Legal Prof.
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
2. Rule 138 ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION to the bar.
2.1 WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW.
Cayetano vs Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, Sept 3, 1991
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article
IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of
a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l),
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no
jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation
of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating
with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as
to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of
a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive
field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice
by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in
even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public
service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such
as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of
the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be
allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They
must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting
from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed
in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that
as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are
using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to
be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on
Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem
it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of
the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at
least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA
by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal
work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers
who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is
that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis
supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and
which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage
in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private
practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business
of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually
a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.
Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to
traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern
Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously
be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a
client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms,
and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and
the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the
public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is
this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate
lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer
as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there
are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an
attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more
legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in
law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where
internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And
even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a
lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of
much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills
of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting,
and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the
new skills of evaluation and mediation are both
effective for many clients and a source of employment.
(Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or
in litigation work that is constrained in very important
ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it
some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of
these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way
in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily,
herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate
law practice, a departure from the traditional concept
of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular
those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems
of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research
function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to
be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing,
and electronic computing equipment. Understandably,
an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a
segment thereof is developed to test projected
alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic
effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the
law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the law can
be improved through an early introduction to multi-
variable decisional context and the various approaches
for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with
either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques
of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate
finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with
a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers,
many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms. Many others have in-
house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a
lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter
alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting
out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling
of being isolated from the action, or not understanding
how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who
needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to
be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes
be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities
available to corporate lawyers to enter the international
law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms.
Because working in a foreign country is perceived by
many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go
to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990,
p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the
lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A
bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the
excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs
a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and
the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily
with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a
corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and
(3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as
intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences
affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he
provides counsel for are required to make, and the need
to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple
levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units.
Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in
decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating
in the organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other decision-
making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office
of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and
temporary groups within organizations has been found
to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work
with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are
better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of
the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel,
three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics
has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An understanding of the role of
feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make
the system dynamics principles more accessible to
managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make
better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In
the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management.
Computer-based models can be used directly by parties
and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated
set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction
in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of
the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires
special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing
legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to
which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive
in a global, interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global
economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate
Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in
the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions
with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of
how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And
even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand
all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must,
at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the
bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman
of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception
in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional
license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating
legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant
or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field
of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with
the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform
law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of
which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel
acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11).
(Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants;
and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any
debt restructuring program. For aside from performing
the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United
States Agency for International Development, during
the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at
the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored
by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-
31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more
so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise
in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement
drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign
lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model
loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and
signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical
support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of
the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements
of the contract. A good agreement must not only define
the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails
to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle
which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign
loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once
said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not
the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal,
Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977,
p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the
term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept
of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and
must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
(emphasis supplied) distinguished from the modern concept of the practice
of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition
it stated:
would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as practised two or three times a week and would
in this case, and all the other legal requirements are outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil constitutional intent.
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
an appointment on the ground that another person is
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made
more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
use of a definition of law practice which really means
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
nothing because the definition says that law practice
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
" . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of
appointment is essentially within the discretionary
sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law
condition that the appointee should possess the
practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the
the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
different from the acts of persons practising
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
law, without first becoming lawyers.
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give
disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say,
its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications.
the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section
This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an
1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
action or petition be brought against the President? And
provides:
even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
by the President with the consent of the Commission on President?
Appointments for a term of seven years without
We now proceed:
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
Members for five years, and the last Members for three doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the qualifications as required by law. The judgment
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a
grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of
the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a
nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming
body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the
U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by
the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah.
Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was
captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of
what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury,
accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his
skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
BAR MATTER No. 702
May 12, 1994
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a Resolution
of the Court En Banc dated May 12, 1994.
Bar Matter No. 702 (In the Matter of Petition to
authorize Sharia'h District Court Judges to Appoint
Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries Public, Atty. Royo M.
Gampong, petitioner)
Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LIB)
graduate of Notre Dame University who was admitted
to the Philippine Shari'a Bar on October 7, 1991, filed
the instant petition praying that this Court, after due
notice and hearing, issue an order authorizing all Shari'a
District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers who
possess the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications as notaries public within their
respective jurisdictions.
On the theory that Shari'a District Courts are co-equal
with the regular Regional Trial Courts in the hierarchy of
the Philippine Judicial System, petitioner claims that by
analogy, Shari'a District Court Judges may be authorized
to appoint the members of the Philippine Shari'a Bar.
Petitioner further argues that, being a special member
of the Philippine Bar and a practicing Shari'a lawyer,
notarial work is indispensable and imperative in the
exercise of his profession; therefore, he is qualified to
be appointed as notary public by Shari'a District Judge.
Petitioner likewise claims that Shari'a lawyers cannot be
appointed as notaries public in their places of residence
and in cities and other pilot centers where Shari'a courts
are established because the RTC Executive Judges in
Cotabato and Maguindanao require them to secure
certifications from the IBP Secretary that there are no
practicing lawyers in the place where they are applying.
Thus, Shari'a lawyers lose their chance to be appointed
as notaries public because of the policy of the IBP
chapters in Region 12 to appoint regular IBP members
practically in all municipalities and provinces.
The petition is denied.
The appointment, qualification, jurisdiction and powers
of notaries public are governed by the provisions of the
Notarial Law embodied in Sections 231 to Section 241,
Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code, Section
232 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by
Executive Order No. 41, May 11, 1945 provides:
Sec. 232. Appointment of notaries public. — Judges of
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the
respective may appoint as many notaries public as the
public good requires, and there shall be at least one for
every municipality in each province. Notaries public in
the City of Manila shall be appointed by one of the
judges of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Manila to be chosen by the judges of the
branches of said court" (Words in parenthesis supplied)
Strictly speaking, Shari'a District Courts do not form part
of the integrated judicial system of the Philippines.
Section 2 of the Judiciary Reorganization Acts of 1980
(B.P. Blg. 129) enumerates the courts covered by the
Act, comprising the integrated judicial system. Shari'a
Courts are not included in the enumeration
notwithstanding that, when said B.P. Blg. 129 took
effect on August 14, 1981, P.D. No. 1083 (otherwise
known as "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines") was already in force. The Shari'a Courts are
mentioned in Section 45 of the Act only for the purpose
of including them "in the funding appropriations."
The fact that judges thereof are required by law to
possess the same qualifications as those of Regional
Trial Courts does not signify that the Shari'a Court is a
regular court like the Regional Trial Court. The latter is a
court of general jurisdiction, i.e., competent to decide
all cases, civil and criminal, within its jurisdiction. A
Shari'a District Court, created pursuant to Article 137 of
Presidential Decree No. 1083, is a court of limited
jurisdiction, exercising original only over cases
specifically enumerated in Article 143 thereof. In other
words, a Shari'a District Court is not a regular court
exercising general jurisdiction within the meaning of
Section 232 of the Notarial Law.
The fact, too, that Shari'a Courts are called "courts"
does not imply that they are on equal footing or are
identical with regular courts, for the word "court" may
be applied to tribunals which are not actually judicial in
character, but are quasi-judicial agencies, like the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Boards, Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology,
Energy Regulatory Board, etc. 1
Moreover, decisions of the Shari'a District Courts are
not elevated to this Court by appeal under Rule 41, or
by petition for review under Rule 45, of the Rules of
Court. Their decisions are final "whether on appeal from
the Shari'a Circuit Court or not" 2 and hence, may reach
this Court only by way of a special civil action under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, similar to those of the
National Labor Relations Commission, or the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals. 3
Furthermore, the qualifications for appointment as a
judge of a Shari'a District Court are different from those
required of a judge of a Regional Trial Court under
Section 15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides:
Sec. 15. Qualifications — No person shall be appointed
Regional trial Court Judge unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of
age, and, for at least ten years, has been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines requiring admission to
the practice of law as an indispensable requirement.
In case of Shari'a Court judges, on the other hand, a
Special Bar Examination for Shari'a Courts was
authorized by the Supreme Court in its En
Banc resolution dated September 20, 1983. Those who
pass said examination are qualified for appointment for
Shari'a court judges and for admission to special
membership in the Philippine Bar to practice law in the
Shari'a courts pursuant to Article 152, in relation to
Articles 148 and 158 of P.D. No. 1083. Said Article 152,
P.D. No. 1083 provides, thus:
Art. 152. Qualifications. — No person shall be appointed
judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court unless he is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years
of age, and has passed an examination in the Sharia'
and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to be given by the
Supreme Court for admission to special membership in
the Philippine Bar to practice law in the Shari'a courts.
The authority thus conferred by the Notarial Law upon
judges of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional
Trial Court, in their respective provinces to appoint
notaries public cannot be expanded to cloth the judges
of the Shari'a District Court with the same statutory
authority. The authority to appoint notaries public
contemplated under Section 232 of the Notarial Law
and the corresponding supervising authority over them
authorized under Section 248 thereof require the
qualifications and experience of an RTC Judge.
It must be made clear in this regard that since a person
who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination does not
automatically become a regular member of the
Philippine Bar, he lacks the necessary qualification to be
appointed a notary public. Section 233 of the Notarial
Law provides for the qualifications for appointment as
notary public, thus:
Sec. 233. Qualifications for Appointment. — To be
eligible for appointment as notary public, a person must
be a citizen of the Philippines (or of the United States)
and over twenty-one years of age. He must,
furthermore, be a person who has been admitted to the
practice of law or who has completed and passed in the
studies of law in a reputable university or school of law,
or has passed the examination for the office of the
peace or clerk or deputy clerk of court, or be a person
who had qualified for the office of notary public under
the Spanish sovereignty.
In the chartered cities and in the capitals of the
provinces, where there are two or more lawyers
appointed as notaries public, no person other than a
lawyer or a person who had qualified to hold the office
of notary public under the Spanish sovereignty shall
hold said office.
In municipalities or municipal districts where no person
resides having the qualifications herein before specified
or having them, refuses to hold such office, judges of
first instance may appoint other persons temporarily to
exercise the office of notary public who have the
requisite qualifications or fitness and morality.
In an En Banc resolution of the Court dated August 5,
1993, in Bar Matter No. 681 "Re: Petition to Allow
Shari'a Lawyers to exercise their profession at the
regular courts," this Court categorically stated that a
person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is
only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a
full-fledged member thereof even if he is a Bachelor of
Laws degree holder. As such, he is authorized to
practice only in the Shari'a courts.
Only a person duly admitted as members of the
Philippine Bar in accordance with the Rules of Court are
entitled to practice law before the regular courts.
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of
this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
This Court further emphasized in its resolution in Bar
Matter 681, that:
In order to be admitted as member of the Philippine
Bar, the candidate must pass an examination for
admission covering the following subjects: Political and
International Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Civil Law
and Taxation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Remedial
Law; and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (Sec. 11,
Rule 138) Further, in order that a candidate may be
deemed to have passed the bar examination, he must
have obtained a general average of 75% in all the
aforementioned subjects without failing below 50% in
any subject (Sec. 14, Rule 138). On the other hand, the
subjects covered by the special bar examination for
Shari'a courts are: (1) Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and
Customary laws (Adat); (2) Persons, Family Relations
and Property; (3) Successions, Wills/Adjudication and
Settlement of Property; (4) Procedure in Shari'a Courts
(See Resolution dated September 20, 1983).
It is quite obvious that the subject matter of the two
examinations are different. The Philippine Bar
Examination covers the entire range of the Philippine
Laws and jurisprudence, while the Shari'a Bar
Examination covers Muslim personal laws and
jurisprudence only. Hence, a person who has passed the
Shari'a Bar Examination, who is not a lawyer, is not
qualified to practice law before the regular courts
because he has not passed the requisite examinations
for admission as a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, the Shari'a bar lawyer may appear before the
Municipal Trial Courts as agent or friend of a litigant, if
appointed by the latter for the purpose but not before
the Regional Trial Courts as only duly authorized
members of the Bar may conduct litigations in the latter
court (Sec. 34, Rule 138).
Considering, therefore that a person who has passed
the Shari'a Bar Examination is only a special member of
the Philippine Bar and not a full-fledged member
thereof even if he holds a Bachelor of Laws Degree, he
is not qualified to practice to qualified to practice law
before the regular courts. As a general rule, a Shari'a
Lawyer is not possessed of the basic requisite of
"practice of law" in order to be appointed as a notary
public under Section 233 of the Notarial Law in relation
to Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition to authorize Shari'a District
Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers as notaries
public in their respective jurisdiction is DENIED.
Rules 11 to 14 of BAR MATTER no. 850
Oct 2, 2001
RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. Compliance card
Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a
Compliance Card before the end of his compliance
period. He shall complete the card by attesting under
oath that he has complied with the education
requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature
of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be
returned to the address indicated therein not later than
the day after the end of the member's compliance
period.
Section 2. Member record keeping requirement
Each member shall maintain sufficient record of
compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE
Committee. The record required to be provided to the
members by the provider pursuant to Section 3(c) of
Rule 9 should be sufficient record of attendance at a
participatory activity. A record of non-participatory
activity shall also be maintained by the member, as
referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
RULE 12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance
The following shall constitute non-compliance
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement
within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or
exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of
compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within
the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and
furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty (60)
days from receipt of a non-compliance notice;
(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the
foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.
Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to
attain compliance
A member failing to comply will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and
will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification
to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance
with the requirements. Such notice shall contain, among
other things, the following language in capital letters:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION
FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60
DAYS FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE), SHALL BE A CAUSE
FOR LISTING AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER.
The Member may use this period to attain the adequate
number of credit hours for compliance. Credit hours
earned during this period may only be counted toward
compliance with the prior compliance period
requirement unless hours in excess of the requirement
are earned, in which case, the excess hours may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.lawphil.net
RULE 13
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Section 1. Non-compliance fee
A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-
compliance at the end of the compliance period shall
pay a non-compliance fee.
Section 2. Listing as delinquent member
Any member who fails to satisfactorily comply with
Section 2 of Rule 12 shall be listed as a delinquent
member by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which
case, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
RULE 14
REINSTATEMENT
Section 1. Process
The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be
terminated when the member provides proof of
compliance with the MCLE requirement, including
payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain
the necessary credit hours to meet the requirement for
the period of non-compliance during the period the
member is on inactive status. These credit hours may
not be counted toward meeting the current compliance
period requirement. Credit hours attained during the
period of non-compliance in excess of the number
needed to satisfy the prior compliance period
requirement may be counted toward meeting the
current compliance period requirement.lawphil.net
Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing
administrative process
The termination of listing as a delinquent member is
administrative in nature but it shall be made with notice
and hearing by the MCLE Committee.
2.2 Requirements for applicants for admission
to the bar.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE
BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
 
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution
of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect
Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has
reached the age of majority? This is the question sought
to be resolved in the present case involving the
application for admission to the Philippine Bar of
Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat
Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino,
was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a
Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in
Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1
September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must
submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching
submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board
of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations
Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar
Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the
successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May
1999. However, because of the questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath.
Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April
1999, he was required to submit further proof of his
citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment
on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that
Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution
was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing
for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother
is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine
citizenship which he could perfect by election upon
reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG
clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order
that the election of Philippine citizenship may be
effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making
the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b)
said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the
phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has
been construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which had been
interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3)
years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice
No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic)
person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3,
12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held
that an election done after over seven (7) years was not
made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not
formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he
does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the
OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on
the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and
the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as
a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching
therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15
July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently
declared myself as one in my school records and other
official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public
Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I
was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and
sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my
oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La
Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing
fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on
15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has
elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable
time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by
election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter
was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3)
of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship
was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution
which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973
and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as
having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject
to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section
1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers
may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did
not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter
only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In
the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the
time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions,
the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was,
in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government
to the effect that the election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary
of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority,
and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted
to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of
the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,
1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15,
1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age,
or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April
1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he
complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15
June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had
reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which
to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special circumstances invoked by
Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot
constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal
election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the
case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion
of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were
(sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the
right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has
been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered
voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925
(when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already
participating in the elections and campaigning for
certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show
his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and
circumstances obtaining therein are very different from
those in the present case, thus, negating its
applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment
of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and
procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and
C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would
not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling
in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out
by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to
elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a
Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In
this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina,
is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would
be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-
4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693,
Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous
belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further
elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court,
we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came
of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship.
(p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise
his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent
who cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In
Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only
to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that
the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries. There is no
doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when
he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on
the part of the private respondent would not only have
been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an
absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight
of Ching. However, even if we consider the special
circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in
the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that
he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence
constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of
the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen
(14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age
of majority until he finally expressed his intention to
elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has
offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the
elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged
to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right
to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right
with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this
case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to
DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
A. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER:
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND
OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13)
other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8
September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed
from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him
in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university
fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused then entered into plea bargaining with the
prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless
imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court.
In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues
filed an application for probation with the lower court.
The application for probation was granted in an Order
dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge
Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at
two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial
report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino
filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of
his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He
was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He
passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this
Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office
and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that
Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation
period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We
note that his probation period did not last for more
than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of
Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June
1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3)
Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited
to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in
those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we
regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a
condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a
license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which
he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the
court, includes all the elements necessary to make up
such a character. It is something more than an absence
of bad character. It is the good name which the
applicant has acquired, or should have acquired,
through association with his fellows. It means that he
must have conducted himself as a man of upright
character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in
following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in
the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the
statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the
duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his
advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every
man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care;
he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law
is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as
such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law
Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere
greater temptations to deviate from the straight and
narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances
that arise in the practice of profession. For these
reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard
therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of
bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to
cause a minute examination to be made of the moral
standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to
arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of
scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of
a candidate who presents himself for admission to the
bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its
very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once
been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation
is presented to the court when proceedings are
instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and
annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent
rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege
granted and continued only to those who demonstrate
special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal
basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has
been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all
and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who
pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and
only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, and a fair private and professional character
is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy
applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an
examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and
ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and
interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in
the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They
are required to be of good moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court, which they are, may
not bring discredit upon the due administration of the
law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such qualifications in the first
instance, or who, having had them, have fallen
therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to
aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good
moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far
as the general public and the proper administration of
justice are concerned, than the possession of legal
learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1,
10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit
no person to the practice of the law unless he covered
an upright moral character. The possession of this by
the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of justice than
legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after
years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the
bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his
character will remain bad, and that he will become a
disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a
curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a
Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be
properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a
proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in
scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application
for admission to the California Bar the court cannot
reject him for want of good moral character unless it
appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be
cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than
that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the
applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and
general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission
upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of
the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied
by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is
a very real need to prevent a general perception that
entry into the legal profession is open to individuals
with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of
such a perception would signal the progressive
destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of
law and in our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing"
activities certainly fell far short of the required standard
of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than
merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe
physical injuries which proximately led to the death of
the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated
serious character flaws on the part of those who
inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused
had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the
life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking
admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he
would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless
stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and
mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral
duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was
then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by
the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C.
Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated not only at the time of
application for permission to take the bar examinations
but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for
its examination and consideration, evidence that he
may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the
Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr.
Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant
evidence to show that he is a different person now, that
he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient
and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this
Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and mother (in
default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let
a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
EN BANC
[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S
OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar
examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred
his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s
conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991.
Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered
pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8)
accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-
arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered
judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of
the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2)
years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein
petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order
approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge
from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a
petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based
on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior
Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit
to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as
complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the
bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner
submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial
court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of
Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts
of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the
criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert
Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty.
Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical
injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not
only homicide but murder since the accused took
advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying
abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior
strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the
lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused
and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to
their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy
Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and
begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told
him that the father of one of the accused had died of a
heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in
the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-
accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would
succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of
an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is
now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those
who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments
in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It
is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble
profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby
further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in
recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a
weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law.
The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth
constituted evident absence of that moral fitness to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
required for admission to the bar since they were totally
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated: lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according
to the sworn promises he makes when taking the
"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless
lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding
strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
that the participant [herein petitioner] was then
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice
possessed of good moral
will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for
character."1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
everyone concerned.
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will
Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
deficiency in moral character referred to above.
position to render legal and other services to the more
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares unfortunate members of society.
the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino
one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience.
is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date
The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and,
profound in cases where the death is due to causes
thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a SO ORDERED.
struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause
B. Application under SECTION 4 of R 138
of death.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court
jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who, being
manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less
Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing
than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional
in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any
for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to
circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in
find room for forgiveness.
the highest court of any State or Territory of the United
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates
position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a that they have practiced at least five years in any of said
lawyer. courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and
that they have never been suspended or disbarred,
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve
may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without
to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
examination.
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the
legal profession with the following admonition: C. Section 7-16 Application, Examinations and Passing
Average Admission to the Bar; Judgement; SC exclusive
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the
power; Practice of law is privilege, not right; etc.,
Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of
bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various Sec. 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. - All
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the
genuine concern for civic duties and public service. Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of
this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted
of the examination. If not embraced within sections 3
all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We
and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same
are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5,
and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall
exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission distributed as follows: First day: Political and
to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not International Law (morning) and Labor and Social
been revoked, and certificates as to their professional Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning)
standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law
own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship. (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day:
Remedial Law (morning) and Legal Ethics and Practical
Sec. 8. Notice of applications. -  Notice of applications
Exercises (afternoon).
for admission shall be published by the clerk of the
Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, Sec. 12. Committee of examiners. -  Examinations shall
English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be
beginning of the examination. appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall
be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who
Sec. 9. Examination; subjects. -  Applicants, not
shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by
otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule,
the court to serve for one year, and eight members of
shall be subjected to examinations in the following
the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a
subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation;
period of one year. The names of the members of this
Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law
committee shall be published in each volume of the
(Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public
official reports.
Officers); International Law (Private and Public);
Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Sec. 13. Disciplinary measures. -  No candidate shall
Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical endeavor to influence any member of the committee,
Exercises (in Pleading and Conveyancing). and during examination the candidates shall not
communicate with each other nor shall they give or
Sec. 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers,
receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this
and in writing. -  Persons taking the examination shall
provision, or any other provision of this rule, shall be
not bring papers, books or notes into the examination
barred from the examination, and the same to count as
rooms. The questions shall be the same for all
a failure against him, and further disciplinary action,
examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish,
including permanent disqualification, may be taken in
shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall
the discretion of the court. chan robles virtual law
answer the questions personally without help from
library
anyone.
Sec. 14. Passing average. -  In order that a candidate
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating
may be deemed to have passed his examinations
that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to
successfully, he must have obtained a general average
read his answers without much loss of time, the
of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50
Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a
per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the
typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless
subjects in the examination shall be given the following
typewriters shall be allowed to be used. chan robles
relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social
virtual law library
Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent;
Criminal Law; 10 per cent; Political and International
The committee of bar examiners shall take such
Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law,
precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution
20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per
of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees
cent.
shall not place their names on the examination papers.
No oral examination shall be given. Sec. 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination
papers. -  Not later than February 15th after the
Sec. 11. Annual examination. -  Examinations for
examination, or as soon thereafter as may be
admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place
practicable, the committee shall file its reports on the
annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four
result of such examination. The examination papers and
days to be designated by the chairman of the
notes of the committee shall be fixed with the clerk and
committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be
may there be examined by the parties in interest, after
the court has approved the report.
Sec. 16. Failing candidates to take review course. -  rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the
Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for
three times shall be disqualified from taking another
examination unless they show to the satisfaction of the
court that they have enrolled in and passed regular
fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar
review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects
attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify
under oath that the candidates have regularly attended
classes and passed the subjects under the same
conditions as ordinary students and the ratings
obtained by them in the particular subject.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant
and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG,
1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON
PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL
MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members,
1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D.
Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo
Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions
during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a
confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-
evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar
Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations
with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%,
respectively — invited the attention of the Court
to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised
for one reason or another, before the bar results were
released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I,
Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C.
Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D.
Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are
strong reasons to believe that the grades in other
examination notebooks in other subjects also
underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior
to the release of the results. Note that this was without
any formal motion or request from the proper parties,
i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners
concerned reconsidered their grades without formal
motion, there is no reason why they may not do so
now when proper request answer motion therefor is
made. It would be contrary to due process postulates.
Might not one say that some candidates got unfair
and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked
to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the
discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason
for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its
conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I,
rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court
checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations
and found that the grades in five subjects — Political
Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of
a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954
underwent some changes which, however, were duly
initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner
concerned. Further check of the records revealed that
the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%,
72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He
passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a
Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as
the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar
Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners
concerned to submit their sworn statements on the
matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and
his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-
checked the notebook involved pertaining to his
subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the
same and that the examinee concerned failed only in
his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents
warranting a formal investigation, the Court required,
in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice why his name should not be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34,
rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore
he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5,
1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why his name should not be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p.
99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also
required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31,
rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and
35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on
March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer
on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-
104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the
same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it
was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated
and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office
Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International
Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help
in the correction of a number of examination
notebooks in Political Law and Public International
Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24,
Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as
respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon.
Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was
also discovered that another paper in Political Law
and Public International Law also underwent re-
evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with
Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto
Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the
discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking
of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law
resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50%
This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned
by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz
and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the
investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation
Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra,
alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of
Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on
September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila
committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student
of the same university. Confronted with this
information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V,
pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that
he does not remember having been charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI,
pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the
bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact
which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on
July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2,
1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required
to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo,
Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho
took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is
believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not
summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except
respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his
oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only
his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence
the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them
to the Court. The same became the basis for their
cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer,
which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-
examiners recounted the circumstances under which
they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination
notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent
Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law,
affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in
December last year, while I was
correcting the examination notebooks,
Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant,
explained to me that it is the practice
and the policy in bar examinations that
he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of
the grades obtained in all subjects and
if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one
subject and a rather low one in
another, he will bring back the latter to
the examiner concerned for re-
evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of
January of this year, he brought back
to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, because
according to him the owner of the
paper is on the borderline and if I
could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under
the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do
so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so,
I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law
was brought back to me for such re-
evaluation and upon verifying my files
I found that the notebook is numbered
'95;
6. That the original grade
was 64% and my re-evaluation of the
answers were based on the same
standard used in the correction and
evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3
and 4 with original grades of 7% each
was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with
4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and
No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis
supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially
reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit
with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2,
6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as
it is no longer to make the
reconsideration of these answers
because of the same evaluation and
standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10
remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at
10%;
4. That at the time I made the
reconsideration of examination booklet
No. 951 I did not know the identity of
its owner until I received this
resolution of the Honorable Supreme
Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was
made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in
view of the misrepresentation of said
Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following
circumstances:
a) Since I started
correcting the papers
on or about October
16, 1971, relationship
between Atty. Lanuevo
and myself had
developed to the point
that with respect to the
correction of the
examination booklets
of bar candidates I
have always followed
him and considered his
instructions as
reflecting the rules and
policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with
respect to the same;
that I have no
alternative but to take
his words;
b) That considering
this relationship
and considering his
misrepresentation to
me as reflecting the
real and policy of the
 Honorable Supreme
Court, I did not bother
any more to get the
consent and
permission of the
Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides,
at that time, I was
isolating myself from
all members of the
Supreme Court and
specially the chairman
of the Bar Committee
for fear that I might be
identified as a bar
examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever
has been received by me in return for
such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one
booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made
the original correction of the same
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge,
Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public
International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8,
1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar
Confidant went to my residence to
obtain from me the last bag of two
hundred notebooks (bearing
examiner's code numbers 1200 to
1400) which according to my record
was on February 5, 1972, he came to
my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding
in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme
Court, with at least two companions.
The bar confidant had with him an
examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and re-
examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a
grade of 57, whereas, according to the
Bar Confidant, the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84,
if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was
allowed to receive or re-examinee the
notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was
authorized to do so because the same
was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number
decode and the examinee's name was
revealed. The Bar Confidant told me
that the name of the examinee in the
case present bearing code number
661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been
possible that I had given a particularly
low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the
Bar Confidant's representations to me,
and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the
said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and
graded it in accordance with the same
standards I had used throughout the
grading of the entire notebooks, with
the result that the examinee deserved
an increased grade of 66. After again
clearing with the Bar Confidant my
authority to correct the grades, and as
he had assured me that the code
number of the examinee in question
had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the
total grade in the notebook and the
grade card attached thereto, and
properly initia(l)ed the same. I also
corrected the itemized grades (from
item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two
sets of grading sheets, my personal
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought
with him the other copy the grading
sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-
59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he
denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo
P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference
the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the
examinee's notebook in political and
international law, code numbered 661,
I did know the name of the examinee.
In fact, I came to know his name only
upon receipt of the resolution of March
5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish
to state that I do not know him
personally, and that I have never met
him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the
impression that I was authorized to
make such review, and had
repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant
whether I was authorized to make
such revision and was so assured of
my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded
or his identity revealed. The Bar
Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of express prohibition
in the rules and guidelines given to me
as an examiner, and the Bar
Confidant was my official liaison with
the Chairman, as, unless called, I
refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the
Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came
to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority
with the Chairman. It did not appear to
me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed,
the Bar Confidant was riding in the
official vehicle of the Supreme Court,
a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by
two companions, which was usual,
and thus looked like a regular visit to
me of the Bar Confidant, as it was
about the same hour that he used to
see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code
numbered 661 was still in the same
condition as when I submitted the
same. In agreeing to review the said
notebook code numbered 661, my aim
was to see if I committed an error in
the correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the
Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was
84% in remedial law, if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not strike
me as unusual that the Bar Confidant
knew the grades of the examinee in
the position to know and that there
was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the
original grade obtained by the
examinee with notebook code
numbered 661 was 57%. After review,
it was increased by 9 points, resulting
in a final grade of 66%. Still, the
examinee did not pass the subject,
and, as heretofore stated, my aim was
not to make the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the representation
that he had passed the other subjects.
...
9. I quite recall that during the first
meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where
an examinee failed in only one subject
and passed the rest, the examiner in
said subject would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did
not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception,
not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office,
and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of
contract with him before or rather the
review and even up to the present
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law,
affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar
Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at
951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
 3. That towards the end when I had
already completed correction of the
books in Criminal Law and was
helping in the correction of some of
the papers in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1)
paper in Criminal Law saying that that
particular examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75% then he would make the
general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised
the grade to 75%, that is, giving a
raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and
revised also the mark and revised also
the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of
the book of the examinee concerned"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent
Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar
Confidant in good faith and without the slightest
inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question
who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated
in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of
January or early part of February
1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw
me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion
Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to
me an examinee's notebook in
Remedial Law which I had previously
graded and submitted to him.
He informed me that he and
others (he used the words "we") had
reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said
notebook and possibly reconsider the
grade that I had previously given. He
explained that the examine concerned
had done well in other subjects, but
that because of the comparatively low
grade that I had given him in
Remedial Law his general average
was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo
remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the
examinee deserving of being admitted
to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr.
Lanuevo particularly called my
attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly
and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that
whether I would reconsider the grades
I had previously given and submitted
was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr.
Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant
to address such a request to me and
that the said request was in order, I, in
the presence of Mr. Lanuevo,
proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate
each and every item of the paper in
question. I recall that in my re-
evaluation of the answers, I increased
the grades in some items, made
deductions in other items, and
maintained the same grades in other
items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new
grades that I had given after re-
evaluation, the total grade increased
by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973,
respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the
notebook, with resulted in increasing
the total grade of the examinee-
concerned in Remedial Law
from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may
well be that he could be faulted for not
having verified from the Chairman of
the Committee of Bar Examiners the
legitimacy of the request made by Mr.
Lanuevo. Herein respondent,
however, pleads in attenuation of such
omission, that —
 a) Having been answer written by the
appointed an Examiner examinee, from 9.25%
for the first time, he to 9% (Adm. Case No.
was not aware, not 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.;
having been apprised emphasis supplied).
otherwise, that it was
not within the authority Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law,
of the Bar Confidant of affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
the Supreme Court to
request or suggest that xxx xxx xxx
the grade of a
particular examination
That during one of the deliberations of
notebook be revised or
the Bar Examiners' Committee after
reconsidered. He had
the Bar Examinations were held, I was
every right to
informed that one Bar examinee
presume, owing to the
passed all other subjects except
highly fiduciary nature
Mercantile Law;
of the position of the
Bar Confidant, that the
request was legitimate. That I informed the Bar Examiners'
Committee that I would be willing to
re-evaluate the paper of this particular
xxx xxx xxx
Bar candidate;.
c) In revising the grade
That the next day, the Bar Confidant
of the particular
handed to me a Bar candidate's
examinee concerned,
notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade
herein respondent
of 61%;
carefully evaluated
each and every
answer written in the That I reviewed the whole paper and
notebook. Testing the after re-evaluating the answers of this
answers by the criteria particular Bar candidate I decided to
laid down by the Court, increase his final grade to 71%;
and giving the said
examinee the benefit That consequently, I amended my
of doubt in view of Mr. report and duly initialed the changes in
Lanuevo's the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164,
representation that it p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
was only in that
particular subject that In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
the said examine Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
failed, herein statement of April 17, 1972, and
respondent became
convinced that the said xxx xxx xxx
examinee deserved a
higher grade than that 2. Supplementary to the foregoing
previously given to sworn statement, I hereby state that
him, but that he did not I re-evaluated the examination
deserve, in herein notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613
respondent's honest in Mercantile Law in absolute good
appraisal, to be given faith and in direct compliance with the
the passing grade of agreement made during one of the
75%. It should also be deliberations of the Bar Examiners
mentioned that, in Committee that where a candidate
reappraising the fails in only one subject, the Examiner
answers, herein concerned should make a re-
respondent evaluation of the answers of the
downgraded a candidate concerned, which I did.
previous rating of an
 3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not
know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that
notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and
that I have never met up to this time
this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar
Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks,
checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record
of ratings, I was impressed of the
writing and the answers on the first
notebook. This led me to scrutinize all
the set of notebooks. Believing that
those five merited re-evalation on the
basis of the memorandum circularized
to the examiners shortly earlier to the
effect that
... in the correction of
the papers, substantial
weight should then be
given to clarify of
language and
soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them
back to the respective examiners for
re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division
that immediately after the release of
the results of the examinations, we are
usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their
notebooks. Many of them would copy
their answers and have them checked
by their professors. Eventually some
of them would file motions or requests
for re-correction and/or re-evaluation.
Right now, we have some 19 of such
motions or requests which we are
reading for submission to the
Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are
meritorious, but just the same they
have to be denied because the result
of the examinations when released is
final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the
occurrence of such instances that
motivated me to bring those
notebooks back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in
question to the examiners concerned
in his hotest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in so doing,
it was not his intention to forsake or
betray the trust reposed in him as bar
confidant but on the contrary to do
justice to the examinee concerned;
that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation
was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not remember
having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the
attention of the Committee during the
meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade
below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the
grade in said subject, respondent
brought the notebook in question to
the Examiner concerned who thereby
raised the grade thus enabling the
said examinee to pass. If he
remembers right, the examinee
concerned is one surnamed "de la
Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never
entertained a notion that his act would
stir such serious charges as would
tend to undermine his integrity
because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his Marcelino street and
answer, stating: almost adjacent to the
south-eastern corner
xxx xxx xxx of the fence of the
Araullo High
1. That I vehemently deny having School(photograph of
deceived the examiners concerned the number '954', the
into believing that the examinee contrivance on which it
involved failed only in their respective is printed and a portion
subjects, the fact of the matter being of the post to which it
that the notebooks in question were is attached is identified
submitted to the respective examiners and marked as Exhibit
for re-evaluation believing in all good 4-Lanuevo and the
faith that they so merited on the basis number "954" as Exh.
of the Confidential Memorandum 4-a-Lanuevo).
(identified and marked as Exh. 1-
Lanuevo, particularly that portion With this number (954)
marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which in mind, I proceeded to
was circulated to all the examiners Plaza Sta. Cruz to look
earlier, leaving to them entirely the for a ticket that would
matter of whether or not re-evaluation contain such number.
was in order, Eventually, I found a
ticket, which I then
2. That the following coincidence bought, whose last
prompted me to pry into the notebooks three digits
in question: corresponded to "954".
This number became
doubly impressive to
Sometime during the
me because the sum
latter part of January
of all the six digits of
and the early part of
the ticket number was
February, 1972, on my
"27", a number that is
way back to the office
so significant to me
(Bar Division) after
that everything I do I
lunch, I though of
try somewhat
buying a sweepstake
instinctively to link or
ticket. I have always
connect it with said
made it a point that the
number whenever
moment I think of so
possible. Thus even in
buying, I pick a
assigning code
number from any
numbers on the Master
object and the first
List of examinees from
number that comes
1968 when I first took
into my sight becomes
charge of the
the basis of the ticket
examinations as Bar
that I buy. At that
Confidant up to 1971, I
moment, the first
either started with the
number that I saw was
number "27" (or "227")
"954" boldly printed on
or end with said
an electrical
number. (1968 Master
contribance (evidently
List is identified and
belonging to the
marked as Exh. 5-
MERALCO) attached
Lanuevo and the figure
to a post standing
"27" at the beginning
along the right
of the list, as Exh. 5-a
sidewalk of P. Faura
Lanuevo; 1969 Master
street towards the
List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo
Supreme Court
and the figure "227" at
building from San
the beginning of the
list, as Exh. 6-a- after buying the ticket,
Lanuevo; 1970 Master I resumed my work
List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo which at the time was
and the figure "227" at on the checking of the
the beginning of the list notebooks. While thus
as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; checking, I came upon
and the 1971 Master the notebooks bearing
List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo the office code number
and the figure "227" at "954". As the number
the end of the list as was still fresh in my
Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo). mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me
The significance to me to pry into the contents
of this number (27) of the notebooks.
was born out of these Impressed by the
incidents in my life, to clarity of the writing
wit: (a) On November and language and the
27, 1941 while with the apparent soundness of
Philippine Army the answers and,
stationed at Camp thereby, believing in all
Manacnac, good faith on the basis
Cabanatuan, Nueva of the aforementioned
Ecija, I was stricken Confidential
with pneumonia and Memorandum (Exh. 1-
was hospitalized at the Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-
Nueva Ecija Provincial Lanuevo) that they
Hospital as a result. As merited re-evaluation, I
will be recalled, the set them aside and
last Pacific War broke later on took them
out on December 8, back to the respective
1941. While I was still examiners for possible
confined at the review recalling to
hospital, our camp was them the said
bombed and strafed by Confidential
Japanese planes on Memorandum but
December 13, 1941 leaving absolutely the
resulting in many matter to their
casualties. From then discretion and
on, I regarded judgment.
November 27, 1941 as
the beginning of a new 3. That the alleged misrepresentation
life for me having been or deception could have reference to
saved from the either of the two cases which I brought
possibility of being to the attention of the committee
among the casualties; during the meeting and which the
(b) On February 27, Committee agreed to refer back to the
1946, I was able to get respective examines, namely:
out of the army byway
of honorable (a) That of an
discharge; and (c) on examinee who
February 27, 1947, I obtained a passing
got married and since general average but
then we begot children with a grade below
the youngest of whom 50% (47%) in
was born on February Mercantile Law(the
27, 1957. notebooks of this
examinee bear the
Returning to the office Office Code No. 110,
that same afternoon identified and marked
 as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and referral of the notebooks involved to
the notebook in the examiners concerned;
Mercantile Law
bearing the Examiner's 5. That at that juncture, the examiner
Code No. 951 with the in Taxation even volunteered to review
original grade of 4% or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks
increased to 50% after in his subject but that I told the
re-evaluation as Exh. Committee that there was very little
9-a-Lanuevo); and time left and that the increase in grade
after re-evaluation, unless very highly
(b) That of an substantial, may not alter the outcome
examinee who since the subject carries the weight of
obtained a borderline only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
general average of 45-47, rec.).
73.15% with a grade
below 60% (57%) in The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves
one subject which, at to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid
the time, I could not of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he
pinpoint having was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of
inadvertently left in the respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of
office the data thereon. the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as
It turned out that the he "was going over those notebooks, checking the
subject was Political entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the
and International Law record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973,
under Asst. Solicitor he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post
General Bernardo provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
Pardo (The notebooks notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code
of this examinee bear number '954."
the Office Code No.
1622 identified and Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
marked as Exh. 10- Galang, asserted, among others;
Lanuevo and the
notebook in Political
1. That herein respondent is not
and International Law
acquainted with former BarConfidant
bearing the Examiner's
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him
Code No. 661 with the
before except once when, as required
original grade of 57%
by the latter respondent submitted
increased to 66% after
certain papers necessary for taking
re-evaluation, as Exh.
the bar examinations.
10-a-Lanuevo). This
notebook in Political
and International Law xxx xxx xxx
is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in 4. That it has been the consistent
the sworn statement of policy of the Supreme Court not to
Asst. Solicitor General reconsider "failure" cases; after the
Bernardo Pardo(Exh. official release thereof; why should it
------- Pardo). now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the
4. That in each of the two cases respondent and the bar confidant do
mentioned in the next preceding not know each other and, indeed, met
paragraph, only one (1) subject or only once in the ordinary course of
notebook was reviewed or re- official business?
evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law
in the former; and only Political and It is not inevitable, then, to conclude
International Law in the latter, under that the entire situation clearly
the facts and circumstances I made manifests a reasonable doubt to which
known to the Committee and pursuant respondent is richly entitled?
to which the Committee authorized the
5. That respondent, before reading a
copy of this Honorable Court's
resolution dated March 5, 1973, had
no knowledge whatsoever of former
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's
actuations which are stated in
particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man
intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact
the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his
behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as stated in the Resolution, which are
evidently purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of herein
respondent, these questions arise:
First, was the re-evaluation of
Respondent's examination papers by
the Bar Examination Committee done
only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the
other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the re-
evaluation of Respondent's grades
was done among those of others, then
it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase
the percentage of passing in that
year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's
papers were re-evaluated upon the
influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
would be unjustifiable, if not far
fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations
resulted in herein Respondent's
benefit an evidence per se of
Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to
be done in former's behalf? To
assume this could be disastrous in
effect because that would be
presuming all the members of the Bar
Examination Committee as devoid of
integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year,
as also unworthy of anything. All of
these inferences are deductible from
the narration of facts in the resolution,
and which only goes to show said
narration of facts an unworthy of
credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's
Resolution of March 5, 1973 would
make this Respondent Account or
answer for the actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners
implying the existence of some
conspiracy between them and the
Respondent. The evident imputation is
denied and it is contended that the Bar
Examiners were in the performance of
their duties and that they should be
regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates
how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly
initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-
evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make the
desired revision without prior authority from the
Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent
Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for
and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around
the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil
Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the
process of correcting examination booklets, and then
and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high
grade in one subject and a rather low one on another,
he will bring back to the examiner concerned the
notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh.
2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V,
pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee
who owned the particular notebook is on the
borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject
could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will
get a passing average. Respondent-examiner
Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under
the belief that was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was
just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-
evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's
grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular
notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's
Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954.
This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the
identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated
the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and
3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56,
57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee
Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law.
After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six
subjects and could not obtain the passing average of
75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or
early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel
Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with
an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which
respondent Manalo and previously corrected and
graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and
representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had done
well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by
respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing.
Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his
answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and
in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo
called the attention of respondent Manalo to
Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that
read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be
more a test of logic, knowledge of
legal fundamentals, and ability to
analyze and solve legal problems
rather than a test of memory; in the
correction of papers, substantial
weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of
reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by
respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's)
discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the
authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-
evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's
grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from
63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated
with his signature the changes made by him in the
notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook
examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as
earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged
to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1
& 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75;
Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo,
Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade
due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one
occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to
respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a
new batch of examination papers in Political Law and
Public International Law to be corrected, respondent
Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing
respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns
the said notebook seems to have passed in all other
subjects except in Political Law and Public
International Law; and that if the said notebook would
be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least
75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations.
After satisfying himself from respondent that this is
possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing
him that this is the practice of the Court to help out
examinees who are failing in just one subject —
respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby
told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the
answers, this time with leniency. After the re-
evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from
68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then
made the corresponding corrections in the grading
sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made.
This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also
belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee
Galang's general average was still below the passing
grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in
Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who
was then helping in the correction of papers in
Political Law and Public International Law, as he had
already finished correcting the examination notebooks
in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the
examinee who owns that particular notebook had
missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be
raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would
make the passing grade. Accepting the words of
respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and
because he did not want to be the one causing the
failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised
the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed
the revised mark and also revised the mark in the
general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his
Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71;
Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been
shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the
latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation;
but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that
where a candidate had almost made the passing
average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of
policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing
the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He
recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the
Confidential Memorandum but this was long before
the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo
as the same was received by him before the
examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not
raise Galang's general average to a passing grade
because of his failing mark in three more subjects,
including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law,
respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his
quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization
from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner
in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee
on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested
that where an examinee failed in only one subject and
passed the rest, the examiner concerned would
review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion
(Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was
made during the meeting within hearing of the order
members, who were all closely seated together.
Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness
tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day,
respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo
a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after
re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the
final grade to 71%. The matter was not however
thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp.
33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being
given the information that the particular examinee
failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he
would not have consented to make the re-evaluation
of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent
Montecillo likewise added that there was only one
instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his
personal records, that he had to change the grade of
an examinee after he had submitted his report,
referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's
Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number
954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-
examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the
residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen
panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with
two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo,
this was around the second week of February, 1972,
after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that
occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's
Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and
re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because,
according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who
owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in
Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent
Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers
of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of
grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number
1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee
Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D.
Lanuevo, respondent.
A and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo,
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE
ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias
ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR
SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having
requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's
average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or
a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or
less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making
74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any
subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is
likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from
the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps
towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the
examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the
borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to
justify his actuations on the authority of the
aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol.
VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar
Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted
in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him
as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to
the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act
in a presumptuous manner because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left
alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the
investigation, the said confidential memorandum was
intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the
initial correction of the examination papers and never
as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners
the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion
or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive
to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo,
Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations
are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each
other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of
the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164)
and clarified by extensive cross-examination
conducted during the investigation and hearing of the
cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records
that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and
the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant
as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in
and characterized his relationship with the five
members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who were thus deceived and induced into re-
evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang
in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his
grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted
a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that
characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and
well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to
the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-
evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5)
major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his
general average was only 66.25% — which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly
claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he
was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the
first notebook of Galang was referred back to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had
only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of
81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang
before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as
follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
 Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5%
(75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25%
74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-
evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated,
Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to
74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the
great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar
examinations and to the disadvantage of the other
examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee
Galang, with the possible addition of examinees
Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only
one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter
who — Political Law and Public International Law for
Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed,
has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to
make the passing mark before or after their notebooks
are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the
corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the
Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual
grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and
thereafter compute the general average. That done,
he will then prepare a comparative data showing the
percentage of passing and failing in relation to a
certain average to be submitted to the Committee and
to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or
73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating
the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the
functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the
Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be
done by the examinee and the same should be
addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act
thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative,
exposes himself to suspicion and thereby
compromises his position as well as the image of the
Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely
doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by
the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in
the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out
Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the
papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far
better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which
he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.),
which could be more properly claimed as borderline
cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's
claim of absolute good faith in referring back the
papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation.
For certainly, as against the original weighted average
of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute
that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90)
examinees were more deserving of reconsideration.
Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on
the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates. And
the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to
apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar
Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after
the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any
pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in
Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case
of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the
over ninety examinees who were far better situated
than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-
evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one
notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of
the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee
to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails
only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed
in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as
hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the
office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in
his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into
the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It
only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at
straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was
revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only
on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19,
1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-
36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B of the notebook of said examinee and the change is
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA
CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO
RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER
MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE
ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL
LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-
EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF
HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO
66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted
having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what
circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners
concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these
two cases were officially brought to the Bar
Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol.
VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer
them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to
remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela
Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent
Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two
cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee
(Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of
the dates of every meeting of the Committee was
made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.).
The alleged sheet containing the date of the two
examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of
the Committee were not presented by respondent
Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room
when he went on leave after the release of the Bar
results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of
the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent
Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh.
X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-
13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law,
maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him
and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this
notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V,
p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the
original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela
Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover
authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo.
He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented
in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing
Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number
110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No.
1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the
figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as
Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48,
rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.
Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo
testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing
marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee
agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed
(Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject,
but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p.
16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware
of any case of an examinee who was on the
borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50%
in one subject that was taken up by the Committee
(Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook
with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to
Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the
Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which
the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was
taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said
notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number 954
belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee
whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up
by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case
brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.).
Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that
involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of
Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the Political
meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Law
Committee that where an examinee failed in only one 70%
subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in Taxatio
whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate n 72%
or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-
Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60- His grades and averages before and after the
63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.). BA

