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Sakdalism and Philippine Radicalism
DAVID R. STURTEVANT
The author is Associate Professor of History at Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio. Research
for this paper was conducted in the Joseph R. Hayden Papers at Ann Arbor, Michigan with the assistance
of a Foreign Area Training and Research Grant from the Ford Foundation.
1 Estimates of Sakdal membership ranged as high as 300,000 at the time of the uprising. No more
than 65,ooo, if that many, however, participated in the insurrection. Acting Governor-General J. R. Hayde
Preliminary Report on the Sakdalista Disturbances, Manila, May 7, I935, p. 4. Hayden Papers. Cited here-
after as Hayden, Preliminary Report. Documents from the Hayden Papers will be labeled HP.
2 See G. C. Dunham, L. J. Van Schaik, F. W. Manley, and E. G. Chapman, Report of the Committee
Appointed by Acting Governor-General 1. R. Hayden to Investigate the Uprising of May 2 and 3, 1935,
Manila, May 2I, I935. HP. Cited hereafter as Sakdal Uprising Report.
3 J. R. Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York, I942), p. 39I. Cited
hereafter as Hayden, The Philippines.
4 Manila Herald, May 3, I935.
5 Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix III, "Action of Municipal Authorities," pp. I-I4.
6 The influx of well-to-do rural refugees placed a severe strain on Manila's hotel facilities. Manila
Daily Bulletin, May 4, I935.
7 Richard Ely, the ranking official at Malacafian during the disturbance, filed a memorandum im-
mediately after the uprising explaining the alert: ". . . early yesterday morning there was a possibility
that the Constabulary would not be able to control the situation and I thought it might ultimately be
necessary to call on the Army." Ely to Hayden, May 4, I935. HP.
8 Hayden, Preliminary Report, p. 4.
199
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200 DAVID R. STURTEVANT
Origins of Sakdalism
9 All available Constabulary reserves except I 14 men at Manila headquarters were committed to action.
If the insurrection had lasted a few more hours or spread to neighboring provinces the reserve would have
been exhausted. Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix II, "Action by the Constabulary," pp. I-3.
10 Three of the wounded died within twenty-four hours. Sakdal Uprising Report, p. 8.
11 Typical of the treatment accorded the Sakdals by Filipino historians is that of Gregorio F. Zaide.
Volume II of his standard history contains only three sentences pertaining to Sakdalism. G. F. Zaide,
The Philippines Since the British Invasion (Manila, I949), p. 289. An excellent popular survey of Philippine
affairs dismisses the Sakdalistas as "part crackpot, part idealistic, part socialist and part fascist . . ." David
Bernstein, The Philippine Story (New York, I947), p. I20.
12 A recent monograph on agrarian unrest in the Philippines continues standard misinterpretations by
lumping the Colorums and Tangulan into one movement and by glossing over the armed revolt of the
Sakdals in "I934." A. H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, California, I955), pp.
I47-I48.
13 Zaide, The Philippines since the British Invasion, p. 289.
14 Luis Taruc, Born of the People (New York, I953), p. 29.
15 See D. R. Sturtevant, "Philippine Social Structure, and Its Relation to Agrarian Unrest" (unpublished
doctral dissertation, Stanford Univ., I958), pp. I05-I53.
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SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 201
16 Biographical information on Ramos' early career can be found in R. M. Stubbs, "Philippine Radi-
calism: The Central Luzon Uprisings, 1925-35" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of California,
Berkeley, 1951), pp. 130-35.
17 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 382.
18 For an analysis of the Tangulan Movement and Ramos' connection with Dionisio, see Stubbs,
"Philippine Radicalism," pp. 94-125.
19 Stubbs, "Philippine Radicalism," p. 135.
20 Constabulary records indicated that the abortive "Tangulan uprising . . . was precipitated by the
influence of the 'Sakdal' publications . . ." G. B. Francisco, Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary, The
,Sakdal Party, Manila, May 7, 1935, p. i. HP.
