JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISCIPLINARY CASES INVOLVING PUBLIC FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO

OFFICERS HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR

EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR)
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10660 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
AN ACT STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE FUNCTIONAL AND government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FURTHER commission of the offense:
AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are
placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired
Congress assembled: property amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this reasoning
becomes even more obvious when we consider that the respondent in
Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or employee and the
violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed during the respondent officer
"SEC. 3. Constitution of the Divisions; Quorum. – The Sandiganbayan shall sit in seven (7) divisions of three (3) members each.
or employee’s incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line
"Two (2) members shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had
with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-
due to the legal disqualification or temporary incapacity of a member or a vacancy therein, the Presiding Justice may designate a member of another
division to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and
graft court—to address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public
prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto." service.

Jurisdiction -authority and power of the court to hear and decide cases.

Original jurisdiction the exercised by a court or body in the first instance (MTC’s
jurisdiction over ejectment cases.
Section Two – Bribery
Appellate Jurisdictionthe exercised by a court/body over a case elevated to it by
way of review Art. 210. Direct bribery. – Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties,
in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
Exclusive Jurisdiction  that jurisdsiction exercised by a court to the exclusion of personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision
all other courts mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three
times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime
agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
Concurrent Jurisdiction jurisdiction exercised over a case or subject matter by 2
or more courts or bodies (SCA certiorari RTC, CA and SC) If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall
suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall
not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of
such gift.
Section 2. Section 4 of the same decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows: If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public
officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall
suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not less than three times the value of
jurisdiction in all cases involving: such gift.

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti- In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379 (AN ACT DECLARING

suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to
assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other
persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 871,
approved May 29, 1985.)
Art. 211. Indirect bribery. – The penalties of prision correctional in its medium
and maximum periods, suspension and public censure shall be imposed upon
any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office.
(As amended by BP Blg. 871, approved May 29, 1985.)
Art. 211–A. Qualified Bribery. – if any public officer is entrusted with law
enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for
the offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer
the penalty of death. (As added by Section 4, RA No. 7659.)
Art. 212. Corruption of Public officials. – The same penalties imposed upon the
officer corrupted, except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be
imposed upon any person, who shall have made the offers or promises or given
the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles.
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ’27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
 GRADE means of grouping positions “sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and
responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work” so that they may be
lumped together in “one range of basic compensation.”
 Salary Grade” is “the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing multiple steps or
rates which is assigned to a class.”  is a number that defines the amount of monthly
payment/income that a government employee receives. Salary grades in the
Philippine government run from 1 to 33, with 33 receiving the highest pay.
s al ar y s tep?
Each salary grade consists of eight steps (except for SG 33 with only two
steps) that correspond to the basic salary of an employee based on how long he/she
has served in a particular position.Regardless of salary grade, all newly hired
government employees start at Step 1, which is the MINIMUM pay rate. After
every three years of continuous satisfactory service in their current positions,
employees move forward to the next salary step that indicates their increased salary.
"b. Other offenses or felonies (acts and omissions punishable by law)
whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads:
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent and higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as
Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional
Commissions (COAudit, COMELEC, CSC), without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. (provincial
governors, v-governors, members of the sangguiniang panlalawigan, Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial heads) of jurisdiction thereof.
this section in relation to their office.
SECTION 3. Civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or
------ Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of
fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the indemnification for consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil
actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection
with Executive Order No. 1 dated February 28, 1986 and
Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986, may be filed
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with separately from and proceed independently of any criminal
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
E.O No. 1 “Creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government” an urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth The technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be
strictly applied to the civil cases filed hereunder.
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and E.O No. 14-A “ Amending E.O 14”
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 was issued
owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or vesting in the Sandiganbayan original and exclusive
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
jurisdiction over all criminal and civil suits filed by the
relationship Presidential Commission on Good Government:

The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President “SECTION 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully
may assign to the Commission from time to time. acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for
restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification
The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices shall not be for consequential and other damages or any other civil
repeated in any manner under the new government, and the institution of
adequate measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.
actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed
with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos,
E.O No. 2 “ Regarding the funds, moneys, assets, and properties illegally Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate family,
acquired or misappropriated by former Pres. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business
Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates business associates, dummies, associates, dummies, agents and nominees, may
agents, or nominees proceed independently of any criminal proceedings
and may be proved by a preponderance of
E.O No. 14 “Defining the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten evidence.”
wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Marcos,
members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close
and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees.

SECTION 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government

shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the

"Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any
bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the
same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One
million pesos (P1,000,000.00).
"Subject to the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the cases falling under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under this section shall be tried in a judicial
region other than where the official holds office.
"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
Salary Grade ’27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758,(
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”) or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended.
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986. (OSG: presidential commission on good government)
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly (together) with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action,
and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal
action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and
the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,
said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as
the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Appellate jurisdiction -> power of the court to hear appeals from

the lower courts. review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
final judgments, and orders of the lower courts 

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,  That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. (but may not deprive the SC of
its jurisdiction)

"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative
to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
 154. Maglalang v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013 (Justice Villarama)
TOPIC: Judicial Review of Disciplinary Cases Involving Public Officers
DOCTRINE:
 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where
no administrative review (in other words, no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy) is provided by law. This is what applies to
the instant case; kindly see complete enumeration in the Ruling below.
 Decisions of administrative or quasi administrative agencies which are
declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if
they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a
contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual
findings

FACTS: Mark Jerome Maglalang (charged with Discourtesy towards a casino
customer; 30-day suspension for this first offense) was a teller at Casino
Filipino in Angeles City operated by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), a GOCC. On December 13, 2018, a customer named
Cecila Nakasato handed Maglalang mixed Php1,000 and Php500 bills amounting to
Php50,000. He miscounted and declared only Php40,000. Even if the error got
rectified, Nakasato allegedly would not stop berating him, until both were invited to
the Internal Security Office. He was required to file an incident report.
The Board of Directors found Maglalang guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino
customer (for allegedly treating Nakasato with arrogance, and slamming the cash on
the counter in the midst of the tension). A 30-day suspension was imposed on him.
His MR before the Board was denied.
Before the CA, Maglalang filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. He argued
that there was GADALEJ in the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the
charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision, and
in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension: discourtesy in the performance
of official duties was classified as a light offense which would only be punishable by
reprimand. Maglalang explained that he did not appeal to the CSC, because the
penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which was not within the
CSC’s appellate jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the petition outright, and stated that Maglalang failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Petitioner claims that the CA clearly overlooked the applicable laws and
jurisprudence that provide that when the penalty involved in an
administrative case is suspension for not more than 30 days, the CSC
has no appellate jurisdiction over the said administrative case
The Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section 47 provides that the CSC
may entertain appeals only, among others, from a penalty of suspension
of more than 30 days. Petitioner asserts that his case, involving a 30-day
suspension penalty, is not appealable to the CSC. Thus, Maglalang
submits that his case was properly brought before the CA via a petition
for certiorari.
WON the decision of administrative agencies/quasi-admin agencies like Pagcor in
this case which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial
review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
NO.
RULING: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, as
it admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process;
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
(5) when there is irreparable injury;
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,
and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant;
(12) where no administrative review is provided by law;
(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and
(14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.
since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative
cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service
law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more
than 30 days.
  