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law 70% 70%
Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to = No reevaluation
Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing Labor Laws 75% 75%
grades in three (3) subjects, as follows: ="
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Labor Laws 3% Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47%
Taxation 69% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Mercantile Law 68% Criminal Law 78%
78% = no reevaluation
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and Remedial Law 88%
after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are 88% = "
as follows: Legal Ethics 79% 79%
="
——————————
BA
———————
Political Law 57% 66%
Weighted Averages
= 9 pts. or 27
74.95% 75.4%
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73%
= No reevaluation (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = " The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in
Mercantile Law 68% Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
68% = " Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar
Criminal Law 78% Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
78% = " violation was due to the misrepresentation of
Remedial Law 85% respondent Lanuevo.
85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of
=" Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can
—————————— hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the
—————— Bar Examination Committee because even at the time
of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-
Average (weighted) evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang
73.15% 74.5% had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws.
His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. was considered 75% under the Confidential
Case No. 1162, rec.) Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His
grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated
by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in
Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo
to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious
subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are: misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby
impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He
should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela
Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be
required to show cause and the corresponding
investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of
the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in
five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and
Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in
admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion,
requires: (1) previous established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for
Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
determination of whether a bar candidate has
obtained the required passing grade certainly involves
discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin,
1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through
a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight
(8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the
eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the
Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the
individual members of the Committee, on the other, is
the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy
clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of
discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with
the established rules of the Court and must always be
subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect
to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily
confidential as the designation indicates, his functions
in connection with the conduct of the Bar
examinations are defined and circumscribed by the
Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the
examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5)
subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated
by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from
the Court, a serious breach of the trust and
confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar
Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that
enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess
any discretion with respect to the matter of admission
of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with
authority to determine whether or not an examinee's
answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or
whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is
was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial.
What is decisive is whether the proceedings or
incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the
Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of
1964, in connection, among others, with the character
requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar,
provides that "every applicant for admission as a
member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old
Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule
127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound
to lay before the Court all his involvement in any
criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to
enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine
applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme
Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying
before or informing the Court of one's personal record
— whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending —
becomes more compelling. The forms for application
to take the Bar examinations provided by the
Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the
disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but
also of all other criminal cases of which he has been
accused. It is of course true that the application form
used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for
the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any.
But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character
is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can
consider them in the ascertainment and determination
of his moral character. And undeniably, with the
applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be
in a better position to consider the applicant's moral
character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether
pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's
acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963
and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for
the second and third time, respectively, the
application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare
under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted
for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense
involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending
case of that nature against him." By 1966, when
Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time,
the application form prepared by the Court for use of
applicants required the applicant to reveal all his
criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or
not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is
required under oath to declare that "he has not been
charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal
Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime
involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case
against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet,
respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold
or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight
physical injuries which was then and until now is
pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter
repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967,
1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case
for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967,
1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that
he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely
representing to the Court that he had no criminal case
pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application
to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had
been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is
a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is
well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach
the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this
court, to whom he applied for
admission, information respecting so
serious a matter as an indictment for a
felony, was guilty of fraud upon the
court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the
board of law examiners, or the judge
to whom he applied for admission,
been apprised of the true situation,
neither the certificate of the board nor
of the judge would have been
forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of
Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W
— 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and
annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name
was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on
motion is conferred in the discretion of
the Appellate Division.' In the exercise
of the discretion, the court should be
informed truthfully and frankly of
matters tending to show the character
of the applicant and his standing at the
bar of the state from which he comes.
The finding of indictments against him,
one of which was still outstanding at
the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to
the court, with such explanations as
were available. Silence respecting
them was reprehensible, as tending to
deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104;
emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his
involvement in any criminal case despite his having
been apprised by the Investigation of some of the
circumstances of the criminal case including the very
name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who
was called to testify thereon), and his continued
failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in
that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his
lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of
becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of
the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to
explain why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as
August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to
the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not
offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to
take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular
manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no
other alternative but to order the surrender of his
attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re
Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an
absolute right to be granted every one
who demands it, but is a privilege to
be extended or withheld in the
exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of
the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive
one whose integrity is questionable as
an officer of the court, to clothe him
with all the prestige of its confidence,
and then to permit him to hold himself
as a duly authorized member of the
bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil.
399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not
without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on
several occasions in the past nullified the admission
of successful bar candidates to the membership of the
Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative
to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T.
Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the
findings of the Court Investigators contained in their
report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re:
Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good
moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314];
and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations
[People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil.
151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs.
Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of
Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found
that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified
and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of
public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge
Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo,
Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted
having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of
the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of
respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without
knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the
said notebooks; and that they did the same without
any consideration or expectation of any. These the
records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the
opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-
correcion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved
in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the
respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances,
should have exercised greater care and caution and
should have been more inquisitive before acceding to
the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo.
They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar
Examination Committee, who would have referred the
matter to the Supreme Court. At least the
respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee
represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed
only in their respective and particular subject and/or
was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really
so circumstances. This they could have easily done
and the stain on the Bar examinations could have
been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and
Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the
answers of respondent Galang really deserved or
merited the increased grades; and so with respondent
Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to
respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear
that they increased the grades of Galang in their
respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence,
in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to
me one paper and you said that this particular
examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject
he received 60 something, I cannot remember the
exact average and if he would get a few points higher,
he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that
because I did not wish to be the one causing his
failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also
allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent
Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee
seems to have passed in allot her subject except this
subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination
notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this
particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so
I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said
'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to
help out examinees who are failing in just one subject'
so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just
leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left
it with me and what i did was to go over the book and
tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark
correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was
to be more lenient and if the answers was correct
although it was not complete I raise the grade so I
had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to
correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the
changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the
favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo
notwithstanding their declarations that the increases
in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee
concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the
misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of
that information you
made the re-evaluation
of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-
evaluated the paper of
your own accord in the
absence of such
information?
A No, your Honor,
because I have
submitted my report at
that time" (Vol. V, p.
33, rec.; see also
allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17,
1972, Exh. B-
Montecillo; allegation
No. 2, Answer dated
march 19, 1973, Exh.
A-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of
January of this year, he brought back
to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation because
according to him the owner of the
paper is on the borderline and if I
could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under
the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do
so and in the further belief that I was
just manifesting cooperation in doing
so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..."
(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was
made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in
view of them is representation of said
Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the
particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the
criteria laid down by the Court, and
giving the said examinee the benefit of
the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that
particular subject that said examinee
failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that
previously given him, but he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-
Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
 ... I considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on
December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the
Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was
84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances
utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein
examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no
one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation
effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty
and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he
deserved the increased grades given after the said re-
evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records,
Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the
explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in
connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve
the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their
explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are
constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners
that their participation in the admission of members to
the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest — absolute purity of
the proceedings — and so are required to exercise
the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the
performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his
memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed
that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up
this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness
due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant
in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner
named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will
show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's
memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge
against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18,
1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not
bring this out during the investigation which in his
words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that
he did not make this charge during the investigation
when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred
the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and
possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter
departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as
being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome
of this case on the part of respondent or an act of
reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not
impugn the motives of the five other members of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed
that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising
the grades of respondent Galang in their respective
subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the
results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see
and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the
purpose of seeking his help in connection with the
1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised
Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before
the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7,
rec). Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of the
bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly
expected of a member of the Judiciary who should
exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by
resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His
unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the
bar examinations and to impair public faith in the
Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct
evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by
Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February,
1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as
Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife acquired from
the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot
with an area of 374 square meters,
more or less, for the amount of
P84,114.00. The deed of sale was
dated March 5, 1972 but was
notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the
same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house
and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in
the total amount of P67,291.20 (First
mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40,
Entry No. 90914: date of instrument
— April 5, 1972, date of inscription
— April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III,
rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as
down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the
purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his
savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and
received by him through a niece
before Christmas of 1971 in dollars
($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII,
pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his
alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his
sister; are not fully reflected and
accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities
which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent
Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank
deposit in the amount of only
P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his
bank deposit listed under Assets was
in the amount of P1,011.00, which
shows therefore that of the P2,000.00
bank deposit listed in his 1971
statement under Assets, only the
amount of P989.00 was used or
withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00
receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized
because the transaction therein
involved did not push through
(Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to
1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971
$2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said
amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not
reflected in his 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities filed on January
17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note
which he allegedly received from his
sister at the time he received the $200
was not even presented by
respondent during the investigation.
And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered
this a loan, his sister did not seriously
consider it as one. In fact, no mode or
time of payment was agreed upon by
them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo
promised to furnish the Investigator
the address of his sister in Okinawa.
Said promise was not fulfilled as borne
out by the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his sister,
who has a family of her own, is among
the top earners in Okinawa or has
saved a lot of money to give to him,
the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or
undeclared income is inevitable under
the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their
BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS
for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry
No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 — date
of inscription). On February 28, 1973,
the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was
redeemed by respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on March
20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973
the first mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also
redeemed by respondent Lanuevo
and thereafter cancelled on March 20,
1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.).
Hence, only the mortgage in favor of
GSIS remains as the encumbrance of
respondent's house and lot. According
to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly
amortization of the GSIS mortgage is
 P778.00 a month, but that since May
of 1973, he was unable to pay the
same. In his 1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and
retirement (filed October 13, 1972),
the house and lot declared as part of
his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an
item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate
loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities is
a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00.
That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred
from the fact that no such car or any
car was listed in his statement of
assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the
years previous to 1965. It appears,
however, that his listed total assets,
excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in
his 1972 (as of November, 1972)
Statement, his listed total
assets, excluding the house and lot
was P18,211.00, including the said
1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between
the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of
the above-mentioned properties, tends
to link or tie up the said acquisitions
with the illegal machination committed
by respondent Lanuevo with respect
to respondent Galang's examination
papers or to show that the money
used by respondent Lanuevo in the
acquisition of the above properties
came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after
the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the
serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations
alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in
fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered
by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed
his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the
end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation
before he was required to show cause on March 5,
1973 but after he was informed of the said
irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official
release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave
from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining
the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation
that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his
BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.),
which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against
respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-
Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing
another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of
the latter, or allowing himself to be
presented, induced, or influenced to
commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality,
evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees
of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes
the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is
determined that his property or money "is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec.
2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent
Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and
Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the
investigation; but they were examined as they are part
of the records of this Court.
B respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible
contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang
and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo
before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of
the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the
Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days
— 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the
MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University)
— 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent
Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine
Veterans Board which is the governmental agency
entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the
implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator,
Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans
Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator
(Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During
that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo
had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries
of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational
benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive
as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is
also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it
was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even
when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law
at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In
1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old,
and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a
technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol.
V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the
investigation, he claimed that he was the private
secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13,
rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-
letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans
Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the
approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from
Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution
effective the first semester of the school year 1955-
56 was directly addressed and furnished to
respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that
he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans
to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that
he does not even know the location of the said office.
He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the
G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to
go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to
submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But
GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists
that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The
huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is
beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the
City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator
in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated
claims for the several benefits given to veterans like
educational benefits and disability benefits; that he
does not remember, however, whether in the course
of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across
the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational
benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr.
Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII,
pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of
the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating
at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans
Legion especially while working with the Philippine
Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the
guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During
the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was
operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in
other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans
Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila,
even while he was employed with the Philippine
Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders
of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo
was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken
with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still
confined there when their camp was bombed and
strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
(Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated
August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a
member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise
known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned
and inducted as a member thereof on January 16,
1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His
unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US
Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the
38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the
mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9
May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945,
date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has
submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any
purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the
Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its
strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar
examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above
delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO.
1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS
HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS;
AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E.
GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND
HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Resolution             March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the
Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo,
and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for
respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused
so much public interest and concern as Republic Act
No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of
1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission
to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to
the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127,
sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering
the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree
of strictness with which the examination papers were
graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar
those candidates who had obtained an average of
only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per
cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to
1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law
as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
feeling conscious of having been discriminated
against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the
court subscribed to and submitted written comments
adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead,
it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although
the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable
views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to
become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature.
The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election
year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING
MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS
FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-
FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of
section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after
July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up
to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one
bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a
 grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall
be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for
the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or
more of a fraction, shall be considered as one
and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a
grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the
Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for
the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also others
who have sought simply the reconsideration of their
grades without, however, invoking the law in question.
To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court
first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has
found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to
be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to
Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should
be applied equally to all concerned whether they have
filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners,
properly classified, affected by this decision, as well
as a more detailed account of the history of Republic
Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the
effects of the law, the following statistical data are set
forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be
benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total
1,168, classified as follows:
1946     (August) 206 121 18
1946     477 228 43
(November)
1947 749 340 0 Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,03 426
3
1953        
2,555 968 284
               TOTAL 12,23 5,42 1,16
0 1 8
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in
subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to
said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful
candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from
two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain
a passing average in any of them. Consolidating,
however, their highest grades in different subjects in
previous examinations, with their latest marks, they
would be sufficient to reach the passing average as
provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by
this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only
604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33
who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied, while
125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953,
had presented similar motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic
Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated,
this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider
their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-
reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession
and the administration of justice, and because some
doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the
court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions
for admission on the sole question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this
question by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing,
on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of
the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique
M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios,
Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V.
Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from
the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and
Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly
helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the
court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question
has been the object of intense deliberation for a long
time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the
preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a
new member in order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to
its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per
cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon
after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations
from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted
(which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered
from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public
interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public
interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problem evolved by the times become more difficult.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the
legal profession is entrusted the protection of
property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve
officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to
dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to
create a serious social danger. Moreover, the
statement that there was an insufficiency of legal
reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were
abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had
also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines
published abroad have entered without restriction
since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised
and enlarged editions have been printed locally during
those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began
to be published since 1946, which continued to be
supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those
are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is
valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or
from the point of view of applicable principles, but the
resolution of the question would have been easier had
an identical case of similar background been picked
out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there
any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history,
from which has been directly derived the judicial
system established here with its lofty ideals by the
Congress of the United States, and which we have
preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a
century? From the citations of those defending the
law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a
similar law had been sustained, while those against its
validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In
re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon,
240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24
Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President
which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law
respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar
laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force or
effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to
uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have
examined carefully the case that has been cited to us
as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper
(22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York
revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that
State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to
the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College
promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by
the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that
time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other
office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the
Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
the people, shall be void. They shall not
exercise any power of appointment to public
office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-
one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of
learning and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the courts of this
State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the
constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers;
the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the
principal appointing power which they
possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the
restrictions which the judges had imposed
upon admission to practice before them. The
prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion
of the provision" expecting the admission of
attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its
connection with the object of this prohibitory
clause. There is nothing indicative of
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to
preserve any portion of their power over this
subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in
the inference it draws from the use of the word
`admission' in the action referred to. It is urged
that the admission spoken of must be by the
court; that to admit means to grant leave, and
that the power of granting necessarily implies
the power of refusing, and of course the right
of determining whether the applicant
possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle
him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without
affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the
decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of
Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor
of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that
the constitution required of applicants for admission to
the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text
of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law
consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is
apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and
having a law department under the charge of
able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a
formal examination by the law committee of
the institution, but to a certain definite period
of study before being entitled to a diploma of
being graduates, the Legislature evidently,
and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary
study required by the act, as fully equivalent
as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering
the latter examination, to which no definite
period of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference
to the learning and ability of the applicant, and
for the mere purpose of substituting the
examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have had
no other object, and hence no greater scope
should be given to its provisions. We cannot
suppose that the Legislature designed entirely
to dispense with the plain and explicit
requirements of the Constitution; and the act
contains nothing whatever to indicate an
intention that the authorities of the college
should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc.,
of the students before granting a diploma. The
only rational interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to make the
college diploma competent evidence as to the
legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing
else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is
to be read in connection with these statutes
and with the Constitution itself in order to
determine the present condition of the law on
the subject. (p.89)
xxx     xxx     xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of admission,
 that has simply prescribed what shall be
competent evidence in certain cases upon
that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the
case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen.
Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any
candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very
decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney
at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of
any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that
of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been disputably
a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and
exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which
certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition
that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
function, properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts
are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes
more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these
same individuals are attempted to be revoked or
modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of
this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the
validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts
was discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of
legislative power without parallel in the history
of the English speaking people so far as we
have been able to ascertain. There has been
much uncertainty as to the extent of the power
of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been
expressly committed to the courts, and the act
of admission has always been regarded as a
judicial function. This act purports to constitute
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this
respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is
vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1,
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of
qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it
sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p.
444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those
qualifications which in its judgment will serve
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude,
is the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed
or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and
legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the
powers of sovereignty which properly belongs
to its department. Neither department should
so act as to embarrass the other in the
discharge of its respective functions. That was
the scheme and thought of the people setting
upon the form of government under which we
exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow,
4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is
responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our
state government, under 42a scheme which it
was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other
department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which
 the powers of sovereignty thus committed to
the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a
peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is
an attache of the courts. The quality of justice
dispense by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and
bring the courts themselves into disrepute.
(p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a
direct and severe supervision over their bars,
at least in the English speaking countries. (p.
445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court
ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows:
For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of
England, concededly subordinate to
Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had
exercise the right of determining who should
be admitted to the practice of law, which, as
was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the
most solid of all titles." If the courts and
judicial power be regarded as an entity, the
power to determine who should be admitted to
practice law is a constituent element of that
entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element
and say with assurance that it is either a part
of the inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power
exercised by the court, but that it is a power
belonging to the judicial entity and made of
not only a sovereign institution, but made of it
a separate independent, and coordinate
branch of the government. They took this
institution along with the power traditionally
exercise to determine who should constitute
its attorney at law. There is no express
provision in the Constitution which indicates
an intent that this traditional power of the
judicial department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is
inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the
legislative department, and such a purpose
should not be inferred in the absence of
express constitutional provisions. While the
legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental
merely to its general and unquestioned power
to protect the public interest. When it does
legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications
required of attorneys at law in order that public
interests may be protected, such qualifications
do not constitute only a minimum standard
and limit the class from which the court must
make its selection. Such legislative
qualifications do not constitute the ultimate
qualifications beyond which the court cannot
go in fixing additional qualifications deemed
necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to
their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at
law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to
exercise the power of appointment. It is quite
likely true that the legislature may exercise the
power of appointment when it is in pursuance
of a legislative functions. However, the
authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the
power to admit attorneys to the practice of law
is a judicial function. In all of the states, except
New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90
A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals,
attorneys receive their formal license to
practice law by their admission as members of
the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur.
572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed.
565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed.
366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L.
Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843,
115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan,
23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep.
1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice
having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that
the act of the court in admitting an attorney to
practice is the judgment of the court, and an
attempt as this on the part of the Legislature
to confer such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that
the licensing of an attorney is and always has
been a purely judicial function, no matter
where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of
justice and to interpretation of the laws that
there be members of the bar of sufficient
ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant.
It is highly important, also that the public be
protected from incompetent and vicious
practitioners, whose opportunity for doing
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L.,
in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y.
456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R.
851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to
the bar "for something more than private
gain." He becomes an "officer of the court",
and ,like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever
justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the
judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties.
That has been the history of attorneys under
the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney
at law is almost without exception conceded to
be a judicial function. Petition to that end is
filed in courts, as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar
is accomplish and made open and notorious
by a decision of the court entered upon its
records. The establishment by the
Constitution of the judicial department
conferred authority necessary to the exercise
of its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a
department of government ultimately to
determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting
in its work, and to protect itself in this respect
from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good
moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated
succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565,
"It has been well settled, by the rules and
practice of common-law courts, that it rests
exclusively with the court to determine who is
qualified to become one of its officers, as an
attorney and counselor, and for what cause he
ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a
petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE
646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333,
18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained
the nature of the attorney's office as follows:
"They are officers of the court, admitted as
such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair
private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this
evidence by an examination of the parties. In
this court the fact of the admission of such
officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong for, three
years preceding their application, is regarded
as sufficient evidence of the possession of the
requisite legal learning, and the statement of
counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional
character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess
the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such
and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct.
They hold their office during good behavior,
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by the judgment of
the court after opportunity to be heard has
been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or
their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere
ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial
power, and has been so held in numerous
cases. It was so held by the court of appeals
of New York in the matter of the application of
Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court,
"are not only officers of the court, but officers
whose duties relate almost exclusively to
proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence
their appointment may, with propriety, be
entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly
considered as engaged in the exercise of their
appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent
portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without
exception conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion
need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been
 held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash.
472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the
exercise of a judicial function, and is an
inherent power of the court. — A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281
Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65,
A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the
legislative and the judicial departments is that
it is the province of the legislature to establish
rules that shall regulate and govern in matters
of transactions occurring subsequent to the
legislative action, while the judiciary
determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise
of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital
one and not subject to alteration or change
either by legislative action or by judicial
decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province
shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control
the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own
views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly,
by settling aside their judgments, compelling
them to grant new trials, ordering the
discharge of offenders, or directing what
particular steps shall be taken in the progress
of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the
bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average
of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law,
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment —
a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can
revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive department, that may
be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its
functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the
power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights. The existing laws
on pleading, practice and procedure are
hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.
The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines,
Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred
on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. the
primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this
Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not
promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and
their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or
take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
primary power on the matter. The Constitution does
not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.
Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement
the existing rules on the matter, if according to its
judgment the need for a better service of the legal
profession requires it. But this power does not relieve
this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend,
disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise
the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the
power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and
should be exercised with the respect that each owes
to the other, giving careful consideration to the
responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing
rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision
of the practice of the legal profession, should consider
these reforms as the minimum standards for the
elevation of the profession, and see to it that with
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at
law is realized. They are powers which, exercise
within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of
the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our
criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a
few points to obtain the general average. A recently
enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to
the practice of law without a previous examination.
The Government appointed Guariña and he
discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province.
This tribunal refused to give his license without
previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act
No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the
prescribed examination, on the ground that he
holds the office of provincial fiscal for the
Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February
28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of
Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is
hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under
the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States
and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to
the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority
of the United States, the position of justice of
the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First
Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city
attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney
for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to
practice law in the courts of the Philippine
Islands without an examination, upon motion
before the Supreme Court and establishing
such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a
former occasion this appellant took, and failed
to pass the prescribed examination. The
report of the examining board, dated March
23, 1907, shows that he received an average
of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined,
thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in
the performance of our duty to the public and
to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative
indication of the deficiency of the applicant in
the required qualifications of learning in the
law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should
grant him license to practice law in the courts
of these Islands, without first satisfying
ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of
the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
as of right to be admitted to the bar without
taking the prescribed examination "upon
motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has
held and now holds the office of provincial
fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged
that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in
enacting the above-cited amendment to the
 earlier statute, and in view of the context
generally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain
candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is
imperatively required in order to give effect to
the apparent intention of the legislator, and to
the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the
Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of
Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the
Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred
upon this court by the commission and
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would
be limited and restricted, and in a case such
as that under consideration wholly destroyed,
by giving the word "may," as used in the
above citation from Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing,
defining or limiting the power conferred upon
the commission is to that extent invalid and
void, as transcending its rightful limits and
authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who
were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with
particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court
held:
In the various cases wherein applications for
the admission to the bar under the provisions
of this statute have been considered
heretofore, we have accepted the fact that
such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of
the applicant. But in all of those cases we had
reason to believe that the applicants had been
practicing attorneys prior to the date of their
appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was
not and never had been practicing attorney in
this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of
his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it
further affirmatively appears that he was
deficient in the required qualifications at the
time when he last applied for admission to the
bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his
defieciency on that occasion, we do not think
that his appointment to the office of provincial
fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his
possession of the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability. We conclude therefore
that this application for license to practice in
the courts of the Philippines, should be
denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took
the examination he fell only four points short
of the necessary grade to entitle him to a
license to practice; and in view also of the fact
that since that time he has held the
responsible office of the governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave
evidence of such marked ability in the
performance of the duties of that office that
the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought
to retain him in the Government service by
appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal,
we think we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in
waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a
special examination which will be given him by
a committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of
the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and
Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal
defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has
intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21,
1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December
31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law
to those students who began studying before
November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and
presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to
those who had studied in a law office and would pass
an examination, or to those who had studied for three
years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared
that this law was unconstitutional being, among
others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for
admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
diplomas from law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general assembly
passed in 1899, under which the application is
made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of
an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors,"
approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1,
1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in
the enacting clause, consists in the addition to
the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with
the rules of the supreme court in regard to
admission to the bar in force at the time such
applicant commend the study of law, either in
a law or office or a law school or college, shall
be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in
said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double
proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to the holder
of every diploma regularly issued by any law
school regularly organized under the laws of
this state, whose regular course of law studies
is two years, and requiring an attendance by
the student of at least 36 weeks in each of
such years, and showing that the student
began the study of law prior to November 4,
1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs
of good moral character. The other branch of
the proviso is that any student who has
studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, "and part in
the aforesaid law school," and whose course
of study began prior to November 4, 1897,
shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the
branches now required by the rules of this
court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is
by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed,
confers substantial rights and privileges upon
the persons named therein, and establishes
rules of legislative creation for their admission
to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an
enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as
such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take
part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which
should be received by the court as conclusive
of the requisite learning and ability of persons
to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, persons or classes of persons.
Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice
law is a privilege, and a license for that
purpose makes the holder an officer of the
court, and confers upon him the right to
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to
collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court.
The law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the
legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the
law establishing classes in general, and has
some reasonable relation to the end sought.
There must be some difference which
furnishes a reasonable basis for different one,
having no just relation to the subject of the
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People,
147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155
Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced,
and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs.
People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and
practiced his profession cannot furnish such
basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination,
making an enactment based upon it void
(State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878).
Here the legislature undertakes to say what
shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any
classification must have some reference to
learning, character, or ability to engage in
such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a
class of persons who began the study of law
prior to November 4, 1897. This class is
subdivided into two classes — First, those
presenting diplomas issued by any law school
of this state before December 31, 1899; and,
second, those who studied law for the period
of two years in a law office, or part of the time
in a law school and part in a law office, who
are to be admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of this
court, and as to this latter subdivision there
seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes,
the conditions of the rules are dispensed with,
and as between the two different conditions
and limits of time are fixed. No course of study
is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma
granted upon the completion of any sort of
course its managers may prescribe is made
all-sufficient. Can there be anything with
relation to the qualifications or fitness of
 persons to practice law resting upon the mere
date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a
basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who
began the study of law November 4th could
qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The
classes named in the proviso need spend only
two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend three
years, although they would complete two
years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a
diploma, is to be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without any
prescribed course of study, while as to the
other the prescribed course must be pursued,
and the diploma is utterly useless. Such
classification cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to the subject
sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is
for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges
upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon,
240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law
to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court
also held with regards to its aspect of being a class
legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If
it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit
and license those applying as attorneys at
law, that power can not be exercised in the
manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will
apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity
to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature
to exact qualifications of those desiring to
pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in
the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626,
said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every
citizen of the United States to follow any lawful
calling, business or profession he may
choose, subject only to such restrictions as
are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex,
and condition." This right may in many
respects be considered as a distinguishing
feature of our republican institutions. Here all
vocations are all open to every one on like
conditions. All may be pursued as sources of
livelihood, some requiring years of study and
great learning for their successful prosecution.
The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the
"estate" acquired in them — that is, the right
to continue their prosecution — is often of
great value to the possessors and cannot be
arbitrarily taken from them, any more than
their real or personal property can be thus
taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and
possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy
equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating
the practice of medicine, requiring
medications to establish the possession on
the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to
practice, have been challenged, and courts
have seriously considered whether the
exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon
this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The
State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis.
172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122
Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes
to confer upon him the right to practice law
and to constitute him an officer of this Court
as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor.
It is not material that he had once established
his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other
qualifications to entitle him to that right. That
fact in no matter affect the power of the
Legislature to select from the great body of
the public an individual upon whom it would
confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws
1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court
to admit to the practice of law without
examination, all who had served in the military
or naval forces of the United States during the
World War and received a honorable
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby within the purview of the Act
of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known
as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per cent
thereunder at the time of the passage of this
Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on
the ground that it clearly violated the quality
clauses of the constitution of that state. In
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178
Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally
acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as
follows:
 The general rule is well settled by unanimity of
the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between
the person included in it and those excluded
and, furthermore, must be based upon
substantial distinctions. As the rule has
sometimes avoided the constitutional
prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent
and real differences, as distinguished from
irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any
law that is made applicable to one class of
citizens only must be based on some
substantial difference between the situation of
that class and other individuals to which it
does not apply and must rest on some reason
on which it can be defended. In other words,
there must be such a difference between the
situation and circumstances of all the
members of the class and the situation and
circumstances of all other members of the
state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just
and natural cause for the difference made in
their liabilities and burdens and in their rights
and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is
a substantial reason why it is made to operate
on that class only, and not generally on all.
(12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained
a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar
examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952,
71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per
cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding
that the rules require a minimum general average of
75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since
1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by
the abovementioned authorities, for this
classification ? If there is none, and none has been
given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or
the years before, with the general average indicated,
were not included because the Tribunal has no record
of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This
fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951,
1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of
those who failed before said years under the same
conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no
record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify
that no one concerned may prove by some other
means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is
constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in
which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of
candidates who did not obtain the general average of
75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per
cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or
more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent;
and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent,
which was considered by the Court as equivalent to
75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable.
These changes in the passing averages during those
years were all that could be objected to or criticized.
Now, it is desired to undo what had been done —
cancel the license that was issued to those who did
not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not.
The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this
Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court
did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those
candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of
will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being
cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to
the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year
the general average by one per cent, with the order
that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof
that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of
the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is
doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of
Congress. In other words, the power exercised was
not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which
continue in force. What was done was to stop or
suspend them. And this power is not included in what
the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it
falls within the power to apply the rules. This power
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been
confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing
of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into
account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting
in this manner his usefulness. The system that the
said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however,
the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to
1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to
Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because
it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its
nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested
law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby
declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect
for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees
the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine
if they are at present already prepared to become
members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform
something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary
manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that
this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any
time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no
other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it
directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and
should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely
in the daily performance of judicial functions and is
essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is
therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the
Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who
may be admitted and may continue in the practice of
law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended
classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and
does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in
the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of
article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that
part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953
to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns
the examinations in those years, shall continue in
force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing
and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at
the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who
since the beginning have announced their decision
not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of
the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and
under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No.
972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952,
and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional
and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that
part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from
1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of
the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of
the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946
to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates
who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general
average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are Number of candidates who failed 2
considered as having passed, whether they have filed
Number of those affected by Republic
petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
Act No. 972
become final, they shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as Percentage of success (per
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief cent)
Justice may set. So ordered. Percentage of failure (per
cent)
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Passing grade (per
Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.          (By resolution of the Court). cent)
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman,
Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Sim
ANNEX I
Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, H
Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hila
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. Members.
972
Number of candidates 7
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar Number of candidates whose grades
examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows: were raised
         70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 1
August, 19461 50 per cent
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof.          69 per cent 40
Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin          68 per cent 2
Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Number of candidates who passed 4
Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon.
Bienvenido A. Tan, members. Number of candidates who failed 3
Number of candidates Number of those affected by Republic 9
Act No. 972
Number of candidates whose grades
were raised Percentage of success (per
cent)
          73'S 6
Percentage of failure (per
          72'S 6 cent)
Number of candidates who passed Passing grade (per
Number of candidates who failed cent)
Number of those affected by Republic          (by resolution of the Court).
Act No. 972
Percentage of success (per Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.
cent) per cent and 68.1 per cent respectively, the Co
Percentage of failure (per found out that they were not benefited at all by
cent) bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Ci
Law.
Passing grade (per
cent) August, 1948
November, 1946 Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor,
Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, H
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario
except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Ampa
Honesto K. Bausan. Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Number of candidates Number of candidates 8
Number of candidates whose grades Number of candidates whose grades
were raised were raised
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---          71's 29
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
         70's 35
Number of candidates who passed
Number of candidates who passed 4
Number of candidates who failed Passing grade (per
Number of those affected by Republic cent)
Act No. 972 August, 1951
Percentage of success (per Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairma
cent) Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon.
Percentage of failure (per Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Alber
cent) Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfon
Felix, Members.
Passing grade (per
cent) Number of candidates 2,0
         (by resolution of the Court). Number of candidates whose grades 1
were raised (74's)
August, 1949
Number of candidates who passed 1,1
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon.
Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Number of candidates who failed 8
Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Number of those affected by Republic 1
Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Act No. 972
Emeterio Barcelon, Members. Percentage of success (per
Number of candidates cent)
Number of candidates whose grades Percentage of failure (per
were raised (74's) cent)
Number of candidates who passed Passing grade (per
Number of candidates who failed cent)
Number of those affected by Republic August, 1952
Act No. 972 Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, H
Percentage of success (per Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty.
cent) Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Vi
Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macari
Percentage of failure (per Peralta, Sr., Members.
cent)
Number of candidates 2,7
Passing grade (per
cent) Number of candidates whose grades 1
were raised (74's)
         (by resolution of the Court).
Number of candidates who passed 1,7
August, 1950
Number of candidates who failed 1,0
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon.
Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Number of those affected by Republic 4
Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Act No. 972
Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Percentage of success (per
Antonio Horrilleno, Members. cent)
Number of candidates Percentage of failure (per
Number of candidates whose grades cent)
were raised Passing grade (per
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by cent)
recommendation and authority August, 1953
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, H
Delgado). Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Franci
Number of candidates who passed Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz
Number of candidates who failed Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Marian
de la Rosa, Members.
Number of those affected by Republic
Act No. 972 Number of candidates 2,5
Percentage of success (per Number of candidates whose grades 1
cent) were raised (74's)
Percentage of failure (per Number of candidates who passed 1,5
cent) Number of candidates who failed 9
 Number of those affected by Republic 16. Balintona, 75 80 64 78 74 67 6
Act No. 972 Bernardo
Percentage of success (per 17. Banawa, 78 70 70 75 81 83 6
cent) Angel L.
Percentage of failure (per 18. Bandala, 66 80 66 71 93 72 5
cent) Anacleto A.
Passing grade (per 19. Bandon, 74 79 69 77 91 73 6
cent) Alawadin L.
20. Baquero, 76 79 64 77 85 72 6
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Benjamin
Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which 21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 6
they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to
who had presented motions for reconsideration which 22. Buenaluz, 75 71 72 78 67 82 6
were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for Victoriano T.
reconsideration without invoking said law, which are 23. Canda, 75 72 75 82 76 77 6
still pending, follows: Benjamin S.
24. Canon, 77 86 67 88 75 69 7
PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW Guillermo
Civ Lan Merc Int Pol Crim 25. Carlos, Estela 75 81 81 79 72 73 6
. d . . . . S.
MRD Agunod, 66 71 61 76 80 83 26. Cerezo, 69 76 76 79 71 80 5
- 1. Filemon L. Gregorio O.
MRD Cunanan, 76 72 74 75 70 70 27. Clarin, Manuel 75 82 76 81 73 69 7
- 2. Albino L.
MRD Mejia, 64 64 65 68 83 74 28. Claudo, 76 62 78 77 73 72 6
- 3. Flaviano V. Conrado O.
1948 29. Condevillamar 68 65 74 80 85 75 6
MRD Orlina, 71 68 66 75 63 75 , Antonio V.
- 4. Soledad R. MRD Cornejo, 72 75 69 82 83 79 6
MRD Vivero, 75 73 73 65 63 66 - 30. Crisanto R.
- 5. Antonio Lu. 31. Corona, 68 76 73 81 81 72 6
MRD Gatchalian, 72 66 71 75 78 68 Olvido D.
- 6. Salud 32. Dizon, Marcial 76 86 69 83 75 74 6
1949 C.
7. Abaya, Jesus 69 79 75 75 71 89 33. Enriquez, 75 77 70 81 81 77 6
A. Agustin P.
MRD Advincula, 76 80 62 86 81 72 34. Espiritu, Irineo 80 88 69 75 76 77 6
- 8. David D. E.
9. Agraviador, 63 85 70 77 80 81 35. Fernandez, 63 82 76 75 81 84 6
Alfredo L. Macario J.
10. Alacar, 61 63 83 79 71 85 36. Gallardo, 78 79 67 77 76 75 6
Pascual C. Amando C.
11. Amog, Pedro 75 66 76 78 81 74 37. Garcia, 76 80 66 75 72 70 6
M. Freidrich M.
12. Apolinario, 75 84 78 78 70 70 38. Garcia, Julian 64 77 68 82 89 77 6
Miguel S. L.
13. Aquino, 82 77 71 77 76 77 39. Garcia, Leon 77 86 71 80 60 82 6
Maximo G. Mo.
14. Asinas, 75 83 69 80 81 83 40. Garcia, Pedro 76 82 73 81 74 83 6
Candido D. V.
15. Baldivino, 75 65 72 82 82 69 41. Garcia, 62 91 79 75 72 75 6
Jose B. Santiago C.
 42. Genoves, 75 83 70 78 87 76 Manuel C.
Pedro 68. Palang, 71 75 82 71 55 87 5
43. Gonzales, 75 71 71 75 86 75 Basilio S.
Amado P. 69. Palma, 62 75 69 93 80 79 5
44. Guia, Odon R. 77 76 66 81 74 76 Cuadrato
de 70. Pañganiban, 67 83 61 81 91 74 6
45. Fernandez, 62 68 71 80 74 90 Jose V.
Simeon 71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 6
46. Jakosalem, 82 83 73 82 61 87
Filoteo 72. Patalinjug, 73 77 78 73 78 71 5
47. Jesus, Felipe 75 83 67 79 78 85 Eriberto
D. de 73. Paulin, Jose 66 69 71 77 83 82 6
48. Jocom, 77 77 74 77 74 64 C.
Jacobo M. 74. Pido, Serafin 72 78 63 80 71 85 7
49. Juares, 77 84 56 76 73 82 C.
Nicolas 75. Pimentel, Luis 77 75 76 81 76 68 5
50. Kalalang, 65 75 74 80 70 70 P.
Remigio 76. Plantilla, 72 78 68 89 79 81 6
51. Layumas, 67 84 65 75 89 66 Rodrigo C.
Vicente L. 77. Regalario, 72 80 64 80 75 81 5
52. Leyson, 69 83 75 76 81 75 Benito B.
Amancio F. 78. Robis, Casto 62 77 74 73 68 80 7
53. Libanan, 71 83 61 77 80 81 P.
Marcelino 79. Rodil, 68 69 70 81 76 75 6
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 Francisco C.
80. Rodriguez, 80 75 69 80 72 80 6
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 Mariano I.
56. Linao, 66 84 76 78 80 75 81. Romero, 78 75 66 77 76 83 6
Mariano M. Crispulo P.
57. Lopez, Angelo 67 81 75 72 79 81 82. Saez, Porfirio 75 75 72 81 69 77 6
P. D.
58. Lopez, Eliezar 77 75 60 75 77 85 83. Saliguma, 79 79 74 78 69 65 6
M. Crisogono D.
59. Lopez, 72 71 70 78 77 84 84. Samano, 75 84 72 77 70 82 6
Nicanor S. Fortunato A.
60. Manoleto, 72 70 65 78 81 90 85. Santos, 71 68 68 76 75 85 5
Proceso D. Faustina C.
61. Mancao, 67 64 71 83 76 76 86. Santos, 68 69 76 71 77 82 6
Alfredo P. Josefina R.
62. Manera, 75 78 75 75 68 79 87. Seludo, 75 80 69 79 77 82 6
Mariano A. Ananias G.
63. Mercado, 67 64 71 83 76 76 88. Semilia, 68 85 55 83 89 79 6
Arsenio N. Rafael I.
64. Miranda, 76 81 67 82 74 77 89. Telan, 77 79 70 75 70 75 6
Benjamin G. Gaudencio
65. Manad, 77 75 68 82 69 72 90. Tesorero, 75 71 63 75 82 62 6
Andres B. Leocadio T.
1948 91. Torre, Valentin 85 81 71 76 69 65 5
66. Orosco, 72 84 69 81 70 82 S. de la
Casimiro P. 92. Torres, Ariston 78 71 72 81 61 84 5
67. Padua, 76 76 68 80 79 79 L.
 93. Veyra, Zosimo 70 75 71 79 65 80 MRD Benitez, 67 75 75 60 73 72 7
C. de -118. Tomas P.
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 119. Biason, Sixto 73 82 67 65 66 72 7
95. Villacarlos, 73 87 71 82 69 70 F.
Delfin A. MRD Briñas, 71 69 74 70 76 52 7
96. Villamil, 73 81 76 86 86 73 -120. Isagani A.
Leonor S. 121. Buela, Arcadio 72 77 61 70 71 58 7
97. Zabala, 76 70 67 75 76 76 P.
Amando A. 122. Cabilao, 73 50 75 75 75 60 7
1950 Leonardo S.
MRD Cruz, 70 71 78 81 76 72 123. Cabrera, 75 66 70 65 72 81 7
-98. Filomeno de la Ireneo M.
99. Española, 71 78 55 76 85 69 124. Cacacho,              
Pablo S. Emilio V.
100. Foronda, 60 78 68 79 84 88 125. Calilung, 64 73 73 80 73 57 7
Clarencio J. Soledad C.
101. Hechanova, 59 76 75 75 69 68 MRD Calimlim, Jose 64 73 73 80 73 57 7
Vicente -126. B.
MRD Peñalosa, 80 78 61 76 61 77 127. Calimlim, 66 82 69 60 69 52 8
-102. Osias R. Pedro B.
103. Sarmiento, 65 86 63 82 89 72 128. Camello, 70 77 63 65 75 66 8
Floro A. Sotero H.
MRD Torre, 75 85 68 78 69 67 129. Campos, Juan 71 88 70 75 64 69 7
-104. Catalino P. A.
105. Ungson, 61 87 75 70 57 85 130. Castillo, 78 78 70 60 79 67 6
Fernando S. Antonio del
1951 MRD Castillo, 75 61 72 75 74 71 6
-131. Dominador
106. Abasolo, 77 70 64 65 76 70 Ad.
Romulo
MRD Castro, Jesus 72 86 72 75 65 75 7
107. Adeva, Daniel 75 59 74 65 69 51 -132. B.
G.
133. Casuga, 75 72 72 70 69 61 7
108. Aguilar, 73 63 68 75 70 69 Bienvenido B.
Vicente Z.
134. Cabangbang, 77 67 61 80 73 59 8
109. Amodia, Juan 75 76 66 75 76 60 Santiago B.
T.
135. Cruz, Federico 69 74 75 75 68 65 7
MRD Añosa, Pablo 76 78 63 75 74 61 S.
-110. S.
136. Dacanay, 70 73 62 75 72 69 8
111. Antiola, 68 76 75 70 71 70 Eufemio P.
Anastacio R.
137. Deysolong, 66 62 72 75 70 62 8
112. Aquino, S. 70 71 71 60 74 62 Felisberto
Rey A.
MRD Dimaano, Jr., 78 79 63 75 73 75 8
113. Atienza, 71 78 68 80 86 51 -138. Jose N.
Manuel G.
139. Espinosa, 78 63 58 70 70 67 8
114. Avanceña, 71 71 65 75 70 72 Domingo L.
Alfonso
MRD Farol, Evencia 80 78 66 75 81 72 6
MRD Balacuit, 75 73 75 70 72 65 -140. C.
-115. Camilo N.
141. Felix, Conrado 71 71 75 65 70 58 7
116. Barinaga, 68 69 73 70 74 50 S.
Jeremias L.
142. Fernan, Pablo 67 88 66 85 73 68 7
MRD Barrientos, 76 60 67 55 74 63 L.
-117. Ambrosio D.
 143. Gandioco, 64 58 66 65 76 70 -168. Leodegario C.
Salvador G. 169. Monzon, 70 72 74 75 67 70 7
144. Gastardo, 70 69 68 75 78 66 Candido T.
Crispin B. 170. Natividad, 73 79 68 65 73 69 7
145. Genson, 75 57 73 65 67 54 Alberto M.
Angelo B. MRD Navallo, 70 72 68 85 81 66 7
146. Guiani, 68 60 75 65 74 67 -171. Capistrano C.
Guinald M. 172. Nisce, Camilo 66 66 75 65 79 68 8
147. Guina, 66 69 67 60 78 52 Z.
Graciano P. MRD Ocampo, 75 81 76 65 74 67 7
MRD Homeres, 74 74 75 75 71 69 -173. Antonio F. de
-148. Praxedes P. 174. Olaviar, Jose 72 70 69 55 66 70 7
149. Ibarra, 60 75 74 70 74 70 O.
Venancio M. MRD Perez, 75 76 66 80 72 63 8
150. Imperial, 72 78 75 75 72 56 -175. Cesario Z.
Monico L. 176. Pogado, 70 66 65 70 75 64 7
MRD Ibasco, Jr., 71 70 63 85 71 60 Causin O.
-151. Emiliano M. 177. Ramos- 75 73 62 65 78 59 7
152. Inandan, 77 77 67 53 73 75 Balmori,
Fortunato C. Manuela
153. Jimenez, 75 70 70 75 72 61 178. Recinto, 73 76 68 75 74 68 8
Florencio C. Ireneo I.
154. Kintanar, 70 83 72 65 76 73 MRD Redor, 62 77 73 75 69 64 7
Woodrow M. -179. Francisco K.
155. Languido, 63 71 63 85 70 61 MRD Regis, 76 74 68 65 65 65 8
Cesar V. -180. Deogracias A.
156. Lavilles, Cesar 61 89 75 55 73 63 181. Rigor, Estelita 67 78 61 80 71 77 7
L. C.
157. Llenos, 64 70 65 60 72 65 MRD Rimorin- 70 72 62 60 88 66 6
Francisco U. -182. Gordo, Estela
158. Leon, Marcelo 63 73 60 85 75 75 183. Rosario, 70 64 70 70 72 73 8
D. de Prisco del
159. Llanto, 72 68 60 65 76 67 184. Rosario, 75 91 65 75 68 68 7
Priscilla Vicente D. del
160. Machachor, 68 59 78 70 67 57 185. Saavedra, 73 80 63 75 76 73 6
Oscar Felipe
MRD Magsino, 77 66 70 70 76 71 186. Salazar, 66 72 73 75 67 68 7
-161. Encarnacion Alfredo N.
MRD Maligaya, 70 61 75 65 75 50 187. Salem, 77 81 72 65 73 60 7
-162. Demetrio M. Romulo R.
163. Manio, 67 67 69 80 71 67 188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 7
Gregorio 189. Santa Ana, 77 69 65 75 81 75 7
164. Puzon, 72 82 60 60 69 70 Candido T.
Eduardo S. 190. Santos, 72 66 69 65 68 70 8
MRD Marcial, 66 75 74 70 75 67 Aquilino
-165. Meynardo R. 191. Santos, 76 72 75 75 68 62 7
166. Martin, 68 72 63 75 69 63 Valeriano V.
Benjamin S. 192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 8
MRD Monterroyo, 70 80 75 80 76 66 193. Suson, 74 68 66 80 66 59 7
-167. Catalina S. Teodorico
MRD Montero, 73 67 66 80 81 65 194. Tado, 64 76 67 65 76 72 7
 Florentino P. Felicidad
195. Tapayan, 69 72 69 70 76 73 MRP- Amodia, Juan 75 79 68 85 62 64 7
Domingo A. 220. T.
MRD Tiausas, 67 60 71 75 79 67 MRP- Antonio, 71 76 81 83 79 52 7
-196. Miguel V. 221. Felino A.
197. Torres, Carlos 68 71 71 70 70 63 MRP- Antonio, Jose 75 92 90 68 65 64 6
P. 222. S.
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 223. Añonuevo, 71 87 78 81 64 63 7
Ramos B.
199. Velasco, 65 72 75 75 71 67 224. Aquino, S. 67 77 57 78 69 70 6
Avelino A. Rey A.
200. Villa, 65 80 73 75 68 79 225. Arteche, 78 83 50 89 76 77 7
Francisco C. Filomeno D.
201. Villagonzalo, 78 67 74 65 72 51 MRP- Arribas, Isaac 75 78 70 81 73 70 6
Job R. 226. M.
202. Villarama, Jr., 75 74 75 55 75 66 MRP- Azucena, 72 67 78 89 72 67 7
Pedro 227. Ceferino D.
1952 228. Atienza, 72 87 70 79 66 55 7
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 Ricardo
MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 229. Balacuit, 75 78 89 75 70 54 6
204. Camilo N.
MRP- Abella, 70 81 76 81 70 66 MRP- Baclig, 77 84 83 80 69 70 6
205. Ludovico B. 230. Cayetano S.
MRP- Abellera, 75 79 79 87 76 51 231. Balcita, Oscar 75 77 79 90 64 60 6
206. Geronimo F. C.
MRP- Abenojar, 71 72 78 84 70 75 232. Barilea, 71 67 82 77 64 61 6
207. Agapito N. Dominador Z.
208. Alandy, 64 83 93 91 68 59 MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 7
Doroteo R. 233.
209. Alano, Fabian 70 83 61 83 72 87 MRP- Barrientos, 76 70 67 80 67 65 7
T. 234. Ambrosio D.
MRP- Alcantara, 71 79 80 81 73 70 235. Batucan, Jose 66 76 78 88 62 76 6
210. Pablo V. M.
211. Arcangel, 75 85 71 73 76 65 236. Bautista, 70 82 84 85 58 61 7
Agustin Ag. Atilano C.
212. Acosta, 75 81 78 87 56 65 237. Bautista, 71 68 63 87 80 67 8
Dionisio N. Celso J.
MRP- Abinguna, 66 85 80 84 75 58 238. Belderon, 76 81 76 92 70 66 6
213. Agapito C. Jose
214. Adove, 76 86 78 77 66 78 MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 7
Nehemias C. 239.
215. Adrias, 75 83 61 88 76 67 MRP- Bejec, 79 80 73 82 63 77 7
Inocencio C. 240. Conceso D.
216. Aglugub, 75 83 73 88 72 62 MRP- Beltran, 72 75 81 73 75 57 7
Andres R. 241. Gervasio M.
217. Andrada, 76 85 66 87 63 77 MRP- Benaojan, 74 84 77 84 75 63 6
Mariano L. 242. Robustiano O.
MRP- Almeda, 72 72 75 81 61 67 MRP- Beriña, Roger 70 80 79 79 68 72 6
218. Serafin V. 243. C.
219. Almonte- 73 71 72 91 75 67 MRP- Bihis, Marcelo 75 86 65 92 64 64 8
Peralta, 244. M.
MRP- Binaoro, 73 69 78 83 73 59 Gaudencio V.
245. Vicente M. 271. Castro, Pedro 70 68 69 87 76 75 7
MRP- Bobila, 76 86 76 83 68 59 L. de
246. Rosalio B. 272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 7
247. Buenafe, 78 80 75 75 70 55
Avelina R. 273. Colorado, 68 75 80 74 77 66 6
248. Bueno, 73 78 71 78 71 67 Alfonso R.
Anastacio F. 274. Chavez, 73 65 79 84 73 69 6
249. Borres, 67 85 62 91 72 63 Doroteo M.
Maximino L. 275. Chavez, 77 76 79 86 74 53 7
MRP- Cabegin, 72 71 76 75 74 70 Honorato A.
250. Cesar V. MRP- Cobangbang, 69 81 74 82 76 61 7
MRP- Cabello, 72 78 78 89 58 70 276. Orlando B.
251. Melecio F. 277. Cortez, 78 60 88 86 60 66 6
MRP- Cabrera, 79 88 53 91 71 85 Armando R.
252. Irineo M. 278. Crisostomo, 76 87 74 76 62 55 7
253. Cabreros, 71 79 83 84 60 62 Jesus L.
Paulino N. MRP- Cornejo, 68 87 78 86 79 50 8
254. Calayag, 69 79 66 88 69 75 279. Crisanto R.
Florentino R. MRP- Cruz, 75 81 79 85 72 57 6
MRP- Calzada, 76 72 80 67 62 71 280. Raymundo
255. Cesar de la MRP- Cunanan, 78 92 63 83 76 72 6
256. Canabal, 70 82 81 77 78 51 281. Jose C.
Isabel 282. Cunanan, 70 82 64 92 67 75 7
MRP- Cabugao, 76 87 69 80 58 64 Salvador F.
257. Pablo N. 283. Cimafranca, 71 76 76 80 70 71 7
258. Calañgi, 73 93 71 87 70 66 Agustin B.
Mateo C. 284. Crisol, Getulio 70 91 78 85 68 55 7
259. Canda, 72 71 77 90 62 75 R.
Benjamin S. MRP- Dusi, 76 82 69 82 66 62 8
260. Cantoria, 71 80 71 89 70 55 285. Felicisimo R.
Eulogio MRP- Datu, Alfredo 70 75 72 86 80 55 6
261. Capacio, Jr., 67 78 71 90 65 75 286. J.
Conrado 287. Dacuma, Luis 71 67 87 83 71 50 6
262. Capitulo, 75 70 53 87 78 63 B.
Alejandro P. MRP- Degamo, 73 80 82 74 80 67 6
MRP- Calupitan, Jr., 75 93 81 76 64 75 288. Pedro R.
263. Alfredo 289. Delgado, 70 84 82 84 77 52 7
MRP- Caluya, 75 86 70 87 77 52 Vicente N.
264. Arsenio V. MRP- Diolazo, 75 83 86 73 54 54 7
MRP- Campanilla, 80 75 78 77 73 71 290. Ernesto A.
265. Mariano B. 291. Dionisio, Jr., 73 84 64 89 71 78 7
MRP- Campos, Juan 66 85 83 84 67 61 Guillermo
266. A. MRP- Dichoso, 71 77 71 81 69 75 8
267. Cardoso, 78 71 73 76 79 56 292. Alberto M.
Angelita G. MRP- Dipasupil, 70 76 82 73 79 70 7
268. Cartagena, 71 72 65 89 64 73 293. Claudio R.
Herminio R. MRP- Delgado, 75 84 63 67 64 60 7
MRP- Castro, Daniel 65 75 77 76 85 60 294. Abner
269. T. MRP- Domingo, 70 69 81 82 68 63 7
270. Cauntay, 70 78 72 73 77 69 295. Dominador T.
 296. Ducusin, 70 78 53 88 75 77 322. Gaerlan, 73 87 77 90 67 61 7
Agapito B. Manuel L.
MRP- Duque, 75 77 78 86 76 72 323. Galem, Nestor 72 79 86 78 60 61 7
297. Antonio S. R.
298. Duque, 75 80 73 83 66 67 324. Gallardo, Jose 75 88 75 75 63 70 7
Castulo Pe B.
299. Ebbah, 70 80 85 76 66 63 MRP- Gallos, Cirilo 70 78 84 91 80 51 6
Percival B. 325. B.
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 326. Galindo, 70 89 87 65 78 71 6
301. Edradan, 70 75 84 84 71 59 Eulalio D.
Rosa C. 327. Galman, 72 72 80 85 71 56 7
MRP- Enage, 66 70 88 93 72 67 Patrocinio G.
302. Jacinto N. 328. Gamalinda, 76 79 81 86 67 63 6
MRP- Encarnacion, 75 86 73 81 63 77 Carlos S.
303. Alfonso B. 329. Gamboa, 71 67 70 72 76 60 7
304. Encarnacion, 65 78 58 68 66 64 Antonio G.
Cesar 330. Gannod, Jose 69 80 75 81 68 62 7
305. Estoista, 78 76 74 86 58 67 A.
Agustin A. MRP- Garcia, Matias 67 78 74 90 79 59 7
MRP- Fabros, Jose 66 75 80 82 80 71 331. N.
306. B. MRP- Ganete, 75 87 77 82 74 57 6
MRP- Fajardo, 77 69 82 83 65 60 332. Carmelo
307. Balbino P. 333. Gilbang, 75 67 80 82 67 57 6
308. Fajardo, 70 79 77 79 79 50 Gaudioso R.
Genaro P. 334. Gofredo, Claro 68 78 72 86 78 52 7
309. Evangelista, 75 75 72 87 63 63 C.
Felicidad P. 335. Gomez, Jose 71 76 71 81 76 63 6
310. Familara, 68 75 87 83 64 65 S.
Raymundo Z. MRP- Gosiaoco, 68 93 85 78 64 69 7
311. Fariñas, 70 78 89 66 65 75 336. Lorenzo V.
Dionisio MRP- Gonzales, 77 75 71 89 55 70 7
312. Favila, Hilario 71 84 74 70 75 67 337. Rafael C.
B. MRP- Gracia, Eulalia 66 68 90 84 77 59 6
MRP- Feliciano, 71 69 70 85 69 81 338. L. de
313. Alberto I. 339. Grageda, Jose 70 85 72 67 70 60 7
MRP- Fernando, 73 77 86 79 70 76 M. A.
314. Lope F. 340. Guzman, Juan 75 86 69 84 64 79 7
MRP- Flores, 78 72 77 83 67 60 de
315. Dionisio S. MRP- Guzman, 76 79 79 73 72 69 6
MRP- Fortich, 70 82 70 70 78 65 341. Mateo de
316. Benjamin B. 342. Guzman, 71 61 74 72 61 66 7
MRP- Fuente, Jose 76 88 72 74 60 71 Salvador B.
317. S. de la 343. Guzman, 75 84 64 81 74 61 7
318. Fohmantes, 72 79 71 77 68 61 Salvador T. de
Nazario S. 344. Habelito, 71 76 71 87 73 60 6
MRP- Fuggan, 76 81 74 69 71 71 Geronimo E.
319. Lorenzo B. 345. Hedriana, 75 68 84 76 66 58 7
320. Gabuya, 70 83 82 83 70 63 Naterno G.
Jesus S. 346. Hernandez, 67 75 72 81 72 72 6
321. Galang, Victor 69 83 84 76 70 57 Quintin B.
N. 1952
 347. Homeres, 73 84 65 86 70 77 Napoleon
Agustin R. MRP- Marco, Jaime 75 67 74 76 64 75 7
348. Ines, Leonilo 65 88 71 88 77 73 374. P.
F. MRP- Martir, 70 86 76 78 72 71 7
349. Jamer, Alipio 68 75 83 89 80 61 375. Osmundo P.
S. MRP- Masancay, 73 87 75 77 72 50 7
MRP- Ibasco, Jr., 75 65 68 85 76 70 376. Amando E.
350. Emiliano M. MRP- Mati-ong, 62 87 72 79 73 76 6
MRP- Jardinico, Jr., 73 86 72 78 82 67 377. Ignacio T.
351. Emilio 378. Mara, 70 78 78 89 75 67 6
MRP- Jaen, 76 75 78 84 71 66 Guillermo L.
352. Justiniano F. MRP- Mercado, 73 77 82 82 78 52 6
353. Jaring, 72 77 79 70 72 57 379. Felipe A.
Antonio S. MRP- Miculob, 70 82 73 86 77 52 7
MRP- Javier, 75 84 79 78 77 61 380. Eugenio P.
354. Aquilino M. 381. Mison, Rafael 79 78 73 75 71 68 6
355. Jomuad, 75 75 72 88 78 58 M. Jr.,
Francisco MRP- Monponbanua 79 79 68 88 64 78 6
MRP- Jose, Nestor 78 61 64 73 68 76 382. , Antonio D.
356. L. MRP- Montero, 72 89 69 89 70 68 7
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 383. Leodegario C.
358. Leon, Brigido 67 75 78 91 78 51 384. Morada, 75 76 67 71 65 66 7
C. de Servillano S.
359. Leones, 68 81 79 84 73 60 385. Mocorro, 78 84 78 84 60 73 6
Constante B. Generoso
360. Liboro, 72 69 80 87 73 62 MRP- Mosquera, 75 78 75 85 72 55 7
Horacio T. 386. Estanislao L.
361. Llanera, Cesar 77 81 80 78 64 59 387. Motus, 80 78 70 94 72 75 7
L. Rodentor P.
362. Lomontod, 75 76 69 70 73 76 388. Macario, 70 67 74 86 78 63 7
Jose P. Pedro R.
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 MRP- Nadela, 72 64 64 81 73 50 7
MRP- Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 389. Geredion T.
364. MRP- Nazareno, 67 70 71 76 76 79 7
MRP- Macasaet, 73 81 72 83 66 75 390. Romeo P.
365. Tomas S. 391. Nieto, 69 79 77 77 72 62 7
366. Magbiray, 80 67 84 76 70 62 Benedicto S.
Godofredo V. MRP- Noguera, 71 86 81 80 73 56 7
367. Majarais, 70 62 64 82 88 75 392. Raymundo
Rodolfo P. MRP- Nodado, 70 70 69 73 57 37 6
MRP- Makabenta, 75 90 77 83 59 71 393. Domiciano R.
368. Eduardo 394. Nono, Pacifico 67 77 78 67 75 59 7
MRP- Malapit, 74 83 74 89 58 60 G.
369. Justiniano S. MRP- Nuval, Manuel 78 72 67 90 72 68 7
370. Maloles, 70 87 73 76 77 50 395. R.
Iluminado M. 396. Ocampo, 75 90 77 72 69 55 6
371. Maniquis, 75 80 73 91 69 71 Augusto
Daniel R. 397. Oliveros, 72 75 68 72 84 50 7
372. Maraña, 65 79 60 72 73 51 Amado A.
Arsenio 398. Opiña, Jr., 76 77 74 67 73 66 6
373. Marasigan, 75 71 83 75 69 62 Pedro
MRP- Olaviar, Jose 70 62 85 81 74 50 425. Quetulio, 75 90 60 93 64 78 7
399. O. Josefina D.
MRP- Olandesca, 70 91 76 87 72 66 MRP- Quipanes, 69 88 79 82 65 62 7
400. Per O. 426. Melchor V.
401. Orden, 72 65 84 86 66 50 MRP- Quietson, 73 75 76 77 70 81 7
Apolonio J. 427. Bayani R.
402. Ortiz, 71 75 78 81 66 67 428. Racho, 68 75 81 82 78 53 6
Melencio T. Macario D.
MRP- Pablo, 72 64 76 86 72 61 429. Ramirez, 71 80 73 87 62 62 7
403. Fedelino S. Sabas P.
404. Pacifico, 76 79 69 80 76 52 MRP- Raffiñan, Jose 80 83 79 79 62 72 6
Vicente V. 430. A.
MRP- Paderna, 75 69 72 75 78 58 MRP- Ramos, 75 87 76 75 72 72 6
405. Perfecto D. 431. Patricio S.
406. Padlan, 71 66 76 79 68 67 MRP- Ramos- 78 84 76 90 48 75 8
Crispin M. 432. Balmori,
407. Padilla, Jose 70 65 67 82 78 75 Manuela
C. MRP- Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 5
408. Padilla, Jr., 71 88 78 86 59 75 433.
Estanislao E. MRP- Rayos, Victor 75 86 79 91 71 67 6
MRP- Palma, 67 81 80 82 71 75 434. S.
409. Bartolome 435. Revilla, 75 78 81 90 70 54 6
MRP- Papa, Angel 75 72 85 85 77 59 Mariano S.
410. A. 436. Reyes, Abdon 72 64 81 78 76 73 6
MRP- Parayno, 71 88 74 89 69 66 L.
411. Mario V. 437. Reyes, 72 87 78 83 72 75 6
412. Pariña, Santos 70 87 85 77 64 67 Domingo B.
L. 438. Reyes, 75 85 84 68 75 71 6
MRP- Pasion, 63 80 68 81 82 79 Francisco M.
413. Anastacio 439. Reyes, 80 57 78 79 78 65 6
414. Pastrana, 69 76 71 76 68 63 Lozano M.
Rizal R. MRP- Reyes, Oscar 75 75 82 82 76 64 6
MRP- Paulin, Jose 70 66 80 87 75 50 440. R.
415. O. 441. Rigonan, 71 85 65 86 75 70 7
MRP- Pelaez, Jr., 79 87 73 83 69 71 Cesar V.
416. Vicente C. 442. Rivera, 71 56 70 90 71 65 7
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 Honorio
418. Perez, Toribio 71 64 81 92 69 58 MRP- Rivero, 72 88 72 94 68 73 6
R. 443. Buenaventura
A.
419. Pestaño, 77 81 74 87 59 68
Melquiades MRP- Robles, 75 77 75 77 82 64 6
444. Enrique
MRP- Pido, Serafin 77 81 72 82 69 71
420. C. 445. Rodriguez, 76 75 76 63 69 77 6
Orestes
421. Pinlac, 67 76 74 86 65 79 Arellano
Filemon
446. Roldan, Jose 67 80 79 83 73 71 7
422. Poblete, Celso 72 79 82 76 66 64 V.
B.
447. Rosario, 80 75 65 70 68 72 8
MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 Adelaida R.
423. del
424. Puzon, 72 80 81 69 72 53 448. Rosario, 75 75 79 90 68 65 6
Eduardo S. Restituto F.
 del Alfredo A.
MRP- Sabelino, 71 81 69 75 77 71 MRP- Tobias, 69 58 74 81 71 55 6
449. Conrado S. 475. Artemio M.
450. San Juan, 77 86 72 89 59 76 MRP- Trillana, Jr., 76 86 76 86 70 68 7
Damaso 476. Apolonio
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 MRP- Trinidad, 66 91 83 75 63 66 6
452. Samaniego, 75 80 76 72 60 67 477. Manuel O.
Jesus B. 478. Trinidad, 66 78 78 85 78 51 6
MRP- Sandoval, 75 83 70 83 77 67 Pedro O.
453. Emmanuel M. MRP- Udarbe, Flavio 80 82 77 82 67 56 6
MRP- Sanidad, 71 75 81 90 62 64 479. J.
454. Emmanuel Q. 480. Umali, 68 75 81 80 71 69 6
455. Santiago, Jr., 75 76 84 93 63 65 Osmundo C.
Cristobal 481. Umayam, 77 75 87 85 56 56 6
456. Santillan, 76 89 83 83 63 58 Juanito C.
Juanito Ll. MRP- Usita, Gelacio 75 72 75 74 73 76 7
MRP- Santos, 75 75 78 82 73 76 482. U.
457. Rodolfo C. 483. Valino, 72 81 80 84 62 78 7
MRP- Santos, 67 54 69 76 63 64 Francisco M.
458. Ruperto M. 484. Varela, 67 75 81 86 72 57 8
MRP- Santos, 72 71 73 79 73 79 Dominador M.
459. Aquilino C. 485. Vega, 78 62 79 87 70 70 7
MRP- Santos, Rufino 75 81 79 85 74 72 Macairog L.
460. A. de
461. Suanding, 75 67 67 92 79 59 MRP- Velasco, 71 80 74 85 60 66 7
Bantas 486. Emmanuel D.
MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 487. Velez, Maria 73 70 89 80 56 50 7
462. E.
463. Songco, 70 68 82 84 60 69 MRP- Venal, Artemio 78 91 58 67 76 55 7
Felicisimo G. 488. V.
464. Soriano, 64 79 77 80 80 53 489. Venus, 69 81 74 85 62 66 7
Aniceto S. Conrado B.
465. Suarez, Pablo 73 85 70 87 76 70 MRP- Verzosa, 75 79 72 88 76 68 7
D. 490. Federico B.
MRP- Sybico, Jesus 79 70 70 72 75 75 MRP- Villafuerte, 75 83 70 76 64 64 7
466. L. 491. Eduardo V.
467. Tabaque, 69 68 77 79 74 68 MRP- Villanueva, 75 85 79 88 66 77 6
Benjamin R. 492. Cecilio C.
MRP- Tan Kiang, 81 79 72 80 62 75 493. Villar, 73 69 70 88 76 66 6
468. Clarita Custodio R.
MRP- Tando, Amado 71 82 78 83 71 61 MRP- Villaseñor, 80 85 67 77 62 75 7
469. T. 494. Leonidas F.
470. Tasico, 71 69 75 89 70 75 495. Viterbo, Jose 80 77 65 93 70 65 6
Severo E. H.
471. Tiburcio, 73 82 72 93 76 57 496. Yaranon, 70 77 76 85 72 50 7
Ismael P. Pedro
MRP- Tiongson, 70 70 76 84 77 75 MRP- Yasay, 75 75 72 76 63 77 7
472. Federico T. 497. Mariano R.
MRP- Tolentino, 75 89 63 84 85 73 MRP- Ygay, 73 80 83 84 62 59 7
473. Jesus C. 498. Venancio M.
474. Torrijas, 77 66 67 83 68 75 499. Yulo, Jr., 73 82 78 75 60 81 7
 Teodoro 1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74
500. Zamora, 70 65 76 79 62 77 8. Maraña,              
Alberto Arsenio s.
501. Rigonan, 70 79 69 89 76 62 1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60
Felipe C.
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75
A list of those who petitioned for the 9. Montano,              
consolidation of their grades in subjects Manuel M.
passed in previous examinations, showing the 1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75
years in which they took the examinations
together with their grades and averages, and 1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70
those who had filed motions for 1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71
reconsideration which were denied, indicated
by the initials MRD, follows: 10. Peña, Jesus              
S.
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46
72 1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim.
11. Placido, Sr.,              
Isidro
1. Amao,            
Sulpicio M. 1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 12. Rementizo,              
Filemon S.
2. Baldo,            
Olegario Ga. 1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 13. Amao,              
Sulpicio M.
3. Blanco, Jose            
B. 1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 14. Rodulfa,              
Juan T.
4. Condeno,            
Mateo 1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 15. Sanchez,              
Juan J.
5. Ducusin,            
Agapito B. 1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78
6. Garcia,             16. Santos,              
Manuel N. Constantino
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65
7. Luna, Lucito             17. Santos,              
A. Salvador H.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70
 1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 15 Castañeda, 70 73 80 71 75 70 7
. Gregorio
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54
16 Estrellado, 67 79 64 73 82 62 7
18. Sevilla,             . Benjamin R.
Macario C.
17 Fabunan, 70 72 68 69 77 60 7
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 . Edilberto C.
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 18 Feril, Domingo 75 71 84 65 70 60 6
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 . B.
19 Fernandez, 65 75 87 80 81 63 6
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65
. Alejandro G.
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 20 Gapus, Rosita 76 80 86 77 64 74 6
. S. (Miss)
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, 21 Garcia, Rafael 70 86 70 75 73 63 7
while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions . B.
for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the
22 Gracia, Miguel 73 68 75 59 80 51 7
provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those
. L. de
candidates separating those who filed mere motions
for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the 23 Gungon, 68 76 76 84 77 57 7
aforesaid Republic act, is as follows: . Armando G.
24 Gutierrez, 68 77 66 70 72 59 7
1953 PETITIONERS FOR . Antonio S.
RECONSIDERATION 25 Ilejay, Abraham 77 70 76 77 81 62 7
. I.
Civ Land Merc Int Pol. Crim. 26 Leon, Benjamin 66 66 75 70 77 55 7
. . . . La. De
1. Acenas, Calixto 73 70 68 62 82 51 27 Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 6
R. .
2. Alcantara, Pedro 67 70 75 85 87 54 28 Lukman, Abdul- 76 64 67 69 73 59 7
N. . Hamid
3. Alejandro, 67 72 71 75 80 76 29 Maloles, Jr., 77 76 68 68 71 51 7
Exequiel . Benjamin G.
4. Andres, 70 73 86 58 79 50 30 Maloles, Julius 77 71 60 71 79 62 6
Gregorio M. . G.
5. Arnaiz, Antonio 66 80 76 58 79 68 31 Mandi, Santiago 65 76 70 61 79 68 7
E. . P.
6. Asis, Floriano U. 66 78 75 81 77 55 32 Margete, Rufino 70 76 66 75 85 73 7
de . C.
7. Bacaiso, 71 65 76 68 76 50 33 Melocoton, 70 81 73 78 83 52 7
Celestino M. . Nestorio B.
8. Bala, Florencio 64 82 47 70 82 58 34 Molina, Manuel 75 78 70 61 75 63 6
F. . C.
9. Baldo, Olegario 57 74 68 68 76 52 35 Muñoz, Mariano 75 80 86 67 74 57 6
A. . A.
10 Barrios, 65 71 76 75 80 62 36 Navarro, 80 75 65 75 83 55 7
. Benjamin O. . Buenaventura
11 Buhay, Eduardo 73 76 71 91 76 61 M.
. L. 37 Nodado, 60 67 67 50 70 50 5
12 Burgos, 72 80 89 61 66 37 . Domiciano R.
. Dominador C. 38 Papas, 65 62 71 61 70 56 6
13 Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 . Sisenando B.
. 39 Pagulayan-Sy, 63 75 71 62 83 67 7
14 Casar, 67 73 84 79 77 61 . Fernando
. Dimapuro
40 Padula, 70 77 54 62 74 78 7. Enriquez, 84 69 76 75 82 50 5
. Benjamin C. Pelagio y
41 Pasno, Enrique 78 72 66 54 71 58 Concepcion
. M. 8. Estonina, 80 74 64 89 81 56 6
42 Peña, Jr., 70 95 81 78 67 66 Severino
. Narciso 9. Fernandez, 65 75 87 80 81 63 6
43 Peralta, Rodolfo 70 70 52 81 68 63 Alejandro Q.
. P. 10 Fernandez, Luis 70 75 77 75 78 67 7
44 Pigar, Leopoldo 76 75 78 61 72 72 . N.
. R. 11 Figueroa, 70 75 87 78 75 50 6
45 Publico, Paciano 68 69 76 76 70 59 . Alfredo A.
. L. 12 Formilleza, 65 75 89 68 83 51 7
46 Radaza, 75 78 76 61 77 50 . Pedro
. Leovigildo 13 Garcia, Manuel 69 68 83 83 73 62 6
47 Ramos, 64 62 75 93 81 52 . M.
. Bernardo M. 14 Grospe, Vicente 68 75 78 66 79 61 6
48 Rabaino, Andres 68 72 75 73 78 55 . E.
. D. 15 Galema, Nestor 72 79 86 78 60 61 7
49 Ravanera, 70 77 80 71 82 62 . R. (1952)
. Oscar N. 16 Jacobo, Rafael 76 76 75 74 76 50 7
50 Renovilla, Jose 65 75 80 68 79 52 . F.
. M. 17 Macalindong, 67 77 79 79 74 72 6
51 Sabaot, 69 73 80 69 82 69 . Reinerio L.
. Solomon B. 18 Mangubat, 70 70 78 61 80 74 6
52 Sumaway, 66 76 69 76 74 56 . Antonio M.
. Ricardo S. 19 Montano, 78 64 66 68 81 50 7
53 Torrefiel, 70 77 74 75 73 50 . Manuel M.
. Sofronio O. 20 Plomantes, 73 67 74 58 68 70 7
54 Vera, Federico 60 61 47 77 69 50 . Marcos
. V. de 21 Ramos, Eugenio 70 80 76 67 72 69 7
55 Viray, Venancio 65 67 67 52 73 64 . R.
. Bustos 22 Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 7
56 Ylaya, Angela P. 63 70 56 75 68 54 .
. (Miss) 23 Reyes, Santiago 65 78 83 60 76 75 7
. R.
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 24 Rivera, Eulogio 65 67 78 74 75 62 6
972 . J.
25 Santos, 73 71 70 65 78 64 6
Civ Land Merc Int Pol. Crim. . Constantino P.
. . . 26 Santos, 70 71 79 65 72 54 6
1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 . Salvador H.
2. Alcantara, Pedro 67 70 75 85 87 54 27 Sevilla, Macario 70 73 74 70 81 56 6
N. . C.
3. Arellano, 74 66 73 60 78 63 28 Villavicencio, 78 75 70 67 69 77 6
Antonio L. . Jose A.
4. Buhay, Eduardo 73 76 71 91 76 61 29 Viray, Ruperto 76 73 76 73 80 58 6
L. . G.
5. Calautit, 71 78 84 75 75 61
Celestino R. There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604
directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
6. Casuncad, 61 73 82 69 81 68
candidates who have not presented any petition, they
Sulvio P.
reach a total of 1,094.
 The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced
to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar
examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per
cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950,
but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per
cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951,
in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which
was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16
of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the
admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the
profession. The amendments embrace many
interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14
and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed
amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a
candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 70 per cent
without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject. In determining the average, the
foregoing subjects shall be given the following
relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land
Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent;
Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10
per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent;
International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law,
20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per
cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful
candidates shall not be required to take
another examination in any subject in which
they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or
higher and such rating shall be taken into
account in determining their general average
in any subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get a
general average of 70 per cent in his third
examination, he shall lose the benefit of
having already passed some subjects and
shall be required to the examination in all the
subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful
applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained
a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without falling below 50 per cent in
any examination held after the 4th day of July,
1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of
office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion
pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful
candidates at bar examinations should be
compelled to repeat even those subjects
which they have previously passed. This is not
the case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have
therefore been amended in this measure to
give a candidate due credit for any subject
which he has previously passed with a rating
of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by
Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested
the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the
same. The comment was signed by seven Justices
while three chose to refrain from making any and one
took no part. With regards to the matter that interests
us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule
127. One part of this amendment provides
that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or
higher in any subject, although failing to pass
the examination, he need not be examined in
said subject in his next examination. This is a
sort of passing the Bar Examination on the
installment plan, one or two or three subjects
at a time. The trouble with this proposed
system is that although it makes it easier and
more convenient for the candidate because he
may in an examination prepare himself on
only one or two subjects so as to insure
passing them, by the time that he has passed
the last required subjects, which may be
several years away from the time that he
reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he
shall have forgotten the principles and
theories contained in those subjects and
remembers only those of the one or two
subjects that he had last reviewed and
passed. This is highly possible because there
is nothing in the law which requires a
candidate to continue taking the Bar
examinations every year in succession. The
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on
this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no
limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken.
This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in
admitting persons to the practice of law. When
a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed
and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the
knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to
practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by
prospective clients. But this would not hold
true of the candidates who may have obtained
a passing grade on any five subjects eight
years ago, another three subjects one year
later, and the last two subjects the present
year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing
general average with no grade in any subject
below 50 per cent is more desirable and
satisfactory. It requires one to be all around,
and prepared in all required legal subjects at
the time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of
section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any application who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in
any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office. In other words, Bar candidates who
obtained not less than 70 per cent in any
examination since the year 1946 without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject,
despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain
a passing general average in any of those
years, will be admitted to the Bar. This
provision is not only prospective but
retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on
the next preceding amendment that we are
not exactly in favor of reducing the passing
general average from 75 per cent to 70 per
cent to govern even in the future. As to the
validity of making such reduction retroactive,
we have serious legal doubts. We should not
lose sight of the fact that after every bar
examinations, the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average grade, but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of
those who have failed. The present
amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the
Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have
obtained an average of 70 per cent or more
but less than the general passing average
fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of
the amendment if finally enacted into law
might have to go thru a legal test. As one
member of the Court remarked during the
discussion, when a court renders a decision or
promulgate a resolution or order on the basis
of and in accordance with a certain law or rule
then in force, the subsequent amendment or
even repeal of said law or rule may not affect
the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be
considered is the fact that members of the bar
are officers of the courts, including the
Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is
admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit,
competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied
admission to the Bar to a candidate who in
any year since 1946 may have obtained a
general average of 70 per cent but less than
that required for that year in order to pass, the
Supreme Court equally and impliedly
considered and declared that he was not
prepared, ready, competent and qualified to
be its officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the passing
general average runs counter to all these acts
and resolutions of the Supreme Court and
practically and in effect says that a candidate
not accepted, and even rejected by the Court
to be its officer because he was unprepared,
undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless
and in spite of all, must be admitted and
allowed by this Court to serve as its officer.
We repeat, that this is another important
aspect of the question to be carefully and
seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951,
stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection
of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of
the legal profession and maintain it on a high
level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class
who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which
I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in
any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take
 and subscribed the corresponding oath of
office. This provision constitutes class
legislation, benefiting as it does specifically
one group of persons, namely, the
unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947,
1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or
set aside final resolutions of the Supreme
Court made in accordance with the law then in
force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of
those who have failed. The provision under
consideration would have the effect of
revoking the Supreme Court's resolution
denying and rejecting the petitions of those
who may have failed to obtain the passing
average fixed for that year. Said provision also
sets a bad precedent in that the Government
would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the
examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine, engineering,
architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress
of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote
of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI
of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS
FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP
TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in any bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the
August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in
the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the
1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the
1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955
bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
member of the Philippine Bar; Provided,
however, That 75 per cent passing general
average shall be restored in all succeeding
examinations; and Provided, finally, That for
the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or
more of a fraction, shall be considered as one
and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a
grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its
approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the
objections of the President and to afford
another opportunity to those who feel
themselves discriminated by the Supreme
Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who
would otherwise have passed the bar
examination but were arbitrarily not so
considered by altering its previous decisions
of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has
been altering the passing mark from 69 in
1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the
apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades
and to give satisfaction to all parties
concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual
increase in the general averages for passing
the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to
1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952
bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar
examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the
passing mark will be restored with the
condition that the candidate shall not obtain in
any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The
reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent
passing grade, is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to
overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon
after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956
the preparation of our students as well as the
available reading materials will be under
normal conditions, if not improved from those
years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of
having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of
the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year
stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class
who failed in the bar examination". He
considered the bill a class legislation. This
contention, however, is not, in good
conscience, correct because Congress is
merely supplementing what the Supreme
Court have already established as precedent
by making as low as 69 per cent the passing
mark of those who took the Bar examination in
1947. These bar candidates for who this bill
should be enacted, considered themselves as
having passed the bar examination on the
strength of the established precedent of our
Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We
believe that such precedent cannot or could
not have been altered, constitutionally, by the
Supreme Court, without giving due
consideration to the rights already accrued or
vested in the bar candidates who took the
examination when the precedent was not yet
altered, or in effect, was still enforced and
without being inconsistent with the principles
of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be
considered as a simple curative act or
corrective statute which Congress has the
power to enact. The requirement of a "valid
classification" as against class legislation, is
very expressed in the following American
Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who
naturally belong to the class, all who possess
a common disability, attribute, or
classification, and there must be a "natural"
and substantial differentiation between those
included in the class and those it leaves
untouched. When a class is accepted by the
Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and
then have the dissevered factions of the
original unit designated with different rules
established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs.
Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo:
"Time with its tides brings new conditions
which must be cared for by new laws.
Sometimes the new conditions affect the
members of a class. If so, the correcting
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the
condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting
statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The
constitution does not prohibit special laws
inflexibly and always. It permits them when
there are special evils with which the general
laws are incompetent to cope. The special
public purpose will sustain the special form. . .
. The problem in the last analysis is one of
legislative policy, with a wide margin of
discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in
the case of plain abuse will there be revision
by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed.
1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective
statute which always retroacts to the extent of
the care of correction only as in this case from
1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of
Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of
this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by
Congress as above transcribed. The President again
asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed
the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the
Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill
No. 371, the members of the Court are taking
the same views they expressed on Senate Bill
No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
contained in the first indorsement of the
undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the
Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill
should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue
of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20,
Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times
erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an
election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election,
together, however, they lost in the polls.
D. Section 17-19 Admission and Oath, Certificate,
Atty’s Roll……
Sec. 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. - 
An applicant who has passed the required examination,
or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission
to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office.
Sec. 18. Certificate. -  The Supreme Court shall
thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar
for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an
order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and
that a certificate of such record be given to him by the
clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to
practice. 
Sec. 19. Attorneys' roll. - The clerk of the Supreme Court
shall keep a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice,
which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when
he receives his certificate.
……Section 21- 26, 31-37 authority to Appear,
compensation, Atty’s Lien Authority to bind clients
Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. -  An attorney
is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court
for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of
either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being
shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to
appear in a case to produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as
justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court
for a person without being employed, unless by leave of
the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer
of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions. 
Sec. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed
to represent client on appeal. -  An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be
presumed to continue representing his client on appeal,
unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his
appearance in the appellate court.
Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - 
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or
receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the
full amount in cash.
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to
fees. -  An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy,
the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be
bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses
as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt.
- When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money
of his client after it has been demanded, he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who
has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a
criminal prosecution.
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys. -  An attorney may retire
at any time from any action or special proceeding, by
the written consent of his client filed in court. He may
also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should
the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney
newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and written notice of
the change shall be given to the adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or
substitute another in his place, but if the contract
between client and attorney has been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without
justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the
client the full compensation stipulated in the contract.
However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the
court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the
payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a
lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgment,
rendered in the case wherein his services had been
retained by the client.
Sec. 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. -  A court may
assign an attorney to render professional aid free of
charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it
appears that the party is destitute and unable to
employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect
the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the
attorney so assigned to render the required service,
unless he is excused therefrom by the court for
sufficient cause shown.
Sec. 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. -  Subject
to availability of funds as may be provided by law the
court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed
as counsel de oficio to be compensated in such sum as
the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this
rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall
not be less than thirty pesos (P30.00) in any case, nor
more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos
(P50.00) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos
(P100.00) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos
(P200.00) in grave felonies other than capital offenses;
(4) Five hundred pesos (P500.00) in capital offenses.  and secure the payment of his just fees and
Sec. 33. Standing in court of persons authorized to
appear for Government. - Any official or other person
appointed or designated in accordance with law to
appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have
all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to
appear in any case in which said government has an
interest direct or indirect.
Sec. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -  In the court of
a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. -  No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients.
Sec. 36. Amicus curiae. -  The court may, in special
cases, and upon proper application, permit the
appearance, as amici curiae, of those lawyers who in its
opinion can help in the disposition of the matter before
it; or it may, on its own initiative, invite prominent
attorneys to appear as amici curiae in such special
cases.
Sec. 37. Attorneys' liens. -  An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession and may
retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his
client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the
same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien
disbursements.
Guiang Vs. Antonio 218 scra 381
ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, Petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA
COPUZ, Respondents.
 