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202 DAVID R. STURTEVANT
With the party formally launched Ramos and his aides prepared strategy for the
I934 electoral campaign. As a means of publicizing the chief plank in the Sakdal
platform, Ramos sailed to America for an eleventh hour effort to achieve immediate
independence.23 While the absent supremo's pronouncements occupied the headlines,
editorials in Sakdal continued to level verbal barrages on both camps of the badly-split
Nacionalistas. In the provinces a full slate of Sakdalista hopefuls quietly filed petitions
for the June election and activists went to work in the villages. Sakdal organizational
techniques became apparent in April and May when the pre-election debate reached
fever pitch. Followers of Quezon and Osmefia travelled the well-worn Nacionalista
campaign routes and vilified one another before assembled voters in major towns
and provincial capitals. Sakdalista orators, however, visited remote barrios to harangue
delighted taos by the light of flickering oil flares.24
The Sakdals organized their appeal around issues which were clearcut and mean-
ingful to the peasantry. Party speakers accused the Nacionalistas of hypocrisy on the
issue of national freedom and promised that Ramos would acquire "complete and
absolute" independence for the Philippines by December 3I, I935. They guaranteed
also that when the Sakdal Party acquired control of the government it would abolish
all taxes. To these political appeals Sakdal orators added the issue of caciquism. Calling
for equal or common ownership of land they proclaimed that all large holdings
should be divided and distributed to the poor. They also launched vitriolic attacks
on the religious orders for operating vast estates and amassing wealth "through
dishonest means."25
But Sakdals did not limit their campaigning to rhetoric. They supported verbal ac-
cusations of Nacionalista chicanery with fraudulent evidence. Party speakers linked
dignified depictions of Ramos' exemplary character with lurid descriptions of Manuel
Quezon's private life; moreover, they circulated two snapshots to prove their point.
21 Of the thirteen men elected to subordinate positions in the party, four were lawyers, three former
government employees, two merchants, one a school teacher, one an ex-judge, and one a dentist. Stubbs,
p. I55.
22 A summary of the Sakdal Party Platform can be found in Francisco, Sakdal Party, p. i.
23 Ramos spent more time in Japan and California building political fences than he did in Washington.
For an account of his trip see Stubbs, pp. 157-I59.
24 "They appealed to people whom the local leaders of the dominant parties often disdained, ignored
or patronized." Hayden, The Philippines, p. 384.
25 Campaign techniques are described by Francisco, Sakdal Party, p. 2.
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SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 203
The first pictured Quezon enjoying the company of an American movie queen; The
second portrayed Benigno Ramos in earnest conversation with President Roosevelt.
Sakdal spokesmen, of course, did not inform their rustic audiences that the Quezon
photograph was a standard Hollywood publicity shot while the statesmanlike por-
trayal of Ramos was a cleverly-devised composite.26 Te sharp contrast between the
two pictures clinched the argument for many taos. Distrust of Nacionalista leadership
spread in the wake of Sakdalista orators and an intense hatred for Manuel Quezon
developed in many villages.
The rural peregrinations of Sakdalista organizers together with the inflammatory
content of their speeches were ignored by everyone in official circles except the Argus-
eyed Philippine Constabulary. When returns for the elections began to roll in, how-
ever, amazed Nacionalistas discovered that Sakdalism had become a force to be reck-
oned with. All three Sakdal candidates for the House of Representatives won re-
sounding victories. The people of Marinduque elected a Sakdal governor of their
province. In Laguna, Bulacan, Rizal, and Cavite, the party's candidates for municipal
offices made remarkable showings and won more than a score of important posts.2T
The outcome demonstrated the effectiveness of the Sakdal appeal and bore witness
to the degree of discontent in the provinces. In a post-election statement a triumphant
Benigno Ramos denied the growing Nacionalista accusation that his party advocated
violence. After restating Sakdalism's peaceful objectives the ex-senate clerk concluded
his remarks on a note of qualified optimism, "We fight only for things that are
reasonable," he said. "Given the chance we hope to make good."28
Ramos' confidence, however, proved to be ephemeral. Quezon and Osmefna, rec-
ognizing that their debate over independence laws had opened the door to a poten-
tially dangerous opposition, followed time-honored precedent and ended their feudV"
The majority party obediently closed ranks behind them. Almost overnight Ramos
and his followers found themselves confronted by the same overwhelming majority
against which minority parties had been dispersed for a generation. Moreover, the
reconstituted Nacionalistas moved efficiently to exploit the political advantages of the
Tydings-McDuffie Law and the Commonwealth status it promised. In July I934,
Filipinos went to the polls again to select delegates for a Constitutional Conven-
tion. The Sakdalistas boycotted the election and labeled the whole procedure a
thinly-disguised technique to perpetuate oligarchic controls on a foundation of
American bayonets.30 Their protests, however, went unheeded. The duly elected
delegates, whom Ramos dismissed as a collection of "half-breeds and betrayers,"8'
assembled on July 30, I934 and began the deliberations which concluded with the
adoption of an organic act on February 8, I935. President Roosevelt signed the Con-
stitution in March and called for a plebiscite to be held on May I4, I935.