The instant case would fall under exception number (12). Maglalang was right that
his situation was not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction, because the penalty It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before
imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension. Minor offenses (which are penalized the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion,
with not more than 30 days) are numerous, for they are the usual offenses committed amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal.
by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under
doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of the administrative system, and Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition
defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the
ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action
Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and
by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a
of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as
law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of
evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.33
hesitate to reverse the factual findings. The case was remanded to the CA. In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law in view of petitioner’s allegation that PAGCOR has acted
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law.  For what the
law declares as “final” are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA’s outright dismissal of the petition
decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual offenses for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft
committed by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless
overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast
of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the
deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to
eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review,
question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of
especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or
from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts
a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.
exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments
  of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to
wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual
Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or
unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. incomplete facts appearing on record.34 Considering the circumstances and since this
Francisco, we held: Court is not a trier of facts, 35 remand of this case to the CA for its judicious
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) resolution is in order.
month is final and unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED
jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same. The Ombudsman was not estopped
from asserting in this Court that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review and
reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman cannot be
questioned. Decisions of administrative or quasi administrative agencies which
are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they
fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or
error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate
evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate
to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be
reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
 155. Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 167103. August 31, 2006, Tinga, J.
Topic: Judicial Review of Disciplinary Cases Involving Public Officer
Doctrine:
1. The subsequent action of the court on a defective motion does not cure the
flaw, for a motion with a fatally defective notice is a useless scrap of paper,
and the court has no authority to act thereon.
2. The Court reiterates its pronouncement in Republic of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al. that in cases where the
Sandiganbayan’s interlocutory orders are challenged before this Court, the
Sandiganbayan should continue, not suspend, proceedings before it where
no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued by
this Court and there is an absence of a strong probability that the issues
raised before this Court would be rendered moot by the continuation of the
proceedings.
Facts:
1. The petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property filed against
petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, and two sons
(Garcia, et al.) before the Sandiganbayan spawned two petitions for
certiorari involving different questions of law.
2. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 165835, questioned the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over petitions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
property filed under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA 1379). The Court
dismissed the same and affirming the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over such petitions for forfeiture.
3. This disposes of the second petition filed by petitioner Garcia assailing
respondent Sandiganbayan’s Resolution which denied his Motion to
Dismiss, as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration thereof.
4. The petition for forfeiture was filed by the Ombudsman against Garcia, et
al. before the Sandiganbayan. The last day for filing an answer, Garcia, et
al. filed Motion to Dismiss to the petition for forfeiture on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of respondent Sandiganbayan over special civil actions
for forfeiture under RA 1379. On even date, Garcia filed before SC the first
petition for certiorari, G.R. No. 165835, which the court dismissed as earlier
mentioned. While G.R. No. 165835 was pending in SC, the action for
forfeiture proceeded.
5. The Republic filed a motion seeking:
a. (1) to expunge the Motion to Dismiss of Garcia, et al.,
b. (2) to declare Garcia, et al. to be in default, and
c. (3) that judgment by default be rendered in favor of the Republic.
6. The Republic sought to have the Motion to Dismiss expunged on the
ground that the motion contained a defective notice of hearing that set
the same for hearing three (3) days beyond the ten (10)-day period
provided for under Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Consequently,
the Republic argued, the Motion to Dismiss is a mere scrap of paper
which does not merit consideration and likewise does not toll the
running of the period to file an answer.
7. Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss and
granting the Republic’s motion by declaring Garcia, et al. in default and
setting the case for ex parte reception of evidence. In resolving the motion,
the Sandiganbayan settled these issues:
a. whether it has jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture
under R.A. No. 1379, and if it has such jurisdiction, who has
authority to file the petition—whether the Solicitor General or the
Office of the Ombudsman;
b. whether the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period to file the answer; and
c. whether the proceedings before it should be deferred in view of the
pendency of G.R. No. 165835.
8. Resolving the
a. first issue, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it has jurisdiction over
petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 and that the
authority to file the petition for forfeiture of properties
unlawfully acquired after 25 February 1986 is lodged with the
Office of the Ombudsman.
b. As to the second issue, the graft court held that the Motion to
Dismiss suffers from a fatal procedural defect in that it does not
comply with the mandatory provision of Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court on notice of hearing. Hence, the motion is a mere
scrap of paper and could not interrupt the running of the period to
file an answer due to be filed not later than 17 November 2004.
c. Finally, it ruled that that the mere filing by Garcia of the petition
in G.R. No. 165835 would not automatically warrant the deferment
of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan, especially where no writ
of injunction or restraining order was issued in the special civil
action for certiorari.
9. Garcia, et al. filed their Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Admit
Attached Answer, arguing that the pendency of the petition in G.R. No.
165835 had the effect of holding in abeyance the proceedings in the
forfeiture case before the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the insistence of the
Sandiganbayan on technicalities, especially in declaring Garcia, et al. in
default and allowing presentation of evidence ex parte, would only pre-
empt this Court’s action in G.R. No. 165835. They added that the principle
of judicial courtesy should be applied.
a. The Sandiganbayan ruled the principle of judicial courtesy is
inapplicable to the case since it applies only when the action of the
lower court in the course of its proceedings will result in rendering
moot the very issue brought before the higher court.
 b. In the present case, the continuation of the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan will not make academic the issue of jurisdiction
raised before the Court in G.R. No. 165835. The Sandiganbayan
further noted that the issue of application of the principle of
judicial courtesy to the case was triggered by petitioner’s act of
forum shopping when they filed the petition in G.R. No. 165835
before this Court simultaneously with the filing of the Motion to
Dismiss before the Sandiganbayan.
10. Petitioner argues that since the Sandiganbayan had denied the Motion to
Dismiss based on the merits, he had less than five (5) days only within
which to file its answer. Since he received the summons on 2 November
2004, he had until 17 November 2004 to file his answer. Petitioner filed the
motion to dismiss on the last day. The assailed resolution of 20 January
2005 was received the following day, 21 January 2006. Hence, he had until
26 January 2005 to file the answer since the motion to dismiss tolled the
running of the period to file the answer. The Motion for Reconsideration
and/or to Admit Attached Answer was filed one (1) day before the deadline.
The answer was thus timely filed and there is no basis to hold petitioner in
default, so he concludes. Petitioner thus prays that the Resolutions of 20
January 2005 and 3 February 2005 be set aside.
11. Respondent Republic contends that the Sandiganbayan correctly declared
petitioner in default. Considering that R.A. No. 1379 does not provide for
the procedure in cases where motions are filed, respondent posits that the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure will apply in a suppletory character. Hence,
as provided in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules, 10 every motion must
be set for hearing on a certain date and the hearing date must not be later
than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. In petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss, the date and time of the hearing are set beyond the period specified
under the Rules, clearly in contravention of the mandatory character of Sec.
5, Rule 15. The Republic also finds ludicrous petitioner’s claim that since