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of
both the husband and the wife. The absence of the
consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the
vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the
latter case can ratification cure the defect.
 The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in
deciding this petition for review of the Decision 1 dated
January 30, 1996 and the Resolution 2 dated May 28,
1996, promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV No. 41758, affirming the Decision of the lower court
and denying reconsideration, respectively.
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz
filed an Amended Complainant 3 against her husband
Judie Corpuz and Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the
declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved
the conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void. The case was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato,
Branch 25. In due course, the trial court rendered a
Decision 4 dated September 9, 1992, disposing as
follow: 5
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff
and against the defendants,
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights dated
March 1, 1990 (Exh. "A") and the "amicable
settlement" dated March 16, 1990 (Exh. "B") as null
void and of no effect;
2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and
possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the remaining
one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409
which has been the subject of the Deed of Transfer of
Rights (Exh. "A");
3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse
defendants Luzviminda Guiang the amount of NINE
THOUSAND (P9,000.00) PESOS corresponding to the
payment made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel
Callejo for the unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff
in favor of Manuel Callejo, and another sum of P379.62
representing one-half of the amount of realty taxes
paid by defendants Guiangs on Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC)
Psd-165409, both with legal interests thereon
computed from the finality of the decision.
No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual
circumstances of the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. Respondent Court, in its
challenged Decision, ruled as follow: 6
WHEREFORE, the appealed of the lower court in Civil
Case No. 204 is hereby AFFIRMED by this Court. No
costs considering plaintiff-appellee's failure to file her
brief despite notice.
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same
court in its assailed Resolution: 7
Finding that the issues raised in defendants-appellants
motion for reconsideration of Our decision in this case
of January 30, 1996, to be a mere rehash of the same
issues which we have already passed upon in the said
decision, and there [being] no cogent reason to disturb
the same, this Court RESOLVED to DENY the instant
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts
The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of
private respondent and while she was in Manila
seeking employment, her husband sold to the
petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal peoperty,
consisting of their residence and the lot on which it
stood. The circumstances of this sale are set forth in
the Decision of Respondent Court, which quoted from
the Decision of the trial court as follows: 8
1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz
are legally married spouses. They were married on
December 24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge.
This is admitted by defendants-spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, and also admitted
by defendant Judie Corpuz when he testified in court
(tsn. p. 3, June 9, 1992), although the latter says that
they were married in 1967. The couple have three
children, namely: Junie - 18 years old, Harriet - 17
years of age, and Jodie or Joji, the youngest, who was
15 years of age in August, 1990 when her mother
testified in court.
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and
Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as
vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in
Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal,
South Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot 9, Block
8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel Callejo who signed
as vendor through a conditional deed of sale for a total
consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was
payable in installment, with right of cancellation in
favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three
successive installments (Exh. "2", tsn p. 6, February
14, 1990).
2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and
Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The latter have since
then occupied the one-half portion [and] built their
house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992). They are thus
adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in
June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad, in
[the] Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim
of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able
to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila
however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, .
. . on March 11, 1990. Plaintiff's departure for Manila
to look for work in the Middle East was with the
consent of her husband Judie Corpuz (tsn. p. 16, Aug.
12, 1990; p. 10 Sept. 6, 1991).
After his wife's departure for Manila, defendant Judie
Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He
stayed most of the time at his place of work at
Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a
cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went to school at
King's College, Bo. 1, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but
she was at the same time working as household help
of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother
Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie)
was going to school. Her mother sometimes sent them
money (tsn. p. 14, Sept. 6, 1991.)
Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned
that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half
portion including their house, of their homelot to
defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother
informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was
objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform
her father about this; but instead gave the letter to
Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang] would
advise her father (tsn. pp. 16-17, Sept. 6, 1991).
4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz,
defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of the
remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC)
Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to defendant
Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as "Deed
of Transfer of Rights" (Exh. "A") the remaining one-
half portion of their lot and the house standing thereon
for a total consideration of P30,000.00 of which
P5,000.00 was to be paid in June, 1990. Transferor
Judie Corpuz's children Junie and Harriet signed the
document as witness.
Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5,
1990, obviously to cure whatever defect in defendant
Judie Corpuz's title over the lot transferred, defendant
Luzviminda Guiang as vendee executed another
agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408
(Exh. "3"), this time with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a
widow of the original registered owner from whom the
couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz originally bought the lot
(Exh. "2"), who signed as vendor for a consideration of
P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a witness
to the sale (Exh. "3-A"). The new sale (Exh. "3")
describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-
165408 but it is obvious from the mass of evidence
that the correct lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-
165409, the very lot earlier sold to the couple Gilda
and Judie Corpuz.
5. Sometimes on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned
home. She found her children staying with other
households. Only Junie was staying in their house.
Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered
her children together and stayed at their house. Her
husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed
by her children that their father had a wife already.
6. For staying in their house sold by her husband,
plaintiff was complained against by defendant
Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio Guiang
before the Barangay authorities of Barangay General
Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, for
trespassing (tsn. p. 34, Aug. 17, 1990). The case was
docketed by the barangay authorities as Barangay
Case No. 38 for "trespassing". On March 16, 1990, the
parties thereat signed a document known as "amicable
settlement". In full, the settlement provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three
children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave
voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang,
where they are presently boarding without any charge,
on or before April 7, 1990.
FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the
bargain, plaintiff to the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Paulino Santos to question her signature on the
amicable settlement. She was referred however to the
Office-In-Charge at the time, a certain Mr. de la Cruz.
The latter in turn told her that he could not do
anything on the matter (tsn. p. 31, Aug. 17, 1990).
This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay
Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda
Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the
settlement. He merely said he forgot whether Mrs.
Corpuz had approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26,
1990). We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really
approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of
the settlement. Annulment not having been made,
plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot.
7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the
amicable settlement with a motion for the execution of
the amicable settlement, filing the same with the
Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato.
The proceedings [are] still pending before the said
court, with the filing of the instant suit.
8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang
spent P600.00 for the preparation of the Deed of
Transfer of Rights, Exh. "A", P9,000.00 as the amount
they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having assumed the
remaining obligation of the Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo
(Exh. "3"); P100.00 for the preparation of Exhibit "3";
a total of P759.62 basic tax and special education fund
on the lot; P127.50 as the total documentary stamp
tax on the various documents; P535.72 for the capital
gains tax; P22.50 as transfer tax; a standard fee of
P17.00; certification fee of P5.00. These expenses
particularly the taxes and other expenses towards the
transfer of the title to the spouses Guiangs were
incurred for the whole Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-
165409.
Ruling of Respondent Court
Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial
court's ruling that any alienation or encumbrance by
the husband of the conjugal propety without the
consent of his wife is null and void as provided under
Article 124 of the Family Code. It also rejected
petitioners' contention that the "amicable sttlement"
ratified said sale, citing Article 1409 of the Code which
expressly bars ratification of the contracts specified
therein, particularly those "prohibited or declared void
by law."
Hence, this petition. 9
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public
respondent the following errors: 10
I
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights
was validly executed.
II
Whether or not the Cour of Appeals erred in not
declairing as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the
Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights
which was validly ratified thru the execution of the
"amicable settlement" by the contending parties.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not
setting aside the findings of the Court a quo which
recognized as lawful and valid the ownership and
possession of private respondent over the remaining
one half (1/2) portion of the properly.
In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the
contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was
merely voidable, and (2) such contract was ratified by
private respondent when she entered into an amicable
sttlement with them.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue:  Void or Voidable Contract?
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer
of Rights was validly executed by the parties-litigants
in good faith and for valuable consideration. The
absence of private respondent's consent merely
rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled
by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of
ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article
1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of
consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a
person whose consent was obtained and vitiated
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud. In this instance, private
respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their
conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.
Gilda Corpuz, on direct examination, testified thus: 11
Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you still recall where
you were?
A I was still in Manila during that time.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FUENTES:
Q When did you come back to Koronadal, South
Cotabato?
A That was on March 11, 1990, Ma'am.
Q Now, when you arrived at Koronadal, was there any
problem which arose concerning the ownership of your
residential house at Callejo Subdivision?
A When I arrived here in Koronadal, there was a
problem which arose regarding my residential house
and lot because it was sold by my husband without my
knowledge.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within
the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was
correctly applied by the teo lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disgreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(165a) (Emphasis supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the
Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the
amendatory effect of the above provision in this
wise: 12
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or
encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we
compare the same with the equivalent provision of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the
Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnershit
without the wife's consent. The alienation or
encumbrance if so made however is not null and void.
It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an
action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance.
Thus the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within
ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after
the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value
of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10)
years . . . during [the] marriage to annul the alienation
or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family
Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or
encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the
Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal
partnership property without the consent of the wife is
null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the
intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated
in the execution of the document embodying the
amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial
that barangay authorities made her sign said document
through misrepresentation and
coercion. 13 In any event, its execution does not alter
the void character of the deed of sale between the
husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be
discussed later. The fact remains that such contract
was entered into without the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised
on the absence of private respondent's consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2)
object, and (3) consent, 14 the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Second Issue:  Amicable Settlement
Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable,
petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the
contending parties through the "amicable settlement"
they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay Case
No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the
appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of the
private respondent. The trial court correctly held: 15
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil
Code] therefore, the Deed to Transfer of Rights (Exh.
"A") cannot be ratified, even by an "amicable
settlement". The participation by some barangay
authorities in the "amicable settlement" cannot
otherwise validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot
be denied that the "amicable settlement (Exh. "B")
entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendent
spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot of
the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A"). By express
provision of law, such a contract is also void. Thus, the
legal provision, to wit:
Art. 1422. Acontract which is the direct result of a
previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.
(Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of
Rights (Exh. "A") and the "amicable settlement" (Exh.
"3") are null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be
ratified. 16
Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a
continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by
the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124.
The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the
sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing
against private respondent, after which the barangay
authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and
petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its
execution. The settlement, however, does not mention
a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance
of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect
that private respondent would vacate the property. By
no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret
this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article
124.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition
and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and Resolution.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Legarda vs Court of appeals 209 scra 722
VICTORIA LEGARDA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC. and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
94, Respondents.

Singson, Valdez & Associates for Petitioner.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for private respondent
Cabrera.
E.A. Barangan & Associates Law Offices for Nancy
Saw Cheung.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR
EXTENSION; GRANTING AND DENIAL THEREOF; SUBJECT
TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT; CASE AT
BAR. — The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992,
granted said motion for extension with warning that no
further extension will be given. Atty. Coronel received a
copy of said resolution on March 27, 1992 but it appears
that on March 24, 1992, a day after the expiration of the
30-day extended period prayed for in his first motion for
extension, he had mailed another urgent motion for a
second extension of thirty (30) days within which to
submit his explanation on the ground that since March 2,
1992, he had been "treated and confined at the St. Luke’s
Hospital." Attached to the motion is a medical certificate
stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiomyopathy,
diabetes mellitus, congestive heart failure class IV and
brain infraction, thrombotic." While off-hand, the reasons
cited in the second motion for reconsideration seem to
warrant another extension, the fact that it was filed one
day late, coupled with the circumstances of this case do
not call for a reconsideration of the resolution of March 9,
1992. Hence, the second motions for extension of time
will always be granted by the Court. The granting or
denial of motions for extension of time is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court with a view to attaining
substantial justice.
2. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYERS; EXPECTED TO RECOGNIZE
THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT AND OBEY ITS LAWFUL
PROCESSES; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DO SO. — It should
be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was
addressed to Atty. Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer
of a litigant in this Court. It was addressed to him in his
personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary
powers of this Court. That he failed to immediately heed
the directive of the decision of March 18, 1991 to show
cause, notwithstanding the grant of a 30-day extension
for him to do so, reflects an unbecoming disrespect. As a
lawyer, Atty. Coronel is expected to recognize the
authority of this Court and obey its lawful processes and
orders. Hence, the Court considers his failure to show
cause, notwithstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a
waiver of his rights to be heard and to due process,
thereby warranting an ex parte determination of the
matter for which he had been required to explain.
3. ID.; ID.; DUTY TO SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE; NON-OBSERVANCE
THEREOF CONSTITUTES GROSS NEGLIGENCE HENCE
LIABLE. — The facts of the case clearly show that Atty.
Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence." He failed to
observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which
requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable." Indeed, petitioner could
not have gone through the travials attending the
disposition of the case against her not to mention the
devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean
Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a
member of the Bar. By negligence to file the answer to
the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events
which resulted in the deprivation of petitioner’s rights over
her house and lot. In this regard, worth quoting is the
observation of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in his ponencia
of March 18, 1991: "Petitioner’s counsel is a well-known
practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be
expected that he would extend the highest quality of
service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately,
counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of
petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the
civil case failed against her by the private respondent,
said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance
and seek for an extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence,
petitioner was declared in default on the motion of private
respondent’s counsel. . . ."
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a
complaint for specific performance with damages filed by
private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was
aimed at compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a lease
contract involving her house and lot at 123 West Avenue,
Quezon City which New Cathay House, Inc. intended to
use in operating a restaurant. 1
As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining Victoria Legarda
and her agents from stopping the renovation of the
property which was being done by New Cathay House,
Inc. After hearing, the lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel of the Coronel Law Office
at 146 Katipunan Road, White Plains, Quezon City,
entered his appearance as counsel for Victoria Legarda.
He also filed an urgent motion for an extension of ten (10)
days from February 6, 1985 within which to file an answer
to the complaint. The motion was granted by the court
which gave Victoria Legarda until February 20, 1985 to
answer the complaint.
However, Victoria Legarda failed to file her answer within
the extended period granted by the court. Hence, upon
motion of New Cathay House, Inc., she was declared in
default, thereby paving the way for the presentation of
evidence ex parte.
On March 25, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision
by default. It ordered Victoria Legarda to execute and sign
the lease contract and to pay the following: (a) exemplary
damages of P100,000.00, (b) actual and compensatory
damages in the total amount of P278,764.37, and (c)
attorney’s fees of P10,000.00.

Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower court’s decision
on April 9, 1985 but he did not interpose an appeal
therefrom within the reglementary period. Consequently,
the decision became final and, upon motion of New
Cathay House, Inc., the lower court issued a writ of
execution. In compliance with the writ, on June 27, 1985,
the sheriff levied upon, and sold at public auction, the
property subject of the litigation to New Cathay House,
Inc., the highest bidder. The sheriff’s certificate of sale
was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City.
The one-year redemption period having expired on July 8,
1986, the sheriff issued a final deed of sale which, on July
11, 1986, was duly registered with the Office of the
Register of Deeds. On November 6, 1986, Victoria
Legarda, represented by her attorney-in-fact Ligaya C.
Gomez, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition of
annulment of the judgment against her in Civil Case No.
Q-43811. She alleged therein that the decision was
obtained through fraud and that it is not supported by the
allegations in the pleadings nor by the evidence
submitted.
Forthwith, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from
dispossessing petitioner of the premises in question.
Private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. then filed its
consolidated comment on the petition with a motion for
the lifting of the temporary restraining order. Victoria
Legarda, through Atty. Coronel, filed a reply to the
consolidated comment. The petition was thereafter orally
argued. Required by the Court of Appeals to manifest if
the parties desired to file their respective memoranda,
Dean Coronel informed the appellate court that he was
adopting Victoria Legarda’s reply to the consolidated
comment as her memorandum.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on
November 29, 1989. On the issue of fraud, for which
Victoria Legarda claimed that Robert V. Cabrera Jr., who
represented New Cathay House, Inc., made her believe
through false pretenses that he was agreeable to the
conditions of the lease she had imposed on the lessee and
that the latter would withdraw the complaint against her,
thereby prompting her to advise her lawyer not to file an
answer to the complaint anymore, the Court of Appeals 2
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On the other hand, petitioner’s above allegation of fraud
supposedly practiced upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr.
is so improbable as to inspire belief. For the Coronel Law
Office had already entered its appearance as petitioner’s
counsel by then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had
already agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner,
said law office would have asked plaintiff to file the proper
motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court,
and if plaintiff had refused to do so, it would have filed
defendant’s answer anyway so that she would not be
declared in default. Or said law office would have
prepared a compromise agreement embodying the
conditions imposed by their client in the lease contract in
question which plaintiffs had allegedly already accepted,
so that the same could have been submitted to the Court
and judgment on a compromise could be entered. All
these, any conscientious lawyer of lesser stature than the
Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a member of
the bar, would normally have done under the
circumstances to protect the interests of their client,
instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw
its complaint against defendant, as it had allegedly
promised the latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is
one of pure and simple negligence on the part of the
defendant’s counsel, who simply failed to file the answer
in behalf of defendant. But counsel’s negligence does not
stop here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the
decision by default against defendant, it should then have
appealed therefrom or file (sic) a petition for relief from
the order declaring their client in default or from the
judgment by default. Hence, defendant is bound by the
acts of her counsel in this case and cannot be heard to
complain that the result might have been different if it had
proceeded differently (Pulido v. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon
v. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257, among other cases). And the
rationale of this rule is obvious and clear. For if such
grounds were to be admitted as reasons for opening
cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as
new counsel could be employed who could allege and
show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently
diligent, or experienced, or learned’ (Fernandez v. Tan
Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138)." (Emphasis supplied.)
Finding the second ground for the petition to be likewise
unmeritorious, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. Surprisingly, however, inspite of the Court of
Appeals’ tirade on his professional competence, Atty.
Coronel did not lift a finger to file a motion for
reconsideration. Neither did he initiate moves towards an
appeal to this Court of the decision which was adverse and
prejudicial to his client. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Thus, the Court of Appeals decision became final. On
December 8, 1989, counsel for New Cathay House, Inc.
sent petitioner through the Coronel Law Office, a letter
demanding that she vacate the property within three days
from receipt thereof. Atty. Coronel did not inform
petitioner of this development until sometime in March,
1990. Due to petitioner’s persistent telephone calls, Atty.
Coronel’s secretary informed her of the fact that New
Cathay House, Inc. had demanded her eviction from the
property. Consequently, petitioner had no recourse but to
oblige and vacate the property. 3
On August 7, 1990, Victoria Legarda, represented by a
new counsel, 4 filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 contending that the decisions
of the courts below "are null and void as petitioner was
deprived of her day in court and divested of her property
without due process of law through the gross, pervasive
and malicious negligence of previous counsel, Atty.
Antonio Coronel." 5
In its decision of March 18, 1991, this Court declared as
null and void the decisions of March 25, 1985 and
November 29, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and the Court of Appeals, respectively, as well as the
sheriff’s certificate of sale dated June 27, 1985 of the
property involved and the subsequent final deed of sale
covering the same. The court further directed private
respondent New Cathay House, Inc. to reconvey the
property to the petitioner and the Register of Deeds to
cancel the registration of said property in the name of said
private respondent and to issue a new one in the name of
the petitioner.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The same decision required the former counsel of
petitioner, Atty. Antonio Coronel, to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice why he should not be held
administratively liable for his acts and omissions which
resulted in grave injustice to the petitioner. Said counsel
having been inadvertently omitted in the service of copies
of said decision, 6 on February 11, 1992, the Clerk of
Court of this Division to which this case was transferred,
sent Atty. Coronel a copy thereof which he received on
February 12, 1992. 7
On the tenth day from his receipt of said copy, Atty.
Coronel filed an urgent ex-parte motion for an extension
of thirty (30) days from February 22, 1992 within which to
file his explanation. He alleged as reason for the motion
pressure of work "consisting of daily hearings in several
forums and preparations of pleadings in equally urgent
cases, such as the more than 80 civil and criminal cases
against the Marcoses." 8
The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992 granted said
motion for extension with warning that no further
extension will be given. Atty. Coronel received a copy of
said resolution on March 27, 1992 but it appears that on
March 24, 1992, 9 a day after the expiration of the 30-day
extended period prayed for in his first motion for
extension, he had mailed another urgent motion for a
second extension of thirty (30) days within which to
submit his explanation on the ground that since March 2,
1992, he had been "treated and confined at the St. Luke’s
Hospital." Attached to the motion is a medical certificate
stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiomyopathy,
diabetes mellitus, congestive heart failure class IV and
brain infraction, thrombotic." 10
While off-hand, the reasons cited in the second motion for
reconsideration seem to warrant another extension, the
fact that it was filed one day late, coupled with the
circumstances of this case do not call for a reconsideration
of the resolution of March 9, 1992. Hence, the second
motion for extension must be denied. Lawyers should not
presume that their motions for extension of time will
always be granted by the Court. The granting or denial of
motions for extension of time is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court with a view to attaining substantial
justice. 11
It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution
was addressed to Atty. Coronel not in his capacity as a
lawyer of a litigant in this Court. It was addressed to him
in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the
disciplinary powers of this court. That he failed to
immediately heed the directive of the decision of March
18, 1991 to show cause, notwithstanding the grant of a
30-day extension for him to do so, reflects an unbecoming
disrespect towards this Court’s orders. We cannot
countenance such disrespect. As a lawyer, Atty. Coronel is
expected to recognize the authority of this Court and obey
its lawful processes and orders. 12
Hence, the Court considers his failure to show cause,
notwithstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a waiver of
his rights to be heard and to due process, thereby
warranting an ex parte determination of the matter for
which he had been required to explain. 13
The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel
violated Canon 18 of the Code of the Professional
Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence." He failed to
observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which
requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable." cralaw virtua1aw library
Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the
travails attending the disposition of the case against her
not to mention the devastating consequence on her
property rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the
ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar. By neglecting
to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he
set off the events which resulted in the deprivation of
petitioner’s rights over her house and lot. In this regard,
worth quoting is the observation of Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco in his ponencia of March 18, 1991: chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"Petitioner’s counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and
dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would
extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the
petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have
abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to
defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by
private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than
enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to
file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer.
Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion of
private respondent’s counsel. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
This is not the only case wherein, in dealing with this
Court’s orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern
of negligence, inattention to his obligations as counsel,
sloppiness and superciliousness. In G.R. No. 97418,
"Imelda R. Marcos, Et. Al. v. PCGG, Et Al.," the Court en
bank, in its Resolution of May 28, 1992, imposed upon
Atty. Coronel a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) after
he was found guilty of inexcusable negligence in his failure
to comply with this Court’s resolutions. The Court said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We find the explanation for his failure to comply with the
Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991
unsatisfactory. Atty. Coronel had obviously taken this
Court for granted. Although he received a copy of the 4
June 1991 Resolution on 4 July 1991, he nonchalantly let
the 10-day period pass and even deliberately chose to
remain silent about it even after he received a copy of the
Resolution of 27 August 1991. It was only on the last day
of the period granted to him under said Resolution that he
showed initial efforts to comply with the Resolution by
filing a motion for a 20-day extension from 30 September
1991 to file the Reply. This was a a self-imposed period
and, therefore, he was expected to faithfully comply with
it not only because of the respect due this Court, but also
because he had put his honor and virtues of candor and
good faith on the line. For reasons only known to him, he
did not. Worse, despite his receipt on 27 November 1991
of the Resolution of 5 November 1991 which granted his
30 September 1991 motion, Atty. Coronel did not even
move for a new period within which to comply with the
Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991. This
Court had to issue the Resolution of 30 January 1992 to
compel compliance. When he finally did, he committed,
allegedly through inadvertence, the blunder of placing his
Reply under a wrong caption.
"For deliberately failing, if not stubbornly refusing, to
comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August
1991 and meet his self-imposed deadline, Atty. Coronel
was both unfair and disrespectful to this Court.
Furthermore, he has unduly delayed the disposition of the
pending incidents in this case." (Emphasis supplied).

Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronel’s failure
to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to
the interest of his client caused the latter material
prejudice. 14 It should be remembered that the moment a
lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will
exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion.
A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons
his client’s cause makes him unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by the latter. 15 Moreover, a lawyer owes
fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which
he is an officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey this Court’s
order even on a matter that personally affects him, such
that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be bent
on professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty.
Coronel cannot escape this Court’s disciplinary action for
gross negligence which resulted in depriving petitioner or
her property rights, for, as this Court enunciated in the
aforecited Cantiller v. Potenciano case: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of
administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when
strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the
legal profession, strict compliance with one’s oath of office
and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.
"Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above
suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their
clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary
business proposition. It is a matter of public interest."
WHEREFORE, the second motion for an extension of time
to file explanation is hereby DENIED. Atty. Antonio P.
Coronel is hereby found GUILTY of gross negligence in the
defense of petitioner Victoria Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-
43811 and accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months effective from the date
of his receipt of this resolution. A repetition of the acts
constituting gross negligence shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his personal
record, another copy be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and copies thereof be circulated in all the
courts.
SO ORDERED.
Legarda vs CA 195 scra 418
G.R. No. 94457             March 18, 1991
VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW
CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 94, respondents.
Singson, Valdez & Associates for petitioner.
Lenito T. Serrano for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the mistake
of a counsel binds the client. It is only in case of gross
or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts
must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered
thereby.
The present case is a typical example of such rare
exception.
Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel
of land and the improvements thereon located at 123
West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985
respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint
against the petitioner for specific performance with
preliminary injunction and damages in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for Quezon City alleging, among
others, that petitioner entered into a lease agreement
with the private respondent through its representative,
Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of
petitioner effective January 1, 1985 until December
31, 1989 or for a period of five (5) years; that the
rental is P25,000.00 per month with 5% escalation per
cralaw virtua1aw library
year; that on November 23, 1984, private respondent
deposited the amount of P72,000.00 with petitioner as
down payment of rentals; that respondent drew up the
written contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner
failed and refused to execute and sign the same
despite demands of respondent; and that the
respondent suffered damages due to the delay in the
renovation and opening of its restaurant business.
The private respondent prayed that pending the
resolution of the case a restraining order be issued
against petitioner or her agents enjoining them from
stopping the renovation and use of the premises by
private respondent. It was also prayed that after due
hearing the petitioner be ordered to execute the lease
contract; to pay actual compensatory, exemplary and
other damages in such amount as may be proved
during the trial including P30,000.00 attorney's fees
plus P300.00 per appearance of counsel, and to pay
the expenses of litigation.1
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle
her case. Said counsel filed his appearance with an
urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer
within ten (10) days from February 26,
1985.  However, said counsel failed to file the answer
2
within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for
private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare
petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court
on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was
allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on
March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision,
the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendant Victoria G. Legarda to
execute and sign Exhibit "D":, the lease
contract for the premises at 123 West Avenue,
Quezon City. Accordingly, the preliminary
injunction earlier issued on January 31, 1985
is hereby made permanent.
Judgment is likewise rendered ordering
defendant to pay exemplary damages in the
sum of P100,000.00 to serve as example and
deterrent for others, and actual and
compensatory damages as follows:
1. For loss and destroyed goodwill and
reputation in the amount of P100,000.00;
2. The sum of P61,704.40 as adjustments in
the costs of labor and materials for the
renovation of the premises;
3. The sum of P50,000.00 as unearned
income for the delay of plaintiff 's operations
from January 1, 1985 up to February 25, 1985
or a period of almost two (2) months;
4. The sum of P16,635.57 and P50,424.40 as
additional compensatory damages incurred by
plaintiff for the extension of the lease of its
premises at Makati and salaries of idle
employees, respectively;
5. The sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees; and
6. The costs of suit. 3 petitioner and to enjoin the former from further
Copy of said decision was duly served on counsel for
the petitioner but he did not take any action. Thus, the
judgment became final and executory. On May 8,
1985, upon motion of private respondent, a writ of
execution of the judgment was issued by the trial
court.
4 exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the
At public auction, the sheriff sold the aforestated
property of petitioner to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. for the
sum of P376,500.00 to satisfy the judgment. The
sheriff issued a certificate of sale dated June 8, 1985
covering the said property.  After the one year
5 supported by the allegations in the pleadings or by the
redemption period expired without the petitioner
redeeming the property, ownership was consolidated
in the name of Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. The sheriff
issued a final deed of sale on July 8, 1986 in his favor.
Cabrera registered the same in the office of the
Register of Deeds on July 11, 1986.
Upon learning of this unfortunate turn of events,
petitioner prevailed upon her counsel, to seek the
appropriate relief. On November 6, 1986 said counsel
filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment
of judgment calling attention to the unjust enrichment
of private respondent in securing the transfer in its
name of the property valued at P 2.5 million without
justification; that when the complaint was filed in court
by private respondent against the petitioner, the
parties came to an agreement to settle their
differences, the private respondent assuring petitioner
that the complaint it filed shall be withdrawn so
petitioner advised her lawyer that there was no longer
any need to file an answer to the complaint; that on
February 22, 1985, private respondent nevertheless
filed an ex-parte motion to declare the petitioner in
default; that petitioner was deprived of the right to
present her defense through false pretenses,
misrepresentation and fraud practiced upon her by
private respondent warranting the annulment of the
judgment; that the documentary evidence presented
by private respondent, which served as the basis of
the decision, is falsified and tampered with; that as an
example, the voucher filed by petitioner, contains
typewritten entries to the effect that the term of the
lease is for five (5) years to which petitioner never
agreed, and that the option to buy the property was
given to the private respondent; that the fact that the
property worth P2 million was sold at public auction at
a shockingly and questionably low price of
P376,500.00 is by itself a sufficient basis for annulling
the sale for being grossly inadequate to shock the
conscience and understanding of men, giving rise to a
presumption of fraud.  Thus, it was prayed that a
6
preliminary mandatory injunction issue ordering the
private respondent to surrender the property to
harassing and threatening the peaceful possession of
petitioner; and that after hearing, the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and the sheriffs
certificate of sale  be likewise annulled; that private
7
respondent be adjudged to pay petitioner no less than
P500,000.00 actual and moral damages, as well as
amount of P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit. 8
On February 2, 1987 an amended petition was filed
by counsel for petitioner in the Court of Appeals
raising the additional issue that the decision is not
evidence submitted. 9
In due course, a decision was rendered by the Court
of Appeals on November 29, 1989.  The appellate
10
court made the following observations:
On the other hand, petitioner's above
allegation of fraud supposedly practiced upon
her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is so
 improbable as to inspire belief. For the
Coronel Law Office had already entered its
appearance as petitioner's counsel by then, so
that if it were true that Cabrera had already
agreed to the conditions imposed by
petitioner, said law office would have asked
plaintiff to file the proper motion to dismiss or
withdraw complaint with the Court, and if
plaintiff had refused to do so, it would have
filed defendant's answer anyway so that she
would not be declared in default. Or said law
office would have prepared a compromise
agreement embodying the conditions imposed
by their client in the lease contract in question
which plaintiff had allegedly already accepted,
so that the same could have been submitted
to the Court and judgment on a compromise
could be entered. All these, any conscientious
lawyer of lesser stature than the Coronel Law
Office, headed by no less than a former law
dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or even a new
member of the bar, would normally have done
under the circumstances to protect the
interests of their client, instead of leaving it to
the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its
complaint against defendant, as it had
allegedly promised the latter. Thus, it is our
belief that this case is one of-pure and simple
negligence on the part of defendant's counsel
who simply failed to file the answer in behalf
of defendant, But counsel's negligence does
not stop here. For after it had been furnished
with copy of the decision by default against
defendant, it should then have appealed
therefrom or file a petition from relief from the
order declaring their client in default or from
the judgment by default. [sic] Again, counsel
negligently failed to do either. Hence,
defendant is bound by the acts of her counsel
in this case and cannot be heard to complain
that the result might have been different if it
had proceeded differently (Pulido vs. C.A.,
122 SCRA 63; Ayllon vs. Sevilla, 156 SCRA
257, among other cases). And the rationale of
this rule is obvious and clear. For "if such
grounds were to be admitted as reasons for
opening cases, there would never be an end
to a suit so long as new counsel could be
employed who could allege and show that the
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
or experienced, or learned" (Fernandez vs.
Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138). 11
Despite these findings, the appellate court
nevertheless dismissed the petition for annulment of
judgment with costs against the petitioner. A copy of
the said judgment appears to have been served on
counsel for the petitioner. However, said counsel did
not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal
therefrom, so it became final.
It was only in March 1990 when the secretary of
counsel for petitioner informed the latter of the
adverse decision against her only after persistent
telephone inquiries of the petitioner.
Hence, petitioner secured the services of another
lawyer who filed this petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is prayed that the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-43811, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10487 and the sheriff's sale
at public auction of the property in question be
annulled, as the same are attributable to the gross
negligence and inefficiency of petitioner's counsel,
whose blunder cannot bind the petitioner who was
deprived of due process thereby. It is further prayed
that private respondent Cathay House, Inc. be
ordered to reconvey to petitioner the property covered
by TCT No. 270814, which was sold at public auction
to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. and in whose favor its
ownership was consolidated, and thereafter
ownership appears to have been transferred to private
respondent.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer
and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he
would extend the highest quality of service as a
lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel
appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner.
After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case
filed against her by private respondent, said counsel
did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek
for an extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence,
petitioner was declared in default on motion of private
respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private
respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment was
rendered by the trial court.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the
judgment but took no steps to have the same set
aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment
became final and executory. The property of petitioner
was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in
favor of private respondent. The property was sold to
Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private
respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his
favor. The redemption period expired after one year
so a final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in
favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have
transferred the same to private respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When,
upon her return, she learned, to her great shock, what
happened to her case and property, she nevertheless
did not lose faith in her counsel. She still asked Atty.
Coronel to take such appropriate action possible
under the circumstances.
As above related, said counsel filed a petition for
annulment of judgment and its amendment in the
Court of Appeals.  But that was all he did. After an
1âwphi1
adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of
which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not
inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for
a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review
before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It
was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of
petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her
counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately
become final.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his
client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be
taken or withheld from his client except in accordance
with the law. He should present every remedy or
defense authorized by the law in support of his client's
cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the
full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer
should not be afraid of the possibility that he may
displease the judge or the general public. 12
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case,
he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his
utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's
cause.  It is not only a case of simple negligence as
13
found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross
negligence, so much so that his client was deprived of
her property without due process of law.
In People's Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco
and Escasa,  this Court ruled as follows:
14
Procedural technicality should not be made a
bar to the vindication of a legitimate
grievance. When such technicality deserts
from being an aid to justice, the courts are
justified in excepting from its operation a
particular case. Where there was something
fishy and suspicious about the actuations of
the former counsel of petitioner in the case at
bar, in that he did not given any significance at
all to the processes of the court, which has
proven prejudicial to the rights of said clients,
under a lame and flimsy explanation that the
court's processes just escaped his attention, it
is held that said lawyer deprived his clients of
their day in court, thus entitling said clients to
petition for relief from judgment despite the
lapse of the reglementary period for filing said
period for filing said petition.
In Escudero vs. Judge Dulay,  this Court, in holding
15
that the counsel's blunder in procedure is an
exception to the rule that the client is bound by the
mistakes of counsel, made the following disquisition:
Petitioners contend, through their new
counsel, that the judgments rendered against
them by the respondent court are null and
void, because they were therein deprived of
their day in court and divested of their
property without due process of law, through
the gross ignorance, mistake and negligence
of their previous counsel. They acknowledge
that, while as a rule, clients are bound by the
mistake of their counsel, the rule should not
be applied automatically to their case, as their
trial counsel's blunder in procedure and gross
ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed
their cause of action and violated their
substantial rights.
We are impressed with petitioner's
contentions.
Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or
cure for failure to file a timely petition for
review on certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of
the Rules. Where, however, the application of
the rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, the rule may be
relaxed.
x x x           x x x          x x x
While this Court is cognizant of the rule that,
generally, a client will suffer the
consequences of the negligence, mistake or
lack of competence of his counsel, in the
interest of justice and equity, exceptions may
be made to such rule, in accordance with the
facts and circumstances of each case.
Adherence to the general rule would, in the
instant case, result in the outright deprivation
of their property through a technicality.
In its questioned decision dated November 19, 1989
the Court of Appeals found, in no uncertain terms, the
negligence of the then counsel for petitioner when he
failed to file the proper motion to dismiss or to draw a
compromise agreement if it was true that they agreed
on a settlement of the case; or in simply filing an
answer; and that after having been furnished a copy
of the decision by the court he failed to appeal
therefrom or to file a petition for relief from the order
declaring petitioner in default. In all these instances
the appellate court found said counsel negligent but
his acts were held to bind his client, petitioner herein,
nevertheless.
The Court disagrees and finds that the negligence of
counsel in this case appears to be so gross and
inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that
after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to
make up for his omissions by asking him to file a
petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate
court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner
in that after he received a copy of the adverse
judgment of the appellate court, he did not do
anything to save the situation or inform his client of
the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and
become final. Such reckless and gross negligence
should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner
was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.
Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an
alleged lease agreement of the property of petitioner,
private respondent went to court, and that because of
the gross negligence of the counsel for the petitioner,
she lost the case as well as the title and ownership of
the property, which is worth millions. The mere lessee
then now became the owner of the property. Its true
owner then, the petitioner, now is consigned to penury
all because her lawyer appear to have abandoned her
case not once but repeatedly.
The Court cannot allow such a grave injustice to
prevail. It cannot tolerate such unjust enrichment of
the private respondent at the expense of the
petitioner. The situation is aggravated by the fact that
said counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and the
dean of a law school as the Court at the beginning of
this discourse observed. His competence should be
beyond cavil. Thus, there appears to be no cogent
excuse for his repeated negligence and inaction. His
lack of devotion to duty is so gross and palpable that
this Court must come to the aid of his distraught
client, the petitioner herein.
As member of the Philippine Bar he owes complete
fidelity to the cause of his client. He should give
adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is
the reason why a practicing lawyer should accept only
so many cases he can afford to handle. And once he
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the
task with dedication and care. If he should do any
less, then he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City dated March 25, 1985 in Civil Case No.
Q-43811; the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP-10487; the
Sheriff 's Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985 of
the property in question; and the subsequent final
deed of sale covering the same property, are all
hereby declared null and void. Private respondent
New Cathay House, Inc. is directed to reconvey said
property to the petitioner, and the Register of Deeds is
ordered to cancel the registration of said property in
the name of private respondent and to issue a new
one in the name of petitioner. Costs against private
respondent. Said counsel for petitioner is hereby
required to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why he should not be held administratively
liable for his acts and omissions hereinabove
described in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
SMC vs Laguesma 236 scra 595
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
and NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA SALES LABOR
UNION-INDEPENDENT, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.
E.N.A. Cruz & Associates for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) prays that
the Resolution dated March 19, 1991 and the Order
dated April 12, 1991 of public respondent
Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma declaring
respondent union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the Magnolia sales personnel
in northern Luzon be set aside for having been issued
in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion.
On June 4, 1990, the North Luzon Magnolia Sales
Labor Union (respondent union for brevity) filed with
the Department of Labor a petition for certification
election among all the regular sales personnel of
Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales
Area. 1
Petitioner opposed the petition and questioned the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit sought to be
represented by respondent union. It claimed that its
bargaining history in its sales offices, plants and
warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit for REGULAR SALES
each sales office. OFFICES OF
MAGNOLIA DAIRY
The petition was heard on November 9, 1990 with PRODUCTS, NORTH
petitioner LUZON SALES
being represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the AREA",
Siguion Reyna law office. Atty. Batalla withdrew COMPLETELY
petitioner's opposition to a certification election IGNORING THE
and agreed to consider all the sales offices in ESTABLISHED
northern Luzon as one bargaining unit. At the pre- BARGAINING
election conference, the parties agreed inter alia, on HISTORY OF
the date, time and place of the consent election. PETITIONER SMC.
Respondent union won the election held on
November 24, 1990. In an Order dated December 3, B
1990,   Mediator-Arbiter Benalfre J. Galang certified
2

respondent union as the sole and exclusive THAT PETITIONER IS

bargaining agent for all the regular sales personnel in ESTOPPED FROM
all the sales offices of Magnolia Dairy Products in the QUESTIONING THE
North Luzon Sales Area. "AGREEMENT"
ENTERED INTO AT
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It THE HEARING ON
claimed that 9 NOVEMBER 1990,
Atty. Batalla was only authorized to agree to the IN CONTRAVENTION
holding of certification elections subject to the OF THE
following conditions: (1) there would only be one ESTABLISHED
general election; (2) in this general election, the FACTS OF THE CASE
individual sales offices shall still comprise separate AND THE
bargaining units. 3
APPLICABLE LAW
ON THE MATTER.
In a Resolution dated March 19, 1991,   public
4

respondent, by authority of the Secretary of Labor, We find no merit in the petition.

denied SMC's appeal and affirmed the Order of the
Med- Arbiter.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner claims that:
THE HONORABLE
UNDERSECRETARY LAGUESMA
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN HE IGNORED
AND TOTALLY DISREGARDED
PETITIONER'S VALID AND
JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS WHY THE
ERROR MADE IN GOOD FAITH BY
PETITIONER'S COUNSEL BE
CORRECTED, AND INSTEAD
RULED:
A employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS
"THE SOLE AND
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not
respondent union represents an appropriate
bargaining unit, and (2) whether or not petitioner is
bound by its lawyer's act of agreeing to consider the
sales personnel in the north Luzon sales area as one
bargaining unit.
Petitioner claims that in issuing the impugned Orders,
public respondent disregarded its collective
bargaining history which is to have a separate
bargaining unit for each sales office. It insists that its
prior collective bargaining history is the most
persuasive criterion in determining the
appropriateness of the collective bargaining unit.
There is no merit in the contention.
A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given
body of employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law."  5

EXCLUSIVE
BARGAINING AGENT The fundamental factors in determining the
FOR ALL THE appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will
of the employees (Globe Doctrine);   (2) affinity and
6
unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) similarity of employment status.  7
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has
categorically ruled that the existence of a prior
collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor
conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an
appropriate bargaining unit.  8
Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or
commonality of interests. The employees sought to be
represented by the collective bargaining agent must
have substantial mutual interests in terms of
employment and working conditions as evinced by the
type of work they perform.
In the case at bench, respondent union sought to
represent the sales personnel in the various Magnolia
sales offices in northern Luzon. There is similarity of
employment status for only the regular sales
personnel in the north Luzon area are covered. They
have the same duties and responsibilities and
substantially similar compensation and working
conditions. The commonality of interest among he
sales personnel in the north Luzon sales area cannot
be gainsaid. In fact, in the certification election held on
November 24, 1990, the employees concerned
accepted respondent union as their exclusive
bargaining agent. Clearly, they have expressed their
desire to be one.
Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales office of
Magnolia should constitute only one bargaining unit.
What greatly militates against this position is
the meager number of sales personnel in each of the
Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon. Even the
bargaining unit sought to be represented by
respondent union in the entire north Luzon sales area
consists only of approximately
fifty-five (55) employees.   Surely, it would not be for
9 bargaining representative.
the best interest of these employees if they would
further be fractionalized. The adage "there is strength
in number" is the very rationale underlying the
formation of a labor union.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that Atty.
Batalla was merely a substitute lawyer for Atty.
Christine Ona, who got stranded in Legaspi City. Atty.
Batalla was allegedly unfamiliar with the collective
bargaining history of its establishment. Petitioner
claims it should not be bound by the mistake
committed by its substitute lawyer.
We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, the
collective bargaining history of a company is not
decisive of what should comprise the collective
bargaining unit. Insofar as the alleged "mistake" of the
substitute lawyer is concerned, we find that this
mistake was the direct result of the negligence of
petitioner's lawyers. It will be noted that Atty. Ona was
under the supervision of two (2) other lawyers, Attys.
Jacinto de la Rosa, Jr. and George C. Nograles.
There is nothing in the records to show that these two
(2) counsels were likewise unavailable at that time.
Instead of deferring the hearing, petitioner's counsels
chose to proceed therewith. Indeed, prudence
dictates that, in such case, the lawyers allegedly
actively involved in SMC's labor case should have
adequately and sufficiently briefed the substitute
lawyer with respect to the matters involved in the case
and the specific limits of his authority. Unfortunately,
this was not done in this case. The negligence of its
lawyers binds petitioner. As held by this Court in the
case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz:  10
. . . As a general rule, a client is bound
by the mistakes of his counsel. Only
when the application of the general
rule would result in serious
injustice should an exception thereto
be called for.
In the case at bench, petitioner insists that each of the
sales offices in northern Luzon should be considered
as a separate bargaining unit for negotiations would
be more expeditious. Petitioner obviously chooses to
follow the path of least resistance. It is not, however,
the convenience of the employer that constitutes the
determinative factor in forming an appropriate
bargaining unit. Equally, if not more important, is the
interest of the employees. In choosing and crafting an
appropriate bargaining unit, extreme care should be
taken to prevent an employer from having any undue
advantage over the employees' bargaining
representative. Our workers are weak enough and it is
not our social policy to further debilitate their
In sum, we find that no arbitrariness or grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to public respondents
certification of respondent union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the regular Magnolia
sales personnel of the north Luzon sales area.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged
Resolution and Order of public respondent are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto, there being no showing of grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

