Philosophical Review

The Influence of Schopenhauer upon Friedrich Nietzsche

Author(s): Grace Neal Dolson
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (May, 1901), pp. 241-250
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 THE INFLUENCE OF SCHOPENHAUER UPON
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.

SOME timebetweenOctober, i865, and August, i867, Fried-

rich Nietzsche, who was then a student of philology at
the Universityof Leipzig, found in an antiquarianshop a copy
of Die Weltals Wille und Vorstellung.' The book was new to
him and he carriedit home. When he had finishedreadingit,
Schopenhauerhad gainedanotherdisciple. Withall the ardor of
a newlymade convert,Nietzsche began to proselyte. He suc-
ceeded in winningover his friendsto the faith,and togetherthey
paid homage to their divinity. If one was in trouble,the others
suggested appropriatepassages fromSchopenhauer's works. It
was no mere collectionof doctrinesthattheystudied. Schopen-
hauer was to them an incarnationof the ideal philosopher,a
friendwith whom they came into almost personal relationship.
Later, when Nietzsche accepted the chair of philology at Bale,
it was withthe expressintentionof infusingthe Schopenhauerian
spirit into philology.2 When he came to write Unzeitgemdsse
Betrachtungen, he called one of them Schopenhauera/s Erzieher,
and in it he tried to show what Schopenhauer meant to him.
The essay, instead of reproducingSchopenhauer's theories, is
rathera descriptionof his 'physiological influence,'as Nietzsche
calls it.3 The importanceof a philosopher,he goes on to say,
rests not so much upon specific doctrines,as upon the example
that he sets both in his books and in his life; fora philosopher
is not only a great thinkerbut a genuine man, and it is in these
virilequalitiesthatSchopenhaueris preeminent. He makes men
see what lifemeans,and what are the essentialsof a trueculture.
He preaches freedomfromthe prejudicesdue to individualsur-
roundings,to the end that each soul may learn to live its own
lifeundisturbedby outside influences.4 His independencemakes
1 Frau Frster-Nietzsche
.- Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsche's, Vol. I, p. 23 1 .
2 Ibid., p. 306.
3 Were, Vol. I, pp. 402-3.

4 lbid., pp. 386-392.

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242 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. X.

him the best possible educator (Erzieker). From him men may
learn that happinessis not an essential,and that the end of lifeis
the establishment of a noblercultureand theproductionof genius.
The entireessay is writtenin such a spiritof enthusiasmthat the
reader is lead almost involuntarilyto feelthat Schopenhauer is
one of the greatestnames in the historyof philosophy. "I be-
long to the readers of Schopenhauer," Nietzsche says, "'who
afterthey have read the firstpage of him know with certainty
that theywill read all his pages, and that theywill listento every
word that he has said."
AfterNietzsche's own system had taken more definiteshape,
he threwoffhis whole-heartedallegiance to his master,and even
came to feel that in his own naturewas to be foundthe explana-
tion of the deep significancethat Schopenhauerhad once had for
him. Full of the ardor of discipleship,he had read his own ideas
intothe other'swords,and evenwhilemakinguse of the Schopen-
hauerianformshad filledthem witha different content. It may
be doubtedwhetherNietzschewas just in this respectto his early
positionand the influencesthatmoulded it. He was too much in
love withintellectualfreedomto findit easy to believe thathe had
once accepted anyone's philosophy. Nevertheless,thetestimony
of his books is against him,and it is safeto assume that Schopen-
hauer's influencewas a real and importantone. The problemto
be solved does not concern its existence,but ratherits direction
and extent.
Nietzsche's philosophypresents such different aspects at dif-
ferentstages of its developmentthat some chronologicalarrange-
mentof his views is almost a necessity. His writingslend them-
selves most readilyto a tripledivision,the threeperiodsof which
may be called fromtheirdifferent standpointsthe aesthetic,the
intellectual,and the ethical. Each gives an answer to the ques-
tion that occupied Nietzsche's attentionduringthe whole of his
literaryactivity,namely,that of the nature of true culture,or,
what was practicallythe same thingforhim, the problem of the
supremelyvaluable. Nietzschewas alwaysaskingwhatitis thatis
reallyworthwhile,and since at different stages of his development
the world appeared to him under different aspects, his answers