The mending of the split in Nacionalista ranks, together with the pell mell race
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204 DAVID R. STURTEVANT
toward autonomy under majority party auspices, constituted a political disaster for
the Sakdalistas. Unity among the established leaders made a rapid rise to majority
status of the new opposition group inconceivable. It also precluded action as a fulcrum
in a delicately balanced legislature. Last but not least the three Sakdal members of the
House of Representatives could not possibly frustrate the Nacionalista drive toward
Commonwealth status. Some Sakdals advocated the formulation of more realistic
party goals to meet radically changed conditions.32 Ramos and his principal aides
found themselves caught between the grindstones of their own demagoguery and
Nacionalista exploitation of the widespread desire for self-rule. The painful squeeze
left only two alternatives for the Sakdal leaders: (i) a major modification of their
platform including the primary objective of immediate independence; or (2) an all-
out campaign to frustrate the plebiscite.
Ramos spent several uncomfortable months squirming under the pressure of his
party's situation. Exactly when he decided to block the plebiscite is not clear, but in
November I934, he set forth on his travels again. Before leaving he announced that
he was bound for Washington to fight for repeal of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. He
made no effort, however, to carry the views of his followers to the United States. In-
stead, he journeyed directly to Japan where he began negotiations with Pan-Asia
elements.33
While Ramos discussed his plight with Japanese extremists, Sakdal leaders in the
Philippines fought a frantic rear guard action against a wave of Nacionalista cam-
paigners advocating Commonwealth status. Vituperation alone, however, could not
check the ground swell of sentiment in favor of the Constitution. In March I935,
Sakdal organizers in the provinces initiated a determined counteroffensive and prob-
ably began covert preparations for an uprising. By the beginning of April, officials in
Manila began to express concern over Sakdal activities in the region surrounding the
capital.34 Nacionalista speakers attempting to parry Sakdal attacks on the Constitution
encountered a wall of hostile silence or jeers and catcalls from the taos of Laguna. In
Bulacan municipal police arrested a Sakdal orator at an anti-Commonwealth rally, but
had to fight their way through an aroused mob of his supporters before they could
place their prisoner behind bars.
On April ii, with political storm signals fluttering on all sides, members of the
insular government moved to end the mounting turbulence. The Secretary of the
Interior ordered municipal authorities to require permits for public meetings; he also
specified that permission should not be granted until applicants had filed an ac-
32 Basilio Valdes, "Peace and Order in the Philippines," The Philippines Herald Year Book I935, III
(November, I935) p. I41. Gonrado Benitez suggested that the independence issue be set aside in favor
of the more worthy social and economic objectives. Conrado Benitez, "Sakdal," Philippine Magazinie,
XXXII (I935), p. 240.
33 Ramos' contacts with Japanese extremists were established by Matsumoto Kumpei, a member of
the Seiyukai Party and an erstwhile representative in the Diet. Matsumoto, who had imbibed the doctrines
of Kitta Ikki and other Japanese expansionists, introduced Ramos to personal friends and acquaintances,
including Toyama Mitsuru, and urged them to grant aid to the Sakdal leader, New York Times, May 5,
I935.
34 Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Eulogio Rodriguez informed the Acting Governor-General
of the situation in a confidential memorandum and suggested that "irresponsible speakers" guilty of
"defamatory and seditious denunciations" be arrested on the grounds that such a course would "stop this
campaign of exaggerated misrepresentation." Rodriguez to Hayden, April 2, I935. HP.
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SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 205
35 Conrado Benitez considered the order a violation of the new Constitution and warned that a policy
of suppression would result in "explosion and violence." Benitez, "Sakdal," p. 253.
36 Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Office of the Secretary, General Circular #11, April i
1935. HP.
37 "News Summary," Philippine Magazine, XXXII (I935), p. 270.
38 See George A. Malcolm, The Commonwealth of the Philippines (New York, 1936), p. 282; and the
Manila Daily Bulletin, May I, 1935.
