1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

206020, [April 14, 2015]

PONENTE: Reyes, J.

DOCTRINE:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any
democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a
particular candidate. The right to express one’s preference for a candidate is likewise part of
the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to
convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.

FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the
rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local
elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms
of election propaganda, pertinently provides:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is

unlawful:

xxxx

(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of
authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the
consent of the owner thereof.

(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:

xxxx

5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and
tricycles, whether motorized or not;

6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports,
seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.

The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the
public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service
and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as
implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.

Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of REsolution No.
9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately
owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the
COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private owners
of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and
transport terminals.

The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the petitioner’s
request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
are constitutional. [NO]

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for
being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

In the guise of Censorship

Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if
the supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The
prohibition under Section 7 (g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under
the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since
they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.

Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials
violates the equal protection clause.

A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other
properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government
either a franchise or a permit to operate.

In sum, Section 7 (g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7 (f) of Resolution No. 9615 violate
the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the
constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of
ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to
the free speech clause, but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no
substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private
vehicles and other properties.
 Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, [April 7, 2015])

PONENTE: Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:
The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by the Fair Election Act is a
recognition that election surveys are not a mere descriptive aggregation of data. Publishing
surveys are a means to shape the preference of voters, inform the strategy of campaign
machineries, and ultimately, affect the outcome of elections. Election surveys have a similar
nature as election propaganda. They are expensive, normally paid for by those interested in the
outcome of elections, and have tremendous consequences on election results.

FACTS:
Commission on Election’s (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather Stations,
Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as other survey firms of similar circumstance
to submit to COMELEC the names of allcommissioners and payors of all surveys published from
February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of their “subscribers.”

This resolves the Petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that respondent Commission on
Election’s Resolution No. 96742 dated April 23, 2013 be nullified and set aside and that the
Commission on Elections be permanently enjoined from enforcing the same Resolution, as well
as prosecuting Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc. for violating it or otherwise
compelling compliance with it.

In the letter dated April 30, 2013, SWS and Pulse Asia informed COMELEC Chairman Brillantes
that they have not received a copy of Resolution No. 9674. They also articulated their view that
Resolution No. 9674 was tainted with irregularities, having been issued ultra vires (i.e., in excess
of what the Fair Elections Act allows) and in violation of the non-impairment of contracts clause
of the Constitution. They also expressed their intention to bring the matter before this court on
account of these supposed irregularities. Thus, they requested that COMELEC defer or hold in
abeyance Resolution No. 9674’s enforcement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 9674’s requirement of disclosing the names of
subscribers to election surveys valid and constitutional? [YES]

RULING:
We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or pay for
election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant, to Section
5.2 (a) of the Fair Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police
power and effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for
public service[.]" 47 Section 5.2 (a)'s requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails
petitioners' free speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription against the
impairment of contracts.
Section 5.1 defines election surveys as "the measurement of opinions and perceptions of the
voters as regards a candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of public
discussion in relation to the election, including voters' preference for candidates or publicly
discussed issues during the campaign period[.]"

The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by the Fair Election Act is a
recognition that election surveys are not a mere descriptive aggregation of data. Publishing
surveys are a means to shape the preference of voters, inform the strategy of campaign
machineries, and ultimately, affect the outcome of elections. Election surveys have a similar
nature as election propaganda. They are expensive, normally paid for by those interested in the
outcome of elections, and have tremendous consequences on election results.

Several possible, albeit conflicting, effects of surveys on voter behavior have been postulated:

First, there is the bandwagon effect where "electors rally to support the candidate leading in
the polls." This "assumes that knowledge of a popular 'tide' will likely change voting intentions
in [favor] of the frontrunner, that many electors feel more comfortable supporting a popular
choice or that people accept the perceived collective wisdom of others as being enough reason
for supporting a candidate."

Second, there is the underdog effect where "electors rally to support the candidate trailing in
the polls." This shift can be motivated by sympathy for the perceived underdog.

Third, there is the motivating effect where "individuals who had not intended to vote are
persuaded to do so," having been alerted to the fact of an election's imminence.

Fourth, there is also the demotivating effect where "voters abstain from voting out of certainty
that their candidate or party will win[.]"

Fifth, there are reports of a behavior known as strategic voting where "voting is influenced by
the chances of winning[.]"

Lastly, there is also the theory of a free-will effect where "voters cast their ballots to prove the
polls wrong[.]"

Of the six (6) effects, the bandwagon effect has a particular resonance and has been of concern.
Surveys, or opinion polls, "by directly influencing individual-level support . . . , can be self-
fulfilling prophecies and produce opinion cascades."

"[A] poll's prediction may come to pass not only because it measures public opinion but also
because it may influence public opinion."
The Philippines, as it emerged in the wake of Ferdinand Marcos' presidency and the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution, saw the "celebritification" of political office.

This celebritification nurtures misleading notions of an enhanced or healthier democracy, one

that opens avenues to a crop of political leaders not belonging to oligarchic families.

To reiterate, the inclusion of published election surveys in a statute that regulates election
propaganda and other means through which candidates may shape voter preferences is itself
telling of the recognition that published election surveys, too, may influence voter preferences.

COMELEC correctly points out that in Section 5.2 (a) of the Fair Election Act, those who
"commissioned" and those who "paid for" the published survey are separated by the
disjunctive term "or." This disassociates those who "commissioned" from those who "paid for"
and identifies them as alternatives to each other. Section 5.2 (a) thus requires the disclosure of
two (2) classes of persons: "[first,] those who commissioned or sponsored the survey; and
[second,] those who paid for the survey."

Second, not only an important or substantial state interest but even a compelling one
reasonably grounds Resolution No. 9674's inclusion of subscribers to election surveys. Thus,
regardless of whether an intermediate or a strict standard is used, Resolution No. 9674 passes
scrutiny.

Resolution No. 9674 addresses the reality that an election survey is formative as it is
descriptive. It can be a means to shape the preference of voters and, thus, the outcome of
elections. In the hands of those whose end is to get a candidate elected, it is a means for such
end and partakes of the nature of election propaganda.

First, verba legis or the so-called plain-meaning rule applies only when the law is completely
clear, such that there is absolutely no room for interpretation. Its application is premised on a
situation where the words of the legislature are clear that its intention, insofar as the facts of a
case demand from the point of view of a contemporary interpretative community, is neither
vague nor ambiguous. This is a matter of judicial appreciation. It cannot apply merely on a
party's contention of supposed clarity and lack of room for interpretation.