1. CHAVEZ VS. JBC leaves no room for any other construction.

It is
Doctrine: ​where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. (Except for technical terms)
FACTS
1. Petitioner asked the Court to determine 1]
whether the first paragraph of Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows
more than one (1) member of Congress to sit
in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two
(2) representatives from each House of
Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned
by the Constitution​.
2. Through the subject motion, respondents pray
that the Court reconsider its decision and
dismiss the petition on the following grounds:
1] that allowing only one representative from
Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity
considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the
failure of the Framers to make the proper
adjustment when there was a shift from
unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain
oversight; 3] that two representatives from
Congress would not subvert the intention of
the Framers to insulate the JBC from political
partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the
Court in declaring a seven-member
composition would provide a solution should
there be a stalemate is not exactly correct​.
indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had
it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.
In the interpretation of the constitutional
provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic
postulate that the Framers mean what they
say. The language used in the Constitution
must be taken to have been deliberately
chosen for a definite purpose. Every word
employed in the Constitution must be
interpreted to exude its deliberate intent
which must be maintained inviolate against
disobedience and defiance. What the
Constitution clearly says, according to its text,
compels acceptance and bars modification
even by the branch tasked to interpret it​.

ISSUE:
WON JBC’s practice of having members from the
Senate and the House of Representatives making 8
instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

HELD

Yes. ​The use of the singular letter “a” preceding

“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and
2. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. CORTES
Legal maxim: ​we must interpret not by the letter that
killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. (Purpose over
form)
FACTS
1. The Commission En Banc of the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) approved the
appointment to the position of Information
Officer V (IO V) of respondent Maricelle M.
Cortes.
2. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of
respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and
requested the CHR to render an opinion on
the legality of the respondent's appointment.
3. CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Efren Ephraim
G. Lamorena rendered an opinion that
respondent Cortes' appointment is not
covered by the rule on nepotism because the
appointing authority, the Commission En
Banc, has a personality distinct and separate
from its members
4. CHR commissioner and office in charge
terminated respondent services,
5. Respondent Cortes filed a Petition for Review
with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the Court of Appeals (CA).
6. The CA rendered its Decision granting the
petition and nullified Resolution.The CA also
ordered that Cortes be reinstated to her
position as IO V in the CHR​.
member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner
Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the
nepotistic character of the appointment because the
evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still
exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for
the appointment of IO V created an impression of
influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and
neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
The appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the
CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions provided
by law. The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against
nepotism is to take out the discretion of the
appointing and recommending authority on the
matter of appointing or recommending for
appointment a relative. The rule insures the
objectivity of the appointing or recommending official
by preventing that objectivity from being in fact
tested. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is
intended to apply to natural persons​.
Additional facts:
● Respondent Cortes merely raises the
argument that the appointing authority
referred to in Section 59 of the Administrative
Code is the Commission En Banc and not the
individual Commissioners who compose it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the
appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR
is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.

HELD:
Yes. Respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the
CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his father is a
3. CORPUZ V PEOPLE
GR 180016
Petitioner: ​Lito Corpuz
Respondents: ​People of the Philippines
D​octrine:
1. The Court should apply the law in a manner
that would give effect to their letter and spirit
especially when the law is clear as to its intent
and purpose.
2. The duty of the Court in case of excessive
penalty.
Facts:
● Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the
Admiral Royale Casino where the petitioner
approached Tancoy and offered to sell pieces
of jewelry on commission basis. Tancoy
agreed and turned over jewelries with an
aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced
by a receipt of even date. They both agreed
that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the
sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same
items, within a period of 60 days.
● The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning
the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the
latter promised the former that he will pay the
value of the said items entrusted to him, but to
no avail. Thus, an Information was filed
against petitioner for the crime of estafa.
● Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and
denied having transacted any business with
Tancoy. He testified that he obtained a loan
from Balajadia, where he and Tancoy work as
a collecting agent, for which he was made to
sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same
receipt was used as evidence against him for
the supposed agreement to sell the subject
pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
● The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information and the CA affirmed the said
decision.
● Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision of both RTC and CA and contended
that the penalty imposed upon him violates
the equal protection clause and the
prohibition against oppressive and cruel
punishment.
ISSUE: ​WON the Supreme Court can reverse the
decision of both RTC and CA because the penalty
imposed violates the equal protection clause and the
prohibition against oppressive and cruel punishment?
HELD: ​No. Although there seems to be a perceived
injustice brought about by the range of penalties that
the courts continue to impose on crimes against
property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years
ago in 1932, this Court cannot modify the said range
of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said
crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the
power of another branch of the government. This,
however, does not render the whole situation without
any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that
the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which
reads “x x x In the same way, the court shall submit to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence,
when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.”