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No. 3.1 SCHOPENHA UER AND NIETZSCHE. 243

were naturallyinconsistent. To attemptto tracethe influenceof

anyone throughso many phases of thoughtis perhaps a hazard-
ous undertaking. It is difficult to avoid emphasizingovermuch
eitherthedifferencesor the likenesses. Any throughgoingagree-
mentbetween Nietzsche and Schopenhauer is precluded by the
natureof the subjects treated. Nietzsche's interestswere never
in the directionof metaphysics. He even ridiculed attemptsto
solve the ultimateproblem of the universe,sometimes seeming
to base his scorn less upon the frailtyof the human reason than
upon the convictionthat therewere no ultimatesto be known.
Schopenhauer, on the other hand, was a metaphysician. He
took seriouslysuch questions as the natureof the phenomenon
and the noumenon and the relation of the two to each other.
He approachedthe Ding-an-sickwithall the traditionalreverence
of a Germanphilosopher. Naturally,the subject matterof his
philosophy and that of Nietzsche's had oftennothingin com-
mon. In some respects,however,as has been stated,they re-
mained closely related,and although these pointsof agreement
decreased in numberas Nietzscheattainedgreaterindependence,
they neverthelessdid not entirelydisappear.
At the timeof the publicationof Die Geburtder TragOdiein
I872, Nietzsche was a professed follower of Schopenhauer.
The subject of the book precluded any discussion of Schopen-
hauer's metaphysics,but the publishedselectionsfromNietzsche's
note-bookswrittenat thistimeshow that he accepted mostof the
theoriesof his master; and even without these explicit state-
ments the implicationsof the Geburtwould be sufficientto es-
tablish the importanceof Schopenhauer's influence. The frag-
ments found in the note-books contain a discussion of the
ultimatenatureof the universe,which,in true Schopenhauerian
fashion, Nietzsche declares to be the will.1 The intellect is
merely phenomenal: outside of the will and its manifestations
nothingcan be said to exist at all. The will's effortsto attain
individualityare the cause of the phenomenal world,of which
man formsa part. No matterwhatvaried shapes the phenomena
may assume,in themselvestheyare less thannothing. Theironly
1 Werke,Vol. IX, pp. 47, 66, 67, 69-72, 130, i64-174.

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244 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. X.

value lies in the degree in which they furtherexistence. What-

ever bringsabout permanenceis affirmed by the will withoutre-
gard to any othercharacteristics.Nietzschediffers fromSchopen-
hauer in distinguishing betweenconscious and unconsciousidea,
and also speaks of an originalintelligencethat logicallyprecedes
individual existence.' Individuationis the resultof thisuncon-
scious idea, of the universal ideating principle,which seems to
stand midwaybetween the particularphenomena and the will.
The difference, however,is not fundamental, and as it had no
influenceupon Nietzsche's position in other matters,it may
well be ignored,especially since he deliberatelyrefrainedfrom
publishing any statementconcerning these early metaphysical
theories.
The notionof the primal nature of the will is the connecting
link betweenNietzsche and Schopenhauer. In Nietzsche's later
writings,although he abandoned the distinctively Schopenhau-
erian formof the theory,he still gave the will the foremostpo-
sition,emphasizingin factmore and more the secondaryimpor-
tance of the intellect. To be sure, the will to livehas with him
become the will forpower,but it is still the will. He reduces to
it, all the othermanifestationsof the mind,and even attemptsby
means of it to explain the world. At least, he says that since
the will can act only upon will, the one possible reductionof the
world to simpletermsis foundin the assumptionthatthe will is
everywherepresent.2 In no otherway can the relationbetween
the human will and its environmentbe made intelligible. To
complete the simplification, one needs only to suppose that all
the impulses of the mindare different manifestations of a single
formof the will, 'the will forpower.' Unlike Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche nowheregoes into detailsconcerningthe cosmological
side ofhistheory,so to speak,but devotesall hisattentionto show-
ing the omnipresenceofthe ' will forpower' in the lifeofmankind,
where it appears not only as the formulaforall existence,but
as the criterionof value as well. All states ofconsciousnessare
due to it, and are to be measured by the degree in which they
A1 Op. cit., pp. 66, 67.
2 Were, Vol. VII, pp. 27, 33, 55-57.