people vs Salido GR No. 116208 July 5, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. ESMAEL SALIDO, MANNY BULOD, TENG
CODALEZ, CAMARUDIN SILANGAN, ROBERT
BALABAGIN, ALLAN KAWASA, FAHAD ZACARIA alias
"Alvin", ALEX INEDAL, MOLIBAS SINDAD,
BARTOLOME MABUTI, ROBERTO DIVINA and JOHN
DOES, Accused, ALLAN KAWASA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Allan Kawasa is before us on appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region,
convicting him, together with two others, Fahad Zacaria
alias "Alvin" and Molibas Sindad (who did not appeal), of
the crime of kidnapping and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and
severally with the other two above-named accused, the
offended party in the sum of P20,000.00. He now seeks a
retrial.
Accused-appellant, with ten others and several John Does,
was charged in an Amended Information which reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about 06 January 1993 at around 7:00 in the
morning along Taft Avenue, Pasay City . . . the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, after introducing themselves as CIS
agents, did then and there, by force and intimidation,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and
thereafter, detain Elizabeth Luega, a female, in the middle
of a sugar cane field at Sitio Malipa, Barangay Malaking
Pulo, Tanauan, Batangas against her will and consent
thereby depriving her of liberty.
(pp. 10-11, Rollo.)
Following a plea of not guilty and full-blown trial, the
lower court rendered a decision on September 15, 1993,
the dispositive portion of which reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, Accused Allan Kawasa, Molibas Sindad and
Fahad Zacaria, alias Alvin, are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping, as charged
in the aforequoted Amended Information; and they are
each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the offended
party, Elizabeth Luega, the sum of P20,000.00, as moral
damages.
Accused Esmael Salido, Manny Bulod, Alex Inedal,
Bartolome Mabuti and Roberto Divina, for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
are acquitted of the charge against them.
As aforesaid, only Allan Kawasa interposed an appeal, and
in his brief, he assigns a single error, asserting that there
was a mistrial resulting in a miscarriage of justice insofar
as he is concerned due to the inefficiency and negligence
of his counsel.
The facts of the case are as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On January 6, 1993 at around 7 o’clock in the morning,
Loreta Chua, her two sons Stanley and Jermyn, and her
housemaid Elizabeth Luega, were on board Mrs. Chua’s
car, driven by Bartolome Mabuti, when they were blocked
by another car, along Taft Avenue. Three unidentified
men, later found to be Allan Kawasa, Molibas Sindad, and
"Alvin" Zacaria alighted from the blocking car, introduced
themselves as Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) agents
and boarded Mrs. Chuas’ vehicle. Sindad took the wheel
from Mabuti, Zacaria sat beside Mabuti and Stanley in the
front seat, while Kawasa sat beside Luega, Jermyn, and
Mrs. Chua at the back seat. They then proceeded towards
South Super Highway, with the car that blocked them and
another back-up car following them.
Upon reaching Susana Heights at around 9 o’clock, the
three vehicles stopped. Mrs. Chua alighted from her car,
with Kawasa following. They talked for a while. Then
Kawasa returned and boarded Mrs. Chua’s car. They drove
away with the occupants of the two cars, leaving Mrs.
Chua behind. Luega, Mabuti and the two children were
then blindfolded and their hands tied. They were brought
to a nipa hut in the middle of a sugar field where they
were kept. Here, Luega was raped by one the men whom
she was not able to identify.
On January 7, 1993, the Criminal Investigation Service of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted an
operation in Bongo, Laguna for the rescue of the
kidnapped individuals. At about 7 o’clock of the same
evening, police operatives rescued Mabuti Luega, and the
Chua children, from the hands of their abductors after a
brief gunfight.
On January 8, 1993, a team led by Chief Inspector Allen
Fortes of the PNP from Camp Crame apprehended accused
Bulod, Silangan, Balabagin, and Codalez in Bacoor, Cavite
and brought them to Camp Crame for questioning.
On their way to Camp Crame, Fortes and his team met a
speeding Ford Cortina car with Plate No. NKV 997, which
was suspected as one of the cars used by the kidnappers.
Upon intercepting said vehicle, the peace officers found
Kawasa, Sindad, Zacaria, Salido, and Medal, who were
thereupon arrested and subsequently charged with
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Accused-appellant denies involvement in the crime and
claims he was deprived the opportunity to submit his
evidence and to disprove the evidence for the prosecution
due to the inefficiency and negligence of his counsel, for
which reason, Accused-appellant urges us to reopen the
case with respect to him.
Such submission is not acceptable.
It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by his
counsel’s conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling
the case and the client cannot be heard to complain that
the result might have been different had his lawyer
proceeded differently (Tupas v. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 597 [1991]; Alabangas v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 204 SCRA 304 [1991]). Aguila v. CFI of Batangas,
Br. 7,160 SCRA 352 [1988], Pulido v. CA, 122 SCRA 63
[1983], Aylion v. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257 [1987], Legarda
v. CA, 195 SCRA 418 [1991]
In Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 296, 304 [1973],
this Court, reiterating the rule on the effects of counsel’s
acts upon his client, categorically declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound
by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and
cannot be heard to complain that the result might have
been different had he proceeded differently. A client is
bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were
to be admitted and reasons for reopening cases, there
would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel
could be employed who could allege and show that prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced
or learned . . .. Mistakes of attorneys as to the
competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the
burden of proof . . . failure to introduce certain evidence,
to summon witnesses, and to argue the case are not
proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of
counsel is so great that this client is prejudiced and
prevented from properly presenting his case" (Vol. 2,
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 218-219-
220; citing Rivero v. Santos Et. Al., 98 Phil., 500, 503-
540; Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279; Montes v. Court, 48
Phil., 64; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167; U.S. v.
Dungca, 27 Phil. 274; U.S. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33; see also
People v. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151, 1164). In the 1968 case of
Palanca v. American Food etc. (24 SCRA 819,828), this
principle was reiterated.
It is only in cases involving gross or palpable negligence of
counsel when the courts must step in and accord relief to
a client who has suffered thereby (Legarda v. CA, 195
SCRA 418 [1991]; Alabang v. IAC, 204 SCRA 304
[1991]).
In the case at bar, Accused-appellant has not shown such
carelessness or negligence in his lawyer’s discharge of his
duties, or that his counsel was singularly inept or
motivated by bad faith or excusably misled by the facts,
so as to justify us in not applying the rule that clients are
bound by the acts of their counsel, including his mistakes.
The record shows that accused-appellant’s counsel
attended the hearings, cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses, presented accused-appellant to testify and
introduced his own evidence which to him was sufficient
and relevant, and after an adverse decision, appealed the
case.
If there is anybody to blame, it is accused-appellant
himself. Accused-appellant, in his testimony and in his
brief, admitted having accosted or blocked the car drive
by Mrs. Chua’s driver, Bartolome Mabuti, allegedly
because he was requested to help arrest Mabuti
(Appellant’s brief, p. 14). Such testimony and related
evidence were considered by the trial court (Decision RTC,
par. 3, p. 4). This belies accused-appellant’s claim that his
counsel did not present evidence. This perhaps the reason
why accused-appellant does not challenge the decision of
the trial court, but opted to train his guns on his former
counsel.
If indeed accused-appellant felt and believed that his
counsel was inept, that he should have taken action, such
as discharging him earlier, instead of waiting until an
adverse decision was handed, and thereupon heap all
blame and condemnation on his counsel, who cannot now
be heard to defend himself. This cannot be allowed, for to
do otherwise would result in a situation where all a
defeated party would have to do salvage his case is to
claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a
ground for reversing an adverse judgment. There would
be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every
shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge
by his client through another counsel who, if he is also
found waiting, would likewise be disowned by the same
client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum.
This would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative,
and subject to reopening at any time by the mere
subterfuge of replacing counsel (Aguila v. CFI of
Batangas, Br. I, supra; Tupas v. CA, 193 SCRA 597
[1991]).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the slight modification that the civil
indemnity of P20,000.00 which accused-appellant was
ordered to pay offended party is increased to P50,000.00
in consonance with current jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
tupas vs Ca 193 scra 597
FRANCISCO LIM TUPAS and IGNACIO LIM
TUPAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Fernandez, Velasco & Grapilan for petitioners.
CRUZ, J.:
In its resolution dated October 12, 1989, the Court
denied the petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court for failure to show that the respondent
court committed reversible error in its resolution dated
May 31, 1989.  The petitioner filed a motion for
1
reconsideration on November 23, 1989, to which we
required a Comment, which was followed by a Reply
and later a Rejoinder.
After considering the issues and the arguments of the
parties in their respective pleadings, we affirm that the
respondent court was, indeed, correct when it held
that the appeal had been tardily made. The record
shows that the petitioners received a copy of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on
April 3, 1989, and that the motion for reconsideration
thereof was filed on April 17, 1989, or fourteen days
later. The order of May 3, 1989, denying the motion
was received by the petitioners' counsel on May 9,
1989. Instead of filing the petition for review with the
Court of Appeals within the remainder of the 15-day
reglementary period, that is, on May 10, 1989, the
petitioner did so only on May 23, 1989, or 14 days
later. The petition was therefore clearly tardy.
In Lacsamana v. Court of Appeals,  which was
2 source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
promulgated on August 26, 1986, before the case at
bar arose, we held:
APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS.
The final judgment or order of a regional trial
court in an appeal from the final judgment or
order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court and municipal circuit trial court may
be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a
petition for review in accordance with Section
22 of BP no. 129 and Section 22(b) of the
Interim Rules, or to this Court through a
petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules. The reason for
extending the period for the riling of a record
on appeal is also applicable to the filing of a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. If
a motion for reconsideration is filed with and
denied by a regional trial court, the movant
has only the remaining period within which to
file a petition for review. Hence, it may be
necessary to file a motion with the Court of
Appeals for extension of time to file such
petition for review (emphasis supplied.)
The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for
review within the remaining period, which he should
have known was only one day. Neither did he move
for an extension that would have been granted as a
matter of course. The petition for review being
indisputably late, he could not thereafter ask that it be
treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which can be filed within a reasonable
time. This remedy cannot be employed as a substitute
for a lost appeal.3
It follows that for having themselves forfeited the right
to appeal, the petitioners cannot now plaintively claim
that they have been denied due process.
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
administration of justice and the protection of
substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial
proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to
each other or, as has often been suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive
rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the
concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact,
the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of
law, as complementing each other, in the just and
speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.
Observance of both substantive and procedural rights
is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the
only a statute or a rule of court. 4
The petitioners' argument that they should not be
prejudiced by the mistakes of their counsel because
they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of
the law is not acceptable. If clients could disauthorize
their counsel on this ground, the administration of
justice could be hopelessly encumbered. The
petitioners have not shown that their counsel was
exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith or
excusably misled by the facts. There is no reason why
we should not apply the rule that clients should be
bound by the acts of their counsel, including his
mistakes 5
The petitioners' submission that their counsel's failure
to appeal on time should be regarded as excusable
neglect or honest error is not compatible with his
impressive credentials. He is a prestigious member of
the bar and his conduct at the trial demonstrated his
experience and skill as a trial lawyer. The petitioners
themselves describe him as "a graduate of one of the
top law schools in the country, a bar examiner in
Remedial Law, a law professor in Remedial Law and
other law subjects, a former National Officer of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and a seasoned
practitioner for more than 30 years." 6
The procedural mistake might have been
understandable in an ordinary lawyer but not in the
case of the petitioners' former counsel.
Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the
antecedent proceedings and recognize his
earlier claims to the disputed property on the
justification that his counsel was grossly inept.
Such a reason is hardly plausible as the
petitioner's new counsel should know.
Otherwise, all a defeated party would have to
do to salvage his case is claim neglect or
mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground
for reversing the adverse judgment. There
would be no end to litigation if this were
allowed as every shortcoming of counsel
could be the subject of challenge by his client
through another counsel who, if he is also
found wanting, would likewise be disowned by
the same client through another counsel, and
so on ad infinitum. This would render court
proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to
reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge
of replacing counsel. 7
It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial
court was filed on the fourteenth day of the
reglementary period and that the petition for review
was filed, presumably under the belief that a new 15-
day period had begun, fourteen days after the
petitioners' counsel was notified of the denial of the
motion. This smacks of a dilatory tactic. It would seem
to the Court that if the petitioners felt so strongly that
the said decision was erroneous they would have
demonstrated more spirit and promptitude in assailing
it. Instead, they waited to move for reconsideration
until the last hour and, ultimately, when the motion
was denied, filed the petition for review only when it
was already too late. Under these circumstances,
equity cannot be extended to them to soften the rigor
of the law they have not chosen to observe.
For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in
the absence of law and not as its
replacement.  Equity is described as justice outside
1âwphi1
legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant
although it may, as often happens, supplement the
law. We said in an earlier case, and we repeat it now,
that all abstract arguments based only on equity
should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and
prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for
justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court,
cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law as
long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim,
which goes back to the ancient days of the Roman
jurists — and is now still reverently observed — is
"aequetas nunquam contravenit legis." 8 Alabanzas and Nelie Alabanzas the sum of
It is clear that the respondent court did not commit
any reversible error in dismissing the petitioners'
appeal on the ground of tardiness. On the contrary,
the challenged resolution is conformable to the
applicable law and jurisprudence that, despite the
confusion of the petitioners' former counsel, carried
no esoteric meaning not available to the ordinary
practitioner.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED with finality. It is so ordered.
Alabanzas vs IAC 204 scra 304
LINO ALABANZAS and NELLY
ALABANZAS, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
BRANCH XLII, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, ALICIA PALMA and ADORACION
PALMA, respondents.
Vicente F. Delfin for petitioners.
Angel F. Lobaton, Sr. for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the judgment of
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
of Appeals)   dated July 29, 1983, in CA-G.R. CV No.
1
49537, with prayer for a restraining order.
The records of the case reveal that Alicia Palma (now
private respondent), filed a complaint for recovery of
possession damages against Lino Alabanzas as and
NELLY Alabanzas before the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Negros Occidental,
Branch XLII, presided over by then Nestor Alampay,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8612. The trial court, after
hearing, rendered judgment on June 18, 1971 in favor
of defendants Alabanzas, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
plaintiffs complaint as well as the counter-
claim of the third-party defendant, Adoracion
Palma, with respect to the defendants'
counterclaim plaintiff Alicia Palma herein is
hereby ordered to pay the defendants Lino
P4,000, as moral and exemplary damages;
and likewise the sum of P2,000, for
defendant's attorney's fees and their
expenses of litigation and this award shall be
increased to P3,000 in case of appeal and to
pay the costs.
Upon payment to the plaintiff herein by the
defendants of the sum of P8,323.40
representing the remaining balance still
unpaid for the stated purchase of the portion
of Lot 37-A occupied by them or the deposit of
this sum with the clerk of court for delivery to
the plaintiff, said plaintiff is hereby directed to
execute the corresponding deed of transfer of
all her rights and interests covering said
portion of Lot 37-A to the defendants spouses
herein and/or upon her failure to do so, the
clerk of court is hereby authorized to execute
such deed of transfer pursuant to Rule 39,
section 10 of the Rules of Court.
From the aforesaid amount of P8,323,40 may
be subtracted or set off whatever sum of
money may be due the defendants herein
under this judgment.
 SO ORDERED.
Alicia Palma appealed the trial court's decision to the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
of Appeals). Private respondent having failed to file
her brief within the reglementary period, and after an
extension of ninety (90) days, the Court of Appeals, in
a resolution   dated June 14, 1977, dismissed her
2 fees. In turn, party defendant Adoracion
appeal.
The dismissal became final on July 25, 1973. (See
entry of judgment, Annex "C", Petition; p. 18, Rollo).
On October 4, 1973, the case was remanded to the
trial court for execution (Letter Transmittal, Annex "D"
to Petition, p. 20, Rollo). The trial court ordered the
execution of its judgment on October 27, 1973 but
said order was not fully complied with until August 20,
1975 when the corresponding deed of sale was
executed by the Clerk of Court and duly annotated at
the back of the title (Last part of par. 2, Petition, p.
2, Rollo).
More than three (2) years after the dismissal of the
appeal, upon motion of herein respondents' counsel,
the respondent Court of Appeals resolved to recall the
records, reinstate the appeal and grant appellant
another extension of thirty (30) days within which to
file her brief, on the basis of the following grounds:
1. The appellant herein did not know about the
dismissal of this appeal by the Court of
Appeals until recently when she was informed
that the defendants-appellees in this case
held a victory party to celebrate their "winning
of the case";
2. That failure to file brief was due to the gross
misconduct of appellant's counsel to whom
appellant had paid P300.00 for printing
expenses of brief, and such negligence is not
attributable to appellant;
3. That the Decision appealed from the lower
court is patently unjust, irregular and a
travesty of justice in the new society. (p.
21, Rollo)
[CA resolution dated September 23, 1976, Annex "E",
Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-22)]. Thereafter, on July 29,
1983, respondent Appellate Court rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby set aside and reversed and another
one is entered ordering the defendants-
appellees to vacate the property in question,
to demolish their house standing thereon and
to pay the sum of P100.00 a month from July
10, 1966, all to be complied with within ten
(10) days from the issuance of the order of
execution by the court of origin. Defendants-
appellees are also ordered to pay plaintiff-
appellant the sum of P2,500.00 as counsel
Palma is hereby ordered to reimburse the sum
of P3,756.60 to the third-party plaintiffs
representing installment payments she had
received from the latter. No costs.
The sole issue in this petition is whether the Court of
Appeal has jurisdiction to reconsider its own
resolution dismissing appeal long after said resolution
had become final and executory and render another
decision on the merits.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is well-settled that once a decision becomes final
and executory, it is removed from the power or
jurisdiction of the Court which rendered it to further
amend, much less revoke it (Turquieza v. Hernando,
97 SCRA 483 [1980]; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, 124
SCRA 410 [1983]; Javier v. Madamba, Jr., 174 SCRA
495 [1989]; Galindez v. Rural Bank of Llanera, Inc.,
175 SCRA 132 [1989]; Olympia International, Inc. v.
CA, 180 SCRA 353 [1989]). Decisions which have
long become final and executory cannot be annulled
by courts (United CMC Textile Workers Union v.
Labor Arbiter, 149 SCRA 424 [1987]) and the
appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter the
trial court's final judgment (Carbonel v. CA, 147 SCRA
656 [1987]; Republic v. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313
[1987]).
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the
judgments of the courts must become final at some
definite date set by law (Tarquieza v.
Hernando, supra; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, supra; Edra
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 344
[1989]). Reopening of a case which has become final
and executory is disallowed (Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. v. Arciaga, 148 SCRA, 433 [1987]; Edra v.
Intermediate Court, supra.). The subsequent filing of a
motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of
a judgment and restore jurisdiction which had already
been lost (Pfleider v. Victorino, 98 SCRA 491 [1980];
Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, supra).
After the judgment has become final, no addition can
be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith
except its execution; otherwise, there can be no end
to litigation, thus setting at naught the main role of
Courts of Justice, which is to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of
peace and order, by settling justiceable controversies
with finality (Farescal Vda. de Emnas v. Emnas, 95
SCRA 470 [1980]; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, supra).
Moreover, it is an equally well-settled rule that the
client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence
and mistake in handling the case, and the client
cannot be heard to complain that the result might
have been different had his lawyer proceeded
differently. (Vivero vs. Santos, 52 O.G. 1424; Tupas
vs. CA, 193 SCRA 597).
It is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of
counsel when the courts must step in and accord
relief to a client who suffered thereby. (Legarda vs.
CA, 195 SCRA 418). In the present case, the private
respondents have not shown such carelessness or
negligence in their lawyer's discharge of his duties to
them as to justify a deviation from the rule that "clients
should be bound by the acts of their counsel,
including his mistakes."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the respondent Court of
Appeals' resolution dated September 3, 1976 and
decision dated July 29, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No.
49537 are SET ASIDE as null and void and the
decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Negros Occidental, Branch XLII dated
June 18, 1971 in Civil Case No. 8612, is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and the restraining
order earlier issued is MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Aguila vs CFI Batangas 160 scra 352
JUAN AGUILA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS,
BRANCH I, SPOUSES JUAN HERNANDEZ and
MAGDALENA MALALUAN, GAVINA HERNANDEZ
and BONIFACIO LIMBO, MAGDALENA
HERNANDEZ and BENITO DIMACULANGAN,
ELEUTERIO HERNANDEZ and LAURA BRIONES,
DEMETRIA HERNANDEZ and CONRADO
CASTILLO, and AVELINO, NESTORIO and
CARMEN, all surnamed HERNANDEZ, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession, namely, Escolastico
Alabastro and, after his death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is claiming the
disputed property as the only surviving child of the second marriage. The
private respondents are resisting this claim as the children of Maria
Alabastro, the sole offspring of the first marriage. 1
In an earlier action between them, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1552 in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, the private respondents had sued for
partition and damages against the herein petitioner
and his wife, alleging that some properties held by
them pertained to the first marriage as Juliana and her
second husband had not acquired anything during
their marriage. Judgment was rendered on January 7,
1974, in favor of the plaintiffs after the defendants
were precluded from presenting their own evidence
owing to what they later called "the gross ineptitude of
their counsel," who had failed to appear at two
scheduled hearings.   A motion for reconsideration
2
and a second motion for reconsideration and/or to
present their evidence were both denied by the trial
court. On September 5, 1974, the defendants were
given an extension of twenty days to file their record
on appeal and on September 24, 1974, another
extension of fifteen days was granted. On November
21, 1974, the trial court denied the defendants' record
on appeal and appeal bond on the ground that the
decision had already become final and executory. On
motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court then issued a
writ of execution on December 2, 1974, amended the
following day, pursuant to which the properties held
by the defendants were levied upon and sold at public
auction to the plaintiffs as the highest bidders.  3
The acts of the trial court were questioned by the
defendants in a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction, which was denied by the Court of Appeals.
So was their motion for reconsideration. The
defendants then came to this Court in a petition for
review by certiorari which was also denied. An
"amended" petition was considered a motion for
reconsideration and was likewise denied. On August
16, 1976, another motion for reconsideration was also
denied with finality, with the warning that no further
motions would be entertained . 4
Nothing daunted the defendants tried again, this time
by filing on June 8, 1977, a complaint for
reconveyance of the properties acquired by the
defendants in the earlier action for partition. This new
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1728 in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas. In their answer,
the defendants alleged res judicata as one of their
affirmative defenses, arguing that the complaint was
barred by the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 1552.
After preliminary hearing of this defense, the trial court
considered the objection well-taken and dismissed the
case.   The petitioner then came to this court to
5
challenge the order.
The petitioner does not seriously dispute that
requisites of res judicata are present, to wit: (1) the
presence of a final former judgment; (2) the court
rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the former
judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must
be, between the two cases, Identity of parties, Identity
of subject matter and Identity of causes of action.   He
6
says in fact that "he does not seek to do away with
the rule of res judicata but merely proposes to undo a
grave and serious wrong perpetuated in the name of
justice." 
7
What he does contend in his brief is that, as a mere
technical defense, res judicata showed not prevail
over his right to substantial justice, and specifically to
due process. The petitioner claims he was denied this
constitutional protection when the defendants were
deprived of the opportunity to submit their evidence in
the said Civil Case No. 1552 and later to appeal the
decision of the trial court.
As a matter of fact, he was not denied that
opportunity, which is precisely – and only – what due
process guarantees. The records show that he did
have that opportunity to be heard and to have the
decision reviewed but forfeited the right because of
his own counsel, whom he criticized as follows:
Clearly, it was through the gross
ineptitude of petitioner's original
counsel that he was precluded from
presenting his evidence in Civil Case
No. 1552; that he lost his right to
appeal; and that the Decision in the Id
case became final, executory and
executed.
xxx xxx xxx
There is also no dispute that the
Decision in Civil Case No. 1552 has
already become final, executory and
executed, and this, all because of the
gross ineptitude of counsel for the
defendants (herein petitioner and his
wife) who did not file the record on
appeal within the extended period of
time granted by the Court and who
later on pursued a wrong remedy
before the Honorable Court of appeals
in CA. G.R. No. SP-04698 and before
the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R.
No. L- 43388 thereby allowing the
period for availing of the remedy of
Relief judgment judgment to lapse.  6
Counsel are supposed to represent their clients by
virtue of a valid authorization from the latter and act
on their behalf with binding effect. Persons are
allowed to practice law only after they shall have
passed the bar petitions, which merely determine if
they have the minimum requirements to engage in the
exercise of the legal profession. This is no guaranty,
of course, that they will discharge their duties with full
fidelity to their clients or with full mastery or at least
appreciation of the law. The law, to be fair, is not
really all that simple; there are parts that are rather
complicated and may challenge the skills of many
lawyers. By and large, however, the practice of the
law should not present much difficulty unless by some
unfortunate quirk of fate the lawyer has been allowed
to enter the bar despite his lack of preparation, or,
while familiar with the intricacies of his , is
nevertheless neglectful of his duties and does not pay
proper attention to his work.
In the instant case, the petitioner should have noticed
the succession of errors committed by his counsel
and taken appropriate steps for his replacement
before it was altogether too late. He did not. On the
contrary, he continued to retain his counsel through
the series of proceedings that all resulted in the
rejection of his cause, obviously through such
counsel's "ineptitude" and, let it be added, the clients"
forbearance. The petitioner"s reverses should have
cautioned him that his lawyer was mishandling his
case and moved him to seek the help of other
counsel, which he did in the end but rather tardily.
Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent
proceedings and recognize his earlier claims to the
disputed property on the justification that his counsel
was grossly inepet. Such a reason is hardly plausible
as the petitioner's new counsel should know.
Otherwise, all a defeated party would have to do to
salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake on the
part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the
adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation
if this were allowed as every shortcoming of counsel
could be the subject of challenge by his client through
another counsel who, if he is also found wanting,
would likewise be disowned by the same client
through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This
would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative
and subject to reopening at any time by the mere
subterfuge of replacing counsel.
On the effects of counsel's acts upon his client, this
Court has categorically declared:
It has been repeatedly enunciated that
"a client is bound by the action of his
counsel in the conduct of a case and
cannot be heard to complain that the
 result might have been different had
he proceeded differently. A client is
bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If
such grounds were to be admitted and
reasons for reopening cases, there
would never be an end to a suit so
long as new counsel could be
employed who could allege and show
that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or
learned. ... Mistakes of attorneys as to
the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of
certain evidence, the proper defense,
or the burden of proof, ... failure to
introduce certain evidence, to
summon witnesses and to argue the
case are not paper grounds for a new
trial, unless the incompetency of
counsel is so great that his client is
prejudiced and prevented from
properly presence his case." (Vol. 2,
Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, pp. 218, 219-220, citing Rivero
v. Santos, et al., 98 Phil. 500. 503-
504; Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279;
Montes v. Court, 48 Phil. 64; People v.
Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167; U.S. v.
Dungca, 27 Phil. 274, U.S. v. Umali,
15 Phil. 33; see also People v. Ner 28
SCRA 1151, 1164). In the 1988 case
of Palanca v. American Food, etc. (24
SCRA 819, 828), this principle was
reiterated. (Tesoro v. Court of
Appeals, 54 SCRA 296, 304).
At that, it is not even exactly true, as the petitioner
claims, that his evidence was not considered by the
trial court in Civil Case No. 1552. The record shows
that when the defendants filed their second motion for
reconsideration and/or to allow them to present their
evidence, which was attached, it was examined by the
court "in fairness to the defendants" but found to be
"so vague and not appearing to be indubitable as to
warrant reopening of the case."   This conclusion was
9
reached by the late Judge Jaime R. Agloro after he
had made a careful and lengthy analysis of such
evidence, dwelling on each of the disputed properties,
their antecedent, description, and the basis of the
defendants' claims therefor. A mere reading of such
discussion, which covered two single spaced
typewritten pages, will show that, although the judge
could have simply denied the second motion for
reconsideration, he nonetheless took the time and
exerted painstaking efforts to study the proffered
evidence. The meticulous consideration of such
evidence commends the trial judge's thoroughness
and sense of justice and clearly belies the petitioner's
complaint that he had been denied due process.
Perhaps it is for this reason that the petitioner does
not strongly attack the decision, preferring to train his
sights on his own former counsel. As he says in his
petition, he "does not seek the nullity of the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 1552 which has already
become final due to legal technicality."   What he
10
does ask for is a reconveyance of the subject
properties which he says were udjustly taken from him
as a result of his lawyer's mistakes. Such blunders, he
contends, are correctable in an action for
reconveyance which the Court should allow in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence
thereon is well-settled. This remedy is available in
cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud, property
is registered in the name of a person not its
owner.  Clerical error in designating the real owner is
11
a valid ground for reconveyance after the decree shall
have become final following the lapse of one year
therefrom. Reconveyance may also be sought where
it is established that a person not entitled to the
property succeeded in registering it in his name to the
prejudice of the real owner. However, it cannot be
employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a
court of justice determining the conflicting claims of
ownership of the parties in an appropriate proceeding,
as in Civil Case No. 1562. The decision in that case
was a valid resolution of the question of ownership
over the disputed properties and cannot be reversed
now through the remedy of reconveyance.
For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in
the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity
is described as justice outside legality, which simply
means that it cannot supplant although it may, as
often happens, supplement the law. We said in an
earlier case   and we repeat it now, that all abstract
12
arguments based only on equity should yield to
positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such
persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they
may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify
disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it
remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes
back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists – and is
now still reverently observed – is "aequetas nunquam
contravenit legis.
We find it unnecessary to rule on the other arguments
raised by the petitioner as they will not affect the
decision we reach today. This decision must again be
adverse to him although he may this time be
represented by able counsel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Pulido vs CA 122 scra 63
G.R. No. 170924             July 4, 2007
In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, petitioner,
vs.
Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and all persons acting in
his stead and under his authority, and GEN.
ERNESTO DE LEON, in his capacity as the Flag
Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all
persons acting in his stead and under his
authority, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 which dismissed
the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner
Roberto Rafael Pulido (Pulido) in behalf of Cezari
Gonzales and Julius Mesa, and imposed on petitioner
the penalty of censure, and its Resolution 2 dated 6
January 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are not disputed.
At around one o’clock in the morning of 27 July 2003,
three hundred twenty-one (321) junior officers and
enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) entered and took over the premises
of the Oakwood Premiere Luxury Apartments
(Oakwood) located at the Glorietta Complex, Ayala
Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security
guards of said establishment and planted explosives
in its immediate surroundings.
The soldiers publicly announced that they went to
Oakwood to air their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(President Arroyo). They declared their withdrawal of
support from the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP –
President Arroyo – and demanded her resignation
and that of the members of her cabinet and top
officers of both the AFP and the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
At about one o’clock in the afternoon, President
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring the
country to be under a "state of rebellion."
Consequently, she issued General Order No. 4
directing the AFP and the PNP to carry out all
reasonable measures, giving due regard to
constitutional rights, to suppress and quell the
"rebellion."
After a series of negotiations between the soldiers
and the government negotiators, the former agreed to
return to barracks, thus ending the occupation of
Oakwood.
Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood
were Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, both enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in their behalf
that the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed before
the Court of Appeals.
On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L.
Abaya issued a directive3 to all Major Service
Commanders and to the Chief of the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(ISAFP) regarding the Custody of Military Personnel
Involved in the 27 July 2003 Mutiny. On the strength
thereof, Gonzales and Mesa were taken into custody
by their Service Commander.
Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court
martial with violation of the Articles of War. They
were, however, among the soldiers charged before
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, with the crime of Coup D’etat as defined under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Said case
entitled, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et
al." was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. On
18 November 2003, a Commitment Order was issued
by the RTC committing custody of the persons of
Gonzales and Mesa to the Commanding Officer of
Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite City.4
On 8 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were
discharged5 from military service.
On 16 December 2003, per order of the RTC,
Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with
Criminal Case No. 03-2678 entitled, "People v.
Ramon B. Cardenas" pending before Branch 148 of
the RTC of Makati City, on the ground that the cases
are founded on the same facts and/or formed part of a
series of offenses of similar character.6
In a Manifestation and Motion dated 3 March 2004,
Commodore Normando Naval, Commander of Naval
Base Cavite, asked the Makati RTC, Branch 148, to
relieve him of his duty as custodian of Gonzales and
Mesa and that the latter be transferred to the Makati
City Jail.7 In an Order dated 29 April 2004, the RTC
relieved him of his duty but ordered the transfer of
Gonzales and Mesa from the Naval Base Cavite in
Sangley Point, Cavite City, to the Philippine Marine
Brigade Headquarters, Philippine Marine, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the custody of
the Commander of the Marine Brigade of the
Philippine Marines, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro
Manila.8
In an Order dated 8 July 2004, the RTC resolved the
petitions for bail filed by the accused-soldiers. It
admitted Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other
co-accused to bail pegging the amount thereof
at P100,000.00 each.9
On 19 July 2004, both Gonzales and Mesa posted
bail.10 On 20 July 2004, the RTC issued orders
directing the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine
Corps, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, to release
Gonzales and Mesa from his custody.11 Despite said
orders and their service to the marines, Gonzales and
Mesa were not released.
On 21 July 2004, the People of the Philippines moved
for partial reconsideration12 of the order granting bail.
Prior to the resolution of said motion, Jovencito R.
Zuño, Chief State Prosecutor, advised Brig. Gen.
Manuel F. Llena, Judge Advocate General, to defer
action on the provisional release of Gonzales and
Mesa "until the Motion for Reconsideration shall have
been resolved and attained finality." 13 On 26 October
2004, the RTC denied the motion for partial
reconsideration.
With the denial of the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, the People filed with the Court of
Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, asking for the
nullification and setting aside of the orders dated 8
July 2004 and 26 October 2004 of Judge Oscar B.
Pimentel for having been issued without jurisdiction
and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari was
raffled to the Seventh Division and was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 88440 entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Hon. Oscar B. Pimentel, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 148." The Court of Appeals (Seventh Division)
did not issue a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in
detention, a Petition for Habeas Corpus14 was filed by
petitioner Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005. The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 and
raffled to the Third Division. In support thereof, it was
argued that since Gonzales and Mesa are no longer
subject to Military Law as they had been discharged
from the service on 8 December 2003, and since they
are not charged before a court martial, the military
authorities have no jurisdiction to detain them, and
there is no legal ground to detain them further
because a court order for their release had already
been issued.
On 10 August 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division)
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing respondents
Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and all persons acting in his stead
and under his authority, and Gen. Ernesto de Leon,
Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and
all persons acting in his stead and under his authority,
to produce the bodies of Gonzales and Mesa before
the Court and to appear and show the cause and
validity of their detention.15
On 18 August 2005, a return of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus was made.16 Respondents prayed that the
Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on
two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales
and Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the
Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8
July 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and
Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440; and (2)
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his
failure to state in the petition that the order granting
bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and
pending before its 7th Division.
On 9 September 2005, the Court of Appeals
(7th Division) rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
88440 dismissing the petition that questioned the
propriety of the granting of bail to Gonzales, Mesa,
and twenty-five of their co-accused.17
On 12 September 2005, the Court of Appeals
(3rd Division) dismissed the Petition for Habeas
Corpus for violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court. It ratiocinated:
A reading of the parties’ submissions reveals
a threshold issue – the charge of forum
shopping and the related falsity in the
certification supporting the petition. We must
initially resolve these issues because a finding
that the petitioner violated Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court can lead to the outright
dismissal of the present petition. x x x
xxxx
The records show that the present petition
contained the following certificate of non-
forum shopping:
"I, ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, with
office address at Unit 1601, 16th Floor
139 Corporate Center Valero Street,
 Makati City, after having been duly
sworn in accordance with law, do
hereby state that:
1. I am the petitioner in the above-
captioned case;
2. I have read the Petition and caused
it to be prepared. All the contents
thereof are true to my own personal
knowledge and the record;
3. I have not heretofore commenced
any action or proceeding involving the
same issues, in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency and to the best of
my knowledge, no action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency; except for the
related cases of "Eugene Gonzales et
al. vs. Gen. Narciso Abaya, et al.,
G.R. No. 164007 and "Humabono
Adaza et al., vs. Gen. Pedro Cabuay
et al., G.R. No. 160792, both awaiting
the resolution of the Supreme Court.
5. (sic, should be 4) If I should learn of
any similar action or proceeding filed
or is pending in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency, I undertake to
report such fact within five (5) days
therefrom to this Court.
The present petition and its accompanying
certification likewise show that the petitioner
never mentioned the pendency before the
Seventh Division of this Court of the certiorari
case, SP 88440, for the annulment of the
lower court’s order granting the soldiers-
accused’s petition for bail, when this same
lower court order is cited as basis for the
immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa in
the present petition. All that the certification
mentioned were the related cases pending
before the Honorable Supreme Court. Neither
did the petitioner comply with his undertaking
under his certification to inform this Court
within five (5) days of the pendency of any
similar action or proceeding filed or is pending
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other tribunal or agency, as in fact the
certiorari case was already pending with this
Court when the present petition was filed. The
certiorari case was only brought to our
attention after the respondents filed their
Return of the Writ.
To be sure, the petitioner, who is also the
counsel for the accused Gonzales and Mesa
in the criminal case before Branch 148 RTC
Makati City and who represents Gonzales and
Mesa as private respondents in CA-G.R. SP
No. 88440, cannot feign ignorance of the
pendency of the certiorari case. Why he
deliberately kept the pendency of the certiorari
case hidden from us, has not been sufficiently
explained. We have no doubt, however, that
his deliberate act of withholding information on
a material fact directly required to be
disclosed by the Rules of Court cannot but
have legal consequences.
The primary basis of the present petition is the
bail granted to and posted by Gonzales and
Mesa. This is very clear from the petitioner’s
argument that "The continued detention of the
enlisted personnel constitutes violation of the
lawful orders of the civilian court." He cited in
support of this argument the grant and the
posting of the bail, and the issuance of the
release orders by the lower court. He did not
disclose, however, what subsequently
happened to the order granting bail. He
deliberately omitted in his narration the fact
that the People moved to reconsider this
order. Thus, he gave the impression that the
order granting bail immediately became
enforceable and that Gonzales’ and Mesa’s
continued detention is illegal because their
constitutional rights to bail, which have
received judicial imprimatur, were
continuously being violated by the
respondents.
The petitioner next omitted the fact that after
the denial of its motion for reconsideration of
the order granting bail, the People filed the
certiorari case before this Court, seeking to
annul the lower court’s order. While we are
aware of the rule that – the mere pendency of
a petition for certiorari will not prevent the
implementation of the assailed order unless
the court where the petition was filed issues
either a temporary restraining order or a writ
or preliminary injunction – the filing of a
petition for habeas corpus while the order
granting bail is being questioned on a petition
for certiorari raises issues beyond the
immediate execution of the lower court’s bail
and release orders. They raise questions on
the propriety of filing the habeas corpus
petition to seek the release of persons under
detention, at the same time that a petition
regarding their continued detention and
release are pending. Apparently, the petitioner
wanted to avoid these questions, prompting
him to actively conceal the subsequent motion
for reconsideration of the bail order and the
petition for certiorari directly questioning this
same order. In short, the petitioner
conveniently omitted in his narration of
facts the material factual antecedents
detrimental to his cause; he chose to
narrate only the factual antecedents
favorable to his cause.
That the present petition has direct and
intimate links with the certiorari case is
beyond doubt as they involve two sides of the
same coin. The certiorari case filed by the
People seeks to prevent the release of
Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower
court’s grant of bail. The present petition, on
the other hand, was filed in behalf of Gonzales
and Mesa to secure their immediate release
because the order granting bail is already
executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to
implement through a petition for habeas
corpus the provisional release from detention
that the lower court has ordered. The question
this immediately raises is: can this be done
through a petition for habeas corpus when the
validity of the grant of bail and the release
under bail are live questions before another
Division of this Court?
We believe and so hold that his cannot and
should not be done as this is precisely the
reason why the rule against forum shopping
has been put in place. The remedies sought
being two sides of the same coin (i.e., the
release of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot
be secured through separately-filed cases
where issues of jurisdiction may arise and
whose rulings may conflict with one another.
To be sure, we clearly heard the petitioner say
that there can be no conflict because the
effectiveness of our ruling in this petition will
depend on the nature and tenor of the ruling in
the certiorari case; there is no basis for a
release on habeas corpus if this same Court
will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of
bail is improper. For this very same reason,
we should not entertain the present petition as
the matter before us is already before another
co-equal body whose ruling will be finally
determinative of the issue of Gonzales’ and
Mesa’s release. The Decision of the Seventh
Division of this Court, heretofore footnoted,
ordering the release on bail of Gonzales and
Mesa drives home this point.
To be strictly accurate, the issues of detention
and immediate release that are now before
the two Divisions of this Court are likewise
properly within the jurisdiction of the lower
court who has original jurisdiction over the
criminal case and who has issued the order
granting bail in the exercise of this jurisdiction.
If indeed there is a question relating to the
immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa
pursuant to the lower court’s order pending
the determination of the certiorari issues, such
question should be brought before the lower
court as the tribunal that has ordered the
release, or before the Seventh Division of this
Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers
over the lower court. The Decision recently
promulgated by the Seventh Division of this
Court ordering the release on bail of the
soldiers-accused effectively demonstrates this
point.
The inter-relationships among the criminal
case below, the certiorari case and the
present petition, as well as among the courts
where these cases are pending, show beyond
doubt that the petitioner committed forum
shopping in the strict sense of that term i.e.,
the attempt by a party, after an adverse
opinion in one forum, to seek a favorable
opinion in another forum other that through an
appeal or certiorari. The "adverse" aspect for
the petitioner, while not an opinion, is no less
adverse as he has failed to secure the release
of Gonzales and Mesa before the lower court
and before this Court in the certiorari case (as
of the time of the filing of the present petition);
thus, he came to us in the present petition.
That the Seventh Division of this Court has
ordered the release on bail of the soldiers-
accused, thus rendering the present petition
moot and academic after the finality of the
7th Division Decision, plainly demonstrates this
legal reality.18
The Court further imposed on petitioner the penalty of
censure for the aforesaid violation. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby DISMISS the petition for violation of
and pursuant to Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court. The petitioner, Atty. Roberto Rafael
Pulido, is hereby CENSURED for these
violations. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Honorable Supreme Court, to be
attached to the petitioner’s record as a
member of the Bar, as a RECORD OF
CENSURE that may be referred to and
considered in any future similar act.19
On 5 September 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration20 which the Court of Appeals (Special
Former Third Division) denied in its resolution21 dated
6 January 2006.
Petitioner is now before us raising the following
issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FORUM
SHOPPING.
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
NATURE OF THE ACTION AND
LIMITED ITSELF TO THE ISSUE OF
FORUM SHOPPING.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON
PETITIONER THE PENALTY OF
CENSURE.
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON
THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF
VALID GROUNDS TO DETAIN
JULIUS MESA AND CEZARI
GONZALES.
Petitioner prays that the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set
aside, and an order be issued ordering respondents to
immediately release Gonzales and Mesa. He further
prays that the censure against him be also reversed
and set aside.
Before respondents could comment on the petition,
petitioner filed, with leave of court, a Motion to
Withdraw the Prayer for the Immediate Release of
Julius Mesa and Cezari Gonzales.22 Petitioner
informed the Court that the Commanding General of
the Philippine Marines had ordered the release of
Gonzales and Mesa and surrendered their persons to
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. Thus, Mesa and
Gonzales are now enjoying temporary liberty by virtue
of the release orders dated 20 July 2004 issued by
the RTC. Petitioner asks that the prayer for the
immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa be
dismissed but asks that the other prayers in the
petition be granted.
In its comment, the Solicitor General stressed that
the habeas corpus petition has been rendered moot
and academic by reason of the release of Mesa and
Gonzales from detention and, in the absence of an
actual case or controversy, it is impractical to consider
and resolve issues involving the validity or legality of
their detention, including the alleged refusal of the
Court of Appeals to resolve said issues.
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the
application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is
effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic.23 With the release of
both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas
Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of
justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will
not consider questions where no actual interests are
involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not
determine a moot question. Where the issues have
become moot and academic, there ceases to be any
justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution
of the same of no practical value.24 This Court will
therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case
where no legal relief is needed or called for.25
The only remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) Is
petitioner guilty of forum shopping? (2) Should
petitioner be penalized when he failed to inform the
3rd Division of the Court of Appeals of the pendency of
the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents before
the 7th Division of the same court which asked for the
annulment of the RTC’s order granting Gonzales and
Mesa’s petition for bail?
To support his contention that there was no forum
shopping, petitioner asserts that the issues in the
petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus are not
similar/identical. As to his non-disclosure of
respondents’ filing of the motion for reconsideration
and the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner claims that
the same has no legal relevance to the Petition
for Habeas Corpus because at the time he filed said
petition, the order granting bail subsisted and has not
been reversed or modified; and no TRO or injunction
has been issued that would affect the efficacy or
validity of the order granting the bail and the order
directing the release of Mesa and Gonzales.
For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the
pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that questioned
the validity of the order granting bail, which order is
precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.
It has been held that forum shopping is the act of a
party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and
possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), SO ORDERED.
or the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Thus, it has been held that there Ayilon v sevilla 156 scra 257 (l-79244)
is forum shopping — (1) when, as a result of an
adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari)
in another; OR (2) if, after he has filed a petition Tesoro vs ca 54 scra 296
before the Supreme Court, a party files a motion
before the Court of Appeals, since in such a case, he
deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even in
Salonga vs CA 269 scra 534
one case in which a particular allowable remedy
sought for is dismissed, another case (offering a
similar remedy) would still be open; OR (3) where a GEORGE F. SALONGA and SOLID
party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in
another court after failing to obtain the same from the
INTERTAIN
original court.26 CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COU
RT OF APPEALS, HON. JULIO R.
The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine LOGARTA, and PAUL GENEVE
whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping, as where the elements of litis pendentia are ENTERTAINMENT
present or where a final judgment in one case will CORPORATION,  respondents.
amount to res judicata in the other. Stated differently,
there must be between the two cases: (a) identity of
parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs DECISION
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is PANGANIBAN, J.:
such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration.27 Are the professional lapses,
inefficiency, carelessness and
As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the negligence of a lawyer enough to
ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both
the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release
annul a default judgment? Do they
of Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not have constitute "extrinsic fraud"?
filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because the relief Alternatively, do they amount to
he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for
in the certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in deprivation of due process? Is a
both cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa motion (as distinguished from an
should be released on bail. Because of the presence independent and separate petition)
of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and
issue are substantially the same/similar in the two sufficient to vest contempt
cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be jurisdiction on a trial court? These
binding on the habeas corpus case – petitioner is thus questions are answered by the Court
guilty of forum shopping.
as it resolves this petition assailing
For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the the Decision of respondent Court of
pendency of the certiorari case, petitioner clearly Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29138
violated his obligation to disclose within five days the
pendency of the same or a similar action or claim as promulgated on August 26, 1993,
mandated in Section 5(c), Rule 728 of the Rules of affirming with slight modification the
Court. judgment by default rendered by the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of
trial court.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 dated
12 September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the The Antecedent Facts
petitioner.
The court of origin (Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 63, presided
by Judge Julio R. Logarta) narrated
the facts it culled from the evidence,
as follows:
"Astra Realty Development
Corporation owned a property
located at No. 32 Jupiter St.,
Bel-Air Village, Makati. This
property is being leased to
Alelie A. Montojima under a
'bilateral' contract of lease.
Alelie Montojima constructed a
building in the leased
premises and opened a
restaurant (sic) under the
name and style Aquatic Chef
Seafoods Restaurant which
however, did not prosper.
Alelie Montojima then came to
transact with (herein private
respondent) Paul Geneve
Entertainment Corporation
and with the consent of the
lessor Astra Realty they
agreed on a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) with the
following terms: that upon the
signing and due execution of
the JVA, Alelie Montojima will
be selling all her existing
rights and interests over the
leased premises in favor of
(herein private respondent)
for P3 Million pesos. The JVA
was executed and signed on
September 1, 1989. (Herein
private respondent) paid Alelie
Montojima the total amount
of P1,000,000.00. (Herein
private respondent) took over
the possession of the leased
premises, but before (herein
private respondent) could
open her business, a
complaint was lodged by Bel-
Air Village Homeowner's
Association for violation of
some municipal ordinances.
Astra was also informed by
the Bel-Air Village Association
of the complaint and Alelie
Montojima demanded (herein
private respondent) to vacate
the premises. Meanwhile,
(herein private respondent),
through Mrs. Milagros Izon,
the president, was looking for
a possible taker of the leased
premises for a consideration,
so she could recover the huge
investments she had made.
Thereafter, (herein private
respondent) filed a civil case
with prayer for preliminary
injunction and writ of
attachment against
Montojima. A Temporary
Restraining Order against
Montojima was issued on
March 22, 1990 while the writ
of preliminary injunction was
granted on November 29,
1991. Mrs. Milagros Izon was
introduced by her friend, Ed
Calveria, to (herein petitioner)
George Salonga. (Herein
petitioner) Salonga was
supposed to buy-out all the
leaseholding rights of the
(herein private respondent) in
the amount of P5.5 Million.
Since (herein petitioner)
Salonga did not have the sum
of money(,) he proposed
instead to Mrs. Izon a joint
venture enterprise between
(herein petitioner) Salonga's
company (herein petitioner)
Solid Intertain and (herein
private respondent). The idea
was that (herein petitioner)
Solid Intertain Corporation
and (herein private
respondent) Paul Geneve
Corporation will form a new
corporation and the name
Solidisque Inc. (sic). The
documents all in seven (7)
sets were drafted by both
parties' respective counsels,
Atty. Garlitos for (herein
petitioners) and Atty. Sadili
for (herein private
respondent). (Herein private
respondent) through Mrs. Izon
has signed the joint venture
agreement. The document
with extra copies were then
delivered to (herein petitioner)
Salonga for his signature and
for notarization. The
document together with the
extra copies remained
unsigned and unexecuted.
With the memorandum of
agreement still unsigned, not
notarized and in the
possession of (herein
petitioner) Salonga, the latter
transferred all his equipments
and properties from his former
business site, Metro Disco, to
the subject premises in
question after informing Mrs.
Izon that he did not have a
place where he can transfer
his things and asked that he
be allowed to put it at No. 32
Jupiter St. Club Ibiza was thus
opened and made operational
on the leased premises in
question under the name (of
herein petitioner) Solid
Intertain Corporation. No
corporation under the name
Solidisque (sic) Inc. was ever
registered as agreed upon in
the Securities and Exchange
Commission. (Herein private
respondent) was totally left
out."2
cräläwvirtualibräry
To continue the story, we now quote
from the respondent Court of
Appeals:
"It appears that on November
26, 1991 herein private
respondent (Paul Geneve
Entertainment Corporation)
filed a complaint for specific
performance with temporary
restraining order and
preliminary injunction with
prayer for damages against
herein petitioners (George
Salonga and Solid Intertain
Corporation) to enforce a
memorandum of agreement
that was supposedly perfected
between the parties (Rollo, p.
157). On November 29, 1991
petitioners received a copy of
the summons and complaint,
including a copy of the
restraining order issued in the
said civil case by public
respondent, enjoining
'petitioners from further
operating club Ibiza,' which
order was referred by
petitioners to Atty. Onofre G.
Garlito, Jr., the former counsel
of record (Petition, p. 8
paragraph 16).
During the scheduled hearing
for injunction on December 4,
1991, only private
respondents appeared despite
notice to petitioners (Rollo, p.
31 Annex 'A'). For disobeying
the restraining order issued on
November 29, 1991, private
respondent sought to cite
petitioner for indirect criminal
contempt (Rollo, p. 217)
during the hearing on the civil
case whereby Atty. Garlito, Jr.
presented George F. Salonga
in support of the opposition to
the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (Rollo,
p. 125, Comment).
On December 9, 1991,
petitioners and their counsel
failed to appear on the date
set for hearing the motion for
issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction (Rollo,
p. 38). Acting on private
respondent's motion to submit
the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction, the
(Regional Trial Court a quo)
resolved to grant the same on
December 12, 1991 (Rollo, p.
38, Decision, Annex 'A').
In the meantime, and despite
two motions for extension of
time to file an answer,
(Petition, paragraphs 21 and
22) no answer was filed
(Rollo, p. 39). However, (the)
trial court received on June
16, 1992 (Petition, p. 10) an
answer purportedly dated
January 14, 1992.
On January 15, 1992,
petitioner's counsel move (sic)
to dissolve the injunction
(Rollo, p. 232) and set the
hearing thereof on January
17, but on said latter date,
only private respondent's
counsel showed up (Rollo, p.
237).
Due to petitioner's failure to
file an answer, private
respondent submitted a
third ex parte motion to
declare petitioner, as
defendant (before the
Regional Trial Court), in
default on March 4, 1992
(Rollo, p. 238) which was
favorably acted upon on
March 10, 1992 (Petition,
paragraph 25).
On April 14, 1992, the
impugned decision was
handed down by (the Regional
Trial Court) judge, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. The writ of preliminary
injunction issued on
December 12, 1991 is
hereby made permanent;
2. Ordering defendants to
sign, perform and
execute the formalities of
the Memorandum of
Agreement (Exh. 'K'),
pursuant to the Joint
 Venture Agreement (Exh.
'C');
3. Ordering defendants to
undertake the creation
and formation,
organization and
registration of a new
corporation pursuant to
and in accordance with
Philippine Laws before
the Securities and
Exchange Commission,
under the business name
and style 'Solidisque Inc.'
whose primary purpose
shall be to operate a
discotique (sic), club
restaurant and/or other
forms of business similar
thereto on the aforesaid
leased premises setting
the authorized capital
stock of the Joint Venture
Corporation to be
registered at PESOS TEN
MILLION
(P10,000,000.00),
twenty five (25 %) per
cent of the total
subscription as paid-up
capital, in compliance to
paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2,
page (3), of the
Memorandum of
Agreement;
4. Ordering defendants to
perform and provide as
its equity participation to
SOLIDISQUE, INC. a total
of SEVEN MILLION
PESOS (P7,000,000,00),
more or less consisting of
audio and lighting
equipment, inclusive of
electrical and
construction materials,
among others, and to
prepare a list of the
aforesaid equipment,
materials together with
their present value and
cost of improvements to
be introduced on the
establishment to be
operated on the leased
premises and make such
list available to the
plaintiff the soonest
possible time, in
compliance to paragraph
No. 3, of the
Memorandum of
Agreement;
5. Ordering defendants to
faithfully and religiously
perform, comply, fulfill
and satisfy all the terms
and conditions as
embodied under
paragraphs Nos. 4, 5,
5(a) and 5(b), 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
and 16, pages (3) to (6),
of the Memorandum of
Agreement, Exh. 'K';
6. Ordering the defendants
to pay the plaintiff,
jointly and severally the
cash amount
of P500,000.00 plus legal
interest, computed from
November 1, 1990, for
being in default, until
fully paid, pursuant to
 paragraph No. 6, page
(4) of the MOA as
ACTUAL DAMAGES;
7. Ordering the defendants
to pay the plaintiff,
jointly and severally the
amount of P100,000.00
as exemplary damages;
8. Ordering the defendants
jointly (and) severally to
pay the amount
of P100,000.00
attorney's fees; and
9. Costs of Suit.
SO ORDERED." (PETITION, pp.
2-3)
Petitioner claims that he
received a copy of the decision
only on October 7, 1992
(Petition, par. 3). Yet, a
Motion for Reconsideration
was filed on July 28, 1992 by
his counsel (Petition, par. 24).
On September 25, 1992,
herein petitioner George F.
Salonga was adjudged guilty
of civil contempt, thus:
'IN VIEW THEREOF,
plaintiff's motion are
hereby GRANTED and
defendant George F.
Salonga, is hereby
adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt of
court. Accordingly, the
(Regional Trial Court)
hereby orders
defendant George F.
Salonga jointly and
severally with the
corporation to pay a
fine of TWO THOUSAND
(P2,000.00) PESOS), a
day reckoned from
November 1991 until he
complies with the
orders of the Court
aforementioned and the
default judgment. Such
fine shall pertain to the
benefit of plaintiff.
Let a warrant of arrest
issue on defendant
George F. Salonga, who
shall be placed under
the custody of the law
until such time that he
obeys the orders and
judgment of the Court
afore-mentioned (sic).
SO ORDERED.' (Rollo,
pp. 115-116)
Four days later, an order for
issuance of a writ of execution
was issued over petitioner's
plea for a period of five days
within which to submit an
opposition. (Rollo, p. 300)
On October 13, 1992, (the
Court of Appeals) issued a
Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining public respondent
(trial court) from enforcing the
Decision dated April 14, 1992
and the Order dated
September 15, 1992 (Rollo, p.
45) and on November 3,
1992, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the
(Court of Appeals) upon
 approval of the required bond
(Rollo, p. 300)."3
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners raised before the public
respondent Court of Appeals the
following arguments:
"1. The Judgment/Decision
dated 14 April 1992 and
the Order dated 25
September 1992 issued
in Civil Case No. 91-3261
must be annulled on the
ground of fraud on the
part of petitioners'
previous counsel.
2. The public respondent
judge never acquired
jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner
Salonga in hearing the
criminal contempt
proceedings, thereby
depriving petitioner
Salonga of his basic
constitutional right to
due process and
justifying the annulment
of the Order dated 25
September 1992."4
The respondent Court disagreed with
these arguments and ruled that:
"WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT
OF THE FOREGOING, the
petition is hereby DENIED.
The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction earlier issued by
this Court is hereby LIFTED
and SET ASIDE. Insofar as the
fine for contempt is
concerned, the same is
reduced to only P1,000.00,
pursuant to and as provided
under Section 6, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court."5
The Issues
Before us, petitioners allege the
following "errors" in the challenged
Decision of public respondent:
I
The public respondent
Court of Appeals grievously
erred in denying the
Petition for Annulment of
Default Judgment filed in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29138 and
disregarding the blatant,
serious and culpable
negligence and
professional misconduct of
petitioners' previous
counsel amounting to
deprivation of due process
of law.
II
The public respondent
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Court of Appeals
committed grave and
serious reversible error in
merely reducing the fine
for the indirect contempt
instead of nullifying the
entire contempt
proceedings as having no
basis in law and
procedure."6
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the main, the issue is whether
extrinsic fraud and denial of due
process obtain in this case to justify
annulment of the default judgment
rendered by the trial court against
petitioners.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Annulment of Judgment
Well-settled is the doctrine that "a
judgment can be annulled only on
two (2) grounds: (a) that the
judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or lack of due process of
law; or (b) that it has been obtained
by fraud."7 Absent any of these
grounds, a final and executory
judgment cannot be voided.
Petitioners George Salonga and Solid
Intertain Corporation allege that the
"inimical and antagonistic acts" of
their counsel Atty. Onofre G.
Garlitos constitute extrinsic fraud
"entitling them to the remedy of
annulment of the assailed
Judgment/Decision dated 14 April
1992 and of the Order dated 25
September 1992" that they "may be
afforded substantial justice and their
day in court."8 These allegedly
fraudulent acts of their previous
counsel Garlitos in handling Civil
Case No. 91-3261 are:9 (1) his "very
late" arrival at the December 4,
1991 hearing tackling private
respondent's application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, arriving only
after the testimony of private
respondent's witness; (2) his failure
to appear at the December 9, 1991
hearing "for purposes of submitting
evidence/opposition to private
respondent's aforementioned
application for the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, as a
consequence of which said private
respondent's application was
deemed 'submitted for resolution' x
x x" by the trial judge; (3) his failure
to appear on the date he himself
requested, January 17, 1992, for the
hearing of the Motion for Dissolution
of Injunction he had filed on behalf
of petitioners; (4) his failure to file
an answer within the period required
by the Rules of Court, which
resulted in a decision by default in
favor of private respondents; (5) his
failure to appear on the date he
requested for hearing petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration on July
8, 1992, as a result of which the
motion was considered submitted for
resolution since only the counsel for
private respondent was present; and
(6) his failure to appear at the
August 26, 1992 hearing during
which the counsel for private
respondent successfully obtained
denial of the aforementioned
motion.
No Extrinsic Fraud
Jurisprudence teaches us that "(i)n
order for fraud to serve as a basis
for the annulment of a judgment, it
must be extrinsic or collateral in
character, otherwise there would be
no end to litigations. Extrinsic fraud
refers to any fraudulent act of
the prevailing party which
is committed outside the trial of the
case, whereby the defeated party
has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his side of the case, by fraud or
deception practised on him by his
opponent."10 Thus, it "refers to some
act or conduct of the prevailing
party which has prevented the
aggrieved party from having a trial
or presenting his case to the court,
or was used to procure judgment
without a fair submission of the
controversy. x x x It must be
distinguished from intrinsic fraud
which refers to acts of a party at a
trial which prevented a fair and just
determination of the case and which
could have been litigated and
determined at the trial or
adjudication of the case."11
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petitioners argue that
"(e)xtrinsic fraud justifying the
annulment of a judgment should not
and cannot be solely limited to acts
attributable to the adverse party. It
likewise includes instances wherein
a party was prevented from
defending the action brought against
him on account of the delinquent
acts and omissions of his attorney.
In other words, there is extrinsic
fraud when a party was prevented
from having presented all of his case
to the court as when the lawyer
connives at his defeat or corruptly
sells out his client's
interests (Laxamana vs. Court of
Appeals, 87 SCRA
48)."12 (Underscoring found in the
original.)
We disagree. The nature of extrinsic
fraud, as discussed previously,
necessarily requires that its cause
be traceable to some fraudulent act
of the prevailing party committed
outside the trial of the case. The
Court notes that the previously
enumerated negligent acts
attributed to petitioner's former
counsel Garlitos were in no way
shown or alleged to have been
caused by private respondents. Atty.
Garlitos neither connived nor sold
out to the latter.
Laxamana vs. Court of
Appeals13 cited by petitioners does
not support their cause because its
factual background is different from
the instant case. In that case, the
Court found that "Laxamana had
directly charged his lawyer with
having deliberately failed to appear
at the trial after having
received P1,500 from Mallari. He
introduced evidence in support of
that charge. His lawyer, although
subpoenaed by the Mallari plaintiffs,
did not testify to deny that charge."
Thus, the fraudulent act of the
aggrieved parties' counsel in the
cited case was clearly caused by and
done in connivance with the
prevailing party. In contrast, Atty.
Garlitos, in the instant case, was not
even charged with, much less shown
guilty of, having neglected his duties
to his clients by reason of any
compensatory arrangement or
collusion with Private Respondent
Paul Geneve Entertainment
Corporation. In fact, petitioners
never alleged that private
respondent had anything to do with
petitioner's counsel Garlitos. Since
there was no extrinsic fraud, the
assailed judgment may not be
annulled on such ground.14
Negligence of Counsel Binds Client
On the other hand, it is well-settled
that the negligence of counsel binds
the client.15 This is based on the rule
that any act performed by a lawyer
within the scope of his general or
implied authority is regarded as an
act of his client.16 Consequently, the
mistake or negligence of petitioners'
counsel may result in the rendition
of an unfavorable judgment against
them.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Exceptions to the foregoing have
been recognized by the Court in
cases where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law,18 or
when its application "results in the
outright deprivation of one's
property through a
technicality."19 None of these
exceptions has been sufficiently
shown in the present case.
Gross or Simple Negligence?
Petitioners argue that their previous
counsel Garlitos was guilty of gross
negligence in handling their case
before the trial court and, thus, they
should not be bound by the
consequences of his said negligence.
They insist on the applicability
of Legarda vs. Court of
Appeals20 asserting that "it sets the
correct directions upon which the
Public Respondent Court of Appeals
should have steered its
course."21 We are not persuaded.
The factual scenario in  Legarda is
not on all fours with the case before
us. The counsel in the cited case
was found grossly negligent because
of the sheer absence of real effort
on his part to defend his client's
cause. In the present case,
however, counsel Garlitos was
merely guilty of simple negligence.
Although his failure to file a timely
answer had led to a judgment by
default against his clients, his efforts
at defending their cause were
palpably real, albeit bereft of zeal.
As succinctly stated by the Court of
Appeals:
"x x x It may be noted that in
the case of Legarda vs. Court
of Appeals, supra, counsel for
petitioner Legarda merely
entered his appearance and
filed a motion for extension of
time to file answer before the
lower court. When the lower
court declared petitioner
Legarda as in default and
subsequently issued a
judgment by default, her
counsel did nothing and
allowed the judgment to
become final and executory.
Upon the prodding of
petitioner Legarda, her
counsel filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before
the (Court of Appeals). When
the (Court of Appeals) denied
the petition, her counsel
allowed the judgment to
become final and executory.
Petitioner Legarda's counsel
was, therefore, adjudged as
grossly negligent by the
Supreme Court. The case at
bar is different. Herein
petitioners' previous counsel
presented petitioner Salonga
as witness to oppose the
 issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. When
the writ of injunction was
issued by (the trial court),
petitioners' counsel filed a
motion to dissolve the writ.
When the assailed judgment
was rendered by (the trial
court), petitioners' counsel
filed a motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners'
previous counsel was present
during one of the hearings of
the motion for contempt and
even filed and
objection/comment to the
private respondent's offer of
exhibits in support of their
motion. Thus, while
petitioners' counsel failed to
file some pleadings or to
attend other hearings before
(the trial court), (the Court of
Appeals) holds that such
negligence is purely simple,
not gross as would amount to
a deprivation of petitioner's
right to due process of law."22
No Denial of Due Process
The Constitution mandates that
"(n)o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due
process of law x x x"23 The "essence
of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one's defense. 'To
be heard' does not mean only verbal
arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due
process."24 Hence, due process was
never denied petitioners Salonga
and Solid Intertain Corporation
because the trial court had given
them a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and present their side in all
the proceedings before it. The
records reveal that the judgment by
default was rendered by the trial
court in faithful compliance with
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court and
the constitutional guaranty of due
process.
In fact, petitioners were declared in
default only on the third ex
parte motion filed by private
respondents on March 4,
1992.25 Acting on the private
respondents' first motion to declare
petitioners in default for their failure
to appear at the hearing of the
Motion for Dissolution of Injunction,
on the hearing date petitioners
themselves requested, the trial court
issued an order dated February 3,
1992, which read as follows:
"After examination of the
record this court finds that the
interest of justice would be
better served by giving the
parties opportunities to
ventilate their respective
positions.
Furthermore, this Court finds
that motion to Declare
Defendants (herein
petitioners) in Default
prematurely filed considering
that (herein petitioners) filed a
 Motion for Extension of Time
to File Responsive Pleading on
December 27, 1991, which
was granted by the Court."
The failure of petitioners and their
counsel Garlitos to take full
advantage of this opportunity to be
heard does not change the fact that
they were accorded such
opportunity.
To agree with petitioners' tenuous
argument would enable any
defeated party to render inutile any
default judgment through the simple
expedient of alleging negligence of
counsel in filing a timely answer.
This Court will not countenance such
a farce which contradicts long-
settled doctrines of trial and
procedure. As correctly stated by
Respondent Court of Appeals:
"Neither can petitioners claim
that they were denied of their
day in court. It is axiomatic
that as long as the parties
were given the chance to
present their case or defense
before judgment was
rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met.
In the case at bar, petitioners
were served with copies of the
summons and the complaint.
Petitioners were allowed to
present their evidence in
support of their opposition to
the writ of preliminary
injunction. They were given
the chance to oppose the
motion to cite them in
contempt of court. Counsel for
petitioners had filed before
respondent court several
pleadings and had attended
hearings of the case. Indeed,
it cannot be gainsaid that
petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard.
xxx xxx xxx
Corollarily, the records of the
case would suggest that
petitioner Salonga is also
negligent. For instance,
petitioner Salonga knew that
the initial hearing of the
application for issuance of writ
of injunction was set on
December 4, 1991 but he did
not attend. His former counsel
attended, albeit he arrived
late. During the hearing on
December 6, 1991, petitioner
Salonga arrived late such that
(the Regional Trial Court), the
private respondent and his
former counsel had to wait for
him. After giving his
testimonies on December 6,
1991, petitioner Salonga knew
that the next hearing for
injunction was on December
9, 1991 but he, as well as his
counsel, did not arrive on said
date. (The Court of Appeals)
also notes that the motion for
dissolution of injunction filed
by petitioner's former counsel
was verified by petitioner
Salonga. Therefore, petitioner
Salonga must have known
that as requested by his
counsel, the motion for
dissolution was set for hearing
 on January 17, 1972, yet he
and his counsel again failed to
appear during the hearing.
Petitioner Salonga knew about
private respondent's motion to
cite him in contempt of court
but he did not attend the
hearing of said motion. The
above incidents clearly
manifest the in officiousness
or lack of zeal on the part of
petitioner Salonga in pursuing
his defense."26 cräläwvirtualibräry
Parenthetically, petitioners admit
that on July 22, 1992, Atty. Garlitos
was able to file a timely Motion for
Reconsideration on their behalf
which was set for hearing by the
trial court.27 The fact that petitioners
and their counsel Garlitos failed to
attend said hearing and adduce
evidence on their behalf is of no
moment. What is important is that
they were given the chance to do so.
"Indeed, deprivation of due process
cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance
to be heard in his motion for
reconsideration."28 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Memorandum of Agreement
Consented to by Petitioners
Petitioners further attack the validity
of the decision of the trial court by
contending that they "were unjustly
and unlawfully compelled to pay the
Private Respondent Corporation the
amount of five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00), compelled to
make Private Respondent
Corporation a partner of the
petitioners in the latter's business
under the name and style
'Solidisque, Inc.' and to provide the
former with thirty percent (30%)
equity participation in exchange for
the alleged three million pesos
(P3,000,000.00) capital
contribution, compelled to provide
as petitioners' alleged equity
participation in the supposed Joint
Venture with Private Respondent
Corporation the exorbitant amount
of seven million pesos
(P7,000,000.00) consisting of audio
and lightning (sic) equipment,
electrical and construction materials
and other assets necessary in the
creation and construction of a
discoteque, (sic) and, compelled to
enter into a Joint Venture with the
Private Respondent Corporation, all
on the basis of an unsigned
Memorandum of Agreement x x
x"29 Thus, petitioners' contention is
based on their alleged lack of
consent to the Memorandum of
Agreement.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly
holds that findings of fact of the trial
court, particularly when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are binding
upon this Court.30 Hence, the factual
finding of the trial court affirmed by
the respondent Court of Appeals as
to the perfection of the
Memorandum of Agreement
between petitioners and private
respondent, is binding on this Court.
This is more than sufficient to
debunk petitioners' contention.
Understood properly, it is clear that
the lower courts are not compelling
petitioners to enter into any contract
or to pay any sum of money. The the accused to be heard by himself
courts are merely enforcing the or counsel" before one guilty of
terms of the agreement voluntarily indirect contempt may be punished
entered into by the parties, therefor. The conclusion of
particularly petitioners. Respondent Court of Appeals was
based on the pronouncement of this
Second Issue: Petitioners Guilty of Court in Gavieres vs. Falcis:
Indirect Contempt?
"A court's power to punish for
Petitioners argue that the trial court contempt is primarily self-
never acquired jurisdiction over the preservative, in the exercise
person of Petitioner Salonga because of which the interest of private
the contempt proceedings were parties -- be they litigants or
"wrongly initiated." Citing Slade not in the case in which it is
Perkins vs. Director of invoked -- is at best only a
Prisons,31 they contend that the coincidental, not a necessary
Motion to Cite for Indirect Contempt or an indispensable, factor. A
filed by private respondent partakes citation for indirect contempt
of the nature of criminal contempt issued by the Court itself,
as distinguished from civil contempt; even if based on information
hence, the mode of procedure and only privately or informally
rules of evidence in criminal communicated to the court,
prosecutions should apply.32 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

operates as the written charge

prescribed by the Rule and if
The Court is not persuaded. The duly and regularly heard,
distinction between civil and criminal makes a resulting contempt
contempt made by this Court order no less valid than if it
in  Slade Perkins does not support had been rendered upon
petitioners' contention. As we stated formal charges preferred by a
in Slade Perkins, the "question of party-litigant. Indeed, it has
whether the contempt for which the been held that such charges
petitioner was committed in jail is may be made, not only by the
civil or criminal, does not affect court or the prosecuting office,
either the jurisdiction or the power but 'x x x even by a private
of the court in the premises."33 The person.'"35
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
cräläwvirtualibräry

