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by SOFREP Nov 29, 2014 MO S T R E AD

American Heroes:

1 Merit Scholar to
Navy SEAL, Meet
Dave Scott

American Heroes:

2 The Legacy of
Navy SEAL Dave
Scott

Volunteers at the
U.S. Border:
3 Training with
Arizona Border
Recon

US Navy Puts Iran

4 on Notice in the
Persian Gulf

Folk hero or real

villain? The
5 complex tale of
Colorado’s
Special thanks to Patrick Collins for writing this guest post. -Jack ‘Killdozer’

In the mid 1960’s and throughout the 1970’s, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) faced a boiling
communist inspired insurgency that sought to overthrow the existing government that was led
by the descendants of European settlers. The Rhodesian Bushwar would last over fifteen years,
RE C ENT COM ME N TS
coming on the heels of the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam Conflict. Faced with
bureaucratic constraints and operational shortcomings, the Rhodesians were forced to
Keith W.
maximize the potential of their meager resources by creating highly reliable small unit forces This is so horrible, I don't even know
that could conduct raids and “pseudo-operations” against rebel forces. Among these units were what to say. My thoughts and prayers...

the Rhodesian Light Infantry Commandos (RLI), the Rhodesian SAS and the Selous Scouts. Fort Bragg Special Operations Medic Kills
Though modern circumstances have changed, the tactics of the Selous Scouts continue to be Pregnant Wife Before Turning Gun on
relevant and apply to the ongoing fight against ISIS and the Global War on Terror. Himself  · 33 minutes ago

This is not a comprehensive study of counterinsurgency doctrine, rather it focuses on the CHP3G
Greg, perhaps draw a clear distinction
kinetic tactics that could be employed to eliminate enemy forces (a minor element in broader
between the actual BLM Organization...
COIN strategy). The list of differences between the Rhodesian Bushwar and the Global War on
What I Learned From Riding With the
Terror is extensive (see below) but the most critical similarity remains: the enemy has/had the
Boogaloo Bois  · 1 hour ago
power to reach across national borders and the “deep pockets” to procure weaponry, support
and provide governance. The strategy of the Selous Scouts was to conduct “pseudo-
operations” (false flag) by pretending to be guerillas themselves and luring the true guerillas
into ambushes or to gather intelligence about guerilla operations/tradecraft. The Selous Scouts Craig S.
We all need to be much more critical in
would also attempt to turn captured guerillas making them “tamed terrs” and incorporating
our assessments of what we are told...
them into the unit.
What I Learned From Riding With the
Boogaloo Bois  · 1 hour ago

Rhodesia Similarities Global War on Terror

Trent L
(ISIS Specific) Thanks Keith.

Daily History Hangfire: Which American

Terrain Fought on Both conflicts span Not fought primarily on President Founded the U.S. Navy SEAL
Rhodesian land across multiple American/Western soil Teams?  · 2 hours ago
where soldiers had borders in
“grown up” inhospitable terrain.
Join SOFREP Team Room
Ideology Communist inspired In both instances the Ideological (religious) for Insider Access and
insurgency less ideological could insurgency Analysis
be “turned” Your Subscription Supports
our Veteran Staff
Culture Rhodesian vs. In pseudo-operations Western vs. Radical
African tactical landscape, Islamism (specifically S UBS C RIBE N OW
“culture” becomes takfirist jihad)
less relevant

Purpose: ISIS’ “Two Front

War”
The most daunting task in the past half-century of counterinsurgency warfare has been
determining friends and foe. Whether Viet Cong or al-Qaeda inspired militants,
counterinsurgents have faced the insurmountable task of discerning civilian from combatant.
The resulting psychological pressure of “not knowing” has caused even the most disciplined
units to become worn out. While most small unit SOF forces employed guerilla tactics to
“terrorize” insurgents, very few have gone to the lengths that the Selous Scouts took to deceive
and surprise the enemy. This paradigm shift exposed bushwar insurgents to the psychological
pressures normally experienced by counterinsurgents: the constant fear of deception, betrayal
and surprise attacks. Scouts would often stage elaborate scenarios where black members of
the unit would pretend to be guerillas leading captured white soldiers into a guerilla camp. At
the last moment all weaponry would be returned to the pseudo-captives, allowing the Scouts
to catch the entire camp by surprise. Even though the sides of the conflict seemed as stark as
“black and white”, the Scouts knew how to use their craft to show guerillas that they were not
safe.

In examining the current struggle

against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the model
of pseudo-operations could readily be
applied to wield a kinetic as well as
psychological blow to ISIS and to fill
gaps in intelligence collection. ISIS’
ability to function as a pseudo-
government that controls territory and
as a pseudo-military that blends both
Read Next: The Selous Scouts, a uniquely conventional and asymmetric tactics
Rhodesian solution to counter-insurgency makes it the ideal target for exploitation
by a pseudo-operations group. To many,
the ability of ISIS to straddle the world of
conventional and non-conventional the group’s greatest strength since it can provide
“legitimate” governance as well as armored military might augmented by guerilla/terrorist
tactics. This “strength” is in fact their greatest vulnerability since they are susceptible to the
same weaknesses that plague governments and militants alike. Psuedo-operators would force
ISIS into a two-front war, much like the Selous Scouts threatened both insurgent governments
and guerillas alike.