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No. 3.] SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE. 245

express it. There is littleattemptto show in detail the presence

of the will as a basis for the individual ideas and feelings. Its
fundamentalnaturewas so much a matterof assumption with
Nietzsche,that he not only wisely refrainedfromtryingto prove
it, but also feltno obligations to point out its various manifesta-
tions. He was more interestedin establishingthe moral value
of the will,in correlatingdegrees of will and degreesof morality.
In doing this he differed radicallyfromSchopenhauer,inasmuch
as he made the supremegood consistnot in completedenial of
the will, but in its fullestaffirmation.
As soon as one passes fromthis general attitudeto more defi-
nitettheories,the differences betweenNietzsche and Schopenhauer
are morenumerousthanthe resemblances. In fact,the one field
wheretheywere in anythinglike agreementis aesthetics. This
is doubtlesspartiallydue to the early appearance chronologically
of Nietzsche'spositivecontributions to the theoryof art and to
art criticism; but even later his revoltfrom Schopenhauer was
scarcelyperceptiblein thisparticularfield. Even here,however,
the subjects treatedby the two men were as a rule different, but
the Schopenhauerianspiritof Nietzsche's work is evident. One
always has a feelingthat,in general,Schopenhauerwould have
treatedthe subject in the same way, if he had ever had occasion
to discuss the same questions.
In fact,an attempthas been made to show that the two forces
whichNietzschefoundin all formsofartisticexpression,and which
he called the Apollinic and the Dionysian, are nothingmore nor
less thanSchopenhauer's Willeand Vorstellung.There are, how-
ever, two objectionsto such an identification. In the firstplace,
Nietzschenevereven suggestedthe extensionof his forcesbeyond
the fieldof art. He neverattemptedto apply themto the uni-
verse as a whole; and though,ifhe had done so, the resultmight
have been practicallySchopenhauer's ultimates,yet thereseems
to be no reason why any one should insist upon doing in his
name what he deliberatelyleft undone. The second reason for
rejecting the proposed parallelism is that the Apollinic and
Dionysian correspondmuch more closely to one of Schopen-
hauer's specificallyaestheticclassifications. Schopenhauer drew

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246 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. X.

a sharp line of divisionbetweenthe pictorialand plastic arts on

the one side and music on the other,which latterhe regardedas
the more directexpressionof the will, and so as more ultimatein
its nature. Nietzschemade the same distinctionwith regardto
his two art forces. The Apollinic findsexpression in all the
static arts, so to speak. The Dionysian, on the contrary,in-
cludes all the musical and passionate arts,such as lyricpoetry,
and especially music itself. The Apollinic is a dream, the
Dionysian is intoxication. The latter expresses the will imme-
diately,withoutveilingits strengthof feelingunderthe formof
representation. This is substantiallySchopenhauer's position,
and the very closeness of the parallel makes the attemptediden-
tificationwith Willeand Vorstellung seem the more forced.
Outsidethe fieldof aestheticsthe differences
betweenNietzsche
and Schopenhauer are everywhereevident. One of the most
strikingis in the valuation put upon truth. Nietzsche regarded
the historyof civilizationas made up of one long line of errors,
withoutwhich any advance would have been an impossibility.
The developmentof reason, of art, of all the feelingsand senti-
ments that make lifefull of meaningto us, is based upon false
ideas. A knowledgeof thetruthwould have been fatalto much
thatis worthhaving. Schopenhauer'spositionis just the oppo-
site of Nietzsche's. According to him everyerror is a deadly
poison.' The truthand the truthalone is worthyof pursuit.
Inasmuch as Nietzsche's most importantcontributionsto phil-
osophic thoughtare ethicalin nature,any discussionof his rela-
tionsto otherwritersmustconcernitselfchieflywiththe problems
of morality. Here, fromthe very natureof Nietzsche's system,
one findsno metaphysicalbasis forthe ethics proper,as thereis
in Schopenhauer. The will is assumed as thefundamentalfactor
in human life; and althoughthere is a briefaccount of its uni-
versal validityas an explanatoryand substantial principle,this is
altogethera matterofsecondaryimportance,merelya subordinate
issue that has no vital connectionwiththe more importantprob-
lem of the will as an elementof personality. Whetherthe will
in this morerestricted formis thesame in Nietzscheand in Schop-
I Bk. I,
Die Weltals Willeund Vorstellung, Q 8.

