10/9/2020 Why Armenia and Azerbaijan Are on the Brink of War | Foreign Affairs

Why Armenia and Azerbaijan Are

on the Brink of War
Local Tensions Meet Global Rivalries in Nagorno-
Karabakh
By Jeffrey Mankoff
October 1, 2020
JEFFREY MANKOFF is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the U.S. National Defense
University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies and the author of the forthcoming
book Empires of Eurasia: How Imperial Legacies Shape International Security.

The views expressed here are his own.

On September 27, signi cant ghting broke out between the militaries of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, two states that have been locked in an intractable
con ict over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh since the last days
of the Soviet Union. Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions have seen
periodic outbursts of violence in recent years, but the current ghting is the
most serious since Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a cease- re in 1994.

Domestic political factors in both countries militate against compromise.

e international context surrounding the con ict in Nagorno-Karabakh

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has also shifted in ways that complicate e orts to peacefully address the
underlying dispute. In particular, Turkey’s growing involvement in a con ict
in which Russia has long been the dominant player risks both giving the
protagonists—especially Azerbaijan—an incentive to keep ghting and
opening up a new front in the Turkish-Russian rivalry that has already
engulfed Syria, Libya, and to a lesser extent Ukraine.

A FROZEN CONFLICT HEATS UP

e origins of the Nagorno-Karabakh con ict can be traced back to the
Kremlin’s decision to include the Armenian-majority region within Soviet
Azerbaijan. When Moscow relaxed restrictions on popular mobilization in
the late 1980s, ethnic Armenians began demanding Nagorno-Karabakh’s
transfer to Armenia. Moscow refused, and when the Soviet Union collapsed
a few years later, a full-scale war broke out between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, leaving around 30,000 dead and over one million displaced.
With Azerbaijan led by the pan-Turkic nationalist Abulfaz Elchibey for
much of the con ict, Russian forces largely supported the Armenian side. A
Russian-brokered cease- re ended the war in May 1994, but not the
underlying dispute: today, Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding
districts are under Armenian control, but Azerbaijan regards it as illegally
occupied. Although Nagorno-Karabakh typically gets little attention in the
West, it is perhaps the most dangerous ash point across post-Soviet
Eurasia.

e current clashes broke out on September 27, with barrages of artillery

and the deployment of heavy armor along the Line of Contact separating
Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan proper. While
each side blames the other for ring the rst shot, local observers have
reported for weeks that escalation seemed imminent. Both countries
declared martial law and partially mobilized their reserves, suggesting an

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expectation of sustained con ict. Clips of this week’s ghting posted

online show evidence of signi cant con ict involving artillery, armor,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and infantry forces. On Monday,
Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, came under artillery re.

Domestic political factors in both countries militate against compromise.

is week’s clashes are hardly the rst since the 1994 cease- re. Sporadic
sniping across the Line of Contact is common. In April 2016, an
Azerbaijani o ensive recaptured several strategic high points, leaving
around 200 dead. Although Moscow was able to convince the two
governments to return to the cease- re after a few days, the clash was a
warning sign that the status quo—frozen in place since 1994—was in
danger of unraveling. Fighting along the Line of Contact broke out again
in July 2020, raising tensions and expectations of further con ict.

Unlike previous bouts of ghting, this one may result in signi cant changes
to the status quo. Baku and Yerevan both face increasing pressure to resort
to harsh measures. In Armenia, the government of Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan—which came to power amid a popular uprising in 2018 that
Russia largely opposed—is worried about what it sees as Moscow’s
increasingly ambivalent support for maintaining the status quo. Despite
some initial indications that he would be more open to a negotiated
solution, Pashinyan has taken a harder line, including calling for Nagorno-
Karabakh to be formally integrated into Armenia.

Nagorno-Karabakh is perhaps the most dangerous ash point across post-

Soviet Eurasia.

In Azerbaijan, an economic downturn and frustration at the authoritarian

rule of President Ilham Aliyev have fed popular discontent. As the losing
side in the initial war, Baku has made public calls for the return of
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Nagorno-Karabakh to mobilize nationalist support but risks being

out anked by public opinion. During the ghting this summer,
protesters stormed the parliament building in Baku demanding war with
Yerevan.

e ghting so far has encompassed an Azerbaijani o ensive against Fizuli

and Jabrayil, two of the Armenian-occupied districts outside Nagorno-
Karabakh whose relatively at terrain facilitates o ensive operations. e
bulk of their Azeri-majority population ed during the 1990s war, and in
recent years, Yerevan has started settling them with Armenians. While the
overall population of the two districts remains low, a continued Azerbaijani
o ensive into Nagorno-Karabakh proper could result in signi cant refugee
ows, possibly in the hundreds of thousands.