ISIS has relied on both terrorist theatrics (beheadings, ransoms, televised threats) as well as
military prowess that incorporates some conventional tactics and command structure. As a
guerilla force, Scouts could target ISIS’ governmental structure and create an insurgency with
bombings, kidnappings and assassinations of ISIS leaders. An attempt to crush the Scouts using
conventional force such as tanks, artillery and irregular infantry would be thwarted by
additional guerilla attacks by the Scouts designed to target conventional(ish) vulnerabilities.
Since ISIS also maintains its image as a terrorist/insurgent group, Scouts could perform
pseudo-operations to infiltrate and decimate ISIS from within. Likewise, scouts could stage false
flag operations to lure ISIS elements into the open to be dispatched by air power or
conventional units. All three approaches would work to turn the insurgency against the
“insurgents” both kinetically and psychologically.

Tactic Method Kinetic Outcome Psychological

Outcome

False Flag 1. Turn former 1. Destruction of 1. No

insurgents against militant resources militant/insurgent
the group and and personnel. government is safe.
incorporate into 2. Gain additional 2. Drain morale from
scouts. personnel and insurgents and
2. Gain intelligence. critical insurgent
3. intelligence. government.
Impersonate
militant group to
draw insurgents
into defenseless
area.
4.
Kill, capture and
“turn” additional
insurgents.

Guerilla (Blue) on 1. Use guerilla tactics 1. Degrade ISIS’ 1. Weaken public

Conventional to attack ISIS physical ability to perception of ISIS’
(Black) conventional govern ability to govern,
structure. 2. Draw ISIS turn public against
2. Portray attack as aggression to ISIS similar to “2006
action taken by other militant Anbar Awakening”
rival militant groups hostile to
groups (AQ). US.
3. Potential for
further chaos and
instability
(negative
outcome).

Guerilla (Blue) on 1. Use guerilla tactics 1. Destroy large 1. No militant is safe.

Guerilla (Black) to attack ISIS amounts of
terrorist networks. militant hardware
2. Portray attack as and personnel.
action taken by
rival militant
groups

*note “blue” represents Scout forces while “Black” represent ISIS forces/government
Formation: Forging the
new unconventional
The formation of such a group would require collaboration across all branches of the US
Military as well as SOCOM and the Intelligence Community. Since the original Selous Scouts
grew up in Rhodesia, knew the bush that they fought in, and were at least somewhat familiar
with the culture and history of their enemies, an emphasis would need to be placed on cultural
knowledge (languages, customs, history, etc.) for American volunteers to the Scouts. The
volunteer would also require extensive warfighting skills with a particular focus on
unconventional warfare; although this knowledge could be taught in later training. Though
most SOF elements have unconventional warfare capabilities, the Scouts would operate in truly
unconventional, guerilla circumstances. With minimal reliance on US military technology,
resupply, firepower and equipment, the teams would function with strict oversight but little
structure.

Selection and training for the group would mirror the curriculum of the Selous Scouts by first
shrinking the applicant pool through rigorous PT, ruck marching, starvation and mind-games
(incorporating all relevant evolutions from current US-SOF schools). Once the class was reduced
to around 10-20%, the remainder of the course would be focused on learning unconventional
warfare and tradecraft related to pseudo-operations. Since applicants would come from all
branches and even civilian life/academia, graduates would next be sent to various schools to
round out their skillsets (language school, sniper school, demolitions, ect.) Once downrange,
team members would recreate the course to incorporate indigenous personnel as well as
captured insurgents to be turned into “tamed terrs” (to use the Rhodesian phrase).

The Rhodesian Selous Scouts had extensive knowledge of the bush that they grew up in and
the rebels they fought against but they had to rely on makeup and extensive “costuming” to
play the part of a Marxist guerilla and convince hapless terrorists of the authenticity. While this
masquerade of appearance and cultural practices would continue to be a critical weapon in the
Scout’s arsenal, the use of social media and technology would serve as a relatively safe way to
initiate and guide pseudo-operations. Scouts would undergo training to create fake accounts to
spread “propaganda”, disseminate videos and boost their militant credentials. These activities
would not replace fieldwork/raids but would complement their intelligence collection,
potentially helping them pinpoint locations of other cyber-jihadists nearby.

Deployment
After developing a cadre of indigenous personnel to incorporate into the Scouts, the teams
would begin work on a specific strategy. Some would focus on conducting pseudo-missions
against ISIS while others would conduct guerilla operations against ISIS to build bona-fides with
other terrorist groups (hostile to the US) and in turn conduct pseudo-operations against them.
In a war where there are multiple enemy sides, the Scouts would be able to strike at any
terrorist group hostile to US interests. While this would potentially create chaos or a power
vacuum, it would be highly effective for gathering intelligence and destroying terrorist
infrastructure.

This model is not intended to bring stability and order to Mesopotamia and the Levant. Rather,
it comprises the 10% of counterinsurgency doctrine that requires kinetic force against the
enemy. It would serve as an effective method to identify insurgent infrastructure, terrorist
plots/networks and build intelligence collection capacity. By shifting the insurgency paradigm
against the pseudo-government of ISIS, Scouts would psychologically degrade the will of the
organization and its fighters. Although operators would be compensated for their service, the
independent structure and ethos of the Scouts would come with the understanding that their
specialized training and mission would mean forgoing the military “comforts” of tremendous
firepower and specialized equipment. This minimalist approach to combat support would
drastically increase the “tooth-to-tail” ratio of the unit.
M ORE F ROM SOF RE P

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