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No. 3.] SCHOPENHA UER A ND NIETZSCHE. 247

enhauer is a questionthat hardlyadmitsof a categoricalanswer.

If the ' willto live' and the ' willforpower' are taken strictly,the
termsare evidentlynotidenticalinmeaning. Neverthelessthe ' will
to live' necessarilyincludesthe exerciseof power and theeffort to
get it. No existence is possible withouta certain amount of
strugglewithotherexistences,and some degreeofsuccess in over-
comingthem. Ofcourse,the desireforlifeand the desireforpower
sometimesconflict;they are not always the same. The latter,
at least as described by Nietzsche,is more conscious and might
be called a higherdegree of development. The closeness of the
parallel betweenit and the ' willto live' dependsentirelyupon the
interpretation of the two principles. They may be put farapart,
or theymay be broughtclose together; eitherprocedureadmits
ofjustification. A middle course would perhaps be the most
prudent,but here again the amountof likeness and of difference
to be admittedmust remaina matterof individualopinion.
However the will forpower is interpreted, it is the basal prin-
ciple of Nietzsche's ethics; and he differedfromSchopenhauerin
that he regardedthe exercise of the will not only as a fact,but
as a moral end. The one thing needfulis more life,a healthy
freedomof feelingand impulse. Nothing could be furtherfrom
quietism than Nietzsche's deificationof force,especially in its
physical form. The result is an acceptance of Schopenhauer's
pessimisticpremises,but a denial of the conclusionsdrawn from
them. There is no doubt thatthe world is evil, and that wretch-
edness is everywhere. Life is fullof pain and sorrowforwhich
thereis no help nor hope, and the futureis quite as dark as the
presentand thepast. Man is a poor thing,pitiablein his weakness,
and is not even a healthyanimal. All this and more Nietzsche
believed,but he was neverled by it to advocate the inactionof
despair. The strongman,who is the onlybeingworthyof consid-
eration,fightsthe harderwhen fateis against him. No pain can
overcome him,because he will yield to nothing. He is strong
enough even to live withouthope. He recognizes the condition
of the world,he has no illusions,but the veryabundance of oppo-
sition gives him a fiercejoy in his own power of overcoming
evil. He is always and everywherea fighterwith no desire to
yield.

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248 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. X.