ON THE FRONTLINES OF EMPIRE

Unlike many other so-called frozen con icts in the former Soviet Union,
the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is driven almost entirely by local actors.
Russia remains the most important outside actor, but its ability to manage,
much less control, the con ict is limited.

Russia maintains upward of 5,000 soldiers in Armenia, which most

Armenians tolerate as a guarantee of their security. Although it has sided
with Armenia throughout the con ict, Moscow has also cultivated relations
with Azerbaijan and is the leading supplier of weapons to both sides. As
Azerbaijan’s relations with the West have deteriorated in recent years amid
declining interest in its oil and gas reserves and growing concern about
Aliyev’s authoritarian rule, Russia has made additional inroads with Baku.

While Moscow does not call the shots on the ground, both sides
understand that any resolution to the con ict can come only with Russian
support. During previous rounds of ghting (including in July), Russian

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o cials were instrumental in brokering a truce. Today, Russia has little

interest in a wider con ict, which could force it to make di cult decisions
about how far to take its commitments to Armenia and to devote
additional resources to the South Caucasus at a time when it is already
engaged on multiple other fronts.

ENTER THE TURKS

Although Russia remains the most important power broker, another
external power with historical ties to the region has increasingly sought to
shape the outcome of the con ict. Turkey sided with Azerbaijan in the
initial con ict in the 1990s, and the two countries share close ethnic and
cultural ties. Commentators and o cials—mostly Turks—describe the
relationship as “one nation, two states.” Until recently, however, Turkey’s
involvement in the dispute was relatively limited. But as Ankara has
adopted a more assertive posture in the Middle East and eastern
Mediterranean under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it has become more
forthright in its support for Azerbaijan.

Over the past year, Turkey has sold Azerbaijan a wide range of weapons,
including UAVs, missiles, and electronic warfare equipment. Once the
ghting started in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey also o ered Azerbaijan
strong political support. Erdogan declared that Turkey would “remain by
the side of our friend and brother Azerbaijan” and demanded that Armenia
immediately return its “occupied territory.” Turkey’s main opposition parties
joined Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party in passing a
resolution condemning Armenian actions. Turkey has also reportedly
dispatched Syrian mercenaries to Azerbaijan, and Armenia claimed this
week that a Turkish F-16 shot down one of its ghters (a claim Turkey
rejects).

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Turkey’s deepening involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh is a dangerous

game. Within the South Caucasus, strong Turkish support could encourage
Baku to take an uncompromising line and resist calls for a cease- re that
maintains some version of the status quo ante. Turkish involvement could
also transform the con ict into an existential one in the eyes of the
Armenian public, especially in light of the World War I–era massacres of
Armenians by Ottoman forces.

Turkey’s deepening involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh is a dangerous

game.

Russo-Turkish relations have thrived despite the two countries’

postimperial competition. But Turkey’s intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh
is Ankara’s most overt challenge to Russian in uence in the former Soviet
Union, where Moscow is extremely protective of its claims to preeminence.
Even if Russia remains committed to limiting the ghting between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, the overlapping presence of Russian and Turkish
forces in many other theaters gives Moscow multiple opportunities to
escalate. Indeed, Turkey’s direct involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh raises
the stakes not only in the South Caucasus but throughout the areas where
Ankara and Moscow are at odds. Already, the two countries back opposing
sides in the Libyan and Syrian con icts, where their proxies have engaged
in occasional clashes, and have incompatible ambitions in the Balkans and
Ukraine. Ankara likely sees its involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh in part as
a bargaining chip not only in the Caucasus but in its wider rivalry with
Moscow. And the involvement of Turkish mercenaries from Syria, another
theater where Russian and Turkish interests clash, suggests that this time
the Nagorno-Karabakh con ict may not stay con ned to the South
Caucasus.

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Renewed ghting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh was not unexpected.

But the scale of the ongoing clashes, Turkey’s more prominent role, and the
potential for the con ict to spill over into other contested regions have
already raised the stakes considerably. For now, Russia is calling on all sides
to de-escalate, seemingly caught o -guard by the extent of the ghting and
Turkey’s role in it. anks in part to its recent success in building ties with
Baku, Moscow remains reluctant to take sides or intervene directly. Russia
is the only outside power in a position to force the sides to return to the
negotiating table. Turkey’s intervention threatens Russia’s traditional
mediator role, but Moscow still has considerable nancial and political
leverage to push for a stop to the ghting. It should do so, even if it will
ultimately be up to the protagonists in Baku and Yerevan to step back from
the brink.

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