There may be some provisions of the law that should

be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position
to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the
Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the
applicability of the penalties imposable in the present
times. Such is not within the competence of the Court
but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct
public hearings on the matter, consult legal
luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can
decide whether or not to amend or to revise the
questioned law or other laws, or even create a new
legislation which will adopt to the times.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to

apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp
legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in
the course of such application or construction, it
should not make or supervise legislation, or under the
guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms. The
Court should apply the law in a manner that would
give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when
the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly
put, the Court should shy away from encroaching
upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the
Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers by means of judicial legislation.

Cruel as it may be, it is for the Congress to amend the

law and adapt it to our modern time. All that the
Court could do in such eventuality, under Article 5 of
RPC, is to report the matter to the Chief Executive
with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes
to be harsh.
4. De Castro vs JBC
G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010
Petitioner:​ Arturo M. De Castro
Respondents: ​Judicial and Bar Council and President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Doctrine: Art VII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution
prohibiting the president to make appointments two
months before the next Presidential election is ​not
applicable to the Judiciary. ​Article VIII, Sec 4(1)
which provides that any vacancy shall be filled within
90 days from the occurrence thereof is mandatory.
Facts:
● The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just 7
days after the coming presidential elections
on May 10, 2010.
● Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from
a “list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within
two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his
term.
● The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18,
2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court.
● The OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court.
● A part of the question to be reviewed by the
Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some
of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC
could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another
part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section
4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires
the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court
(be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy.
Issue:
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
Ruling:
-​YES. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does
not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are
seemingly in conflict.
-The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
-The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof. T
-​The Court held that the President can appoint the
successor ​of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement
on the ground that the prohibition against
Presidential appointments under Art. VII, Sec. 15 does
not extend to appointments in the judiciary.
5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE JABINAL
Legal Maxim: ​the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law.
● When a doctrine of this Court is overruled and
a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should
not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
FACTS
1. Respondent was found guilty of illegal
possession of Firearm and ammunition.
2. Respondent admitted that he was in
possession of the revolver and ammunition
without the requisite license or permit. He,
however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because he had an appointment
as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor
of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments
expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the firearm in question.
3. Respondent also contended that he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the
Supreme Court's decisions in People vs.
Macarandang and People vs. Lucero.
4. The trial court held the accused in its decision
criminally liable on the ground that the
rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and
abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra.
HELD:
Yes on basis of Court's ruling in Macarandang and
Lucero. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and
Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of
the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he
was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the
doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties
who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof​.
ADDITIONAL FACTS:
● It will be noted that when appellant was
appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Governor and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Commander, the prevailing
doctrine on the matter was that laid down by
Us in People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero.

ISSUE:
WON appellant should be acquitted on the basis of
Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his
conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
6. PGBI V COMELEC
GR No. 190529, 29 April 2010
Petitioner: ​Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
(PGBI)
Respondent: ​Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Doctrine:
Doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to
adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things which
are established)
Facts:
● The Party-List System Act (RA 7941) provides
under Section 6 (8) that the COMELEC, upon
verified complaint of any interested party,
may remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, or organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds: It
fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections ​OR fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8679, deleting several party-list groups or
organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions, and among the
party-list organizations affected was PGBI
because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in
2004 ​AND it did not participate in the 2007
elections.
● PGBI filed for a request seeking a deferment of
its participation in the 2007 elections within
the period required prior to the 2007
elections. They also asserted that the MINERO
ruling cannot apply to ​them  because  the  precedents and not to unsettle things which are
factual  milieu  of  the  cited  case  is  removed  established) as embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code
from  PGBI’s,  and  MINERO,  prior  to  being 
delisted,  was  afforded  the  opportunity  to 
be  heard,  while  they  were  not.  The 
resolution  should  be  suspended  and/or 
aborted  to  prevent  a  miscarriage  of justice 
in view of the failure to notify the parties. 
Issues:
1. Whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI
2. Whether PGBI’s right to due process was violated
Held:
1. The court held that the MINERO ruling is an
erroneous application of RA 7941, thus, it cannot
sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system. This is because
the word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from
other things enumerated. Thus, the language of law
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
MINERO is thus diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent of Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 because
it characterizes the non-participation of a party-list
organization in an election as ​similar to a failure to
garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. This is a
confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s
clear and categorical language and the legislative
intent to treat the two scenarios differently. It is an
interpretation not within the contemplation of the
framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive
interpretation of the law. The PGBI case should be
understood in the light of the ​Banat ruling, which
ruled that a party-list group or organization which
qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot
now validly be delisted for the reason that it garnered
less than 2% in the last two elections. The PGBI case
is ruled out to be an exception to the ​doctrine of
stare decisis et non quieta movere ​(to adhere to
because the MINERO ruling is clearly an erroneous
application of the law.