his Motion to Dismiss was adjudged by the Sandiganbayan to be a mere
scrap of paper and that such judgment is equivalent to a denial of
his Motion to Dismiss, therefore he may still file his answer. Since
the Motion to Dismiss is a mere scrap of paper, it is as if no pleading was
filed within the reglementary period to file a responsive pleading and
therefore did not stop the running of the period to file his answer. It was
then proper to declare petitioner in default. Having been declared in default,
the Republic further notes, petitioner’s proper course of action would have
been to file a motion to lift the order of default pursuant to Sec. 3 (b), Rule
9 of the Rules instead of the Motion for Reconsideration and/or To Admit
Attached Answer. Such motion for reconsideration does not even allege that
his failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, nor was he able to establish that he had a meritorious defense.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. –
NO.
Ruling: The Motion to Dismiss remains defective and of no legal effect despite the
disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the issue raised in the motion. The subsequent
action of the court on a defective motion does not cure the flaw, for a motion with a
fatally defective notice is a useless scrap of paper, and the court has no authority to
act thereon.
The Sandiganbayan recognized that the motion suffered from a fatal procedural
defect, declaring that “any motion that does not comply with Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules must be regarded as ‘a mere scrap of paper, should not be accepted for filing,
and if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance and does not affect any
reglementary period involved for the filing of the requisite pleading,’ ” but
nevertheless addressed the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Error may be imputed to the
Sandiganbayan in delving into the merits of the Motion to Dismiss since the effect of
non-compliance with the requisites for a valid notice of hearing is that the motion is
legally non-existent, that is as if it has never been filed. There is actually no motion
which the court should act upon; it was nothing but a piece of paper filed with the
court and presented no question which the court could decide. But the error is plainly
innocuous. Respondent court’s action on the merits of the motion to dismiss is a
mere surplusage. It does not detract from or contradict its ruling that the motion to
dismiss is a mere scrap of paper.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan’s resolution dated 20 January 2005 stands and
remains in full force and effect. Thus, the filing of the Motion to Dismiss could not
and did not interrupt the running of the period to file an answer. For failing to answer
within the time allowed, Garcia was properly declared in default upon motion of the
Republic.
While Garcia immediately sought recourse via the Motion for Reconsideration
and/or To Admit Attached Answer, the contentions he raises therein—that the
Sandiganbayan should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over the forfeiture case
“out of respect for the Supreme Court, and so as not to preempt the latter’s action” in
G.R. No. 165835 which was then pending, and that the Sandiganbayan’s act of
declaring Garcia, et al. in default is a play on technicalities that may only render the
action of this court in G.R. No. 165835 moot—do not address the grounds for which
he, his wife and sons were declared in default. His line of reasoning in his motion for
reconsideration is directed towards the denial of the Motion to Dismiss and does not
lay down the considerations for the lifting of the order of default. In fact, as observed
by the Sandiganbayan, the motion for reconsideration fails to comply with the
requirements of Sec. 3 (b), Rule 9, which is the proper remedy to lift an order of
default. It was as if Garcia considered only the denial of his Motion to Dismiss, even
attaching his answer in the mistaken belief that he had a fresh period of five (5) days
to file the responsive pleading. It seems Garcia has not taken into account that
portion of the Resolution declaring him and his co-respondents in the forfeiture case
in default. Thus, the Sandiganbayan acted properly in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or To Admit Answer.
A final note. The Court reiterates its pronouncement in Republic of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al. that in cases where the
Sandiganbayan’s interlocutory orders are challenged before this Court, the
Sandiganbayan should continue, not suspend, proceedings before it where no
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued by this
Court and there is an absence of a strong probability that the issues raised
before this Court would be rendered moot by the continuation of the
proceedings.
In resolving the motion, the Sandiganbayan settled these issues: (a)
whether it has jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture under
R.A. No. 1379, and if it has such jurisdiction, who has authority to file the
petition—whether the Solicitor General or the Office of the Ombudsman;
Sandiganbayan ruled that it has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture
under R.A. No. 1379 and that the authority to file the petition for forfeiture
of properties unlawfully acquired after 25 February 1986 is lodged with
the Office of the Ombudsman.
whether the proceedings before it should be deferred in view of the
pendency of G.R. No. 165835.
mere filing by Garcia of the petition in G.R. No. 165835 would not
automatically warrant the deferment of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan, especially where no writ of injunction or restraining order
was issued in the special civil action for certiorari.
Garcia, et al. filed their Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Admit
Attached Answer, 7 arguing that the pendency of the petition in G.R.
No. 165835 had the effect of holding in abeyance the proceedings in
the forfeiture case before the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the
insistence of the Sandiganbayan on technicalities, especially in declaring
Garcia, et al. in default and allowing presentation of evidence ex parte,
would only pre-empt this Court’s action in G.R. No. 165835. They added
that the principle of judicial courtesy should be applied.
The Sandiganbayan ruled the principle of judicial courtesy is inapplicable
to the case since it applies only when the action of the lower court in the
course of its proceedings will result in rendering moot the very issue
brought before the higher court. In the present case, the continuation of
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan will not make academic the
issue of jurisdiction raised before the Court in G.R. No. 165835. The
Sandiganbayan further noted that the issue of application of the principle
of judicial courtesy to the case was triggered by petitioner’s act of forum
shopping when they filed the petition in G.R. No. 165835 before this
Court simultaneously with the filing of the Motion to Dismiss before the
Sandiganbayan. 
respondent Republic contends that the Sandiganbayan correctly declared
petitioner in default. Considering that R.A. No. 1379 
main issue to be resolved is whether the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion. In turn, the resolution of the issue depends on
the determination of whether petitioner was properly declared in default.
Garcia then contends that since the Sandiganbayan had resolved
the Motion to Dismiss on the merits by denying it and ruling on the issue
of lack of jurisdiction, he had in fact been given a period of five (5) days to
file the pleading. Since his Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Admit
Attached Answer was timely filed, he should not have been declared in
default, he adds.
The argument has no merit. The Motion to Dismiss remains defective
and of no legal effect despite the disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the
issue raised in the motion. The subsequent action of the court on a
defective motion does not cure the flaw, for a motion with a fatally
defective notice is a useless scrap of paper, and the court has no
authority to act thereon.  The Sandiganbayan recognized that the motion
suffered from a fatal procedural defect, declaring that "any motion that
does not comply with Sec[.] 5, Rule 15 of the Rules must be regarded as
‘a mere scrap of paper, should not be accepted for filing, and if filed, is
not entitled to judicial cognizance and does not affect any reglementary
period involved for the filing of the requisite pleading,’" 21 but nevertheless
addressed the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Error may be imputed to the
Sandiganbayan in delving into the merits of the Motion to Dismiss since
the effect of non-compliance with the requisites for a valid notice of
hearing is that the motion is legally non-existent, that is as if it has never
been filed. There is actually no motion which the court should act upon; it
was nothing but a piece of paper filed with the court and presented no
question which the court could decide. But the error is plainly innocuous.
Respondent court’s action on the merits of the motion to dismiss is a
mere surplusage. It does not detract from or contradict its ruling that the
motion to dismiss is a mere scrap of paper.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan’s resolution dated 20 January 2005
stands and remains in full force and effect. Thus, the filing of the Motion
to Dismiss  could not and did not interrupt the running of the period to file
an answer. For failing to answer within the time allowed, Garcia was
properly declared in default upon motion of the Republic.
While Garcia immediately sought recourse via the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or To Admit Attached Answer, the contentions he
raises therein—that the Sandiganbayan should refrain from exercising
jurisdiction over the forfeiture case "out of respect for the Supreme Court,
and so as not to preempt the latter’s action" in G.R. No. 165835 which
was then pending, and that the Sandiganbayan’s act of declaring
Garcia, et al. in default is a play on technicalities that may only render the
action of this court in G.R. No. 165835 moot —do not address the
grounds for which he, his wife and sons were declared in default. His line
of reasoning in his motion for reconsideration is directed towards the
denial of the Motion to Dismiss and does not lay down the considerations
for the lifting of the order of default. In fact, as observed by the
Sandiganbayan, the motion for reconsideration fails to comply with the
requirements of Sec. 3 (b), Rule 9, which is the proper remedy to lift an
order of default. It was as if Garcia considered only the denial of
his Motion to Dismiss, even attaching his answer in the mistaken belief
that he had a fresh period of five (5) days to file the responsive pleading.
It seems Garcia has not taken into account that portion of the 20 January
2005 Resolution declaring him and his co-respondents in the forfeiture
case in default. Thus, the Sandiganbayan acted properly in denying
the Motion for Reconsideration and/or To Admit Answer.