It may be questionedwhethersuch a position as Nietzsche's

can properlybe denominatedpessimism. To call it optimism
seems absurd,and yet according to it life certainlydoes offer
somethingworth the having. Evil may be predominant,but
so long as a man can struggleagainst it, lifeis good. There is
no suggestionofdespair,no feelingthatsalvationshould be sought
in the negationof the will. Nietzsche's own name forhisposition
describesit exactly. His attitudetoward lifeis that of a ' tragic
optimist.'
Great as is thedifferencebetweenNietzscheand Schopenhauer
with regard to theirvaluation of life,they are no less far apart
in their relative estimationof the virtues. In fact,one of the
main incentivesto Nietzsche's work in ethics seems to have been
his oppositionto Schopenhauer's view of sympathy. Instead of
makingsympathythe chiefvirtue,he putit among the vices, and
could find no termsopprobriousenough forthose thinkerswho
mightdefendit. In his eyes it was a mark of weakness, a dis-
grace to both giver and receiver. In the one it shows a desire to
pry into another'ssecrets,a total lack of delicacyand reserve; in
the other,a willingnessto acknowledge oneself beaten and no
longer self-sufficient.To found all moralityupon sympathyis
to make every man a slave, whose only criterionof worth is
that which makes lifeeasier.
Nietzsche classes withsympathyall the allied virtues,such as
humilityand self-sacrifice.These he regardsas positivelyvicious,
and theonly qualities that he considersworthyof praiseare those
characteristic of the warrior. Strengthand power, and pleasure
in using them are the virtuesof a freeman. Nothing that does
not express these in some formor other deserves the name of
virtue. Completeindependence,completeself-assertion, a certain
ruthlessnessand crueltyare all so much superior to sympathy
that a comparisonis almost impossible.
The ethical ideals of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche evidently
differ as much and in the same way as does theirestimationof
the differentethicalqualities. For the former,the highestend of
human existenceis foundin the negationof the will to live. The
firststep toward its attainment is sympathywiththe sufferings of

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No. 3.] SCHOPENHA UER AND NIETZSCHE. 249

others,in which state one feelsthe underlyingidentityof all life,

even of all being. As thisfeelingis strengthened, the futilityof
effortbecomes more evident, all desire is suppressed,and life
itselfceases to be wortha thought. The finalstage is complete
quietism,thenegationofall positivephysicaland mentallife. The
ethical ideal held up by Schopenhauer is that of the Buddhist
monk. For both, existenceis the greatestof evils, involvingall
the others,and the saint is he who approaches most closely to
the state of Nirvana.
It would be impossibleto conceiveany formof the ethical ideal
moreopposed to thatof Nietzsche. As his chiefvirtuesare those
that best furtheraggressive life,so his ideal is complete self-
affirmation. Its embodimentis the warrior,who crushes all
oppositionby the exercise of his own strengthand power. The
ethical aim is not lifeforothersbut life forself. The develop-
ment of one's own personality,self-expression,freedomfrom
restrainteven by ideas, are at once means to the will forpower
and also a partof the end. Napoleon was theincarnationof the
noble idea. He had the capacityforpower and the will to use it
withoutmisgivings. The aim for man is self-assertion, and all
thatinterferes withit is to be ruthlesslycast aside.
In the face of such great differences between Nietzscheand
Schopenhauer,what is the close connectionin theirviews that
is commonlyassumed to exist? We have found no great simi-
larityin theirtheories,and theirinterestswereon the whole even
morewidely separated. Yet the relation between them was a
real and importantone. What seems especially to have at-
tracted Nietzsche to Schopenhauerwas a radical independence
of traditionand public opinion,and where he praises the latter's
work it is usually for this freedom from outside influences.
Schopenhauerwas a man who gloried in disagreeingwithestab-
lished authority,livingor dead; and he was able to findlittleto
praise in the systemsof any philosophersexcept Plato and Kant.
His mannerof expressinghis criticismswas oftenpersonal in its
tone and could hardlyfail to be offensive to many of his read-
ers. He advocated greater freedomin many lines of thought,
and the fact that the results in his own case were a different

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250 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

formof dogmatism,ratherthan more open-mindedness, probably

recommendedhis standpointto Nietzsche all the more. It was
exactly the intellectualattitudethat appealed most stronglyto
him. He controverted manyof Schopenhauer'sviews withgreat
bitterness,but he always recognized that here was an enemy
worthyof him; and his strictureswere never contemptuous.
The chief bond between the two men was that of a similar
intellectual personality; and though Schopenhauer's influence
upon the latterperiods of Nietzsche's philosophywas not always
positive,and oftenappears quite indefinite,it was no less real.
GRACE NEAL DOLSON.
WELLS COLLEGE.

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