"(in) indirect contempt proceedings Incidentally, as aptly observed by

such as in the case at bar, a mere
motion to that effect will suffice for
the (trial court) to acquire
jurisdiction."34 For after all, Section 3
of the Rules of Court requires merely
that "a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to
respondent appellate court, the
order for petitioners to pay a fine
inuring to the benefit of private
respondent finds support in Slade
Perkins, viz.:
 "Where the punishment is by
fine directed to be paid to a
party in the nature of
damages for the wrong
inflicted or by imprisonment
as a coercive measure to
enforce the performance of
some act for the benefit of the
party or in aid of the final
judgment or decree rendered
in his behalf, the contempt
judgment will, if made before
final decree, be treated as in
the nature of an interlocutory
order, or, if made after final
decree, as remedial in nature,
and may be reviewed only on
appeal from the final decree,
or in such other mode as in
appropriate to the review of
judgments in civil cases."36
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, this Decision is without
prejudice to whatever cause of
action petitioners may have in law
against their former counsel
Garlitos. Elementary dictates of due
process prevent us from acting
against him in this proceeding.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit, for its failure to show
any reversible error on the part of
Respondent Court. The assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED in toto. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
2.3 Quantum merit
In re testate estate of Dona Gabina Raquel,
Vicente J. Francisco vs. Aurea Matias
GR no. L-16349 Jan 31, 1964
[ G. R. No. L-16349, January 31, 1964 ]
IN RE TESTATE ESTATE OF DOÑA
GABINA RAQUEL. VICENTE J.
FRANCISCO, PETITIONER AND
APPELLEE, VS. AUREA MATIAS,
OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
BENGZON, C.J.:
Statement. Aurea Matias has appealed
from the resoration of the Cavite Court
of First Instance fixing the professional
fees of Atty. Vicente J. Francisco at 25%
of the current market value of the estate
left by the deceased Gabina Kaquel. The
relevant facts are these:
Material Facts. In May, 1952, she filed
in this expediente, thru Atty. E. N.
Agbunag, a petition for the probate of
the will of said Gabina Raquel. The
petition was in due time, opposed by
Basilia Salud, first cousin of Gabina on
the grounds that: (1) the will was not
signed by the deceased; (2) it was not
executed in accordance with law; (S)
Gabina had been the victim of undue
influence and fraud; and (4) the
deceased had no mental capacity to
make a testament.
On July 16, 1952, said Aurea Matias
named as executrix in the will engaged
the services of Atty. Vicente Francisco,
who, with the assistance of Atty.
Agbunag and of Attorneys Alberto J.
Francisco and J. Gonzales Orense,
personally handled the case before three
different judges successively.
The written contract for services signed
on the date above-mentioned by both
Atty. Francisco and Aurea Matias reads
as follows:
RECEIPT
"RECIBI de la Srta. Aurea Matias la
cantidad de cinco mil (P5,000.00) pesos
acuenta cle los lionorarios convenidos
de veinte mil (P20,000.00) pesos, bajo
las siguientes ctmdiciones: si se gana el
asunto la senonta Aurea Matias me
pagara el saldo de quince mil
(P15,000.00) pesos y que cada dia de
vista en que yo eomparezca me pagara
doscientos pesos. Mis servicios se
limitan. a la legalizacion del testamento
de la diyunta Dña. Gabina Raquel."
After more than thirty hearings and
thirty-two scheduled hearings which
started in August 1952[1], and continued
on until November 1955 Judge Primitivo
L. Gonzales rendered in February, 1956,
a decision denying the probate of the
will. However, on appeal to this Court,
Aurea Matias obtained a reversal of the
judgment, the authenticity and due
execution of the will having been upheld
(June 1958). Her brief as appellant here
284 printed pages was prepared and
signed by Atty. Vicente Francisco,
although in the name of the four
lawyers.
Petition for fees. After the decision of
this Court had become final, said
attorney filed on October 7, 1958, in the
Cavite court, in this testate proceeding,
motion to fix his attorney's fees on the
basis of quantum meruit. He alleged,
among other things, that the Supreme
Court had approved the probate of the
will of Gabina Raquel, that he had
agreed to receive a contingent fee of
P15,000.00 under his erroneous belief,
due to misrepresentations of Aurea
Matias, that Gabina Raquel had left
properties worth only P167,000.00; that
he learned, after the decision of the
Supreme Court that the said properties
actually amounted to much more than
that sum; and that, consequently, he was
not bound by his agreement to receive a
contingent fee of P15,000.00 only. Atty.
Francisco prayed that his compensation
be fixed at 30% of the market value of
the estate.
Objections. Resisting this motion, Aurea
Matias averred that appellee was only
one of the four attorneys engaged by her
to secure the probate of the will; that she
had a written contract for attorney's fees
as above described; that Francisco "had
already received the amount of
P5,000.00 on July 16, 1952, plus a total
sum of P6,000.00 for all his
appearances in court at P200.00 per
day; that inasmuch as there was a
written contract for attorney's fees, such
contract should prevail; that the estate
was worth around P246,329.25 only;
that appellee had all the time to
investigate but did not the value of the
property under litigation, and to
question the inadequacy of his fees
under the contract; that the value of the
estate did not warrant the payment of
fees greater than that stipulated in the
contract.
Consequently, she requested the court to
approve the attorney's fees as
determined in the said contract and to
note the unpaid balance of P15,000.00
as a lien upon the estate.
Motion pendente lite. On February 10,
1959, Francisco filed another motion
praying that, without prejudice to his
aforesaid petition to fix his fees, Aurea
Matias be ordered to make immediate
payment of the sum of P15,000.00.
Appellant interposed seasonable
objection thereto.
Hearing. During the hearing of these
motions, the trial judge made the
following observations:
"The Court has read very carefully the
answer of Atty. Orense (for Aurea
Matias) and it gets the impression that
his theory is that the amount of P15,000
which still remains unpaid is even
excessive and exhorbitant. If that be the
case, it appears that the question now
before the Court is: Should it order the
payment of the sum of P15.000 without
further proof? Atty. Orense is disputing
the reasonableness of that amount;
naturally enough, the other party has the
right to prove that the amount is not
only inadequate hut that lie is entitled to
more for the value of his services. In
other words, the issue now is: What is
the reasonable amount of attorney's fees
of the petitioner for the services he has
rendered?"
Thereafter, he denied appellee's motion
for immediate payment of the unpaid
portion (P15,000) until proof shall have
been adduced of the reasonable value of
his professional services on the basis
of quantum meruit.
So, in deciding the main petition in view
of the testimonial and documentary
evidence, it brushed aside, as
immaterial, the alleged
misrepresentation in the making of the
written contract, since "reasonable
amount" had become the real issue.
Resolution fixing fee. In determining the
amount of compensation, the Cavite
court paid particular attention and made
a detailed account of "the extent of the
services rendered" by petitioning
counsel; "the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy;" his
"professional standing."
And in line with its various
considerations, the said court declared
in its resolution of September 24, 1959,
that "in the light of its own professional
knowledge, considering the skill, labor
and time devoted by the movant to the
case, he (Francisco) is entitled to 25% of
the current market value of the estate of
the deceased" which value it fixed at
Pl,236,993.46.
Disagreeing with such resolution, Aurea
Matias appealed directly to this Court.
Appellants' thesis. In her brief, Aurea
Matias strongly urges the following
propositions: (a) the attorney's fees
should have been fixed according to the
contract not on the basis of quantum,
meruit; (b) assuming that the fees could
be fixed on quantum meruit, the basis
should be the assessed value not the
current market value; (c) assuming
further that the current market value
should be the basis, the appraisal made
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
should have been adopted; (d) the
attorney's fees are chargeable only
against appellant, not against the estate;
(e) to award 25% of the gross estate to
this attorney would be unreasonable,
even unconscionable; (f) there were no
special reasons to direct execution
pending appeal.
All the above propositions except the
last[2] will herein be duly considered.
Discussion. On the strength of rules 26
and 27 of the Rules of Court, appellant
disputes the validity of the hearing in
the lower court of appellee's motion to
fix, and to pay a portion of his counsel
fees.
It appears that the will of Gabina
Raquel, who died without forced heirs,
bequeathed the greatest part of the
estate to appellant, and the rest to
Santos Matias, Rafael Matias (her
brothers) and to Victorina Salud,
Santiago Salud and Policarpio Salud.
Appellant argues here that as notice of'
the motion had been given neither to her
brothers nor to the Saluds, the hearings
and the resolution produced no valid
and binding effect.
According to the record, at the hearing
of October 25, 1958, appellant's counsel
called the attention of the lower court to
this lack of notice; and during the
hearing on June 27, 1959, said counsel
again objected on the same ground.
Acting upon such objection, the court
ruled that the other legatees should also
be notified, and accordingly directed
that notice be given. In the subsequent
hearings which took place on July 13,
1959, and other days of that month,
legatee Rafael Matias was present; and
appellant's counsel no longer voiced any
manifestations or objections.
In the resolution now on appeal before
this Court, this defect urged by appellant
is not discussed. Probably, the other
legatees were notified, as ordered.
Anyway, as this particular issue affects
appellant's proposition (d) [services not
chargeable to estate] both may, for
convenience, be jointly taken up.
It is appellee's contention on these
related points that the attorney's fees for
probating the will, constituted a proper
charge against the estate[3], and that a
motion to fix such fees should be served,
on the executor or administrator of the
estate; it being unnecessary to notify the
legatees, for the reason that until the
project of partition is approved and their
portions adjudicated to the legatees, the
estate, as well as the heirs and legatees,
are legally represented by the executor
or administrator.
Appellee then concludes that service on
appellant as the executrix of the said
will, sufficiently complied with the
procedural rules on the matter Aurea
Matias having engaged the services of
the appellee in her capacity as executrix
of the will.
Matias denies having engaged Francisco
as executrix. This denial can not prevail
as against the following circumstances :
1. Atty. Francisco said he contracted
with her as the executrix. The will
(shown to him) designated her as
such; 2. She later asked to be
noted in the estate proceedings,
the amount of P15,000.00
(Francisco's fees) as a lien upon
the estate (p. 103, R.A.) ; 3. In her
motion ex-parte of July 20, 1959,
she petitioned for authority to
pay from the estate, the sum of
P2,000.00 as part of the retainer
fees of Atty. Francisco; 4. She
included in her statement of
account[4] as executrix, Francisco's
attorney's fees in the amount of
P11,000.00; and 5. The statement
of assets and liabilities of the
estate filed by her with the lower
court on January 10, 1959, listed
appellee's fees in the amount of
P15,000.00 as an item of estate
liability.
Appellant's inconsistent course of action
thus meets the judge's eye. Whereas in
invoking procedural rules, she denies
representative capacity as executrix, she
has, as executrix, caused this claim to be
recorded as a lien upon the estate.
Whereas she denied liability of the
estate for Francisco's fees, she has
charged the estate for the attorney's fees
paid by her to him.
On the other hand, if service of the
motion upon her does not bind the other
legatees as she claims because she does
not represent them, the question arises,
why does she speak for them by insisting
on the point?
Finally, it appears that when the lack of
notice was called to the attention of the
court, service was ordered. Thereafter,
hearings were resumed, without any
further objection. So, it may be assumed
at this level that service was accordingly
made; specially because no motion to
reconsider was filed in the court below
which was best fitted to verify
compliance with its notification orders
Quantum meruit. Proposition (b)
addresses itself to the main question:
what should be the basis of appellee's
fees: the contract or quantum meruit?
Generally speaking, where the
employment of an attorney is under an
express valid contract[5] fixing the
compensation for the attorney, such
contract is conclusive as to the amount
of compensation.[6]
Atty. Francisco assails the written
contract, because appellant
misrepresented the real value of
Gabina's inheritance. Appellant, on the
other hand, maintains that the contract
should govern, and that if courts could
interfere with the stipulated fee, the
objective should be to reduce the
amount.
Adverse to appellant's contention is the
fact that during the hearing on June 27,
1959, after having mulled over the
pleadings and listened to oral argument
of both parties, the presiding judge
defined in open court (a definition to
which appellant's counsel acceded), the
issue between the parties as, "the
reasonable amount of Attorney
Francisco's fees for the services he .has
rendered."
Her counsel's assent to the above
definition has placed Aurea in a
situation where she could not equitably
insist upon the amount fixed in the
written contract. Appellant's disavowal
of the fee stipulated therein resulted in a
repudiation of the contractual
compensation.
At this juncture, it may be added: it is
very probable, that Atty. Francisco had
been actually led to believe that the
estate was worth P167.000.00 only;
because given his experience and
prestige, he would not have undertaken
the task of probating a will involving
over one million pesos[7] for P15,000.00
only and contingent at that.[8] Aurea was
advised by Simeon del Rosario before
going to engage the services of Francisco
that the latter charge high fees. p. 401,
Record on Appeal.
In the circumstances, we are constrained
to hold that the trial judge did not err in
determining the attorney's fees on the
basis of quantum meruit in disregard of
the written contract.
Assessed value or market value. With
an array of decided eases, appellant
argues that in special proceedings,
testate or intestate, the value in the
inventories submitted by the
administrator or executor is considered
as the correct value of the estate binding
upon all parties, and even the court, in
the proper management and
administration of such estate.
Then she points out that in Reyes vs. de
la Cruz[9], a contract providing for
compensation of attorney's fees in the
amount of 5% of whatever may be
adjudicated to the client, was held to
refer only to the assessed value of
properties' adjudicated and not to
their market value.
Refuting this argument, appellee aptly
denies analogy between the Reyes
decision (supra) and the instant case,
because the former merely called for
interpretation of the written contract of
services[10]; whereas, the question here at
issue is the value of appellee's
professional services on the basis
of quantum meruit.
This Court must, therefore, determine
how much the services of appellee are
really worth. And we cannot refuse to
take a realistic approach in the
performance of the work. Inquiry into
the real, value of the estate (its true
value) becomes imperative.
We note that in Sison vs. Suntay, supra,
we fixed the counsel's fees for services
rendered in opposing a will on the basis
of the market value of the estate.
Market value. Both parties have
submitted for examination, two
valuations of the estate. To show that its
market value does not exceed
P246,329.25, appellant presented the
appraisal for tax purposes of the estate
of the deceased by Internal Revenue
Examiner Florencio M. Alfonso (Exhibit
3-A) ; in addition to certificates of the
assessed value of such properties in
several municipalities of Cavite.
Appellee per contra, substantiated his
valuation of the estate at P1,236,993
with official statements of the provincial
assessors, and deeds of sale of
neighboring" realty or of lands similarly
situated. And to rebut the certificate
Exhibit 3-A, appellee introduced Exhibit
"M", and affidavit of Jose Arafias,
former Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, showing the defect in the
methods employed by the Internal
Revenue examiners in appraising the
inheritance left by deceased taxpayers.
After examining the evidence presented
by both sides, we find no important
reason to overrule the opinion of the
trial judge that the current market value
is that reflected in the estimate of the
provincial assessors, whose judgment,
by reason of their official work and wide
experience in such particular line
deserves great weight and reliability.
Besides, holding court sessions in Cavite
City and possessing background
information, the trial judge occupied a
better position to estimate landed
property prices. Furthermore, we cannot
discount the fact that the assessment of
real properties for tax purposes (the
principal element taken into account
when the Revenue Examiner made his
appraisal) is of little use in a judicial
inquiry as to the market value of the
land. Lastly, the appraisal made by the
Revenue Examiners turned out to be
unreliable according to Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Arañas (Exhibit
M).
At any rate, we may take judicial notice
of the general information that the
market value of real property in the
provinces is usually three or more times
the assessed valuation thereof.[11]
Percentage of Fees. Citing Section 22,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court which
says that "an attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation
for his services", appellant denounces as
unreasonable and unconscionable the
25% given to Atty. Francisco as counsel
fees.
This Supreme Court has held the
following as the guidelines to be
observed in determining the
compensation of' an attorney: (a) the
amount and character of the services
rendered; (b) tile labor, time and trouble
involved; (c) the nature and importance
of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; (d) the
responsibility imposed; (e) the amount
of money or the value of the property
affected by the controversy, or involved
in the employment; (f) the skill and
experience called for in the performance
of the services; (g) the professional
character and standing of the attorney;
(h) the results. secured; (i) and whether
or not the fee is absolute or
contingent [12], it being a recognized rule
that an attorney may properly charge a
much larger fee when it is to be
contingent than when it is not." (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
III [1957 Ed.] pp. 644, 645, citing
Haussermann vs. Rahmeyer, 12 Phil.
350; and others.)
The Court has likewise held that:
"The allowance of counsel fees in
probate proceedings rests largely in the
sound discretion of the court (probate)
which should not be interfered with
except for manifest abuse; out it may be
modified by the reviewing court, when
the fee allowed is inadequate or
excessive." (Quintillan vs. Degala, 96
Phil., 77; 60 Off. Gaz. 5305.)
By the way, in this Quintillan case, a
thirty-percent (30%) or thirty-three
percent (33%) contingent fee in
opposing a will was held not to be
excessive or unreasonable.
Importance of the subject matter.
Appellee's services were engaged to
secure the probate of the will of Gabina
Raquel. Upon the allowance of the will.
rested the appellant's right to the bulk of
an estate, worth more than one million
pesos. Had the will been disallowed,
appellant and the other legatees named
in the will would have received nothing.
The whole estate would have passed to
the oppositor Basilia Salud, who is the
first cousin of the deceased Gabina
Raquel to the exclusion of appellant and
the other legatees named in the will.
Aurea Matias, whose father is a first
cousin of the deceased, stands five
degrees removed from Gabina Raquel,
whereas Basilia Salud is only four
degrees removed from her; and under
our rules on succession[13] in case of
intestate or legal succession, the relative
nearer in degree excludes the more
remote ones and considering also, that
in the collateral line, the right of
representation holds only where
nephews and nieces survive with
brothers and sisters of the deceased.
[14]
 Note incidentally, that the will
favored Aurea because the latter lived
with, and rendered services to, her aunt
Gabina for more than 32 years.
Nature and extent of the services
rendered. The probate of the will,
confronted Aurea's counsel with
questions of fact and questions of law.
Counsel had to prove that the said will
was valid, duly executed in accordance
with law. In view of the various grounds
of the opposition to the probate of the
will, Atty. Francisco had to make wide
and extensive research in the field of
handwriting, medicine and chemistry
not to mention the interviewing of
prospective witnesses.
Indeed, the legal services rendered in
the lower court were expectably quite
exacting. The trial alone covered almost
a period of four years. The preparation
and presentation of evidence called for
strenuous work. Thirty-one documents
were presented as evidence for the
proponent of the will. The transcript of
the stenographic notes consisted of
more than a thousand pages.
Numberless motions were filed. After
the closing of the evidence, a
memorandum had to be filed to answer
the oppositor's motion to reject the will.
And then, despite the extensive study,
research, and preparation of the
evidence, and notwithstanding the skill
and experience of Atty. Francisco, the
Cavite court denied the probate of the
will.
The adverse judgment was appealed to
this Court. There was additional labor to
be performed, because there was a
greater responsibility to discharge. To
secure a reversal of judgment was
doubly hard. Counsel had to
demonstrate the errors of fact and law
committed by the lower court in its
decision and to persuade the appellate
court to reverse overcoming the
presumption in favor of a judicial
pronouncement. This Court was actually
convinced the will was admitted to
probate. Appellant's brief consisted of
285 printed pages. The reversal of the
appealed decision proved the
effectiveness of Francisco's appellate
advocacy.
Attempting to minimize the importance
to the estate of legal services in securing
approval of the will, appellant points out
that will or no will, the estate remains.
The argument, however, plausible,
overlooks the significance of the will. It
is the desire, the command of the owner
of the estate as to how his inheritance
shall be distributed. In upholding the
will and working for its approval, the
attorney was simply serving such
departed owner of the estate and so in
effect serving the estate.
As already explained; had the will been
disapproved, this appellant and the
other legatees would have gotten
nothing out of the estate. It is fair to
make them pay. "Yes, they are liable, but
not the estate" appellant may reply.
Such distinction does not seem
equitable. Anyway, as stated, service was
rendered to the estate.
Professional Standing of counsel. The
professional standing of appellee has
been amply attested to by the late
Senator Claro M. Recto and the former
Secretary of Justice, Jose P. Bengzon.
Appellee has been shown to have
practiced law since his admission to the
bar in 1914, either alone or in
association with other equally
prominent lawyers; to have figured in
several precedent-laying controversies
decided by this Court; to have annotated
or written commentaries on practically
every branch of the law; to have
published and edited for 23 years, the
Lawyers Journal; to have founded a law
school; to have actively participated in
various political and civic organizations;
to have been elected to the Philippine
Senate, obtaining the highest number of
votes among all the senatorial
candidates in the election held in the
year 1945, etc.
There is no doubt, he belongs in the
front line of the legal profession. In trial
work, there are few who can match his
mental acumen and resourcefulness.
Conclusion. Taking into account all the
variables of the process, in the light of
our several pronouncements on the
matter of contingent lawyer's fees, we
feel that modifying the appealed
resolution and awarding 12.5% of the
market value to the herein appellee
would accomplish substantial justice.
This figure represents a compromise,
some members having "voted for a
bigger amount[15], while others voted for
less. The Suntay and the Harden cases
were specially mentioned, since they
belonged to the million-peso class. This
award sets a higher ratio than the first,
because the latter involved over three
million pesos and because Atty.
Francisco rendered much greater
services to this estate. For one thing, he
handled tedious trial work which lasted
for about four years and for another, the
fee was contingent. The Harden ratio
(20%) was not applied, because attorney
and client had entered therein into a
valid written contract.[16]
Several circumstances account for this
drastic reduction, among them: (a) 25%
of P1,236,993.46 equals P309,248.36;
but Atty. Francisco expressed
willingness to receive P100,000.00 only,
in his letter of September 15, 1958
(Record on Appeal, p. 132) ; (b) although
admittedly the leading legal counsel, he
got the assistance of three other
attorneys; (c) believing the estate
amounted to P167,000.00, he agreed to
receive P15,000.00 as contingent fee,
i.e. 9% only; and (d) he has already
received a total of P11,000.00,
WHEREFORE, modified as herein
indicated, the appealed decision is
affirmed. No costs in this instance.
2.4 Unlawful retention of funds and charging liens
Armovit cs CA 202 scra 16
G.R. No. 154559               October 5, 2011
THE LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A.
ARMOVIT, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENGSON
COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit (Armovit
Law Firm) captioned the present action as a "Petition
and/or Motion for Execution." As a Petition for
Certiorari, petitioner assails the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43099 dated
November 28, 1996,1 August 27, 20012 and June 11,
2002,3 as well as the Orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Civil Case
No. 2794 dated February 24 and June 7, 1993. As a
Motion for Execution, petitioner seeks the execution of
the 1991 Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90983,
entitled Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of
Appeals.4
On August 20, 1965 and November 23, 1971,
Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (BCBI) obtained
loans from the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) in the total amount of ₱4,250,000.00, secured
by real estate and chattel mortgages. When BCBI
defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, GSIS
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties
and sold them at public auction where it emerged as
the highest bidder.5
With the Armovit Law Firm as its counsel, BCBI filed
an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure on
June 23, 1977 with the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of La Union. The action was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2794. After trial, the CFI, by then renamed
Regional Trial Court, rendered a Decision: (1)
nullifying the foreclosure of BCBI’s mortgaged
properties; (2) ordering the cancellation of the titles
issued to GSIS and the issuance of new ones in the
name of BCBI; (3) ordering BCBI to pay GSIS
₱900,000.00 for the debenture bonds; and (4)
directing GSIS to (a) restore to BCBI full possession
of the foreclosed properties, (b) restructure the ₱4.25
Million worth of loans at the legal rate of interest from
the finality of the judgment, (c) pay BCBI ₱1.9 Million
representing accrued monthly rentals and ₱20,000.00
rental monthly until the properties are restored to
BCBI’s possession, and (d) pay the costs.6
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 09361. It appears
that the Armovit Law Firm ceased to be the counsel of
BCBI sometime before the appeal of GSIS. The said
law firm and BCBI dispute the legality of the
replacement, with BCBI claiming that the Armovit Law
Firm had been remiss in its duties as BCBI’s counsel.
On January 19, 1988, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC Decision with modification. The dispositive
portion of the Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, we affirm the appealed decision with
MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. The foreclosure and auction sale on
February 10, 1977 of BENGSON's properties
covered by real estate and chattel mortgages
mentioned in the notice of sale issued by the
La Union provincial sheriff are set aside.
2. The writ of possession issued to GSIS as
the highest bidder by the defunct Court of First
Instance, sitting as a cadastral court, as a
consequence of said foreclosure sale, is
annulled.
3. The Register of Deeds of La Union is
ordered to cancel the present certificates of
title covering those properties and issue new
ones in lieu thereof in the same names and
with the same annotations, terms and
conditions, including the mortgage in question,
as appeared (sic) in the previous certificates
of title as of the date BENGSON constituted
the mortgage on those properties in favor of
GSIS, it being understood that all expenses to
be incurred incidental to such title cancellation
and issuance shall be borne by GSIS.
4. GSIS is ordered to restore to BENGSON
full possession of those mortgaged properties
situated in San Fernando, La Union.
5. All properties under the mortgage in
question, including those parcels of land
situated in San Fernando, La Union and in
Quezon City, shall remain under mortgage in
favor of GSIS.
6. GSIS is ordered to restructure BENGSON's
loan as promised, the restructuring to proceed
from the premise that as of the foreclosure
date, i.e. February 10, 1977, BENGSON had
paid GSIS an aggregate amount of
₱286,000.00 on the subject loan.
7. The interest rates per annum stated in the
first and second mortgage loan contracts
entered into between BENGSON and GSIS,
as well as all other terms and conditions
provided for therein — except as qualified by
the subsequent agreement of the parties
regarding the promised loan restructuring and
deferment of foreclosure by reason of the
arrearages incurred — shall remain as
originally stipulated upon by the parties.
8. BENGSON is ordered to pay GSIS the
debenture bond with an aggregate face value
of ₱900,000.00 at the stipulated interest rate
of 14% per annum, quarterly; and to pay 14%
interest per annum, compounded monthly, on
the interest on said debenture bond, that had
become due quarterly, in accordance with the
stipulations provided for therein.
9. GSIS shall reimburse BENGSON the
monthly rent of ₱20,000.00 representing
income produced by one of the latter's
mortgaged properties, i.e., the Regent Theatre
building, from February 15, 1977 until GSIS
shall have restored the full possession of said
building, together with the land on which it
stands, to BENGSON.
10. The entire record of this case is ordered
remanded to the trial court and the latter is
directed to ascertain whether such mortgaged
properties as machineries, equipment, and
other movie paraphernalia, etc., are in fact no
longer in existence per report of the provincial
sheriff, as well as to determine their
replacement value if GSIS fails to return them;
 and, as prayed for by BENGSON, to receive
evidence from the parties on the costs of suit
awarded to it.
No pronouncement as to cost of this appeal.
(Emphasis supplied.)7
The Decision of the Court of Appeals became final
and executory on February 10, 1988 and the records
were remanded to the court a quo on March 14, 1988.
The GSIS did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or
an appeal therefrom.8
The subsequent proceedings were summarized by
this Court in its Decision in G.R. No. 90983, 9 which is
now the subject of petitioner’s Motion for Execution:
It x x x appears that when Atty. Armovit sought
execution with the court a quo, he was informed by
Romualdo Bengzon, president of the respondent
corporation, that the firm had retained the services of
Atty. Pacifico Yadao. He was also informed that the
company would pay him the agreed compensation
and that Atty. Yadao's fees were covered by a
separate agreement. The private respondent,
however, later ignored his billings and over the phone,
directed him allegedly not to take part in the execution
proceedings. Forthwith, he sought the entry of an
attorney's lien in the records of the case. The lower
court allegedly refused to make the entry and on the
contrary, issued an order ordering the Philippine
National Bank to "release to the custody of Mr.
Romualdo F. Bengzon and or Atty. Pacifico Yadao"
the sum of ₱2,760,000.00 (ordered by the Court of
Appeals as rentals payable by the Government
Service Insurance System).
Atty. Armovit then moved, apparently for the hearing
of his motion to recognize attorney's lien, and
thereafter, the trial court issued an order in the tenor
as follows:
When this case was called for hearing on the petition
to record attorney's charging lien, Attys. Armovit and
Aglipay appeared for the petitioners.
Atty. Armovit informed the Court that they are
withdrawing the petition considering that they are in
the process of amicably settling their differences with
the plaintiff, which manifestation was confirmed by
Atty. Yadao as well as the plaintiffs, Romualdo
Bengson and Brenda Bengson, who are present
today.
In view of this development, the petition to record
attorney’s charging lien, the same being in order and
not contrary to law, morals and public policy, as
prayed for by Attys. Armovit and Aglipay, it is hereby
withdrawn. The parties, therefore are hereby directed
to comply faithfully with their respective obligations.
SO ORDERED.
However, upon the turnover of the money to the
private respondent, Mrs. Brenda Bengson (wife of
Romualdo Bengson) delivered to Atty. Armovit the
sum of ₱300,000.00 only. Atty. Armovit protested and
demanded the amount of ₱552,000.00 (twenty
percent of ₱2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengson
made assurances that he will be paid the balance.
On November 4, 1988, however, Atty. Armovit
received an order emanating from the trial court in the
tenor as follows:
During the hearing on the petition to record attorney's
charging lien on October 11, 1988, Attys. Armovit and
Aglipay withdrew their petition to record attorney's
charging lien, which was duly approved by the Court,
after which the Court directed the parties to comply
faithfully with their respective obligations.
In compliance with the Order of this Court, the plaintiff
submitted a pleading denominated as compliance
alleging that petitioner (Atty. Armovit) has already
received from the plaintiff the sum of ₱300,000.00,
Philippine Currency, as and by way of attorney’s fees.
With the receipt by the petitioner from the plaintiff of
this amount, the latter has faithfully complied with its
obligation.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated October
11, 1988 approving the withdrawal of the petition to
record attorney’s charging lien, on motion of the
petitioner, is now final.
SO ORDERED.
Reconsideration having been denied, Atty. Armovit
went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
On August 25, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment dismissing the petition. Reconsideration
having been likewise denied by the Appellate Court,
Atty. Armovit instituted the instant appeal.10
This Court rendered its Decision in the foregoing case
on September 27, 1991. The relevant portions of the
Decision, including the fallo thereof, are quoted
hereunder:
The disposition of the Court of Appeals was that since
the receipt evidencing payment to Atty. Armovit of the
sum of ₱300,000.00 "was without any qualification as
'advance' or 'partial' or 'incomplete'," the intention of
the parties was that it was full payment. The Appellate
Court also noted Atty. Armovit's withdrawal of his
motion to record attorney's lien and figured that Atty.
Armovit was satisfied with the payment of
₱300,000.00.
The only issue is whether or not Atty. Armovit is
entitled to the sum of ₱252,000.00 more, in addition to
the sum of ₱300,000.00 already paid him by the
private respondent.
There is no question that the parties had agreed on a
compensation as follows:
a) ₱15,000.00 by way of acceptance and study fee,
payable within five (5) days from date;
b) 20% contingent fee computed on the value to be
recovered by favorable judgment in the cases; and
c.) the execution and signing of a final retainer
agreement complete with all necessary details.
(While the parties' agreement speaks of "a final
retainer agreement" to be executed later, it does not
appear that the parties did enter into a "final"
agreement thereafter.)
The private respondent's version however is that
while it may be true that the agreed compensation
was twenty percent of all recoveries, the parties later
agreed on a compromise sum approved allegedly by
the trial court, per its Order of October 11, 1988.
xxxx
Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true
that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable;
however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for
"twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable.
In the case of Aro v. Nañawa, decided in 1969, this
Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the
client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In
parallel vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovit's claim
for ₱252,000.00 more — pursuant to the contingent
fee agreement — amid the private respondent's own
endeavours to evade its obligations.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The private respondent is ORDERED to
pay the petitioner the sum of ₱252,000.00. Costs
against the private respondent. 11
Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration from
the Decision of this Court. Thus, the Decision became
final and executory on December 17, 1991. 12
On October 29, 1992, the Armovit Law Firm filed in
Civil Case No. 2794 an Omnibus Motion praying,
among other things, that a final assessment of its
attorney’s fees be computed at 20% on the value of
all the properties recovered by BCBI, deducting the
amount already paid which is 20% of the money
judgment for ₱1,900,00.00; and that a writ of
execution for the full payment of the balance of its
attorney’s fees be issued.13
On February 24, 1993, the RTC issued the first
assailed Order denying the Armovit Law Firm’s
Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the issue
regarding attorney’s fees had already been resolved
by this Court in G.R. No. 90983, whereby this Court
ordered BCBI to pay the Armovit Law Firm the sum of
₱252,000.00, in addition to the ₱300,000.00 already
paid. The RTC noted that the Decision of this Court
had long become final and executory and in fact, was
already executed upon the payment of the sum of
₱252,000.00. The RTC also stressed that the Armovit
Law Firm had no more participation in the prosecution
of the case before the appellate court, as BCBI was,
by then, already represented by another counsel.
Thus, according to the RTC, it would constitute unjust
enrichment to grant the Armovit Law Firm attorney’s
fees despite having no more participation in the
case.14
The Armovit Law Firm filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC on
June 7, 1993.15
The Armovit Law Firm appealed the Orders of the
RTC to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 43099.
When the Court of Appeals became repeatedly
unsuccessful in securing the original records of Civil
Case No. 2794 due to the progress of the execution of
the same in the trial court, the appellate court, in the
first assailed Resolution dated November 28, 1996,
directed Atty. Raymundo Armovit to submit a certified
copy of the complete original records at his
expense.16 Atty. Armovit filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying that BCBI be ordered to
defray the costs of the copying of the pertinent
records, as he has no responsibility whatsoever for
the delay. Atty. Armovit added that the photocopying
of the records would be futile as there was still the
need to await the termination of the proceedings
before the trial court.17 On April 24, 2001, the Court of
Appeals received a letter from the Officer-in-Charge of
the RTC informing the appellate court of the pendency
before this Court of G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No.
141454, which were both connected with the
execution of the Decision in Civil Case No. 2794. Due
to all of the foregoing circumstances, the Court of
Appeals issued on August 27, 2001 the second
assailed Resolution ordering that CA-G.R. CV No.
43099 be archived temporarily pending receipt of the
original records of Civil Case No. 2794. 18 The Armovit
Law Firm’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in
the third assailed Resolution dated June 11, 2002. 19
On September 9, 2002, the Armovit Law Firm filed the
present action captioned "Petition and/or Motion for
Execution," a joint Petition for Certiorari and Motion
for Execution, with the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that the
instant petition for certiorari be given due course and,
after due proceedings, judgment be rendered setting
aside as null and void ab initio the respondent courts
Orders dated February 24 and June 7, 1993 (Annexes
A and B) and Resolutions dated November 28, 1996,
August 27, 2001 and June 11, 2002 (Annexes C, D
and E); and ordering respondent trial court as follows:
1. To immediately issue a writ of execution of
the final and executory Decision of September
29, 1991, of the Supreme Court in Law Firm of
Raymundo A. Armovit vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. (G.R. No. 90983) on the twenty percent of
all recoveries on the following:
a. All the mortgaged properties
recovered by private respondent from
the GSIS by annotating petitioner’s
charging lien at the back of their
corresponding titles.
b. The ₱29,982,824.19 received by
private respondent on September 26,
1994, as per Sheriff’s Return dated
October 3, 1994 (Annex EE), plus the
legal rate of interest from such date
until fully paid.
2. To assess the value of the real properties
recovered by private respondent from the
GSIS and apply petitioner’s charging lien by
deducting therefrom the sum of ₱552,000.00
priorly applied to the accumulated rentals
recovered from GSIS by private respondent.
After the assessment and determination of the
value of petitioner’s twenty percent of all
recoveries to cause the execution thereof.20
According to the Armovit Law Firm, the RTC and the
Court of Appeals committed the following legal errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VARYING
THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY SUPREME
COURT D E C I S I O N BY LIMITING THE
EXECUTION OF PETITIONER’S
ATTORNEY’S FEES OF "TWENTY
PERCENT OF ALL RECOVERIES" ONLY TO
THE RENTALS AND EXCLUDING THE
REST OF THE RECOVERIES MADE BY THE
BENGSONS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SENDING PETITIONER’S APPEAL TO THE
ARCHIVES.
III.
THE APPELLATE AND TRIAL COURTS
ERRED IN DEFYING THE SUPREME
COURT IN ITS FINAL AND EXECUTORY D
E C I S I O N AWARDING PETITIONER A
CONTINGENT FEE OF "TWENTY PERCENT
OF ALL RECOVERIES."21
The present action is devoid of merit.
For convenient reference, the dispositive portion of
the judgment sought to be executed, namely our
Decision in G.R. No. 90983, is re-quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The private respondent is ORDERED to
pay the petitioner the sum of ₱252,000.00. Costs
against the private respondent. 22
As can be readily observed, the Court ordered the
payment of the sum of ₱252,000.00, nothing more,
nothing less. While the body of the Decision quoted
the agreement of the parties stating the compensation
as "20% contingent fee computed on the value to be
recovered by favorable judgment on the cases,"23 this
Court specifically ordered BCBI to pay the Armovit
Law Firm the aforementioned sum only, in addition to
the ₱300,000.00 already paid. BCBI was therefore
held to be liable for the total amount of ₱552,000.00,
representing 20% of the ₱2,760,000.00 received by
BCBI as rental payments from GSIS. Significantly,
the order upon GSIS to reimburse BCBI for rental
payments constitutes the only monetary award in
favor of BCBI in the final and executory Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 09361.24 This Court confined its
award to the said sum despite the fact that the
Armovit Law Firm prayed for a much greater amount
in its Memorandum:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays for
judgment declaring respondent trial court’s orders
(Annexes "N" and "Q") and respondent Court of
Appeals’ confirmatory decisions (Annexes "R" and
"T") null and void ab initio, and instead directing that
petitioner be paid his attorney’s fees of 20% of all
monies and properties received and to be received by
respondent BCBI in consequence of the final
judgment secured for them by petitioner (Annex "E" in
rel. annex "G"), as follows –
a) 20% of ₱2,760,000.00, the rental
arrearages due and already received by BCBI,
which amounts to ₱552,000.00, minus the
₱300,000.00 paid unto petitioner, or a net
balance of ₱252,000.00 due petitioner;
b) 20% of ₱15 million, the market value of the
commercial lots, multi-story buildings and
residential lots and houses, already placed in
BCBI’s possession, which amounts to
₱3,000,000.00 still due petitioner; and
c) 20% of ₱20 million worth of hotel and movie
machines and equipment units, centralized air
conditioning facilities, etc., to be paid in cash
to BCBI, which amounts to ₱4,000,000.00 in
unpaid fees to petitioner –
or, in the alternative, should trial of facts be deemed
appropriate, that the case be remanded for further
proceedings to receive petitioner’s evidence on the
amount of his attorney’s fees due and unpaid, the
same to be presided over by another trial judge
chosen by proper raffle; that respondent judge
Genaro Gines be prohibited from any further
intervention in Civil Case No. 2794; and at all events,
that treble costs be fixed and imposed upon
respondents.
Petitioner also prays for such other reliefs as may be
just and equitable in the premises.25 (Emphases
supplied.)
As stated above, the Armovit Law Firm did not file a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R.
No. 90983 to protest the exclusion in the dispositive
portion of several items it specifically prayed for in its
pleadings. The Decision thus became final and
executory on December 17, 1991.26 The Armovit Law
Firm cannot now ask the trial court, or this Court, to
execute the Decision in G.R. No. 90983 as if these
items prayed for were actually granted.
The Armovit Law Firm, in insisting on its claim, pins its
entire case on the statement in the body of the
Decision that "we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for
‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be
unreasonable."27 In this regard, our ruling in Grageda
v. Gomez 28 is enlightening:
It is basic that when there is a conflict between the
dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the
opinion of the court contained in the text or body of
the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An
order of execution is based on the disposition, not on
the body, of the Decision.  This rule rests on the
1avvphi1
theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion
in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.
Indeed, the foregoing rule is not without an exception.
We have held that where the inevitable conclusion
from the body of the decision is so clear as to show
that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the
body of the decision will prevail. x x x.29
Applying this ruling to the case at bar, it is clear that
the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision (that
"we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for ‘twenty
percent of all recoveries’ to be unreasonable"30) is not
an order which can be the subject of execution.
Neither can we ascertain from the body of the
Decision an inevitable conclusion clearly showing a
mistake in the dispositive portion. On the contrary, the
context in which the statement was used shows that it
is premised on the interpretation that Atty. Armovit’s
valid claim is only for an additional ₱252,000.00 in
attorney’s fees:
Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true
that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable;
however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for
"twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable.
In the case of Aro v. Nañawa, decided in 1969, this
Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the
client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In
parallel vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovit's claim
for ₱252,000.00 more — pursuant to the contingent
fee agreement — amid the private respondent's own
endeavours to evade its obligations.31 (Emphases
supplied.)
The confusion created in the case at bar shows yet
another reason why mere pronouncements in bodies
of Decisions may not be the subject of execution:
random statements can easily be taken out of context
and are susceptible to different interpretations. When
not enshrined in a clear and definite order, random
statements in bodies of Decisions can still be the
subject of another legal debate, which is inappropriate
and should not be allowed in the execution stage of
litigation.
Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to
have committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the execution of the statement in the body of our 1991
Decision that "we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for
‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be
unreasonable."32 All things considered, it was the
interpretation of petitioner Armovit Law Firm, not that
of the trial court, which had the effect of varying the
final and executory Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
90983. The instant Petition for Certiorari should
therefore fail.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
2.5 Authority to appear for government
Gongzales vs Chavez 205 scra 815
G.R. No. 97351 February 4, 1992
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as
Solicitor General, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, petitioner submits for the Court's adjudication
the twin issues of whether or not the Solicitor General
neglected his public duty by withdrawing as counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines and the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in cases
he had filed in court and whether or not the PCGG
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring
private lawyers as a result of such withdrawal of
appearance.
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen taxpayer,
filed the petition as a class suit under Section 12, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the subject
matters involved are of common and general interest
to all Filipino citizens and taxpayers as they pertain to
the enforcement of a public duty and the prevention of
unlawful expenditure of public funds.
According to the petitioner, the Solicitor General is the
counsel for the Republic and the PCGG in thirty-three
(33) cases before this Court, one hundred nine (109)
cases in the Sandiganbayan, one (1) case in the
National Labor Relations Commission and another
case in the Municipal Trial Court or a total of one
hundred forty-four (144) cases.   In December 1990,
1
the Solicitor General withdrew as counsel in said
cases through a pleading entitled "Withdrawal of
Appearance with Reservation."  The pleading states:
2
The SOLICITOR GENERAL, to this
Honorable Court, hereby respectfully
withdraws as counsel for plaintiff
Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in the above-
captioned case, with the reservation,
however, conformably with
Presidential Decree No. 478, the
provisions of Executive Order No. 292
as well as the decisional law of "Orbos
v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,"
(G.R. No. 92561, September 12,
1990), to submit his
comment/observation on
incidents/matters pending with this
Honorable Court, if called for by
circumstances in the interest of the
government or if he is so required by
the court.
Makati, Metro Manila, December 3,
1990.
(Sgd.) F
IBP O.R
The Solicitor General filed a substantially
similar pleading in the cases where the
Republic is a party.
As a result of such withdrawal of appearance, the
PCGG hired forty (40) private lawyers, nineteen (19)
of whom are trial lawyers. They would receive a
monthly compensation of at least P10,000.00 plus
appearance fee of P1,700.00 in actual trial and/or
P500.00 if trial is postponed. 3
Petitioner contends that since the Solicitor General's
withdrawal of appearance was made without any
reason, it implied that it was "within the absolute
discretion" of said public official. Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 478 and Section 35 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, mandatorily
require the Solicitor General to stand in the place of,
and act for the Republic and the PCGG in court.
Therefore, the Solicitor General has "no discretion to
reject by withdrawing" as counsel for said entities.
Applying the ruling of this Court with respect to a fiscal
in Sta. Rosa Mining Co. v. Zabala,   the petitioner
4
further states that: "Similarly, it is the duty of the
Solicitor General to appear for the Republic and the
PCGG, hence regardless of his personal convictions
or opinions, he must proceed to discharge his duty
(not withdraw, which is equivalent to refusal to
prosecute), and let the court decide the merits of the
case." 5
Moreover, petitioner avers that the Solicitor General
cannot withdraw his appearance "with reservation"
nor can he file his "comment/observation on the
incident/matters" after such withdrawal because by
ceasing to appear as counsel, he loses his standing in
court. Unless a case involves the constitutionality of a
treaty, law, ordinance or executive order for which
Rule 3 Section 23 of the Rules of Court   mandates
6
his appearance, the Solicitor General is not
authorized to appear therein after his withdrawal as
counsel inasmuch as he himself is not a party-litigant.
Furthermore, under Section 26, of Rule 138,  the
7 many proceedings and his continued
Solicitor General may not unilaterally withdraw his
appearance without the consent of the Republic or the
PCGG unless the court authorizes his withdrawal.
Since there was no such court authority, the Solicitor
General's withdrawal of appearance in said several
cases is null and void, as it constitutes an act against
a mandatory law and hence, it may be attacked
collaterally. Neither may the Solicitor General
withdraw on the authority of Orbos v. Civil Service
Commission 8 wherein this Court held:
In the discharge of this task the
Solicitor General must see to it that
the best interest of the government is
upheld within the limits set by law. . .
xxx xxx xxx
There are cases where a government
agency declines the services of the
Solicitor General or otherwise fails or
refuses to forward the papers of the
case to him for appropriate action. . .
The Court finds and so holds that this
practice should be stopped. To repeat,
the Solicitor General is the lawyer of
the government, any of its agents and
officials in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. The exception is
when such officials or agents are
being charged criminally or are
being civilly sued for damages arising
from a felony. His services cannot be
lightly rejected, much less ignored by
the officer or officials concerned.
Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor
General should be welcomed by the
parties. He should be given full
support and cooperation by any
agency or official involved in litigation.
He should be enabled to faithfully
discharge his duties and
responsibilities as the government
advocate. And he should do no less
for his clients. His burden of assisting
in the fair and just administration of
justice is clear.
This Court does not expect the
Solicitor General to waver in the
performance of his duty. As a matter
of fact, the Court appreciates the
participation of the Solicitor General in
fealty to his assigned task. He should
not therefore desist from appearing
before this Court even in those cases
he finds his opinion inconsistent with
the government or any of its agents he
is expected to represent. The Court
must be advised of his position just as
well. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner adds the following observations:  9
Therefore, this case militates more
against the Solicitor General than in
his favor. For if the government and its
officials cannot reject the services of
the Solicitor General, neither may the
latter select the case he would
represent by withdrawing in some and
retaining others. For unlike private
lawyers who are bound to their clients
by contract and, therefore, can reject
cases offered to them, the Solicitor
General and PCGG are wedded to
each other by statute for better and for
worse. And only a divorce, through the
abolition of PCGG or resignation of
the Solicitor General, can untie the
marital knot. Otherwise, the
relationship should continue sans
PCGG demurring, and the Solicitor
General withdrawing. Absent such
resignation or abolition, the Solicitor
General has to prosecute or defend
the said cases to the best of his ability.
Hence, petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as
substitutes for the Solicitor General. Nowhere in
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14 does it appear that
the PCGG is authorized to hire said lawyers. Since
the Solicitor General is named by law as the lawyer
for all government agencies, the hiring of private
lawyers by such agencies is impliedly excluded. Thus,
by employing private lawyers, the PCGG is creating a
public office and naming a public officer. However, in
the absence of a law providing for the creation of the
office of PCGG counsel, said hired lawyers are
usurpers or intruders whose acts may be challenged
in a collateral proceeding such as an action for
prohibition.
Similarly, petitioner asserts, prohibition will lie against
the Commission on Audit considering that any
payment for the services of the PCGG-hired lawyers
would result in an unlawful expenditure of public
funds. Stressing the need to preserve the status
quo until the determination of his rights as a citizen
and taxpayer, petitioner prays for the issuance of
temporary restraining order.
Acting on the petition, however, the Court required the
respondent to file their respective comments on the
petition without granting the prayer for a temporary
restraining order. 10
In its comment, the Commission on Audit (COA)
alleges that it has not allowed the disbursement of
funds to pay for the services of PCGG-hired private
lawyers. It points out the fact that under COA Circular
No. 89-299 dated March 21, 1989, the COA has
withdrawn the pre-audit of transactions entered into
by national government agencies pursuant to the
constitutional provision that the COA has the
exclusive authority to "define the scope of its audit
and examination, to establish the techniques and
methods required therefor."   Neither has the COA
11
allowed in post-audit the disbursements of funds in
payment of the services of the hired private lawyers.
Moreover, under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April
2, 1986, the hiring of private lawyers by government
agencies and instrumentalities is prohibited unless
there is prior written conformity of the Solicitor
General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as
the case may be, as well as the written concurrence
of COA.
For its part, the PCGG, through Commissioner
Maximo A. Maceren and lawyer Eliseo B. Alampay,
asserts in its comment that the scope of its authority
under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 is broad
enough to include the authority to engage the services
of private lawyers, if necessary, for the fulfillment of its
mandate. While such authority is not expressly stated
in said executive orders, "it must be deemed
necessarily implied in and subsumed under the
expressly enumerated powers of the Commission."  12
The PCGG contends that its power under Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 14 to "file and prosecute all
cases investigated by it" includes "the grant of
discretion to the Commission in determining
the manner of filing and prosecuting its cases
including the matter of who, in particular, will control
and supervise the prosecution of said cases." The
phrase "with the assistance of the Office of the
Solicitor General and other government agencies"
simply means that the Solicitor General is called upon
to render assistance to the PCGG and whether or not
such discretion is required by the Commission is a
matter of discretion on its part. Such provision does
not preclude the PCGG from engaging the services of
private lawyers in the same way that it is "clearly
authorized to hire accountants, appraisers,
researchers and other professionals as it performs its
functions." Since, upon the dictates of legal and
practical necessity, it has hired lawyers in the United
States and in Switzerland, "it may similarly hire
Filipino lawyers in prosecuting its Philippine cases." 
13
The PCGG further asserts that the hiring of private
lawyers is "not an ultra vires" act but a "means by
which (it) can effectively exercise its powers." It
emphasizes the fact that it hired private lawyers "only
after the Officer of the Solicitor General had
unilaterally withdrawn its appearance" for the PCGG
in the various pending PCGG-instituted cases. Its own
Litigation Division, which was constituted after the
Solicitor General's withdrawal, is "sorely
undermanned" but it has to contend with "affluent and
influential individuals and entities" who can "afford to
hire skilled lawyers and organize vast litigation
networks." The PCGG tried to seek the assistance of
the Department of Justice and the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel but only the former
sent two additional prosecutors to handle its cases.  14
The PCGG clarifies that its powers are circumscribed
not only by the executive orders aforementioned but
also by the inherent police power of the State. By
hiring private lawyers, it was merely trying to assist
the President of the Philippines in protecting the
interest of the State. As such, it was acting as an alter
ego of the President and therefore, it was the
Executive which determined the necessity of
engaging the services of private prosecutors.
Contending that "overwhelming necessity" impelled it
to hire private lawyers, the PCGG avers that
inasmuch as the Central Bank of the Philippines or
the Philippine National Bank may engage the services
of private lawyers, with more reason may it be allowed
to hire private prosecutors after it was abandoned by
the Solicitor General in the prosecution of the ill-
gotten wealth cases. Consequently, "the Solicitor
General's withdrawal of assistance is tantamount to
his tacit approval of the PCGG's hiring of private
prosecutors in replacement of the solicitors handling
the said civil cases." 
15
The PCGG concludes that the reasonableness of the
compensation for its hired lawyers can hardly be
questioned considering the expertise of said lawyers
and the complexity of the cases they would be
handling for the PCGG. Thus, the prayer for a
preliminary injunction must be denied otherwise "the
harm that would be done would be far greater than
the perceived mischief petitioner seeks to prevent."  16
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez inhibits himself
from appearing in this case "considering that as far as
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) is
concerned, the subject is a closed matter among the
OSG, the PCGG and the Courts."   In the comment
17
filed by Assistant Solicitor General Edgardo L. Kilayko
and Solicitor Iderlina P. Pagunuran, the OSG sets out
at length the history of the PCGG from its creation
until the filing in the Sandiganbayan of thirty-nine (39)
" prima facie cases" for ill-gotten wealth against
former President Marcos and his cronies. As suits and
countersuits stemmed from the original thirty-nine (39)
civil cases, "the OSG had been put to a tremendous
task and thus invariably in urgent need of being
consulted or informed by the PCGG of the facts and
circumstances material to the prosecution and
progress not only of the original 39 civil cases, but
also of all kinds of "incidents."
Nonetheless, the OSG lawyers faced the challenge
and the odds if only to live up to their task as "the best
lawyers there are in the country." The OSG further
explains: 18
On many a time, however a time,
however, the lack of the above-
mentioned consultation or information
resulted in situations that rendered the
OSG unavoidably incapable of
performing its functions and duties as
Lawyer of the Government, not only
as mandated upon it by law and as
spelled out in Orbos v. CSC, G.R. No.
92561, September 12, 1990, but also
in consonance with its office motto:
"Integrity In Advocacy."
Once the OSG argued before the
Sandiganbayan that an asset was
under sequestration, only to be
informed by the adverse party waving
a document before the
Sandiganbayan Justices that the
sequestration had earlier been lifted,
with a PCGG resolution, the
document, to boot (Razon case).
Then, again, OSG argued, even
before this Honorable Court, that an
ill-gotten asset had "mysteriously"
disappeared, only to be informed by
the Honorable Court, that a PCGG
Commissioner had earlier by
resolution authorized the disposition of
the asset (COCOFED case). All the
instances need not be enumerated
here, as they are not meat and
substance, even as OSG is rendered
thereby a laughing stock in its
professionalism.
As to matters that are of great pith and
moment, suffice it to say that the
recent Benedicto "compromise"
agreement, not to mention the SMC-
UCPB Compromise settlement, is sub
judice or under advisement not only of
the Sandiganbayan but also of this
Honorable Court in separate
"incidents," and suffice it to state that
the relationship, obtaining between the
Government offices/agencies and the
Office of the Solicitor General as
counsel, is not at all like one that
simply would obtain between private
client and private lawyer in private
practice, although constant
consultation and advice are sine qua
non in both types of relationship. The
relationship is rather one, created as it
is by law, where imposed upon OSG
is the responsibility to present to the
courts the position that will uphold the
best interests of the People, the
Government and the State, albeit the
same may run counter to its client's
position or route of action. At any rate,
the PCGG through nationwide TV
broadcast and print media, publicly
announced that PCGG had disposed
with or otherwise did not need the
legal services of the Lawyer of the
Government, and thus OSG
descended, not the unmerited remark
of having "abandoned" the ill-gotten
wealth cases, but the time-honored
principle of impossibilium nulla
obligatio est, i.e., there is no obligation
to do impossible things (Lim Co Chui
v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 463), without in
any way casting any aspersion on the
moral integrity of any Commissioner or
PCGG official, as made clear by the
Solicitor General to the President in a
meeting with PCGG.
 Hence, in the light of all the foregoing
circumstances, at rock-bottom
precisely so as not to prejudice "the
interest of the Government" (Orbos),
the Solicitor General withdrew as
counsel for PCGG in all said cases by
filing a notice of "Withdrawal of
Appearance with Reservation."
In arguing that the instant petition should be
dismissed, the OSG contends that this case has
become moot and academic as this very Court had
resolved to allow the withdrawal of appearance of the
Solicitor General in all the cases pending before it
"with reservation, conformably with PD No. 478,
Executive Order No. 292, as well as the doctrine laid
down in 'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et
al.,' G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, . . ."   For19
its part, the Sandiganbayan had also resolved that
"the appearance of the Solicitor General is deemed
withdrawn to be substituted by the PCGG's legal
panel."  20
The OSG maintains further that the instant petition
does not present a case and controversy as the
petitioner himself does not even have a "court
standing" and a "litigable interest." All the petitioner
seeks is an "advisory opinion." The OSG asserts that
the "incident" (referring to the Solicitor General's
withdrawal of appearance) should be distinguished
from that in JPC Enterprise, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
et al.,   wherein the Assets Privatization Trust (APT)
21
decided to appear for itself because the law names
the Minister of Justice only as its ex oficio legal
adviser while by itself it can file suits and institute
proceedings and engage external expertise in the
fulfillment of its tasks. However, since the APT has no
personality of its own, it should have appeared
through the Solicitor General. The OSG argues that
said "adversarial incident" is not present in this case.
In his reply to the comments of the PCGG and the
OSG, the petitioner insists that although as between
the Solicitor General and the PCGG, this case may
have been rendered moot and academic, as between
him on the one hand and the Solicitor General and the
PCGG on the other hand, a "real controversy" still
exists and the issues raised herein have not ceased
to exist either. Moreover, a judgment of prohibition
and mandamus would have a "practical legal effect
and can be enforced."  22
Citing Miguel v. Zulueta,   and Tañada
23
v. Tuvera,   petitioner asserts that he has a standing
24
in court because where a question of public right is
involved and the object of the mandamus is the
enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not
show any legal or special interest in the result of the
proceeding. It is sufficient that, as a citizen, he is
interested in having the laws executed and the duty in
question enforced.
The petitioner rebuts the PCGG's contention that its
power to hire private lawyers may be implied from its
expressly enumerated powers. He asserts that since
P.D. No. 478 mandates that "the Solicitor General as
law office of the government with the duty to appear
for the PCGG," no implication from the express
powers of (the) PCGG can stand against the
language of P.D. No. 478. On the other hand, the law
regarding the PCGG and that regarding the Solicitor
General should be harmonized.  25
The Court considers these pleadings sufficient bases
for resolving this petition and, on account of the
importance and imperativeness of the issues raised
herein, the filing of memoranda by the parties is
dispensed with.
We shall, first of all, confront a preliminary issue
interposed by the OSG — whether or not this case
has been rendered moot and academic by this Court's
resolution granting the Solicitor General's motion to
withdraw appearance as counsel in the several cases
pending herein. It should be clarified that the
resolution had to be issued with the national interest
in mind. Time was of the essence and any hedging on
the part of the PCGG and/or its counsel could, not
merely set back but prejudice, the government's all-
out efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth.
Notwithstanding the ostensible mootness of the
issues raised in a case, this Court has never shirked
from its symbolic function of educating bench and bar
by formulating guiding and controlling principles,
precepts, doctrines and rules.   More so, if the case is
26
of such magnitude that certain legal ambiguities must
be unravelled for the protection of the national
interest. 
27
To allow the transcendental issue of whether the OSG
may withdraw its appearance in a cluster of cases of
national import to pass into legal limbo simply
because it has been "mooted" would be a clear case
of misguided judicial self-restraint. This Court has
assiduously taken every opportunity to lay down brick
by brick the doctrinal infrastructure of our legal
system. Certainly, this is no time for a display of
judicial timorousness of the kind which the Solicitor
General is untimely exhibiting now.
Accordingly, we confront the issue conscious of their
far-reaching implications, not alone on the instant
case but on future ones as well, which the OSG will
surely be called upon to handle again and again.
The resolution of the first issue laid down at the
beginning of this ponencia hinges on whether or not
the Solicitor General may be compelled
by mandamus to appear for the Republic and the
PCGG. This issue is best resolved by a close scrutiny
of the nature and extent of the power and authority
lodged by law on the Solicitor General.
At this juncture, a flashback on the statutory origins of
the Office of the Solicitor General is in order.
Incorporated in Act No. 136 dated June 11,
1901   providing for the organization of courts in the
28
Philippine Islands was Chapter III entitled "The
Attorney General." Section 40 states:
There shall be an Attorney-General for
the Philippine Islands, to be appointed
by the Philippine Commission . . .
The catalog of his duties includes the following:
He shall prosecute or defend therein
all causes, civil and criminal, to which
the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or any officer thereof, in his
official capacity, is a party . . . 
29
Section 41 further provides:
There shall be an officer learned in the
law to assist the Attorney-General in
the performance of all his duties,
called the Solicitor-General who shall
be appointed by the Commission . . .
In case of a vacancy in the office of
Attorney-General, or of his absence or
disability, the Solicitor-General shall
have power to exercise the duties of
that office. Under the supervision of
the Attorney-General, it shall be the
especial duty of the Solicitor-General
to conduct and argue suits and
appeals in the Supreme Court, in
which the Philippine Government is
interested, and the Attorney-General
may, whenever he deems it for the
interest of the Philippine Government,
either in person conduct and argue
any case in any court of the Philippine
Islands in which the Philippine
Government is interested or may
direct the Solicitor General to do so.
(Emphasis supplied)
Six months later, a law was passed reorganizing the
Office of the Attorney-General and providing for the
appointment of the said official and the Solicitor
General by the Civil Governor and for an increase in
their salaries. Their duties remained basically the
same.  30
In the meantime, Act No. 222 was passed on
September 5, 1901 providing for the organization of,
among others, the Department of Finance and Justice
which embraced within its executive control the
Bureau of Justice.  31
Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1917, the Bureau of Justice is
specifically constituted "the law office of the
Government of the Philippine Islands and by it shall
be performed duties requiring the services of a law
officer."   Its chief officials are the Attorney-General
32
and his assistant, the Solicitor General.  33
As principal law officer of the
Government, the Attorney-General
shall have authority to act for and
represent the Government of the
Philippine Islands, its officers, and
agents in any official investigation,
proceeding, or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer.  34
In 1932, the office of the Attorney-General was
phased out and his functions were assumed by the
Secretary of Justice.   Subsequently, the Bureau of
35
Justice came to be known as the Office of the Solicitor
General,   headed by the Solicitor General. 
36 37
Parenthetically, these institutions were patterned after
the Office of Attorney-General, created by the First
U.S. Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which
called for a "meet person, learned in the law, to act as
Attorney-General for the U.S."   When the
38
Department of Justice was established in 1870, the
position of Solicitor-General was created as an
assistant to the Attorney-General.   Over a century
39
later, their respective positions and functions remain
the same. The Attorney-General of the United States,
appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, is now the head of the
Department of Justice.   In the same manner, a
40
Solicitor General, learned in the law, is appointed to
assist the Attorney-General in the performance of his
duties. 41
In contrast, the Solicitor-General of the Philippines,
emerging from the shadow of the Attorney-General
and later, of the Secretary of Justice, has come to his
own. On July 20, 1948, Republic Act. No. 335,
amending Section 1659 of the Administrative Code,
bestowed on him the rank of Undersecretary of a
Department. Subsequently, a series of amendatory
laws designed to enlarge the complement of the
Office of the Solicitor General was enacted   until on 42
June 4, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. (1) Represent the
478, its pivotal role in the government became clearly Government in the
defined and delineated. Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals in
During the martial law years, President Ferdinand E. all criminal
Marcos leaned heavily on his Solicitor General to proceedings; represent
provide legal underpinnings of his official acts. the Government and
Reflective of the tremendously enhanced power of the its officers in the
official and the position was Executive Order No. 454 Supreme Court, the
enacted on September 23, 1975, conferring upon the Court of Appeals, and
Solicitor General the rank of a member of the all other courts or
Cabinet "with all the rights, honors and privileges tribunals in all civil
pertaining to the position." Said executive order was actions and special
superseded by Executive Order No. 473 dated August proceedings in which
12, 1976 "making the Solicitor General a member of the Government or any
the Cabinet." These executive orders were capped by officer thereof in his
Executive Order No. 552 dated August 14, 1979 official capacity is a
elevating the OSG into a Ministry with the same party.
powers and functions defined in P.D. Nos. 478 and
1347. (2) Investigate, initiate
court action, or in any
P.D. 478 became, as it were, the Magna Carta of the manner proceed
Office of the Solicitor General. After the change of against any person,
administration, or on July 25, 1987, President corporation or firm for
Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order the enforcement of any
No. 292 instituting the Administrative Code of 1987. contract, bond,
Under Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, the Office guarantee, mortgage,
of the Solicitor General is described as an pledge or other
"independent and autonomous office attached to the collateral executed in
Department of Justice." Headed by the Solicitor favor of the
General, "who is the principal law officer and legal Government. Where
defender of the Government," the Office shall have a proceedings are to be
Legal Staff composed of fifteen (15) Assistant conducted outside of
Solicitors General and such number of Solicitors and the Philippines, the
Trial Attorneys "as may be necessary to operate the Solicitor General may
Office which shall divided into fifteen (15) employ counsel to
divisions.   Among its powers and functions are the
43 assist in the discharge
following which are relevant to the issues: of the aforementioned
responsibilities.
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. —
The office of the Solicitor General x x x           x x x          x x x
shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and (8) Deputize
instrumentalities and its officials and legal officers of
agents in any litigation, proceeding, government
investigation or matter requiring the departments, bureaus,
services of a lawyer. When authorized agencies and offices to
by the President or head of the office assist the Solicitor
concerned, it shall also represent General and appear or
government owned or controlled represent the
corporations. The Office of the Government in cases
Solicitor General shall constitute the involving their
law office of the Government, and, as respective offices,
such, shall discharge duties requiring brought before the
the services of a lawyer. (Emphasis courts and exercise
supplied.) It shall have the following supervision and control
specific powers and functions: over such legal
Officers with respect to
such cases.
(9) Call on any matter, action or
department, bureau, proceeding which, in
office, agency or his opinion , affects the
instrumentality of the welfare of the people
Government for such as the ends of justice
service, assistance may require; and
and cooperation as
may be necessary in (12) Perform such
fulfilling its function other functions as may
and responsibilities be provided by law.  44

and for this purpose

enlist the services of In thus tracing the origins of the Office of the Solicitor
any government official General to gain a clear understanding of the nature of
or employees in the the functions and extent of the powers of the Solicitor
pursuit of his tasks. General himself, it is evident that a policy decision
was made in the early beginnings to consolidate in
Departments, bureaus, one official the discharge of legal functions and
agencies, offices, services in the government. These took the form
instrumentalities and mostly of representing the Government in various
corporations to whom legal proceedings.
the Office of the
Solicitor General The rationale behind this step is not difficult to
renders legal services comprehend. Sound government operations require
are authorized to consistency in legal policies and practices among the
disburse funds from instrumentalities of the State. Moreover, an official
their sundry operating learned in the law and skilled in advocacy could best
and other funds for the plan and coordinate the strategies and moves of the
latter Office. For this legal battles of the different arms of the government.
purpose, the Solicitor Surely, the economy factor, too, must have weighed
General and his staff heavily in arriving at such a decision.
are specifically
authorized to receive
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give
allowances as may be
the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this
provided by the
case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the
Government offices,
government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the
instrumentalities and
laws creating the office is the discernible intent which
corporations
may be gathered from the term "shall," which is
concerned, in addition
invariably employed, from Act No. 136 (1901) to the
to their regular
more recent Executive Order No. 292 (1987).
compensation.
Under the principles of statutory construction, so
(10) Represent, upon
familiar even to law students, the term "shall" is
the instructions of the
nothing if not mandatory.
President of the
Republic of the
Philippines in In common or ordinary parlance and in
international litigations, its ordinary significance, the term
negotiations or "shall" is a word of command, and one
conferences where the which has always and which must be
legal position of the given a compulsory meaning, and it is
Republic must be generally imperative or mandatory. It
defended or has the invariable significance of
presented. operating to impose a duty which may
be enforced, particularly if public
policy is in favor of this meaning or
(11) Act for the
when public interest is involved, or
Republic and/or the
where the public or persons have
people before any
rights which ought to be exercised or
court, tribunal, body or
commission in any
 enforced, unless a contrary intent for mandamus to compel him to prosecute the case.
appears.  45
We declared:

The presumption is that the word Notwithstanding his personal

"shall" in a statute is used in an
imperative, and not in a directory,
sense. If a different interpretations if
sought, it must rest upon something in
the character of the legislation or in
the context which will justify a different
meaning.  46
Exactly what is the signification of the mandate for the
OSG "to represent the Government of the Philippines,
its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigations or
matter requiring the services of the lawyer?"
To "represent" is standing in place,
supplying the place, or performing the
duties or exercising the rights, of the
party represented; to speak or act with
authority on behalf of another; to
conduct and control proceedings in
court on behalf of another. 47
The decision of this Court as early as 1910 with
respect to the duties of Attorney-General well applies
to the Solicitor General under the facts of the present
case. The Court then declared:
convictions or opinions, the fiscal must
proceed with his duty of presenting
evidence to the Court to enable the
court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to the culpability of the
accused. The fiscal should not shirk
from his responsibility much less leave
the prosecution of the case at the
hands of a private prosecutor . . . In
the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty
of the public prosecutor to appear for
the government since an offense is an
outrage to the sovereignty of the State
. . . This is so because "the
prosecuting officer is the
representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy but of a sovereignty
where obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligations to
govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in
a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the two-fold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.  51

In this jurisdiction, it is the duty of the

Undoubtedly, the above arguments apply equally well
Attorney General "to perform the
to the Solicitor General who is sought to be compelled
duties imposed upon him by law" and
to appear before the different courts to ensure that the
"he shall prosecute all causes, civil
case of the Republic of the Philippines against those
and criminal, to which the Government
who illegally amassed wealth at the expense the
of the Philippines Islands, or any
people maybe made to account for their misdeeds
officer thereof, in his official capacity,
and return said wealth.
is a party . . ." 
48

Like the Attorney-General of the United States who

Being a public officer, the Solicitor General is
has absolute discretion in choosing whether to
"invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a
of the government, to be exercised by him for the
prosecution already started,   our own Solicitor
52

benefit of the public."   Another role of the Solicitor

49

General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or

General is an officer of the Court, in which case he is
compromise suit either with or without stipulations
called upon "to share in the task and responsibility of
with other party.   Abandonment of a case, however,
53

dispensing justice and resolving disputes;" therefore,

does not mean that the Solicitor General may just
he may be enjoined in the same manner that a special
drop it without any legal and valid reason for the
prosecutor was sought enjoined by this Court from
discretion given him is not unlimited.   Its exercise
54

committing any act which may tend to "obstruct,

must be, not only within the parameters set by law but
pervert or impede and degrade the administration of
with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.
justice." 
50

Such are reflected in its policies, thus:

In one case where a fiscal manifested before the trial
The discretionary power of the
court that he would not prosecute the case in court for
attorney for the United States in
insufficiency of evidence after his motion to dismiss
determining whether a prosecution
had been denied, this Court granted a petition
shall be commenced or maintained
 may well depend upon matters of
policy wholly apart from any question
of probable cause. Although as
member of the bar, the Attorney for
the United States is an officer of the
court, he is nevertheless an executive
official of the Government, and it is as
an officer of the executive department
that he exercises a discretion as to
whether or not there shall be a
prosecution in a particular case. . . . 
55
The first executive order ever issued by President
Aquino on February 28, 1986, created the PCGG. It
announced the government's policy of recovering all
ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close
associates. It charged the PCGG with the "task of
assisting the President" in regard to the recovery of all
ill-gotten wealth, investigation of "such cases of graft
and corruption as the President may assign" to it, and
the adoption of safeguards to ensure that corruption
may not be again committed with impunity.
This issuance was followed by Executive Order No. 2
dated March 12, 1986 freezing all assets and
properties of Marcos, his family and cronies;
prohibiting their transfer, conveyance, encumbrance
or concealment, and requiring all persons in and
outside of the Philippines who are in possession of
said properties to make full disclosure of the same to
the PCGG.
On April 11, 1986, the PCGG promulgated its Rules
and Regulations. A pertinent provision states:
Sec. 10. Findings of the
Commission. — Based on the
evidence adduced, the Commission
shall determine whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the
asset, property or business enterprise
in question constitute ill-gotten wealth
as described in Executive Orders Nos.
1 and 2. In the event of an affirmative
finding, the Commission shall certify
the case to the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance with
law. Business, properties, funds, and
other assets found to be lawfully
acquired shall be immediately
released and the writ of sequestration,
hold or freeze orders lifted
accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, or on May 7, 1986, Executive Order No.
14 defining the jurisdiction over cases involving such
ill-gotten wealth was issued, it contains the following
provisions:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government, with the assistance of
the Solicitor General and other
government agencies, is hereby
empowered to file and prosecute all
cases investigated by it under
Executive Order No. 1, dated
February 28, 1986, and Executive
Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as
may be warranted by its finding.
Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission
on Good Government shall file all
such cases, whether civil or criminal,
with the Sandiganbayan, which shall
have exclusive and original jurisdiction
thereof.
Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution,
reparation of damages, or
indemnification for consequential
damages, forfeiture proceedings
provided for under Republic Act No.
1379, or any other civil actions under
the Civil Code or other existing laws,
in connection with Executive Order
No. 2 dated March 12, 1986, may be
filed separately from and proceed
independently of any criminal
proceedings and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied).
All these legal provisions ineluctably lead to no other
conclusion but that under the law of its creation and
the complementary Rules, the law office of the PCGG,
as it is for the rest of the Government, is the Office of
the Solicitor General. Although the PCGG is
"empowered to file and prosecute all cases
investigated by it" under Executive Orders No. 1 and
2, it does not thereby oust the Office of the Solicitor
General from its lawful mandate to represent the
Government and its agencies in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. Moreover, such express grant of
power to PCGG does not imply that it may abdicate
such power and turn over the prosecution of the
cases to private lawyers whom it may decide to
employ. In those instances where proceedings are to
be conducted outside of the Philippines, the Solicitor
General, continuing to discharge his duties, may
employ counsel to assist him,   particularly because
56
he may not be licensed to appear before the courts in
a foreign jurisdiction.
Under its own Rules and Regulations, specifically the
provision aforequoted, the PCGG certifies to the
Solicitor General the cases for which it had found
reasonable ground to believe that certain assets and
properties are ill-gotten under Executive Order Nos. 1
and 2. The Solicitor General shall then proceed "in
accordance with law."
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor
General exercises his discretion in the management
of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case
by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt
not to file the case at all. He may do everything within
his legal authority but always conformably with the
national interest and the policy of the government on
the matter at hand.
After filing a case, he may even move for its dismissal
in the event that, along the way, he realizes that
prosecuting the case would not serve the
government's purposes. In other words, because he
was appointed to the position on account of his
qualification as a man "learned in the law," the
Solicitor General is obligated to perform his functions
and to perform them well. He may not, however,
abdicate his function through an arbitrary exercise of
his discretion. We find that a withdrawal of
appearance on flimsy or petty grounds is tantamount
to withdrawing on no grounds at all and to a
dereliction of duty.
The Office of the Solicitor General repeatedly invoked
the ruling in Orbos v. Civil Service
Commission,   which hardly constitutes authority to
57
uphold its position with respect to the withdrawal of
the Solicitor General in the instant case. On the
contrary, in said case, this Court struck down private
respondent's motion to disqualify the OSG from
appearing for petitioner Department of Transportation
and Communications Secretary Orbos. At the risk of
being repetitious, the parties were reminded that
under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 —
The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation, or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer.
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court clarified that even when "confronted with a
situation where one government office takes an
adverse position against another government agency,
as in this case, the Solicitor General should not refrain
from performing his duty as the lawyer of the
government. It is incumbent upon him to present to
the court what he considers would legally uphold the
best interest of the government although it may run
counter to a client's position. In such an instance, the
government office adversely affected by the position
taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the
merit of its case may appear in its own behalf through
its legal personnel or representative."
The Court further pointed out that it is not entirely
impossible that the Office of the Solicitor General may
take a position adverse to his clients like the Civil
Service Commission and the National Labor Relations
Commission, among others, and even the People of
the Philippines. In such instances, however, it is not
proper for the Solicitor General to simply decline to
handle the case or arbitrarily withdraw therefrom. The
Court enjoins him to "nevertheless manifest his
opinion and recommendations to the Court which is
an invaluable aid in the disposition of the case."  58
However, in those cases where a government agency
declines the services of the Solicitor General or
otherwise fails or refuses to forward the papers of the
case to him for appropriate action, the Court
categorically held that ". . . this practice should be
estopped."   By the same token, the Solicitor General
59
should not decline to appear in court to represent a
government agency without just and valid reason,
especially the PCGG which is under the Office of the
President, he being a part of the Executive
Department.
In the case at bar, the reason advanced by the
Solicitor General for his motion to withdraw his
appearance as lawyer for the PCGG is that he has
been, more than once embarrassed in court and
thereby made "a laughing stock in its (his)
professionalism." Examples are when the OSG
lawyers betrayed ignorance in open court of certain
moves taken by the PCGG, such as the lifting of a
sequestration of an asset or when it was under the
impression that an asset had mysteriously
disappeared only to be informed that "a PCGG
Commissioner had earlier by resolution authorized the
disposition of said asset."
The last straw, as it were, was the public
announcement through media made by the PCGG
that it had "dispensed with or otherwise did not need
the legal services of the lawyer of the
government."   It is evident that the withdrawal of the
60
Solicitor General was precipitated by institutional
pique, the lawyers concerned having allowed their
collective pride to prevail over their sense of duty in
protecting and upholding the public interest.
One wistfully wishes that the OSG could have been
as zealous in representing the PCGG as it was in
appearing for the head of their office, the Solicitor
General, in a civil suit for damages filed against him in
a Regional Trial Court arising from allegedly
defamatory remarks uttered by him.
Such enthusiasm, according to this Court, was
misplaced. For Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
478 which authorizes the OSG to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, admits of an exception, and that it is, it stops
short of representing "a public official at any stage of
a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising
from a felony." 61
In instances such as the above, the OSG can, with
reason, withdraw its representation even if it has
already entered its appearance. But the Solicitor
General, as the officially-mandated lawyer of the
government, is not empowered to take a similar step
on the basis of a petty reason like embarrassment, as
that to which the individual lawyers assigned to
appear for their office were subjected. Had they not
been too preoccupied with their personal feelings,
they could have checked themselves in time. For a
sense of professional responsibility and proper
decorum would dictate that they distinguish between
the institution which, from the very beginning, had
been constituted as the law office of the Government
and the individuals through whom its powers and
duties are exercised. No emotions, of whatever kind
and degree, should be allowed to becloud their high
sense of duty and commitment to country and people.
The OSG itself admitted refraining from citing other
incidents as additional bases for the Solicitor
General's withdrawal "as they are not of meat and
substance" but apparently, their overwhelming sense
of shame overcame them as the OSG was "rendered
thereby a laughing stock in its professionalism."  62
Now a word on the incidents that allegedly caused
humiliation to the OSG lawyers, thus provoking the
Solicitor General into withdrawing his appearance as
counsel for the PCGG. No litigation can be assured of
success if counsel does not enjoy the confidence of
his client. This is manifested by, among other things,
holding regular, constant and untrammeled
consultation with each other. Who can say but that if
the communication lines had been kept open between
the OSG and PCGG, no surprises would have been
sprung on the former by the latter in open court?
Petitioner's claim that the Solicitor General could not
withdraw his appearance as lawyer of PCGG
inasmuch as he had neither the consent of his client
nor the authority from the court, applying the pertinent
provision of the Rules of Court, is not well-taken. Here
is no ordinary lawyer-client relationship. Let it be
remembered that the client is no less than the
Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of
sovereignty resides. Whether regarded as an abstract
entity or an ideal person, it is to state the obvious that
it can only act through the instrumentality of the
government which, according to the Administrative
Code of 1987, refers to the "corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines . . ."   And the
63
OSG is, by law, constituted the law office of the
Government whose specific powers and functions
include that of representing the Republic and/or the
people before any court in any action which affects
the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require.
Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as
a collectivity that constitutes the Republic of the
Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of the OSG
is the people themselves of which the individual
lawyers in said office are a part.
In order to cushion the impact of his untimely
withdrawal of appearance which might adversely
affect the case, the Solicitor General has offered "to
submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters
pending with this Honorable Court, if called for by
circumstances in the interest of the government or if
he is so required by the court." However, as correctly
pointed out by the petitioner, while the Solicitor
General may be free to express his views and
comments before the Court in connection with a case
he is handling, he may not do so anymore after he
has formally expressed his refusal to appear therein.
For by then, he has lost his standing in court. Unless
his views are sought by the court, the Solicitor
General may not voluntarily appear in behalf of his
client after his withdrawal from the case; otherwise,
such reappearance would constitute a blatant
disregard for court rules and procedure, and that, on
the part of one who is presumed to be "learned in the
law."
In the face of such express refusal on the part of the
Solicitor General to continue his appearance as
counsel of the PCGG in the cases to recover the ill-
gotten wealth of the Filipino people from the Marcoses
and their cronies, the PCGG has had to employ the
service of a group of private attorneys lest the national
interest be prejudiced. Were this Court to allow such
action to remain unchallenged, this could well signal
the laying down of the novel and unprecedented
doctrine that the representation by the Solicitor
General of the Government enunciated by law is, after
all, not mandatory but merely directory. Worse, that
this option may be exercised on less than meritorious
grounds; not on substance but on whimsy, depending
on the all too human frailties of the lawyers in the
OSG assigned to a particular case. Under such
circumstances, it were better to repeal the law than
leave the various government agencies, all dependent
on the OSG for legal representation, in a condition of
suspenseful uncertainty. With every looming legal
battle, they will be speculating whether they can rely
on the Solicitor General to defend the Government's
interest or whether they shall have to depend on their
own "in-house" resources for legal assistance.
The Court is firmly convinced that, considering the
spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other
logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative
Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG
to "represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer."
Sound management policies require that the
government's approach to legal problems and policies
formulated on legal issues be harmonized and
coordinated by a specific agency. The government
owes it to its officials and their respective offices, the
political units at different levels, the public and the
various sectors, local and international, that have
dealings with it, to assure them of a degree of
certitude and predictability in matters of legal import.
From the historical and statutory perspectives detailed
earlier in this ponencia, it is beyond cavil that it is the
Solicitor General who has been conferred the singular
honor and privilege of being the "principal law officer
and legal defender of the Government." One would be
hard put to name a single legal group or law firm that
can match the expertise, experience, resources, staff
and prestige of the OSG which were painstakingly
built up for almost a century.
Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that
spans the legal interests of virtually the entire
government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to
transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client
agency and instead, promote and protect the public
weal. Given such objectivity, it can discern,
metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the forest
and not just the individual trees. Not merely will it
strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow
interests of the client office or official, but as well, the
vast concerns of the sovereign which it is committed
to serve.
In light of the foregoing, the Solicitor General's
withdrawal of his appearance on behalf of the PCGG
was beyond the scope of his authority in the
management of a case. As a public official, it is his
sworn duty to provide legal services to the
Government, particularly to represent it in litigations.
And such duty may be enjoined upon him by the writ
of mandamus. And such duty may be enjoined upon
him by the writ of mandamus. Such order, however,
should not be construed to mean that his discretion in
the handling of his cases may be interfered with. The
Court is not compelling him to act in a particular
way.   Rather, the Court is directing him to prevent a
64
failure of justice   resulting from his abandonment in
65
midstream of the cause of the PCGG and the
Republic and ultimately, of the Filipino people.
In view of the foregoing, there need be no proof
adduced that the petitioner has a personal interest in
the case, as his petition is anchored on the right of the
people, through the PCGG and the Republic, to be
represented in court by the public officer duly
authorized by law. The requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner
is a citizen and hence, part of the public which
possesses the right.  66
The writ of prohibition, however, may not be similarly
treated and granted in this petition. The said writ,
being intended to prevent the doing of some act that
is about to be done, it may not provide a remedy for
acts which are already fait accompli.   Having been
67
placed in a situation where it was constrained to hire
private lawyers if the Republic's campaign to legally
recover the wealth amassed by the Marcoses, their
friends and relatives was to prosper, the PCGG's
action is justified. However, it was not entirely
blameless. Its failure to coordinate closely with the
Solicitor General has spawned the incidents which
culminated in the withdrawal of the latter from
appearing as counsel in its cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of mandamus is
hereby GRANTED. The Solicitor General is
DIRECTED to immediately re-enter his appearance in
the cases wherein he had filed a motion to withdraw
appearance and the PCGG shall terminate the
services of the lawyers it had employed but not before
paying them the reasonable fees due them in
accordance with rules and regulations of the
Commission on Audit.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Section 5-20, 27-30 Duties of Attorneys, Suspension
and Removal
 Teodoro Regala, et al. vs Sandiganbayan,
Republic of the Philippines EN BANC GR No. 105938
Sept 20, 1996( include separate opinions)
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and
EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First
Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and
RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every
State's judicial system, upon which the workings of
the contentious and adversarial system in the
Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity of
fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The
fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what
makes the law profession a unique position of trust
and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other
calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to
uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection
accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the
performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the
institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before
the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as
one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No.
33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the
Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1
Among the dependants named in the case are herein
petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A.
Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and
Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz
Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA
Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal
services for its clients, which included, among others,
the organization and acquisition of business
associations and/or organizations, with the correlative
and incidental services where its members acted as
incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More
specifically, in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client
documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's
name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment
covering said shares. In the course of their dealings
with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as well as
their personal and business circumstances. As
members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted
in the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with
the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as
nominees-stockholders of the said corporations
involved in sequestration proceedings. 2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential
Commission on Good Government (hereinafter
referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG
Case No. 33 as party-defendant.  Respondent PCGG
3
based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as
party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal
the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in
PCGG Case No. 33. 4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended
Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino
V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo
U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and
Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion
Cruz Regala and Abello law offices
(ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed
conspired and confederated with each
other in setting up, through the use of
the coconut levy funds, the financial
 and corporate framework and
structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM,
COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and
more than twenty other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the
acquisition of San Miguel Corporation
shares and its institutionalization
through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly. Through insidious
means and machinations, ACCRA,
being the wholly-owned investment
arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total
outstanding capital stock of UCPB as
of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
Investments Corporation number 44
among the top 100 biggest
stockholders of UCPB which has
approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of
February, 1984. 5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,
petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers'
participation in the acts with which
their codefendants are charged, was
in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of
rendering professional
and legal services to
clients, defendants-
ACCRA lawyers, Jose
C. Concepcion,
Teodoro D. Regala,
Rogelio A. Vinluan and
Eduardo U. Escueta,
became holders of
shares of stock in the
corporations listed
under their respective
names in Annex "A" of
the expanded
Amended Complaint
as incorporating or
acquiring stockholders
only and, as such, they
do not claim any
proprietary interest in
the said shares of
stock.
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino
V. Cruz was one of the incorporators
in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing
Corporation, which was organized for
legitimate business purposes not
related to the allegations of the
expanded Amended Complaint.
However, he has long ago transferred
any material interest therein and
therefore denies that the "shares"
appearing in his name in Annex "A" of
the expanded Amended Complaint are
his assets. 6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from
ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the
allegations in the complaint implicating him in the
alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October
8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG
similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion
as parties-defendants) as accorded private
respondent Roco.  The Counter-Motion for dropping
8
petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing
on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following
conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of
the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in
favor of its client covering their respective
shareholdings. 9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented
supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private
respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to
warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in
PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent
PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May
24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for
reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33;
(b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private
respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter
aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag,
and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988
to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private
respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence
of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG
Case No. 33.  10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private
respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention
that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client
involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he
undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom
he acted as nominee-stockholder.  11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan
promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case
No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions
required by respondent PCGG. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic
stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have
acted, i.e. their principal, and that will
be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by
the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot
even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of
their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of
the client.
This is what appears to be the cause
for which they have been impleaded
by the PCGG as defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that
defendant Roco has demonstrated his
agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which
revelation could show the lack of
cause against him. This in turn has
allowed the PCGG to exercise its
power both under the rules of Agency
and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A
in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to
the ACCRA lawyers the same
conditions availed of by Roco; full
disclosure in exchange for exclusion
from these proceedings (par. 7,
PCGG's COMMENT dated November
4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have
preferred not to make the disclosures
required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot,
therefore, begrudge the PCGG for
keeping them as party defendants. In
the same vein, they cannot compel the
PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion
dated October 8, 1991 filed by the
ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty.
Paraja G. Hayudini for the same
treatment by the PCGG as accorded
to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of
merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the
above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA
lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in
subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers
who undisputably acted as lawyers in
serving as nominee-stockholders, to
the strict application of the law of
agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not considering petitioners ACCRA
lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly
situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely
no evidence that Mr.
Roco had revealed, or
had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of
the client(s) for whom
he acted as nominee-
stockholder.
2. Even assuming that
Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal,
the identities of the
client(s), the disclosure
does not constitute a
substantial distinction
as would make the
 classification the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No.
reasonable under the 105938.
equal protection
clause. Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent
Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33
3. Respondent grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his
Sandiganbayan alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client,
sanctioned favoritism giving him an advantage over them who are in the
and undue preference same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm.
in favor of Mr. Roco in Petitioners further argue that even granting that such
violation of the equal an undertaking has been assumed by private
protection clause. respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing
the identity of their principal under their sworn
III mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all
times the confidentiality of information obtained during
The Honorable Sandiganbayan such lawyer-client relationship.
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not holding that, under the facts of this Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes
case, the attorney-client privilege petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the
from revealing the identity of their lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
client(s) and the other information documents it required (deeds of assignment)
requested by the PCGG. protected, because they are evidence of nominee
status. 
13