A final note. The Court reiterates its pronouncement in Republic of the

Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al.  that in cases where
the Sandiganbayan’s interlocutory orders are challenged before this
Court, the Sandiganbayan should continue, not suspend, proceedings
before it where no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction is issued by this Court and there is an absence of a strong
probability that the issues raised before this Court would be rendered
moot by the continuation of the proceedings.

Republic of the Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the

Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified
Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment6 against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379, as amended Garcia together with his wife and 3 sons during his
incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of
money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer and his other lawful income, if any.
156. Rodrigo vs. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 125498, (1999) both Decision and MR (Justice Kapunan)
"big fish" from the "small fry,"
DBM (Department of Budget and Management) drafted the 1989 Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, later revised in
1997. In both versions, the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned a
Salary Grade 27
Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa approved the filing of an information
against Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the
Mayor and Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator,
respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No.3019 before the Sandiganbayan.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction in this case because the
petitioners contend that Mayor Rodrigo occupies a position of Grade 24
and is, therefore, beyond the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. (YES)
PETIONER IN THIS CASE CONTENDS THAT at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public
ranking public official impleaded in this case, was receiving a monthly
salary of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is supposedly equivalent to
a fourth step increment in Grade 24 under the Salary Schedule
prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758: *
Ruling:
A local government official's actual salary may be less than what the
Salary Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class and
financial capability of his or her respective local government unit. This
circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official's Grade. the
Court in this case discussed that an official's salary is determined by
the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature of his
position — the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work. To rule in favor of the
petitioners' argument that Mayor Rodrigo's salary determines his Grade
would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore
the constitutional and statutory policies behind said law.
Petitioner mayor's position having been classified as Grade 27 in
accordance with R.A. No 6758, and having been charged with
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a., of P.D
No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. By virtue of the
same Section 4 a., as amended, his co-accused are also subject to
the Anti-Graft Court' s jurisdiction.
At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, which was prepared by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6758, otherwise known as the “Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989,” lists the following positions under Salary Grade 27, including
the position of “Municipal Mayor I”: x x x Earlier, in the 1989 version of the
same Index, the Municipal Mayor was also assigned a Salary Grade of 27. It
appears, therefore, that petitioner Mayor comes within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 Salary Grade” is “the numerical place on the Salary Schedule
representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class.”
 With the advent of the new Constitution, and in compliance
therewith, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof
declares it the policy of the State “to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions.” To give life to this
policy, as well as the constitutional prescription to “(take) into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required” for the positions of government officials and
 employees, Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985
for classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and
qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar
salaries. This scheme is known as the “Grade,” defined in P.D. No.
985 as: Includ[ing] all classes of positions which, although different
with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently
equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of
such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.
The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions “sufficiently
equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work” so that they may be lumped
together in “one range of basic compensation.”
 A local government official’s actual salary may be less than what the
Salary Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class
and financial capability of his or her respective local government
unit.
Facts: Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the
Mayor and Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator,
respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan, while petitioner Alejandro
A. Facundo is the former Municipal Treasurer of the same
municipality.
The Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor Rodrigo,
entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by
Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas,
for the sum of P486,386.18. Mejica, the Planning and Development
Coordinator of San Nicolas, prepared an Accomplishment Report
stating that the Caboloan Power Generation project was 97.5%
accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by Mayor
Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. On the basis of said report,
payment of P452,825.53 was effected by the Municipal Treasurer,
petitioner Facundo, to Philwood Construction.
Petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance dated 21 June 1993 from
the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who
found that as per COA (Commission on Audit) evaluation of the
electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project (equivalent to
P291,915.07) was actually accomplished. Of the two units of generator
supposedly purchased, only one second-hand unit was delivered. The
same generator broke down after only two nights of operation. In
addition, instead of 40 wooden posts, only 27 were installed. The
powerhouse was only 65.635% completed. The Provincial Auditor
thus disallowed the amount of P160,910.46.
Petitioners requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of
disallowance and to re-inspect the project. Petitioners reiterated their
plea in a letter to the Provincial Auditor dated 3 November 1993,
attaching therewith a "Certificate of Acceptance and Completion"
signed by Clemente Arquero, Jr., Barangay Captain of Caboloan, and
Eusebio Doton, President of the Cabaloan Electric Cooperative. The
Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act on petitioners’
requests.
Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the
Ombudsman against petitioners. Likewise impleaded were Larry Lu
and Ramil Ang, President and General Manager, and Project Engineer,
respectively, of Philwood Construction. Acting Ombudsman Francisco
Villa approved the filing of an information against petitioners for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation before the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan granted said motion. Office of the
Special Prosecutor issued a memorandum recommending that the
charges against petitioners be maintained. The Ombudsman approved
said memorandum.
Petitioners thereafter filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash
the information alleging, as grounds therefor that (1) the facts alleged
in the information did not constitute an offense, and (2) the same
information charged more than one offense. The Sandiganbayan
denied said motion in an Order dated 18 March 1996. Prosecution
moved to suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners opposed the
motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over
them. In a Resolution dated 2 July 1996, the Sandiganbayan ruled that
it had jurisdiction over petitioners and ordered the suspension of
petitioners pendente lite.
Decision February 2019
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
petitioners.
Ruling: Yes. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioners.
Petitioners next question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
contend that Mayor Rodrigo occupies a position of Grade 24 and is,
therefore, beyond the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the
Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades,
which was prepared by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758, 31 otherwise known as the
"Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989," lists the
following positions under Salary Grade 27, including the position of
"Municipal Mayor I" (pls see case for list).ryEarlier, in the 1989
version of the same Index, the Municipal Mayor was also assigned a
Salary Grade of 27. It appears, therefore, that petitioner Mayor comes
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
With the advent of the new Constitution, and in compliance therewith,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the
policy of the State "to provide equal pay for substantially equal work
and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences is duties
and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions."
To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional prescription to"
(take) into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and
the qualifications required" for the positions of government officials
and employees, Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No.
985 for classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and
qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar
salaries. This scheme is known as the "Grade," defined in P.D. No. 985
as: Includ[ing] all classes of positions which, although different with
respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as
to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification
requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of
positions within one range of basic compensation.
The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions "sufficiently
equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work" so that they may be lumped
together in "one range of basic compensation."cralaw virtua1aw
library
A local government official’s actual salary may be less than what the
Salary Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class
and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit.
This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official’s Grade.
As the foregoing discussion shows, an official’s salary is determined
by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature
of his position — the level of difficulty and responsibilities and
level of qualification requirements of the work. To give credence to
petitioners’ argument that Mayor Rodrigo’s salary determines his
Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and
ignore the constitutional and statutory policies behind said law.
Motion For Reconsideration Case (July 2019)
Issue: Petitioners now move for a reconsideration of our decision,
contending that the authority of the DBM was limited to the
"preparation" of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades. A new law adopting said Index, petitioners argue,
is required for such Index to have the force of law. It is also alleged
that the authority conferred upon the DBM constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative powers resulting in the executive branch,
through the DBM, determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Ruling: We noted that while Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, did not expressly include the position of Municipal Mayor as
among those within the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original
jurisdiction, such position is embraced in the catch-all provision,
Section 4 a. (5).
Petitioners overlook Section 444 (d) of the Local Government
Code,3which provides:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly
compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-
 seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the
implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It must be clarified that what Congress delegated to the DBM is the
administration of the Compensation and Position Classification
System, and, with it the, assignment of Salary Grades — not the
determination of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. When the
DBM assigns a position a certain Salary Grade, it does so pursuant to
its authority under R.A. No. 6758. That by such allocation the official
comes under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is only incidental to the exercise of such authority.
Congress delegated the rest of this tedious task (of fixing Salary Grades)
to the DBM, subject to the standards contained in R.A. No. 6758, by
authorizing the DBM to "determine the officials who are of equivalent rank
to the foregoing officials, where applicable," and to assign them the same
Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section. 
35
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 directs
the DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by (a)
the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9.   and (b) the following
36
factors:
(1) the education and experience required to perform the
duties and responsibilities of the position;
(2) nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the
completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external
relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment;
and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the
job.
Pursuant to such authority., the DBM drafted the 1989 Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, later revised in
1997. In both versions, the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned a
Salary Grade 27
Thus, a local government official's actual salary may be less than what
the Salary Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class
and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit.
This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official's Grade. As
the foregoing discussion shows, an official's salary is determined by the
Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature of his
position — the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work. To give credence to petitioners'
argument that Mayor Rodrigo's salary determines his Grade would be
to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the
constitutional and statutory policies behind said law.
Petitioner mayor's position having been classified as Grade 27 in
accordance with R.A. No 6758, and having been charged with violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a., of P.D No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. By virtue of the same Section 4
a., as amended, his co-accused are also subject to the Anti-Graft Court' s
jurisdiction.
157. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001 (VITUG; J)

