption of innocence. With plausibility, the minority deems it

inappropriate to apply presumption of innocence in a search situation. The

rule of presumption of innocence applies when a person stands as an accuse

but not before that. The rule would call for proof beyond reasonable doubt

to convict the accused. But in the conduct of search the relevant standard is

probable cause, the minority argues. Citing United States jurisprudence, the

minority opinion articulates that what is needed in conducting a search is an

objective justification - a “level of suspicion (that) is considerably less than

proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” They conclude

that – “(T)he concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not

"readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Once more

arguing for a case-to-case approach and careful evaluation of the facts.

The majority position makes a loud proclamation that the “(C)onstitution

does not allow the end to justify the means.” The control of criminality

cannot be undertaken by disrespecting the rights enshrined in the

Constitution. In the epilogue, the following bold statements are made -

“(B)y disregarding basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the

proliferation of illegal drugs, instead of protecting the general welfare,

oppositely, the general welfare is viciously assaulted. In other words, when

the Constitution is disregarded, the battle waged against illegal drugs

becomes a self-defeating and self-destructive enterprise. A battle waged

against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of the people is not a war on

drugs; it is a war against the people.”

Insofar as it is premised on the guaranteed rights enshrined in the Bill of

Rights, it is unmistakably an appeal to shared aspirations nothing less. And

for the protection and redress in protesting the violation of those rights i.e.

“The Bill of Rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of convenience.”

On those aspirations the majority opinion staked the parameters upon which

the Case was evaluated and the outcome is not surprising.

With the ponente using as the breadth and width for the Court’s task of

judicial review of the Case - the guarantee against unreasonable search and

seizure, and of the presumption of innocence in criminal prosecution, the

support for the majority view was solidified. The framing of the issue

appeals both to mind and emotion. The ponencia written by Justice Caguioa

(the “Ponencia”) harps on the Bill of Rights and tugs at the heart citing

People vs Tudtud’s eloquent words that - ". . . the Bill of Rights is the

bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their

rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government

becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is

in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the

fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power."

The ponencia has in a sense pitted the government as to the exercise of its

power to that of the people’s reliance on and exercise of their guaranteed

rights. A better understanding of the majority decision therefore perhaps

requires one to go behind the concepts upon which the rights arose.

Constitutionalism in the minimal sense of the term consists of a set of

norms (rules, principles or values) creating, structuring, and possibly

defining the limits of, government power or authority. The very essence of

constitutionalism is to limit the power of the government and to mandate the

government to respect the individual who must be free and afforded every

means for his happiness. After all government exists for this purpose under
the social contract doctrine popularized by John Locke where people in the

state of nature conditionally transfer some of their rights to the government

in order to better ensure the stable, comfortable enjoyment of their lives,

liberty, and property.

Against this backdrop of power granted to the government and of the

universally accepted rights belonging to a human being, ii is to be appreciated

the guarantees to protection of life and liberty and of a person’s security.

The guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizure is an

implementation of the right to security of an individual in his person, house,

effects and papers. It is giving flesh to the social contract between the

people and the government. Government power is not absolute but is

inherently subject to that limitation that it is to be exercised for the good of

the people from whom such power is derived. This accords with the majority

opinion’s pronouncement that the “law is heavily in favor of the accused”.

Accordingly, the ponencia recognizes that the person (e.g. accused) must be

protected versus the government. This is necessary because the individual

pales when arrayed against the government with all its agencies and

instrumentalities and with its vast array of powers.

The majority and minority opinion appear to lock horns on the presumption

of innocence as a defining concept in the Case. This norm which only arises

in criminal proceedings has to be understood better. The function of criminal

law under the punitive view is to deliver justified punishment It conceives

of criminal law as an instrument of the community—a way of ensuring that

the community gets what it is owed from wrongdoers. This explains why the

protection given to an individual in criminal prosecution is more robust than

in other legal proceedings. It is in large part explained by the consequences

of conviction. Conviction means deprivation of some kind ( e.g. liberty)

or a suffering in general. In addition, a person upon conviction may be

deprived of certain benefits ( i.e. housing, monetary, job ), disenfranchised,

and even ostracized. It all begins with the criminalization of an act by which

the law prohibits something to be done. The commission of a crime grants to

police the use of reasonable force to stop the doing of unlawful act and to

effect arrest. The other view of the function of criminal law is to deter the

commission of wrong. For this criminal law confers a set of investigative

powers designed to help generate evidence of criminality: these include

powers to stop and search, to carry out surveillance, and to detain suspects

for questioning. If sufficient evidence is produced, and it is in the public

interest to do so, the individual is charged with a crime. To exercise these

powers is to impose new duties on the accused – he must submit to the

search, remain in detention, and turn up in court when required. If the

accused does otherwise—absent justification or excuse— that by itself is

criminal. Accordingly for refusal to cooperate, the accused is allowed to

suffer reasonable force to compel him.iii For all the mentioned consequences

and adversities to which an individual is to suffer, it is therefore not amiss,

despite the minority view’s protestation of the inappropriateness of the

presumption of innocence doctrine, that the majority extends the said

entitlement to accused-appellant.

The dynamics of decision making by the Court has been amply demonstrated

in the Case. It could have gone otherwise where the opinion espoused by

the dissenters becomes the ruling. And it can not be said that it is the wrong

ruling. The minority did not say that the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights

be ignored but that they called for a balancing act between the recognition

of those rights to the performance of the duty of government to prevent the

occurrence of wrongdoing. The majority have adopted the view that

between the exercise of government power and that of the individual rights,

there is a need to protect the latter because of the imbalance in the powers

and resources available to the government vis-à-vis the individual. How the
individual justices perceived the issue to be is determinative of the outcome.

The framing of the issue substantially impacts on which view has

preponderance. The perceptions and the values may change and one can

expect a shift in the pronouncements. What is important is that in reaching

the decision, the justices have acted with candor on the basis of their sincere

belief of what is good and are not swayed by self-interest nor of serving the

interest of a select group or another. Lady Justice is portrayed wearing a

blindfold because she should dispense justice without regard to the parties’

status. But perhaps the blinder is also to allow her to focus intently and

perspicaciously in order that truth be served.

I quote John Adams to conclude –

“But if innocence itself is brought to the bar and condemned,

perhaps to die, then the citizen will say, 'whether I do good or

whether I do evil is immaterial, for innocence itself is no

protection,' and if such an idea as that were to take hold in the

mind of the citizen that would be the end of security

whatsoever.”  iv

ENDNOTES:
i
See dissenting opinion of J. Lazaro-Javier in the Case citing discussion of SCOTUS of the Ross ruling
(456 U.S. 809-810)
ii
Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations General
Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (General Assembly resolution 217 A) as a common standard
of achievements for all peoples and all nations.
iii
Theories of Criminal Law, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy published online in
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/
iv
John Adams, The Portable John Adams, Penguin Classics