39 The existence of the letters, signed by Major Hiroshi Tamaru, came to the attention of the Gover-
nor-General's office shortly after the uprising. Inquiries despatched to the American Embassy in Tokyo
revealed nothing other than the fact that Major Hiroshi was attached to the Headquarters Staff of the
Imperial Army on Formosa. Hayden to Grew, May 8, 1935; and Grew to Hayden, May 9, 1935. HP.
40 A rare copy of Free Filipinos is included in the Hayden Papers. The following quotations are from
this source.
41 The exact role of Japanese nationals in the uprising is difficult to evaluate. Sakdalistas captured dur-
ing the encounters of May 2-3, believed that arms and air support would be supplied by Japan. Such a
development, of course, did not take place. In fact, there is no evidence of any ties between Ramos and
Japanese government circles. Interviews conducted in Tokyo immediately after the uprising with eight
responsible Imperial officials revealed that only one had ever heard of Ramos. Grew to Hayden, May 13,
I935. HP. Moreover, Japanese diplomatic personnel vigorously denied any connection between their
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206 DAVID R. STURTEVANT
government and the rebels. New York Times, May 5, I935. Students of the Sakdal movement agree that
the Imperial Government was in no way responsible for the upheaval. See Hayden, The Philippines, p. 392;
and Stubbs, "Philippine Radicalism," p. I83. Matsumoto Kumpei, however, admitted that he introduced
Ramos to members of patriotic societies. Later he intervened to prevent the Sakdal leader's extradition to
the Philippines. Matsumoto's activities, together with Major Hiroshi's letter, and the issues of Free Filipinos
which circulated among "Pan-Asia" elements in Japan, indicate that private individuals and groups
definitely associated themselves with the movement. The only conclusion which can be safely drawn is
that the connection between the Japanese and Sakdalism resulted from covert activity by a few extremists
who hoped to embarrass the United States and thus contribute to the growth of antagonism toward the
West among the colonial peoples of Southwest Asia.
42 The Tayug uprising took the lives of five constabularymen. Five Colorums, including two women,
died during the engagement; twenty suffered serious wounds. See Stubbs, "Philippine Radicalism," pp.
60-87.
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SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 207
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208 DAVID R. STURTEVANT
probability, they concluded their last-minute appeals with the not too subtle slogan
that independence would "appear magically like the burst of a sunrise."47
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SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 209
quickly gained the editorial support of responsible journalists. Unanimity did not
characterize the demand for social amelioration; but the fact that a select group of
politicians and editors shunned cliches and sought valid explanations contributed to
the creation of a new attitude of understanding toward the peasant and his plight.52
Public and confidential statements by Nacionalista leaders presented a case study
in changing outlooks. Speaker of tht House Quintin Paredes, enunciating the time-
honored interpretation, found the loss of life "deeply regrettable," but hoped that "the
tragic occurrences will be a blessing in breaking up these fanatical movements."53
Secretary of Labor Ramon Torres, however, expressed a more sympathetic view. After
interviewing Sakdal prisoners in Bulacan and Laguna he reported no evidence of cults
or cultists. Instead the Secretary traced the difficulties in Bulacan to iniquitous rents
demanded of tenants on the Buenavista Estate.54 In Laguna the effects of the depres-
sion and natural calamities in the form of severe typhoons led him to conclude "that
hard times are at the bottom of the trouble."55 While Torres' remarks were not
sensational they marked a startling departure from the party line.56
The interpretations of the Secretary of Labor were reinforced by the findings of an
investigating team sent into the field by Acting Governor-General Hayden. Their
formal report attributed the uprising primarily to political factors,57 but their final
remarks stressed the role of unhealthy social conditions:58
The government was more or less out of touch with the pulse and thought of the barrio
people who basically are good citizens. The conidition of the lower strata of them has not
changed materially since I898. They eat out of the same common bowl. They are protected
against the worst epidemics . . . they have some chance for a little education if they are not
too poor, and they are afforded some protection in the matter of civil rights. But they do
not see or feel much change except that they watch the middle and upper classes, whose
standards have risen, ride in automobiles, live in better houses, and possess more than
formerly. Their poverty and grievances make it possible for unscrupulous or misguided men
to lead them.