1. Under the peculiar

facts of this case, the In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that
attorney-client privilege respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as
includes the identity of party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an
the client(s). Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss
Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco 'without an order of
2. The factual court by filing a notice of dismissal',"   and he has
14

disclosures required by undertaken to identify his principal. 15

the PCGG are not

limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA
lawyers' alleged
client(s) but extend to
other privileged
matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not requiring that the dropping of
party-defendants by the PCGG must
be based on reasonable and just
grounds and with due consideration to
the constitutional right of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers to the equal
protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own
motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991
resolution which was denied by respondent
Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing
respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by
the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose
the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG
is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say
in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the
PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with petitioners —
the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion
from the complaint. The statement of the
Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated
March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic
stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have
acted, i.e, their principal, and that will
be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by
the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot
even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
 themselves from the consequences of
their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of
the client.
This is what appears to be the cause
for which they have been impleaded
by the PCGG as defendants herein.
(Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on
Good Government" respondent PCGG, through
counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on
December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish
through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those
subscription payments in corporations included in
Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint; that the
ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of
assignment, some in the name of particular persons;
some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court.
I propose to establish through these
ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-
called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all
the monies to these subscription
payments of these corporations who
are now the petitioners in this case.
Third, that these lawyers executed
deeds of trust, some in the name of a
particular person, some in blank. Now,
these blank deeds are important to our
claim that some of the shares are
actually being held by the nominees
for the late President Marcos. Fourth,
they also executed deeds of
assignment and some of these
assignments have also blank
assignees. Again, this is important to
our claim that some of the shares are
for Mr. Conjuangco and some are for
Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of thes e
corporations are really just paper
corporations. Why do we say that?
One: There are no really fixed sets of
officers, no fixed sets of directors at
the time of incorporation and even up
to 1986, which is the crucial year. And
not only that, they have no permits
from the municipal authorities in
Makati. Next, actually all their
addresses now are care of Villareal
Law Office. They really have no
address on records. These are some
of the principal things that we would
ask of these nominees stockholders,
as they called themselves.  16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in
for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of
activities and services performed in the course of their
duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners'
inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely
being used as leverage to compel them to name their
clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail
these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG
has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and
should exclude them from the Third Amended
Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on
the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one
person lets his services and another hires them
without reference to the object of which the services
are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may
be compensated by honorarium or for
hire,   and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a
17
friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a
contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained
by the contract to the person who requested
him.   But the lawyer-client relationship is more than
18
that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client
relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of
trust and confidence reposed on him by his client.   A
19
lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the
court, thus his powers are entirely different from and
superior to those of an ordinary agent.  Moreover, an
20
attorney also occupies what may be considered as a
"quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of
the Court   and exercises his judgment in the choice
21
of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship,
there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to
his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of
fidelity and good faith,   that is required by reason of
22
necessity and public interest   based on the
23
hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice
in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.  24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a
lawyer to his client that distinguishes
him from any other professional in
society. This conception is entrenched
and embodies centuries of established
and stable tradition.   In Stockton
25
v. Ford,  the U. S. Supreme Court
26
held:
There are few of the business
relations of life involving a higher trust
and confidence than that of attorney
and client, or generally speaking, one
more honorably and faithfully
discharged; few more anxiously
guarded by the law, or governed by
the sterner principles of morality and
justice; and it is the duty of the court to
administer them in a corresponding
spirit, and to be watchful and
industrious, to see that confidence
thus reposed shall not be used to the
detriment or prejudice of the rights of
the party bestowing it.  27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old
Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the
Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of
his client to reveal any communication made by the
client to him or his advice given thereon in the course
of professional employment."   Passed on into various
28
provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client
privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. — The
following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view
to, professional employment, can an
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such
capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation
in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge
and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or
public popularity should restrain him
from the full discharge of his duty. In
the judicial forum the client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the
law of the land, and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be
borne in mind that the great trust of
the lawyer is to be performed within
and not without the bounds of the law.
The office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for
any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicanery. He must
obey his own conscience and not that
of his client.
Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client
relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the
constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one
of the most sacrosanct rights available to the
accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to
choose between legal representation without effective
communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he
might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt
to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the
right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high,
or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of
information would be curtailed thereby rendering the
right practically nugatory. The threat this represents
against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to
be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one
seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be
circumscribed by limited information engendered by a
fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client
relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and client
which in turn requires a situation which encourages a
dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information.
It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege
not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and
professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may
be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts
and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the
answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should
not be shrouded in mystery   Under this premise, the
30
general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United
States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege
and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this
client. 
31
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well
established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be protected
is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a
client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject
matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the
opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know
who his opponent is."   He cannot be obliged to grope
32
in the dark against unknown forces.  33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general
rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which
he sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor,   a state supreme court reversed a
34
lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the
name of her client on the ground that the subject
matter of the relationship was so closely related to the
issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually
attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an
election official, informed his attorney in confidence
that he had been offered a bribe to violate election
laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In
her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had
advised her client to count the votes correctly, but
averred that she could not remember whether her
client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited
for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's
identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower
court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held
that under the circumstances of the case, and under
the exceptions described above, even the name of the
client was privileged.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,  involved the same
35
exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those
instances where a strong probability exists that the
disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the
client in the very criminal activity for which the
lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury
proceedings inquiring into the activities of the
"Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal
importation of drugs in the United States. The
respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses
and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe
Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of
1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig,
requiring them to produce documents and information
regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of
any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers
refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-
disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the
case, held:
 A client's identity and the nature of
that client's fee arrangements may be
privileged where the person invoking
the privilege can show that a strong
probability exists that disclosure of
such information would implicate that
client in the very criminal activity for
which legal advice was sought Baird
v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in
Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a
matter of California law, the rule also
reflects federal law. Appellants
contend that the Baird exception
applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely
consonant with the principal policy
behind the attorney-client privilege. "In
order to promote freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by
clients, the apprehension of compelled
disclosure from the legal advisors
must be removed; hence, the law
must prohibit such disclosure except
on the client's consent." 8 J.
Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In
furtherance of this policy, the client's
identity and the nature of his fee
arrangements are, in exceptional
cases, protected as confidential
communications.  36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass
v. Terminal Cab Corporation,  prompted the New
37
York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the
effect that he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury
when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second
taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought
action both against defendant corporation and the
owner of the second cab, identified in the information
only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney
of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary
examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the
lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the
second cab when a man, a client of the insurance
company, prior to the institution of legal action, came
to him and reported that he was involved in a car
accident. It was apparent under the circumstances
that the man was the owner of the second cab. The
state supreme court held that the reports were clearly
made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The
court said:
That his employment came about
through the fact that the insurance
company had hired him to defend its
policyholders seems immaterial. The
attorney is such cases is clearly the
attorney for the policyholder when the
policyholder goes to him to report an
occurrence contemplating that it would
be used in an action or claim against
him. 38
xxx xxx xxx
All communications made by a client
to his counsel, for the purpose of
professional advice or assistance, are
privileged, whether they relate to a suit
pending or contemplated, or to any
other matter proper for such advice or
aid; . . . And whenever the
communication made, relates to a
matter so connected with the
employment as attorney or counsel as
to afford presumption that it was the
ground of the address by the client,
then it is privileged from disclosure. . .
It appears . . . that the name and
address of the owner of the second
cab came to the attorney in this case
as a confidential communication. His
client is not seeking to use the courts,
and his address cannot be disclosed
on that theory, nor is the present
action pending against him as service
of the summons on him has not been
effected. The objections on which the
court reserved decision are
sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining
Company,  the lawyer involved was required by a
40
lower court to disclose whether he represented certain
clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the
court's request was to determine whether the
unnamed persons as interested parties were
connected with the purchase of properties involved in
the action. The lawyer refused and brought the
question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the
lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients the
court held:
If it can compel the witness to state,
as directed by the order appealed
from, that he represented certain
persons in the purchase or sale of
these mines, it has made progress in
establishing by such evidence their
 version of the litigation. As already
suggested, such testimony by the
witness would compel him to disclose
not only that he was attorney for
certain people, but that, as the result
of communications made to him in the
course of such employment as such
attorney, he knew that they were
interested in certain transactions. We
feel sure that under such conditions
no case has ever gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance
of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only
his retainer, but the nature of the
transactions to which it related, when
such information could be made the
basis of a suit against his client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the only
link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is
privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner,  a lawyer was consulted by the
42
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the
undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case
criminal charges were brought against them by the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous
years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure
about whether or not they violated tax laws and
sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical
possibility that they had. No investigation was then
being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers.
Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered
to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been
previously assessed as the tax due, and another
amount of money representing his fee for the advice
given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the
IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the
payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS
demanded that Baird identify the lawyers,
accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused
on the ground that he did not know their names, and
declined to name the attorney and accountants
because this constituted privileged communication. A
petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS
summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his
clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not
be forced to reveal the names of clients who
employed him to pay sums of money to the
government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined
income taxes, unsued on, and with no government
audit or investigation into that client's income tax
liability pending. The court emphasized the exception
that a client's name is privileged when so much has
been revealed concerning the legal services rendered
that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him
to possible investigation and sanction by government
agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it
squarely within that exception to the
general rule. Here money was
received by the government, paid by
persons who thereby admitted they
had not paid a sufficient amount in
income taxes some one or more years
in the past. The names of the clients
are useful to the government for but
one purpose — to ascertain which
taxpayers think they were delinquent,
so that it may check the records for
that one year or several years. The
voluntary nature of the payment
indicates a belief by the taxpayers that
more taxes or interest or penalties are
due than the sum previously paid, if
any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for
nonpayment of taxes, though whether
it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it
may well be the link that could form
the chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual of a federal
crime. Certainly the payment and the
feeling of guilt are the reasons the
attorney here involved was employed
— to advise his clients what, under the
circumstances, should be done.  43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist
other situations which could qualify as exceptions to
the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication
to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to
the subject matter of the legal problem on which the
client seeks legal assistance.   Moreover, where
44
the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been
previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client
has been held to be privileged, since such revelation
would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to
the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client's name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would
then reveal client confidences.  46
The circumstances involving the engagement of
lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal
that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the
alleged client's name would lead to establish said
client's connection with the very fact in issue of the
case, which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter
or the substance (without which there would be not
attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the
legal advice or legal service sought was duly
establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its
clients;
(b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in
favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can
readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the
financial and corporate structure, framework and set-
up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners
gave their professional advice in the form of, among
others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment
covering their client's shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the
aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners' legal service to their clients. More
important, it constituted an integral part of their duties
as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate
fear that identifying their clients would implicate them
in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception,
revelation of the client's name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build
its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in
the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of
a . . . crime." 
47
An important distinction must be made between a
case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how
to go around the law for the purpose of committing
illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he
might have previously committed something illegal
and consults his attorney about it. The first case
clearly does not fall within the privilege because the
same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The
second case falls within the exception because
whether or not the act for which the client sought
advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be
used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence,
not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might
lead to possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because
the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for
an illegal act, as in the first example; while the
prosecution may not have a case against the client in
the second example and cannot use the attorney
client relationship to build up a case against the latter.
The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the
professional character of a lawyer to give advice on
the commission of a crime.   The reason for the
48
second has been stated in the cases above discussed
and are founded on the same policy grounds for
which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate
court therein stated that "under such conditions no
case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an
attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to
disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the
transactions to which it related, when such information
could be made the basis of a suit against his
client."   "Communications made to an attorney in the
49
course of any personal employment, relating to the
subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be
drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the
parties stand to each other, are under the seal of
confidence and entitled to protection as privileged
communications."  Where the communicated
50
information, which clearly falls within the privilege,
would suggest possible criminal activity but there
would be not much in the information known to the
prosecution which would sustain a charge except that
revealing the name of the client would open up other
privileged information which would substantiate the
prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is
so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it
falls within the protection. The Baird exception,
applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the
principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the
purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled
disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This
exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand
Jury Proceedings  and Tillotson v. Boughner.  What
51 52
these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the
exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to
a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information
available to the prosecutor which do not depend on
utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and
readily available source of information in the building
of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of
the client's name in circumstances such as the one
which exists in the case at bench amounts to
sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors
and litigants which we cannot and will not
countenance. When the nature of the transaction
would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's
retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the
privilege.   It follows that petitioner attorneys in the
53
instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an
obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in
turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately
hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has
a case against their clients, the latter's case should be
built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by
them from their own sources and not from compelled
testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals much
about the nature of the transaction which may or may
not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and
nature of transaction is so intimate in this case the it
would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the
other. In this sense, the name is as much
"communication" as information revealed directly
about the transaction in question itself, a
communication which is clearly and distinctly
privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such
communication without exposing himself to charges of
violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the
entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and
his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to
the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to
keep clients informed and protect their rights to make
decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon,  the US Second
54
District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law
firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by
helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for
the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in
proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm
to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a
fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a
special breed of cases that often loosen normally
stringent requirements of causation and damages,
and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney,
Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
P.A. v. Scheller  requiring strict obligation of
55
lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee
lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion
of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of
work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer
was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his
client into signing a new fee agreement while
settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While
the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum,
events forced the client to settle for less than what
was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of
fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard
v. Salmon  famously attributed to Justice Benjamin
56
Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer
involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no
attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of
the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's
loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the
protection, which exists not only during the
relationship, but extends even after the termination of
the relationship. 
57
Such are the unrelenting duties required by
lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which
the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of
Oliver Wendell Holmes,   ". . . is an exacting goddess,
58
demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral
discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to
accept respondents' position without denigrating the
noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by
Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly
pursued. But what other gives such
scope to realize the spontaneous
energy of one's soul? In what other
does one plunge so deep in the
stream of life — so share its passions
its battles, its despair, its triumphs,
both as witness and actor? . . . But
that is not all. What a subject is this in
which we are united — this abstraction
called the Law, wherein as in a magic
mirror, we see reflected, not only in
our lives, but the lives of all men that
have been. When I think on this
majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we
are to speak of the law as our
mistress, we who are here know that
she is a mistress only to be won with
sustained and lonely passion — only
to be won by straining all the faculties
by which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not
to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because
the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's
name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the
lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the
identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers
themselves to possible litigation by their clients in
view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on
them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged
that the defendants therein, including herein
petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
conspired with each other in setting up
through the use of coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of
UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
using its wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investment Corporation, became the
holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The
PCGG wanted to establish through the
ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their
client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all
the monies to the subscription payment;
hence, petitioners acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing
themselves, among others, to be used as
instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth
through government concessions, etc., which
acts constitute gross abuse of official position
and authority, flagrant breach of public trust,
unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution
and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal
the identity of their clients, but worse, to
submit to the PCGG documents substantiating
the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds
of assignment petitioners executed in favor of
its clients covering their respective
shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from
petitioners a link "that would inevitably form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict
the (client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of
error, respondents alleged that the private
respondent was dropped as party defendant
not only because of his admission that he
acted merely as a nominee but also because
of his undertaking to testify to such facts and
circumstances "as the interest of truth may
require, which includes . . . the identity of the
principal."
59
First, as to the bare statement that private
respondent merely acted as a lawyer and
nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court
settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to
state that petitioners have likewise made the
same claim not merely out-of-court but also in
the Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended
Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that
their acts were made in furtherance of
"legitimate lawyering."  Being "similarly
60
situated" in this regard, public respondents
must show that there exist other conditions
and circumstances which would warrant their
treating the private respondent differently from
petitioners in the case at bench in order to
evade a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that
the primary consideration behind their
decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping of
private respondent as a defendant was his
promise to disclose the identities of the clients
in question. However, respondents failed to
show — and absolute nothing exists in the
records of the case at bar — that private
respondent actually revealed the identity of his
client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking
happens to be the leitmotif of the entire
arrangement between Mr. Roco and the
PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as
to have justified PCGG's special treatment
exempting the private respondent from
prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan
should have required proof of the undertaking
more substantial than a "bare assertion" that
private respondent did indeed comply with the
undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the
PCGG, only three documents were submitted
for the purpose, two of which were mere
requests for re-investigation and one simply
disclosed certain clients which petitioners
(ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to
reveal. These were clients to whom both
petitioners and private respondent rendered
legal services while all of them were partners
at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the
PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged
questioned transactions. 61
To justify the dropping of the private
respondent from the case or the filing of the
suit in the respondent court without him,
therefore, the PCGG should conclusively
show that Mr. Roco was treated as species
apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on
the basis of a classification which made
substantial distinctions based on real
differences. No such substantial distinctions
exist from the records of the case at bench, in
violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee
which provides a wall of protection against
uneven application of status and regulations.
In the broader sense, the guarantee operates
against uneven application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances
would be accorded the same
treatment.   Those who fall within a particular
62
class ought to be treated alike not only as to
privileges granted but also as to the liabilities
imposed.
. . . What is required under this
constitutional guarantee is the uniform
operation of legal norms so that all
persons under similar circumstances
would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed.
As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical
are analogous. If law be looked upon
in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding the rest. 63
We find that the condition precedent required
by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for
their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG
Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition also
constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.  It is
64
grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated
litigant from prosecution without allowing the
same exemption to the others. Moreover, the
PCGG's demand not only touches upon the
question of the identity of their clients but also
on documents related to the suspected
transactions, not only in violation of the
attorney-client privilege but also of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing
expedition, a free ride at the expense of such
rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation
by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings
is premature and that they should wait until
they are called to testify and examine as
witnesses as to matters learned in confidence
before they can raise their objections. But
petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are
co-principals in the case for recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made
their position clear from the very beginning
that they are not willing to testify and they
cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination
and of their fundamental legal right to maintain
inviolate the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against
petitioners should never be allowed to take its
full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners
should not be made to suffer the effects of
further litigation when it is obvious that their
inclusion in the complaint arose from a
privileged attorney-client relationship and as a
means of coercing them to disclose the
identities of their clients. To allow the case to
continue with respect to them when this Court
could nip the problem in the bud at this early
opportunity would be to sanction an unjust
situation which we should not here
countenance. The case hangs as a real and
palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of
Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should
not be allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's
legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we
will not sanction acts which violate the equal
protection guarantee and the right against
self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated
on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered
to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
 Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-
defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled
"Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur in the
result.
Romero and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., took no part.
Mendoza, J., is on leave.
 
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
VITUG, J., concurring:
The legal profession, despite all the
unrestrained calumny hurled against it, is still
the noblest of professions. It exists upon the
thesis that, in an orderly society that is
opposed to all forms of anarchy, it so
occupies, as it should, an exalted position in
the proper dispensation of justice. In time,
principles have evolved that would help
ensure its effective ministration. The
protection of confidentiality of the lawyer-client
relationship is one, and it has since been an
accepted firmament in the profession. It allows
the lawyer and the client to institutionalize a
unique relationship based on full trust and
confidence essential in a justice system that
works on the basis of substantive and
procedural due process. To be sure, the rule
is not without its pitfalls, and demands against
it may be strong, but these problems are, in
the ultimate analysis, no more than mere tests
of vigor that have made and will make that
rule endure.
I see in the case before us, given the
attendant circumstances already detailed in
the ponencia, a situation of the Republic
attempting to establish a case not on what it
perceives to be the strength of its own
evidence but on what it could elicit from a
counsel against his client. I find it
unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to
compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed
on them and succumb to a thinly disguised
threat of incrimination.
Accordingly, I join my other colleague who
vote for the GRANT of the petition.
 
DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting
The impressive presentation of the case in
the ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan makes
difficult the espousal of a dissenting view.
Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to express that
view because I strongly feel that this Court
must confine itself to the key issue in this
special civil action for certiorari, viz., whether
or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in not excluding the
defendants, the petitioners herein, from the
Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No.
0033. That issue, unfortunately, has been
simply buried under the avalanche of
authorities upholding the sanctity of lawyer-
client relationship which appears to me to be
prematurely invoked.
From the undisputed facts disclosed by the
pleadings and summarized in the ponencia, I
cannot find my way clear to a conclusion that
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not acting favorably on the
petitioners' prayer in their Comment to the
PCGG's Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint.
The prerogative to determine who shall be
made defendants in a civil case is initially
vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this
case. The control of the Court comes in only
when the issue of "interest" (§ 2, Rule 3,
Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether an
indispensable party has not been joined, or
whether there is a misjoinder of parties (§ 7, 8,
and 9, Id.), is raised.
In the case below, the PCGG decided to drop
or exclude from the complaint original co-
defendant Raul Roco because he had
allegedly complied with the condition
prescribed by the PCGG, viz., undertake that
he will reveal the identity of the principals for
whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 0033.
In short, there was an agreement or
compromise settlement between the PCGG
and Roco. Accordingly, the PCGG submitted
a Third Amended Complaint without Roco as
a defendant. No obstacle to such an
agreement has been insinuated. If Roco's
revelation violated the confidentiality of a
lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely
answerable therefor to his principals/clients
and, probably, to this Court in an appropriate
disciplinary action if warranted. There is at all
no showing that Civil Case No. 0033 cannot
further be proceeded upon or that any
judgment therein cannot be binding without
Roco remaining as a defendant. Accordingly,
the admission of the Third Amended
Complaint cannot be validly withheld by the
Sandiganbayan.
Are the petitioners, who did not file a formal
motion to be excluded but only made the
request to that effect as a rider to their
Comment to the Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint, entitled to be excluded
from the Third Amended Complaint such that
denial thereof would constitute grave abuse of
discretion on the Sandiganbayan's part? To
me, the answer is clearly in the negative.
The petitioners seek to be accorded the same
benefit granted to or to be similarly treated as
Roco. Reason and logic dictate that they
cannot, unless they too would make
themselves like Roco. Otherwise stated, they
must first voluntarily adopt for themselves the
factual milieu created by Roco and must bind
themselves to perform certain obligations as
Roco. It is precisely for this that in response to
the petitioners' comment on the
aforementioned Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint the PCGG manifested
that it is willing to accord the petitioners the
treatment it gave Roco provided they would
do what Roco had done, that is, disclose the
identity of their principals/clients and submit
documents substantiating their claimed
lawyer-client relationship with the said
principals/clients, as well as copies of deeds
of assignments the petitioners executed in
favor of their principals/clients. The petitioners
did not do so because they believed that
compliance thereof would breach the sanctity
of their fiduciary duty in a lawyer-client
relationship.
It, indeed, appears that Roco has complied
with his obligation as a consideration for his
exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint.
The Sandiganbayan found that
5. The PCGG is satisfied that
defendant Roco has demonstrated his
agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which
revelation could show the lack of
action against him. This in turn has
allowed the PCGG to exercise its
power both under the rules of agency
and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-1
in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
As a matter of fact, the PCGG presented
evidence to substantiate Roco's compliance.
The ponencia itself so stated, thus:
. . . respondent PCGG presented
evidence to substantiate compliance
by private respondent Roco of the
conditions precedent to warrant the
latter's exclusion as party-defendant in
PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter
to respondent PCGG of the counsel of
respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989
reiterating a previous request for
reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG
Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March
8, 1989 executed by private
respondent Roco as Attachment to the
letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter
of Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law
Offices dated September 21, 1988 to
the respondent in behalf of private
respondent Roco originally requesting
the reinvestigation and/or re-
examination of evidence by the PCGG
it Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.
(Id., 5-6).
These are the pieces of evidence upon which
the Sandiganbayan founded its conclusion
that the PCGG was satisfied with Roco's
compliance. The petitioners have not assailed
such finding as arbitrary.
The ponencia's observation then that Roco
did not refute the petitioners' contention that
he did not comply with his obligation to
disclose the identity of his principals is entirely
irrelevant.
In view of their adamantine position, the
petitioners did not, therefore, allow
themselves to be like Roco. They cannot
claim the same treatment, much less compel
the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for
nothing whatsoever. They have no right to
make such a demand for until they shall have
complied with the conditions imposed for their
exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by
way of a motion to dismiss based on the
grounds allowed by law (e.g., those
enumerated in § 1, Rule 16, Rules of
Court). The rule of confidentiality under the
lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to
exclude a party. It is merely aground for
disqualification of a witness (§ 24, Rule 130,
Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at
the appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is
under compulsion to answer as witness, as
when, having taken the witness stand, he is
questioned as to such confidential
communicator or advice, or is being otherwise
judicially coerced to produce,
through subpoena duces tecum or otherwise,
letters or other documents containing the
same privileged matter. But none of the
lawyers in this case is being required to testify
about or otherwise reveal "any [confidential]
communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment."
What they are being asked to do, in line with
their claim that they had done the acts
ascribed to them in pursuance of their
professional relation to their clients, is to
identify the latter to the PCGG and the Court;
but this, only if they so choose in order to be
dropped from the complaint, such
identification being the condition under which
the PCGG has expressed willingness to
exclude them from the action. The revelation
is entirely optional, discretionary, on their part.
The attorney-client privilege is not therefor
applicable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any
abuse of discretion when it denied the
petitioners' prayer for their exclusion as party-
defendants because they did not want to
abide with any of the conditions set by the
PCGG. There would have been abuse if the
Sandiganbayan granted the prayer because
then it would have capriciously, whimsically,
arbitrarily, and oppressively imposed its will on
the PCGG.
Again, what the petitioners want is their
exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint
or the dismissal of the case insofar as they
are concerned because either they are
invested with immunity under the principle of
confidentiality in a lawyer-client relationship,
or the claims against them in Civil Case No.
0033 are barred by such principle.
Even if we have to accommodate this issue, I
still submit that the lawyer-client privilege
provides the petitioners no refuge. They are
sued as principal defendants in Civil Case No.
0033, a case of the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth. Conspiracy is imputed to the
petitioners therein. In short, they are,
allegedly, conspirators in the commission of
the acts complained of for being nominees of
certain parties.
Their inclusion as defendants in justified under
§ 15, Article XI of the Constitution — which
provides that the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred
by prescription, laches or estoppel — and
E.O. No. 1 of 28 February 1986, E.O. No. 2 of
12 March 1986, E.O. No. 14 of 7 May 1986,
and the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG.
Furthermore, § 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court requires that the complaint or
information should be "against all persons
who appear to be responsible for the offense
involved."
Hypothetically admitting the allegations in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself
unable to agree with the majority opinion that
the petitioners are immune from suit or that
they have to be excluded as defendants, or
that they cannot be compelled to reveal or
disclose the identity of their principals, all
because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege.
This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
§ 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. — The
following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view
to, professional employment, nor can
an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the
 consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such
capacity.
The majority seeks to expand the scope of the
Philippine rule on the lawyer-client privilege by
copious citations of American jurisprudence
which includes in the privilege the identity of
the client under the exceptional situations
narrated therein. From the plethora of cases
cited, two facts stand out in bold relief. Firstly,
the issue of privilege contested therein arose
in grand jury proceedings on different States,
which are preliminary proceedings before the
filing of the case in court, and we are not even
told what evidentiary rules apply in the said
hearings. In the present case, the privilege is
invoked in the court where it was already filed
and presently pends, and we have the
foregoing specific rules above-quoted.
Secondly, and more important, in the cases
cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned
were merely advocating the cause of their
clients but were not indicted for the charges
against their said clients. Here, the counsel
themselves are co-defendants duly charged in
court as co-conspirators in the offenses
charged. The cases cited by the majority
evidently do not apply to them.
Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the
fact that the lawyer-client privilege is not a
shield for the commission of a crime or
against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor.
I quote, with emphases supplied, from 81 AM
JUR 2d, Witnesses, § 393 to 395, pages 356-
357:
§ 393. Effect of unlawful purpose.
The existence of an unlawful purpose
prevents the attorney-client privilege
from attaching. The attorney-client
privilege does not generally exist
where the representation is sought to
further criminal or fraudulent conduct
either past, present, or future. Thus, a
confidence received by an attorney in
order to advance a criminal or
fraudulent purpose is beyond the
scope of the privilege.
Observation: The
common-law rule that
the privilege protecting
confidential
communications
between attorney and
client is lost if the
relation is abused by a
client who seeks legal
assistance to
perpetrate a crime or
fraud has been
codified.
§ 394. Attorney participation.
The attorney-client privilege cannot be
used to protect a client in the
perpetration of a crime in concert with
the attorney, even where the attorney
is not aware of his client's purpose.
The reason for the rule is that it is not
within the professional character of a
lawyer to give advised on the
commission of crime. Professional
responsibility does not countenance
the use of the attorney-client privilege
as a subterfuge, and all conspiracies,
either active or passive, which are
calculated to hinder the administration
of justice will vitiate the privilege. In
some jurisdictions, however, this
exception to the rule of privilege in
confined to such intended acts in
violation of the law as are mala in se,
as distinguished from those which are
merely mala prohibita.
§ 395. Communication in
contemplation of crime.
Communications between attorney
and client having to do with the client's
contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered
by the cloak of privilege ordinarily
existing in reference to
communications between attorney and
client. But, the mere charge of
illegality, not supported by evidence,
will not defeat the privilege; there must
be at least prima facie evidence that
the illegality has some foundation in
fact.
Underhill also states:
There are many other cases to the
same effect, for the rule is prostitution
of the honorable relation of attorney
and client will not be permitted under
the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney
 by a client for a criminal purpose is a
conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy
which is not only lawful to divulge, but
which the attorney under certain
circumstances may be bound to
disclose at once in the interest of
justice. In accordance with this rule,
where a forged will or other false
instrument has come into possession
of an attorney through the
instrumentality of the accused, with
the hope and expectation that the
attorney would take some action in
reference thereto, and the attorney
does act, in ignorance of the true
character of the instrument, there is no
privilege, inasmuch as full confidence
has been withheld. The attorney is
then compelled to produce a forged
writing against the client. The fact that
the attorney is not cognizant of the
criminal or wrongful purpose, or,
knowing it, attempts to dissuade his
client, is immaterial. The attorney's
ignorance of his client's intentions
deprives the information of a
professional character as full
confidence has been withheld. (H.C.
Underhill, A Treatise on the Law of
Criminal Case Evidence, vol. 2, Fifth
ed. (1956), Sec. 332, pp. 836-837;
emphasis mine).
125 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS
ANNOTATED, 516-519, summarizes the
rationale of the rule excepting
communications with respect to contemplated
criminal or fraudulent acts, thus:
c. Rationale of rule excepting
communications with respect to
contemplated criminal or fraudulent
act.
Various reasons have been
announced as being the foundation for
the holdings that communications with
respect to contemplated criminal or
fraudulent acts are not privileged.
The reason perhaps most frequently
advanced is that in such cases there
is no professional employment,
properly speaking. Standard
F. Ins. Co v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky
679, 211 SW. 441, 5 ALR
972; Cummings v. Com. (1927) 221
Ky 301, 298 SW 943; Strong v. Abner
(1937) 268 Ky 502, 105 SW(2d)
599; People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57
Mich 69, 23 NW 594; Hamil &
Co. v. England (1892) 50 Mo App
338; Carney v. United R. Co. (1920)
205 Mo App 495, 226 SW
308; Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48
NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054; Covency
v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37
AM Dec 287; People ex
rel. Vogelstein v. Warden (1934) 150
Misc 714, 270 NYS 362 (affirmed
without opinion in (1934) 242 App Div
611, 271 NYS 1059); Russell
v. Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng
Reprint 558; Charlton
v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng
Reprint 751; Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14
QB Div (Eng) 153 — CCR; Re
Postlethwaite (1887) LR 35 Ch Div
(Eng) 722.
In Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div
(Eng) 153 — CCR, the court said: "In
order that the rule may apply, there
must be both professional confidence
and professional employment, but if
the client has a criminal object in view
in his communications with his
solicitor one of these elements must
necessarily be absent. The client must
either conspire with his solicitor or
deceive him. If his criminal object is
avowed, the client does not consult
his adviser professionally, because it
cannot be the solicitor's business to
further any criminal object. If the client
does not avow his object, he reposes
no confidence, for the state of facts
which is the foundation of the
supposed confidence does not exist.
The solicitor's advice is obtained by a
fraud."
So,
in Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart (1
919) 183 Ky 679, 211 SW 441, 5 ALR
972, the court said: "The reason of the
principle which holds such
communications not to be privileged is
that it is not within the professional
character of a lawyer to give advice
upon such subjects, and that it is no
part of the profession of an attorney or
counselor at law to be advising
persons as to how they may commit
crimes or frauds, or how they may
escape the consequences of
contemplated crimes and frauds. If the
crime or fraud has already been
committed and finished, a client may
advise with an attorney in regard to it,
and communicate with him freely, and
the communications cannot be
divulged as evidence without the
consent of the client, because it is a
part of the business and duty of those
engaged in the practice of the
profession of law, when employed and
relied upon for that purpose, to give
advice to those who have made
infractions of the laws; and, to enable
the attorney to properly advise and to
properly represent the client in court or
when prosecutions are threatened, it
is conducive to the administration of
justice that the client shall be free to
communicate to his attorney all the
facts within his knowledge, and that he
may be assured that a communication
made by him shall not be used to his
prejudice."
The protection which the law affords to
communications between attorney and
client has reference to those which are
legitimately and properly within the
scope of a lawful employment, and
does not extend to communications
made in contemplation of a crime, or
perpetration of a
fraud. Strong v. Abner (1937) 368 Ky
502, 105 SW (2d) 599.
The court
in People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57
Mich 69, 23 NW 594, in holding not
privileged communications to an
attorney having for their object the
communication of a crime, said: "They
then partake of the nature of a
conspiracy, or attempted conspiracy,
and it is not only lawful to divulge such
communications, but under certain
circumstances it might become the
duty of the attorney to do so. The
interests of public justice require that
no such shield from merited exposure
shall be interposed to protect a person
who takes counsel how he can safely
commit a crime. The relation of
attorney and client cannot exist for the
purpose of counsel in concocting
crimes."
And in Coveney v. Tannahill (1841) 1
Hill (NY) 33, 37 Am Dec 287, the court
was of the opinion that there could be
no such relation as that of attorney
and client, either in the commission of
a crime, or in the doing of a wrong by
force or fraud to an individual, the
privileged relation of attorney and
client existing only for lawful and
honest purposes.
If the client consults the attorney at
law with reference to the perpetration
of a crime, and they co-operate in
effecting it, there is no privilege,
inasmuch as it is no part of the
lawyer's duty to aid in crime — he
ceases to be counsel and becomes a
criminal. Matthews v. Hoagland (1891)
48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054.
The court cannot permit it to be said
that the contriving of a fraud forms
part of the professional business of an
attorney or solicitor. Charlton
v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng
Reprint 751.
If the client does not frankly and freely
reveal his object and intention as well
as facts, there is not professional
confidence, and therefore no
privilege. Matthews
v. Hoagland (NJ) supra. See to the
same effect Carney v. United R. Co.
(1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW 308.
There is no valid claim of privilege in
regard to the production of documents
passing between solicitor and client,
when the transaction impeached is
charged to be based upon fraud, that
is the matter to be investigated, and it
is thought better that the alleged
privilege should suffer than that
honestly and fair dealing should
appear to be violated with
impunity. Smith v. Hunt (1901) 1 Ont L
Rep 334.
In Tichborne v. Lushington, shorthand
Notes (Eng) p. 5211 (cited in Reg. v.
Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 172
— CCR), the chief justice said "I
believe the law is, and properly is, that
if a party consults an attorney, and
obtains advice for what afterwards
turns out to be the commission of a
crime or a fraud, that party so
consulting the attorney has no
privilege whatever to close the lips of
the attorney from stating the truth.
Indeed, if any such privilege should be
contended for, or existing, it would
work most grievous hardship on an
attorney, who, after he had been
consulted upon what subsequently
appeared to be a manifest crime and
fraud, would have his lips closed, and
might place him in a very serious
position of being suspected to be a
party to the fraud, and without his
having an opportunity of exculpating
himself . . . There is no privilege in the
case which I have suggested of a
party consulting another, a
professional man, as to what may
afterwards turn out to be a crime or
fraud, and the best mode of
accomplishing it."
In Garside v. Outram (1856) 3 Jur NS
(Eng) 39, although the question of
privilege as to communications
between attorney and client was not
involved, the question directly involved
being the competency of a clerk in a
business establishment to testify as to
certain information which he acquired
while working in the establishment, the
court strongly approved of a view as
stated arguendo for plaintiff,
in Annesley v. Anglesea (1743) 17
How St Tr (Eng) 1229, as follows: "I
shall claim leave to consider whether
an attorney may be examined as to
any matter which came to his
knowledge as an attorney. If he is
employed as an attorney in any
unlawful or wicked act, his duty to the
public obliges him to disclose it; no
private obligations can dispense with
that universal one which lies on every
member of society to discover every
design which may be formed, contrary
to the laws of society, to destroy the
public welfare. For this reason, I
apprehend that if a secret which is
contrary to the public good, such as a
design to commit treason, murder, or
perjury, comes to the knowledge of an
attorney, even in a cause where he is
concerned, the obligation to the public
must dispense with the private
obligation to the client."
The court in McMannus
v. State (1858) 2 Head (Tenn) 213,
said; "It would be monstrous to hold
that if counsel was asked and
obtained in reference to a
contemplated crime that the lips of the
attorney would be sealed, when the
facts might become important to the
ends of justice in the prosecution of
crime. In such a case the relation
cannot be taken to exist. Public policy
would forbid it."
And the court in Lanum
v. Patterson (1909) 151 Ill App 36,
observed that this rule was not in
contravention of sound public policy,
but on the contrary, tended to the
maintenance of a higher standard of
professional ethics by preventing the
relation of attorney and client from
operating as a cloak for fraud.
Communications of a client to an
attorney are not privileged if they were
a request for advice as to how to
commit a fraud, it being in such a case
not only the attorney's privilege, but
his duty, to disclose the facts to the
court. Will v. Tornabells & Co. (1907)
3 Porto Rico Fed Rep 125. The court
said: "We say this notwithstanding the
comments of opposing counsel as to
the indelicacy of his position because
of his being now on the opposite side
of the issue that arose as a
consequence of the communication he
testifies about, and is interested in the
cause to the extent of a large
contingent fee, as he confesses."
The object of prohibiting the disclosure
of confidential communications is to
protect the client, and not to make the
attorney an accomplice or permit him
to aid in the commission of a
crime. People vs. Petersen (1901) 60
App Div 118, NYS 941.
The seal of personal confidence can
never be used to cover a transaction
which is in itself a crime. People
v. Farmer (1909) 194 NY 251, 87 NE
457.
As to disclosing the identity of a client, 81 AM
JUR 2d, Witnesses, § 410 and 411, pages
366-368, states:
§ 410. Name or identity of client.
Disclosure of a client's identity is
necessary proof of the existence of
the attorney-client relationship and is
not privileged information. Thus, the
attorney-client privilege is inapplicable
even though the information was
communicated confidentially to the
attorney in his professional capacity
and, in some cases, in spite of the fact
that the attorney may have been
sworn to secrecy, where an inquiry is
directed to an attorney as to the name
or identity of his client. This general
rule applies in criminal cases, as well
as in civil actions. Where an
undisclosed client is a party to an
action, the opposing party has a right
to know with whom he is contending
or who the real party in interest is, if
not the nominal adversary.
§ 411. Disclosure of identity of client
as breach of confidentiality.
The revelation of the identification of a
client is not usually considered
privileged, except where so much has
been divulged with regard to to legal
services rendered or the advice
sought, that to reveal the client's name
would be to disclose the whole
relationship and confidential
communications. However, even
where the subject matter of the
attorney-client relationship has already
been revealed, the client's name has
been deemed privileged.
Where disclosure of the identity of a
client might harm the client by being
used against him under
circumstances where there are no
countervailing factors, then the identity
is protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
In criminal proceedings, a client's
name may be privileged if information
already obtained by the tribunal,
combined with the client's identity,
might expose him to criminal
prosecution for acts subsequent to,
and because of, which he had sought
the advice of his attorney.
Although as a general rule, the identity
of a defendant in a criminal
prosecution is a matter of public
record and, thus, not covered by the
attorney-client privilege, where the
attorney has surrendered to the
authorities physical evidence in his
possession by way of the attorney-
client relationship, the state must
prove the connection between the
piece of physical evidence and the
defendant without in any way relying
on the testimony of the client's
attorney who initially received the
evidence and, thus, the attorney may
not be called to the stand and asked
to disclose the identity of the client.
However, an attorney cannot refuse to
reveal the identity of a person who
asked him to deliver stolen property to
the police department, whether a bona
fide attorney-client relationship exists
between them, inasmuch as the
transaction was not a legal service or
done in the attorney's professional
capacity.
Distinction: Where an
attorney was informed
by a male client that
his female
acquaintance was
possibly involved in [a]
his-and-run accident,
the identity of the
female did not come
within scope of
attorney-client privilege
although the identity of
the male client was
protected. (emphases
supplied)
WIGMORE explains why the identity of a
client is not within the lawyer-client privilege in
this manner:
§ 2313. Identity of client or purpose of
suit. — The identity of the attorney's
client or the name of the real party in
interest will seldom be a matter
communicated in confidence because
the procedure of litigation ordinarily
presupposes a disclosure of these
facts. Furthermore, so far as a client
may in fact desire secrecy and may be
able to secure action without
appearing as a party to the
proceedings, it would be improper to
sanction such a wish. Every litigant is
in justice entitled to know the identity
of his opponents. He cannot be
 obliged to struggle in the dark against
unknown forces. He has by
anticipation the right, in later
proceedings, if desired, to enforce the
legal responsibility of those who may
have maliciously sued or prosecuted
him or fraudulently evaded his claim.
He has as much right to ask the
attorney "Who fees your fee?" as to
ask the witness (966 supra). "Who
maintains you during this trial?" upon
the analogy of the principle already
examined (2298 supra), the privilege
cannot be used to evade a client's
responsibility for the use of legal
process. And if it is necessary for the
purpose to make a plain exception to
the rule of confidence, then it must be
made. (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8,
(1961), p. 609; emphases supplied).
In 114 ALR, 1322, we also find the following
statement:
1. Name or identity.
As is indicated in 28 R.C.L. p. 563, it
appears that the rule making
communications between attorney and
client privileged from disclosure
ordinarily does not apply where the
inquiry is confined to the fact of the
attorney's employment and the name
of the person employing him, since the
privilege presupposes the relationship
of client and attorney, and therefore
does not attach to its creation.
At the present stage of the proceedings
below, the petitioners have not shown that
they are so situated with respect to their
principals as to bring them within any of the
exceptions established by American
jurisprudence. There will be full opportunity for
them to establish that fact at the trial where
the broader perspectives of the case shall
have been presented and can be better
appreciated by the court. The insistence for
their exclusion from the case is
understandable, but the reasons for the hasty
resolution desired is naturally suspect.
We do not even have to go beyond our shores
for an authority that the lawyer-client privilege
cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of
a client's identity where the lawyer and the
client are conspirators in the commission of a
crime or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction,
lawyers are mandated not to counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule
1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility) and to employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id.). And
under the Canons of Professional Ethics, a
lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind that his
great trust is to be performed within and not
without the bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.),
that he advances the honor of his profession
and the best interest of his client when he
renders service or gives advice tending to
impress upon the client and his undertaking
exact compliance with the strictest principles
of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These canons
strip a lawyer of the lawyer-client privilege
whenever he conspires with the client in the
commission of a crime or a fraud.
I then vote to DENY, for want of merit, the
instant petition.
Narvasa, C.J. and Regalado, J., concur.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is an important petition for certiorari to
annul the resolutions of the
respondent Sandiganbayan denying
petitioners' motion to be excluded from the
Complaint for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth on the principal ground that as lawyers
they cannot be ordered to reveal the identity
of their client.
First, we fast forward the facts. The
Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) filed Civil Case No. 33
before the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr., for the recovery of alleged
ill-gotten wealth. Sued as co-defendants are
the petitioners in the cases at bar — lawyers
Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino
V. Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio A.
Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo Escueta
and Paraja Hayudini. Also included as a co-
defendant is lawyer Raul Roco, now a duly
elected senator of the Republic. All co-
defendants were then partners of the law firm,
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz
Law Offices, better known as the ACCRA Law
Firm. The Complaint against Cojuangco, Jr.,
and the petitioners alleged, inter alia, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
 The wrongs committed by defendants
acting singly or collectively and in
unlawful concert with one another,
include the misappropriation and theft
of public funds, plunder of the nation's
wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery,
embezzlement and other acts of
corruption, betrayal of public trust and
brazen abuse of power as more fully
described (in the subsequent
paragraphs of the complaint), all at the
expense and to the grave and
irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the
Filipino people.
Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Regalio A. Vinluan,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G.
Hayudini and Raul S. Roco of Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala, and Abello
law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised,
schemed, conspired and confederated
with each other in setting up, through
the use of the coconut levy funds, the
financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM,
COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC and
more than twenty other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the
acquisition of the San Miguel
Corporation shares and the
institutionalization through presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly.
through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, using its
wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation,
became the holder of approximately
fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding
capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March
1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments
Corporation number 44 among the top
100 biggest stockholders of UCPB
which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of 7
June 1984.
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that the
legal services offered and made available by
their firm to its clients include: (a) organizing
and acquiring business organizations, (b)
acting as incorporators or stockholders
thereof, and (c) delivering to clients the
corresponding documents of their equity
holdings (i.e., certificates of stock endorsed in
blank or blank deeds of trust or assignment).
They claimed that their activities were "in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering."
In the course of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan, the PCGG filed a Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint and the
Third Amended Complaint excluding lawyer
Roco as party defendant. Lawyer Roco was
excluded on the basis of his promise to reveal
the identity of the principals for whom he
acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in the case.
The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners to
comment on the motion. In their Comment,
petitioners demanded that they be extended
the same privilege as their co-defendant
Roco. They prayed for their exclusion from the
complaint. PCGG agreed but set the following
conditions: (1) disclosure of the identity of
their client; (2) submission of documents
substantiating their lawyer-client relationship;
and (3) submission of the deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of
their client covering their respective
shareholdings. The same conditions were
imposed on lawyer Roco.
Petitioners refused to comply with the PCGG
conditions contending that the attorney-client
privilege gives them the right not to reveal the
identity of their client. They also alleged that
lawyer Roco was excluded though he did not
in fact reveal the identity of his clients. On
March 18, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied
the exclusion of petitioners in Case No. 33. It
held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic
stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have
acted, i.e., their principal, and that will
be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by
the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot
even begin to the debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of
their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the
 privilege; the existence and identity of The Honorable Sandiganbayan
the client. gravely abused its discretion in
subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers
This is what appears to be the cause who indisputably acted as lawyers in
for which they have been impleaded serving as nominee-stockholders, to
by the PCGG as defendants herein. the strict application of the law
agency.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that
defendant Roco has demonstrated his II
agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which The Honorable Sandiganbayan
revelation could show the lack of committed grave abuse of discretion in
course against him. This in turn has not considering petitioners ACCRA
allowed the PCGG to exercise its lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly
power both under the rules of Agency situated and, therefore, deserving of
and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A equal treatment.
in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic 1. There is absolutely
v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72). no evidence that Mr.
Roco had revealed, or
The PCGG has apparently offered to had undertaken to
the ACCRA lawyers the same reveal, the identities of
conditions availed of by Roco; full the client(s) for whom
disclosure in exchange for exclusion he acted as nominee-
from these proceedings (par. 7, stockholder.
PCGG's COMMENT dated November
4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have 2. Even assuming that
preferred not to make the disclosures Mr. Roco had
required by the PCGG. revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal,
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, the identities of the
therefore, begrudge the PCGG for client(s), the disclosure
keeping them as a party defendants. does not constitute a
In the same vein, they cannot compel substantial distinction
the PCGG to be accorded the same as would make the
treatment accorded to Roco. classification
reasonable under the
Neither can this Court. equal protection
clause.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion
dated October 8, 1991 filed by the 3. Respondent
ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Sandiganbayan
Paraja G. Hayudini for the same sanctioned favoritism
treatment by the PCGG as accorded and undue preference
to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of in favor of Mr. Roco
merit. and violation of the
equal protection
Sandiganbayan later denied petitioners' clause.
motions for reconsideration in its resolutions
dated May 21, 1988 and September 3, 1992. III

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners The Honorable Sandiganbayan

contend: committed grave abuse of discretion in
not holding that, under the facts of this
I case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their
 client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar
facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege
includes the identity of
the client(s).
2. The factual
disclosures required by
the PCGG are not
limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA
lawyers' alleged
client(s) but extend to
other privileged
matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not requiring that the dropping of
party-defendants by the PCGG must
be based on reasonable and just
grounds and with due consideration to
the constitutional right of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers to the equal
protection of the law.
The petition at bar is atypical of the usual case
where the hinge issue involves the
applicability of attorney-client privilege. It
ought to be noted that petitioners were
included as defendants in Civil Case No. 33
as conspirators. Together with Mr. Cojuangco,
Jr., they are charged with having ". . .
conspired and confederated with each other in
setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework
and structures that led to the establishment of
UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK,
CICI and more than twenty other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the acquisition
of San Miguel Corporation shares and the
institutionalization through presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly." To
stress, petitioners are charged with having
conspired in the commission of crimes. The
issue of attorney-client privilege arose when
PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the
complaint on condition they reveal the identity
of their client. Petitioners refused to comply
and assailed the condition on the ground that
to reveal the identity of their client will violate
the attorney-client privilege.
It is thus necessary to resolve whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it rejected petitioners' thesis
that to reveal the identity of their client would
violate the attorney-client privilege. The
attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications
known to the common law.  For the first time
1
in this jurisdiction, we are asked to rule
whether the attorney-client privilege includes
the right not to disclose the identity of client.
The issue poses a trilemma for its resolution
requires the delicate balancing of three
opposing policy considerations. One
overriding policy consideration is the need for
courts to discover the truth for truth alone is
the true touchstone of justice.  Equally
2
compelling is the need to protect the
adversary system of justice where truth is best
extracted by giving a client broad privilege to
confide facts to his counsel.  Similarly
3
deserving of sedulous concern is the need to
keep inviolate the constitutional right against
self-incrimination and the right to effective
counsel in criminal litigations. To bridle at
center the centrifugal forces of these policy
considerations, courts have followed to
prudential principle that the attorney-client
privilege must not be expansively construed
as it is in derogation of the search for
truth.  Accordingly, a narrow construction has
4
been given to the privilege and it has been
consistently held that "these competing
societal interests demand that application of
the privilege not exceed that which is
necessary to effect the policy considerations
underlying the privilege, i.e., the privilege must
be upheld only in those circumstances for
which it was created.'"5
Prescinding from these premises, our initial
task is to define in clear strokes the
substantive content of the attorney-client
privilege within the context of the distinct
issues posed by the petition at bar. With due
respect, I like to start by stressing the
irreducible principle that the attorney-client
privilege can never be used as a shield to
commit a crime or a fraud. Communications to
an attorney having for their object the
commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature
of a conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to
divulge such communications, but under
certain circumstances it might become the
duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of
public justice require that no such shield from
merited exposure shall be interposed to
protect a person who takes counsel how he
can safely commit a crime. The relation of
attorney and client cannot exist for the
purpose of counsel in concocting crimes."  In6
the well chosen words of retired Justice
Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.  I
7
hasten to add, however, that a mere allegation
that a lawyer conspired with his client to
commit a crime or a fraud will not defeat the
privilege.  As early as 1933, no less than the
8
Mr. Justice Cardozo held in Clark v. United
States  that: "there are early cases apparently
9
to the effect that a mere charge of illegality,
not supported by any evidence, will set the
confidences free . . . But this conception of the
privilege is without support . . . To drive the
privilege away, there must be 'something to
give colour to the charge;' there must
be prima facie evidence that it has foundation
in fact." In the petition at bar, however, the
PCGG appears to have relented on its original
stance as spelled out in its Complaint that
petitioners are co-conspirators in crimes and
cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege.
The PCGG has agreed to exclude petitioners
from the Complaint provided they reveal the
identity of their client. In fine, PCGG has
conceded that petitioner are entitled to invoke
the attorney-client privilege if they reveal their
client's identity.
Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the
attorney-client privilege since the PCGG is no
longer proceeding against them as co-
conspirators in crimes, we should focus on the
more specific issue of whether the attorney-
client privilege includes the right not to divulge
the identity of a client as contended by the
petitioners. As a general rule, the attorney-
client privilege does not include the right of
non-disclosure of client identity. The general
rule, however, admits of well-etched
exceptions which the Sandiganbayan failed to
recognize. The general rule and its exceptions
are accurately summarized in In re Grand Jury
Investigation,  viz:
10
The federal forum is unanimously in
accord with the general rule that the
identity of a client is, with limited
exceptions, not within the protective
ambit of the attorney-client privilege.
See: In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th
Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Jones), 517 F. 2d 666,
670-71 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Fine), 651 F. 2d
199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); Frank
v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1082, 86
S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966); In
re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695
F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363,
365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215,
218 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Circuits have embraced various
"exceptions" to the general rule that
the identity of a client is not within the
protective ambit of the attorney-client
privilege. All such exceptions appear
to be firmly grounded in the Ninth
Circuit's seminal decision in Baird
v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.
1960). In Baird the IRS received a
letter from an attorney stating that an
enclosed check in the amount of
$12,706 was being tendered for
additional amounts due from
undisclosed taxpayers. When the IRS
summoned the attorney to ascertain
the identity of the delinquent taxpayers
the attorney refused identification
assertion the attorney-client privilege.
The Ninth Circuit, applying California
law, adjudged that the "exception" to
the general rule as pronounced in Ex
parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149
P. 566 (1915) controlled:
The name of the client
will be considered
privileged matter
where the
circumstances of the
case are such that the
name of the client is
material only for the
purpose of showing an
acknowledgment of
guilt on the part of
such client of the very
offenses on account of
which the attorney was
employed.
Baird, supra, 279 F.2d at 633. The
identity of the Baird taxpayer was
adjudged within this exception to the
general rule. The Ninth Circuit has
continued to acknowledge this
exception.
A significant exception
to this principle of non-
 confidentiality holds
that such information
may be privileged
when the person
invoking the privilege
is able to show that a
strong possibility exists
that disclosure of the
information would
implicate the client in
the very matter for
which legal advice was
sought in the first case.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d
363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982).
Accord: United States v. Hodge and
Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir.
1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Sherman, 627
F.2d 189, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1980); In re
Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d
359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982). This
exception, which can perhaps be most
succinctly characterized as the "legal
advice" exception, has also been
recognized by other circuits. See: In re
Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S. Ct.
531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980); In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631
F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S.1083, 101 S.Ct. 869-
70, 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981). Since the
legal advice exception is firmly
grounded in the policy of protecting
confidential communications, this
Court adopts and applies its principles
herein. See: In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), supra.
It should be observed, however that
the legal advice exception may be
defeated through a prima
facie showing that the legal
representation was secured in
furtherance of present or intended
continuing illegality, as where the legal
representation itself is part of a larger
conspiracy. See: In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Decus Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), supra, 695 F.2d
at 365 n. 1; In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489,
495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449, U.S.
994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed. 2d 291
(1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980);
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S.Ct.
869, 66 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1981); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson),
600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d
1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971). See
also: Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1, 15, 53, S.Ct. 465, 469, 77, L.Ed.
993 (1933); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026,
1028-29 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc).
Another exception to the general rule
that the identity of a client is not
privileged arises where disclosure of
the identity would be tantamount to
disclosing an otherwise protected
confidential communication. In
Baird, supra, the Ninth Circuit
observed:
If the identification of
the client conveys
information which
ordinarily would be
conceded to be part of
the usual privileged
communication
between attorney and
client, then the
privilege should extend
to such identification in
the absence of another
factors.
Id., 279 F.2d at 632. Citing Baird, the Fourth
Circuit promulgated the following exception:
To the general rule is
an exception, firmly
embedded as the rule
itself. The privilege
may be recognized
where so much of the
actual communication
has already been
disclosed that
identification of the
client amounts to
disclosure of a
confidential
communication.
NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905
(4th Cir. 1965). Accord: United States
v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir.
1975); Colton v. United States, 306
F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9
L.Ed.2d 499 1963); Tillotson
v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th
Cir. 1965); United States v. Pape, 144
F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944). See
also: Chirac v. Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11
Wheat) 280, 6 L.Ed. 474 (1826). The
Seventh Circuit has added to
the Harvey exception the following
emphasized caveat:
The privilege may be
recognized where so
much of the actual
communication has
already been disclosed
[not necessarily by the
attorney, but by
independent sources
as well] that
identification of the
client [or of fees paid]
amounts to disclosure
of a confidential
communication.
United States vs. Jeffers, 532 F.2d
1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976 (emphasis
added). The Third Circuit, applying
this exception, has emphasized that it
is the link between the client and
the communication, rather than the
link between the client and the
possibility of potential criminal
prosecution, which serves to bring the
client's identity within the protective
ambit of the attorney-client privilege.
See: In re Grand Jury Empanelled
February 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603
F.2d 469, 473 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1979). Like
the "legal advice" exception, this
exception is also firmly rooted in
principles of confidentiality.
Another exception, articulated in the
Fifth Circuit's en banc decision of In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc), is
recognized when disclosure of the
identity of the client would provide the
"last link" of evidence:
We have long
recognized the general
rule that matters
involving the payment
of fees and the identity
of clients are not
generally privileged. In
re Grand Jury
Proceedings, (United
States v. Jones), 517
F.2d 666 (5th Cir.
1975); see cases
collected id. at 670 n.
2. There we also
recognized, however,
a limited and narrow
exception to the
general rule, one that
obtains when the
disclosure of the
client's identity by his
attorney would have
supplied the last link in
an existing chain of
incriminating evidence
likely to lead to the
client's indictment.
I join the majority in holding that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it misdelineated the metes
and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by
failing to recognize the exceptions discussed
above.
Be that as it may, I part ways with the majority
when it ruled that petitioners need not prove
they fall within the exceptions to the general
rule. I respectfully submit that the attorney-
client privilege is not a magic mantra whose
invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape
he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly
put, it is not enough to assert the
privilege.  The person claiming the privilege or
11
its exceptions has the obligation to present the
underlying facts demonstrating the existence
of the privilege.  When these facts can be
12
presented only by revealing the very
information sought to be protected by the
privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to
move for an inspection of the evidence in an
in camera hearing.  The hearing can even be
13
in camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been
held that "a well-recognized means for an
attorney to demonstrate the existence of an
exception to the general rule, while
simultaneously preserving confidentiality of
the identity of his client, is to move the court
for an in camera ex-parte hearing.  Without
14
the proofs adduced in these in camera
hearings, the Court has no factual basis to
determine whether petitioners fall within any of
the exceptions to the general rule.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that
petitioners have not adduced evidence that
they fall within any of the above mentioned
exceptions for as aforestated, the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize the
exceptions, hence, the order compelling them
to reveal the identity of their client. In ruling
that petitioners need not further establish the
factual basis of their claim that they fall within
the exceptions to the general rule, the majority
held:
The circumstances involving the
engagement of lawyers in the case at
bench therefore clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue
of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as
stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which
there would be no attorney-client
relationship). Furthermore, under the
third main exception, revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution
to build its case, where none
otherwise exists. It is the link, in the
word of Baird, "that would inevitably
form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict the (client) of a . . . crime.
I respectfully submit that the first and third
exceptions relied upon by the majority are not
self-executory but need factual basis for their
successful invocation. The first exception as
cited by the majority is ". . . where a strong
probability exists that revealing the clients'
name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice." It seems to me evident that "the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice" is a question of fact which must first
be established before there can be any ruling
that the exception can be invoked. The
majority cites Ex Parte Enzor,   and
15
U S v. Hodge and Zweig,  but these cases
16
leave no doubt that the "very activity" for
which the client sought the advice of counsel
was properly proved. In both cases, the "very
activity" of the clients reveal they sought
advice on their criminal activities. Thus, in
Enzor, the majority opinion states that the
"unidentified client, an election official,
informed his attorney in confidence that he
had been offered a bribe to violate election
laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that
end."  In Hodge, the "very activity" of the
17
clients deals with illegal importation of drugs.
In the case at bar, there is no inkling
whatsoever about the "very activity" for which
the clients of petitioners sought their
professional advice as lawyers. There is
nothing in the records that petitioners were
consulted on the "criminal activities" of their
client. The complaint did allege that petitioners
and their client conspired to commit crimes
but allegations are not evidence.
So it is with the third exception which as
related by the majority is "where the
government's lawyers have no case against
an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the
only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of
a crime."  Again, the rhetorical questions that
18
answer themselves are: (1) how can we
determine that PCGG has "no case" against
petitioners without presentation of evidence?
and (2) how can we determine that the name
of the client is the only link without
presentation of evidence as to the other links?
The case of Baird vs. Koerner  does not
19
support the "no need for evidence" ruling of
the majority. In Baird, as related by the
majority itself, "a lawyer was consulted by the
accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be
taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a
favorable position in case criminal charges
were brought against them by the US Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). It appeared that the
taxpayers' returns of previous years were
probably incorrect and the taxes
understated.  Once more, it is clear that the
20
Baird court was informed of the activity of the
client for which the lawyer was consulted and
the activity involved probable violation of the
tax laws. Thus, the Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it
squarely within that exception to the
general rule. Here money was
received by the government, paid by
persons who thereby admitted they
had not paid a sufficient amount in
income taxes some one or more years
in the past. The names of the clients
are useful to the government for but
one purpose — to ascertain which
taxpayers think they were delinquent,
so that it may check the records for
that one year or several years. The
voluntary nature of the payment
 indicates a belief by the taxpayers that
more tax or interest or penalties are
due than the sum previously paid, if
any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for
nonpayment of taxes, though whether
it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it
may well be the link that could form
the chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual of a federal
crime. Certainly the payment and the
feeling of guilt are the reasons the
attorney here involved was employed
— to advise his clients what, under the
circumstances, should be done.
In fine, the factual basis for the ruling in Baird
was properly established by the parties. In the
case at bar, there is no evidence about the
subject matter of the consultation made by
petitioners' client. Again, the records do not
show that the subject matter is criminal in
character except for the raw allegations in the
Complaint. Yet, this is the unstated predicate
of the majority ruling that revealing the identity
of the client ". . . would furnish the only link
that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime."
The silent implication is unflattering and unfair
to petitioners who are marquee names in the
legal profession and unjust to their
undisclosed client.
Finally, it ought to be obvious that petitioners'
right to claim the attorney-client privilege is
resolutory of the Complaint against them, and
hence should be decided ahead and
independently of their claim to equal
protection of the law. Pursuant to the rule in
legal hermeneutics that courts should not
decide constitutional issues unless
unavoidable, I also respectfully submit that
there is no immediate necessity to resolve
petitioners' claim to equal protection of the law
at this stage of the proceedings.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a
qualified dissent from the majority opinion.
 
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
The legal profession, despite all the
unrestrained calumny hurled against it, is still
the noblest of professions. It exists upon the
thesis that, in an orderly society that is
opposed to all forms of anarchy, it so
occupies, as it should, an exalted position in
the proper dispensation of justice. In time,
principles have evolved that would help
ensure its effective ministration. The
protection of confidentiality of the lawyer-client
relationship is one, and it has since been an
accepted firmament in the profession. It allows
the lawyer and the client to institutionalize a
unique relationship based on full trust and
confidence essential in a justice system that
works on the basis of substantive and
procedural due process. To be sure, the rule
is not without its pitfalls, and demands against
it may be strong, but these problems are, in
the ultimate analysis, no more than mere tests
of vigor that have made and will make that
rule endure.
I see in the case before us, given the
attendant circumstances already detailed in
the ponencia, a situation of the Republic
attempting to establish a case not on what it
perceives to be the strength of its own
evidence but on what it could elicit from a
counsel against his client. I find it
unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to
compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed
on them and succumb to a thinly disguised
threat of incrimination.
Accordingly, I join my other colleague who
vote for the GRANT of the petition.
 
DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting
The impressive presentation of the case in
the ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan makes
difficult the espousal of a dissenting view.
Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to express that
view because I strongly feel that this Court
must confine itself to the key issue in this
special civil action for certiorari, viz., whether
or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in not excluding the
defendants, the petitioners herein, from the
Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No.
0033. That issue, unfortunately, has been
simply buried under the avalanche of
authorities upholding the sanctity of lawyer-
client relationship which appears to me to be
prematurely invoked.
From the undisputed facts disclosed by the
pleadings and summarized in the ponencia, I
cannot find my way clear to a conclusion that
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not acting favorably on the
petitioners' prayer in their Comment to the
PCGG's Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint.
The prerogative to determine who shall be
made defendants in a civil case is initially
vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this
case. The control of the Court comes in only
when the issue of "interest" (§ 2, Rule 3,
Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether an
indispensable party has not been joined, or
whether there is a misjoinder of parties (§ 7, 8,
and 9, Id.), is raised.
In the case below, the PCGG decided to drop
or exclude from the complaint original co-
defendant Raul Roco because he had
allegedly complied with the condition
prescribed by the PCGG, viz., undertake that
he will reveal the identity of the principals for
whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 0033.
In short, there was an agreement or
compromise settlement between the PCGG
and Roco. Accordingly, the PCGG submitted
a Third Amended Complaint without Roco as
a defendant. No obstacle to such an
agreement has been insinuated. If Roco's
revelation violated the confidentiality of a
lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely
answerable therefor to his principals/clients
and, probably, to this Court in an appropriate
disciplinary action if warranted. There is at all
no showing that Civil Case No. 0033 cannot
further be proceeded upon or that any
judgment therein cannot be binding without
Roco remaining as a defendant. Accordingly,
the admission of the Third Amended
Complaint cannot be validly withheld by the
Sandiganbayan.
Are the petitioners, who did not file a formal
motion to be excluded but only made the
request to that effect as a rider to their
Comment to the Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint, entitled to be excluded
from the Third Amended Complaint such that
denial thereof would constitute grave abuse of
discretion on the Sandiganbayan's part? To
me, the answer is clearly in the negative.
The petitioners seek to be accorded the same
benefit granted to or to be similarly treated as
Roco. Reason and logic dictate that they
cannot, unless they too would make
themselves like Roco. Otherwise stated, they
must first voluntarily adopt for themselves the
factual milieu created by Roco and must bind
themselves to perform certain obligations as
Roco. It is precisely for this that in response to
the petitioners' comment on the
aforementioned Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint the PCGG manifested
that it is willing to accord the petitioners the
treatment it gave Roco provided they would
do what Roco had done, that is, disclose the
identity of their principals/clients and submit
documents substantiating their claimed
lawyer-client relationship with the said
principals/clients, as well as copies of deeds
of assignments the petitioners executed in
favor of their principals/clients. The petitioners
did not do so because they believed that
compliance thereof would breach the sanctity
of their fiduciary duty in a lawyer-client
relationship.
It, indeed, appears that Roco has complied
with his obligation as a consideration for his
exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint.
The Sandiganbayan found that
5. The PCGG is satisfied that
defendant Roco has demonstrated his
agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which
revelation could show the lack of
action against him. This in turn has
allowed the PCGG to exercise its
power both under the rules of agency
and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-1
in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
As a matter of fact, the PCGG presented
evidence to substantiate Roco's compliance.
The ponencia itself so stated, thus:
. . . respondent PCGG presented
evidence to substantiate compliance
by private respondent Roco of the
conditions precedent to warrant the
latter's exclusion as party-defendant in
PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter
to respondent PCGG of the counsel of
respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989
reiterating a previous request for
reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG
Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March
8, 1989 executed by private
respondent Roco as Attachment to the
letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter
of Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law
 Offices dated September 21, 1988 to
the respondent in behalf of private
respondent Roco originally requesting
the reinvestigation and/or re-
examination of evidence by the PCGG
it Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.
(Id., 5-6).
These are the pieces of evidence upon which
the Sandiganbayan founded its conclusion
that the PCGG was satisfied with Roco's
compliance. The petitioners have not assailed
such finding as arbitrary.
The ponencia's observation then that Roco
did not refute the petitioners' contention that
he did not comply with his obligation to
disclose the identity of his principals is entirely
irrelevant.
In view of their adamantine position, the
petitioners did not, therefore, allow
themselves to be like Roco. They cannot
claim the same treatment, much less compel
the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for
nothing whatsoever. They have no right to
make such a demand for until they shall have
complied with the conditions imposed for their
exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by
way of a motion to dismiss based on the
grounds allowed by law (e.g., those
enumerated in § 1, Rule 16, Rules of
Court). The rule of confidentiality under the
lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to
exclude a party. It is merely aground for
disqualification of a witness (§ 24, Rule 130,
Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at
the appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is
under compulsion to answer as witness, as
when, having taken the witness stand, he is
questioned as to such confidential
communicator or advice, or is being otherwise
judicially coerced to produce,
through subpoena duces tecum or otherwise,
letters or other documents containing the
same privileged matter. But none of the
lawyers in this case is being required to testify
about or otherwise reveal "any [confidential]
communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment."
What they are being asked to do, in line with
their claim that they had done the acts
ascribed to them in pursuance of their
professional relation to their clients, is to
identify the latter to the PCGG and the Court;
but this, only if they so choose in order to be
dropped from the complaint, such
identification being the condition under which
the PCGG has expressed willingness to
exclude them from the action. The revelation
is entirely optional, discretionary, on their part.
The attorney-client privilege is not therefor
applicable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any
abuse of discretion when it denied the
petitioners' prayer for their exclusion as party-
defendants because they did not want to
abide with any of the conditions set by the
PCGG. There would have been abuse if the
Sandiganbayan granted the prayer because
then it would have capriciously, whimsically,
arbitrarily, and oppressively imposed its will on
the PCGG.
Again, what the petitioners want is their
exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint
or the dismissal of the case insofar as they
are concerned because either they are
invested with immunity under the principle of
confidentiality in a lawyer-client relationship,
or the claims against them in Civil Case No.
0033 are barred by such principle.
Even if we have to accommodate this issue, I
still submit that the lawyer-client privilege
provides the petitioners no refuge. They are
sued as principal defendants in Civil Case No.
0033, a case of the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth. Conspiracy is imputed to the
petitioners therein. In short, they are,
allegedly, conspirators in the commission of
the acts complained of for being nominees of
certain parties.
Their inclusion as defendants in justified under
§ 15, Article XI of the Constitution — which
provides that the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred
by prescription, laches or estoppel — and
E.O. No. 1 of 28 February 1986, E.O. No. 2 of
12 March 1986, E.O. No. 14 of 7 May 1986,
and the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG.
Furthermore, § 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court requires that the complaint or
information should be "against all persons
who appear to be responsible for the offense
involved."
Hypothetically admitting the allegations in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself
unable to agree with the majority opinion that
the petitioners are immune from suit or that
they have to be excluded as defendants, or
that they cannot be compelled to reveal or
disclose the identity of their principals, all
because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege.
This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
§ 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. — The
following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view
to, professional employment, nor can
an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such
capacity.
The majority seeks to expand the scope of the
Philippine rule on the lawyer-client privilege by
copious citations of American jurisprudence
which includes in the privilege the identity of
the client under the exceptional situations
narrated therein. From the plethora of cases
cited, two facts stand out in bold relief. Firstly,
the issue of privilege contested therein arose
in grand jury proceedings on different States,
which are preliminary proceedings before the
filing of the case in court, and we are not even
told what evidentiary rules apply in the said
hearings. In the present case, the privilege is
invoked in the court where it was already filed
and presently pends, and we have the
foregoing specific rules above-quoted.
Secondly, and more important, in the cases
cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned
were merely advocating the cause of their
clients but were not indicted for the charges
against their said clients. Here, the counsel
themselves are co-defendants duly charged in
court as co-conspirators in the offenses
charged. The cases cited by the majority
evidently do not apply to them.
Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the
fact that the lawyer-client privilege is not a
shield for the commission of a crime or
against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor.
I quote, with emphases supplied, from 81 AM
JUR 2d, Witnesses, § 393 to 395, pages 356-
357:
§ 393. Effect of unlawful purpose.
The existence of an unlawful purpose
prevents the attorney-client privilege
from attaching. The attorney-client
privilege does not generally exist
where the representation is sought to
further criminal or fraudulent conduct
either past, present, or future. Thus, a
confidence received by an attorney in
order to advance a criminal or
fraudulent purpose is beyond the
scope of the privilege.
Observation: The
common-law rule that
the privilege protecting
confidential
communications
between attorney and
client is lost if the
relation is abused by a
client who seeks legal
assistance to
perpetrate a crime or
fraud has been
codified.
§ 394. Attorney participation.
The attorney-client privilege cannot be
used to protect a client in the
perpetration of a crime in concert with
the attorney, even where the attorney
is not aware of his client's purpose.
The reason for the rule is that it is not
within the professional character of a
lawyer to give advised on the
commission of crime. Professional
responsibility does not countenance
the use of the attorney-client privilege
as a subterfuge, and all conspiracies,
either active or passive, which are
calculated to hinder the administration
of justice will vitiate the privilege. In
some jurisdictions, however, this
exception to the rule of privilege in
confined to such intended acts in
violation of the law as are mala in se,
as distinguished from those which are
merely mala prohibita.
§ 395. Communication in
contemplation of crime.
 Communications between attorney
and client having to do with the client's
contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered
by the cloak of privilege ordinarily
existing in reference to
communications between attorney and
client. But, the mere charge of
illegality, not supported by evidence,
will not defeat the privilege; there must
be at least prima facie evidence that
the illegality has some foundation in
fact.
Underhill also states:
There are many other cases to the
same effect, for the rule is prostitution
of the honorable relation of attorney
and client will not be permitted under
the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney
by a client for a criminal purpose is a
conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy
which is not only lawful to divulge, but
which the attorney under certain
circumstances may be bound to
disclose at once in the interest of
justice. In accordance with this rule,
where a forged will or other false
instrument has come into possession
of an attorney through the
instrumentality of the accused, with
the hope and expectation that the
attorney would take some action in
reference thereto, and the attorney
does act, in ignorance of the true
character of the instrument, there is no
privilege, inasmuch as full confidence
has been withheld. The attorney is
then compelled to produce a forged
writing against the client. The fact that
the attorney is not cognizant of the
criminal or wrongful purpose, or,
knowing it, attempts to dissuade his
client, is immaterial. The attorney's
ignorance of his client's intentions
deprives the information of a
professional character as full
confidence has been withheld. (H.C.
Underhill, A Treatise on the Law of
Criminal Case Evidence, vol. 2, Fifth
ed. (1956), Sec. 332, pp. 836-837;
emphasis mine).
125 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS
ANNOTATED, 516-519, summarizes the
rationale of the rule excepting
communications with respect to contemplated
criminal or fraudulent acts, thus:
c. Rationale of rule excepting
communications with respect to
contemplated criminal or fraudulent
act.
Various reasons have been
announced as being the foundation for
the holdings that communications with
respect to contemplated criminal or
fraudulent acts are not privileged.
The reason perhaps most frequently
advanced is that in such cases there
is no professional employment,
properly speaking. Standard
F. Ins. Co v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky
679, 211 SW. 441, 5 ALR
972; Cummings v. Com. (1927) 221
Ky 301, 298 SW 943; Strong v. Abner
(1937) 268 Ky 502, 105 SW(2d)
599; People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57
Mich 69, 23 NW 594; Hamil &
Co. v. England (1892) 50 Mo App
338; Carney v. United R. Co. (1920)
205 Mo App 495, 226 SW
308; Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48
NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054; Covency
v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37
AM Dec 287; People ex
rel. Vogelstein v. Warden (1934) 150
Misc 714, 270 NYS 362 (affirmed
without opinion in (1934) 242 App Div
611, 271 NYS 1059); Russell
v. Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng
Reprint 558; Charlton
v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng
Reprint 751; Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14
QB Div (Eng) 153 — CCR; Re
Postlethwaite (1887) LR 35 Ch Div
(Eng) 722.
In Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div
(Eng) 153 — CCR, the court said: "In
order that the rule may apply, there
must be both professional confidence
and professional employment, but if
the client has a criminal object in view
in his communications with his
solicitor one of these elements must
necessarily be absent. The client must
either conspire with his solicitor or
deceive him. If his criminal object is
avowed, the client does not consult
his adviser professionally, because it
cannot be the solicitor's business to
further any criminal object. If the client
does not avow his object, he reposes
no confidence, for the state of facts
which is the foundation of the
supposed confidence does not exist.
The solicitor's advice is obtained by a
fraud."
So,
in Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart (1
919) 183 Ky 679, 211 SW 441, 5 ALR
972, the court said: "The reason of the
principle which holds such
communications not to be privileged is
that it is not within the professional
character of a lawyer to give advice
upon such subjects, and that it is no
part of the profession of an attorney or
counselor at law to be advising
persons as to how they may commit
crimes or frauds, or how they may
escape the consequences of
contemplated crimes and frauds. If the
crime or fraud has already been
committed and finished, a client may
advise with an attorney in regard to it,
and communicate with him freely, and
the communications cannot be
divulged as evidence without the
consent of the client, because it is a
part of the business and duty of those
engaged in the practice of the
profession of law, when employed and
relied upon for that purpose, to give
advice to those who have made
infractions of the laws; and, to enable
the attorney to properly advise and to
properly represent the client in court or
when prosecutions are threatened, it
is conducive to the administration of
justice that the client shall be free to
communicate to his attorney all the
facts within his knowledge, and that he
may be assured that a communication
made by him shall not be used to his
prejudice."
The protection which the law affords to
communications between attorney and
client has reference to those which are
legitimately and properly within the
scope of a lawful employment, and
does not extend to communications
made in contemplation of a crime, or
perpetration of a
fraud. Strong v. Abner (1937) 368 Ky
502, 105 SW (2d) 599.
The court
in People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57
Mich 69, 23 NW 594, in holding not
privileged communications to an
attorney having for their object the
communication of a crime, said: "They
then partake of the nature of a
conspiracy, or attempted conspiracy,
and it is not only lawful to divulge such
communications, but under certain
circumstances it might become the
duty of the attorney to do so. The
interests of public justice require that
no such shield from merited exposure
shall be interposed to protect a person
who takes counsel how he can safely
commit a crime. The relation of
attorney and client cannot exist for the
purpose of counsel in concocting
crimes."
And in Coveney v. Tannahill (1841) 1
Hill (NY) 33, 37 Am Dec 287, the court
was of the opinion that there could be
no such relation as that of attorney
and client, either in the commission of
a crime, or in the doing of a wrong by
force or fraud to an individual, the
privileged relation of attorney and
client existing only for lawful and
honest purposes.
If the client consults the attorney at
law with reference to the perpetration
of a crime, and they co-operate in
effecting it, there is no privilege,
inasmuch as it is no part of the
lawyer's duty to aid in crime — he
ceases to be counsel and becomes a
criminal. Matthews v. Hoagland (1891)
48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054.
The court cannot permit it to be said
that the contriving of a fraud forms
part of the professional business of an
attorney or solicitor. Charlton
v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng
Reprint 751.
If the client does not frankly and freely
reveal his object and intention as well
as facts, there is not professional
confidence, and therefore no
privilege. Matthews
v. Hoagland (NJ) supra. See to the
same effect Carney v. United R. Co.
(1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW 308.
There is no valid claim of privilege in
regard to the production of documents
passing between solicitor and client,
when the transaction impeached is
charged to be based upon fraud, that
is the matter to be investigated, and it
is thought better that the alleged
privilege should suffer than that
honestly and fair dealing should
appear to be violated with
impunity. Smith v. Hunt (1901) 1 Ont L
Rep 334.
In Tichborne v. Lushington, shorthand
Notes (Eng) p. 5211 (cited in Reg. v.
Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 172
— CCR), the chief justice said "I
believe the law is, and properly is, that
if a party consults an attorney, and
obtains advice for what afterwards
turns out to be the commission of a
crime or a fraud, that party so
consulting the attorney has no
privilege whatever to close the lips of
the attorney from stating the truth.
Indeed, if any such privilege should be
contended for, or existing, it would
work most grievous hardship on an
attorney, who, after he had been
consulted upon what subsequently
appeared to be a manifest crime and
fraud, would have his lips closed, and
might place him in a very serious
position of being suspected to be a
party to the fraud, and without his
having an opportunity of exculpating
himself . . . There is no privilege in the
case which I have suggested of a
party consulting another, a
professional man, as to what may
afterwards turn out to be a crime or
fraud, and the best mode of
accomplishing it."
In Garside v. Outram (1856) 3 Jur NS
(Eng) 39, although the question of
privilege as to communications
between attorney and client was not
involved, the question directly involved
being the competency of a clerk in a
business establishment to testify as to
certain information which he acquired
while working in the establishment, the
court strongly approved of a view as
stated arguendo for plaintiff,
in Annesley v. Anglesea (1743) 17
How St Tr (Eng) 1229, as follows: "I
shall claim leave to consider whether
an attorney may be examined as to
any matter which came to his
knowledge as an attorney. If he is
employed as an attorney in any
unlawful or wicked act, his duty to the
public obliges him to disclose it; no
private obligations can dispense with
that universal one which lies on every
member of society to discover every
design which may be formed, contrary
to the laws of society, to destroy the
public welfare. For this reason, I
apprehend that if a secret which is
contrary to the public good, such as a
design to commit treason, murder, or
perjury, comes to the knowledge of an
attorney, even in a cause where he is
concerned, the obligation to the public
must dispense with the private
obligation to the client."
The court in McMannus
v. State (1858) 2 Head (Tenn) 213,
said; "It would be monstrous to hold
that if counsel was asked and
obtained in reference to a
contemplated crime that the lips of the
attorney would be sealed, when the
facts might become important to the
ends of justice in the prosecution of
crime. In such a case the relation
cannot be taken to exist. Public policy
would forbid it."
And the court in Lanum
v. Patterson (1909) 151 Ill App 36,
observed that this rule was not in
contravention of sound public policy,
but on the contrary, tended to the
maintenance of a higher standard of
professional ethics by preventing the
relation of attorney and client from
operating as a cloak for fraud.
Communications of a client to an
attorney are not privileged if they were
a request for advice as to how to
commit a fraud, it being in such a case
not only the attorney's privilege, but
his duty, to disclose the facts to the
court. Will v. Tornabells & Co. (1907)
3 Porto Rico Fed Rep 125. The court
said: "We say this notwithstanding the
comments of opposing counsel as to
the indelicacy of his position because
of his being now on the opposite side
of the issue that arose as a
consequence of the communication he
testifies about, and is interested in the
 cause to the extent of a large
contingent fee, as he confesses."
The object of prohibiting the disclosure
of confidential communications is to
protect the client, and not to make the
attorney an accomplice or permit him
to aid in the commission of a
crime. People vs. Petersen (1901) 60
App Div 118, NYS 941.
The seal of personal confidence can
never be used to cover a transaction
which is in itself a crime. People
v. Farmer (1909) 194 NY 251, 87 NE
457.
As to disclosing the identity of a client, 81 AM
JUR 2d, Witnesses, § 410 and 411, pages
366-368, states:
§ 410. Name or identity of client.
Disclosure of a client's identity is
necessary proof of the existence of
the attorney-client relationship and is
not privileged information. Thus, the
attorney-client privilege is inapplicable
even though the information was
communicated confidentially to the
attorney in his professional capacity
and, in some cases, in spite of the fact
that the attorney may have been
sworn to secrecy, where an inquiry is
directed to an attorney as to the name
or identity of his client. This general
rule applies in criminal cases, as well
as in civil actions. Where an
undisclosed client is a party to an
action, the opposing party has a right
to know with whom he is contending
or who the real party in interest is, if
not the nominal adversary.
§ 411. Disclosure of identity of client
as breach of confidentiality.
The revelation of the identification of a
client is not usually considered
privileged, except where so much has
been divulged with regard to to legal
services rendered or the advice
sought, that to reveal the client's name
would be to disclose the whole
relationship and confidential
communications. However, even
where the subject matter of the
attorney-client relationship has already
been revealed, the client's name has
been deemed privileged.
Where disclosure of the identity of a
client might harm the client by being
used against him under
circumstances where there are no
countervailing factors, then the identity
is protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
In criminal proceedings, a client's
name may be privileged if information
already obtained by the tribunal,
combined with the client's identity,
might expose him to criminal
prosecution for acts subsequent to,
and because of, which he had sought
the advice of his attorney.
Although as a general rule, the identity
of a defendant in a criminal
prosecution is a matter of public
record and, thus, not covered by the
attorney-client privilege, where the
attorney has surrendered to the
authorities physical evidence in his
possession by way of the attorney-
client relationship, the state must
prove the connection between the
piece of physical evidence and the
defendant without in any way relying
on the testimony of the client's
attorney who initially received the
evidence and, thus, the attorney may
not be called to the stand and asked
to disclose the identity of the client.
However, an attorney cannot refuse to
reveal the identity of a person who
asked him to deliver stolen property to
the police department, whether a bona
fide attorney-client relationship exists
between them, inasmuch as the
transaction was not a legal service or
done in the attorney's professional
capacity.
Distinction: Where an
attorney was informed
by a male client that
his female
acquaintance was
possibly involved in [a]
his-and-run accident,
the identity of the
female did not come
within scope of
attorney-client privilege
 although the identity of
the male client was
protected. (emphases
supplied)
WIGMORE explains why the identity of a
client is not within the lawyer-client privilege in
this manner:
§ 2313. Identity of client or purpose of
suit. — The identity of the attorney's
client or the name of the real party in
interest will seldom be a matter
communicated in confidence because
the procedure of litigation ordinarily
presupposes a disclosure of these
facts. Furthermore, so far as a client
may in fact desire secrecy and may be
able to secure action without
appearing as a party to the
proceedings, it would be improper to
sanction such a wish. Every litigant is
in justice entitled to know the identity
of his opponents. He cannot be
obliged to struggle in the dark against
unknown forces. He has by
anticipation the right, in later
proceedings, if desired, to enforce the
legal responsibility of those who may
have maliciously sued or prosecuted
him or fraudulently evaded his claim.
He has as much right to ask the
attorney "Who fees your fee?" as to
ask the witness (966 supra). "Who
maintains you during this trial?" upon
the analogy of the principle already
examined (2298 supra), the privilege
cannot be used to evade a client's
responsibility for the use of legal
process. And if it is necessary for the
purpose to make a plain exception to
the rule of confidence, then it must be
made. (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8,
(1961), p. 609; emphases supplied).
In 114 ALR, 1322, we also find the following
statement:
1. Name or identity.
As is indicated in 28 R.C.L. p. 563, it
appears that the rule making
communications between attorney and
client privileged from disclosure
ordinarily does not apply where the
inquiry is confined to the fact of the
attorney's employment and the name
of the person employing him, since the
privilege presupposes the relationship
of client and attorney, and therefore
does not attach to its creation.
At the present stage of the proceedings
below, the petitioners have not shown that
they are so situated with respect to their
principals as to bring them within any of the
exceptions established by American
jurisprudence. There will be full opportunity for
them to establish that fact at the trial where
the broader perspectives of the case shall
have been presented and can be better
appreciated by the court. The insistence for
their exclusion from the case is
understandable, but the reasons for the hasty
resolution desired is naturally suspect.
We do not even have to go beyond our shores
for an authority that the lawyer-client privilege
cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of
a client's identity where the lawyer and the
client are conspirators in the commission of a
crime or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction,
lawyers are mandated not to counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule
1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility) and to employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id.). And
under the Canons of Professional Ethics, a
lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind that his
great trust is to be performed within and not
without the bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.),
that he advances the honor of his profession
and the best interest of his client when he
renders service or gives advice tending to
impress upon the client and his undertaking
exact compliance with the strictest principles
of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These canons
strip a lawyer of the lawyer-client privilege
whenever he conspires with the client in the
commission of a crime or a fraud.
I then vote to DENY, for want of merit, the
instant petition.
Narvasa, C.J. and Regalado, J., concur.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is an important petition for certiorari to
annul the resolutions of the
respondent Sandiganbayan denying
petitioners' motion to be excluded from the
Complaint for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth on the principal ground that as lawyers
they cannot be ordered to reveal the identity
of their client.
First, we fast forward the facts. The
Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) filed Civil Case No. 33
before the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr., for the recovery of alleged
ill-gotten wealth. Sued as co-defendants are
the petitioners in the cases at bar — lawyers
Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino
V. Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio A.
Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo Escueta
and Paraja Hayudini. Also included as a co-
defendant is lawyer Raul Roco, now a duly
elected senator of the Republic. All co-
defendants were then partners of the law firm,
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz
Law Offices, better known as the ACCRA Law
Firm. The Complaint against Cojuangco, Jr.,
and the petitioners alleged, inter alia, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
The wrongs committed by defendants
acting singly or collectively and in
unlawful concert with one another,
include the misappropriation and theft
of public funds, plunder of the nation's
wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery,
embezzlement and other acts of
corruption, betrayal of public trust and
brazen abuse of power as more fully
described (in the subsequent
paragraphs of the complaint), all at the
expense and to the grave and
irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the
Filipino people.
Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Regalio A. Vinluan,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G.
Hayudini and Raul S. Roco of Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala, and Abello
law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised,
schemed, conspired and confederated
with each other in setting up, through
the use of the coconut levy funds, the
financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM,
COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC and
more than twenty other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the
acquisition of the San Miguel
Corporation shares and the
institutionalization through presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly.
through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, using its
wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation,
became the holder of approximately
fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding
capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March
1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments
Corporation number 44 among the top
100 biggest stockholders of UCPB
which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of 7
June 1984.
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that the
legal services offered and made available by
their firm to its clients include: (a) organizing
and acquiring business organizations, (b)
acting as incorporators or stockholders
thereof, and (c) delivering to clients the
corresponding documents of their equity
holdings (i.e., certificates of stock endorsed in
blank or blank deeds of trust or assignment).
They claimed that their activities were "in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering."
In the course of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan, the PCGG filed a Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint and the
Third Amended Complaint excluding lawyer
Roco as party defendant. Lawyer Roco was
excluded on the basis of his promise to reveal
the identity of the principals for whom he
acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in the case.
The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners to
comment on the motion. In their Comment,
petitioners demanded that they be extended
the same privilege as their co-defendant
Roco. They prayed for their exclusion from the
complaint. PCGG agreed but set the following
conditions: (1) disclosure of the identity of
their client; (2) submission of documents
substantiating their lawyer-client relationship;
and (3) submission of the deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of
their client covering their respective
shareholdings. The same conditions were
imposed on lawyer Roco.
Petitioners refused to comply with the PCGG
conditions contending that the attorney-client
privilege gives them the right not to reveal the
identity of their client. They also alleged that
lawyer Roco was excluded though he did not
in fact reveal the identity of his clients. On
March 18, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied
the exclusion of petitioners in Case No. 33. It
held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic
stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have
acted, i.e., their principal, and that will
be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of
whether or not the privilege claimed by
the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot
even begin to the debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of
their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of
the client.
This is what appears to be the cause
for which they have been impleaded
by the PCGG as defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that
defendant Roco has demonstrated his
agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which
revelation could show the lack of
course against him. This in turn has
allowed the PCGG to exercise its
power both under the rules of Agency
and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A
in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to
the ACCRA lawyers the same
conditions availed of by Roco; full
disclosure in exchange for exclusion
from these proceedings (par. 7,
PCGG's COMMENT dated November
4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have
preferred not to make the disclosures
required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot,
therefore, begrudge the PCGG for
keeping them as a party defendants.
In the same vein, they cannot compel
the PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion
dated October 8, 1991 filed by the
ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty.
Paraja G. Hayudini for the same
treatment by the PCGG as accorded
to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of
merit.
Sandiganbayan later denied petitioners'
motions for reconsideration in its resolutions
dated May 21, 1988 and September 3, 1992.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners
contend:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in
subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers
who indisputably acted as lawyers in
serving as nominee-stockholders, to
the strict application of the law
agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not considering petitioners ACCRA
lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly
situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely
no evidence that Mr.
Roco had revealed, or
had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of
the client(s) for whom
he acted as nominee-
stockholder.
2. Even assuming that
Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal,
the identities of the
client(s), the disclosure
does not constitute a
substantial distinction
 as would make the included as defendants in Civil Case No. 33
classification as conspirators. Together with Mr. Cojuangco,
reasonable under the Jr., they are charged with having ". . .
equal protection conspired and confederated with each other in
clause. setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework
3. Respondent and structures that led to the establishment of
Sandiganbayan UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK,
sanctioned favoritism CICI and more than twenty other coconut levy
and undue preference funded corporations, including the acquisition
in favor of Mr. Roco of San Miguel Corporation shares and the
and violation of the institutionalization through presidential
equal protection directives of the coconut monopoly." To
clause. stress, petitioners are charged with having
conspired in the commission of crimes. The
III issue of attorney-client privilege arose when
PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the
complaint on condition they reveal the identity
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
of their client. Petitioners refused to comply
committed grave abuse of discretion in
and assailed the condition on the ground that
not holding that, under the facts of this
to reveal the identity of their client will violate
case, the attorney-client privilege
the attorney-client privilege.
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information It is thus necessary to resolve whether the
requested by the PCGG. Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it rejected petitioners' thesis
that to reveal the identity of their client would
1. Under the peculiar
violate the attorney-client privilege. The
facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the
attorney-client privilege
privileges for confidential communications
includes the identity of
known to the common law.  For the first time
1

the client(s).
in this jurisdiction, we are asked to rule
whether the attorney-client privilege includes
2. The factual the right not to disclose the identity of client.
disclosures required by The issue poses a trilemma for its resolution
the PCGG are not requires the delicate balancing of three
limited to the identity of opposing policy considerations. One
petitioners ACCRA overriding policy consideration is the need for
lawyers' alleged courts to discover the truth for truth alone is
client(s) but extend to the true touchstone of justice.  Equally
2

other privileged compelling is the need to protect the

matters. adversary system of justice where truth is best
extracted by giving a client broad privilege to
IV confide facts to his counsel.  Similarly
3

deserving of sedulous concern is the need to

The Honorable Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not requiring that the dropping of
party-defendants by the PCGG must
be based on reasonable and just
grounds and with due consideration to
the constitutional right of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers to the equal
protection of the law.
keep inviolate the constitutional right against
self-incrimination and the right to effective
counsel in criminal litigations. To bridle at
center the centrifugal forces of these policy
considerations, courts have followed to
prudential principle that the attorney-client
privilege must not be expansively construed
as it is in derogation of the search for
truth.  Accordingly, a narrow construction has
4

been given to the privilege and it has been

The petition at bar is atypical of the usual case consistently held that "these competing
where the hinge issue involves the societal interests demand that application of
applicability of attorney-client privilege. It the privilege not exceed that which is
ought to be noted that petitioners were necessary to effect the policy considerations
underlying the privilege, i.e., the privilege must
be upheld only in those circumstances for
which it was created.'"5
Prescinding from these premises, our initial
task is to define in clear strokes the
substantive content of the attorney-client
privilege within the context of the distinct
issues posed by the petition at bar. With due
respect, I like to start by stressing the
irreducible principle that the attorney-client
privilege can never be used as a shield to
commit a crime or a fraud. Communications to
an attorney having for their object the
commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature
of a conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to
divulge such communications, but under
certain circumstances it might become the
duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of
public justice require that no such shield from
merited exposure shall be interposed to
protect a person who takes counsel how he
can safely commit a crime. The relation of
attorney and client cannot exist for the
purpose of counsel in concocting crimes."  In6
the well chosen words of retired Justice
Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.  I
7
hasten to add, however, that a mere allegation
that a lawyer conspired with his client to
commit a crime or a fraud will not defeat the
privilege.  As early as 1933, no less than the
8
Mr. Justice Cardozo held in Clark v. United
States  that: "there are early cases apparently
9
to the effect that a mere charge of illegality,
not supported by any evidence, will set the
confidences free . . . But this conception of the
privilege is without support . . . To drive the
privilege away, there must be 'something to
give colour to the charge;' there must
be prima facie evidence that it has foundation
in fact." In the petition at bar, however, the
PCGG appears to have relented on its original
stance as spelled out in its Complaint that
petitioners are co-conspirators in crimes and
cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege.
The PCGG has agreed to exclude petitioners
from the Complaint provided they reveal the
identity of their client. In fine, PCGG has
conceded that petitioner are entitled to invoke
the attorney-client privilege if they reveal their
client's identity.
Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the
attorney-client privilege since the PCGG is no
longer proceeding against them as co-
conspirators in crimes, we should focus on the
more specific issue of whether the attorney-
client privilege includes the right not to divulge
the identity of a client as contended by the
petitioners. As a general rule, the attorney-
client privilege does not include the right of
non-disclosure of client identity. The general
rule, however, admits of well-etched
exceptions which the Sandiganbayan failed to
recognize. The general rule and its exceptions
are accurately summarized in In re Grand Jury
Investigation,  viz:
10
The federal forum is unanimously in
accord with the general rule that the
identity of a client is, with limited
exceptions, not within the protective
ambit of the attorney-client privilege.
See: In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th
Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Jones), 517 F. 2d 666,
670-71 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Fine), 651 F. 2d
199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); Frank
v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1082, 86
S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966); In
re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695
F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363,
365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215,
218 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Circuits have embraced various
"exceptions" to the general rule that
the identity of a client is not within the
protective ambit of the attorney-client
privilege. All such exceptions appear
to be firmly grounded in the Ninth
Circuit's seminal decision in Baird
v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.
1960). In Baird the IRS received a
letter from an attorney stating that an
enclosed check in the amount of
$12,706 was being tendered for
additional amounts due from
undisclosed taxpayers. When the IRS
summoned the attorney to ascertain
the identity of the delinquent taxpayers
the attorney refused identification
assertion the attorney-client privilege.
The Ninth Circuit, applying California
law, adjudged that the "exception" to
the general rule as pronounced in Ex
parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149
P. 566 (1915) controlled:
The name of the client
will be considered
privileged matter
 where the
circumstances of the
case are such that the
name of the client is
material only for the
purpose of showing an
acknowledgment of
guilt on the part of
such client of the very
offenses on account of
which the attorney was
employed.
Baird, supra, 279 F.2d at 633. The
identity of the Baird taxpayer was
adjudged within this exception to the
general rule. The Ninth Circuit has
continued to acknowledge this
exception.
A significant exception
to this principle of non-
confidentiality holds
that such information
may be privileged
when the person
invoking the privilege
is able to show that a
strong possibility exists
that disclosure of the
information would
implicate the client in
the very matter for
which legal advice was
sought in the first case.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d
363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982).
Accord: United States v. Hodge and
Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir.
1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Sherman, 627
F.2d 189, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1980); In re
Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d
359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982). This
exception, which can perhaps be most
succinctly characterized as the "legal
advice" exception, has also been
recognized by other circuits. See: In re
Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S. Ct.
531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980); In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631
F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S.1083, 101 S.Ct. 869-
70, 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981). Since the
legal advice exception is firmly
grounded in the policy of protecting
confidential communications, this
Court adopts and applies its principles
herein. See: In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), supra.
It should be observed, however that
the legal advice exception may be
defeated through a prima
facie showing that the legal
representation was secured in
furtherance of present or intended
continuing illegality, as where the legal
representation itself is part of a larger
conspiracy. See: In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Decus Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), supra, 695 F.2d
at 365 n. 1; In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489,
495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449, U.S.
994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed. 2d 291
(1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980);
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S.Ct.
869, 66 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1981); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson),
600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d
1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971). See
also: Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1, 15, 53, S.Ct. 465, 469, 77, L.Ed.
993 (1933); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026,
1028-29 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc).
Another exception to the general rule
that the identity of a client is not
privileged arises where disclosure of
the identity would be tantamount to
disclosing an otherwise protected
confidential communication. In
Baird, supra, the Ninth Circuit
observed:
If the identification of
the client conveys
information which
ordinarily would be
conceded to be part of
the usual privileged
communication
between attorney and
client, then the
privilege should extend
to such identification in
the absence of another
factors.
Id., 279 F.2d at 632. Citing Baird, the Fourth client's identity within the protective
Circuit promulgated the following exception: ambit of the attorney-client privilege.
See: In re Grand Jury Empanelled
To the general rule is February 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603
an exception, firmly F.2d 469, 473 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1979). Like
embedded as the rule the "legal advice" exception, this
itself. The privilege exception is also firmly rooted in
may be recognized principles of confidentiality.
where so much of the
actual communication Another exception, articulated in the
has already been Fifth Circuit's en banc decision of In re
disclosed that Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680
identification of the F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc), is
client amounts to recognized when disclosure of the
disclosure of a identity of the client would provide the
confidential "last link" of evidence:
communication.
We have long
NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 recognized the general
(4th Cir. 1965). Accord: United States rule that matters
v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. involving the payment
1975); Colton v. United States, 306 of fees and the identity
F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. of clients are not
denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 generally privileged. In
L.Ed.2d 499 1963); Tillotson re Grand Jury
v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Proceedings, (United
Cir. 1965); United States v. Pape, 144 States v. Jones), 517
F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1944). See F.2d 666 (5th Cir.
also: Chirac v. Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11 1975); see cases
Wheat) 280, 6 L.Ed. 474 (1826). The collected id. at 670 n.
Seventh Circuit has added to 2. There we also
the Harvey exception the following recognized, however,
emphasized caveat: a limited and narrow
exception to the
The privilege may be general rule, one that
recognized where so obtains when the
much of the actual disclosure of the
communication has client's identity by his
already been disclosed attorney would have
[not necessarily by the supplied the last link in
attorney, but by an existing chain of
independent sources incriminating evidence
as well] that likely to lead to the
identification of the client's indictment.
client [or of fees paid]
amounts to disclosure I join the majority in holding that the
of a confidential Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
communication. discretion when it misdelineated the metes
and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by
United States vs. Jeffers, 532 F.2d failing to recognize the exceptions discussed
1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976 (emphasis above.
added). The Third Circuit, applying
this exception, has emphasized that it Be that as it may, I part ways with the majority
is the link between the client and when it ruled that petitioners need not prove
the communication, rather than the they fall within the exceptions to the general
link between the client and the rule. I respectfully submit that the attorney-
possibility of potential criminal client privilege is not a magic mantra whose
prosecution, which serves to bring the invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape
he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly
put, it is not enough to assert the
privilege.  The person claiming the privilege or
11
its exceptions has the obligation to present the
underlying facts demonstrating the existence
of the privilege.  When these facts can be
12
presented only by revealing the very
information sought to be protected by the
privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to
move for an inspection of the evidence in an
in camera hearing.  The hearing can even be
13
in camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been
held that "a well-recognized means for an
attorney to demonstrate the existence of an
exception to the general rule, while
simultaneously preserving confidentiality of
the identity of his client, is to move the court
for an in camera ex-parte hearing.  Without
14
the proofs adduced in these in camera
hearings, the Court has no factual basis to
determine whether petitioners fall within any of
the exceptions to the general rule.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that
petitioners have not adduced evidence that
they fall within any of the above mentioned
exceptions for as aforestated, the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize the
exceptions, hence, the order compelling them
to reveal the identity of their client. In ruling
that petitioners need not further establish the
factual basis of their claim that they fall within
the exceptions to the general rule, the majority
held:
The circumstances involving the
engagement of lawyers in the case at
bench therefore clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue
of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as
stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which
there would be no attorney-client
relationship). Furthermore, under the
third main exception, revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution
to build its case, where none
otherwise exists. It is the link, in the
word of Baird, "that would inevitably
form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict the (client) of a . . . crime.
I respectfully submit that the first and third
exceptions relied upon by the majority are not
self-executory but need factual basis for their
successful invocation. The first exception as
cited by the majority is ". . . where a strong
probability exists that revealing the clients'
name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice." It seems to me evident that "the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice" is a question of fact which must first
be established before there can be any ruling
that the exception can be invoked. The
majority cites Ex Parte Enzor,   and
15
U S v. Hodge and Zweig,  but these cases
16
leave no doubt that the "very activity" for
which the client sought the advice of counsel
was properly proved. In both cases, the "very
activity" of the clients reveal they sought
advice on their criminal activities. Thus, in
Enzor, the majority opinion states that the
"unidentified client, an election official,
informed his attorney in confidence that he
had been offered a bribe to violate election
laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that
end."  In Hodge, the "very activity" of the
17
clients deals with illegal importation of drugs.
In the case at bar, there is no inkling
whatsoever about the "very activity" for which
the clients of petitioners sought their
professional advice as lawyers. There is
nothing in the records that petitioners were
consulted on the "criminal activities" of their
client. The complaint did allege that petitioners
and their client conspired to commit crimes
but allegations are not evidence.
So it is with the third exception which as
related by the majority is "where the
government's lawyers have no case against
an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the
only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of
a crime."  Again, the rhetorical questions that
18
answer themselves are: (1) how can we
determine that PCGG has "no case" against
petitioners without presentation of evidence?
and (2) how can we determine that the name
of the client is the only link without
presentation of evidence as to the other links?
The case of Baird vs. Koerner  does not
19
support the "no need for evidence" ruling of
the majority. In Baird, as related by the
majority itself, "a lawyer was consulted by the
accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be
taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a
favorable position in case criminal charges
were brought against them by the US Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). It appeared that the
taxpayers' returns of previous years were
probably incorrect and the taxes
understated.  Once more, it is clear that the
20
Baird court was informed of the activity of the
client for which the lawyer was consulted and
the activity involved probable violation of the
tax laws. Thus, the Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it
squarely within that exception to the
general rule. Here money was
received by the government, paid by
persons who thereby admitted they
had not paid a sufficient amount in
income taxes some one or more years
in the past. The names of the clients
are useful to the government for but
one purpose — to ascertain which
taxpayers think they were delinquent,
so that it may check the records for
that one year or several years. The
voluntary nature of the payment
indicates a belief by the taxpayers that
more tax or interest or penalties are
due than the sum previously paid, if
any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for
nonpayment of taxes, though whether
it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it
may well be the link that could form
the chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual of a federal
crime. Certainly the payment and the
feeling of guilt are the reasons the
attorney here involved was employed
— to advise his clients what, under the
circumstances, should be done.
In fine, the factual basis for the ruling in Baird
was properly established by the parties. In the
case at bar, there is no evidence about the
subject matter of the consultation made by
petitioners' client. Again, the records do not
show that the subject matter is criminal in
character except for the raw allegations in the
Complaint. Yet, this is the unstated predicate
of the majority ruling that revealing the identity
of the client ". . . would furnish the only link
that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime."
The silent implication is unflattering and unfair
to petitioners who are marquee names in the
legal profession and unjust to their
undisclosed client.
Finally, it ought to be obvious that petitioners'
right to claim the attorney-client privilege is
resolutory of the Complaint against them, and
hence should be decided ahead and
independently of their claim to equal
protection of the law. Pursuant to the rule in
legal hermeneutics that courts should not
decide constitutional issues unless
unavoidable, I also respectfully submit that
there is no immediate necessity to resolve
petitioners' claim to equal protection of the law
at this stage of the proceedings.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a
qualified dissent from the majority opinion.
2.6 Different Modes of investigation rule 139
Bautista vs Gonzales 182 scra 151
A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976,
respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit,
gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to
answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a
motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to
amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution
dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required
complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent
committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case
wherein he agreed
with his clients,
namely, Alfaro
Fortunado, Nestor
Fortunado and Editha
Fortunado [hereinafter
referred to as the
Fortunados] to pay all
expenses, including
court fees, for a
contingent fee of fifty
percent (50%) of the
value of the property in
litigation.
2. Acting as counsel
for the Fortunados in
Civil Case No. Q- Fiscal's Office of
15143, wherein Quezon City, in
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is connection with the
one of the defendants complaint for estafa
and, without said case filed by respondent
being terminated, against complainant
acting as counsel for designated as I.S. No.
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in 7512936;
Civil Case No. Q-
15490; 6. Committing acts of
treachery and
3. Transferring to disloyalty to
himself one-half of the complainant who was
properties of the his client;
Fortunados, which
properties are the 7. Harassing the
subject of the litigation complainant by filing
in Civil Case No. Q- several complaints
15143, while the case without legal basis
was still pending; before the Court of
First Instance and the
4. Inducing Fiscal's Office of
complainant, who was Quezon City;
his former client, to
enter into a contract 8. Deliberately
with him on August 30, misleading the Court of
1971 for the First Instance and the
development into a Fiscal's Office by
residential subdivision making false assertion
of the land involved in of facts in his
Civil Case No. Q- pleadings;
15143, covered by
TCT No. T-1929, 9. Filing petitions
claiming that he "cleverly prepared (so)
acquired fifty percent that while he does not
(50%) interest thereof intentionally tell a he,
as attorney's fees from he does not tell the
the Fortunados, while truth either."
knowing fully well that
the said property was
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976
already sold at a public
and an amended answer on November 18, 1976,
auction on June 30,
denying the accusations against him. Complainant
1971, by the Provincial
filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29,
Sheriff of Lanao del
1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a
Norte and registered
rejoinder.
with the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City;
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court
referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General
5. Submitting to the
for investigation, report and recommendation. In the
Court of First Instance
investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
of Quezon City falsified
complainant presented himself as a witness and
documents purporting
submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent
to be true copies of
appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted
"Addendum to the
Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to
Land Development
submit their respective memoranda.
Agreement dated
August 30, 1971" and
submitting the same On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss
document to the the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay
in the resolution of the complaint against him
constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due
process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order
of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to
the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining
that the delay in the investigation of the case was due
to the numerous requests for postponement of
scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the
motions for extension of time to file their respective
memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2;
Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the
Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In
a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court
required the Solicitor General to submit his report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his
report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A.
Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The
Solicitor General found that respondent committed the
following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of
the properties of his clients during the
pendency of the case where the
properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the
fact that the property subject of their
land development agreement had
already been sold at a public auction
prior to the execution of said
agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting
alleged true copies of a document
where two signatories who had not
signed the original (or even the xerox
copy) were made to appear as having
fixed their signatures [Report and
Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-
404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to
refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court.
Respondent manifested that he intends to submit
more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November
27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to
refer this case to the IBP, containing additional
arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous
pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural
issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's
contention that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the
determination of whether or not there is sufficient
ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule
139 the Solicitor General still has to file an
administrative complaint against him. Respondent
claims that the case should be referred to the IBP
since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1,
1988 and shall supersede the present
Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR
SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All
cases pending investigation by the
Office of the Solicitor General shall be
transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors for
investigation and disposition as
provided in this Rule except those
cases where the investigation has
been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In
the first place, contrary to respondent's claim,
reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is
not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988].
Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and
14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct
disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the
IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor
General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and
recommendation of the investigating official shall be
reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court
shall base its final action on the case on the report
and recommendation submitted by the investigating
official and the evidence presented by the parties
during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP
since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June
1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of
the Solicitor General had been substantially
completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that
only pending cases, the investigation of which has not
been substantially completed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In
this case the investigation by the Solicitor General
was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule
139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to
dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the
investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when
respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion
to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since
the Office of the Solicitor General already made a
thorough and comprehensive investigation of the
case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by
the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the
proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but
also to further delay in the disposition of the present
case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13)
years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some
evidence to present does not warrant the referral of
the case to the IBP. Considering that in the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present
evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is
entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of
procedural due process. The record shows that
respondent appeared as witness for himself and
presented no less than eleven (11) documents to
support his contentions. He was also allowed to
cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a
witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of
whether or not respondent committed the acts of
misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and
the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the Court finds that respondent committed
acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this
Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a
document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The
document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of
the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No.
T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT
No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in
consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the
time the document was executed, respondent knew
that the abovementioned properties were the subject
of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending
before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in
said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12;
Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring
one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself,
respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a
lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest
involved in any litigation in which he may take part by
virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code].
This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of
his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach
of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice
[Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go
Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old
Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he
lawyer should not purchase any interests in the
subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting,"
does not appear anymore in the new Code of
Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes
that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in
litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code,
such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary
action under the new Code of Professional
Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon
of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis
supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath
to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines]
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath,
a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the
Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of
Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer
as the vanguard of our legal system. The
transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a
repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will
not countenance. In the instant case, respondent,
having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be
held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons
mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned
therein because of their existing trust relationship with
the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by
purchase the property and rights in litigation because
of his fiduciary relationship with such property and
rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be
claimed that the new Code of Professional
Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and
consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states
that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16
provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his
possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a
specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the
Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the
new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as
well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the
purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in
litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for
which a disciplinary action may be brought against
him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the
properties was not really implemented, because the
land development agreement on which the transfer
depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere
is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the
assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to
respondent was subject to the implementation of the
land development agreement. The last paragraph of
the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal
services of ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia
Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise
Hill, New Manila, Quezon City,
rendered to our entire satisfaction, we
hereby, by these presents, do transfer
and convey to the said ATTY.
RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs,
successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2)
of our rights and interests in the
abovedescribed property, together
with all the improvements found
therein [Annex D of the Complaint,
Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended
the transfer of the properties to respondent to be
absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of
whether or not the land development agreement was
implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his
failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land
development agreement was entered into, that the
land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been
sold at a public auction. The land development
agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while
the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former
client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter
against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the
request of complainant and was understood to be only
provisional. Respondent claims that since
complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn
complainant of the fact that the land involved in their
land development agreement had been sold at a
public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated
at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent
argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant
so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even
assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at
the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that
respondent failed to inform the complainant of the
sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations
for the land development agreement. In so doing,
respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards
of ethics of the law profession which place a premium
on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The
fact that complainant was not a former client of
respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty
to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining
to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since
he was a party to the land development agreement,
respondent should have warned the complainant of
the sale of the land at a public auction so that the
latter could make a proper assessment of the viability
of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court
has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and
fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do
so is a ground for disciplinary action against him
[Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22,
1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting
to the court falsified documents purporting to be true
copies of an addendum to the land development
agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the
Solicitor General found that in the document filed by
respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, the signatories to the addendum to the land
development agreement namely, Ramon A.
Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado,
Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista—were
made to appear as having signed the original
document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the
letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it
was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and
complainant who signed the original and duplicate
original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith
Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even
respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor
Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after
respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them
to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and
to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to
Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329].
Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and
Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to
sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true
copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973
[Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this
Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16].
Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true
copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A"
of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the
Court into believing that the original addendum was
signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado.
Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his
solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a
manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should
never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor
General found that no impropriety was committed by
respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract
with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p.
8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the
agreement between the respondent and the
Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the
50% contingent fee, provided, you
[respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray
all expenses, for the suit, including
court fees.
Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]
Editha T.
Nestor T. Fortunadoinvestigation
CONFORMEInstance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel
Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p.
4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly
agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of
litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith,
advance the expenses of litigation, the same should
be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between
respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not
provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation
expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an
attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP
Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such
agreements are against public policy especially
where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to
carry on the action at his own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the
thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures
Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution
of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the
former must incur administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent
cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as
counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after
considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor
General's findings on the matter. The evidence
presented by respondent shows that his acceptance
of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge
and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed
by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states
that they gave their consent when respondent
accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of
Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One
of the recognized exceptions to the rule against
representation of conflicting interests is where the
clients knowingly consent to the dual representation
after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6,
Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03,
Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several
complaints against him before the Court of First
Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the
sole purpose of harassing him.
The
record shows
Fortunado that at the time of the Solicitor
[signed]
General's
[signed] of this case, Civil Case No. Q-
18060 was still pending before the Court of First
(I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were
already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency
of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report
and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403].
The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that
the complaints for libel and perjury were used by
respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case
No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending
resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on
complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by
respondent to harass him. The determination of the
validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060
was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
where the case was pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the
Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is
no basis for holding that the respondent's sole
purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to
harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not
be discussed separately since the above discussion
on the other grounds sufficiently cover these
remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on
four counts the respondent violated the law and the
rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal
profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of
justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has
"miserably failed to live up to the standards expected
of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm.
Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647].
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that,
considering the nature of the offenses committed by
respondent and the facts and circumstances of the
case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney
Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct,
the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the
date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this
Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for
their information and guidance, and spread in the
personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan GR no. 79690-707
feb 1, 1989
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and
acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and
vigorously written Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul
M. Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of
the Court dated October 7, 1988. We have reviewed
once more the Court's extended per
curiam Resolution, in the light of the argument
adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must
conclude that we find no sufficient basis for modifying
the conclusions and rulings embodied in that
Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth
copious quotations and references to foreign texts
which, however, whatever else they may depict, do
not reflect the law in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in
some measure, some of the conclusions reached in
the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process
some of the "Ten (10) Legal Points for
Reconsideration," made in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed
that it was error for this Court "to
charge respondent [with] indirect
contempt and convict him of direct
contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court
concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of
the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie
curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt,"
though we are aware that courts in the United States
have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of
"direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of the
courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it
regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which
were made both in a pleading filed before the Court
and in statements given to the media) and the
misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts
flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting
a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and,
through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the
Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its
Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he
should not be punished for contempt of court and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect
of which, respondent was heard and given the most
ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments
and evidence that he wanted to present for the
consideration of this Court. The Court did not
summarily impose punishment upon the respondent
which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71
of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to
consider respondent's acts as constituting "direct
contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel
argues that it was "error for this Court
to charge respondent under Rule 139
(b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules
of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule
139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court pointing out
that:
[R]eference of complaints against
attorneys either to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines or to the Solicitor
General is not mandatory upon the
Supreme Court such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to
the Solicitor General is certainly not an
exclusive procedure under the terms
of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules
of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the
Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in
response to respondent's motion for referral of this
case either to the Solicitor General or to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines under Rule 139 (b).
Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to
Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that
under the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor
General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and
was not the only course of action open to the
Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under Section 1
(entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139,
"Proceedings for the removal or suspension of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on
its own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath
of another in writing" (Parentheses supplied). The
procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139
is the procedure provided for suspension or
disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn
complaint of another person, rather than a procedure
required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme
Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the
Supreme Court would initiate motu
proprio proceedings for which it did not find probable
cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is
no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which
referral is made "for investigation to determine if there
is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of
the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the
Court itself has initiated against the respondent. The
Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor
General if it feels that, in a particular case, further
factual investigation is needed. In the present case,
as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the
Court (page 18), there was "no need for further
investigation of facts in the present case for it [was]
not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez
that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed
to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the
amplest opportunity to present his defense: his
defense is not that he did not make the statements
ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to
no liability on his part, having been made in the
exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which
thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of
basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is
compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page
7 of the Motion for Reconsideration is from
a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v.
United State.   It may be pointed out that the majority
1
in Green v. United States, through Mr. Justice Harlan,
held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not
lack power to impose sentences in excess of one year
for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are not
subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right;
nor does the (US) Constitution require that contempt
subject to prison terms of more than one year be
based on grand jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same
case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
Whatever the conflicting views of
scholars in construing more or less
dubious manuscripts of the Fourteenth
Century, what is indisputable is that
from the foundation of the United
States the constitutionality of the
power to punish for contempt without
the intervention of a jury has not been
doubted. The First Judiciary Act
conferred such a power on the federal
courts in the very act of their
establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of
the Judiciary Committee of eight that
reported the bill to the Senate, five
member including the chairman,
Senator, later to be Chief Justice,
Ellsworth, had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention (Oliver
Ellsworth, Chairman, William
Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard
Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong
17). In the First Congress itself no less
than nineteen member including
Madison who contemporaneously
introduced the Bill of Rights, had been
delegates to the Convention. And
when an abuse under this power
manifested itself, and led Congress to
define more explicitly the summary
power vested in the courts, it did not
remotely deny the existence of the
power but merely defined the
conditions for its exercise more
clearly, in an Act "declaratory of the
law concerning contempts of court."
Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.
 xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the
power been doubted by this Court
throughout its existence . In at least
two score cases in this Court, not to
mention the vast mass of decisions in
the lower federal courts, the power to
punish summarily has been accepted
without question. ... 
2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges
his own cause, is simplistic at best. The judge who
finds himself compelled to exercise the power to
punish for contempt does so not really to avenge a
wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he
upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and
integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to
respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who
appears before it, and most especially from those who
are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel
urges that it is error "for this Court to
apply the "visible tendency" rule rather
than the "clear and present danger"
rule in disciplinary and contempt
charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine
of "visible tendency," it was, more modestly, simply
paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by
respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation which
dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis
and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims
to free speech, and which compels a court to
exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is
invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The
clear and present danger" doctrine has been an
accepted method for marking out the appropriate
limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain
contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has
been recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad
v. Vda. de Gonzales,   this Court, speaking through
3 to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to
Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression
indeed, occupies a preferred position
in the "hierarchy of civil liberties"
(Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It
is not, however, without limitations. As
held in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific
constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right is not susceptible
of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. The realities
of life in a complex society preclude
however, a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an
absolute. It would be too much to
insist that all times and under all
circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There
are other societal values that press for
recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the
clear and present danger rule is such
a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of
speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass
media as radio, television and the
movies, is the "balancing-of-interests
test" (Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970
ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a
court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation (Separate
Opinion of the late Chief Justice
Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis
Supplied)  4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
"balancing-of-interest test," we believe that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of
such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was
implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7,
1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive
evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty
threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar
disruptions of public order.   What is here at stake is
5
the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular
case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct
required from members of the bar and officers of the
courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other
words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder
or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more
far reaching in its implications for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel
argues that it is error "for this Court to
hold that intent is irrelevant in charges
of misconduct." What the Court
actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an
intent to attack and denigrate the
Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as
characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the
natural and plain import of his words
and acts. It is, upon the other hand,
not irrelevant to point out that the
respondent offered no apology in his
two (2) explanations and exhibited no
repentance (Resolution, p. 7;
footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are
irrelevant because such subjectivities (understood as
pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and
reached by the processes of this Court. Human intent
can only be shown derivatively and implied from an
examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the
Court was saying was that respondent's disclaimer of
an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot
prevail over the plain import of what he did say and
do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import of his
acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent
or state of mind incompatible with those acts or
statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g.,
one accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his
criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may
have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he
actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for
the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel
argues that it is error "for this Court to
punish respondent for contempt of
court for out of court publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what
he presents as alleged modern trends in the United
Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law
of contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the
texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in our
jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to
document the state of our case law on this matter in
its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the
circumstances of this case that would suggest to this
Court that that case law, which has been followed for
at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel
pleads that the imposition of indefinite
suspension from the practice of law
constitutes "cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment". The Court finds
it difficult to consider this a substantial
constitutional argument. The
indefiniteness of the respondent's
suspension, far from being "cruel" or
"degrading" or "inhuman," has the
effect of placing, as it were, the key to
the restoration of his rights and
privileges as a lawyer in his own
hands. That sanction has the effect of
giving respondent the chance to purge
himself in his own good time of his
contempt and misconduct by
acknowledging such misconduct,
exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and
capacity to live up to the exacting
standards of conduct rightly
demanded from every member of the
bar and officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The
denial is FINAL.
The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and the
Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988,
filed by respondent
3. Rule 138-A, Student Practice Rule ( Circular No. 19,
Dec 19, 1986)
Bar matter No. 194. — Re: Petition to
amend the Revised Rules of Court to
include a Law Student Practice Rule.
— The Court Resolved to ADOPT the
following Rule permitting limited law
student practice effective immediately,
as follows:
RULE 138A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
SECTION 1. Conditions for Student Practice. — A law
student who has successfully completed his 3rd year
of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and
is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to present any indigent
clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law
student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of
the legal clinic.
Sec. 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules
safeguarding privileged communications between
attorney and client shall apply to similar
communications made to or received by the law
student, acting for the legal clinic.
Sec. 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The
law student shall comply with the standards of
professional conduct governing members of the Bar.
Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision
of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary
action.
Let copies hereof be circulated among all Courts, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and major voluntary
bar associations, and the Deans of the law schools.
December 19, 1986.
Rule 139 The IBP
RULE 139
Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys
Section 1. Motion or complaint. — Proceedings for
the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court on its own motion or upon the
complaint under oath of another in writing. The
complaint shall set out distinctly, clearly, and
concisely the facts complained of, supported by
affidavits, if any, of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and shall be
accompanied with copies of such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
Section 2. Service or dismissal. — If the complaint
appears to merit action, a copy thereof shall be
served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer
the same within ten (10) days from the date of
service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the
answer shows to the satisfaction of the Supreme
Court that the complaint is not meritorious, the same
shall be dismissed.
Section 3. Investigation by Solicitor General. — Upon
the issues raised by the complaint and answer, or
upon failure of the respondent to answer, the case
shall be referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground
to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent. In
the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
the respondent shall be given full opportunity to
defend himself, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.
However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent
fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte.
Section 4. Report of the Solicitor General. — Based
upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the
Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed
against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the
Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and
conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be
exonerated unless the court orders differently.
Section 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer
of respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent,
he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his
investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the
respondent shall be served by the clerk of the
Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with
direction to answer the same within fifteen (15) days.
Section 6. Evidence produced before Solicitor
General available. — The evidence produced before
the Solicitor General in his investigation may be
considered by the Supreme Court in the final decision
of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity to
object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's
answer no statement is made as to any intention of
introducing additional evidence, the case shall be set
down for hearing, upon the filing of such answer or
upon the expiration of the time to file the same.
Section 7. Commissioner to investigate and
recommend. Rules of evidence. — Upon receipt of
the respondent's answer, wherein a statement is
made as to his desire to introduce additional
evidence, the case shall be referred to a
commissioner who, in the discretion of the court, may
be the clerk of the Supreme Court, a judge of first
instance, or an attorney-at-law for investigation,
report, and recommendation. The Solicitor General or
his representative shall appear before the
commissioner to conduct the prosecution. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend
himself, to produce additional evidence in his own
behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.
However, if upon reasonable notice the respondent
fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte. The rules of evidence shall be applicable to
proceedings of this nature.
Section 8. Report of commissioner and hearing. —
Upon receipt of the report of the commissioner, copies
of which shall be furnished the Solicitor General and
the respondent, the case shall be set down for
hearing before the court, following which the case
shall be considered submitted to the court for its final
determination.
Section 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Courts of
First Instance. — As far as may be applicable, the
procedure above outlined shall likewise govern the
filing and investigation of complaints against attorneys
in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance.
In case of suspension of the respondent, the judge of
the court of first instance or Justice of the Court of
Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court
a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which same is based.
Section 10. Confidential. — Proceedings against
attorneys shall be private and confidential, except that
the final order of the court shall be made public as in
other cases coming before the court.
in re Integration of the Philippine Bar 49 scra
22 (1973)
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar
Integration  submitted its Report dated November 30,
1 sums as may be necessary for the
1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the
basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 526  of the Court, and
2 Court.
"consistently with the views and counsel received
from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the
Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar,
after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible
and practicable to existing provincial and other local
Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were
orally expounded before the Court. Written
oppositions were admitted,  and all parties were
3
thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and
followed significant developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that
there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine
Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No.
3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of
the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and
took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This
law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit in order to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred
thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the
purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such
same purpose shall be included in the
annual appropriations for the Supreme
 SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon
its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with
argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration
and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the
advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of
the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population
relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as
ample material upon which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this
time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to
integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a
statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will
suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by
the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of
its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar
means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population of the
Philippines. This
requires membership and financial
support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua
non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity
of all persons whose names appear in
the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated
Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible
unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State. Bar
integration, therefore, signifies the
setting up by Government authority of
a national organization of the legal
profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of
the Bar as an instrumentality of justice
and the Rule of Law, integration
fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized
action and participation, the promotion
of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with
minimum supervision and regulation
by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in
general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of
justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of
its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence,
public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional
interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a
spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion
of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and
the relations of the Bar to the Bench
and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal
education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of
legal research in substantive and
adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among
other things, make it possible for the
legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance
in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants
against the abuse of tyrannical judges
and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its
responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which
traditionally cannot defend itself
except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self-interest
may level at it, and assist it to maintain
its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the
selection of judges and prosecuting
officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice
of law, and break up any monopoly of
local practice maintained through
influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families
of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and
establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout
the country so that the poor may not
lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and
informational materials that are difficult
to obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of
continuing legal education for
practising attorneys in order to elevate
the standards of the profession
throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards,
and promulgate minimum fees
schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish
law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate
the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of
preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino
lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive
and meaningful country-wide
involvement of the lawyer population
in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it
may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution,
"to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority
over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a
new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power,
but is a mere legislative declaration that the
integration of the Bar will promote public interest or,
more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the
unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges
on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's
constitutional rights of freedom of association and
freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues
exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent
discussion made by the Commission on Bar
Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar
integration measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support
this reasoning:
— Courts have inherent power to
supervise and regulate the practice of
law.
— The practice of law is not a vested
right but a privilege; a privilege,
moreover, clothed with public interest,
because a lawyer owes duties not only
to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to
the nation; and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State,
the administration of justice, as an
officer of the court.
— Because the practice of law is
privilege clothed with public interest, it
is far and just that the exercise of that
privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
— These public responsibilities can
best be discharged through collective
action; but there can be no collective
action without an organized body; no
organized body can operate effectively
without incurring expenses; therefore,
it is fair and just that all attorneys be
required to contribute to the support of
such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most
efficient means of doing so is by
integrating the Bar through a rule of
court that requires all lawyers to pay
annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of
an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or
the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide
an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The body
compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the
Unified Bar imposes only the duty to
pay dues in reasonable amount. The
issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group
activities, not involuntary membership
in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar
activities serves the function of
elevating the educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the end of
improving the quality of the legal
service available to the people. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional services,
may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does
compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as
a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court
to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be
paid by the members does not mean
that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated
Bar is an exaction for regulation, while
the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the
Court has inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to push through
an Integrated Bar program without
means to defray the concomitant
expenses. The doctrine of implied
powers necessarily includes the power
to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's
power to regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public
interest promoted by the integration of
the Bar far outweighs the
inconsequential inconvenience to a
member that might result from his
required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always
been, to voice his views on any
subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views be opposed
to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a
member's due to promote measures to
which said member is opposed, would
not nullify or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally
condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is
difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to
use the member's dues to fulfill the
very purposes for which it was
established.
The objection would make every
Governmental exaction the material of
a "free speech" issue. Even the
income tax would be suspect. The
objection would carry us to lengths
that have never been dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if his liberties
were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in
furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of
private judgment has never yet been
exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of
Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers
already practising because although
the requirement to pay annual dues is
a new regulation, it will give the
members of the Bar a new system
which they hitherto have not had and
through which, by proper work, they
will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge
their public responsibilities in a more
effective manner than they have been
able to do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid
exercise of regulatory power by the
Court, because it will apply equally to
all lawyers, young and old, at the time
Bar integration takes effect, and
because it is a new regulation in
exchange for new benefits, it is not
retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not
unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the
Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time — requires a careful overview of the practicability
and necessity as well as the advantages and
disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England,
Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline
among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence
and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more
meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the
activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized
practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for
the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better
and more effective discharge by the Bar of its
obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the
courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and in fact expected
from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued
that in the event of integration, Government authority
will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be
weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result;
effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude
into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils
prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have
failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar
integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the
Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar
integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention
the national poll recently conducted by the Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the
Commission in the matter of the integration of the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter
Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as
over the archipelago who have turned in their officers:
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted
in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per
NAME POSITION
cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are
non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Atty. Violeta Drilon President
Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President
expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or
support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates
association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed Atty. Renato F. Secretary, House of Delegates
position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual Ronquillo
lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates
Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor
thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegate
(or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.  All these clearly
5
Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northe
indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar Luzon
integration at this time.
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Centra
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing Luzon
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro
and the mass of factual data contained in the Atty. Jose Aguilar Governor & Vice-President for Southe
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Grapilon Luzon
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolan
within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Easter
the standards of the legal profession, improve the Visayas
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Weste
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively. Visayas

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Easter
vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Mindanao
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines in accordance with the attached Atty. Simeon Governor & Vice-President for Weste
COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973. Datumanong Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their

In re IBP elections 178 scra 398 (1989)
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989
ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June
oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme
Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread
reports received by some members of the Court from
lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the
proceedings and the adverse comments published in
the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates,
led by the main protagonists for the office of president
of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo,
Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use
of government planes, and the officious intervention of
certain public officials to influence the voting, all of
which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws
which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en
banc, exercising its power of supervision over the
Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of
the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of
the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election
process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of
votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the
"IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of
the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by
the participants and observers to be above board. For
Justice Puno took it upon himself to device
safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of,
the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was
the reported electioneering and extravagance that
characterized the campaign conducted by the three
candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION
CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions
Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17,
1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The
Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and
Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam"
(The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the
editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe
(June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-
buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in
the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys.
Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce
who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and
influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's
rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon
allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP
chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso
donations, and she had the added advantage of
having regional directors and labor arbiters of the
Department of Labor and Employment (who had been
granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor
Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants
alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some
members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary
Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of
ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and
Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed,
and that government positions were promised to
others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same
matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel
of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators
and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid
and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the
billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels
where they were reportedly "wined and dined
continuously, womened and subjected to endless
haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which
allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on
the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes
which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a
top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in
IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with
campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in
a room of the PICC (the Philippine International
Convention Center where the convention/election
were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-
echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en
banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the
outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of
Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the
House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday,
June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to
inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of
the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of
confirming and strengthening adherence to the
fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a
basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization
and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall
be non-political in character and that there shall be no
lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of
the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or
regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption
was that officers, delegates and governors would be
chosen on the basis of professional merit and
willingness and ability to serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply
disturbed to note that in connection with the election
of members of the Board of Governors and of the
House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief,
based on reports carried by media and transmitted as
well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and
intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions
as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money
by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or
indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP
President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the
dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel
and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc
on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP
officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter,
the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities
enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed
before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national
officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and
designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices
Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F.
Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as
members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court,
Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's
Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and
testified in response to subpoenas issued by the
Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine
Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three
protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set
up their respective headquarters and where they
billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer
of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport
Office were called to enlighten the Court on the
charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the
members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them
to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of
delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called
to testify on the charge that some candidates gave
free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials
of the Labor Department were also called to enable
the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that
labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the
election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio,
Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to
determine the nature of their sources of information
relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based,
they said, on letters, phone calls and personal
interviews with persons who claimed to have
knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the
Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after
receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence
given by such persons as were perceived to have
direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts;
and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has
Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER
IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes
the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The
Integrated Bar is strictly non-political,
and every activity tending to impair
this basic feature is strictly prohibited
and shall be penalized accordingly. No
lawyer holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in
the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof
shall be eligible for election or
appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof.
A Delegate, Governor, officer or
employee of the Integrated Bar, or an
officer or employee of any Chapter
thereof shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his position as of
the moment he files his certificate of
candidacy for any elective public office
or accepts appointment to any judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in
the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
"'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws
enumerates the prohibited acts
relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices
relative to elections. — The following
acts and practices relative to election
are prohibited, whether committed by
a candidate for any elective office in
the Integrated Bar or by any other
member, directly or indirectly, in any
form or manner, by himself or through
another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election
day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of
election campaign material other than
a statement of the biodata of a
candidate on not more than one page
of a legal-size sheet of paper; or
causing distribution of such statement
to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer
presiding at the elections;
 (c) Campaigning for or against any
candidate, while holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory
office in the Government or any
political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates,
or combinations of candidates, as well
as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or
influencing a member to withhold his
vote, or to vote for or against a
candidate, (1) payment of the dues or
other indebtedness of any member;
(2) giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value,
or any similar consideration to any
person; or (3) making a promise or
causing an expenditure to be made,
offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for
violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing
elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined
in Section 14 prohibited Acts and
Practices relative to elections) of the
by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be
a ground for the disqualification of a
candidate or his removal from office if
elected, without prejudice to the
imposition of sanctions upon any
erring member pursuant to the By-
laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by
the investigating committee, the following violations
were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes
by the candidates for president, executive vice-
president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce
and Paculdo began travelling around the country to
solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989.
Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr.
(t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench
and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference
of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July
3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p.
47) where they announced their candidacies and met
the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country
seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their
votes, and securing their written endorsements. He
personally hand-carried nomination forms and
requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill
up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment
to his nomination for IBP President. He started
campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in
March 1989 after the chapter elections which
determined the membership of the House of
Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty
(40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his
nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were:
Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V.
Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at,
Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F.
Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N.
Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea,
Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J.
Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin,
Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A.
Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan,
Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban,
Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C.
Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto
Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo,
Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P.
Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the
Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had
obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he
obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29,
1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of
those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated"
(t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce,"
t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit
C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the
Department of Environment & Natural Resources
(DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine National
Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for
Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary
Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo)
listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant
Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy
Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the
passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a
PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty.
Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July
3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive
vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that
sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking
from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his
group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to
follow up some papers for a client. While at the
DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was
going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a
PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his
fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the
Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol.
His request was granted. Their purpose in going to
Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP
elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP
chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and
asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use
of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He
recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary
Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor
certain regional development projects there and to
survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in
the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a
fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the
Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and
requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could
be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant
Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which
included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic
Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi
the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr.,
an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-
69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon,
admitted having formed their own slates for the
election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for
President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President;
and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern
Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario
C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la
Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.
(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas),
Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S.
Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr.
(Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for
President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President,
Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan
(Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon),
Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero
Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western
Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao),
Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-
1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and
Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino,
Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr.,
Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban,
Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V.
Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates
and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for
some delegates to the convention. He mentioned
Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to
Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate.
Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him
(Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang
papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not
in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane
tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use them,
because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce,
and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n.,
July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who
was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda
Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines
showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of
Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica),
Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto
Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas
(Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's
candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as
Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p.
161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks,
entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular
rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which
served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be
occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP
delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by
himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association,
and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the
hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a
room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday
Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge
Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar,
Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto
Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J.
Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo
Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto
Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred
Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco
Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral,
Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes,
Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado
Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez,
Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan,
Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio
Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel,
Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay,
Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven
Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager,
testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms,
including the presidential suite, which was used as the
Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty.
Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June
28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89
was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were
billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her
campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40
rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms.
Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions
manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with
the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the
"IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine
Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who
first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She
suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate.
He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would
make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto
turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty.
Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages
consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid
balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel
Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms.
Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for
40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet'
showed that the following persons contributed for that
down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000
(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000
(d) Jay Castro 10,000
(e) Danny Deen 20,000
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000
(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000
(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons
have been contributing money every time the IBP
embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so
that their partners or associates could attend the legal
aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty.
Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine
Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose
name the room she occupied was registered. But she
did ask for a room where she could rest during the
convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for
her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through
Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the
rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine
Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C.
Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria
Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo,
Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat,
Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel
Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon
Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan,
Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array
Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla,
Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto,
Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C.
Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano
Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office
of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to
Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that
some members of his law firm could campaign for the
Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the
legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the
members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of
Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma
Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the
candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her
slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon
Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider
Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being
a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a
room for the members of his own firm who attended
the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made
the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he
paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign
during the convention, by soliciting the votes of
delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former
teacher (but the latter was already committed to
Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in
the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22,
29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras,
entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total
of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He
made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28,
1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on
May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr.
Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit
manager, and reservation manager, respectively of
the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits
E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he
reserved rooms for those who committed themselves
to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos
Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion,
Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin,
Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco,
Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa,
Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo,
Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto
Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo,
Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan,
Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta
Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for
or against a candidate while holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws),
Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment, testified that
he took a leave of absence from his office to attend
the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza
with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral
assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because
he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When
asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary
Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs.
Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the
husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low.
He talked to her immediate circle which included Art
Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty.
Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They
assessed the progress of the campaign, and
measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later
part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant
Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during
the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113
phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as
emanating from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite,
listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco
(candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy
Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These
two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room"
where campaign strategies were discussed before
and during the convention. It was in these rooms
where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys.
Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the
ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any
number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that
she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of
lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but
she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a
candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another,
because the receipts are issued in the name of the
member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28,
1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of
payments in March, April, May during any election
year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000
over that of last year (a non-election year from
Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not
more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec.
14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election,
Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data
and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as,
the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly
distributed their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from
P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own
printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done
by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute
his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty.
Carpio noted that there were more campaign
materials distributed at the convention site this year
than in previous years. The election was more heated
and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President
of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for
chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket,
testified that campaign materials were distributed
during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw
members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for
Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his
vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e],
IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty.
Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his
candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates
and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but
he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt
Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-
Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week
of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the
Department of Labor & Employment at the Green
Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1,
Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon
solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to
stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be
available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her
support during the chapter presidents' meeting to
choose their nominee for governor for the Northern
Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate,
Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote
to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a
judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly
hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the
alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an
offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP
candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from
the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29,
1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's
candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate
instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar
Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro
went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my
wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of
several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials
were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June
29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la
Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n.
June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate
for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some
delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He
testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic
Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of
the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine
Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid
seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the
Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for
him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp.
102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete
City, he already knew that the three candidates had
their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the
Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce,
at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week
before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon
went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned
Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office,
accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional
Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete
City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL
tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza
(t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the
offer because he was already committed to Atty.
Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila
on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy,
approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already
committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce
because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal
and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets
for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000
during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this
amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was
the chapter president) contributed about P150,000.
The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar
association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of
his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga,
Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June
29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to
P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for
his campaign which began several months before the
June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane
tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel,
headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty.
Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and
beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but
still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's
end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in
which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3,
1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and
made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political"
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three
principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in
five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn
and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and
entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island
hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents
who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates
that elects the national officers and regional
governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups
of candidates for the other elective positions aligned
with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce;
the procurement of written commitments and the
distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the
delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in
three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential
candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and
some members of her ticket to enable them to
"assess their chances" among the chapter presidents
in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of
tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the
case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by
Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day
of the election; the giving of assistance by the
Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group;
the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the
airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel;
the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel
accommodations to delegates (and some families
who accompanied them) in exchange for their
support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing
them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another
for some rumored consideration; all these practices
made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted
the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that
election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but
also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes
on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey
and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to
"promote respect for law and legal processes" and to
abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule
1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility).
Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the
law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush
aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their
observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates
pursued the presidency of the association detracted
from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle
of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or
another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the
profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to
be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications
that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including
tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing
conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was
created. The subsequent investigation conducted by
this Committee has revealed that those parties had
been less than candid with the Court and seem to
have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at
least withhold vital information from it to conceal the
irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the
provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII)
providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of
seven (7) members among whom is "a representative
of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the
selection of nominees for appointment to vacant
positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much
interest among the lawyers. The much coveted
"power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that
office might have caused the corruption of the IBP
elections. To impress upon the participants in that
electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct
which attended it and the stern disapproval with which
it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-
political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely
eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top
positions in the organization which, as the recently
concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical
practices which seriously diminished the stature of the
IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble
and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as
they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct
election by the House of Delegates (approved by this
Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No.
287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend,
modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under
Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and
Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91
IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in
Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be
restored. The right of automatic succession by the
Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished
by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the
Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed
to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-
President from among themselves. The position of
Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the
nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as
president may not run for election as Executive Vice-
President in a succeeding election until after the
rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions
shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation
shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read
as follows:
 Section 47. National Officers. — The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
have a President and Executive Vice-
President to be chosen by the Board
of Governors from among nine (9)
regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. The
governors shall be ex oficio Vice-
President for their respective regions.
There shall also be a Secretary and
Treasurer of the Board of Governors
to be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby
amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice
President of the IBP shall be the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the House of
Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer,
and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be
appointed by the President with the
consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions
of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer
and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is
hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board.
— The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall be governed by a
Board of Governors consisting of nine
(9) Governors from the nine (9)
regions as delineated in Section 3 of
the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1)
Governor for each region to be elected
by the members of the House of
Delegates from that region only. The
position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the
region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of
the Governors at least one (1) month
before the national convention the
delegates from each region shall elect
the governor for their region, the
choice of which shall as much as
possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by
addingthe following provision as part of the first
paragraph:
No convention of the House of
Delegates nor of the general
membership shall be held prior to any
election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and
(7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its
amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of
July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall
be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3)
months, after the promulgation of the Court's
resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days
thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the
IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive
vice-president. In these special elections, the
candidates in the election of the national officers held
on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3
of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and
Single Slates," as well as those identified in this
Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities
attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may
not present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board
shall be appointed by the Court to administer the
affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the
dispositions here made are without prejudice to its
adoption in due time of such further and other
measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Power of the court to defend itself
In re Emil Jurado 243 scra 299 (1995)
A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995
IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT), per its First Vice-President, Mr. Vicente R.
Samson, appellant,