Topic: Judicial Review of Disciplinary Cases Involving Public Officers
Doctrines:
 The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. It would
appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed
before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." In issuing the
preventive suspension of Sen. Mirriam Santiago, the Sandiganbayan merely
adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and
employees indicted before it.
 Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular
office under which he stands accused.
Facts: The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID
Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
investigating panel, that took over the case from investigator Gualberto dela Llana
after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's
request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, the
Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner.
The OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved,
forthwith, three informations were filed on even date. The first information filed with
the Sandiganbayan stated that Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization for
the stay of the several aliens.
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis
E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen
Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical
appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or
until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon
manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided
to her office, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment.
Ultimately, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to
suspend her but the Sandiganbayan suspended the accused Miriam Defensor-
Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from
any other government position she was be holding at present or hereafter. Her
suspension was for ninety (90) days only.
petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-
day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government
position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for
the implementation of the suspension order.
Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far
it can go, in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal cases
filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Senator Santiago approve the application for legalization for the stay of
the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching
Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan,
Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu
Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin
Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi
Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting,
Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping,
Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai
Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya
Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of
Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens
are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose
stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused."
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to decree the 90-day
preventive suspension of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago alleged violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. YES.

Ruling: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an

incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute
provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public

officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed
to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.

"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been
separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be
liable to restitute the same to the Government.”

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of

suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once
the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and
buts about it."

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered

to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in
which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts
with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
"office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
158. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 128096 (1999)
Topic: Judicial Review of Disciplinary Cases Involving Public
Officers
Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites
must concur:
(1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten
wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (the law on bribery),  (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A,
30
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),  or (e) other offenses or felonies
31
whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
(2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a
public official or employee  holding any of the positions enumerated in
32
paragraph a of Section 4; and
(3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
 no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers.
 Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information
that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to
office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do
not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and
the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an
essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
 stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was,
sad to say, not satisfied.
 elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence
after trial.
 People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed
in relation to public office "does not appear in the information,
which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is
the specific factual allegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been
committed in relation to public office.
 for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.
Whether the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and decide the
case over Petitioner’s Panfilo Lacson ? NO, RTC HAS
JURISDICTION.
Petitioner Panfino Lacson in this case questions the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the
cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant
to Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, among others, was charged with multiple
murder before the Sandiganbayan. He challenged the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan over him. SC directed that the case be transferred to
the RTC.
Contention of the accused: They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
"principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier
General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the
amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none
has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Charged with murder which is a felony
Doctrine: What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the
offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been
committed in relation to public office. Since there was a lack of
intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the
discharge of official function of the offenders, RTC has
jurisdiction over the case, and not Sandiganbayan.
Requisites for a Case to Fall Within the Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.--A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249
reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten
wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A,
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes;
(2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a
public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.
 Under Section 4, par. b of Republic Act 8249, what determines the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender; In enacting Republic Act 8249, the Congress simply
restored the original provisions of Presidential Decree 1606 which
does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being
charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title
VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4
of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to “other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to
their office.” The phrase “other offenses or felonies” is too broad as
to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation
to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b,
what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender—that is, whether he is one of those
public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4.
The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section
4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the
accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply
restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention
the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named
principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier
public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related
to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein
petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the
amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said
accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among
others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the
raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision,
Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995."
The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by
the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended
information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused
during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted
"at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in
the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the
shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting
happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again,
while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said
accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and
members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection
between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which,
as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to
say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended
information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer
in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion
between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's
official duties.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to
say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended
information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer
in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion
between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's
official duties.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the
charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,  not the Sandiganbayan.
73
Summary: Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, among others, was charged with
multiple murder before the Sandiganbayan. He challenged the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over him. SC directed that the case be
transferred to the RTC.
Contention of the accused: They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
"principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier
General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the
amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none
has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the
ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of
the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired
was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said
incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before
the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the
cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant
to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
“principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal”
from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner
Panfilo M. Lacson and petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr. questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4 and
7 of Republic Act 8249 — an Act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They also seek to prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos.
23047-23057 against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They
further argued that if the case is tried before the Sandiganbayan, their
right to procedural due process would violate as they could no longer
avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they
acquired under RA 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.

 Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the
Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction
over the subject criminal cases since none of
the principal accused under the amended information has the
rank of Superintendent  or higher
28
 Accordingly, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of RA 8249 is
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and
decide the case? NO, RTC HAS JURISDICTION.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of RA
8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and
reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under
RA 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of
the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences.
Since it is within the power of the Congress to define the jurisdiction
of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily
affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the
form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot
now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category
from those similarly situated as them. Moreover, petitioner's and
intervenor's contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which
they acquired under RA 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of RA
8249 is incorrect. The same contention had already been rejected by
the Court considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but
statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of
procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is not included
in the prohibition against ex post facto law. RA 8249 pertains only to
matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does
not partake the nature of an ex post facto law.
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, the Court ruled that for failure to
show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of
those accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and therefore, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
sustained and the Addendum to the March 5, 1997 resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is reversed.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute.
The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.
Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the
evidence presented by the parties at the trial. As stated earlier, the
multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under
Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his
office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall
have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new [1987]
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the
Sandiganbayan "shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction
as now or hereafter may be provided by law."
 159. De Lima v Guerrero
G.R. No. 229781 | October 10, 2017
Topic: Judicial Review
Issue:  Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed
Information.
LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE P
ALISOC DAY AN, for violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3 (jj),
Section 26 (b) and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002
RTC has jurisdiction
Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public
officers is not determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they
were committed "in relation to their office." In determining the forum
vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions, the laws
governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must likewise be
considered.
In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the
jurisdiction to "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of
[RA 9165)." This is an exception, couched in the special law on
dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606,
as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a
special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered
as an exception to the general.
Doctrine: Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the
general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and
offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their
office; Section 90, RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002)
is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction
violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter
case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme
Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165
was committed in relation to the public officials' office.
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 specifies the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as the
court with the jurisdiction to “exclusively try and hear cases involving
violations of [RA No. 9165].” This is an exception, couched in the special
law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, as amended by RA No. 10660.—In this
case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to
“exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165].” This is
an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the
general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It
is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a
general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to the
general. Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed
Section 90 of RA 9165. However, a closer look at the repealing clause of RA
10660 will show that there is no express repeal of Section 90 of RA 9165 and
well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. It is only
accepted upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so repugnant that the two
laws cannot be enforced. The presumption against implied repeal is stronger
when of two laws involved one is special and the other general. The
mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law prevails over a
general law applies regardless of the laws’ respective dates of passage.
De Lima argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 17-165, the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try
and hear the case against her. She posits that the Information charges
her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the
former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even
assuming that the crime described in the Information is a violation of RA
9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the
case considering that the acts described in the Information were
intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some
justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring
that the Information charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of RA 9165, including the acts
described in the Information against the petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically created as
an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to try drug-
related cases even those committed by public officials. In fact,
respondents point out that the history of the laws enabling and governing
the Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was streamlined to
address specific cases of graft and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.
 the designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of
the Information repeatedly provide that the petitioner is charged with
"Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section
5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act
No. 9165." From the very designation of the crime in the Information
itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the petitioner is charged
is a violation of RA 9165. 
a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is
prosecuted would convey that De Lima is being charged as a conspirator
in the crime of Illegal Drug Trading
Facts: The DOJ filed criminal complaints against senator De Lima after
several inquiries made by the congress regarding the proliferation of
drugs inside the bilibid prison. On the basis of the evidence presented by
the DOJ and the complaint affidavits, Judge Guerrrero of Muntinlupa
issued a warrant of arrest against Senator Delima. The senator then filed a
motion to quash the warrant and pending such motion she also filed a
petition for certiorari under rule 65 alleging that the issuance of the
warrant of arrest was with grave abuse of discretion.
De Lima wants the case to be dismissed due to the RTC not having
jurisdiction. Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the
Information in Criminal Case No. 17-165, the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the
Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct
Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31.
For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the
Information is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the
exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described in
the Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of
Justice. Some justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's
view, declaring that the Information charged against the petitioner is
Direct Bribery.
Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to review the case, or is it the
Sandiganbayan? YES, RTC is the proper court based on RA 10660.
Held: Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is
still wont to deny the instant petition on substantive grounds.
Before discussing the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is
necessary to clarify the crime. The Information states:
…accuse LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z.
RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, for violation of
Section 5, in relation to Section 3 (jj), Section 26 (b) and
Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002, committed as
follows:
…having moral ascendancy or influence over inmates in the
New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug
trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with
the use of their power, position, and authority demand, solicit
and extort money from the high profile inmates in the New
Bilibid Prison to support the Senatorial bid of De Lima in the
May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not
being lawfully authorized by law and through the use of
mobile phones and other electronic devices, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous
drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, the
proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five from the
high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.
Information repeatedly provide that the petitioner is charged with
"Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section
5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act
No. 9165." From the very designation of the crime in the Information
itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the petitioner is
charged is a violation of RA 9165
On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually
participated in the actual trafficking of dangerous drugs and had simply
allowed the NBP inmates to do so is non sequitur given that the allegation
of conspiracy makes her liable for the acts of her co-conspirators. As the
Information provides, De Lima's participation and cooperation was
instrumental in the trading of dangerous drugs by the NBP inmates. The
minute details of this participation and cooperation are matters of
evidence that need not be specified in the Information but presented and
threshed out during trial.
In indictments for Illegal Trading, it is illogical to require the elements of
Illegal Sale of drugs, such as the identities of the buyer and the seller, the
object and consideration. For the prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs
to prosper, proof that the accused "act[ed] as a broker" or brought
together the buyer and seller of illegal drugs "using electronic devices
such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines,
two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms" is sufficient.
The DOJ' s designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus
holds sway. After all, the prosecution is vested with a wide range of
discretion-including the discretion of whether, what, and whom to charge.
The exercise of this discretion depends on a smorgasboard of factors,
which are best appreciated by the prosecutors. As such, with the
designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there can
be no other conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with
Direct Bribery but with violation of RA 9165.
Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the
Sandiganbayan or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Criminal Case No. 17-165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is
given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. It is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that Congress
may also, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would be a special
law that is construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of
courts.
The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which
updated the rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA
6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The
designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over
drug-related cases is apparent in RA 9165 provisions where it was
expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority
to hear drug-related cases.1
1
Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act,
Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - x x x x
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court
shall immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of
the offense and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in
the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of proportion
to his/her lawful income:
xxxx
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived
therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred
and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the
same.
xxxx
Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. - x x x
A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on dangerous drugs to a
Center may be filed by any person authorized by the Board with the Regional Trial Court of
the province or city where such person is found.
xxxx
Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with an Offense to
Treatment and Rehabilitation. - If a person charged with an offense where the imposable
penalty is imprisonment of less than six (6) years and one (1) day, and is found by the
prosecutor or by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the
prosecutor or the court as the case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and transmit
copies of the record of the case to the Board.
In the event the Board determines, after medical examination, that public interest requires that
such drug dependent be committed to a center for treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a
petition for his/her commitment with the regional trial court of the province or city where

Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the
authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v.
Court of Appeals,this Court categorically named the RTC as the court
with jurisdiction over drug related-cases, as follows:
Yet, much has been made of the terminology used in Section 90 of RA
9165. The dissents would highlight the provision's departure from Section
39 of RA 6425 - the erstwhile drugs law, which provides:
SECTION 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court. - The Circuit
Criminal Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases
involving offenses punishable under this Act.
For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive
original jurisdiction" is a clear indication that no court, least of all the
RTC, has been vested with such "exclusive original jurisdiction" so that
even the Sandiganbayan can take cognizance and resolve a criminal
prosecution for violation of RA 9165.
As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion,
such deduction is unwarranted given the clear intent of the legislature not
only to retain the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the RTCs over
violations of the drugs law but to segregate from among the several RTCs
of each judicial region some RTCs that will "exclusively try and hear
cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." If at all, the change introduced
by the new phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not the deprivation of
the RTCs' "exclusive original jurisdiction" but the further restriction of
this "exclusive original jurisdiction" to select RTCs of each judicial
region. This intent can be clearly gleaned from the interpellation on
House Bill No. 4433, entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, repealing Republic Act No. 6425, as amended:"
he/she is being investigated or tried: x x x
xxxx
Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the
existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall
be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction.
Initially, Rep. Dilangalen referred to the fact sheet attached to
the Bill which states that the measure will undertake a
comprehensive amendment to the existing law on dangerous
drugs -- RA No. 6425, as amended. Adverting to Section 64
of the Bill on the repealing clause, he then asked whether the
Committee is in effect amending or repealing the aforecited
law. Rep. Cuenco replied that any provision of law which is
in conflict with the provisions of the Bill is repealed and/or
modified accordingly.
In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen suggested that if the
Committee's intention was only to amend RA No. 6425, then
the wording used should be "to amend" and not "to repeal"
with regard to the provisions that are contrary to the
provisions of the Bill.
Adverting to Article VIII, Section 60, on Jurisdiction Over
Dangerous Drugs Case, which provides that "the Supreme
Court shall designate regional trial courts to have original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable by this Act," Rep.
Dilangalen inquired whether it is the Committee's intention
that certain RTC salas will be designated by the Supreme
Court to try drug-related offenses, although all RTCs
have original jurisdiction over those offenses.
Rep. Cuenco replied in the affirmative. He pointed that at
present, the Supreme Court's assignment of drug cases to
certain judges is not exclusive because the latter can still
handle cases other than drug-related cases. He added that the
Committee's intention is to assign drug-related cases to
judges who will handle exclusively these cases assigned to
them.
In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen stated that, at the appropriate
time, he would like to propose the following amendment;
"The Supreme Court shall designate specific salas of the
RTC to try exclusively offenses related to drugs."
Rep. Cuenca agreed therewith, adding that the Body is
proposing the creation of exclusive drug courts because at
 present, almost all of the judges are besieged by a lot of drug
cases some of which have been pending for almost 20 years.
In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the
jurisdiction to "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of
[RA 9165)." This is an exception, couched in the special law on
dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606,
as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that
a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be
considered as an exception to the general.
Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section
90 of RA 9165. However, a closer look at the repealing clause of RA
10660 will show that there is no express repeal of Section 90 of RA 9165
and well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. It is
only accepted upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so repugnant that
the two laws cannot be enforced. The presumption against implied repeal
is stronger when of two laws involved one is special and the other
general. The mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law
prevails over a general law applies regardless of the laws' respective dates
of passage. Thus, this Court ruled:
x x x [I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a special
law prevails over a general law - regardless of their dates of
passage - and the special is to be considered as remaining an
exception to the general.
So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict
between statutes. If reasonable construction is possible, the
laws must be reconciled in that manner.
Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and
the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very
clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time
repeals the other.
To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by
RA 10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers
in relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law
excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA
9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction
is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs
court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed
in relation to the public officials' office.
The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating
original exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the
Supreme Court logically follows given the technical aspect of drug-
related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA
9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and untechnical. However,
narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that render them not
readily identifiable. They must first be subjected to scientific analysis by
forensic chemists to determine their composition and nature. Thus, judges
presiding over designated drugs courts are specially trained by the
Philippine Judicial Academyand given scientific instructions to equip
them with the proper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence and
give analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary
consideration of RA 9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in
fact, dangerous drugs, their plant sources, or their controlled precursors
and essential chemicals. Without a doubt, not one of the Sandiganbayan
justices were provided with knowledge and technical expertise on matters
relating to prohibited substances.
Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTCs over violations of RA 9165. As previously stated, as of June 30,
2017, there are 232,557 drugs cases pending before the RTCs. On the
other hand, not even a single case filed before the Sandiganbayan from
February 1979 to June 30, 2017 dealt with violations of the drugs law.
Instead, true to its designation as an anti-graft court, the bulk of the cases
filed before the Sandiganbayan involve violations of RA 3019, entitled
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and malversation. With these,
it would not only be unwise but reckless to allow the tribunal uninstructed
and inexperienced with the intricacies of drugs cases to hear and decide
violations of RA 9165 solely on account of the pay scale of the accused.
Likewise of special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660
which, to reiterate for emphasis, states:
 Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a)
does not allege any damage to the government or any
bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or
bribery arising from the same or closely related
transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One
million pesos.
The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to
streamline the cases handled by the Sandiganbayan by delegating to
the RTCs some cases involving high-ranking public officials. With the
dissents' proposition, opening the Sandiganbayan to the influx of drug-
related cases, RA 10660 which was intended to unclog the dockets of the
Sandiganbayan would all be for naught. Hence, sustaining the RTC's
jurisdiction over drug-related cases despite the accused's high-ranking
position, as in this case, is all the more proper.
160. CSC vs. Dacoycoy, supra
G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999
Topic: Judicial Review of Disciplinary Cases Involving Public Officers
Doctrine: The Civil Service Commission as an aggrieved party may appeal
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. The Civil Service
Law may include the review of decisions exonerating officers or employees
from administrative charges.
Summary: Pedro Dacoycoy was charged of nepotism on two counts
as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy,
as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under
his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational
School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. The
Recommendation was made by Mr. Daclag, who was under the
supervision of Respondent Dacoycoy.
Issue: Whether the Civil Service Commission is the property party to
appeal the suit. Yes.
Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not
guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was
merely a witness for the government. In this case, the SC expressly
abandoned the rule that “the phrase party adversely affected by the
decision refers to government employee against whom the administrative
case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the
form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or
dismissal from office” and not included are “cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than 30 days or fine in an amount not
exceeding 30 days salary” or when the respondent is exonerated of the
charges, there is no occasion of appeal.” In this case, the SC sustained
the right of the CSC to appeal to SC the decision of the CA exonerating
the respondent and reversing the CSC’s decision which found Dacoycoy
guilty of nepotism and ordered his dismissal from the service. This
decision overrules prior decisions holding that Civil Service Law
does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges.
Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party
adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil
service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision
of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.  By this ruling, we now
14
expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase
'party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which, may take the form of suspension, demotion in
rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office"  and not
15
included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days
salary"  or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is
16
no occasion for appeal."  In other words, we overrule prior decisions
17
holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges"
enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission;   Mendez v. Civil
18
Service Commission;  Magpale v. Civil Service Commission;  Navarro
19 20
v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority   and
21
more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission. 
22
Ruling: The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the CSC and
held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not
the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the
complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the
government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become
the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices
the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.

The Civil Service Law may include the review of decisions exonerating
officers or employees from administrative charges. By this ruling, we
now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that “the
phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed
for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal
from office” and not included are “cases where the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary” or “when the respondent is exonerated of
the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.”

We overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does
not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges”
161. Montoya v. Police Director
G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008
Topic: Judicial Review of Disciplinary Cases Involving Public
Officers
Doctrine: The disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the case
and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal should not be the
one appealing the subsequent exoneration of the public officer or
employee.
Facts: National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued a special
order dropping PO2 Ruel Montoya from the rolls for failure to attend
the Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course. Montoya had been
absent without official leave for a period of 67 days. Montoya filed a
motion for reconsideration to the PNP Regional Director explaining
that he went to Baler Police Station to have his sick leave form
approved by the station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his
name had already been forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his
Sick Leave Form was not approved. Montoya averred that his failure
to attend the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering
from arthritis with on and off symptoms of severe body pain. Montoya
was preventively suspended for 30 days, pending Summary
Proceedings of his administrative liability.
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted
and based the NCR Regional Director dismissed Montoya from the
police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective
immediately. Montoya filed with the CPD office a Petition for
Review/Motion for Reconsideration but was denied for lack of
jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action involving demotion or
dismissal from service imposed by a PNP regional director may only
be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB). Montoya next
filed an appeal before the RAB-NCR, alleging lack of due process
considering that he was not even notified of any hearing by the
Summary Hearing Officer and was thus deprived of the opportunity to
present evidence in his defense. The Summary Hearing Officer in the
Summary Dismissal Proceedings against him recommended his
dismissal from police service based on his failure to report for the
LEEC, without even looking into his side of the controversy.
The RAB-NCR rendered its Decision granting Montoya's appeal and
ordering his reinstatement. Montoya was reinstated. NCR Regional
Director assailed the RAB-NCR decision reinstating Montoya in the
police service. Montoya, together with the other police personnel filed
before the DILG an Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to
the Appeal of the NCR Regional Director. DILG Secretary Lina issued
an order denying the appeal of the NCR Regional Director. The latter
appealed the order of DILG Secretary Lina to the CSC. The NCR
Regional Director issued a special order reinstating Montoya, et al.,
without prejudice to the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director
before the CSC.
Issue: Whether or not the NCR Regional Director may appeal the
decisions of the RAB (Regional Appellate Board)
-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina NO
Ruling: No. The case of NABNPC v. Mamauag provides that the
government party appealing must be the one prosecuting the case
and not the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the
administrative case. In the present case, the NCR Regional Director
appealed the decision of the RAB-NCR to the Office of the DILG
Secretary. DILG Secretary Lina, in his decision affirmed the decision
of the RAB-NCR. Once more, the NCR Regional Director filed an
appeal with the CSC, where he was able to secure a favorable ruling.
It is beyond dispute that the NCR Regional Director was acting as the
investigating and disciplining authority when he rendered his decision
dismissing Montoya from the service. The pronouncement in
NABNPC v. Mamauag, that the disciplining authority or tribunal which
heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal
should not be the one appealing the subsequent exoneration of the
public officer or employee, squarely applies to the NCR Regional
Director.
The NCR Regional Director, in actively appealing the reversal of his
Decision, had inevitably forsaken his impartiality and had become
adversarial. His interest was only in seeing to it that his decision would
be reinstated. The party who has the personality and interest to appeal
the decisions of the RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina exonerating
Montoya from the administrative charges against him and reinstating
him to the service is the PNP as a bureau. It was the PNP, in the
exercise of its authority to implement internal discipline among its
members, which instigated the administrative investigation of
Montoya, so it may be deemed the prosecuting government party. And
it is the PNP which stands to suffer as a result of the purportedly
wrongful exoneration of Montoya, since it would be compelled to take
back to its fold a delinquent member.
Given all of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the RAB-
NCR, affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, reinstating Montoya to the
service. It was only the RAB-NCR which properly acquired
jurisdiction over the appeal filed before it and was able to render a
decision after a consideration of both sides to the controversy.
162. Ombudsman vs. Vitriolo, G.R. No. 237582 (2019) JUSTICE
BERNABE
TOPIC: Judicial Review of Disciplinary Cases Involving Public Officers
DOCTRINE: while it is now settled doctrine that the Ombudsman has legal
standing to intervene in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases, it should,
however, move for intervention before rendition of judgment lest the same be denied,
unless warranted by certain excepting circumstances, which unfortunately do not
obtain herein.
Issue: WON the Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene in appeals from its
rulings in administrative cases.
Ruling: the court held that while it is now settled doctrine that the Ombudsman has
legal standing to intervene in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases, it
should, however, move for intervention before rendition of judgment lest the same be
denied, unless warranted by certain excepting circumstances, which unfortunately do
not obtain herein.
FACTS: In May 2011, Felix, a former faculty member of the College of Physical
Education at PLM, filed a complaint-affidavit against Vitriolo before the
Ombudsman for grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, incompetence, and
inefficiency in the performance of official duties. Felix alleged that he submitted a
letter-request to Vitriolo requesting for a certification that, among other, PLM was
not authorized by CHED to implement the Expanded Tertiary Education Equivalent
Accreditation Program. However, Vitriolo prevented the issuance of said
certification. Additionally, Felix asserted that respondent colluded with Atty.
Garayblas, Acting President of PLM, Dr. Domingo, President of the PLM-NCPE
Alumni Association, and Atty. Palarca for the issuance of diplomas and transcripts of
records to bogus students of PLM. Accordingly, respondent should be held
administratively and criminally liable.
The Ombudsman held mediation conferences relative to Felix's First Complaint. At
the mediation conference on August 9, 2011, the parties reached an agreement
(August 9, 2011 agreement) whereby respondent endeavored to "act on [Felix's] May
21, 2010 and June 29, 2010 submissions and issue the necessary citations and
sanctions to PLM, for it to CEASE and DESIST all illegal academic programs x x
x."
Three (3) years later, or on June 30, 2014, Felix sent respondent a letter captioned
"Notice of Impending Legal Action" stating that despite their August 9, 2011
agreement, the latter tolerated the "diploma mill" of PLM, as CHED failed to
conduct any investigation or hearing regarding the same.
Dissatisfied, Felix filed the present complaint on June 30, 2015 charging respondent
with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, as well as violations of Sections 5 (a), (c), and (d) of
RA 6713 and Sections 3 (a), (e), and (f) of RA 3019,16 alleging that respondent has
not complied with the agreement.
OMBUDSMAN RULING: the Ombudsman (a) found probable cause to indict
respondent for violations of Sections 3 (a) and (e) of RA 3019; and (b) as regards the
administrative charges against respondent, found him guilty of violation of Sections
5 (a), (c) and (d) of RA 6713, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, inefficiency,
and incompetence, and accordingly, meted upon him the penalty of dismissal from
the service, with the corresponding accessory penalties.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CA: the CA upheld the Ombudsman’s ruling
holding respondent administratively liable but modified the penalty of suspension to
30 days pursuant to the Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
INTERVENTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN: As the Ombudsman was not
impleaded as respondent in the CA proceedings, it filed the Omnibus Motion seeking
to intervene in the case and consequently, the reversal of the CA ruling. However,
the CA denied the same in a Resolution, ruling that: (a) the Ombudsman, being the
administrative agency that rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in the
said appeal, and (b) its Omnibus Motion was filed out of time, having been filed only
on September 28, 2017 while the CA's Decision was promulgated on August 17,
2017; hence, this petition filed by the Ombudsman insisting that the Omnibus
Motion be granted and consequently, that it be allowed to intervene in the case and
seek the reversal of the CA ruling on respondent's administrative liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in denying the Ombudsman’s Omnibus
Motion.
After a meticulous review of the available records, however, the Court finds that
none of the excepting circumstances as above-enumerated obtain in this case; hence,
the general rule provided under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court applies.
Therefore, while the Ombudsman had legal interest to intervene in the proceedings in
CA-G.R. SP No. 149063, the CA correctly denied the intervention prayed for as
records show that the Omnibus Motion was filed only on September 28, 2017, or a
month after the promulgation of the CA's Decision on August 17, 2017.

RULING: while it is now settled doctrine that the Ombudsman has legal standing to
intervene in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases, it should, however,
move for intervention before rendition of judgment lest the same be denied,
unless warranted by certain excepting circumstances, which unfortunately do
not obtain herein. Consequently, the present petition must be denied, and since
intervention has been disallowed, there is no more need to delve into the merits of
the substantive arguments raised by the Ombudsman on respondent's administrative
liability.

The Court has already clarified in Ombudsman v. Bongais (Bongais) that the
Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in administrative cases
resolved by it. Even if not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, it has legal
interest to intervene and defend its ruling in administrative cases before the CA,
which interest proceeds from its duty to act as a champion. of the people and to
preserve the integrity of public service.

As it stands, therefore, the Ombudsman's legal standing to intervene in appeals from

its rulings in administrative cases has been settled and is the prevailing rule, in
accordance with the Court's pronouncement in Bongais, provided, that the
Ombudsman moves for intervention before rendition of judgment, pursuant to Rule
19 of the Rules of Court,36 lest its motion be denied.

The rule requiring intervention before rendition of judgment, however, is not

inflexible. Jurisprudence is replete with instances where intervention was allowed
even beyond the period prescribed in the Rules of Court when demanded by the
higher interest of justice; to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard; to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once
and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties; or, because of the grave legal
issues raised. Stated otherwise, the rule may be relaxed and intervention may be
allowed subject to the court's discretion after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances,37 for after all, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure
whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for
justice; its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.38