52 Practically every Sakdal arrested after the uprising was sentenced to prison. Maximum terms ranged
from two to seventeen years. While these sentences may not seem mild they compared favorably with the
maximum terms of seventeen to forty years meted out to survivors of the Tayug affair. Furthermore,
pardons were quickly granted to many Sakdal prisoners. On November I5, I935, in his last official act,
Governor-General Murphy pardoned the vast majority of the Sakdalistas remaining behind bars stating
that he wanted "to set an example of tolerance where differences of opinion are concerned." "News
Summary," Philippine Magazine, XXXII (I935), p. 597.
53 New York Times, May 5, I935.
54 Torres to Hayden, May 7, I935. HP. Shortly after this report, the Buenavista Estate, consisting of
27,408 hectares, was among church lands purchased by Governor-General Murphy for redistribution to
tenants. San Ildefonso, the scene of a bitter encounter on the night of May 2-3, was the largest community
on the estate.
55 Ibid.
56 Senate President Quezon at first attempted to dismiss the uprising as unimportant. In a press con-
ference at his hotel suite in New York City, Quezon called Ramos an "irresponsible demagogue," and
maintained that the Sakdal movement was "operated on a purely racketeering basis." Manila Daily Bul-
letin, May 4, I935. Within twenty-four hours, however, Quezon, who apparently was able to judge in-
finitesimal shifts in the political winds from a distance of IO,OOO miles, adopted a new tack and traced the
uprising to the depression and the threat of American import quotas. New York Times, May 5, I935.
57 "Generally speaking the actions of the individual [Sakdal] were governed by political and purely
patriotic considerations which led him to believe that immediate independence was, for a number of in-
tangible reasons, highly desirable." Sakdal Uprising Report, p. 3.
558bid., p. I3.
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210 DAVID R. STURTEVANT
The same periodical tried to link Sakdalism to the unorthodox religious movements of
the past. In Bulacan, according to the satirical account, "about ioo fanatics went to
the hills, led by a i7-year old girl mystic whose chief claim to divinity was that she
could turn the bark of trees wrapped in paper into guns.""6 But the editors of the
New Philippine Republic did not permit efforts to poke fun at the Sakdals to interfere
with their displeasure toward the government's policy of "complacent forebearance"
in regard to "radicalism."62
Other molders of public opinion saw nothing funny about the incident. Newspapers
owned by hacenderos held the government responsible. The Manila Herald, for ex-
ample, placed the ultimate blame on democracy for its tendency "to pamper the
masses."63 Peasants, complained a Herald feature, behave "like spoiled children . . .
demanding more and more." Echoing the age-old lament of threatened elites, the
newspaper maintained that the taos no longer knew their place: "Belief in injustice,
fancied or factual nerves the masses to heights to insolence if not revolution. The ...
Sakdal uprising is an unfortunate example. Impudence . . . usually precedes violence,
be it in the individual or in the mob. As long as our masses harbor the belief that they
are being persecuted they will be sullen and insolent." 64
While the majority of the press dismissed the movement in the accustomed man-
ner, a few journalists dissented vigorously. A. V. H. Hartendorp of the influential
Philippine Magazine queried, "Exploiting landlords, bloodsucking money lenders,
stupid and callous local officials, the indifference of those in better circumstances .
what better grounds could agitators desire?"" Attacking superficial explanations he
admonished his readers:68
We cannot brush the matter aside by stating that the Sakdal movement is instigated by
racketeers or that it is due to a temporary economic depression. Its roots go much deeper
. . . into a substratum of class conflict that is present here as elsewhere in the world. It is
59 Under a photograph of two dead Sakdals appeared the following warning: "The government must
be respected and those who would destroy it will share the lot of these two." Manila Herald, May 3, I935.
60 New Philippine Republic I (I935), 4.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Manila Herald, June 15, 1935.
64 Ibid.
65 A. V. H. Hartendorp, "The Sakdal Protest," Philippine Magazine, XXXII (935), p. 233.
66 Ibid.
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SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 211
a movement of the dispossessed, of the exploited, of those who are given no chance . . .
The only answer is to give these people a chance. The political party that can arrange that
will be the political party of the future.