NARVASA, C.J.:
Liability for published statements demonstrably false
or misleading, and derogatory of the courts and
individual judges, is what is involved in the proceeding
at bar — than which, upon its facts, there is perhaps
no more appropriate setting for an inquiry into the
limits of press freedom as it relates to public comment
about the courts and their workings within a
constitutional order.
1. Basic Postulates
To resolve the issue raised by those facts, application
of fairly elementary and self-evident postulates is all
that is needed, these being:
1) that the utterance or publication by
a person of falsehood or half-truths, or
of slanted or distorted versions of facts
— or accusations which he made
no bona fide effort previously to verify,
and which he does not or disdains to
prove — cannot be justified as a
legitimate exercise of the freedom of
speech and of the press guaranteed
by the Constitution, and cannot be
deemed an activity shielded from
sanction by that constitutional
guaranty;
2) that such utterance or publication is
also violative of "The Philippine
Journalist's Code of Ethics"
which inter alia commands the
journalist to "scrupulously report and
interpret the news, taking care not to
suppress essential facts nor to distort
the truth by improper omission or
emphasis," and makes it his duty "to
air the other side and to correct
substantive errors promptly;"  1
3) that such an utterance or
publication, when it is offensive to the
dignity and reputation of a Court or of
the judge presiding over it or degrades
or tends to place the courts in
disrepute and disgrace or otherwise to
debase the administration of justice,
constitutes contempt of court and is
punishable as such after due
proceedings; and
4) that prescinding from the obvious
proposition that any aggrieved party
may file a complaint to declare the
utterer or writer in contempt, the
initiation of appropriate contempt
proceedings against the latter by the
court is not only its prerogative but
indeed its duty, imposed by the
overmastering need to preserve and
protect its authority and the integrity,
independence and dignity of the
nation's judicial system.
2. Antecedents
This proceeding treats of Emiliano P. Jurado, a
journalist who writes in a newspaper of general
circulation, the "Manila Standard." He describes
himself as a columnist, who "incidentally happens to
be a lawyer," remarking that while he values his
membership in the law profession, "such membership
is neither a critical nor indispensable adjunct in the
exercise of his occupation as a newspaperman."   His 2
column in the "Manila Standard" is entitled "Opinion."
Jurado had been writing about alleged improperties
and irregularities in the judiciary over several months
(from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). Other
journalists had also been making reports or comments
on the same subject. At the same time, anonymous
communications were being extensively circulated, by
hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and
corruption in the courts. And all these were being
repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain
sectors of society.
In light of these abnormal developments, the Chief
Justice took an extraordinary step. He issued
Administrative Order No. 11-93 dated January 25,
1993, "Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate
Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary,"   reading as
3
follows:
WHEREAS, the Court's attention has
been drawn to the many and
persistent rumors and unverified
reports respecting corruption in the
judiciary, said rumors and reports not
only having been mentioned by media
and in anonymous communications,
but having also been adverted to by
certain government officials and civic
leaders.
NOW, THEREFORE, by authority of
the Court, an Ad Hoc committee is
hereby constituted composed of Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as
Chairman, and former Justices of the
Court, Hon. Lorenzo Relova and Hon.
 Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, as
Members, which shall seek to
ascertain the truth respecting said
reports and statements, and to this
end, forthwith interview at closed-door
sessions or otherwise, such persons
as may appear to it to have some
knowledge of the matter and who may
be appealed to to share that
knowledge with the Court, and
otherwise gather such evidence as
may be available. The Committee is
hereby authorized to use such
facilities and personnel of the court as
may be necessary or convenient in the
fulfillment of its assigned mission, and
shall submit its report to the Court
within thirty (30) days.
Material to the present inquiry are Jurado's published
statements from late 1992 to the middle of February,
1993.
1. In his column of October 21, 1992,
he wrote of "(j)udges in a number of
regional trial courts in Metro Manila
(who) have become so notorious in
their dealings with litigants and
lawyers that they are now called the
"Magnificent Seven."" He stated that
"(i)t has come to a point where
lawyers and litigants try their darndest
to stay away from these judges. The
answer, of course, is obvious."
2. In his February 3, 1993 column, he
adverted to another group, also
named "Magnificent Seven," which, he
said, should be distinguished from the
first. He wrote: "When lawyers speak
of the "Magnificent Seven" one has to
make sure which group they are
referring to. Makati's "Magnificent
Seven" are a bunch of Makati regional
trial court judges who fix drug-related
cases. The "Magnificent Seven" in the
Supreme Court consists of a group of
justices who vote as one."  4
3. Aside from the "Magnificent Seven,"
he also wrote about a group which he
dubbed the "Dirty Dozen." In his
column of October 21, 1992 he said
that there are " . . . 12 judges who
have acquired such reputation for graft
and corruption that they are
collectively known as the "dirty dozen".
These judges, I am told, are not
satisfied with accepting bribes; they
actually sell their decisions to the
litigants and "solicit" their bids for what
is clearly an auction for the judge's
decision."
According to him, the most corrupt
judges now are Makati's "Dirty Dozen"
judges, supplanting some of those
from Pasay, Pasig and Quezon City;
corruption in lower Courts had been
admitted by an Executive Judge in a
Metro Manila Regional Trial Court
(column of November 9, 1992); and
because the "Dirty Dozen" had given
Makati the reputation of having the
most corrupt RTC in the country,
multi-nationals and financing
institutions explicitly stipulate in their
agreements that litigation in
connection with these contracts may
be held anywhere in Metro Manila
except in Makati; and lawyers confirm
that Makati Judges, including some
persons in the sheriffs office, are the
most corrupt, where before, Pasay
and Quezon City had that dubious
distinction (column of December 1,
1992).
4. In his November 9, 1992 column,
he wrote about "a former appellate
justice (who) "holds office" at a
restaurant near the Court of Appeals
building. He is known as the contact
man of five CA divisions. Lawyers say
that this former jurist really delivers."
In his column of January 29, 1993, he
adverted to the same unnamed former
Justice as being "known for fixing
cases for five CA divisions (that is
what he tells lawyers and litigants) for
a fee. And if the price is right, the
lawyer of the litigant paying can even
write his own decision using a CA
justice as ponente. This ex-justice
holds court at the mezzanine of a
restaurant owned by the wife of a
former Marcos cabinet member and
which has become a meeting place for
judges, CA justices, practicing
lawyers, prosecutors and even
Supreme Court justices. The former
CA justice also has his own Chinese
contact. After I exposed this last year,
the habitues became scarce. But they
are back again, and the ex-justice is
still-doing brisk business."
5. In his column of March 24, 1993, he
made the claim that one can "get a
temporary restraining order from a
regional trial court in Metro-Manila by
paying the judge anywhere between
P30,000.00 and P50,000.00."
Other columns of Jurado refer to:
a) a police from the South Capital
Command . . . (to the effect) that 8
Makati judges where paid for
decisions favoring drug-traffickers and
other big-time criminals, naming the
judges and giving detailed accounts of
the bribery (January 30, 1993);
b) a bank, later identified by him as
the Equitable Banking Corporation
(Ermita Branch), which had "hosted a
lunch at its penthouse mainly for some
justices, judges, prosecutors and law
practitioners" (January 12, 1993);  5
c) the lady secretary of an RTC Judge
in Makati who allegedly makes sure,
for a fee of P10,000.00 or more,
depending on how much money is at
stake, that a case is raffled off to a
Judge who will be "extremely
sympathetic," and can arrange to have
the Court issue attachments or
injunctions for a service fee of 1%
over and above the regular premium
of the attachment or injunction bond; a
Chinese-Filipino businessman who
paid this "miracle worker" P300,000.00
on top of the regular premium on the
attachment/injunction bond (October
27, 1992);
d) Executive Judge de la Rosa, who
"has unilaterally decided to discard the
rule that cases seeking provisional
remedies should be raffled off to the
judges," thus violating the rule that no
case may be assigned in multi-
sala courts without a raffle (January
28, 1993);
e) the Secretary of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC), who had
supposedly gotten that body to
nominate him to the Court of Appeals;
and a son and a nephew of JBC
members, who were also nominated
to the Court of Appeals, contrary to
ethics and delicadeza (January l6,
1993; and January 29, 1993);
f) what he denominates "a major
determinant of promotion," i.e., having
a relative in the JBC or the Supreme
Court, or having a powerful politician
as sponsor, citing specifically, the
following nominees to the Court of
Appeals — Conrado Vasquez, Jr., son
and namesake of the Ombudsman
and brother of the head of the
Presidential Management Staff;
Rosalio de la Rosa, "nephew of
Justice Relova and cousin of Chief
Justice Narvasa;" and the fact that
nomination of some worthy individuals
was blocked because they "incurred
the ire of the powers that be," e.g.,
Judge Maximiano Asuncion, Quezon
City RTC, and Raul Victorino, closely
identified with former Senate
President Salonga (January 25, 1993).
3. Events Directly Giving Rise
to the Proceeding at Bar
What may be called the seed of the proceeding at bar
was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court
on August 27, 1992, in the so-called "controversial
case" of "Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI)," G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court
was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of
the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez,
Jr., wrote the opinion for the
majority.   A motion for reconsideration of the decision
6
was filed in respondent's behalf on September 16,
1992, which has recently been resolved.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the
"Philippine Daily Inquirer" and one or two other
newspapers published, on January 28, 1993, a report
of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes,
an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentleman, it
appears, had been commissioned by one of the
parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines,
Inc. (ETPI), to examine and analyze the decision of
Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his
prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers
of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if the
decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the
latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the
Gutierrez decision "looks, reads and sounds like the
writing of the PLDT's counsel,"  7
As might be expected, the Yerkes "revelations"
spawned more public discussion and comment about
the judiciary and the Supreme Court itself, much of it
unfavorable. There were calls for impeachment of the
justices, for resignation of judges. There were
insistent and more widespread reiterations of
denunciations of incompetence and corruption in the
judiciary. Another derogatory epithet for judges was
coined and quickly gained currency: "Hoodlums in
Robes."
It was at about this time and under these
circumstances — particularly the furor caused by the
Yerkes opinion that the PLDT decision was authored
by a PLDT lawyer — that Jurado wrote in his column
on February 8, 1993, an item entitled, "Who will judge
the Justices?" referring among other things to" . . .
(a) report that six justices, their spouses, children and
grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation
in Hong Kong some time last year — and that
luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other
expenses were paid by a pubic utility firm . . . and that
the trip . . . was arranged by the travel agency
patronized by this public utility firm." 
8
This was the event that directly gave rise to the
proceeding at bar.
a. Letter and Affidavit of PLDT
For shortly afterwards, on February 10, 1993, Mr.
Vicente R. Samson, First Vice President of the PLDT
(Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company),
addressed a letter to the Chief Justice, submitting his
sworn statement in confutation of "the item in the
column of Mr. Emil P. Jurado of the Manila Standard
on a vacation trip supposedly taken by six Justices
with their families last year," and requesting that the
Court "take such action as may be appropriate." In his
affidavit, Samson made the following averments:  9
xxx xxx xxx
While the name of the public utility
which supposedly financed the alleged
vacation of the Justices in Hongkong
has not been disclosed in the Jurado
column, the publication thereof, taken
in relation to the spate of recent
newspaper reports alleging that the
decision of the Supreme Court,
penned by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., in the pending case
involving the PLDT and Eastern
Telecommunications Phils., Inc. was
supposedly ghost written by a lawyer
of PLDT, gives rise to the innuendo or
unfair inference that Emil Jurado is
alluding to PLDT in the said column;
and, this in fact was the impression or
perception of those who talked to me
and the other officers of the PLDT
after having read the Jurado column;
4. In as much as the PLDT case
against Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines is still sub-judice, since the
motions for reconsideration filed by
the losing litigants therein, Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
and NTC are still pending before the
Court, we have tried to refrain from
making any public comments on these
matters, lest any statement we make
be interpreted to be an attempt on our
part to unduly influence the final
decision of the Supreme Court in the
above described case. However in the
interest of truth and justice, PLDT is
compelled to emphatically and
categorically declare that it is not the
public utility firm referred to in the
Jurado column and that specifically, it
has never paid for any such trip, hotel
or other accommodations for any
justice of the Supreme Court or his
family during their vacation, if any, in
Hongkong last year. It is not even
aware that any of the justices or their
families have made the trip referred to
in the Jurado column;
5. I further state that neither Atty. Emil
P. Jurado nor anyone in his behalf has
ever spoken to me or any other
responsible officer of PLDT about the
matter quoted in par. 2 hereof;
6. PLDT further emphatically and
categorically denies that it had ever
talked to or made arrangements with
any travel agency or any person or
entity in connection with any such
alleged trip of the Justices and their
families to Hongkong, much less paid
anything therefor to such agencies,
fully or in part, in the year 1992 as
referred to in Par. 2 hereinabove;
7. The travel agencies which PLDT
patronizes or retains for the trips,
hotels or other accommodations of its
officers and employees are:
a.
Philway
Travel
Corpora
 tion birthday happened to fall on a working day and my
M-7 friends from the Equitable Banking
Prince Corporation . . . suggested that I hold it there (at the
Tower lounge) for their convenience because my residence
Cond. is far from down town."
Tordesil
las St., However, this birthday luncheon of Atty. Veto was
Salcedoreported in Jurado's column (in the Manila Standard
Village issues of January 12 and 28, 1993) as having been
Makati, "hosted (by the Equitable Bank) at its penthouse
Metro mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law
Manila practitioners. . . ." And upon this premise, Jurado
indulged in the following pontification: "When those in
b. Citi- the judiciary fraternize this way, what chances before
World the courts do other lawyers, who are not "batang
Travel club," have against others who belong to the
Mart fraternity? In the case of prosecutors and fiscals, what
Corp. chances do opposing counsels have against those in
Suite 3- the fraternity?" (column of January 12, 1993)
4
Ramad c. Information from Ad Hoc Committee
a
Midtow At about this time, too, the Court received information
n from the Ad Hoc Committee (created by
Arcade Administrative Order No. 11-93) to the following
M. effect:
Adriatic
o Street
1) that by letter dated February 1,
Ermita,
1993, the Chairman of the Ad
Manila.
Hoc Committee extended an invitation
to Atty. Emiliano Jurado to appear
The records of these travel agencies before it "at 2 o'clock in the afternoon
will bear out the fact that no of February 4, 1993 . . . (to) give the
arrangements were made by them at committee information that will assist it
the instance of PLDT for the trip in its task," i.e., to definitely and
referred to in the Jurado column. accurately determine the facts as
regards the published rumors and
b. Affidavit of Atty. William Veto reports of corruption in the judiciary;

The Samson affidavit was followed by another 2) that despite receipt of this letter by
submitted to the Court by Atty. William Veto, the "in- a responsible individual at the
house counsel of Equitable Banking Corporation since business address of Jurado, the latter
1958," subscribed and sworn to on February 10, failed to appear at the time and place
1993, in relation to another article of Jurado.   Veto
10
indicated; that instead, in his column
deposed that on Tuesday, January 5, 1993 he had in the issue of Manila Standard of
"hosted a lunch party at the Officers' Lounge, 7th February 4, 1993, Jurado stated that
Floor of the Equitable Banking Corporation Building, he was told he was being summoned
Ermita Branch . . . upon prior permission . . . by the Ad Hoc Committee, but "(t)here
obtained;" that the "expenses for said party were is really no need to summon me. The
exclusively from my personal funds and the food was committee can go by the many things
prepared in my house by my wife and served by my I have written in my column about
house help . . . and four (4) waiters . . . hired from the corruption in the judiciary. Many of
nearby Barrio Fiesta Restaurant;" that among the these column items have been borne
invited guests "were members of the Supreme Court out by subsequent events."
and Court of Appeals who . . . were my friends of forty
years since our days in law school;" and that the party 3) that another letter was sent by the
was held in the lounge of the bank instead of in "my Chairman to Jurado, dated February
residence" "unlike in former years . . . because my
5, 1993, reiterating the Committee's
invitation, viz.:
It is regretted that you failed to
respond to the invitation of the Ad
Hoc Committee to appear at its
session of February 4, 1992. All
indications are that you are the person
with the most knowledge about
corruption in the judiciary and hence,
appear to be best positioned to assist
the Ad Hoc Committee in its function
of obtaining evidence, or leads, on the
matter. You have, I believe, expressed
more than once the laudable desire
that the judiciary rid itself of the
incompetents and the misfits in its
ranks, and we believe you will want to
help the Court do precisely that, by
furnishing the Committee with
competent evidence, testimonial or
otherwise. Clearly, the purging
process cannot be accomplished
without proof, testimonial or otherwise,
as you must no doubt realize, being
yourself a lawyer.
We would like you to know that the Ad
Hoc Committee created by
Administrative Order No. 11-93 is
simply a fact-finding body. Its function
is evidence-gathering. Although
possessed of the authority to maintain
and enforce order in its proceedings,
and to compel obedience to its
processes, it is not an adjudicative
body in the sense that it will
pronounce persons guilty or innocent,
or impose sanctions, on the basis of
such proofs as may be presented to it.
That function is reserved to the
Supreme Court itself, in which it is
lodged by the Constitution and the
laws. Thus, at the conclusion of its
evidence-gathering mission, the Ad
Hoc Committee will submit its report
and recommendations to the Court
which will then take such action as it
deems appropriate.
The Ad Hoc Committee has
scheduled hearings on the 11th and
12th of February, 1993. Mr. Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. will preside as
Chairman at these hearings since I will
be unable to do so in view of earlier
commitments. We reiterate our
invitation that you come before the
Committee, and you may opt to
appear either on the 11th or 12th of
February, 1993, at 2 o'clock in the
afternoon."
4) that notwithstanding receipt of this
second letter by a certain Mr. Gerry
Gil of the Manila Standard, Jurado still
failed to appear.
4. Statement of the Case:
Resolutions and Pleadings
a. Resolution of the February 16, 1993
After considering all these circumstances, the Court
by Resolution dated February 16, 1993, ordered:
1) that the matter dealt with in the
letter and affidavit of the PLDT herein
mentioned be duly DOCKETED, and
hereafter considered and acted upon
as an official Court proceeding for the
determination of whether or not the
allegations made by Atty. Emil Jurado
herein specified are true;
2) that the Clerk of Court SEND
COPIES of the PLDT letter and
affidavit, and of the affidavit of Atty.
William Veto to Atty. Emil Jurado, c/o
the Manila Standard, Railroad & 21
Streets, Port Area, Manila; and copies
of the same PLDT letter and affidavit,
to Philway Travel Corporation, M-7
Prince Tower Cond., Tordesillas St.,
Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila;
and Citi-World Travel Mart Corp.,
Suite 3-4 Ramada Midtown Arcade,
M. Adriatico Street, Ermita, Manila;
3) that within five (5) days from their
receipt of notice of this resolution and
of copies of the PLDT letter and
affidavit, the Philway Travel
Corporations and the Citi-World Travel
Mart Corporation each FILE A
SWORN STATEMENT affirming or
denying the contents of the PLDT
affidavit; and
4) that within fifteen (15) days from his
receipt of notice of this resolution and
of copies of said PLDT letter and
affidavit and of the affidavit of Atty.
Veto, Atty. Emil Jurado FILE A
COMMENT on said affidavits as well
as the allegations made by him in his
columns, herein specified, in which he
 shall make known to the Court the
factual or evidentiary bases of said
allegations.
b. Jurado's Comment dated
March 1, 1993.
As directed, Jurado filed his comment, dated March 1,
1993.
He explained that he had not "snubbed" the invitation
of the Ad Hoc Committee, it being in fact his desire to
cooperate in any investigation on corruption in the
judiciary as this was what "his columns have always
wanted to provoke." What had happened, according
to him, was that the first invitation of the Ad
Hoc Committee was routed to his desk at the Manila
Standard office on the day of the hearing itself, when
it was already impossible to cancel previous
professional and business appointments; and the
second invitation, "if it was ever received" by his
office, was never routed to him; and he had yet to see
it."   If the impression had been created that he had
11
indeed "snubbed" the Ad Hoc Committee, he
"sincerely apologizes."
He averred that his columns are self-explanatory and
reflect his beliefs, and there was no need to elaborate
further on what he had written. He expressed his firm
belief that justice can be administered only by a
judicial system that is itself just and incorruptible, and
the hope that this Court would view his response in
this light.
He also made the following specific observations:
1. The affidavit of Antonio Samson of
the PLDT dated February 9, 1993 was
an assertion of the affiant's belief and
opinion and he (Jurado) would not
comment on it except to say that while
Mr. Samson is entitled to his beliefs
and opinions, these "bind only him and
the PLDT."
2. Atty. William Veto's affidavit
substantially corroborated what he
had written in vital details; hence,
further substantiation would be
surplusage. In fact, the Supreme
Court had confirmed the story in its
press statement quoted by him
(Jurado) in his January 30, 1993
column. His column about the Veto
party constitutes fair comment on the
public conduct of public officers.
3. The column about Executive Judge
Rosalio de la Rosa merely
summarized the position of Judge
Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores on the
actuations of Judge de la Rosa and
called the attention of the Court
thereto, Judge Flores' complaint, a
copy of which had been sent to the
Court Administrator, being on meriting
its attention.
4. The "factual and evidentiary basis"
of his column of January 30, 1993 was
the police report on seven (7) Makati
judges authored by Chief Inspector
Laciste Jr., of the Narcotics Branch of
the RPIU, South CAPCOM, PNP,
addressed to Vice-President Joseph
E. Estrada, a copy of which he had
received in the news room of the
Manila Standard. The existence of the
report had been affirmed by a reporter
of the Manila Standard, Jun Burgos,
when he appeared at the hearing of
the Ad Hoc Committee on January 11,
1993.
5. His observations in his columns of
January 6 and 29, 1993 regarding the
nominations of relatives in the Judicial
and Bar Council echo the public
perception, and constitute fair
comment on a matter of great public
interest and concern.
6. His columns with respect to the
"RTC's Magnificent Seven" (October
20, 1992); the "RTC-Makati's Dirty
Dozen" (October 2, 1992, November
9, 1992, and December 1, 1992); the
"Magnificent Seven" in the Supreme
Court (February 3,1993);   the lady
12
secretary of an RTC Judge (October
27, 1992); and the former Court of
Appeals Justice "fixing" cases
(January 29, 1993) were all based on
information given to him in strict
confidence by sources he takes to be
highly reliable and credible; and he
could not elaborate on the factual and
evidentiary basis of the information
without endangering his sources.
By necessity and custom and usage,
he relies as a journalist not only on
first-hand knowledge but also on
information from sources he has found
by experience to be trustworthy. He
 cannot compromise these sources. He
invokes Republic Act No. 53, as
amended by R.A. No. 1477,
exempting the publisher, editor or
reporter of any publication from
revealing the source of published
news or information obtained in
confidence, and points out that none
of the matters subject of his columns
has any bearing on the security of the
state.
c. Resolution of March 2, 1993
Subsequent to the Resolution of February 16, 1993
and before the filing of Jurado's comment above
mentioned, the Court received the affidavits of the
executive officials of the two travel agencies
mentioned in the affidavit of PLDT Executive Vice-
President Vicente R. Samson — in relation to the
Jurado column of February 8, 1993: that of Mr. Ermin
Garcia, Jr., President of the Citi-World Travel Mart
Corporation, dated February 22, 1993, and that of
Mrs. Marissa de la Paz, General Manager of Philway
Travel Corporation, dated February 19, 1993. Both
denied ever having made any travel arrangements for
any of the Justices of the Supreme Court or their
families to Hongkong, clearly and categorically belying
the Jurado article.
By Resolution dated March 2, 1993, the Court
directed that Jurado be given copies of these two (2)
affidavits and that he submit comment thereon, if
desired, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
d. Jurado's Supplemental Comment
with Request for Clarification
In response, Jurado filed a pleading entitled
"Supplemental Comment with Request for
Clarification" dated March 15, 1993. In this pleading
he alleged that the sworn statements of Mr. Ermin
Garcia, Jr. and Mrs. Marissa de la Paz are
affirmations of matters of their own personal
knowledge; that he (Jurado) had no specific
knowledge of "the contents of these, let alone their
veracity;" and that the affidavits "bind no one except
the affiants and possibly the PLDT." He also sought
clarification on two points — as to the capacity in
which he is being cited in these administrative
proceedings — whether "as full time journalist or as a
member of the bar," and why he is being singled out,
from all his other colleagues in media who had also
written about wrongdoings in the judiciary, and
required to comment in a specific administrative
matter before the Court sitting En Banc — so that he
might "qualify his comment and/or assert his right and
privileges . . . .
e. Resolution of March 18, 1993
Through another Resolution, dated March 18, 1993,
the Court directed the Clerk of Court to inform Jurado
that the Resolutions of February 16 and March 2,
1993 had been addressed to him (according to his
own depiction) in his capacity as "a full-time journalist"
"who coincidentally happens to be a member of the
bar at the same time," and granted him fifteen (15)
days from notice" to qualify his comment and/or
assert his rights and privileges . . . in an appropriate
manifestation or pleading."
f. Jurado's Manifestation
dated March 31, 1993
Again in response, Jurado filed a "Manifestation"
under date of March 31, 1993. He moved for the
termination of the proceeding on the following posited
premises:
1. The court has no administrative
supervision over him as a member of
the press or over his work as a
journalist.
2. The present administrative matter is
not a citation for (a) direct contempt as
there is no pending case or
proceeding out of which a direct
contempt charge against him may
arise, or (b) indirect contempt as no
formal charge for the same has been
laid before the court in accordance
with Section 3 (Rule 71) of the Rules
of Court.
3. His comments would be more
relevant and helpful to the Court if
taken together with the other evidence
and reports of other journalists
gathered before the Ad
Hoc Committee. He perceives no
reason why his comments should be
singled out and taken up in a separate
administrative proceeding.
It is against this background of the material facts and
occurrences that the Court will determine Jurado's
liability, if any, for the above mentioned statements
published by him, as well as "such action as may be
appropriate" in the premises, as the PLDT asks.
5. Norms for Proper Exercise of
Press Freedom
a. Constitutional Law Norms
In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), the The freedom of the
Court underscored the importance both of the press in itself
constitutional guarantee of free speech and the reality presupposes an
that there are fundamental and equally important independent judiciary
public interests which need on occasion to be through which that
balanced against and accommodated with one and freedom may, if
the other. There, the Court stressed the importance of necessary, be
the public interest in the maintenance of the integrity vindicated. And one of
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. the potent means for
The Court said: 13
assuring judges their
independence is a free
The principal defense of respondent press. (Concurring in
Gonzalez is that he was merely Pennekamp v. Florida,
exercising his constitutional right of 328 U.S. 331 at 354-
free speech. He also invokes the 356 [1946]).
related doctrines of qualified privileged
communications and fair criticism in Mr. Justice. Malcolm of this Court
the public interest. expressed the same thought in the
following terms:
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to
the constitutional guarantee of free The Organic Act wisely
speech. No one seeks to deny him guarantees freedom of
that right, least of all this Court. What speech and press.
respondent seems unaware of is that This constitutional
freedom of speech and of expression, right must be
like all constitutional freedoms, is not protected in its fullest
absolute and that freedom of extent. The Court has
expression needs on occasion to be heretofore given
adjusted to and accommodated with evidence of its tolerant
the requirements of equally important regard for charges
public interests. One of these under the Libel Law
fundamental public interests is the which come
maintenance of the integrity and dangerously close to
orderly functioning of the its violation. We shall
administration of justice. There is no continue in this chosen
antinomy between free expression path. The liberty of the
and the integrity of the system of citizens must be
administering justice. For the preserved in all of its
protection and maintenance of completeness. But
freedom of expression itself can be license or abuse of
secured only within the context of a liberty of the press and
functioning and orderly system of of the citizens should
dispensing justice, within the context, not be confused with
in other words, of viable independent liberty in its true
institutions for delivery of justice which sense. As important as
are accepted by the general is the maintenance of
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter an unmuzzled press
put it: and the free exercise
of the rights of the
. . . A free press is not citizens is the
to be preferred to an maintenance of the
independent judiciary, independence of the
nor an independent Judiciary. Respect for
judiciary to a free the Judiciary cannot be
press. Neither has had if persons are
primacy over the other; privileged to scorn a
both are indispensable resolution of the court
to a free society. adopted for good
purposes, and if such
 persons are to be Supplement." The first paragraph of the Code,   and
16

permitted by its corresponding annotations, read as follows:

subterranean means to
diffuse inaccurate 1. I shall scrupulously report and
accounts of interpret the news, taking care not to
confidential suppress essential facts nor to distort
proceedings to the the truth by improper omission or
embarrassment of the emphasis. I recognize the duty to air
parties and the court. the other side and the duty to correct
(In Re Severino substantive errors promptly.
Lozano and Anastacio
Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 1. Scrupulous news
at 807 [1930]). gathering and beat
coverage is required.
b. Civil Law Norms Relying exclusively on
the telephone or on
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for what fellow reporters
the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or say happened at one's
otherwise, viz.: beat is irresponsible.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the 2. The ethical

exercise of his rights and in the journalist does not
performance of his duties, act with bend the facts to suit
justice, give everyone his due, and his biases or to please
observe honesty and good faith. benefactors. He
gathers all the facts,
The provision is reflective of the universally accepted forms a hypothesis,
precept of "abuse of rights," "one of the most verifies it and arrives
dominant principles which must be deemed always at an honest
implied in any system of law."   It parallels too "the
14 interpretation of what
supreme norms of justice which the law develops" happened.
and which are expressed in three familiar Latin
maxims: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus 3. The duty to air the
suum quique tribuere (to live honorably, not to injure other side means that
others, and to render to every man his due).  15
the journalist must
contact the person or
Freedom of expression, the right of speech and of the persons against whom
press is, to be sure, among the most zealously accusations are
protected rights in the Constitution. But every person lodged. A court
exercising it is, as the Civil Code stresses, obliged "to proceeding provides
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe for this balance by
honesty and good faith." The constitutional right of presenting the
freedom of expression may not be availed of to prosecution and then
broadcast lies or half-truths — this would not be "to the defense. A news
observe honesty and good faith;" it may not be used story or editorial
to insult others; destroy their name or reputation or column that fails to
bring them into disrepute. — this would not be "to act present the other side
with justice" or "give everyone his due." is like a court that
does not hear the side
c. Philippine Journalist's of the defense.
Code of Ethics
4. Correcting
Also relevant to the determination of the propriety of substantive errors is
Jurado's acts subject of the inquiry at bar are the the mark of mature
norms laid down in "The Philippine Journalist's Code newspapers like the
of Ethics." The Code was published in the issue of New York Times, the
February 11, 1993 of the Manila Standard, for which International Herald
Jurado writes, as part of the paper's "Anniversary
 Tribune, and some of
Manila's papers.
d. Right to Private Honor
and Reputation
In the present proceeding, there is also involved an
acknowledged and important interest of individual
persons: the right to private reputation. Judges, by
becoming such, are commonly and rightly regarded
as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of
conduct which embody more stringent standards of
honesty, integrity, and competence than are
commonly required from private
persons.   Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept
17
from appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably
be regarded as having thereby forfeited any right
whatsoever to private honor and reputation. For so to
rule will be simply, in the generality of cases, to
discourage all save those who feel no need to
maintain their self-respect as a human being in
society, from becoming judges, with obviously
grievous consequences for the quality of our judges
and the quality of the justice that they will dispense.
Thus, the protection of the right of individual persons
to private reputations is also a matter of public interest
and must be reckoned with as a factor in identifying
and laying down the norms concerning the exercise of
press freedom and free speech.
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of
speech and the individual interest of judges (and for
that matter, all other public officials) in the
maintenance of private honor and reputation need to
be accommodated one to the other. And the point of
adjustment or accommodation between these two
legitimate interest is precisely found in the norm which
requires those who, invoking freedom of speech,
publish statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials to
exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements they publish. The norm does not require
that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or
publishes. But the norm does prohibit
the reckless disregard of private reputation by
publishing or circulating defamatory statements
without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth
thereof. That this norm represents the generally
accepted point of balance or adjustment between the
two interests involved is clear from a consideration of
both the pertinent civil law norms and the Code of
Ethics adopted by the journalism profession in the
Philippines.  a
17
6. Analysis of Jurado Columns
a. Re "Public Utility Firm"
Now, Jurado's allegation in his column of February 8,
1993 — "that six justices, their spouses, children and
grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation
in Hong Kong some time last year — and that
luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other
expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that
the trip reportedly was arranged by the travel agency
patronized by this public utility firm," supra is — in the
context of the facts under which it was made — easily
and quickly perceived as a transparent accusation
that the PLDT had bribed or "rewarded" six (6)
justices for their votes in its favor in the case of
"Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI)," G.R. No.
94374,   by not only paying all their expenses
18
— i.e., hotel accommodations and all other expenses
for the trip — but also by having one of its own travel
agencies arrange for such a trip.
As already stated, that allegation was condemned as
a lie, an outright fabrication, by the PLDT itself,
through one of its responsible officers, Mr. Vicente
Samson, as well as by the heads of the two (2) travel
agencies "patronized by it," Ermin Garcia, Jr. and
Marissa de la Paz, supra.
That categorical denial logically and justly placed on
Jurado the burden of proving the truth of his grave
accusation, or showing that it had been made through
some honest mistake or error committed despite good
faith efforts to arrive at the truth, or if unable to do
either of these things, to offer to atone for the harm
caused.
But the record discloses that Jurado did none of these
things. He exerted no effort whatever to contest or
qualify in any manner whatever the emphatic
declaration of PLDT Vice-President Samson that —
While the name of the public utility
which supposedly financed the alleged
vacation of the Justices in Hongkong
has not been disclosed in the Jurado
column, the publication thereof, taken
in relation to the spate of recent
newspaper reports alleging that the
decision of the Supreme Court,
penned by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., in the pending case
involving the PLDT and Eastern
Telecommunications Phils., Inc. was
supposedly ghost written by a lawyer
of PLDT, gives rise to the innuendo or
unfair inference that Emil Jurado is
alluding to PLDT in the said column;
and, this in fact was the impression or
perception of those who talked to me
 and the other officers of the PLDT
after having read the Jurado column.
The record shows that he made no effort whatsoever
to impugn, modify, clarify or explain Samson's positive
assertion that:
. . . (the PLDT) has never paid for any
such trip, hotel or other
accommodations for any justice of the
Supreme Court or his family during
their vacation, if any, in Hongkong last
year. It is not even aware that any of
the justices or their families have
made the trip referred to in the Jurado
column;
. . . neither Atty. Emil P. Jurado nor
any one in his behalf has ever spoken
to me or any other responsible officer
of PLDT about the matter. . .;
. . . PLDT . . . (never) talked to or
made arrangements with any travel
agency or any person or entity in
connection with any such alleged trip
of the Justices and their families to
Hongkong, much less paid anything
therefor to such agencies, fully or in
part, in the year 1992 as referred to in
Par. 2 hereinabove;
What appears from the record is that without first
having made an effort to talk to any one from the
PLDT or the Supreme Court to ascertain the veracity
of his serious accusation, Jurado went ahead and
published it.
His explanation for having aired the accusation
consists simply of a declaration that Samson's
affidavit, as well as the affidavits of the heads of the
two travel agencies regularly patronized by it, were
just assertions of the affiants' belief and opinion; and
that he (Jurado) would not comment on them except
to say that while they are entitled to their beliefs and
opinions, these were binding on them only. This is
upon its face evasion of duty of the most cavalier kind;
sophistry of the most arrant sort. What is made plain
is that Jurado is in truth unable to challenge any of the
averments in the affidavits of PLDT and its travel
agencies, or otherwise substantiate his accusation,
and that his is a mere resort to semantics to justify the
unjustifiable. What is made plain is that his accusation
is false, and possesses not even the saving grace of
honest error.
If relying on second-hand sources of information is, as
the Journalists' Code states, irresponsible, supra,
then indulging in pure speculation or gossip is even
more so; and a failure to "present the other side" is
equally reprehensible, being what in law amounts to a
denial of due process.
b. Re Equitable Bank Party
Jurado is also shown by the record to have so slanted
his report of the birthday luncheon given by Atty.
William Veto (the "in-house counsel of Equitable
Banking Corporation since 1958") as to project a
completely false depiction of it. His description of that
affair (in the Manila Standard issues of January 12
and 28, 1993) as having been hosted by the Equitable
Bank "at its penthouse mainly for some justices,
judges, prosecutors and law
practitioners . . . , carries the sanctimonious postscript
already quoted, putting the rhetorical question about
how such fraternization affects the chances in court of
lawyers outside that charmed circle.
When confronted with Veto's affidavit to the effect that
the party was given by him at his (Veto's) own
expense, the food having been prepared by his wife in
his house, and served by his house help and waiters
privately hired by him; that he had invited many
persons including friends of long standing, among
them justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals; and that the party had been held in the
Officers' Lounge of Equitable Bank, instead of his
home, as in years past, to suit the convenience of his
guests because his birthday fell on a working day,
Jurado could not, or would not deign to, contradict any
of those statements. He merely stated that Veto's
affidavit substantially corroborated what he had
written in vital details, which is obviously far from
correct.
Most importantly, the record does not show that
before he published that story, Jurado ever got in
touch with Veto or anyone in Equitable Bank, Ermita
Branch, to determine the accuracy of what he would
later report. If he did, he would quickly have learned
that his sources, whoever or whatever they were,
were not to be relied upon. If he did not, he was
gravely at fault — at the very least for disregarding the
Journalist's Code of Ethics — in failing to exert bona
fide efforts to verify the accuracy of his information.
In either case, his publication of the slanted, therefore
misleading and false, report of the affair is censurable.
His proffered explanation that the justices having
confirmed their presence at the luncheon, thus
corroborating what he had written in vital details and
making further substantiation unnecessary, and that
his report constituted fair comment on the public
conduct of public officers, obviously does not at all
explain why a party given by Atty. Veto was reported
by him as one tendered by Equitable Bank. The only
conclusion that may rationally be drawn from these
circumstances is that Jurado, unable to advance any
plausible reason for the conspicuous divergence
between what in fact transpired and what he reported,
again resorts to semantics and sophistry to attempt an
explanation of the unexplainable. Paraphrasing the
Code of Ethics, he failed to scrupulously report and
interpret the news; on the contrary, his failure or
refusal to verify such essential facts as who really
hosted and tendered the luncheon and spent for it,
and his playing up of the Bank's supposed role as
such host have resulted in an improper suppression of
those facts and a gross distortion of the truth about
them.
c. Re Other Items
Jurado disregarded the truth again, and in the process
vilified the Supreme Court, in the item in his column of
February 3, 1993 already adverted to,   and more fully
19
quoted as follows:
When lawyers speak of the
"Magnificent Seven" one has to make
sure which group they are referring to.
Makati's "Magnificent Seven" are a
bunch of Makati regional trial court
judges who fix drug related
cases. The "Magnificent Seven" in the
Supreme Court consists of a group of
justices who vote as one."
About the last (italicized) statement there is, as in
other accusations of Jurado, not a shred of proof; and
the volumes of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) in which are reported the decisions of the
Supreme Court En Banc for the year 1992 (January
to December) and for January 1993, divulge not a
single non-unanimous decision or resolution where
seven (7) justices voted "as one," nor any group of
decisions or resolutions where the recorded votes
would even suggest the existence of such a cabal.
This is yet another accusation which Jurado is unable
to substantiate otherwise than, as also already
pointed out, by invoking unnamed and confidential
sources which he claims he considers highly credible
and reliable and which would be imperiled by
elaborating on the information furnished by them. He
would justify reliance on those sources on grounds of
necessity, custom and usage and claim the protection
of Republic Act No. 53, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1477 from forced, revelation of confidential news
sources except when demanded by the security of the
state. 
20
Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a
journalist who deliberately, prints lies or distorts the
truth; or that a newsman may escape liability who
publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations
against a person or entity, but recognizes no
obligation bona fide to establish beforehand the
factual basis of such imputations and refuses to
submit proof thereof when challenged to do so. It
outrages all notions of fair play and due process, and
reduces to uselessness all the injunctions of the
Journalists' Code of Ethics to allow a newsman, with
all the potential of his profession to influence popular
belief and shape public opinion, to make shameful
and offensive charges destructive of personal or
institutional honor and repute, and when called upon
to justify the same, cavalierly beg off by claiming that
to do so would compromise his sources and
demanding acceptance of his word for the reliability of
those sources.
Jurado's other writings already detailed here are of
the same sort. While it might be tedious to recount
what has already been stated about the nature and
content of those writings, it is necessary to do so
briefly in order not only to stress the gravity he makes,
but also to demonstrate that his response to the call
for their substantiation has been one of unvarying
intransigence: an advertance to confidential sources
with whose reliability he professes satisfaction and
whom fuller disclosure would supposedly
compromise.
There can be no doubt of the serious and degrading
character — not only to the Court of Appeals, but also
to the judiciary in general — of his columns of
November 9, 1992 and January 29, 1993 concerning
an unnamed former justice of the Court of Appeals
who had allegedly turned "fixer" for five of the Court's
divisions and who, for the right price, could guarantee
that a party's lawyer could write his own decision for
and in the name of the ponente; and of his column of
March 24, 1993 to the effect that anywhere from
P30,000 to P50,000 could buy a temporary restraining
order from a regional trial court in Manila.
The litany of falsehoods, and charges made
without bona fide effort at verification or
substantiation, continues:
(a) Jurado's column of January 30,
1993 about eight (8) Makati judges
who were "handsomely paid" for
decisions favoring drug-traffickers and
other big-time criminals was based on
nothing more than raw intelligence
contained is confidential police report.
It does not appear that any part of that
report has been reliably confirmed.
(b) He has refused to offer any
substantiation, either before the Ad
Hoc Committee or in this proceeding,
for his report of October 27, 1992
concerning an unnamed lady
secretary of a Makati RTC Judge who,
besides earning at least P10,000 for
making sure a case is raffled off to a
"sympathetic" judge, can also arrange
the issuance of attachments and
injunctions for a fee of one (1%)
percent over and above usual
premium for the attachment or
injunction bond, a fee that in one
instance amounted to P300,000.
(c) His report (columns of January 16
and 29, 1993) that the Judicial and
Bar Council acted contrary to ethics
and delicadeza in nominating to the
Court of Appeals a son and a nephew
of its members is completely untrue.
The most cursory review of the
records of the Council will show that
since its organization in 1987, there
has not been a single instance of any
son or nephew of a member of the
Council being nominated to the Court
of Appeals during said member's
incumbency; and in this connection,
he mistakenly and carelessly identified
RTC Judge Rosalio de la Rosa as the
nephew of Justice (and then Member
of the Judicial and Bar Council)
Lorenzo Relova when the truth, which
he subsequently learned and
admitted, was that the person referred
to was Judge Joselito de la Rosa, the
son-in-law, not the nephew, of Justice
Relova. Had he bothered to make any
further verification, he would have
learned that at all sessions of the
Council where the nomination of
Judge Joselito de la Rosa was
considered, Justice Relova not only
declined to take part in the
deliberations, but actually left the
conference room; and he would also
have learned that Judge Rosalio de la
Rosa had never been nominated —
indeed, to this date, he has not been
nominated to the Court of Appeals.
(d) He has recklessly slandered the
Judicial and Bar Council by charging
that it has improperly made
nominations to the Court of Appeals
on considerations other than of merit
or fitness, through the manipulations
of the Council's Secretary, Atty. Daniel
Martinez; or because the nominee
happens to be a relative of a member
of the Council (e.g., Judge Joselito de
la Rosa, initially identified as Judge
Rosalio de la Rosa) or of the Supreme
Court (he could name none so
situated); or has powerful political
sponsor (referring to RTC Judge
Conrado Vasquez, Jr., son and
namesake of the Ombudsman).
Acceptance of the truth of these
statements is precluded, not only by
the familiar and established
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions, but
also, and even more conclusively by
the records of the Judicial and Bar
Council itself, which attest to the
qualifications of Atty. Daniel Martinez,
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court,
Judge Joselito de la Rosa, and Judge
Conrado Vasquez, Jr., for
membership in the Appellate Tribunal;
(e) Equally false is Jurado's report
(column of January 25, 1993) that
nomination to the Court of Appeals of
some worthy individuals like Quezon
City RTC Judge Maximiano Asuncion,
and Atty. Raul Victorino (who was
closely identified with former Senate
President Salonga) had been blocked
because they had "incurred the ire of
the powers that be," the truth, which
could very easily have been verified,
being that a pending administrative
case against Judge Asuncion had
stood in the way of his nomination,
and since Mr. Victorino had been
sponsored or recommended by then
Senate President Salonga himself, the
fact that he was not nominated can
hardly be attributed to the hostility or
opposition of persons in positions of
power or influence.
(f) Jurado was similarly unfair,
untruthful and unfoundedly judgmental
in his reporting about Executive Judge
Rosalio de la Rosa of the Manila
Regional Trial Court as:
(1) having been
nominated to the Court
of Appeals by the
Judicial and Bar
Council chiefly, if not
only, by reason of
being the nephew of temporary restraining
Justice Relova and the orders, receiverships,
cousin of Chief Justice etc.), or on
Narvasa, the truth, as interlocutory matters
already pointed out, before raffle, in order
being that to "balance the
Judge Rosalio de la workload among
Rosa had never been courts and judges,
thus nominated to the (Sec. l, par. 2, id.), and
Court of Appeals, the exercise such other
nominee having been powers and
Judge Joselito de la prerogatives as may in
Rosa, the son-in-law his judgment be
(not nephew) of necessary or incidental
Justice Relova; and to the performance of
his functions as a
(2) having discarded Court Administrator"
the rule that cases (Sec. 7, par. 1, id.) —
seeking provisional these provisions being
remedies should be broad enough, not only
raffled off to the judges to authorize unilateral
(column of January 28, action by the Executive
1993) and adopted a Judge himself on
system of farming out provisional remedies
applications for and interlocutory
temporary restraining matters even prior to
orders, etc., among all raffle of the main case,
the branches of the but also to delegate
court; here again, the authority to act
Jurado is shown to thereon to other
have written without judges.
thinking, and made
statements without Jurado does not
verifying the accuracy explain why: (1) he
of his information or made no effort to verify
seeking the views of the state of the rules
the subject of his on the matter; (2) he
pejorative statements; precipitately assumed
the merest inquiry that the views of Judge
would have revealed to Teresita Dy-Liaco
him that while Circular Flores, whose
No. 7 dated complaint on the
September 23, 1974 subject he claims he
requires that no case merely summarized,
may be assigned in were necessarily
multi-sala courts correct and the acts of
without raffle (for Judge de la Rosa
purposes of disposition necessarily wrong or
on the merits), improper; and (3) he
Administrative Order did not try to get Judge
No. 6, dated June 30, de la Rosa's side at all.
1975 (Sec. 15, Par.
IV),   empowers
21
Common to all these utterances of Jurado is
Executive Judges to the failure to undertake even the most cursory
act on all applications verification of their objective truth; the
for provisional abdication of the journalist's duty to report and
remedies interpret the news with scrupulous fairness;
(attachments, and the breach of the law's injunction that a
injunctions, or person act with justice, give everyone his due
 and observe honesty and good faith both in
the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties.
7. Jurado's Proffered Excuses
and Defenses
The principle of press freedom is invoked by Jurado in
justification of these published writings. That
invocation is obviously unavailing in light of the basic
postulates and the established axioms or norms for
the proper exercise of press freedom earlier set forth
in this opinion. 
22
Jurado next puts in issue this Court's power to cite
him for contempt. The issue is quickly disposed of by
adverting to the familiar principle reiterated inter
alia in Zaldivar v. Gonzales: 23
. . . (T)he Supreme Court has inherent
power to punish for contempt, to
control in the furtherance of justice the
conduct of ministerial officers of the
Court including lawyers and all other
persons connected in any manner with
a case before the Court (In re Kelly,
35 Phil. 944 [1916]; In re Severino
Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54
Phil. 801 (1930]; In re Vicente Pelaez,
44 Phil. 567 [1923]; and In re Vicente
Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]). The power
to punish for contempt is "necessary
for its own protection against improper
interference with the due
administration of justice," "(i)t is not
dependent upon the complaint of any
of the parties litigant" (Halili v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112
[1985]; Andres v. Cabrera, 127 SCRA
802 [1984]; Montalban v. Canonoy, 38
SCRA 1 [1971]; Commissioner of
Immigration v. Cloribel, 20 SCRA
1241 [1967]; Herras Teehankee v.
Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 630
[1946]).
Contempt is punishable, even if committed without
relation to a pending case. Philippine jurisprudence
parallels a respectable array of English decisions
holding contumacious scurrilous attacks against the
courts calculated to bring them into disrepute, even
when made after the trial stage or after the end of the
proceedings. The original doctrine laid down
in People vs. Alarcon   — that there is no contempt if
24
there is no pending case — has been abandoned in
subsequent rulings of this Court which have since
adopted the Moran dissent therein,   viz.:
25
Contempt, by reason of publications
relating to court and to court
proceedings, are of two kinds. A
publication which tends to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the
courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by courts. This is the rule
announced in the cases relied upon by
the majority. A publication which tends
to degrade the courts and to destroy
public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any way
into disrepute, constitutes likewise
criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. In the language
of the majority, what is sought, in the
first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of
the courts to administer justice in the
decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive
hand of justice is extended to
vindicate the courts from any act or
conduct calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first, there
is no contempt where there is no
action pending, as there is no decision
which might in any be influenced by
the newspaper publication. In the
second, the contempt exists, with or
without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court
itself and its dignity. (12 Am. Jur. pp.
416-417.) Courts would lose their
utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed.
The foregoing disposes of Jurado's other contention
that the present administrative matter is not a citation
for direct contempt, there being no pending case or
proceeding out of which a charge of direct contempt
against him may arise; this, even without regard to the
fact that the statements made by him about sojourn in
Hongkong of six Justices of the Supreme Court were
clearly in relation to a case involving two (2) public
utility companies, then pending in this Court. 
26
His theory that there is no formal charge against him
is specious. His published statements about that
alleged trip are branded as false in no uncertain terms
by the sworn statement and letter of Vice-President
Vicente R. Samson of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company which:
 (a) "emphatically and categorically"
deny that PLDT had made any
arrangements with any travel agency,
or with the two travel agencies it
patronized or retained, or paid
anything, on account of such alleged
trip;
(b) positively affirm (i) that PLDT was
"not even aware that any of the
justices or their families . . . (had)
made the trip referred to in the Jurado
column," and (ii) that neither Atty. Emil
P. Jurado nor anyone in his behalf has
ever spoken to . . . (said Mr. Samson)
or any other responsible officer of
PLDT about the matter . . .; and
(c) beseech the Court to "take such
action (on the matter) as may be
appropriate.
As already stated, the Court, in its Resolution of
February 16, 1993:
(a) ordered the subject of Samson's letter and affidavit
docketed as an official Court proceeding to determine
the truth of Jurado's allegations about it; and
(b) directed also that Jurado be furnished copies of
Atty. William Veto's affidavit on the luncheon party
hosted by him (which Jurado reported as one given by
Equitable Bank) and that Jurado file comment on said
affidavits as well as allegations in specified columns
of his. Jurado was also furnished copies of the
affidavits later submitted by the two travel agencies
mentioned in Samson's statement, and was required
to comment thereon.
It was thus made clear to him that he was being called
to account for his published statements about the
matters referred to, and that action would be taken
thereon against him as "may be appropriate." That
that was in fact how he understood it is evident from
his submitted defenses, denying or negativing liability
for contempt, direct indirect. Indeed, as journalist of
no little experience and a lawyer to boot, he cannot
credibly claim an inability to understand the nature
and import of the present proceedings.
Jurado would also claim that the Court has no
administrative supervision over him as a member of
the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks
why he is being singled out, and, by being required to
submit to a separate administrative proceeding,
treated differently than his other colleagues in media
who were only asked to explain their reports and
comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad
Hoc Committee. The answer is that upon all that has
so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to
answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or
reputation which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct
the administration of justice, or interfere with the
disposition of its business or the performance of its
functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been
singled out. What has happened is that there have
been brought before the Court, formally and in due
course, sworn statements branding his reports as lies
and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of
substantiating those reports or assuming
responsibility for their publication.
Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity
— whether a journalist, or as a member of the bar —
he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby he
resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar earlier
proceeding: that he is being called to account as a
lawyer for his statements as a
journalist.   This is not the case at all. Upon the
27
doctrines and principles already inquired into and
cited, he is open to sanctions as journalist who has
misused and abused press freedom to put the
judiciary in clear and present to the danger of
disrepute and of public obdium and opprobrium,
detriment and prejudice of the administration of
justice. That he is at the same time a member of the
bar has nothing to do with the setting in of those
sanctions, although it may aggravate liability. At any
rate, what was said about the matter in that earlier
case is equally cogent here:
Respondent expresses perplexity at
being called to account for the
publications in question in his capacity
as a member of the bar, not as a
journalist. The distinction is
meaningless, since as the matter
stands, he has failed to justify his
actuations in either capacity, and there
is no question of the Court's authority
to call him to task either as a
newsman or as a lawyer. What
respondent proposes is that in
considering his actions, the Court
judge them only as those of a member
of the press and disregard the fact that
he is also a lawyer. But his actions
cannot be put into such neat
compartments. In the natural order of
things, a person's acts are determined
by, and reflect, the sum total of his
knowledge, training and experience. In
the case of respondent in particular
the Court will take judicial notice of the
frequent appearance in his regular
columns of comments and
observations utilizing legal language
and argument, bearing witness to the
fact that in pursuing his craft as a
 journalist he calls upon his knowledge
as a lawyer to help inform and
influence his readers and enhance his
credibility. Even absent this
circumstance, respondent cannot
honestly assert that in exercising his
profession as journalist he does not
somehow, consciously or
unconsciously, draw upon his legal
knowledge and training. It is thus not
realistic, nor perhaps even possible, to
come to fair, informed and intelligent
judgment of respondent's actuations
by divorcing from consideration the
fact that he is a lawyer as well as a
newspaperman, even supposing,
which is not the case — that he may
thereby be found without
accountability in this matter.
To repeat, respondent cannot claim
absolution even were the Court to lend
ear to his plea that his actions be
judged solely as those of a
newspaperman unburdened by the
duties and responsibilities peculiar to
the law profession of which he is also
a member.
8. The Dissents
The eloquent, well-crafted dissents of Messrs.
Justices Puno and Melo that would invoke freedom of
the press to purge Jurado's conduct of any taint of
contempt must now be briefly addressed.
a. Apparent Misapprehension
of Antecedents and Issue
Regrettably, there appears to be some
misapprehension not only about the antecedents
directly leading to the proceedings at bar but also the
basic issues involved.
The dissents appear to be of the view, for instance,
that it was chiefly Jurado's failure to appear before
the Ad Hoc Committee in response to two (2) letters
of invitation issued to him, that compelled the Court to
order the matter to be docketed on February 16, 1993
and to require respondent Jurado to file his Comment.
This is not the case at all. As is made clear in Sub-
Heads 3 and 4 of this opinion, supra, the direct cause
of these proceedings was not Jurado's refusal to
appear and give evidence before the Ad
Hoc Committee. The direct cause was the letters of
PLDT and Atty. William Veto, supported by affidavits,
denouncing certain of his stories as false,   with the
28
former praying that the Court take such action as may
be appropriate. And it was precisely "the matter dealt
with in the letter and affidavit of the PLDT" that this
Court ordered to "be duly DOCKETED, and hereafter
considered and acted upon as an official Court
proceeding;" this, by Resolution dated February 16,
1993; the Court also requiring, in the same
Resolution, "that the Clerk of Court SEND COPIES of
the PLDT letter and affidavit, and of the affidavit of
Atty. William Veto to Atty. Emil Jurado . . .," and that
Jurado should comment thereon "as well as (on) the
allegations made by him in his columns,
herein specified" — because of explicit claims, and
indications of the falsity or, inaccuracy thereof.
There thus also appears to be some misapprehension
of the basic issues, at least two of which are framed in
this wise: (1) the right of newsmen to
refuse subpoenas, summons, or "invitations" to
appear in administrative investigations," and (2) their
right "not to reveal confidential sources of information
under R.A. No. 53, as amended" — which are not
really involved here — in respect of which it is
theorized that the majority opinion will have an
inhibiting effect on newsmen's confidential sources of
information, and thereby abridges the freedom of the
press.
(1) No Summons or Subpoena
Ever Issued to Jurado
The fact is that no summons or subpoena was ever
issued to Jurado by the Ad Hoc Committee; nor was
the issuance of any such or similar processes, or any
punitive measures for disobedience thereto, intended
or even contemplated. Like most witnesses who gave
evidence before the Committee, Jurado was
merely invited to appear before it to give information
in aid of its assigned task of ascertaining the truth
concerning persistent rumors and reports about
corruption in the judiciary. When he declined to accept
the invitations, the Ad Hoc Committee took no action
save to inform the Court thereof; and the Court itself
also took no action. There is thus absolutely no
occasion to ascribe to that investigation and the
invitation to appear thereat a "chilling effect" on the by
and large "hard-boiled" and self-assured members of
the media fraternity. If at all, the patience and
forbearance of the Court, despite the indifference of
some of its invitees and projected witnesses, appear
to have generated an attitude on their part bordering
on defiant insolence.
(2) No Blanket Excuse Under RA 53
From Responding to Subpoena
Even assuming that the facts were as presented in
the separate opinion, i.e., that subpoenae had in fact
been issued to and served on Jurado, his unexplained
failure to obey the same would prima facie constitute
constructive contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. It should be obvious that a journalist
may not refuse to appear at all as required by
a subpoena on the bare plea that under R.A. No 53,
he may not be compelled to disclose the source of his
information. For until he knows what questions will be
put to him as witness — for which his presence has
been compelled — the relevance of R.A. No. 53
cannot be ascertained. His duty is clear. He must
obey the subpoena. He must appear at the appointed
place, date and hour, ready to answer questions, and
he may invoke the protection of the statute only at the
appropriate time.
b. The Actual Issue
The issue therefore had nothing to do with any failure
of Jurado's to obey a subpoena, none ever having
been issued to him, and the Ad Hoc Committee
having foreborne to take any action at all as regards
his failure to accept its invitations. The issue, as set
out in the opening sentence of this opinion, essentially
concerns "(l)iability for published statements
demonstrably false or misleading, and derogatory of
the courts and individual judges."
Jurado is not being called to account for declining to
identify the sources of his news stories, or for refusing
to appear and give testimony before the Ad
Hoc Committee. He is not being compelled to
guarantee the truth of what he publishes, but to
exercise honest and reasonable efforts to determine
the truth of defamatory statements before publishing
them. He is being meted the punishment appropriate
to the publication of stories shown to be false and
defamatory of the judiciary — stories that he made no
effort whatsoever to verify and which, after being
denounced as lies, he has refused, or is unable, to
substantiate.
c. RA 53 Confers No Immunity from Liability
for False or Defamatory Publications
This opinion neither negates nor seeks to enervate
the proposition that a newsman has a right to keep his
sources confidential; that he cannot be compelled by
the courts to disclose them, as provided by R.A. 53,
unless the security of the State demands such
revelation. But it does hold that he cannot invoke such
right as a shield against liability for printing stories that
are untrue and derogatory of the courts, or others.
The ruling, in other words, is that when called to
account for publications denounced as inaccurate and
misleading, the journalist has the option (a) to
demonstrate their truthfulness or accuracy even if in
the process he disclose his sources, or (b) to refuse,
on the ground that to do so would require such
disclosure. In the latter event, however, he must be
ready to accept the consequences of publishing
untruthful or misleading stories the truth and accuracy
of which he is unwilling or made no bona fide effort to
prove; for R.A. 53, as amended, is quite unequivocal
that the right of refusal to disclose sources is "without
prejudice to . . . liability under civil and criminal laws."
R.A. 53 thus confers no immunity from prosecution for
libel or for other sanction under law. It does not
declare that the publication of any news report or
information which was "related in confidence" to the
journalist is not actionable; such circumstance (of
confidentiality) does not purge, the publication of its
character as defamatory, if indeed it be such, and
actionable on that ground. All it does is give the
journalist the right to refuse (or not to be compelled) to
reveal the source of any news report published by him
which was revealed to him in confidence.
A journalist cannot say, e.g.: a person of whose
veracity I have no doubt told me in confidence that
Justices X and Y received a bribe of P1M each for
their votes in such and such a case, or that a certain
Judge maintains a mistress, and when called to
account for such statements, absolve himself by
claiming immunity under R.A. 53, or invoking press
freedom.
d. A Word about "Group Libel"
There is hardly need to belabor the familiar doctrine
about group libel and how it has become the familiar
resort of unscrupulous newsmen who can malign any
number of anonymous members of a common
profession, calling or persuasion, thereby putting an
entire institution — like the judiciary in this case — in
peril of public contumely and mistrust without serious
risk of being sued for defamation. The preceding
discussions have revealed Jurado's predilection for, if
not his normal practice of, refusing to specifically
identify or render identifiable the persons he maligns.
Thus, he speaks of the "Magnificent Seven," by
merely referring to undisclosed regional trial court
judges in Makati; the "Magnificent Seven" in the
Supreme Court, as some undesignated justices who
supposedly vote as one; the "Dirty Dozen," as
unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other
cities. He adverts to an anonymous group of justices
and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party;
and six unnamed justices of this Court who reportedly
spent a prepaid vacation in Hong Kong with their
families. This resort to generalities and ambiguities is
an old and familiar but reprehensible expedient of
newsmongers to avoid criminal sanctions since the
American doctrine of group libel is of restricted
application in this jurisdiction. For want of a definitely
identified or satisfactorily identifiable victim, there is
generally no actionable libel, but such a craven
publication inevitably succeeds in putting all the
members of the judiciary thus all together referred to
under a cloud of suspicion. A veteran journalist and
lawyer of long standing that he is, Jurado could not
have been unaware of the foregoing realities and
consequences.
e. Substantiation of News Report
Not Inconsistent with RA 53
It is argued that compelling a journalist to substantiate
the news report or information confidentially revealed
to him would necessarily negate or dilute his right to
refuse disclosure of its source. The argument will not
stand scrutiny.
A journalist's "source" either exists or is fictitious. If
the latter, plainly, the journalist is entitled to no
protection or immunity whatsoever.
If the "source" actually exists, the information
furnished is either capable of independent
substantiation, or it is not. If the first, the journalist's
duty is clear: ascertain, if not obtain, the evidence by
which the information may be
verified before publishing the same; and if thereafter
called to account therefor, present such evidence and
in the process afford the party adversely affected
thereby opportunity to dispute the information or show
it to be false.
If the information is not verifiable, and it is derogatory
of any third party, then it ought not to be published for
obvious reasons. It would be unfair to the subject of
the report, who would be without means of refuting
the imputations against him. And it would afford an
unscrupulous journalist a ready device by which to
smear third parties without the obligation to
substantiate his imputations by merely claiming that
the information had been given to him "in confidence".
It is suggested that there is another face to the
privileged character of a journalist's source of
information than merely the protection of the
journalist, and that it is intended to protect also the
source itself. What clearly is implied is that journalist
may not reveal his source without the latter's
clearance or consent. This totally overlooks the fact
that the object of a derogatory publication has at least
an equal right to know the source thereof and, if
indeed traduced, to the opportunity of obtaining just
satisfaction from the traducer.
9. Need for Guidelines
Advertences to lofty principle, however eloquent and
enlightening, hardly address the mundane, but
immediate and very pertinent, question of whether a
journalist may put in print unverified information
derogatory of the courts and judges and yet remain
immune from liability for contempt for refusing, when
called upon, to demonstrate their truth on the ground
of press freedom or by simply claiming that he need
not do so since (or if) it would compel him to disclose
the identity of his source or sources.
The question, too, is whether or not we are prepared
to say that a journalist's obligation to protect his
sources of information transcends, and is greater
than, his duty to the truth; and that, accordingly, he
has no obligation whatsoever to verify, or exercise
bona fide efforts to verify, the information he is given
or obtain the side of the party adversely affected
before he publishes the same.
True, the pre-eminent role of a free press in keeping
freedom alive and democracy in full bloom cannot be
overemphasized. But it is debatable if that role is well
and truly filled by a press let loose to print what it will,
without reasonable restraints designed to assure the
truth and accuracy of what is published. The value of
information to a free society is in direct proportion to
the truth it contains. That value reduces to little or
nothing when it is no longer possible for the public to
distinguish between truth and falsehood in news
reports, and the courts are denied the mechanisms by
which to make reasonably sure that only the truth
reaches print.
a. No Constitutional Protection for Deliberately
False or Recklessly Inaccurate Reports
It is worth stressing that false reports about a public
official or other person are not shielded from sanction
by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the
Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free
speech has never countenanced the publication of
falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated
dissemination of patent lies. The U.S. Supreme
Court,   while asserting that "(u)nder the First
29
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea,"
and that "(h)owever pernicious an opinion may seem,
we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas" (citing a passage from the first Inaugural
Address of Thomas Jefferson), nonetheless made the
firm pronouncement that "there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact," and "the erroneous
statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional
protection (although) . . . nevertheless inevitable in
free debate." "Neither the intentional lie nor the
careless error," it said, "materially advances society's
interest in "unhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate
on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
US, at 270, 11 L Ed 2d 686, 95 ALR2d 1412. They
belong to that category of utterances which "are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to the truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Chaplinsky v, new Hampshire, 315 US 568,
572, 86 L Ed 1031, 62 S Ct 766 (1942).
"The use of calculated falsehood," it was observed in
another case,   "would put a different cast on the
30
constitutional question. Although honest utterances,
even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of
the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie,
knowingly and deliberately published about a public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. . . . (T)he
knowingly false statement and the false statement
made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection."
Similarly, in a 1969 case concerning a patently false
accusation made against a public employee avowedly
in fulfillment of a "legal, moral, or social duty,"   this
31
Court, through the late Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, ruled that the guaranty of free speech
cannot be considered as according protection to the
disclosure of lies, gossip or rumor, viz.:
. . . Defendant's civil duty was to help
the Government clean house and
weed out dishonest, unfit or disloyal
officers and employees thereof, where
there is reasonable ground to believe
that they fall under this category. He
had no legal right, much less duty,
to gossip, or foster the circulation of
rumors, or jump at conclusions and
more so if they are gratuitous or
groundless. Otherwise, the freedom of
speech, which is guaranteed with a
view to strengthening our democratic
institutions and promoting the general
welfare, would be a convenient
excuse to engage in the vituperation
of individuals, for the attainment of
private, selfish and vindictive ends,
thereby hampering the operation of
the Government with. administrative
investigations of charges preferred
without any color or appearance of
truth and with no other probable effect
than the harassment of the officer or
employee concerned, to the detriment
of public service and public order.
b. No "Chilling Effect"
The fear expressed, and earlier adverted to, that the
principles here affirmed would have a "chilling effect"
on media professionals, seems largely unfounded and
should be inconsequential to the greater number of
journalists in this country who, by and large, out of
considerations of truth, accuracy, and fair play, have
commendably refrained from ventilating what would
otherwise be "sensational" or "high-visibility" stories.
In merely seeking to infuse and perpetuate the same
attitude and sense of responsibility in all
journalists, i.e., that there is a need to check out the
truth and correctness of information before publishing
it, or that, on the other hand, recklessness and crass
sensationalism should be eschewed, this decision,
surely, cannot have such "chilling effect," and no
apprehension that it would deter the determination of
truth or the public exposure of wrong can reasonably
be entertained.
The people's right to discover the truth is not
advanced by unbridled license in reportage that would
find favor only with extremist liberalism. If it has done
nothing else, this case has made clear the compelling
necessity of the guidelines and parameters elsewhere
herein laid down. They are eminently reasonable, and
no responsible journalist should have cause to
complain of difficulty in their observance.
10. Afterword
It seems fitting to close this opinion, with the words of
Chief Justice Moran, whose pronouncements have
already been earlier quoted,   and are as germane
32
today as when they were first written more than fifty
(50) years ago. 33
It may be said that respect to courts
cannot be compelled and that public
confidence should be a tribute to
judicial worth, virtue and intelligence.
But compelling respect to courts is
one thing and denying the courts the
power to vindicate themselves when
outraged is another. I know of no
principle of law that authorizes with
impunity a discontended citizen to
unleash, by newspaper publications,
the avalanche of his wrath and venom
upon courts and judges. If he believes
that a judge is corrupt and that justice
has somewhere been perverted, law
and order require that he follow the
processes provided by the
Constitution and the statutes by
instituting the corresponding
proceedings for impeachment or
otherwise. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
 It might be suggested that judges who
are unjustly attacked have a remedy in
an action for libel. This suggestion Administrative matter, disciplined as lawyer
has, however, no rational basis in
principle. In the first place, the outrage
is not directed to the judge as a
private individual but to the judge as
such or to the court as an organ of the
administration of justice. In the second
place, public interests will gravely
suffer where the judge, as such, will,
from time to time, be pulled down and
disrobed of his judicial authority to
face his assailant on equal grounds
and prosecute cases in his behalf as a
private individual. The same reasons
of public policy which exempt a judge
from civil liability in the exercise of his
judicial functions, most fundamental of
which is the policy to confine his time
exclusively to the discharge of his
public duties, applies here with equal,
if not superior, force (Hamilton v.
Williams, 26 Ala. 529; Busteed v.
Parson, 54 Ala. 403; Ex
parte McLeod, 120 Fed. 130; Coons v.
State, 191 Ind. 580; 134 N. E.
194). . . .

Jurado's actuations, in the context in which they were

done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and
indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he
might cause to the name and reputation of those of
whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court,
directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the
administration of justice and the judges engaged in
that function. By doing them, he has placed himself
beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible
journalists who live by their Code or the "Golden Rule"
and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige
and nobility of their calling.

Clearly unrepentant, exhibiting no remorse for the

acts and conduct detailed here, Jurado has
maintained a defiant stance. "This is a fight I will not
run from," he wrote in his column of March 21, 1993;
and again, "I will not run away from a good fight," in
his column of March 23, 1993. Such an attitude
discourages leniency, and leaves no choice save the
application of sanctions appropriate to the offense.

WHEREFORE, the Court declares Atty. Emil

(Emiliano) P. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, hereby sentences him to pay a fine of one
thousand pesos (P1,000,00).

IT IS SO ORDERED.