2. The court held that PGBI’s right to due process

was not violated because they were given an
opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration
of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process,
we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity
to be heard and the formal or trial-type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential.

WHEREFORE, ​premises considered, we ​GRANT

the petition, and PGBI is qualified to be voted
upon as a party-list group or organization in the
coming May 2010 elections.
7. Salvacion vs. Central Bank
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
Petitioner: Karen E. Salvacion,minor, thru Federico
N. Salvation, her father
Respondents: ​Central Bank of the Philippines, China
Banking Corp, and Greg Bartelli
Doctrine: when a statute is silent or ambiguous, this
is one of those fundamental solutions that would
respond to the vehement urge of conscience
Facts:
1. Karen E. Salvacion, herein petitioner, then 12
years old, was coaxed and lured by private
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott to go
with him in his apartment, where she was
detained for four days from February 4 to 7,
1989; and was raped 10 times (once on
February 4 and 3 times a day from February
5-7).
2. Aside from the criminal case for serious illegal
detention and 4 counts of rape filed by the
Makati investigating fiscal, the petitioner
along with her parents, file in Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a civil case for damages with
preliminary attachment against Bartelli,
which the court then granted.
3. A notice of garnishment was served to China
Banking Corporation, where the dollar
account of the private respondent was
deposited, by the Deputy Sheriff of Makati. But
respondent bank invoking Republic Act No.
1405 as its answer to the notice of
garnishment served on it and later on invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
to the effect that the dollar deposits of
defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any
administrative body.
4. In a letter in response to the inquiry of the
counsel of petitioners to Central Bank, it is
stated that the provision in Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 is absolute in
application and that it does not admit of any
exception, nor has the same been repealed nor
amended.
5. March 29, 1990, after hearing the case
ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in
favor of petitioners, Petitioners tried to
execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit.
Issue:
Whether the dollar bank deposit of Greg Bartelli in
China Bank Corporation be exempted from
attachment, garnishment or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body
Ruling:
● NO​, the provisions of Section 133 of CB
Circular No. 960 are hereby held to be
inapplicable to this case because of its
peculiar circumstances and the Court requires
respondents to comply with the writ to
execution and to release to petitioners the
dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott in such amount as would justify the
judgment.
● In fine, ​the application of the law depends
on the extent of its justice. ​Eventually, if we
rule that the questioned Section 113 of CB
Circular No 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment or any other order
or process of any court. Legislative body,
government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a
citizen aggrieved by a foreign guessed like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which
provides that in case of doubt in the
 interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended
for right and justice to prevail.
● Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a
tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars
with respondent China Banking Corporation
only for safekeeping during his temporary
stay in the Philippines.
● For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor
General thus submits that the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court
processes.
8. TANADA V TUVERA TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

DOCTRINE: Presidential issuances and etc, shall have The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that
no binding force and effect unless published. "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
FACTS unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This
1. Petitioners seek to compel respondent public
proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly
officials to publish various presidential
published pursuant to the basic constitutional
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
requirements of due process.
proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders in
the Official Gazette
2. Responded contended that publication in the FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
Official Gazette is not necessary wherein the
law itself provides for its effectivity date. Such publication required ​need  not  be  confined  to  the 
3. The Court ruled that unpublished laws shall Official Gazette
have no binding effect or force unless
published. The clear object of this provision is
 
to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat.