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212 DAVID R. STURTEVANT
once showed their ... capacity to handle delicate situations." 71 In Pampanga, Gover-
nor Sotero Baluyot organized a "conservative labor union,"72 the Cawal ning Capaya-
pan or Knights of Peace,73 to seek a reconciliation between landlords and tenants
through "understanding."74 Provincial legislatures passed laws to restrict peasant po-
litical activity,75 and hacenderos did everything in their power to strengthen munici-
pal law enforcements agencies.76
Quezon's recognition of the need for social amelioration and the frantic cacique
efforts to thwart further peasant uprisings were not the only tributes to the implica-
tions of Ramos' effectiveness as an agitator. The Sakdal supremo's successful ex-
ploitation of the widening chasm between classes in the Islands attracted the grudging
admiration of more sophisticated Filipino radicals. Close examination of the short-lived
but militant movement revealed to them unlimited possibilities for uniting dispossessed
villagers behind ilustrado leadership. It also disclosed the confines in which successful
challenges to authority could occur. In five years Ramos constructed a vigorous mass
movement on a ramshackle foundation of disconnected causes. By stressing the shop-
worn national freedom theme he undermined his precarious handiwork. More acute
men in Manila and Pampanga ignored the defunct independence issue, stressed eco-
nomic and social objectives, and forged the tenant farmers of Central Luzon into
disciplined agrarian unions.
When the mantle of peasant leadership fell on the emaciated but competent
shoulders of Pedro Abad Santos the trail of dissent blazed by Ramos was converted
into a highway leading toward social revolution. With the vision of the bloody
churchyard at Cabuyao constantly before him, the Socialist leader de-emphasized
sporadic violence and attempted to win concessions through strikes and political ac-
tivity. In addition he resisted efforts of his more enthusiastic disciples to attribute
charismatic qualities to his person. Reminding his followers of the fate of the mag-
netic Ramos and his worshipful retinue, Abad Santos dismissed Sakdalism as "es-
sentially hero worship"; he also warned them that the adoration of Ramos smacked
of fascism, and wryly concluded, "we don't believe in such silly stuff."77 As for the
71 Ibid. Governor Samonte had reason to respect "delicate situations." Captured by a Sakdal band
during the uprising he avoided danger by joining the rebels declaring, "I am with you heart and soul";
later that night he signed a deposition stating that the Sakdals who seized him had gathered in the town
of Tanza to hold a meeting and not to create a disturbance. After this capitulation his captors set him
free. Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix HII, p. 8.
72 Manila Daily Bulletin, July 30, I939.
73 The Manila Tribune, doubting that the Cawal was dedicated to peace, maintained that the associa-
tion's existence was "predicated on its ability and intention to use force." The organization offered free
legal services as an inducement for enrollment; thereby convincing many observers that the Cawal was
designed to operate as a "'private army." Manila Tribune, March IO, I938.
74 Harlan Crippen, "Philippine Agrarian Unrest: Historical Backgrounds," Science and Society, X
(I946), 355.
75 The "Tambuli Ordinances," passed in I938 by the Pampanga Legislature over Quezon's objections,
typified provincial restrictions; the tambuli, or meeting horn, laws forbade the "gathering of two or more
people after dusk." Manila Daily Bulletin, October 3, I938.
76Mounting activity on the part of Socialists and Communists in Central Luzon brought forth again
the spectre of a peasant uprising. In 1938 land-owners and businessmen in San Fernando, Pampanga,
purchased a truck for the municipal police to "facilitate the transportation . . . of patrols during emer-
gencies." Manila Daily Bulletin, April x6, I938. The governor of Bulacan, in the same year, advocated that
municipal police forces in his province be increased by six hundred men. Manila Tribune, January 22, 1938.
77 Manila Tribune, February 6, I938.
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SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 213
The Sakdal uprising, thus, marked the end of innocent spontaneity and the begin-
ning of sophisticated protest. For generations frustrated taos had donned anting-anting
to ward off the powers of evil and turned to wonder-working bandits, religious
prophets, and leaders of outlandish secret societies in their desire to escape the grim
conditions of their existence. As a consequence, peasant energies were dissipated in a
series of unrelated movements and spent in abortive uprisings. Ramos smashed the
pattern. Combining rustic discontent with middle class leadership he quickly created
a potentially powerful instrument of dissent. Bitterness, ambition, and political mis-
calculation led to the extinction of his movement. Nevertheless, his career established
the ground rules for a new generation of agrarian leaders. By avoiding the errors of
Sakdalism and emphasizing its achievements, radicals in Central Luzon formed the
alliance which later grew into the Hukbalahap. Benigno Ramos' indirect legacy to
Filipino Communists, therefore, probably equaled, and perhaps exceeded, the value
of their direct inheritance from Karl Marx and his latter day apostles.
78 Ibid.
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