ISSUE(S): whether publication is necessary for laws

which have its own effectivity date.

HELD: ​Yes. Publication is indispensable because

without such publication, there would be no adequate
notice to the general public of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. It
would render injustice to punish or burden a citizen
for the transgression of law which he had no notice.

SEPARATE OPINION(S)
 9. COJUANGCO V REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR 180705 27 November 2012
Petitioner: ​Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
Respondent: ​Republic of the Philippines
DOCTRINE: Publication is an indispensable
condition for the effectivity of a law.
FACTS:
● In 1971, Republic Act No. ("R.A.") 6260 was
enacted creating the Coconut Investment
Company ("CIC") to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund ("CIF"), which, under Section
8 thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55
levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of
the PhP 0.55 levy of which the copra seller
was – or ought to be – issued COCOFUND
receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the
disposition of COCOFED, the national
association of coconut producers declared by
the Philippine Coconut Administration
("PHILCOA" now "PCA") as having the largest
membership.
● The declaration of martial law in September
1972 saw the issuance of several presidential
decrees ("P.D.") purportedly designed to
improve the coconut industry through its
collection and utilization, how the proceeds of
the levy will be managed and by whom and
the purpose it was supposed to serve which
includes P.D. No. 755 providing under its
Section 1 the following:
○ It is hereby declared that the policy of
the State is to provide readily available
credit facilities to the coconut farmers
at preferential rates; that this policy
can be expeditiously and efficiently
realized by the implementation of the
"Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the benefit of
Coconut Farmers" executed by the
PCA…; and that the PCA is hereby
authorized to distribute, for free, the
shares of stock of the bank it acquired
to the coconut farmers..
○ Towards achieving the policy thus
declared, P.D. No. 755, under its
Section 2, authorized PCA to utilize the
CCSF and the CIDF collections to
acquire a commercial bank and
deposit the CCSF levy collections in
said bank interest free, the deposit
withdrawable only when the bank has
attained a certain level of sufficiency
in its equity capital. The same section
also decreed that all levies PCA is
authorized to collect shall not be
considered as special and/or fiduciary
funds or form part of the general funds
of the government within the
contemplation of P.D. No. 711.
● Charged with the duty of collecting and
administering the Fund was PCA. Like
COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage,
the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in
different coco levy decrees, had its share of
the coco levy.
● The list of FUB stockholders included
Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with
129,955 shares.14 It would appear later that,
pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining
Cojuangco’s equity position in the bank, PCA
would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to
(a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB
and (b) the increase in FUB’s capital stock (the
equivalent of 158,840 and 649,800 shares,
respectively). In all, from the "mother" PCA
shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of
95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as
follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840
shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304
ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement the number of the presidential decree, its title
between PCA and Cojuangco can be accorded or whereabouts and its supposed date of
the status of a law without publication. effectivity would not satisfy the publication
requirement.
HELD: ​No. It will be recalled that Cojuangco’s
claim of ownership over the UCPB shares is In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco
hinged on two contract documents the Agreement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not
respective contents of which formed part of in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract
and reproduced in their entirety in the in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to
aforecited Order of the Sandiganbayan dated the decree when published. We cannot, therefore,
March 11, 2003. The first contract refers to extend to the said Agreement the status of a law.
the agreement entered into by and between Consequently, Sandiganbayan in its holding that the
Pedro Cojuangco and his group, on one hand, PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an
and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., on the other, ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be
bearing date "May 1975" (hereinafter referred governed by contract law under the Civil Code.
to as "PC-ECJ Agreement"), while the second
relates to the accord between the PCA and
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975
(hereinafter referred to as "PCA-Cojuangco
Agreement"). The PC-ECJ Agreement allegedly
contains, inter alia, ​Cojuangco’s personal and
exclusive option to acquire the FUB ("UCPB")
shares from Pedro and his group. The
PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shows PCA’s
acquisition of the said option from Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr.

It bears to stress at this point that the

PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to in
Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or
attached as an annex to the same law. And it is
well-settled that laws must be published to be
valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable
condition for the effectivity of a law. Tañada v.
Tuvera said as much:

Publication of the law is indispensable in

every case x x x.

The publication, as further held in Tañada,

must be of the full text of the law since the
purpose of publication is to inform the public
of the contents of the law. Mere referencing